

**ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: CASES OF THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF CONGO AND SUDAN**

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**A THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
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RELATIONS**

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CERTIFICATION

The undersigned certify that they have read and hereby recommend for acceptance by The Open University of Tanzania a thesis entitled, **“Analysing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Case of in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan (Darfur)”**. In fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of Doctoral of Philosophy in International Relations of The Open University of Tanzania.

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.....

Signature

.....

Date

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my fellow Peacekeepers risking their lives for maintenance of peace.

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ABSTRACT

Africa is a major host of peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in the world following the deterioration of peace and security after the Cold War. PKOs in some conflict areas in the continent have been on the ground for over two decades. Against this backdrop, this study evaluated the effectiveness of the United Nations PKOs in two case studies in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan (Darfur). It addressed four specific objectives: a) to examine the origin and purpose of UNPKOs; b) to analyse the mode of operation and challenges faced by UNPKOs; c) to examine the effectiveness of UNPKOs, and d) to recommend strategies for greater effectiveness of the UNPKOs. The study was informed by the Political Economy theory. The theory's key assumption is that conflicts happen between social classes mainly for economic gains and their mitigation may be influenced by the gains. Data were collected from 100 respondents in Tanzania, DRC, and Sudan (Darfur) from 2019 to 2023. Findings show that PKOs have evolved from their traditional state to into robust PKOs. This research established that PKOs in Africa are largely ineffective especially in protecting civilians. The PKOs in DRC and Sudan (Darfur) qualify this finding. One challenge that limits the effectiveness of the PKOs is the unpredictable changes on the security environment from contests for economic gains in the areas of PKO operations. This study recommends that the UN and other stakeholders should revise their peacekeeping frameworks for the PKOs to have clearly defined and achievable mandates to respond to the complexities and changes in the conflict environment in Africa.

Keywords: *United Nations, Peacekeeping operations, Conflict, Protection of Civilians, Africa, Darfur, DRC, Armed Groups*

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADF-NALU	Allied Democratic Forces- National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AG	Armed groups
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
BCC	Budget Contributing to Countries
BERCI	<i>Bureau d'Etudes de Recherches et Consulting International</i> (International Research and Consulting Studies Office)
CAR	Central African Republic
CNDP	<i>Congrès <u>N</u>ational <u>P</u>our la <u>D</u>éfense du <u>P</u>euple</i> (National Congress for the Defense of the People)
CoW	Correlates of War
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDPD	Doha Document for Peace in Darfur
DLF	Darfur Liberation Front
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EACRF	East Africa Regional Force.

EASO	European Asylum Support Office
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ESPA	Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement
EU	European Union
FDLR	<i>Force Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda</i>
FIB	Force Intervention Brigade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HCFA	Humanitarian Cease Fire Agreement
HOO	Head of Office
HRDLS	Humanitarian Recovery Development and Liaison Section
IASC	Inter - Agency Standing Committee
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority for Development
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IHRL	International human rights law
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
M23	March 23
MONUC	<i>Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo</i> (UN Organization Mission in the DRC)

MONUSCO	<i>Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République <u>D</u>émocratique du Congo</i> (UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC)
NATO	Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation
ONUC	<i>Opération des Nations Unies au Congo</i> (United Nations Operation in the Congo)
PDI	Pre-deployment <u>I</u> nspection
PDT	Pre-deployment <u>T</u> raining
PKOs	Peacekeeping Operations
PMSC	Private Military and Security Companies
POBs	Permanent Operating Bases
POC	Protection of Civilians
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSCF	Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RDF	Rwanda Defence Forces
RED-TABARA	<i>Résistance pour un Etat de Droit</i> “RED-Tabara” (Resistance for a Rule of Law (RED-Tabara))
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SLA	Sudan Liberation Army
SOFA	Status of Force Agreement

SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations
TCCs	Troops Contributing Countries
TOBs	Temporary Operating Bases
TPDF	Tanzania Peoples Defence Forces
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	UN-AU hybrid Peacekeeping Mission in Darfur
UNAMIR	UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHRDDP	UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy
UNITAMS	UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan
UNJHRO	UN Joint Human Rights Office
UNPOL	UN Police
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General
UNSSS	UN Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
UPC	<i>Union des Patriotes Congolais</i> (Union of Congolese Patriots)
USA	United States of America
WW	World War

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

History shows that conflicts are part of the history of Africa (Mays, 2021). The period after the Cold War era is critical in the history. The intensification of violent conflicts in the African states marks the period. Some African states, including DRC and Sudan have been not settled from the 1990s. The conflicts range from civil and tribal wars to political contests over the control of governments and resources (Diehl, 1993).

The deployment of peace-keeping operations (PKOs) into war zones in Africa is common practice of the United Nations (UN) and regional and sub-regional bodies to resolve these internal conflicts. Africa has been the main host of PKOs in the world post-Cold War era (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000). PKOs would ideally be considered a temporary solution to change the violent behaviour of warring parties to provide room for negotiations, mediation, or litigation. This has not always been the case in many conflict areas on the continent. Some PKOs such as the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) have remained on the ground for over two decades and produced mixed results (Depla, 2015). This research studied issues related with the PKOs to make recommendations to improve their effectiveness for peace and security in Africa. The research also examined the decision-making processes towards the

humanitarian interventions in the conflicts in the cases DRC and the Sudan (Darfur) through UN PKOs.

1.2.1 Scope of the Study

This study is limited to the concept of peacekeeping operation and their applications on the actual ground in DRC, Darfur and any parts of the World where PKOs are conducted. My study is limited from the period between 1996 (commencement of the first Congo War) to 2023.

1.2.2 Justification of the Study

The significance of this study is derived from the fact that there has been little research or study on Peacekeeping Operations especially on its effectiveness in resolving conflicts. Thus, there is a need for a study of this nature which is expected to create new and unique knowledge that shall add to the existing body of academic and practical knowledge in the wider filed of PKOs. Also, the theory used in this study (Political Economy theory) will enhance theoretical understanding on how the theory may be applied in the areas of PKOs.

This chapter provides preliminary background information that defines the context of this research. The following section discusses the insecurities in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur) inciting the need for the United Nations peacekeeping interventions. The chapter also presents the statement of the problem, objectives of the study, research questions, its significance, scope, and the structure of the thesis.

1.3 Background to the Problem

The history of human interactions is never without conflicts, which often threaten the world security (Mays, 2021). The international community, regional organisations and respective countries have struggled to resolve conflicts amicably to redress the impact of destruction into a force of prosperity. The Cold War period (1947-1991) marked an increase of interstate conflicts (Norton & Weiss, 1991). Relations between countries were defined in relation to the allegiance of countries to either of the east and west ideological blocs for most of the countries in the world. The relationship between the countries was that of mistrust and suspicion. The end of the Cold War in 1991 signalled the end of the conflict. In contrast to the popular expectation that the world would be much safer in the post-Cold War era, there emerged new security challenges and intrastate conflicts especially in Africa (Mays, 2021). Countries including the now DRC, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Burundi and Central African Republic experienced security instability.

It then became necessary to put in place mechanisms to mitigate the conflicts. The UN had been formed in 1945 after the end of the Second World War (UN, 1945). Its main purpose was the maintenance of international peace and security. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) through UNPKOs has been considered the most effective of all UN instruments to redress intrastate conflicts around the world and reinforce the global peace and security (Mays, 2021).

The importance of PKOs has been acknowledged by most of the global leadership. The UN Peacekeeping functions was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition

of its achievements in 1988 for creating conditions for peaceful negotiations worldwide and preventing armed clashes (Norton & Weiss, 1991). Despite the overall success, most of PKOs have performed dismally, especially in Protection of Civilians (POC) particularly in Africa.

The DRC and the Sudan (Darfur) are cases of study in this research. They are among the African states with wars and conflicts. The unrests have disrupted the social, political, and economic systems and functions in the countries. Various actors have taken initiatives and continue to do so to help redress the effects of the upheavals. The initiatives include the deployment of UN PKOs, peace dialogues, mediation, and a full range of negotiations.

The history of violence in the DRC began shortly after the country's independence on 30 June 1960. Three days later, the Congolese Army mutinied (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2013). Katanga and South Kasai provinces waged secessionist concurrent feuds against the nascent Congo government (Vogel, 2011). The UN immediately deployed troops upon the request of the government in reaction to these incidents [(ONUC) (UN, 1960a)]. The UN force was then withdrawn from Congo by 30 June 1964 (Spooner, 2010). The plight of the DRC is perplexing given all actors in the conflicts in the country have had economic interests in their respective leadership positions. DRC is paradoxically the second poorest country in the world and among the world's richest in natural resources. Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002) related this to the political, security and economic conflicts that erupted soon after the country's independence. DRC continues to be weak in all aspects that define a state.

The second wave of deployment of PKOs in the DRC happened in 1999 during the first Congo War of 1996 to 1997 and the second Congo War of 1998 to 2003 (Rupiya, 2002; Kiteti, 2010). Deaths from both wars were estimated at 5.4 million people by 2019 and 3.4 million were estimated to be displaced (Global Security, 2019). A Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed in 1999 to end the war. Then the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was deployed in the country in 2000 under the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1258 (UN, 1999a). The UN reformed the mandate of MONUC in August 2010 following the DRC general elections of 2006 and renamed it the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the DRC [(MONUSCO) (Depla, 2015). A new rebel group branded M-23 erupted and became operational in eastern DRC in 2012 and caused further insecurity there (Depla, 2015). The Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) was deployed in March 2013 in response. The FIB constituted of military units from Tanzania, South Africa, and Malawi (UN, 2013c).

The PKOs have not been as effective in the DRC as expected as explained previously. The UN peacekeeping forces in DRC are some of the largest and most expensive in the world, yet violence is still characterised the country's socio-cultural fabric. The violence features murder, rape, torture, and other inhuman actions. Global Centre for Responsibility to Protect (2023) noted that over 2,400 people were murdered from January to December 2022, which is approximately double the number of deaths in 2021. Many have questioned the ability of MONUSCO to protect civilians at risk in DRC (Clark, 2011).

Likewise, the current crisis in Darfur Sudan (Darfur) began in February 2003 as insurgence against the Sudanese government in Khartoum. The conflict is galvanised by the people's economic and political marginalisation, unequal and unrepresentative sharing of scarce resources and general resource ownership. The latter particularly concerns land. The resulting landscape fomented the emergence of various rebel groups. Two of these are the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). These waged a guerrilla warfare against the Sudanese government in Darfur in 2003 (Allen, 2010). The government attacked civilian populations in response using groups of militias known as the Janjaweed (De Waal, 2007). An estimated 30,000 civilians lost their lives, over one million people were internally displaced, and over 20,000 became refugees in camps in the neighbouring Chad (Allen, 2010). The United Nations, the African Union (AU), and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) took initiatives to address the matter, which included peace talks that comprised the conflicting parties and ceasefire agreement (Flint, and De Waal, 2008). The African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) was then deployed in Darfur on 28 May 2004 to monitor compliance with the agreement (Flint, and De Waal, 2008). The AMIS faced operational, financial, and logistical obstacles, and thus could not affect its mandate (UN, 2007b). The UN then deployed the joint United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to replace the AMIS in 2007 (Lugman, 2012). UNAMID was one of the largest UN missions in 2019/20, with a budget of US\$ 257,970,000 (UN, 2019b). This fund was one-eighth of the entire budget of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) (UN, 2019b).

The UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2559 of 2020 on 22 December 2020 to end the UNAMID mandate on 31 December 2020 (UN, 2021). This was despite that the conflict in Darfur had not been resolved (UN, 2021). Then UNSC formed the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS) to replace UNAMID with UNSCR 2524 of 2020 (UN, 2020j). This was to support the political transition, peace processes and implementation of future peace agreements, and to support efforts to bring peace and the rule of law (UN, 2020j).

Guns are not fully silent in Darfur. On 16 January 2021, two weeks after the closure of UNAMID, 150 people were killed, more than 190 injured, and about 50,000 displaced after Arab militia attacked Massalit residents in Al-Genaina city (HRW, 2021). Also, conflicts within the new transitional government destabilised it. In addition, a coup on 25 October 2021 complicated the security situation in Darfur. The government concentrated its efforts in containing the situation in Khartoum and paid little attention to the Juba agreement (OCHA, 2021). Security in Darfur continues to be unpredictable (UN, 2021c). Intercommunal violence and violations of human rights have continued and caused 250 deaths and displaced more than 100,000 civilians.

The sited cases of DRC and Sudan (Darfur) exemplify the conflict landscape in post-Cold war Africa. It can be thus deduced that conflicts have been occurring. Secondly, and that UN and other actors have followed with courses of action to reinstall peace. Thirdly, the UN has been withdrawing its forces before peace and

stability is fully in place with the example of Sudan (Darfur). Fourthly, the UN and partner interventions have yielded limited resources to PKOs especially in Africa. Violence is still characteristic and, in some cases, has escalated, featuring murder, rape, torture, and other humane behaviours. People express their dismay by organising violent demonstrations against UN forces to express dissatisfaction with the PKOs particularly in the eastern DRC. The UN's premature withdrawal of the PKOs may contribute to the popular dissatisfaction. For example, records show that the security in Darfur has worsened after the UN decided to end its mission in Darfur on 31 December 2020.

The repeated ineffectual performance of the UN PKOs in peace and security enforcement has raised many questions among academics and practitioners in the field of peace and security (Thakur, Schnabel, & Schnabel, 2001). The critical questions include: a) How can and should the basic principles of peacekeeping be applied to the cases in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur)? b) To what extent have the UNPKOs been successful in the DRC and Darfur? c) Why has the UN been late or reluctant to respond to humanitarian suffering in the DRC and the Sudan? d) How can the situation in the DRC and Sudan be evaluated against the principles of humanitarian interventions in events of intrastate conflicts?

To answer these and other questions the study analysed the effectiveness of UN PKOs in Africa by comparing those in DRC and the Sudan (Darfur). The role, impact, and effectiveness of PKOs in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur) were selected considering that the two locations are in Africa and have had large, complex, and

expensive UN peacekeeping forces and operations. The PKOs in the DRC are still at work while those in the Sudan (Darfur) folded their operations in 2020.

1.4 Statement of the Problem

There have been multiple UNPKOs in DRC and Sudan (Darfur) up to the recent years. Some of these have been the largest and most expensive in Africa. Such interventions are expected to affect significant peace and stability in the conflict zones. The state of art of the security and humanitarian welfare in the regions is however a paradox. DRC remains unstable and security is worsening. The violence and murder of civilians in the eastern part of the country have remained pervasive. Offensives by armed groups have exacerbated the ongoing humanitarian crisis given the country already has the highest number of internally displaced people than anywhere on the African continent. Likewise, the UN and the AU organized the UNAMID joint mission in Darfur in the period 2007 to 2020. This was the largest and most expensive mission in the history of peacekeeping. It deployed 17,308 troops and demanded an annual budget of US\$1.82 billion. The mission ended in 2020, and despite its size and budget, the country is still fragile, and peace has not restored. The reliability upon UNPKOs to protect civilians with impending risks in conflict regions is generally questionable.

Against this puzzling backdrop, this research is informed by the perspective of political economy and analyses the effectiveness of UNPKOs in DRC and the Sudan (Darfur). These conflict regions represent the general conflict landscape in Africa. This study focuses on the need to protect civilians as the key measure of the

effectiveness of PKOs. It concentrates on the effectiveness because PKOs constitute the most significant peace support operations. These are engaged to mainly lay the foundation for lasting peace and security worldwide. The study of the effectiveness of PKOs in Africa has become important due to mixed results of the UNPKOs in DRC and Sudan (Darfur).

1.5 Objectives of the Study

1.5.1 Main Objective

The main objective of this study was to analyse the effectiveness of UNPKOs in Africa with the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur) being cases of study.

1.5.2 Specific Objectives

The main objective was met through engagement of the following operational objectives:

- i) To examine the origin and purpose of UNPKOs deployed in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur);
- ii) To analyse the mode of operations and challenges faced by the UNPKOs in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur);
- iii) To examine the effectiveness of UNPKOs in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur);
- iv) To develop and recommend strategies to enable the UNPKOs to operate more effectively and fulfil their mandate.

1.5.3 Research Questions

The study was guided by the following research questions that scholars and practitioners of peace ask in relation to UN PKOs:

- i) What was the origin and purpose for which the UN created and deployed PKOs in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur)?
- ii) What were the modes of operation and challenges to the UNPKOs in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur)?
- iii) How effective were the UNPKOs been in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur)?
- iv) What were strategies should the UNPKOs deploy for the effective discharge of their mandate?

1.6 Significance of the Study

A study of the effectiveness of PKOs in Africa has become imperative due to the failure of their UN variants to resolve conflicts effectively in Africa. This study and its focus on PKOs in African conflict settings are important to discern and comprehend the conditions that premeditate the conflicts. They are also lay down a possible means to redress them and pre-empt future conflicts.

This study concentrates on the effectiveness of PKOs because they are the most significant peace support operations. They lay the foundation for the global peace and security. The findings are expected to inform policy makers and actors in matters of peace and security in the UN, AU, international NGOs, countries of origin of troops, and peacekeepers on means to make PKOs more effective. The findings are also expected to support conflicting nations, in this case African countries, to

develop policies and strategies that prioritise effective co-operation with all actors that promote and consolidate peace and security worldwide.

1.7 Organization of the Dissertation

This study sought to understand the effectiveness of UNPKOs in Africa using those in DRC and Sudan (Darfur) as case of study. The dissertation is organised in eight chapters. Chapter one introduces the research with a brief historical background of the establishment of the UN and its role. The chapter explains about the organization of peacekeeping activities globally, and the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur) in particular. This chapter also provides the statement of the problem, the objectives of the study and key research questions to guide this research. It also rationalises this research by explaining its significance.

Chapter two is devoted to review literature of peacekeeping-related research as well as about the UN itself. The review includes studies and experience in African peacekeeping missions in the DRC, and the Sudan (Darfur) as part of PKOs practice. This chapter also introduces the key concepts and terminologies used, it brought the theory used in the study, and it has identified the existing research gaps which this study intends to fill. The whole argument is intended to provide an appropriate base on how best African UNKPOs can be better resourced, otherwise empowered and used to effectively establish lasting peace in Africa and indeed elsewhere. The chapter ends by providing the conceptual framework which identifies variables for use in a study and the relationships among them.

Chapter three provides the details of methods adopted in operationalizing the study.

The study adopted qualitative research design, based on both primary and secondary sources of information and data. The research design seeks to address the theme of the study, namely the effectiveness of UNPKOs in resolving conflicts intra conflicts in Africa. The chapter provides the framework and instruments of data collection, data organization and analysis and limitations of the study.

Chapter four presents the findings of the study in sequence of the research objectives and questions that were presented in Chapter One. It also presents findings of the questions raised by the searcher in chapter one. On the same, chapter five presents discussion of the research findings in the sequence they are presented in Chapter four. It will analyse and discuss in detail all the findings given in chapter four in collaboration with other studies on similar area of PKOs. The chapter also discusses the questions raised by the researcher in chapter one.

Chapter six presents the summary of the findings, the conclusions and recommendations for action and further research. The chapter also presents the contributions of the study to knowledge. The dissertation is concluded with a list of references which strengthened the report as well as appendices of research tools and other documents felt necessary to support the report.

1.8 Summary

The period of Cold war and post-cold war was a period of armed conflicts because of mistrusts between nations built from ideological. As such there has been national, regional, and international efforts to restore and enforce peace using different tolls

including the use PKOs. DRC and Sudan (Darfur) have had UN PKOs and regional PKOs which at times were among the largest and expensive Missions in the World. However, they have been ineffective as such there is still unrest and human suffering are on increase. There are different reasons for that, national interests, lack of resources and lack political will are among the factors that hinders its effectiveness. Therefore, this dissertation has been done to analyse the effectiveness of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations bay using the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan (Darfur) as cases.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is a review synthesis of existing literature on peace, security, and the role of UNPKOs. It provides a summary of findings of similar studies to understand maintenance of global peace and security. It provides the knowledge base and identifies existing trends and current developments in the areas of peace, security, and peacekeeping efforts. The chapter includes key definitions, a review of the roles of PKOs in Africa to date, and the theoretical framework guiding the study. It also qualifies research gap this study is undertaken to fill and presents the conceptual framework of the study.

2.2 Definitions of Concepts and Terminologies

It is important to understand the main concepts, terms and terminologies used in this study to develop a common understanding of the key issues for research, discussion, and reporting. For example, it is important to understand what peace and peacekeeping mean in the context of this research, and the difference between armed and civilian peacekeeping.

There has been a debate on the meaning and scope of “peace and security” in the theory and practice of International Relations with no significant consensus. Tavares, Hettne, and Stadtmüller (2007) note that both concepts are used regularly and interchangeably. This has prompted several definitions which require

clarification in this study. The sections hereinafter explain these and other terms and concepts in relation to their uses in the study.

2.1.1 Peace

The concept of peace has been debated in relation to the state of affairs, and issues on the ground over time. Francis (2010) discusses peace as constructive, nonviolent conflict and peaceful relationships in the field of conflict transformation. This contrasts the notion of peace among the traditional political realists, who consider it as a state of tranquillity, security and social and economic stability in a given geopolitical jurisdiction. Han (1992), a Buddhist monk conversely describes peace as a manner of taking progressive steps towards stable existence in a state or community rather than it being a goal or an end of a path. Han (1992) determines that peace is constructed iteratively through the processes we engage in. The means and ends are not separated. The process of war is incompatible with the end result of peace. Therefore, to Han peace cannot be achieved through war.

Galtung (1996) defined peace as the absence of violence, and that it is dichotomous. One side is the negative peace and the other positive. The former is simply considered the absence of war the latter includes a vision of a more just society. The society features co-operation and conflict transformation mechanisms, and absence of all forms of violence (Galtung,1996). This study adopts this definition of peace and means as such in any place it is mentioned in it.

2.1.2 Peacekeeping

PKOs is a concept that is complex and hard to define and may therefore mean

different when various persons explained it (Dawson, 2004). Onumajuru (2005) considers the UN PKOs are impartial interventions by UN peacekeeping forces in a conflict situation aimed to create a buffer between warring factions. Onoja (2008) confines PKOs into a practical mechanism developed by the UN to contain and control armed conflicts and facilitate their resolution by peaceful means. Hillen (1998), Fortna (2008) and Howard (2008) limit the meaning of PKOs into efforts to prevent the recurrence of conflict after a ceasefire has taken place. Studies including that of Findlay (2002) have used the meaning of PKOs to embrace both peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations.

The UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld defined PKOs as the “Chapter Six and a half”, referring to a relevant chapter of the UN charter (Hillen, 1994). This means that PKOs are founded between peaceful resolution without using force (Chapter VI) and the use of force (Chapter VII). Some scholars restrict the meaning of PKOs to include only the UN peacekeeping (Rikhye, 1984) while others, such as Bellamy and Williams (2014), include peacekeeping enforcement by other actors such as regional organisations or coalitions of states. Such missions must first be authorised by the UN in any case.

Diehl (1988) provides a more comprehensive meaning of traditional PKOs. Diehl states that PKOs refer to the deployment of neutral and lightly armed interposition forces following a cessation of armed conflicts in an area, and with the permission of the state on whose territory the forces are deployed. This is an effort to discourage a restart of military conflict, and also done to promote an environment to resolve

underlying disputes. Diehl (1993) determines three basic principles of traditional PKOs, which are consent, impartiality, and use of minimum forces except for self-defence. This study adopts Diehl (1988) definition and meaning of PKOs and therefore all mentions of PKOs in this research refer to this definition.

2.1.3 Protection of Civilians (POC)

POC is principally an activity that is integrated and coordinated by civilians and uniformed mission components within the mission's capabilities and areas of deployment. All necessary means are used to protect civilians, including using deadly force to protect those under imminent threat (UN, 2020f). The main goal of any PKOs according to the UNSCR is the Protection of Civilians (POC). Almost all mandates of PKOs have a component of POC. The UN (2022b) provides that POC is the responsibility of all parties in PKOs. The parties include civilians, military, and police units (2022b).

Peacekeeping missions are in many cases authorised to use all necessary means including deadly force to prevent or respond to threats of physical violence against civilians (UN, 2020f). This is done within the capabilities and areas of operations of the PKOs but without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government (UN, 2020f). The mission will carry out a full range of activities depending on the nature of the threat (UN, 2022b). These include engaging with parties to the conflict and affected communities, providing physical protection and establishment of a clearly protective environment (UN, 2022b).

2.1.4 Armed Groups

Krause & Milliken (2009) state that armed groups (AGs) are the weaponized wing of a non-state party to a non-international armed conflict. Armed groups may comprise dissident armed forces, or other organized AGs that recruit their members from civilian populations. AGs must have developed sufficient degree of military organisation to conduct hostilities on behalf of the party to the conflict to which they affiliate. AGs are basically the militia wing of a non-state party to a non-international armed conflict. It does not include those segments of civilian populations that support non-state parties such as political wings (Krause & Milliken, 2009).

2.1.5 Mandate

In the context of the UN, mandate refers to the decision that gives a body authority to carry out its functions such as the formation of a subsidiary organ, formation of peacekeeping missions, and establishment of a secretariat, office, or division. (UN, 2022a). A UN Mandate also refers to a long-term international mission which has been authorized by the UN General Assembly (GA) or the UN Security Council (SC) in particular (UN, 2022a). UN mandates typically involve PKOs (UN, 2022a). Matlary (2004) states that PKOs are traditionally always deployed basing on the mandate given by the UNSC, which prescribes and assigns the PKOs different tasks. The mandate of one PKO may differ from another basing on the tasks to be performed. The mandates may be expanded depending on the changes of the security situation in the field. There is considerable degree of consistency in the

types of mandates and tasks the Security Council assign to PKOs despite the difference of the UN operations they attend (Matlary, 2004).

2.3 Empirical Literature Review

The UN was established principally to maintain international peace and security (UN, 1945). It has been instrumental in bringing about global peace. It has done so using various instruments including diplomacy, PKOs, laws, sanctions, and many kinds of negotiations (UN, 1945). The UNSC through PKOs has been the most effective way of forging global peace and security and especially so in Africa (Adebajo & Landsberg 2000). The importance of PKOs has been acknowledged by most of the leaders in the world. Autesserre (2019) suggests the peacekeepers have been and still are the “go-to solution” whenever a conflict erupts in the world. PKOs have been hailed for their effectiveness in “ending conflicts and fostering reconciliation in dozens of countries” (UN, 2019a). The UN Peacekeeping function was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988 recognition for preventing armed clashes and creating conditions for peaceful negotiations worldwide (Norton & Weiss, 1991). This is despite PKOs’ various limitations where they are staged, not the least in DRC and Darfur.

Basically, PKOs as seen today were not foreseen as a means of resolving conflicts during the founding of the UN (Hillen, 1998). Article 43 to 47 of the UN Charter provides for the establishment of UN Military Staff Committee in case of a need for the UN intervention in conflicts (UN, 1945). The committee never worked as envisaged nevertheless, largely because of the Cold War. The question remained how

the UN adopted PKOs, which was not explicitly provided for in the UN Charter. Scholars including Oliveira (2016) and Suy (1988) argue that establishing PKOs is legally questionable as it goes contrary to the original Charter of the UN.

The legal basis for the operations of peacekeeping is found in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter (UN, 1945). While Chapter VI deals with the “peaceful settlement of disputes”, Chapter VII has provisions on “actions relating to peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression”. Chapter VIII of the Charter provides for the involvement of regional arrangements and agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security. Oliveira (2016) and Brahimi (2000) argue that the era of chapter VI has ended and thus all related operations need to be conducted under chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Several studies have been conducted to trace the history of PKOs. Howard (2008) traces their origin as far back as the Delian League of ancient Greece in the fifth century, when there were initiatives to prevent recurrence of wars. Tomuschat (1995) states that peacekeeping was introduced by the League of Nations. The Covenant of the League obliged all member states to not resort to war. Part of the reason for the failure of peacekeeping explains the inefficiency of the League, further debased by the eruption of the Second World War (Serafino, 2005). Liu (1994) traces the origin of PKOs to during UN monitoring missions such UN Special Committee on Balkans (UNSCOB) and UN Consular Commission (UNCC) in Indonesia, both founded in 1947.

The first peacekeeping deployment was the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) during the Arab - Israeli crisis of 1948, and shortly followed by the UN Military Observer Group deployed between India and Pakistan on 1949 (Bellamy & Williams, 2014). Hillen (1998) considers the first UN Operation that qualifies as an UN PKO is the UN Emergency Force 1 (UNEF - 1) of 1956. This is because the troops carried weapons for the first time in PKOs. This mission was deployed during the Suez Crisis to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement that signed between Egypt and Israel.

Increased security challenges against the peacekeepers helped PKOs evolve (Findlay, 2002; Mingst, 2004 & Howard, 2008). A new concept emerged, which transformed peacekeepers into being more robust and aggressive (Gibbs, 2000). This contrasted the traditional peacekeeping principles, which emphasised neutral and lightly armed peacekeepers (Gibbs, 2000). However, Oliveira (2016) and Suy (1988) argue that the evolution of the UN peacekeeping from observer missions to robust operations (peace enforcement) has questionable legal basis. It challenges the traditional peacekeeping principles and is against the provisions of the UN Charter (Oliveira, 2016). MONUSCO's robustness and its inclusion of Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) with artillery, special forces, helicopters, and its offensive operations against AGs is wrong under the traditional PKOs principles (Muller, 2015). It effects the perception that the UN is not heeding the principle of impartiality anymore (Muller, 2015).

The evolution of PKOs towards more robust has been argued as a violation of the

principles of PKOs. In reality, the principles of peacekeeping that Diehl (1993) attributes were already challenged in the period during the Cold War and especially when the UN deployed the ONUC and mandated it to use force in two instances: to prevent the outbreak of civil war, and act against foreign mercenaries (UN, 1960a). Findlay (2002) amplifies this, pointing that the security challenges to date were could not be determined when the UN Charter was drafted in 1945. It is thus difficult for those principles to be adequate to meet the challenges and trends. The only feasible way is to amend the Charter as would be for any constitution. Also, the UN Charter is flexible but very difficult to amend given the divergent positions of and divisions among the members of the UN Security Council (Findlay, 2002).

In consonance with the argument for use of force, there is the question of peace enforcement and whether it should be the UN or non-UN actors that should legitimately be authorised to act towards it. Finnemore (2019) wrote on the evolution of traditional peacekeeping and why it was a common means of resolving conflicts and not peace enforcement. That given its sensitivity, the UN itself and not any other actor should undertake enforcement upon demand. Scholars such as Von Hippel (2000), Howards (2008), and Dobbins et al. (2003) support peace enforcement but argue that any actor, UN or non-UN, may undertake enforcement missions.

About 95% of the PKO budget is covered by the five permanent members of the UNSC which are all developed countries (Bobrow & Boyer, 1997). It is argued they use their lion's share of contribution to dominate the decisions on PKOs. De Coning (2021), Gibbs (1997), De Jonge Oudraat (1996), Jakobsen (1996) and Durch (1993)

claim that the ultimate decisions on where, how and under what strength the UN should or not deploy PKOs rest to them. Andersson (2000), Paris (2004) and Marten (2004) believe the deployment of PKOs should depend on the need of international community to transform war-torn societies into democratic ones.

It has also been debated why permanent members of UNSC (P5) contribute fewer troops in PKOs. Yun (2015) and Jett (2000) opine that the P5 are worried and do not wish to risk their troops in increasingly complex conflicts in Africa. This is especially following the lessons of the US debacle in the Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia in 1993. On a different note, Albright, Lake and Clark (1995) argue that the positions of the big nations are always driven by interests when participating in PKOs. Moreover, troops from the P5 and other developed countries tend to be too costly to maintain compared to those from developing countries (Bobrow & Boyer, 1997). Also, regional PKOs in Africa are more likely to succeed in overseeing peacekeeping due to their functional local knowledge in the conflict zones of African context (Mutisi, 2016) or their closeness to the scene from their countries of origin or domicile (Wallenstein & Heldt 2020). The hitches with the regional PKOs are, they lack resources (Mutisi, 2016), they lack neutrality (MacQueen, 2006 and Berman, Sams and Institute for Security Studies, 2000: 24), and the mistrust among African leaders including the low capacity of the AU (Albert, 2007).

Scholars have debated the effectiveness of PKOs, which is a major focus of this study. Effectiveness is the extent to which objectives are attained (Featherson, 2000). It is thus crucial to develop an understanding on what constitutes effectiveness (i.e.,

success or failure). Diehl (1993) identifies two criteria to evaluate the effectiveness of PKOs: limiting conflict and promoting conflict resolution. However, Johansen (1994) critiques this perspective. Johansen argues that limiting the evaluation to conflict containment alone sometimes limits the appreciation only to negative peace or absence of war (Johansen, 1994). Johansen considers that the evaluation of PKOs should be based on their contribution to values including reduction of human suffering and promotion and enhancement of justice and peace. Diehl (1988) suggests two variables to determine the success of PKOs: limiting the armed conflict and peaceful resolution of underlying conflict (Hampson, 1996). Fortna (2008) suggests compliance with ceasefire as the most effective tool in the assessment.

Doyle & Sambanis (2000) critique Fortna's (2008) approach, stating that ceasefire alone cannot guarantee positive peace. They suggested the accomplishment of the given mandate as the main tool to assess the effectiveness of PKOs. Brown (1996) proposes that the fulfilment of mandate, reduction of conflict and facilitation of peaceful resolution should be the main tools of the assessment. This complements Blair, Di Salvatore and Smidt (2022), who opine that the fragmented mandates hinder PKOs from pursuing their mandated tasks.

Druckman et al. (1997) assert that the fulfilment of the mandate has been a fundamental goal of every PKO, and so this can be used to assess the effectiveness of PKOs. There can be no PKO without a mandate. Therefore, the criterion of fulfilment of mandate suits for use to assess the effectiveness of PKOs. However, the mandate of each mission differs and features many details of tasks. Therefore, it

becomes difficult to this criterion as a sole tool to assess the effectiveness of all PKOs. For objectivity therefore, the mandate as a criterion of assessment needs to be narrowed down to only include the variable of ‘the elimination of all possible threat to civilians who are under imminent threats’ (Protection of Civilian - POC). This refocused criterion is a credible measure to assess the effectiveness of PKOs. The definition of POC is given in section 2.2.

Therefore, POC is the main focus in this study in assessing the effectiveness of PKOs in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur). This context is also suggested by other scholars such as Holt & Berkman (2006). POC has unambiguous directives and has been the main focus of about 98% of PKOs’ mandates. Also, POC is a priority in terms of allocation of resources and capabilities. The prevention of war, support for development, advocating for international legal principles and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) processes are within the ambit of POC (Holt & Berkman, 2006).

The effectiveness of PKOs, and especially POC has been challenged. Adebajo and Landsberg (2000) noted that most UN missions in Africa have been failing, specifically those in Somalia and Rwanda on the area of POC. The overall lacklustre performance of the UN missions arises concern of the uncertainty of PKOs in Africa. Studies titled ‘Why Peacekeeping fails’ (Jett, 2000); ‘Peacekeeping Fiascos’ (Fleitz & Fleitz Jr, 2002), ‘Peacekeeping in the Abyss’ (Cassidy, Cassidy & Press, 2004), and a popular journal article ‘Give War a Chance’ (Luttwak, 1999) exemplify the PKO failures. The 1990s were when the UN was roundly criticised, and

consequently its reputation and prestige eroded. It is not a surprise then that the UN deployed very few new PKOs till 1999, only to increase them after the Brahimi report of 2000. The report made recommendations to reform PKOs and strengthen the UN's capacity to undertake a wide variety of missions.

PKOs in DRC and Darfur, the case areas of this study were characteristically identical (Obasanjo & Mills, 2014). The Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs) were mainly the developing countries, but MONUSCO had at least some personnel from the developed countries (Morrison, Kiras, & Fraser, 1997). The conflicts that the missions handled were catalysed by economic gains, power struggle, marginalisation of groups of people, and uneven distributions of natural resources. The actors in both conflicts appeared similar although they had different incentives. The difference in the performance of the PKOs based on levels of co-operation and integration with humanitarian agencies. The PKOs in the DRC (MONUC/MONUSCO) were less integrated with humanitarian agencies than those under UNAMID (Morrison, Kiras, & Fraser, 1997).

Both missions in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur) had dismal results in the POC (UN, 2019a; Durch, 1993). Reasons for the poor performance included lack of resources to back the missions, and lack of political will (Durch, 1993). The choice of approaches fitting respective circumstances also matter. Conflicts differ, and so the possible solutions to the conflicts should also vary (Rodriguez, 2018; Lanz, 2015; De Coning, Lotze & Stensland, 2011). The reasons for conflict in Sudan (Darfur) has been equal

political and economic opportunity, and that DRC conflict is basically government control over natural resources, especially minerals.

The resource crunch to PKOs shows biasness and is not evenly distributed. Novosseloff (2019) argues that PKOs in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur) have been deployed with pocket money. The P5 has indicated no interest in PKOs, which gives the impression that the UN is biased in the deployment of troops especially in Africa. Novosseloff (2019) argues that in 2009 the DRC had one soldier every 100 square kilometres while in Kosovo the ratio was 3.9 soldiers per square kilometres. With a measure of dollar and personnel per unit area of operation, the missions in Africa are under-resourced.

There is debate on the attenuation of hostilities where PKOs have been deployed. Regan (2002) found that a neutral third-party intervention, and especially that of the international community extends the duration of intrastate hostilities. The exception is if the intervention is biased against one of the opponents (Regan, 2002). This relates to the observation of Diehl, Reifschneider and Hensel (1996), who concluded that UN intervention was no better than non-intervention in ending hostilities in interstate crises. Empirical tests of the effects of PKOs in intrastate conflicts have produced different conclusions to different tools and methodologies used in the tests. For example, Haas, Butterworth, and Nye (1972) and Haas (1986) found that UN PKOs help to effect peace in locations of intrastate conflicts (See also Fortna, 2004). Wilkenfeld and Brecher (1984) concluded that UN interventions have cannot moderate recurrences of hostilities, meaning the UN is good at making peace but not

at keeping peace (Wilkenfeld & Brecher, 1984 and Diehl, Reifschneider, & Hensel, 1996). Autesserre (2019) argues that PKOs fail to mitigate conflicts in areas they have been deployed. That PKOs fail because the appointed commanders of the forces have not been free to deploy their operational professionalism to enforce peace in the areas they are designated (Autesserre, 2019).

Dorussen & Gizelis (2017) argue that PKOs help to reduce the duration of hostilities in intrastate conflicts. Gillgan and Sargent (2008) point out that 85% of UN PKOs have resulted in protracted periods of peace or shortened periods of conflict. However, not all PKOs have the same effect in reducing the duration of hostilities. Doyle & Sambanis (2000) note that traditional PKOs with a weak mandate, and with unarmed or lightly armed peacekeepers cannot not contract the duration of hostilities. Otherwise, PKOs with a strong mandate, that which allow the rule of military professionalism, and with multidimensional enforcement capabilities effect durable peace (Doyle & Sambanis, 2007).

Another argument relates to the effects of PKOs on democratisation, a key goal of any UN PKOs (Anderson, 2000). The effectiveness of PKOs in fostering democracy has been contested in literature. Wantchekon (2004) argues that PKOs provide conditions for democracy in a country emerging from civil war. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) and Heldt (2004) state that PKOs support transition to democracy and facilitate elections. Autesserre (2019) differs however, stating that pushing for elections before the country is ready may do more harm than good, increasing possibilities of creating new political crises.

There is argument on the legality of UN interventions, especially the concept of responsibility to Protect (R2P). The arrangement is against Article 2.7 of the UN Charter (non-Intervention to internal matters of any state) (Thakur, 2018). It is also argued that Chapter 7 (article 41 and 42) of the UN Charter authorise the SC to take any measure necessary to maintain and restore peace and security against any threat to them, including acts of aggression.

There is also an argument on the masculinity factor in peacekeeping operations. Women are mostly required to take part in PKOs because the most affected people in conflict are women and children. These women suit to interact with their fellow women peacekeepers than men (Puechguirbal, 2010). The UN (1993) sees the importance of women participation in PKOs because of that, and a target has been set to have 15% as women peacekeepers by 2028. There is a counter-position that PKOs in general see women as a protected group and thus cannot take part in the otherwise interventionist PKOs (Puechguirbal, 2010). In any case, the decisions relating to the deployment of women rest on the countries contributing troops in the PKOs.

2.4 Theoretical Framework

There are many theories scholars use in relation to PKOs. They include Liberal Peace Theory (Paris, 2004), Cosmopolitanism and Peace Operations Theory (Björkdahl, 2005), and Critical Theory (Cox, 1981). However, the interest of this study is determining the effectiveness of PKOs and how competing interests in interstate conflicts. Therefore, the postulations of political economy theory inform the analysis of the study. The political economy theory was developed by William

Stanley Jevons (Jevons & Black 1970) and supported by scholars such as Collier (2000), Collier & Anke (2002), Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) and Wennmann (2007). These share similar assumptions as those by Jevons.

The political economy theory is guided by five key assumptions. The first is competition. The theorists believe competition has been present for as long as human beings have interacted. Competition results from scarcity of resources including commodities, money, and other material resources. Competition may also be for intangible resources such as political power, leisure, and dominance. The second factor is revolution whereby, theorists think conflicts happen between social classes because of related economic gains. One outcome of the conflict is revolution. The change of power and dynamism between groups does not happen as the result of adaptation. It is the effect of conflict between the groups and always the result of economic gains of some over the others. The third factor is structural inequality. In here, few people or groups in a society tend to become more powerful than others. They are usually inclined to incite fights to retain their power. The fourth factor is war. It is used as a 'unifier' or 'cleanser' of societies. Here war is seen as a result of growing conflicts among individual, groups or the whole societies. The final assumption is economic interests. Theorists consider that economic interests attract to the conflict's interventions of actors such as international community, regional organisations, states, and non-state actors including criminal gangs. These are sometimes contracted by the parties to the conflicts. The interventionists are motivated mostly by economic self-interests. They take advantage of the confusion

within a country resulting from the conflict within it for their economic and other gains.

The political economy theory is associated with other theories such as the greedy-rebellion theory and ethnic defection theory (Collier & Hoeffler, 2006). In the greedy-rebellion theory, profit from extortions in conflict areas fuel the initiation and sustenance of violent conflicts and ethnic defections. This occurs as a reaction to economic and political discernment, which affects some groups unfavourably in the society.

The evolution of political economy theory to explain conflict is traced to Karl Marx (Marx, 2010), and Max Weber (Weber, 2019). They analysed conflicts in relation to economic ramifications. Marx (2010) asserts that competition for limited resources is often the source of conflicts in societies as human beings tend to fight for their survival. Karl Marx adds that in most cases order in society is the result of domination and power, not agreement and conformity. Those benefiting from resources and those in power commit to maintain their status by overwhelming the poor and powerless. Conflict theory evolved to link with various social phenomena in society including revolutions, wars, wealth, economy, and inequality. Weber, (2019) refined Marx's conflict theory and added that conflicts within society may be the source of solidarity within in the society and that politics govern the whole process of conflict and its mitigations. Conflict theories of 20th and 21st centuries have expanded the links to the theory beyond those of Karl Marx and Max Weber. The link with politics and economy were established. Scholars such as Jevons and

Black (1970), Collier & Anke (2002), Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) and Wennmann (2007) articulated the direct link between conflict and economy. This birthed the political economy theory.

Political economy theory in this study can be applied twofold: understanding the source (occurrence) of conflicts, and their mitigation (role and effectiveness of PKOs). Faleti (2006) references sources of conflicts and notes that human beings have tendency to fight over material things. Conflicts are additionally instigated by few people competing for valuable natural resources such as oil and minerals. Mitra and Ray (2014) note that continuation of conflict and its transcendence into war will only be possible if the warring parties are financially capable of procuring weapons and maintaining their forces.

The intensification and continuation of conflicts including those motivated by genuine grievances will only be possible if parties thereto are financially supported. Genuine grievances include those of struggle for political power. The political economy theory generalises that civil wars or other forms of conflicts supported with natural resources are likely to last long because instigators deviate from peace processes (Charles & Osah, 2018). No violent struggle can survive without resources that pay for its costly expenses and other needs. This relates to the conflicts to date in DRC. Most of the actors to conflicts in DRC conflict have a motive for resources in the country. Similar is the case in Sudan (Darfur). The conflict in the Sudan (Darfur) is between tribes and ethnic societies each with desire to control resources (Allen, 2010). Largely due to erratic rainfall, pest

infestation and the lack of agricultural inputs, production in all sectors in Darfur is minimal. Livestock has also declined from shortage of pasture and drinking water. Resource scarcity in Darfur is local. The scarcity in DRC is conceptually global. Ikelegbe (2005) asserts that the local abundance of natural resources is the main cause of most rebellions and wars. These locally available resources are scarce globally and thus are in demand. Instigators from within and without the country disguise their economic agenda as some social or political grievances to legitimise conflicts and claims to the resources to feed established supply chains. DRC a case in which conflicts base on the need of a few to control the precious natural resources.

The abundant natural resources in the DRC in substantial global demand is the main cause of rebellions and wars in the country from its independence. The neighbouring countries, armed groups, warlords and insurgents in the DRC are instigating conflicts for resource opportunities. Spittaels, Hilgert and International Peace Information Service (2008) point out that Rwanda and Uganda have instigated conflicts in the DRC and used them to exploit resources using affiliated AGs or people they used to penetrate local systems. Rebellious wars are sustained by war economies and related trade networks. Violence is rampant given many actors in the conflict fight for economic opportunities. Militia and other AGs are created as a result of this. Human greed and the need of conflict entrepreneurs for economic gain galvanise the conflicts and wars (Collier, 2000).

Collier & Hoeffler (2007) point out that civil wars are caused by the presence of AGs with finance and military capabilities. The AGs have these capabilities through

conflict instigators wanting to exploit natural resources using the conflicts. The capabilities and sustenance of most AGs in the DRC such on M-23 rebel group are said to through appropriation of the natural resources in the country. Collier (2000) asserts that popular underdevelopment and poverty may also be a major source of conflict. This starts the conflict trap; poverty creates conflict and conflict creates poverty. Twenty-two out of thirty-one countries with lowest human development index have had civil wars from the 1990s to 2000s (Collier, 2000).

Collier (2000) observes that poverty, economic disparities, the lack of economic opportunities such as employment, lack of educational opportunities and general underdevelopment are critical factors that cause conflict in a society. The contest for the control of economic assets, resources and systems are the basic causes of conflicts in human society. The conflict in the Sudan (Darfur) was triggered by political and economic marginalisation of groups of people. The Janjaweed militia group in Darfur has been fighting to control land, a locally scarce resource, for grazing and farming.

On the same note, the interests of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) militia group were reformation of the national constitution to allow proportional power sharing. It was also a fight against social injustice, political and economic oppression, and provision of basic services to all the Sudanese people. Poverty, economic disparities, lack of economic opportunities (such as employment), lack of educational opportunities, and underdevelopment were factors that mainly drove the conflict. The conflicts and war led to the destruction of infrastructure such as roads,

sea and airports, industries, people's houses and their means of production, and thus seriously affected and still do affect people's livelihoods.

Lastly, the resource interest catalyses the interventions from neighbouring and other states for these actors to exploit the resources under the guise of conflict resolution. Some of these external actors, which include multinational corporations, nations, and non-state (including criminal gangs) are sometimes courted by either side of the warring factions. Others just walk in to take advantage of desperate conditions created by the conflict.

On mitigation, the political economy theory links PKOs with economic gains out of conflicts. Burton (1988) emphasises the need to trace the origin of the conflicts to resolve them and bring about lasting peace effectively and peacefully. This is a function of the PKOs. Peacekeeping programmes are expected to address the root causes of conflicts and lay the foundations for social justice and sustainable peace in the long term collectively and cumulatively (De Coning, 1999). The High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations also recommended the need to address the sources of conflicts in 2015 (UN, 2015b). It stated that peacekeepers are supposed to increasingly manage conflict by tracing the root causes of conflicts (UN, 2015b)

Besides addressing the cause of conflicts, the political economy theory also addresses the mitigation and effectiveness of PKOs. Baregu (2011) states that numerous actors in the DRC conflicts align to the postulations of the political economy theory given that they continue to seek economic benefits from the

conflicts in the country. Baregu (2011) uncovers the hidden economic agenda behind actors of the DRC conflict and Sudan (Darfur). The actors include imperialists, plunderers, drug barons, gunrunners, mercenaries, private military and security companies, moneybags, globalisers, money launderers, ambulance chasers and civil socialites. These have diverse and sometimes incompatible interests. Those with economic motives engage in some kind of double life, on the surface appearing as agents of peace but behind the scenes undertaking activities that threaten peace and the economy (Baregu, 2011). These competing interests affect the effectiveness of PKOs deployed on those areas adversely.

According to Baregu, (2011), the western countries led by the US in Group of Eight (G8) have interests in natural resources in countries of the developing world. They operate in these countries covertly using private security companies, the military, foreign trade, and intelligence to achieve their aims. The plunderers, which include those sponsoring conflicts, frontline actors, and people embedded in the systems of the plundered countries take advantage of the countries government weaknesses to usurp the resources. The weaknesses include weak laws, regulations, security systems, poor licensing mechanisms, and taxation systems. The resources of interest include minerals such as coltan, diamonds, gold, niobium, and genetic resources. Drug barons are individuals or big companies engaging in drug trafficking. These supply the drugs to AGs, mercenaries, child soldiers and warlords. Gunrunners are companies or individuals that supply arms and ammunition to the warring parties legally or otherwise. The G8 countries are the major funders of the PKOs. They use their financial contributions to PKOs and their overarching decision-making power

in the UN to decide where, when, and how the PKOs are deployed and withdrawn. Because these decisions also imply economic gain to them out of the conflicts, they affect the effectiveness of POKs for their benefits.

Baregu (2011) discusses mercenaries, and private military and security companies that are established by professional soldiers that weak or decayed states hire to engage in hostilities on their behalf. In addition, there are moneybags in the conflicting countries to which financial institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and commercial banks give as loans to stiff conditions for different purposes. In most cases the countries are responsible to pay these backs. They fail to do so and are wallowed in debt as a result. Others are influential globalisers that are multinational company behemoths move from continent to continent and countries to find resources and markets. They include Coca-Cola, Adobe, Hyatt hotel, and have technologies, financial capital, expertise, and reach. These are also actors to the conflicts, and fuel them for financial benefits. They also always put hurdles to the operations of PKOs to sustain the conflicts, which results to the ineffectiveness of the PKOs.

Carnahan, Durch & Gilmore (2006) provide that Peacekeeping missions require heavy logistical support chains, engineering material and equipment for constructions of camps and other infrastructure for them to be operational. Some of the other items the missions are supplied with are weapon systems, machines, generators, trucks, vehicles, air assets, construction material, clothing, maps, furniture, computers, and communication equipment. They also require operational

budgets for fuel, lubricants, oils, water, food, accommodation, furniture, and other related items. Manufacturers and suppliers of the merchandise the PKOs use, whom the UN and the TCCs are referred to procure from, benefit in this business (Carnahan, Durch & Gilmore, 2006). The selection of the manufacturers and suppliers to operate supply chains in peacekeeping missions is typically galvanised with political and economic interests. PKOs have thus become a multi-billion-dollar business (Baregu, 2011; Carnahan, Durch & Gilmore, 2006). The effectiveness of PKOs will thus be limited because most of PKOs are primarily motivated by economic interests.

PKOs have created jobs (Baregu, 2011; Carnahan, Durch & Gilmore, 2006). More critically, they are a profit machine benefiting countries, companies, individuals, international humanitarian organisations positioned in the PKO supply value chains. Large PKOs are thus generally mega projects involving costly co-ordination and transactions.

In the field, most TCCs in UN PKOs seek financial benefits through reimbursement of deploying troops and equipment. According to Coleman and Nyblade (2018), the countries that send troops to participate in PKOs are reimbursed by the UN depending on equipment and numbers of troops they deploy in the missions in tandem with the provisions of the relevant Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Carnahan, Durch & Gilmore (2006) additionally argue that the economic impact of PKOs is realised through helping countries in conflict to restore peace and security. These are important conditions for economic ventures. Most people will

not be able to engage in any development activities in the absence of peace and security, and the result is continued economic deterioration countries with conflicts (Carnahan, Durch & Gilmore, 2006).

The political economy theory links the onset of conflicts in societies and their mitigation with economic incentives. The theory determines that most of the actors in a conflict situation have open or hidden economic motives. The theory alludes that conflict in a society is the result of factors including fighting for resources, unemployment, poverty, economic and political marginalisation, and human greed. The theory offers an explanation on complexities of conflicts and the conflation of interests, which all complicate resolution efforts. Furthermore, the theory provides that mitigation of conflicts by different actors and especially by PKOs has economic benefits. The entire set of players including TCCs, companies that supply equipment and logistics for PKOs, peacekeeping staff, and the host nations have economic reasons to participate in PKOs. The theory reveals that some people take intra and interstate conflict to be economic opportunities.

The effectiveness of PKOs have been affected by political and economic motivations of TCCs participating in them. As seen earlier, most of TCCs have been motivated economically to participate in PKOs. They are not fully committed to discharge their duties effectively to restore peace in the locations of their missions. For example, DRC peacekeepers have been accused of involvement in illegal mineral trade in exchange for weapons and arms (International Alert, 2010). There have also been cases of looting property. For example, companies such as Farrel

Trade and Machanga Ltd., owned by businessmen from Pakistan and India and operating around the Great Lakes Region were accused of collusion (International Alert, 2010). They colluded with Pakistani peacekeepers in the MONUC/MONUSCO in the DRC to smuggle minerals. This place the effectiveness of PKOs in jeopardy.

The political economy theory links with other theories. Examples of these are the human needs theory (Maslow, 1973). This theory asserts that most conflicts occur because some members of societies fail to get basic needs for themselves following the doings of other members within that society. The basic needs link to the political economy theory (Midlarsky, 1975). The theory stresses that all human beings have basic needs, the deprivation of which raises the likelihood for eruption of conflict. Maslow (1973) suggested a list of those needs. These are physiological needs, (which include the resources), safety and security; love and belonging; and self-esteem and personal fulfilment/self-actualisation. All these needs, especially resources, are economic by nature (Maslow, 1973). Therefore, they link with the principles of political economy theory.

The political economy theory has been criticised for its overemphasis on resources as the proximate cause of conflicts. Ikelegbe (2005: 6) argues that the theory is biased given it links all sources of conflict to economic reasons, while there are other reasons to explain existence of conflicts in a state. He argues that most conflicts may be caused by diverse factors such as patronage, predatory and personal rule, corrupt control of national resources and the undermining of state institutions. In this

understanding, considerations of the political economy may be just one among the many sources of conflict. In this case, the theory is weak in its fundamental effectiveness of explaining conflicts. Ikelegbe (2005:6) criticised the recommendation of the theory that solutions for most conflicts lie on the central government. He argues that the postulate is not wholly true as there are divergent ways to resolve conflicts depending on the nature of the conflicts. The theory of political economy is still useful in this study despite its limitations. It addresses all the dynamics of conflicts from their origin to mitigation and links them with the economy of the countries in conflict.

2.5 Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework identifies variables for use in a study and the relationships among them. The independent variables in this study are the execution of POC, protection of human rights, and restoration of state authority (Figure 2.1). In the latter, both DRC and Sudan have vast areas that rebel groups take control. Other independent variables are negotiations, control, and prevention of mineral-related conflicts. Another variable is peacebuilding, with which support countries make the difficult transition from conflict to peace. Overall, POC is a responsibility which includes all parts of a peacekeeping mission, with civilian, military and police functions. Peacekeeping missions are in many cases authorised to use all necessary means, including deadly force to prevent or respond to threats of physical violence against civilians. The means are contextualised within the capabilities and areas of operations without prejudice to the functions and responsibilities of the host government.

The dependent variable is the effective execution of peacekeeping missions by the UN forces, which consist of multinational troops. Many peacekeeping missions have a mandate to ensure peace prevails to particularly protect innocent all civilians, and especially those under threat of physical harm. Therefore, if the independent variables of this study (given in the previous paragraph) are change, then the dependent variable of the effective execution also changes. For example, if the POC is not effective, then a peacekeeping mission will be assessed as ineffective. Figure 2.1 shows the sets of independent and the dependent variables and relationship between them.

Many other variables such as control variables, influence the UN peacekeeping participation. Control variables are elucidated via different perspectives, including the characteristics of conflicts, missions, host countries, peacekeeping TCCs, and the dyadic relationship between host countries and peacekeeping TCCs. Regarding the characteristics of conflicts themselves, the intensity of conflict can be measured. A country is likely to contribute to the UN peacekeeping troops in case of intense conflicts. Conflict intensity is measured with the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) dataset of the battle-related death (Pettersson, Högbladh, & Öberg 2019). In conflict studies, conflict intensity can be a categorical variable and classified into 2 categories of less than 1000 people and more than 1000. In this study, conflict intensity is a continuous variable measured using the number of deaths. As for the characteristics of missions, the type of mission can influence peacekeeping participation. Those deploying troops may decide to send the troops in observer mission or traditional missions (Hegre, Hultman, & Nygård, 2019). Many developed

countries contribute token troops in peacekeeping missions (Coleman, 2014). Token troops are tiny number of troops, often less than forty in much larger coalitions (Coleman & Li, 2023).




Figure 2.1: Conceptual framework of the study with variables used in this study and their relationship

Source: Adapted from Gachoki (2017).

2.6 Research Gap

There have been many studies on the establishment, roles, impact, and effectiveness of PKOs. These have been discussed previously in section 2.3. However, there are gaps in those studies. These include those of methodology and knowledge. There are also the empirical, theoretical, and other gaps. Some studies have used single cases. Others have dealt with PKOs generally, and others missed out on the expected facts due to methodological limitations. For example, Autesserre, (2019) carried out a study titled "*The Crisis of Peacekeeping; Why the UN Cannot end Wars*". The study

tried to establish why PKOs fail to mitigate conflicts in areas where they have been deployed. One of the main findings and conclusion of the study was that PKOs fail because the appointed commanders were not free to deploy their professionalism fully. Another is that UN believes that peace can be fast-tracked by quick elections in a conflict-prone area. However, experience shows that hastening for elections prematurely may do more harm than good. There are possibilities of creating new political crises in doing so.

Autesserre's (2019) study has methodological gap. It did not use any specific case for the reported findings. There is also a knowledge gap of its findings being too general. For example, one of the conclusions of the study is that election does not bring peace in a country that has borne the brunt of conflicts. However, DRC was at least peaceful after her first general elections in 2006.

Another study, "*When do UN peacekeeping operations implement their Mandate?*" was conducted by Blair, Di Salvatore and Smidt (2022). The study intended to justify the argument that the fragmented mandates increasingly implemented amidst violence exacerbate delegation and coordination problems. These hinder PKOs to meet their mandates and functions. The findings of the study show that the fragmentation of the mandate correlates negatively with implementation of the key mandate of PKOs, especially the peace-building function. The researcher did not indicate clearly why the UN came up with fragmented mandates, which are also not always compatible to the theatre conditions. The study also suffers a methodological gap: it was done without visitation and first-hand experience of the affected areas.

The researcher would have had an opportunity to interview the deployed peacekeepers to corroborate and consolidate the study findings.

Many studies about PKOs suffer knowledge and methodological gaps because of the security which force their conduct from a safe distance. This exacerbates the incompleteness and uncertainty of the primary data used in the studies. Such studies often suffer the typical shortcoming of overreliance on secondary data sources, biased reporting and in some instances, inaccurate theory-empirical data deductions. In addition, most researchers lack experience of the field of peace and security. This comparative case study focuses on the PKOs in DRC and the Sudan (Darfur) engages systematic data collection and on-site field observations. These field research activities were comprehensively undertaken for an extended period of time to determine conduct and modus operandi of the two related UN missions in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur). The study is thus expected to fill the knowledge gaps that were left unfilled by previous studies.

The researcher of this study has over 25 years of experience working in the area of peace and security. The researcher has worked in various UN PKOs. This provided the edge to collect comprehensive and relevant datasets for this study. This study also drew benefits from a network of other personnel with experience of working with UN PKOs in various missions. In addition, the researcher visited the UN mission areas and took advantage the service currently he is engaged in to collect data updates and baseline information. The researcher was on the ground commanding thousands of peacekeeping troops in the DRC, and was staff officer in

Darfur, Sudan during the Operation. This researcher witnessed first-hand the atrocities in battles and the uncertainties in the actions taken by PKOs in the field. This first-hand experience starkly contrasts many of the studies on PKOs, including those cited previously.

Basing on the limitations of the previous studies, this research uncovered the need for a deep analysis of the effectiveness of UN PKOs to answer the basic question on how best to establish and sustain peacekeeping in conflict areas in Africa. The DRC and the Sudan (Darfur) are the cases of study to answer this question. This study is expected to establish alternate perspective and strategies on how the UN could improve its global peacekeeping operations. The UN is still applying the recommendations from the Panel on UN Peace Operations commonly known as 'the Brahimi Report' of 2000 for effective operations. The context in the conflict zones has changed since then. New dynamics continue to emerge. These demand the need for updated analyses, and the development of new perspectives and modus operandi of UNPKOs especially in Africa.

2.7 Summary

This chapter featured the review of literature related to peace and security in the areas including roles, impact, and effectiveness of PKOs whereby various scholars have written in theme of PKOs and POC. The chapter provided definitions of keywords for a common understanding in the context of this research before it assessed key scholarly arguments related to the theme. It also provided interpretations of main concepts, terms, and techniques that were applied and reflected

in the study. The chapter presented a synthesis of varying perspectives of scholars on the roles and effectiveness of PKOs, and the competing interests that influence the missions. It stages a framework to understand the dynamics of PKOs to unpack lessons and practices for the expected future roles of UN PKOs. The PKOs can be made more effective and focus on bringing forth a more peaceful and secure global community of nations and guarantee protection of lives of people. The chapter also established the suitability of political economy theory to guide this research. It is uncovered in the chapter that conflicts in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur) are dominated by economic actors, which fuel unending conflicts. The chapter also represents research gaps and determines the opportunities to fill them taking advantage of the repertoire of field experience the researcher of this study has. The study also capitalises on the information that its design made it possible to access, made possible to resources design and how this study will contribute to the scholarship. The review of literature determined the independent and dependent variables that are relevant to this research, and their relationship. These are framed in the conceptual framework that is also provided in this chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

Research methods and materials available for this study are provided and justified for in this Chapter. These facilitate collection of data, its processing, and analysis to determine the effectiveness of PKOs in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur). The chapter has ten sections. Section two provides the research design, the third concentrates on the research philosophy, and the fourth explains the study area. The population of the study; sample and sampling techniques are covered in section five, while section six details data collection methods. Section seven present data analysis methods, and eight presents validity and liability of the research methods. Section nine addresses ethical issues and their consideration. The last is the chapter summary.

3.2 Research Philosophy

This research is underpinned by interpretivism research philosophy, which contends that only through subjective interpretation and intervention will reality be fully understood. There are in fact many interpretations of reality. Interpretivism considers that interpretations are in themselves a part of knowledge being pursued. This study assesses the effectiveness of PKOs in their mandates and missions in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur). Its findings may be subject to diverse interpretations. All interpretations are parts of process of knowledge creation, in particular in the area of peace and security. For example, some of the conclusions this study generates indicate that UN PKOs in Africa have been ineffective especially in respect of

protection of civilians (POC). Also, the eastern DRC is still shrouded in violence and fear as armed groups intensify violation of human rights against civilians. There have been arguments for and against the UN's decision to end the UNAMID operations in the Sudan (Darfur) in December 2020. This is because the security in the region had not yet been stabilised and thus the withdrawal of the PKO was premature. These dynamics are subject to many interpretations. This research considers all these to be part of knowledge it intends to develop.

3.3 Research Design

This study employed a comparative case study research design applicable to similar systems design under the category of looser application (Ankar, 2008). Comparative case study involves analysis and synthesis of similarities, differences and patterns across two or more cases that share a common focus or goal, and the comparison produces new knowledge (Carsten, 2008). In this study, the roles and effectiveness of PKOs in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur) are compared to find answers to the four research questions derived from the objectives of this research. This study is informed by the constructivism philosophical paradigm. The paradigm states that people construct their own understanding and knowledge of the world through experiences and reflecting on the experiences (Honebein, 1996).

The selection of comparative case study is because of various reasons. It enables the researcher to consider multiple perspectives of PKOs. It also enables flexibility of thinking in comparing and contrasting PKOs in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur) to draw conclusions from analysis of the cases. It also facilitates progression towards

critical thinking involving analysis, evaluation, and development of new thinking in relation to the concept and rules of PKOs in conflict situations. This research did not commence with any hypothesis or assumptions. It ventured to investigate and seek clarity on the concept and process of peacekeeping in Africa through comparison of the role and effectiveness of PKOs in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur). The two cases appear similar, both are in Africa, and they share similar characteristics including mandates and challenges. Also, in 2010 they both involved complex and expensive deployment of UN PKOs.

The study was conducted in the conflict-affected locations of Goma, Beni, Kiwanja, Rutchuru, Munigi and Ituri in the DRC and in Al-Fashi, Nyala and Hurun Sudan in Sudan (Darfur). Interviews and discussions were held with respondents affected by conflicts, and a few selected that were knowledgeable about PKOs. From the interviews, discussions, and direct engagement in the conflict theatre, the researcher developed a framework of facts and knowledge about PKOs. Knowledge of the cultural norms of the communities in the conflict zones played a crucial role in understanding the source and nature of conflicts. This information and study of related literature formed a base for informed recommendations and possible solutions to the various facets of the conflicts.

3.4 Research Strategy

The study employed qualitative research strategy, which focuses on understanding a phenomenon with focus on the quality of the information and the meanings that people embrace (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008). This is rather than validation with

quantity of responses and the deductive logic. The qualitative approach engages the collection and analysis of non-numerical data for insight into the communities' worldviews into a problem of interest, and to understand related concepts, opinions, and experiences relating to the problem. The qualitative method is inductive, which offers an opportunity to develop theory from findings. The qualitative approach also guided the researcher to develop a research environment that promoted trust and that is ethical. The results derived with the qualitative approach are often rich in description compared to those using the quantitative counterpart.

3.5 Study Area

This research is a comparative study of PKOs in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur). The DRC is located in central sub-Saharan Africa. It has an area coverage of 2,345,408 square kilometres. Darfur is the westernmost region of Sudan covering 493,180 square kilometres. The researcher visited Goma, Beni, Munigi, Kiwanja, Rutchuru and Ituri in DRC; and Al-Fashi, Nyala and Hurun in Darfur, Sudan to collect data. This was also an opportunity to interview PKO experts in both places. The researcher also accessed information from these areas through the networks that developed from past working experience with UN PKOs in those areas. The analysis of the collected data was done in Dar es Salaam.

3.6 Population of the Study; Sample and Sampling Techniques

3.6.1 Population of Study and Sample Size

This study involved about 100 selected respondents. These included men and women

of varying age, racial background, and with knowledge about PKOs. The framework of the respondents is provided in Table 3.1. After interviews with 100 respondents, it was realised that responses and the information becoming repetitive, indicating information saturation. The frequency of new insights, themes, ideas, and opinions plateaued, and so it made economic sense to limit the study to 100 respondents. The target population included the affected local people in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur). Some of these were academicians, senior and junior UN staff members, and senior military commanders of MONUSCO and UNAMID. Others were members of the diplomatic corps, staff working with the AU, SADC, ICGRL, IGAD, and senior military staff from various TCC with credible knowledge of peacekeeping. Some of the latter were commanders from Tanzania People's Defence Forces (TPDF) and police officers that had worked with MONUSCO, UNAMID and other missions. Table 3.1 shows the categories of the respondents involved in the research:

Table 3.1: Categories of respondents in the selected sample for the study

SN	Category	Number of Respondents in DRC	Number of Respondents in Darfur
1.	Members of local communities	11	9
2.	Academicians	2	3
3.	Senior and junior UN staff members	15	5
4.	Senior commanders of MONUSCO and UNAMID	8	2
5.	Members of diplomatic corps,	1	4
6.	Staff working with AU, SADC, ICGRL, IGAD	8	2
7.	Junior and senior military members from different countries with knowledge about peacekeeping	3	2
8.	Junior and senior commanders from TPDF and Police who have worked with MONUSCO, UNAMID and other missions	18	12
9.	Others	2	3
	Total	58	42
Grand total		100	
Of all the respondents, there were 44 women and 56 men			

Source: Researcher's analysis of selected respondents

The researcher chose respondents of varying sex, age, race, but with knowledge and expertise about PKOs and expertise. The variation was deliberate in an effort to diversify the sources of comments and opinions on the role, impact and effectiveness of PKOs in Africa. The women who were the most affected by conflicts played a substantial in providing their concerns and views about the roles played by the PKOs in conflict areas of the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur).

3.6.2 Sampling Techniques

This study employed a purposive sampling procedure. This is a non-probability sampling method basing on characteristics of a population and responsive to the objectives of the study. This method was fitting to this study to purposefully sample respondents focusing on the quality of their knowledge on the subject of PKOs rather than the number of responses (Kothari, 2004). The selection of the respondents was by virtue of their positions, knowledge, experience and expertise in the area of PKOs. Other respondents were selected using a non-probabilistic snow-balling method. With this, interviewees including leaders of entities involved in peacekeeping were requested to identify the people they know who could provide data and information on peacekeeping. This method was used because it is cost effective because it reduces selection of random persons simply because of being in the conflict zones but who may not be knowledgeable on by the matters of interest in research (Kothari, 2004).

The information collected by using the purposive sampling has a low margin of error because of the greater probability of the sampled respondents being in possession of

richer information on the subject matter. It is also more likely to produce (preliminary) results in real-time. Many reports have been written about conflicts in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur). The purposive sampling helped to unearth credible information about the effectiveness of the PKOs in those areas. This was credited by the selection of suitable respondents with adequate knowledge and experience about PKOs and their expected roles in conflict areas of DRC and Sudan (Darfur).

3.7 Data Collection Methods

Data for the study was collected during the activity period between 2019 and 2021, and in 2023. The collection methods were those of in-depth key informant interviews, focus group discussions, field observation and review of availed documents. The use of more than one data collection method enabled the researcher to collect data that could be triangulated, therefore making the data and information more reliable and valid. Given the worsening security situation in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur), researcher went back to Khartoum and Darfur (Sudan) from 06 - 09 February 2023; and Goma and Beni in DRC from 10-12 February 2023 to verify the previously collected information. The researcher managed to interview a few more respondents on the state of art of security in the respective conflict areas.

3.7.1 In-depth Interviews

Semi-structured interviews were employed to collect primary data (see Appendix I). They were conducted in the English language. The exception was in cases where the respondents preferred to communicate in their vernacular. This applied to groups in the local population in both DRC and Sudan (Darfur) through

interpreters. The semi-structured interviews gave the interviewer insight to the respondents' knowledge and emotions more than using the other methods than when other methods were deployed. The two-way translation buffer offered room for a more relaxed atmosphere which enabled the respondents to share views, feelings and opinions more freely. The room for bias was thus attenuated.

The researcher used this method with semi-structured information to identify respondents' feelings, emotions, and opinions about the conflicts in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur). Through this method, key informants were interviewed comfortably, and they provided as much information as they could on the research theme. The method was used to interview former and serving Force Commanders of UN missions in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur), selected academicians, staff of AU, SADC, ICGRL, IGAD, and members of the diplomatic corps at the Embassy of the DRC and the Sudan in Dar es Salaam. Other respondents were the members of the diplomatic corps at the Embassy of Tanzania in DRC and in Sudan. Others were the senior military members from different countries with strategic knowledge about the conflicts in DRC and Sudan (Darfur) conflicts, three former FIB commanders, and three retired defence attachés from Tanzania to the DRC. The interviews also included commanding officers who had worked with UNAMID and FIB in different missions, and eight information officers who worked with MONUSCO and UNAMID. Depending on the nature, breadth, and depth of information the researcher sought, each interview lasted between 30 and 60 minutes.

3.7.2 Focused Group Discussions

The researcher held four Focus Group Discussions [(FGDs) see Appendix II] involving six to twelve members per group. The aim of the discussions was to gain in-depth information related to PKOs. The researcher decided to use this method to set an atmosphere where it was possible to interact more closely with the participants in the study, to pose follow-up questions and to ask questions that probe deeper into the theme of the study. The discussions were recorded by two research assistants. The results from the FGDs were more easily understood than statistical data and the researcher was able to get more information from non-verbal responses such as facial expressions or the general body language. The composition of the groups was in terms of their entity, sex, and participation in peacekeeping missions. The FGDs complemented and clarified aspects missed or otherwise, from interviews. Depending on the sensitivity of the information that was shared and the pertaining situations, some of the members who participated in the FGDs were also called for in-depth interviews.

3.7.3 Observation

By visiting the areas where peacekeeping activities were staged, the researcher employed non-participant observation, whereby he took no part in any activities. The researcher had the opportunity to visit areas such as Goma, Beni, Kiwanja, Rutchuru and Ituri in the DRC, and Al-Fashi, Nyala and Hurun in Sudan (Darfur). An observation guide was considered important in keeping with objective and proper data collection (see Appendix III). The researcher observed the effect of conflicts through examination of the physical appearance of infrastructure such roads, schools,

health facilities, and households; and the presence of the sick and wounded in hospitals. The presence of Internally Displaced Person Camps and physical appearance of the people in conflict zones were also subjects of the observation. The presence of PKOs was determined by looking at the presence of PKO troop camps and their activities. On the effectiveness of PKOs, which this study aimed to assess by examining the state of the POC, the researcher observed the extent of free movement of people, people's engagement in economic activities including farming and business, the presence of social activities such as weddings, and sports, and cultural activities, to mention just some.

3.7.4 Review of Documents

The documents reviewed for the study included books, manuals, papers, articles, journals, newspapers, official reports, programme logs, performance ratings, funding proposals and minutes of meetings. The researcher also collected data using secondary source from reports by think tank organisations, international crisis groups and the UN Group of experts. Others included UN facts sheets, the UN Charter, and different UN resolutions. All the documents of interest related to conflicts and peacekeeping. Source such as The Tanganyika Library, the National Defence College library, Institute of Financial Management library, and Command and Staff College library were the sources of secondary information that fed this study.

The documents were accessed through different means and were obtained through relevant authorities (UN, EU, AU, regional organisations, and NGOs). Likewise, the online sources such as official websites of the UN, EU, AU, SADC, IGAD, DRC,

Sudan were accessed to gather secondary data. It was important to use this type of method due to its nature given that other means involved an element of difficulty and danger associated with other means of collecting sensitive information such as interviews.

3.8 Data Analysis

This study used more than one data analysis method. This is the mixed methods approach, with each corresponding to the type of data collected. This type of analysis combines different types of methods such as the narrative analysis, discourse analysis, thematic analysis and other methods. Therefore, all data collected from interviews, Focus Group Discussions, observations and documentary reviews were analysed collectively using content analysis. In this type of analysis, data gathered was categorized in themes and sub-themes and entered into a matrix to assess comparability (Moore & McCabe, 2005).

The main advantage of content analysis is that it gives the researcher room to structure the collected data in a way that meets research objectives. For example, all the collected data that related to conflicts and PKOs in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur) were categorized depending on research themes. The analysis for some of the data was done through narrative analysis. This involves the evaluation of data from respondents, or reviewed literature and diaries. The analysis determines the speaker or writer who provided the information, interrogating the meaning of their statements, and what it says about the issue under study (Jarman, 2013).

This method was chosen because much has been written and spoken about the DRC and (Sudan) Darfur crises with different perspectives influenced by interests of the observer. Therefore, this method enabled the researcher to understand the author's perceptions, the significance and relevance of information given to determine whether the information can be used in the study or not. This included determination of author bias, which could mislead the significance that the author could place on the words of a respondent. The analysis was done after a written transcription of all the spoken words from all respondents were put together (Mondada, 2007). The analysis was also done by cross-checking data from primary sources and that from institutions/organisations.

In addition, salient points were taken as anecdotes. Document analysis is less time-consuming and therefore more efficient than other research methods which require tangible primary data. Many documents are in the public domain and are more accessible with the ubiquitous internet. They can also be obtained without the authors' permission. This makes document analysis an attractive option for qualitative researchers. As Merriam (1988) argued, locating public records is limited only by one's imagination, competence in using various tools technology accords, and the level of industriousness. An important maxim to keep in mind is that if a public event happens, some official record of it is most likely to exist. Document analysis is less costly than other research methods and is often the method of choice when the collection of new data is not feasible. The documentary information can be readily gathered and what remains is for the content and quality of the documents to be evaluated. Documents are also unaffected by the research process. Therefore,

document analysis counters the concerns related to reflexivity or lack of thereof in other qualitative research methods. With observation for example, an event may proceed differently because it is under observation. The inclusion of exact names, references, and details of events makes documents advantageous in the research process (Yin, 1994). Documents provide broad coverage. They cover a long span of time, many events, and many settings (Yin, 1994). Document analysis is less time-consuming and therefore more efficient than other research methods. It requires data selection, instead of data collection. These factors have been considered in this study.

3.9 Validity and Reliability

3.9.1 Validity

Validity is the ability of the measuring instrument or research to measure what it is claimed to measure (Kothari, 2004). It deals with how accurately the researcher embraces the phenomenon under study (Kothari, 2004). Validity in this study was met through face validity whereby data collection methods are crafted prior to consultation of specialists in the department and the academic supervisor. This is done to determine if they would measure what is intended to be measured in regard to research tenets.

3.9.2 Reliability

Reliability is a measure of consistency of research instruments over time (Kothari, 2004). The data collection methods crafted for this study were pre-tested on a small sample in Dar es Salaam and Central African Republic. The respondents were those who had been involved in peacekeeping missions, included diplomatic corps, armed

forces, and others before the full-scale data collection exercise. All ambiguous questions were rectified to attenuate bias for consistent and pertinent answers to the questions. It was achieved through the triangulation of more than one data collection method for a richer data output.

3.10 Ethical Issues and Considerations

The researcher ensured the following ethical considerations before embarking on data collection exercise. The first consideration was approval of research clearance from the Open University of Tanzania (OUT), missions where PKOs had been deployed, and respective ministries and institutes and within and outside the country. The researcher secured an approval from the Directorate of Postgraduate Studies of OUT, the Embassy of DRC in Tanzania, the Tanzania National Defence College, Tanzania Police College, Tanzania Peoples Defence Forces Headquarters, Ministry of National Defence of DRC, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in DRC, MONUSCO headquarters-DRC, Ministry of Defence of Sudan, and UNAMID Headquarters-Sudan.

The second consideration was informed consent. This was achieved in two ways. First, the researcher paid a courtesy call to respective authority of the area of visitation, introduced himself and explained the purpose of the visitation, which was accompanied with presenting a research clearance permit. Then the authority allowed the researcher to meet with the respondents. Second, after meeting with respondents, the researcher informed them of the research topic and objectives. This

helped them to have a clear understanding on the topic and forged trust. Then the researcher sought their consent and voluntary participation.

The third consideration was confidentiality. A statement of promise was made to potential respondents. They were assured that all research data would be treated privately and confidentially. Only the researcher would have access to the data, and no information will be published about identifiable persons or organisations without their permission. This gave confidence to respondents to give personal and sensitive information including their income and other details.

The fourth element of ethical consideration in this study was anonymity. Anonymity was realised through concealing the identity of the participants in the research information. Also, the identities of individuals were not attached to specific provided information. Additionally, the presentation of findings was done in generalised manner.

The fifth element was acknowledgement: all scholarly information used in this research was acknowledged through citation and referencing. Primary data from field was reported without exaggeration.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction

The analysis and findings of the study basing on the study objectives, and methodology are presented in this chapter. The chapter has eight sections. Section one introduces the chapter, the second presents a description of the demographic characteristics. Section three presents result of the first specific objective, which is to examine the origin and purpose of UNPKOs deployed in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur). Section four presents the results of the analysis of the mode of operation and challenges UNPKOs had been facing in DRC and Sudan (Darfur). The results of the third specific objective, the examination of the effectiveness of UNPKOs in DRC and the Sudan (Darfur) are given in section five. Section six provides the comparison of PKOs in DRC and Sudan (Darfur). Section seven presents the results of specific objective four, which is the strategies for UNPKOs to operate more effectively and fulfil their mandate. Lastly, the answers to questions that the study raised are presented in section eight.

4.2 The Demographic Characteristics of Participants

The descriptive analyses of the demographics of the participants provides a backdrop to the nature of participants this study involved. Demographics add credulity to the insights the study uncovers from the participants. One hundred respondents participated in the study. These comprised of men and women of with variable age, race, and their knowledge about PKOs. Table 3.1 presents the categories of the

respondents involved in the research.

4.2.1 Distribution of Participants by Sex

Forty-four (44%) women and 56 (56%) men were involved in the study. This implies that men participated more in the study than the women. In addition, the statistics imply that despite women are the most affected during crisis, they do not readily share information and their experiences. This may be because of fear or stigma.

4.2.2 Participants Distribution by Age

The age of participants is an important parameter that alludes to maturity of the participants, and the quality and credibility of the information they offer. Table 4.1 presents the age categories of participants. The majority of them (27%) were in the age category of 50-60, followed by those in the age range of 40-50. These constituted 23% of the participants.

Table 4.1: Participants distribution by age

Age (years old)	Frequency	Percentage (%)
10-20	4	4
20-30	14	14
30-40	20	20
40-50	23	23
50-60	27	27
60- 70	14	14
70- Above	6	6
Total	100	100

Source: Researcher's analysis of selected respondents (2023)

This implies that the study involved people with credible knowledge and experience on the PKOs in DRC and Darfur. The interviewed were substantially mature and

thus provide information that could be considered accurate. This implies good quality of the information that was developed for use in this research.

4.2.3 Participants Distribution by Knowledge on PKOs

Data shows that 86 (86%) of people involved in this study had knowledge of PKOs while 18 (18%) had no knowledge on PKOs. This implies that most of the people with knowledge about PKOs were involved in PKOs.

4.3 Objective 1: The Origin and Purpose of UNPKOs Deployed in DRC and Sudan (Darfur)

4.3.1 The Origin and Purpose of UNPKOs Deployed in DRC

DRC is one of the countries that has had upheavals since her independence in 1960. Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002) determined that the country has been weak, and this is because of political, security and economic conflict that erupted soon after her independence. The DRC government thus fails to exercise its authority falls short in providing social services, scantily maintains internal law and order, and cannot defend its sovereignty (Baregu, 2011). This weakness is the grounds for “mineral conflicts”. Minerals have become the motivation for unscrupulous parties to fuel and sustain conflicts (Prunier, 2009). The UN has therefore been deploying PKOs to restore stability in the country. The effectiveness of the PKOs has been questioned with the intensification of atrocities with the missions on the ground. The findings on PKOs in DRC are presented hereinafter.

The UN intervention forces have operated in DRC during various times and in

various guises since 1960s (Vogel, 2011). Three days after her 30th June 1960 independence, the Congolese Army mutinied. Katanga and South Kasai provinces waged secessionist struggles against the new Congo government (Vogel, 2011). This and the assassination of the then Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba on 17th January 1961 exacerbated conflicts and instability in the country (De Witte, 2002). Belgium deployed troops in Congo in response without consent from the Congolese government (Abi-Saab, 1978). The Congolese Government asked for UN military assistance on 12th July 1960 in response. The UN immediately deployed troops in the country in the United Nations Operation in the Congo (Opération des Nations Unies au Congo-ONUC). The aim of the ONUC was to force the withdrawal of Belgian forces and assist the government to maintain law and order. It was the first ever UN military intervention in the country. ONUC was later withdrawn from Congo on 30th June 1964 (Spooner, 2010).

Security in DRC has fluctuated significantly since. Insecurity intensified after the First Congo War of 1996 - 1997 and the second one of 1998 - 2003 (Rupiya, 2002). An estimated six million people died in the two wars and subsequent ones up to 2022. Over five (5.4) million people were displaced during the time (Parens, 2022). The Lusaka ceasefire agreement was signed in 1999 to end the war (UN, 1999a). The deployment of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) followed in 2000 under UNSCR 1258 (UN, 1999a). The mission was mandated to mitigate the conflict through monitoring of the implementation of the agreement and humanitarian assistance. After the general elections of 2006, the UN reformed mandate of MONUC and renamed the new mission the United Nations

Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in August 2010 (Depla, 2015).

Chapter VII of the UN Charter mandated MONUSCO to use all necessary means to protect civilians. It supported the government of the DRC to consolidate state authority and fight against armed groups.

A new rebel group named M23 emerged in 2012 and further destabilised security in eastern DRC (Depla, 2015). Various initiatives were put in place and resulted into signing the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC on 24th February 2013. A Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) made of military units from Tanzania, South Africa, and Malawi was deployed into the conflict zone in March 2013 (UN, 2013c). The FIB is the military unit that constitutes part of the MONUSCO, formed under the UNSCR 2098 of 2013 (UN, 2013c). The FIB was mandated to neutralise all AGs in DRC starting with the M23 (Karlsrud, 2015).

PKOs evolved over time to adapt to increased security challenges. The PKOs there are to date in the conflict zones have evolved from the traditional PKOs to become robust and use force effectively where allowed. This is in contrast with the traditional PKOs that use traditional PKOs principles and place emphasis on neutral and lightly armed peacekeepers. The evolved ones, known as the fourth generation PKOs require peacekeepers to be robust and be more aggressive. Therefore, PKOs of to date in DRC bear traditional elements, but are postured robustly and are capable of offense. In any case, all PKOs in DRC originated from UNSC resolutions and purposed to resolve conflicts in the conflict zones. They are consistent with the main objective of the UN, which is maintenance of global peace and security.

4.3.2 The Origin and Purpose of UNPKOs in the Sudan (Darfur)

The crises that catalysed use of PKOs in Sudan (Darfur) emerged in February 2003 in the form of insurgence against the government in Khartoum. The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) waged a guerrilla war in Darfur against the government (Allen, 2010). The government attacked pockets of civilian population using groups of militias known as the Janjaweed (De Waal, 2007). An estimated 30,000 civilians died, and over a million were internally displaced. Over 20,000 found domicile in refugees in camps in the neighbouring Chad (Allen, 2010). The UN, AU, and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) took initiatives to address the unrest and human suffering in reaction.

The African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) was deployed in Darfur on 28 May 2004 before PKOs were deployed under the AU and UN doctrines (Flint, and De Waal, 2008). AMIS had operational, financial, and logistical obstacles, which limited the execution of its mandate (UN, 2007b). The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed under the leadership of President Idriss Deby of Chad in 2007. The UN deployed thereafter the joint United Nations, African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) under the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) and UNSC in replacement of AMIS (Lugman, 2012). Besides the priority mandate of POC, UNAMID was tasked to support the implementation of the DPA, to supervise a ceasefire agreement, uphold the rule of law, mediate intercommunal conflicts, and render assistance to local institutions. Before the conflict was fully resolved, the UNSC adopted UNSCR 2559 of 2020 on 22 December 2020 to end UNAMID

operations on 31 December 2020 (UN, 2021). Then the UNSC formed the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS) with UNSCR 2524 of 2020. This was to replace the UNAMID; and support the political transition, peace processes and implementation of future peace agreements, and to support peace building efforts and the rule of law (UN, 2020j).

The PKOs in Sudan (Darfur) evolved from traditional to robust PKOs charged with a mandate to enforce peace and authorised to use force as was the case in DRC. The evolution was in effect that of transition of the PKOs into those of fourth generation as explained previously. Different from those in DRC however, the PKOs in Sudan (Darfur) originated from the AU and UN under AUPSC and UNSC. The PKOs were purposed to resolve conflict in the Darfur as was the case in DRC to meet the UN objective of maintenance of global peace and security.

4.4 Objective 2: Mode of Operations and Challenges Faced by the UNPKOs in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur)

4.4.1 Mode of Operations and Challenges Faced by UNPKOs in the DRC

The modus operandi of PKOs in DRC has been the use of force (peace enforcement), characteristic of the fourth generation. Besides aggression, missions sent long, medium and short-range patrols, set up check points, and deployed Temporary Operation Bases (TOBs) and Permanent Operation Bases (POBs) in vulnerable areas. The PKOs installed cameras in some internally displaced people (IDP) camps to monitor penetration attempts of AGs. There were day and night mounted and dismounted armed patrols. Air patrols were also done using helicopters and drones.

There were quick reaction forces with armed helicopters at different levels (Tactical, Operational and strategic). All these modes of operations were guided by the UN PKOs principles of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force. All PKOs deployed in DRC that were initiated and operated under the UN mandate followed the UN Principles of consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force except for self-defence and protection of civilians. The PKOs all operated by the mandates, which were always extended after the one-year expiration. All PKOs are subject to the UNSC assessment and accountable to it operationally and administratively.

The PKOs faced challenges in DRC. One was the complex security environment that peacekeepers faced. Peacekeepers were undisciplined. They engaged in illegal trade of natural resources especially minerals, and even traded arms and ammunition (Koko, Kovatch,2016). DRC recorded the highest rate of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) of all the UN missions. The DRC national army (Force Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo - "FARDC") which the PKOs collaborated with also had issues of indiscipline and weak co-ordination and reaction to intelligence that was shared by the PKOs. FARDC was an important partner to DRC peace initiatives ((Koko, Kovatch,2016).

Other challenge was the time it took to deploy troops after decisions were made, the limited number of troops, and limited budget (Bernath and Edgerton, 2003). Some challenges originated in weakly formulated mandates and failure in their interpretation. Most of peacekeeping mandates did not conform with the state of affairs in the conflict areas. Also, mandates changed frequently and loaded with

many tasks that could not be implemented in the context of the limited time resources (UN,1999). The alleged perpetrating neighbouring states and other externally supported AGs meddling in the DRC's political, economic and security matters were also a challenge to PKOs in the country. The failure of other actors to sign and commit to peace agreements relating to DRC was also a challenge. Lastly, the DRC government provided only a little cooperation to the MONUC PKOs. In some cases, the government threatened to revoke its consent because of perceived ineffectiveness. PKOs also delayed deployment of action in the Eastern Congo.

4.4.2 Mode of Operation and Challenges Faced by UNPKOs in Sudan (Darfur)

The mode of operation of PKOs in Sudan (Darfur) was peace enforcement. This was because of the increased security challenges the peacekeepers faced, which helped evolve traditional PKOs into those of fourth generation with posture and firepower to enforce peace. Similar to the case in DRC, the evolved missions also bolstered and made extensive use of mounted and dismounted patrols, set and used TOBs and POBs, and consolidated surveillance and monitoring in the POC and IDPs, and to engage AGs. Reactionary forces were set and equipped for rapid response. All this was done in compliance with UN's principles of consent, impartiality and use of force minimally and on need basis. The operations in Darfur differed in that "UNAMID" operated under both the AU and UN. It was the first mission in the world with UN chain of command and dual reporting procedure to the UN and AU. However, UNAMID was predominantly governed by the UN principles of PKO operations and mandate that was subject to extension.

UNAMID faced challenges. One was complexity of security environment, which was largely because not all parties in conflict were signatory to and therefore with the DPA. UNAMID failed to effect cessation of hostilities as the peace it sought was not etched in a written agreement that was unanimous to all warring parties (De Waal, 2007). Some that were signatories did not comply fully to it, and placed UNAMID troops on the receiving end of hostilities.

Secondly, intervention in Darfur was slow. The politics of UNSC and various other factors. Powerful countries which are the traditional providers of equipment to UN PKOs relented to do so because they considered UNAMID was ostensibly an “African dominated mission” (AP, 2007). Jensen (2007) shows there was the lack or slow implementation of various agreements that UN signed with different parties and especially the parties to the war in Darfur.

The Government of Sudan (GoS) also had bad relations with all international institutions in Darfur and the local population. This was a considerable challenge to the Operations of UNAMID. This augmented the logistical problems relating to poor transport and communication infrastructure, inadequate financial resources; and lack of mission support personnel including electricians, and plumbers (Adeniji, Halidu, & James, 2015). Luqman (2012) notes that UNAMID had big financial challenges especially in its first two years. The countries and agencies that had pledged to donate funds for the mission did not do timely. Lastly, UNAMID also had the problem of fragmented and frequently changing mandate. The change came along

with change of tasks, which were many. It was a challenge for UNAMID to always to adapt to the changes.

4.5 Objective 3: The Effectiveness of UNPKOs in DRC and Sudan (Darfur)

4.5.1 The Effectiveness of UNPKOs in the DRC

All indicators show that POC was ineffective in DRC. Many reasons attribute to this. The main one however is the weak mandate given to the PKOs. POC is the fundamental duty of all PKOs. Despite that, nearly all of the 18 AGs in DRC signed Peace Agreements from 1999, but they have been violated except that of Lusaka ceasefire. This has held up till to date. The number of people killed in the conflicts in DRC increased (UNJHRO, 2020). For example, the number increased by 142% in 2020 compared to that in 2019. Data shows that also there was an increase of violations of human rights by 21% in 2020 compared to 2019 (UNJHRO, 2020). There were grave violations against children in DRC whereby between 2014-2020 it increased by 60% compared to the period of 2008-2014 (UN, 2020h). The two indicators that showed improvement of POC is the decrease of the number of IDPs and the increase of people undergoing the process of DDR process (2020h). However, it was realised during focus group discussions that the situation in DRC has worsened. IDP camps have decreased, indicating that people do not feel safe to live in their areas of domicile. Also, it might be because of worsening situation on most of IDP camps. The researcher observed that most people had vacated their villages fear for their lives. This corroborates the FGD report of the deterioration of security situation.

Apart from the decrease of about 7% of IDPs in 2020 compared to 2019 and an increase in the number of armed new elements undergoing the DDR, all others show that there has been an increase in concerns for POC in DRC. This has been and still is one of the key indicators of ineffectiveness of the PKOs. Findings of this research show Congolese citizens harbour negative views about the assumed effectiveness of UN forces in DRC. The citizens are especially those from North and South Kivu, and Beni in particular, the areas considerably affected by conflicts. Therefore, the indicators, and reports of the documentary review, interviews, observation and FGDs show that PKOs in DRC are ineffective especially in POC.

4.5.2 Effectiveness of UNPKOs in the Sudan (Darfur)

Findings show the PKOs in Sudan (Darfur) were also ineffective in other areas, but managed to protect civilians. The agreement to a ceasefire agreement was partial. Some AGs did not sign it, and others signed but violated it. The report of Human Rights Watch shows an increase in violence in Darfur from when the UNAMID withdrew in December 2020 (HRW, 2021). The number of grave violence against children also escalated. Incidents of inter-communal and intra-communal violence also increased even in the presence of the peacekeeping forces. Only a few indicators deviated from the general trend instability. One of these was the reduction in the number of new IDPs and refugees, indicating success of the PKOs in isolated cases. According to UN Panel of Experts on Darfur, there was a notable improvement of human rights protection in Darfur in 2019 compared to 2020 (UN, 2020c). The number of deaths and casualties showed a decline. The combined insight from the indicators used in the study, collected data, and links with the economic theory

suggest the results of PKO interventions in Darfur is a mixed bag. Extracts from focus group discussions, direct observation, documentary review, and interviews indicate that missions have at least been successful in the POC. Discussions in some focus groups suggested there was significant improvement on POC by PKOs. There were indications of a decrease of atrocities as with time. It was however admitted that the state of affairs in the affected locations had significant room for improvement. The researcher's on-site observation in 2021 in Darfur corroborated the information from the focus groups. The researcher noted there were no roadblocks, and the communities were returning to their village from hideouts to they had escaped before.

4.5.3 Factors Influencing the Effectiveness of PKOs in DRC and Sudan (Darfur)

The level of effectiveness of PKOs in DRC and Sudan (Darfur) was subject to multiple interplaying factors. These include conflicting interests of actors participating in the PKOs, limited participation of the powerful countries, fragmented PKO mandates, mandates being incongruent to the settings of the conflict environment, and UN's bureaucratic inertia. Others included the dominance and lopsided influence of superpowers in PKOs, limited interoperability among the components of PKOs, the lacking commitment of some peacekeepers, and unscrupulous peacekeepers with motives to exploit resources in the conflict zones riding over those of the missions.

4.6 Comparing PKOS in DRC and Sudan (Darfur)

This research used a comparative case study approach to determine the effectiveness of the UNPKOs in POC and the restoration of peace and functional governance. The case studies are PKOs in DRC and Sudan (Darfur). Tables 4.2 and 4.3 display the similarities and differences pegged onto the variables conceptualised in this study.

Table 4.2: Similarities of PKOs in DRC and that of Sudan (Darfur)

Items	Similarities of PKOs in DRC and that of Sudan (Darfur)
Areas of Operations	Both PKOs staged in Africa.
Mandates	Both the DRC and Sudan (Darfur) PKOs (ONUC/MONUC/MONUSCO and AMIS/UNAMID) suffered from controversial and inconsistent mandates.
Effectiveness of PKOs	Both missions were largely ineffective in POC. However, some success is acknowledged.
Manpower and other resources	Both began modestly and then expanded their areas of operation in the of number of troops, equipment and annual budgets.
Cost	Missions were expensive in both Darfur and DRC. UNAMID had 17,308 troops and an annual budget of US\$1.82 billion while MONUC had 20,586 uniformed troops and an annual budget of US\$ 1.37 billion.
Support from Host nations	The PKOs in the DRC and in Sudan (Darfur) operated with minimal support of respective host governments.
Changing leadership	Both missions were challenged with frequent changes of leadership. MONUSCO was led by nine Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSG) from 2000 to 2020. Sudan (Darfur) had been three SRSG from 2015 to 2020.
Armed Groups (AGs)	Both MONUC/MONUSCO and UNAMID faced more or less similar challenges with AGs. More than 100 AGs were active in DRC, and (Darfur) was ravaged by at least half a dozen AGs.
Deployment	MONUC and UNAMID were deployed following weak and ineffectual ceasefire agreements.

Source: Author compilation 2023

Table 4.3: Differences of PKOs in DRC and that of Sudan (Darfur)

PKOs in DRC	PKOs in Sudan (Darfur)
PKOs in DRC began in 1960 as the UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Congo (ONUC) under complete supervision of the UN from the beginning to date they are known as MONUSCO.	PKOs in Sudan (Darfur) began in 2004 and were called the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The mission was solely under the AU.
ONUC, MONUC and MONUSCO were under the direct supervision of the UN.	The AMIS were under the AU, and UNAMID under the supervision of both AU and UN.
The international community reacted differently to the two missions. After the eruption of the first Congo conflict of 1960, the UN responded swiftly by adopting the UNSCR 143 of 1960 to deploy ONUC (UN, 1960a).	After the 2003 crisis, the UN was slow to act in the Sudan (Darfur) crisis and did not do so until 2004. The bureaucratic procedures of the UN contributed to the delay to deploy PKOs. There was also opposition from China, Qatar and Russia, who considered the conflict was internal matter subject to non-interference.
Though AU has been involved in all DRC peace initiatives, but the main player has been the UN.	AU has been fully involved in the Sudan (Darfur) conflict than UN in comparison to the DRC conflict.
UN missions in DRC had resources because the powerful countries that are the traditional providers of equipment fulfilled their pledges.	AMIS and UNAMID had the challenges of limited resources compared to MONUC/MONUSCO. The powerful countries refrained because they considered AMIS and UNAMID ostensibly “African dominated missions”
MONUSCO maintained presence till to date.	UNAMID ended operation in December 2020.
Force commanders in PKOs in DRC have been changing from Africa, South America, Asia and Europe.	UNAMID was an African Mission, and all Force Commanders came from African states.
The government has not been involved in hostilities against civilians.	The government was responsible for being party to and fuelling hostilities to civilians.

Source: Author compilation 2023

The PKOs in DRC and Darfur had more in common than they had differences.

4.7 Objective 4: Strategies to Enable UNPKOs to Operate more Effectively and Fulfil their Mandates

For the PKOs to be effective, there are number of strategies which need to be considered. These are discussed in section 5.4.4. The strategies are:

- i) There must be no conflicting interests among the TCCs to PKOs. Most of them participate in PKOs with financial benefits taking precedence.
- ii) The permanent member countries of the UN Security Council (P5) need to increase their quota of troops to the PKOs. It has been observed that they contribute more to the UN PKOs budget but deploy tiny numbers of troops to participate in missions.
- iii) The UN should issue mandates to PKOs which are feasible, clear and unambiguous. The UN should limit bureaucracy decision-making and mandate field commanders to use their complete professional discretion in the missions.
- iv) All UN members should have equal opportunity in the process of decision making in matters of PKOs.
- v) It is important to improve relations between the components of PKOs, military, police and civilians and strengthen co-operation and interoperability among them. This is essential for comprehensive and effective restoration of security, peace, and governance apparatus in the countries afflicted with conflicts.
- vi) The troops and other personnel deployed in PKOs must be compatible with the conflict environment and uphold professionalism and commitment to the missions.

- vii) The UN needs to review the reimbursement rates frequently and as needed to ameliorate the effects of inflation and costs of living of the TCCs.

4.8 Questions Raised in this Research

This research raised four questions. These were: 1) How are and can the principles of peacekeeping be applied in each unique case? 2) Were the UNPKOs in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur) successful and effective? 3) What were the reasons for the UN to delay and respond late and reluctantly to humanitarian sufferings in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur)? 4) How can the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur) cases be evaluated within the context of humanitarian interventions globally?

In principle, all the basic guidelines and principles of PKOs were applied in the peace interventions in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur). However, the UNPKO principles of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force were not compatible with the contemporary peacekeeping environment in the field then. Findings showed that the success of PKOs in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur) was limited compared to the efforts and resources invested in them. It should be remembered that some of the missions in the study areas had large budgets compared to many others elsewhere. The challenges presented previously contribute to the limited, if any, effect of the PKOs. The conflict-affected people bore the brunt people of the conflicts and the limitations in the peace restoration and enforcement. The increase of violence, population displacement, extortion, rape and murder have remained rampant as a result of the PKO mission failures.

Furthermore, the study found that the international community reacted variably to the state of affairs and functioning of the missions in DRC and Darfur. The actors to PKOs seemed to take interest in having the conflict in the DRC sustained. However, the position of the international community was never clear on the state of affairs in Sudan (Darfur). Illuminatingly, the UN was glaringly slow to respond to the Sudan (Darfur) crisis when it happened in 2003, and it let time elapse and acted in 2004 (Lanz, 2015). Lastly, the study examined how the DRC and Sudan (Darfur) cases can best be evaluated in the context of humanitarian interventions for the protection of human lives. The PKOs in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur) proved to be ineffective especially in matters of POC. The UN needed to reform the creation, composition, and mandates of PKOs for effective interventions.

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter covers the discussion of research findings meeting the study objective to analyse the effectiveness of UNPKOs in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur). The discussion has been organised around research objectives presented in Section 1.4.2 in chapter one and findings in the sequence they were presented in chapter four. The chapter has eight sections. This is the first. The second is a synopsis of findings related to the origin and purpose of UNPKOs deployed in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur). Section three is a summary of the analysis of the mode of operation and challenges faced by UNPKOs in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur). The fourth summarises the findings on the effectiveness of UNPKOs in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur). The fifth summarises the comparison of PKOs in DRC and Sudan (Darfur). Section six is a summary of findings on strategies to enable UNPKOs to execute their mandates effectively. The questions this research raises are in section seven, and section eight is a summary of chapter six.

The following are the key findings to the research questions derived from the specific objectives of this research. Based on research question one, the UN was established principally to maintain international peace and security using different measures including diplomacy, PKOs, laws, sanctions, and many kinds of negotiations. PKOs are effective in setting conditions for diplomacy and negotiations. The contemporary

PKOs, which are robust and authorised to use force upon need evolved from traditional PKOs that emphasised neutrality and diplomacy.

Based on research question two, the mode of operations used in both missions is using force (peace enforcement). Basically, due to increased security challenges which peacekeepers faced, PKOs had been evolved over time. PKOs we are seen today have been evolved from the traditional PKOs to a robust one where the use of force has been allowed. Others are sending long, medium, and short-range patrols, setting up check points, deployment of Temporary Operation Bases (TOBs) and Permanent Operation Bases (POBs), installations of Cameras, day and night armed patrols, air patrols and quick reaction forces. All these modes of operations were guided by the UN PKOs principles of consent, impartiality, and minimum use of forces.

On the party of challenges, both the missions suffered from is the complexity of the current security environment, where PKOs are currently facing small-scale, lightly-armed, high-tech-enabled, mounted groups capable of inflicting great damage in short periods of time, controversial, ambiguous and limited mandates, minimal support from respective host governments, inconsistencies, redundancies and overlaps of vision from leadership, presence of complex AGs and deployment were done following weak ceasefire agreements.

Based on research question three, it has been noted that the PKOs in DRC and Sudan (Darfur) are ineffectiveness especially on the area of protection of civilians. This has been due to the different kinds of failures, especially on the issue of POC.

Based on research question four, the strategies which the UNPKOs must deploy in order for them to fulfil their mandates more effectively are; there must be no conflicting interests among the troops contributing countries (TCCs) to PKOs, participation of the permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5) countries to PKOs must be enhanced, the UN should be issuing mandate to PKOs which are feasible, clear and without any ambiguity, the UN should reduce the Bureaucracy in taking decisions, all members of the UN should be given equal opportunity in the decisions on issues related to PKOs, there must be good relations between components of PKOs, Troops deployed must be compatible to the environment, disciplined and must be committed to PKOs and lastly, the UN should frequently be reviewing the reimbursement rates.

5.2 Discussion of the Findings

As I mentioned in Subsection 5.1, the discussion of this findings has been based on the four specific objectives; to examine the origin and purpose of UNPKOs as deployed in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur); to analyse the mode of operation and challenges faced by UNPKOs in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur); to examine the effectiveness of UNPKOs in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur); and to develop and recommend strategies to enable UNPKOs to operate more effectively and fulfil their mandate. Based on those objectives as presented in chapter four, the following is the discussion of the findings.

5.2.1 Objective 1: Examination of the Origin and Purpose of UNPKOs Deployed in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur)

5.2.1.1 Origin and Purpose of UNPKOs in the DRC

The UN has been deploying PKOs in DRC in different times from the 1960 till to date. Therefore, the discussion of the origin and purpose of PKOs deployed in DRC is structured on the timeframe of their deployment.

5.2.1.2 Deployment of UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 1960-1964

The first mission was the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) on 20 July 1960. It followed the post-independence political conflict after the adoption of the UNSCR 143 of 1960 (UN, 1960a). Resolution mandated ONUC to protect the Congolese territory, called for Belgium to withdraw its troops from Congo and authorised the UN Secretary General (SG) to provide the government with the needed military assistance (UN, 1960a). The deployment and operations of ONUC was complex given the presence of both inter and intra-state dynamics. ONUC was the first mission to contravene the traditional UN peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force except for self-defence. With the adoption of UNSCR 143 of 1960, ONUC went against principle of impartiality by taking sides by providing the Congo government military assistance.

It was the first time the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) invoked Article 99 of the UN Charter, calling for a SC meeting to discuss the issue raised by a newly independent country (UN, 1960a). Besides fighting external aggression (Belgium), the mission was not allowed to intervene in internal affairs of the Congo including

POC (UN, 1960a). This was one controversy and weaknesses of the ONUC mandate that limited the PKOs. When the UN hesitated to intervene in Katanga secessionist struggle, Lumumba made a request to Soviet Union, which offered the support (Durch, 1993).

The UN later adopted the UNSCR 146 of 1960, which granted power to the ONUC to extend its operations to Katanga (UN, 1960b). There is an argument on the legality of the ONUC intervention in Katanga according to Article 2.7 of the UN Charter of non-intervention on internal matters of any state. It is further argued that the article prohibits the intervention on “matters which are within essentially domestic jurisdiction of any state”, and therefore the non-intervention principle holds. The incursion by Belgium was not essentially domestic matters, and therefore ONUC was right to intervene. A retired General stated that “the Congolese government would have not been able to deal with the secessionist movement in Katanga. ONUC intervention was the only solution” (Interview, Retired General, Dar es Salaam, 23 November 2020). Boulden (2017) notes that ONUC launched different operations inside Katanga with the mandate to use force, and eventually forced secessionists to sign agreements to recognise the central government. The assassination of Lumumba on 17 January 1961 compromised the security situation in the country putting it on the brink of civil war. The UN adopted the UNSCR 161 of 1961 mandating the ONUC to instantly take necessary action to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo (UN, 1961). After meeting its mandate effectively, ONUC withdrew its troops from the Congo on 30 June 1964 (House & House 1978).

The assessment shows that apart from other reasons, natural resources play a significant role as the source and even mitigation of conflicts. The secessionist struggle of Katanga and South Kasai, which was supported by Belgian troops, was about them wanting to dominate the natural resources in their provinces. This motive is a postulate of the political economy theory. Ikelegbe (2005) argues that interest in resource control is a major influence for interstate and intrastate interventions. The deployment of Belgian troops in Katanga to support secessionists was driven by the interest to benefit from the minerals in Katanga.

5.2.1.3 Deployment of MONUC – 1999-2010

The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed in July 1999 between the DRC and five regional States (Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe) in July 1999. The UN Security Council established the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) with resolution 1279 of 30th November 1999 (UN, 1999b). This was after the first Congo war (1996 - 1997) and the second Congo war from 1998 to 2003 (Rupiya, 2002; Kiteti, 2010). The mission was mandated to use chapter VI to monitor the implementation of the agreement and to facilitate humanitarian assistance. A significant question raised during interviews and focus group discussion was why the UN initially deployed MONUC under chapter VI of the UN charter (UNSCR 1279 of 1999) while the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (chapter 8.22) recommended for Chapter VII (enforcement). With this arrangement, the MONUC was authorised to take all necessary actions to protect the UN, facilities, installations and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical

violence (Depla, 2015). A diplomat was sentimental on the formulation of MONUC mandate after the Lusaka Ceasefire agreement:

The peace initiatives were initiated in Africa and signed in Africa by African states and not by the UN. The UN, which was not there, formulated the mandate for the deployment of MONUC. What do you expect? That is why initially the UN assumed that AGs would agree willingly to disarm, which was not the case (Interview, diplomat, 12 November 2020, Dar es Salaam).

From the quote, initiation of MONUC did not conform to the situation on the ground.

This is one of the reasons for the failure of most of UNPKOs.

Changes in mandate also featured in the operations of MONUC. Yabadi (2011) points out that due to political and security fluidity in the DRC, MONUC was subject to frequent changes of its mandates. This eroded its consistency and its effectiveness. Some of the many resolutions was the UNSCR 1291 of 2000 authorising MONUC to deploy up to 5,537 troops under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to protect military observers and civilians under threat of physical violence (UN, 2000). The UN also adopted UNSCR 1355 of 15 June 2001 that authorised support for the implementation of disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of AGs (UN, 2001). The UNSCR 1711 of 2006 instructed the MONUC to support the first democratic elections in the DRC in 2006 (UN, 2006). MONUC went to support presidential, parliamentary, and provincial elections (Koko, 2011).

MONUC recorded some achievements. The UN Joint Human Rights Office in the DRC noted that MONUC succeeded to bring about 18,000 AGs to an effective DDR process in Ituri (UJHRO, 2004). Dorussen & Gizelis (2017) argue that PKOs help

to reduce the duration of hostilities in intrastate conflicts. It also facilitated the repatriation of about 12,000 civilians to Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. Also, more than one million people living in IDP camps in Ituri went back to their homes (Koko, 2011). MONUC played a central role in the integration of the combatants to the national army (Brassage) and redress of the National Congolese Police. Koko (2011), notes that MONUC was also involved in facilitating the salaries of the FARDC soldiers, to reduce the level of looting and corruption in the country. This was confirmed in an interview with a civilian staff working with MONUSCO. The staff informed that “Sometimes officers of lower ranks received higher salaries than senior officers” (Interview, MONUSCO Staff, 18 February 2021, Goma). The EU also helped the DRC to have a system of electronic payments, which helped to monitor payments to all soldiers. While such measures are helpful, they alone cannot guarantee the POC (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000).

Despite its achievements, MONUC had its own weaknesses especially on POC. According to ICG (2003), the lack of knowledge about decisive measures to protect civilians caused the massacre of more than 400 people in 2003 in Ituri. Peacekeepers from Uruguay just stood by in their camp dumbfounded. Similarly, in June 2004 MONUC failed to counter violence against civilians done by AGs in Bukavu. The groups looted, raped women and burnt markets and houses without any challenge from the MONUC forces (Marks, 2007). These acts showed the ineffectiveness of MONUC in POC.

It is worth noting that at times, MONUC troops in the Congo were accused of illegal

trade of natural resources especially minerals and even arms and ammunition (Koko, 2011). Escobales (2008) alluded that peacekeeper in Mongbwalu from Pakistan were accused of conducting illegal trade with AGs such as Nationalist Integrationist Front (FNI). They exchanging weapons confiscated during the disarmament, demobilisation, repatriations, reintegration, and resettlement (DDRRR) programme with gold. The investigation by the UN failed to substantiate the accusations. However, the allegations tarnished the reputation of MONUC. Kovatch (2016) points out that UN peacekeepers in the DRC were associated with the highest rate of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) of all the UN missions.

Another issue was the misconduct of the host country. The FARDC troops, who were mandated to co-operate with MONUC were accused of indiscipline. They committed atrocities to civilians. The indiscipline was due to the weakness of the Lusaka Ceasefire agreement. Chapter 10.10.1 of the agreement provided that “the formation of the National Army will include the forces of the Congolese party signatories of the agreement”. This meant the combatants from AGs that were party to the agreement would constitute the national army. “The indiscipline of FARDC was the result of the Lusaka Ceasefire agreement” (Interview, MONUSCO Staff, 13 February 2021).

Assessment shows that the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, which was key to the deployment of MONUC had many weaknesses, which affected the effectiveness of MONUC. Rwanda and Uganda continued to operate directly or indirectly inside the DRC even after signing the agreement. Some important actors to the conflict included the MaiMai Banyamulenge, did not sign the agreement. Parties that signed

did not fulfil their obligations. War continued for months even after the agreement. Foreign forces failed to withdraw from the DRC as provided in Chapter 4.1 of the agreement and the DDR process as per chapter 9.1 of the agreement also failed. In addition, the Lusaka Ceasefire agreement and the others by Congolese themselves failed to integrate AGs into the national army as an incentive for the ceasefire. This was the paradox to normal military recruitment process. The combatants did not undergo normal vetting and as such the national army became group of robbers and looters. Similarly, the integration motivated the formation of more AGs as paths to join the national army after the agreement. Besides the failure in POC, MONUC recorded some achievements. However, controversial mandates and misconduct contributed to ineffectiveness of MONUC.

5.2.1.4 From MONUC to MONUSCO

MONUSCO replaced MONUC IN 2010 (UN, 2010c). After the 2006 elections, the UN reformed the mandate of MONUC to face the new challenges and to underscore the stage of development of (Neethling, 2011). The UN adopted the UNSCR 1925 of 2010 and renamed the new mission as the “Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo” (MONUSCO) (UN, 2010c). MONUSCO was mandated under chapter VII of the UN Charter to use all necessary means to fulfil its mandate of POC. UN (2010b) shows that it was one of the biggest and most expensive missions with annual budget of US\$ 1.352 billion compared with other missions like the United Nation Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), which had 10,519 troops and annual budget of US\$ 938 million and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNFIL) with 12,200 troops and annual budget of

US\$ 518.71 million. The most expensive mission then was UNAMID with 17,308 troops and an annual budget of US\$1.82 billion (UN, 2009).

As for other PKOs, the mandate of MONUSCO also evolved to meet the situation on ground. The UN adopted the UNSCR 1991 of 2011 and the UNSCR 2409 of 2018 to support DRC general elections of 2011 and 2018/19 respectively (UN, 2011; UN, 2018b). In parallel, the UN called for the reduction of the ceiling of troops in MONUSCO to abide by the recommendations of UN SG. The SG had recommended that all missions should reduce troops considering the progress of the security situation in the DRC and budgetary constraints (UN, 2006c). However, this reduction did not correspond to the reality any progress. More than 3000 civilians were killed in 2020, an increase of 21% compared to 2019 (UN, 2021). Security had deteriorated. The reduction may have been in line with the Trump administration, which in 2017 decided to reduce US budgetary support PKOs from 27.89% to about 22% (Diehl, 2019). The cutting down of the budget and the troop ceiling was a blow to the operations of MONUSCO. For example, the UN (2010b) shows that in 2010 MONUSCO had 20,586 uniformed troops with annual budget of US\$ 1.352 billion. UN (2021) shows that in 2021 MONUSCO had 16,316 troops and a budget of US\$1.123 billion. Despite of deterioration of security situation, UN cut the budget human resources to MONUSCO. This affected its performance.

The relations between MONUSCO and FARDC declined. The Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (UNHRDDP) contributed to this. According to UN (2016), MONUSCO had also been mandated to co-operate with FARDC to conduct joint

operations and support FARDC operations against rebel groups. The UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy regulated the support to and cooperation with FARDC (UN, 2015c). The policy required all UN entities to be diligent in ensuring that support to non-UN security forces is provided in a manner that is in compliant with and promotes respect for international human rights and humanitarian laws (Aust, 2015). The support and operation cooperation between MONUSCO and FARDC was shaky and got terminated several times as a result of the policy because FARDC has been implicated in human rights violation. This strained the relationship with Congolese government, which considered that MONUSCO was using UNHRDDP as a punitive mechanism. During focus group discussions it was known that the implementations of the policy were not received well by the Congolese authority for various different reasons.

On the same, DRC was under the UN embargo, which had restricted its procurement of weapons since 2003 due to the continued violence in the country (Vines, 2007). The embargo was lifted in 2022. This capacitates the DRC forces improve their capabilities to face enemy combatants. However, this might cause more conflict with the population if the DRC forces will continue failing to dislodge the AGs. The DRC government has always giving arms restrictions as an excuse for efficiency of FARDC and other security forces. The effectiveness of MONUSCO depends on the capability of the FARDC. Lifting the arms embargo means the FARDC might be armed to provide required support to MONUSCO to enhance its effectiveness.

The assessment shows that regardless some challenges such as complexity of the

current security environment, frequent changes of mandate, and budgetary constraints, MONUSCO recorded some achievements in the DRC. First, it reunified the country and prevented recurrence of violent conflict like that in the first and second Congo wars. Second, it set conditions to ensure smooth delivery of humanitarian aid. Third, it helped to enhancing democratic conditions and it facilitated collection of information, and conducted observation, reporting and sharing intelligence with the UN, AU, EU, SADC, ICC, ICGLR, World Bank, Donors, media and public. Lastly, it is through MONUSCO that many IDPs have been resettled. Regardless of their weaknesses, PKOs in DRC are still needed. It is believed that after lifting the arms embargo FARDC will be more effective and perhaps DRC will be able to defend itself.

5.2.1.5 Force Intervention Brigade- 2013 to 2023

The last development of the UN forces in DRC was the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB). The FIB comprises of Tanzania, South Africa and Malawi. It was established by UNSCR 2098 of 2013 after the formation of M23 rebel group in DRC (Tull, 2018). As its name implies, FIB was mandated to use Chapter VII to carry out targeted offensive operations either unilaterally or jointly with FARDC in robust, highly mobile and versatile manner to neutralise and disarm AGs in DRC, beginning with M23 (UN, 2013c). This is as a retired general commented, “the formation of FIB from the SADC is acknowledging the failure of UN PKOs in response to rebellion” (Interview, Retired General, 23 November 2020, Dar es Salaam). Fabricius (2020) argues that the formation and operation of FIB is against the principles of traditional KOs. Article 12 of UNSCR 2098 of 2013 gives mandate to

FIB to cooperate with FARDC in carrying out “targeting operations against AGs, ensuring POC, and protecting UN personnel and facilities” (UN, 2013c). This mandate shows that the UN took position in a conflict for the first time, a deviation from the traditional peacekeeping principles. Pacholska (2015) points out that under the Safety Convention of 1994, UN Forces are protected against any attack from AGs.

The deployment of FIB was in response to the weakness of MONUSCO. While MONUSCO was still operating in the country, a new rebel group of M23 was formed and became increasingly active in eastern DRC. The UN Group of Experts on Congo (2014) showed that Rwanda was backing M23 (UN, 2014a). On 20 November 2012, M23 took control of Goma town (North Kivu Capital) with almost no resistance from the 1,500 MONUSCO and 7000 FARDC troops and disrupted security in the region (Kayode, 2014). Although MONUSCO defended its failure to protect Goma citing fear of inciting collateral damage to civilians, it frustrated different peace actors. For example, France gave a statement that “the failure of the MONUSCO with heavy weapons to halt the advance of lightly armed rebels was absurd” (Statement, France representative to UN, 21 November 2012, New York).

The FIB had 3,069 peacekeeping troops consisting of infantry, artillery, special forces, and a reconnaissance company. It also had attack helicopters. It began its operations in the DRC in August 2013. Therefore, MONUSCO had two forces in one from 2013, the framework of forces that conducted operations using traditional PKOs, and FIB which used Chapter VII to carry out “targeted offensive

operations”. Whittle (2015) argues that the deployment of FIB within MONUSCO complicated the use of that clause and brought complexity if the clause was applicable because the AGs were forced to fight back UN Forces. Subsequently, Muller (2015) argues that the presence of FIB put other MONUSCO peacekeepers at the risk of being target to AGs because AGs did not have the capability to distinguish between FIB and other forces. It was thus proposed that FIB be separated from the rest of MONUSCO and refrained from using the UN’s blue beret/helmet and other insignia to distinguish it from other neutral UN forces. During focus group discussions, it was learnt that the FIB would affect the general peace process because rebels would refrain from negotiations thinking that perhaps the UN forces would hunt them down as FIB had done.

The major success the FIB recorded in DRC was in November 2013, when together with FARDC, it defeated M23 rebel group (Day, 2017). Such an achievement of defeating a well organised rebel group like M23 was aired out and the UN thought that perhaps it will be its new dimension in dealing with AGs. However, some schools of thought differ. Day (2017) argues that the defeat of M23 was attributed by international pressure onto Rwanda to stop supporting M23. However, a retired General who was FIB commander commented:

We needed to differentiate between these AGs. M23 posture was that of a conventional army that used to hold ground outside the population and dominated high features. Due to that we were able to use our artillery and air power effectively without fear of collateral damage to civilians. The other AGs such as FDLR and ADF-NALU mixed deeply with local communities and as such it was hard to strike them without collateral damage. The solution for this is to fight asymmetrical warfare, which combines political, social and military strategies. This type of

operation takes a long time (Interview, Retired General, 25 October 2020, Dar es Salaam).

More sentiments behind the decisive defeat of the M23 were aired by a retired government official in Kinshasa:

The FIB stemmed from SADC members particularly Tanzania and South Africa with support for their friend Joseph Kabila against M23 rebel group. The FIB was fighting a proxy war by attacking M23 which was supported by Rwanda. By that time Rwanda's relationship with both Tanzania and South Africa was sour. So, FIB completed their assigned political assignment successfully and one cannot see FIB having the same fighting spirit against other armed groups (Interview, Retired Government Official, 27 February 2021, Kinshasa).

Sanga saw the emerging concept of African solutions to African problems having a contribution to the achievement of FIB. The FIB was formed by regional forces that had been conducting several joint military exercises and had political will to assist a fellow member state (Interview, Sanga, 25 August 2020, Dar es Salaam).

The assessment from documentary review, focus group discussions and interviews conducted by the researcher, shows that the FIB can be looked differently. The success of the FIB against M23 illustrates the strategic use of force for peace enforcement. The Brahimi report (2000) suggests the same. However, the cooperation between FIB and framework forces within MONUSCO remained constrained. MONUSCO headquarters advocated the concept of "One mission, one mandate, one force" to unify the MONUSCO (FIB and framework forces). This was not accepted by many, especially the framework forces. The forces have maintained the spirit of working under the three principles of PKOs of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force except for self-defence. The presence of two UN forces in the

DRC (FIB and Framework forces), each with a different mandate under one chain of command created operational friction between the missions. “The framework forces stopped engaging in any offensive operations, even those within their mandate perceiving that it was the FIB’s duty to do so” (Interview, Commander FIB, 19 February 2021, Goma). This compromised the effectiveness of PKOs. However, after the defeating the M23, the FIB was criticised for its failure to neutralise other AGs. It is really that FIB was deployed with political will and its deployment was based on the situation on the ground. This is because FIB came from region (SADC) where DRC is also a member. Its formation came after political discussions at different levels within SDAC.

On the same course, DRC was admitted as the seventh member of the EAC on 29 March 2022 during 19th Ordinary Summit of EAC Heads of State. Conflicts emerged between Rwanda and the DRC especially after the resurgence of M23 rebel group in April 2021 soon after the admission. DRC believed these were sponsored by Rwanda. The M23 rebel group has since been launching attacks inside the DRC. A Goma resident had this to say during an interview:

On 29 November 2021, I was at home in Kishishe with my husband and our three children when M23 fighters blocked the door and took my husband and our son Undele outside by force and warned me to stay inside the house. After a few seconds, I heard a gunshot and knew that they had shot my husband and son dead. Later I came to know that my husband was shot but survived and my son was killed (Interview, Maseli, 15 February 2023, Minigi).

This is one of many in Eastern DRC who lost family members because of conflict.

Because of the presumed Rwandese support to M23, the DRC announced it was severing all bilateral agreements with Rwanda. According to AFP (2022), the Congolese authorities expelled the Rwandese ambassador from the DRC on 29 October 2022. The DRC government spokesman Patrick Muyaya announced:

In recent days, we have realized an arrival of troops from Rwanda into the DRC to support M23 terrorists. This criminal and terrorist adventure forced thousands of people to flee their homes. Given Rwanda's continued support for the rebels, the DRC defence council, presided over by President Felix Tshisekedi gave the Rwandan Ambassador Vincent Karega 48 hours to leave the country. (Statement by Patrick Muyaya, the DRC government spokesperson, 29 October 2022).

But even before that action was taken, on 28 May 2022, the DRC government suspended the Rwanda Air flights to three cities of the DRC condemning Rwandese government of supporting M23 (DW, 2022).

Because of deterioration of security situation of eastern DRC, different initiatives have been taken by different actors. Wambui, (2022) provided that on 19 June 2022 East African Leaders agreed to deploy East African Community forces (EACRF) to the DRC to stabilize the security situation especially after the M23 occupied areas of the DRC. The question by many remained as to how this regional military force would manage to secure the DRC which the UN, with all its capability and efforts had failed. This question is supported by Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2007) who found that PKOs engaged by the UN are much more effective than those deployed by other organs because the UN has more resources compared to the other actors.

Basically, the origin of PKOs we are seeing today have been evolved from traditional PKOs to robust PKOs (peace enforcement) which allowed to uses force. In contrast

to the traditional PKOs which uses traditional PKOs principles emphasise neutral and lighter armed peacekeepers, the fourth generation of PKOs requires peacekeepers to be more aggressive with a robust posture. On the other hand, the purpose of UNPKOs deployed in DRC in different times have been resolving conflicts erupting in the country. ONUC was deployed after post-independence political conflict, MONUC was deployed to respond to the first Congo war (from 1996 to 1997) and the second Congo war from 1998 to 2003. On the same, MONUC was changed to MONUSCO to respond to the new challenges faced by the country after the 2006 elections. Lastly, FIB was deployed to deal with all AGs in DRC especially the M23 after deteriorating of the security situation. This is in line with the purpose of establishment of the UN, maintenance of global peace and security.

5.2.2 Origin and Purpose of UNPKOs in the Sudan (Darfur)

Before UN deployed its troops in Sudan (Darfur) there were initiatives from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the AU, the UN and other actors (Allen, 2010). The efforts resulted into deployment of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) which was deployed in Darfur on 28 May 2004, and it became operational on 19 June 2004, with 150 troops mainly observers (Flint, & De Waal, 2008). Ekengard (2008) provides that the AMIS suffered from poor planning before their deployment. They had unclear mission structure, weak operational and strategic command capability and lacked sufficient logistical support. On top of that, the GoS often interfered with the operation of the AMIS and sometimes the national army targeted the AMIS forces (UN, 2007b). It was observed further that the nature of the crisis necessitated the transformation of the AMIS (NCC, 2005).

5.2.2.1 Deployment of UNAMID

The deployment of joint United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) came after a long discussion which led into the UN adopting the UNSCR 1769 of 2007 under the initiative of the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) and UNSC to replace the AMIS (UN, 2007a). The recommendation for the formation of a hybrid mission was considered after the GoS refused to accept the deployment of non-African peacekeepers (Sava, 2007). The resolution mandated the UNAMID to have 20,000 troops and 6,500 police with a budget of US\$ 1.48 billion which was the largest budget for the PKOs in the world at the time (UN, 2007a). There were some adjustments in the resolution which stood out as concerns of other members (especially the Sudan) in the previous resolution. ‘The decision to replace the AMIS with UNAMID seemed to have been done under pressure from the media and other organisations which used to refer to the crisis in Darfur as a genocide. The UN did not want to repeat the mistake it did in Rwanda in 1994’ (Interview, Sahul, (Interview, Sahul, a resident of Darfur, 26 October 2020, Darfur). But the replacement of AMIS to UNAMID was in line with Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2007) who found that PKOs engaged by the UN are much more effective than those appointed by other organs.

The UNAMID, the first hybrid mission in history, was mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to use force in certain circumstances to protect civilian and it was the most restricted PKOs in terms of the host government consent (Spandler, 2020). “Apart from empowerment, there was no difference between the AMIS and UNAMID. The UN replaced the AMIS, by heeding the advice of international

organisations and the media, which warned of a repeat of the Rwanda genocide in Darfur” (Interview, Retired UNAMID Commander, 26 October 2020, Dar es Salaam). Apart from the POC being given priority in terms of mission mandate, some of the tasks mandated to the UNAMID were to give support to implementation of the DPA, supervision of ceasefire agreement, upholding rule of law, mediate intercommunal conflicts, render assistance to local institutions and a few others (UN, 2007a). The deployment of UNAMID when the GoS was still hesitant affected the effectiveness of UNAMID because consent and cooperation were key to success of any peacekeeping operation. The effectiveness of UNAMID was thus explained against these provisions in their mandate:

The initiative to come up with hybrid mission (UNAMID) from the AU and UN forces was to combine the political will of the AU in tandem with the spirit and concept of “African solution to African Problems” and the operational effectiveness of the UN. Basically, it can simply be said that the effectiveness of UNAMID (if any) came from this approach. (Interview, Retired Ambassador, 20 November 2020, Dar es Salaam).

From the quotes it is clear that this approach if it could have been well managed well, it could have been more effective.

During focus group discussion it was learnt that the plan to come up with a hybrid mission (UN-AU forces) in Darfur was a smart diplomatic deftness to end the stand-off between the UN and the GoS. It was a win-win situation for both parties. While the GoS saw the UNAMID as a continuation of the AMIS with just additional UN resources, the UN and other western countries saw UNAMID as UN forces co-badged with the AU to make them acceptable to the GoS. This win-win arrangement enabled UNAMID to be deployed. It was the first mission with UN chain of

command and dual reporting procedures (UN and AU). On this, the former UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon said “UNAMID is an unparalleled joint operation which reflects our shared determination to end the tragedy in Darfur once and for all” (Moon, 2015: 2).

The UNAMID mandate had been undergoing evolution over time. This has been affected its effectiveness. In 2014 AU PSC and UNSC reformed the UNAMID mandate and focused it on three priority tasks which were in force until the mission was closed. The first and the main task was POC, the second was to facilitate humanitarian delivery, monitoring and reporting on human rights violations while the third, was to facilitate and take part in mediation (AU, 2014; UN, 2014c). UNAMID fulfilled its mandate, especially POC by sending long, medium and short-range patrols, set check points, TOBs and POBs in different parts of Darfur especially around IDP Camps. Cameras were installed in some IDP camps to monitor AGs penetration. UNAMID conducted day and night armed patrols both mounted and dismounted. UNAMID also had quick reaction forces including armed helicopters at different levels. “When it was deployed, UNAMID was expected and was prepared to achieve POC mandate in a robust manner. The expectations were affected by the lack of political support and obstructions by the GoS (Interview, former UNAMID staff, 26 March 2021, Darfur).

The assessment shows that, it is difficult to conclude that UNAMID was effective in various areas such as improving GoS respect for human rights. It took different initiatives to sensitize the respect of human rights by training different stakeholders

such as police, rural judges and others. The efforts were challenged by the lack of political support from the GoS. This has also been acknowledged by (Tinsley, 2009). Because of this, then UNAMID became ineffective.

On the same, analysis shows that, the security situation of Darfur was improving with the presence of UNAMID. As such from 2015, the UNSC called for the reduction of troops and prepared to end the UNAMID mandate. However, the researcher when visited Darfur observed that many people had left Darfur and sought refuge in Chad or in IDP camps. UNSCR 2363 of 2017 called for the reduction of the strength of the troops in two stages. By the end of 2017 the strength of the troops was expected to be 11,395 and in mid-2018, UNAMID expected to have only eight battalions (8,735 troops) (UN, 2017).

The analysis indicates that, Al-Bashir did not want the UN Forces in Darfur. Generally, the Darfur conflict erupted when the conflict between America and Sudan was still there. United States was the first country to propose the replacement of AMIS by UN PKOs. It assessed that the Al-Bashir government knew that the United States wanted to replace the AMIS with UN PKOs so that it would influence it and in collaboration with other European countries, use it to topple Al-Bashir government. Secondly, some UN members do send peacekeepers implicitly to bolster their chances of consideration for permanent seat in the UN SC. For example, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Germany, Japan, Nigeria and Pakistan were said to harbour this ambition (Findlay, 1996).

During the planning and deployment of UNAMID, the bulk of preparations was on the issue of consent especially for the deployment of troops, giving minimum effort to political strategy for the peace process (Day, 2017). During the focus group discussion, it was realized that the UN forgot that PKOs must go hand in hand with political processes. It was until 2011, after the signing of the DDPD where the political process was involved. The obstructions of UNAMID operation by the GoS reduced the effectiveness of PKOs. “This means that the UN lost its US\$ 1 billion annually for the mission which failed to implement the mandate” (Interview, former UNAMID commander, 24 September 2020, Dar es Salaam). “From the preparation of UNAMID and their implementation, it was obvious that the mission was set to fail” (Interview, former UNAMID commander, 24 September 2020, Dar es Salaam).

Arrest warrants issued by the ICC on President Omar Al-Bashir in 2010 for aiding and abetting crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur missed the timing and complicated the peace process in Darfur (Goldston, 2010). The relation between UNAMID and GoS became tense because Al-Bashir thought that the UNAMID might be directed to arrest him any time.

5.2.2.2 From UNAMID to UNITAMS

Despite the fact that the conflict in Darfur has been difficult to resolve, the security situation has been improving in such a way that the UN-AU started thinking of an exit strategy of UNAMID. The UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 2559 of 2020 on 22 December 2020 to end UNAMID mandate on 31 December 2020 (UN, 2020k). As a result, from 1 January 2021, UNAMID started downsizing their troops

and equipment in phases up to June 2021 when all the troops were out of Darfur. From January to June 2021, the task which was performed by the UNAMID was characterized by the protection of missions withdraw activities (UNAMID, 2020). “It is the pressure from new GoS which forced UNAMID think of closing the mission but not from security point of view (Interview, Darfur resident, Darfur, 21 Marc 2021).

In the effort to replace UNAMID, the UN Security Council formed the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) under UNSCR 2524 of 2020 to be responsible for providing support to the political transition, peace processes and implementation of future peace agreements, including support for peace building efforts, and the rule of law (UN, 2020j). The UNITAMS and the UN Country Team were expected to continue supporting the GoS in the effort of addressing its multiple political and economic challenges related to peace and security (UN, 2020j).

Since then, the security situation in Sudan has remained tentative. Amnesty International (2020) reported that between July and September 2020, armed groups killed more than 70 people in areas under the Sudanese security forces. At the same time armed groups looted, raped and burnt houses, markets and shops. Following these incidents, more than 78 people were injured in armed attacks. HRW (2021) alluded that two weeks after the closure of the mission (16 January 2021), 150 people were killed, more than 190 injured and about 50,000 were displaced after Arab militia attacked Massalit residents in al-Genaina city. The 25 October 2021 coup

complicated the security of Darfur because the government concentrated on issues in Khartoum and forgot their commitment to the Juba agreement (Salin, 2021). The post-UNAMID peace and security challenges in Darfur were expected, because even the members of the Security Council differed when they adopted UNSCR 2524 of 2020 to end UNAMID mission (UN, 2020j). Overall, perhaps it would be too early to judge the effectiveness of UNAMID in bringing peace in Darfur.

The assessment shows that the decision of withdrawing the UNAMID and replacing them with UNITASS who had no mandate and capability of POC exposed Darfur to more atrocities. The UN could have waited until the new transition government of Sudan stabilized to have the ability to take responsibility of POC. This had been also noted by a former UNAMID staff who pointed out:

It was not the right time to withdraw the UNAMID because the causes of conflicts had not been addressed fully. The Juba agreement could not resolve the issue of marginalisation of people in Darfur, which remained as the major source of the crisis. Up to now the issue of land has not been addressed (Interview, former UNAMID staff, 28 March 2021, Darfur).

“The closure of UNAMID operations in Darfur emanated partly from pressure from the Trump administration supported by the GoS. Therefore, there is a possibility of recurrence of violence which would necessitate the deployment of UN PKOs as it did in Angola for UNAVEM I, II and III” (Interview, Kharid, 23 March 2021, Darfur). Equally, according to Fortna (2004), different studies show that almost all countries emerging from civil war are bound to relapse into a conflict after ten years. In fact, the situation in Darfur has remained bad to worse since February 2023.

A resident in Darfur made the following observation:

The security situation in Darfur is still bad. The international community are now paying attention to the Russia and Ukraine War and sometimes reluctantly on the Tigray conflict in Ethiopia giving little, if any attention to Darfur. People in that part of the world are still killed and IDPs are on the increase. If Darfur will not be stable, no one should expect Sudan to be stable (Interview, Darfur Resident, Darfur, 08 February 2023).

This observation was true because on 15 April 2023, there was an eruption of conflict between Sudan Armed Forces “SAF” (government forces) loyal to General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) loyal to General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. Up to when the study was prepared, the conflict was still going on in Sudan which left hundreds of people dead and thousands as IDPs.

Basically, the origin of PKOs we are seeing today have been evolved from traditional PKOs to robust PKOs (peace enforcement) which allowed to use force. In contrast to the traditional PKOs which uses traditional PKOs principles emphasise neutral and lighter armed peacekeepers, the fourth generation of PKOs requires peacekeepers to be more aggressive with a robust posture. On other hand, purpose of UNPKOs deployed in Sudan (Darfur) have been resolving conflicts erupting in the country. The deployment of AMIS which was later been replaced by UNAMID was to respond to the conflict which erupted in Darfur in 2003. When situation was improving, the UN closed the UNAMID operation and deployed UNITAMS to be responsible for providing support to the political transition, peace processes and implementation of future peace agreements. This is in line with the purpose of establishment of the UN, maintenance of global peace and security.

5.2.3 Objective 2: Mode of Operations and Challenges Faced by UNPKOs in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur)

The PKOs in DRC and Sudan (Darfur) have common mode of operations. The mode of operations used in both missions have been using force (peace enforcement). Basically, due to increased security challenges which peacekeepers faced, PKOs had been evolved over time. PKOs we are seen today have been evolved from the traditional PKOs to a robust one where the use of force has been allowed. In contrast to the traditional PKOs which uses traditional PKOs principles emphasise neutral and lighter armed peacekeepers, the fourth generation of PKOs requires peacekeepers to be more aggressive with a robust posture. However, the two mission also used basic operations of the UNPKOs in protecting civilians by sending long, sending long, medium and short-range patrols, setting up check points, deployment of Temporary Operation Bases (TOBs) and Permanent Operation Bases (POBs) in different vulnerable areas. There are areas where there were installations of Cameras, especially in some IDP camps to monitor AGs penetration. There were day and night armed patrols both mounted and dismounted. Air patrols were also done mostly using helicopters and drones. Drones were mostly used in DRC. In both missions, there were quick reaction forces including armed helicopters at different levels. They both initiated and run by the UN though AU was also involved in initiation and operations of UNAMID. They all followed the UN Principles of PKOs, consent, impartiality and minimum use of forces except for self-defence. These principles have been challenged by many scholars such as Findlay (2002), Finnemore (2019), Von Hippel (2000), and even Brahimi report, but the PKOs in these two countries used them. They were all responsible to UN Secretary General

who controlled their operations and logistics. Their mandates were extended yearly, and the missions were subjected to assessment before extensions.

The challenges which effected their effectiveness are diverse. The first challenge which affected all PKOs deployed in DRC and Sudan (Darfur) is the complexity of the current security environment. The contemporary PKOs environment have witnessed small-scale, lightly armed, high-tech-enabled, mounted groups capable of inflicting great damage in short periods of time. Their form of hostility is hard to identify as they do not model or shaped themselves as traditional adversaries do. There is also an evolving threat of violent extremism, transnational terrorism, and transnational organized crime, which bring about unimaginable collateral damage. This has created a need for PSOs to increase involvement in the protection of civilians, and security from terrorists, terrorist groups, and criminal gangs. It has become increasingly difficult to characterize warfare, armed conflicts, and civil movements that have taken place in mission areas. This environment is a big challenge for peacekeepers to operate. Today illegal activities of state and non-state actors often emerge within a nation or region in the form of internal riots, falls of legal institutions, crises, and armed conflicts. This shows that monitoring ceasefire agreements and protecting civilians – which are the main forms of traditional peacekeeping operations – are not always effective. PKOs requires a wide range of social and military activities in cooperation with the host country's legitimate institutions to support or restore a host country's government and social institutions in order to make them sustainable and independent.

There was also complexity of the conflicts themselves which involves different actors including internal and external actors with complex interests and methods they used to achieve their interests. The actors for example to DRC and Sudan (Darfur) conflicts ranges from state, non-state, local, regional, national and international. Numerous numbers these actors are escalating violence due to their struggles in seeking for economy space to uproot. That phenomenon links with the political economy theory whereby, Ikelegbe (2005) argues that, if a country is wealth in terms of natural resources, it is vulnerable to conflict.

The other challenge is mandate. The mandate has explained in Section 2.2.5 and discussed in detail in Section 5.4.4.3 below. To be effective mandate of PKOs must be workable and must conform with the situation on the ground, but it was not the same for these missions. The UNAMID mandate had been undergoing evolution over time with many tasks. The mandate was changing frequently, not directly which results into ineffectiveness of PKOs. For PKOs in DRC situation was the same. For example, the three ONUC mandates (UNSCR 143, 146, and 169) and General Assembly Resolution 161 failed to establish under which article of the UN Charter they were referred, and they had no deadline for the Belgium forces to withdraw from the Congo. The assessment shows that, the formulations of ONUC mandates were based on balancing of agreement to accommodate positions of both blocs. For the MONUC up to 2002 the UN had passed about 11 resolutions and had extended the MONUC mandate six times. POC was mandated only ‘within the mission’s capabilities’ (Karlsrud, 2015).

On the same note, the report by Amnesty International (2003) shows that there were weaknesses of formulation of mandate and failures in interpreting it. Bernath and Edgerton (2003) observed that the weakness to interpret the mandate was revealed on 14 May 2002 in Kisangani when RCD rebel combatants killed dozens of civilians near MONUC camp without any intervention from the mission. When asked why they failed to intervene, they simply said that; “the mandate wants us to take necessary action, in the areas of deployment of infantry battalions and to protect civilians. There were no infantry units among those present, therefore it was not within DRC capacity to protect civilians, even though they were certainly under eminent threat of physical violence” (Bernath and Edgerton, 2003:2). Apart from POC, the MONUC mandate covered about 41 tasks implementation of which were limited due to inadequate resources (UN,1999). Soon MONUC was given a multidimensional mandate with about forty tasks, POC taking precedence. MONUC operation in the DRC set as an example of challenges of PKOs with limited resources, understaffed and spread to remote, austere and volatile region. It operated in partial consent, limited governance, low political commitment for peace with many spoilers. Apart from the reasons mentioned by MONUSCO staff above, the other reason might be the vagueness in mandate where Gibbs (1997) asserts that most of the times, there was a mismatch between the mandate given and the real situation on the ground. The tone of POC in mandate was always not pitched probably to avoid consequences especially on the part of “use of deadly force”. Up to now the use of force in POC is a taboo as such it is a sensitive issue to decide.

Also, the mandate given was and still vague and needs to be translated and operationalized. For example, the meaning of “protection of civilians who are under imminent threat of physical violence” is not adequately clear. One needs to translate these phrases which can distort the real meaning intended by the UN. “The UN knows the problem of mandate phrasing but is doing so to trap commanders on the ground in case something goes wrong” (Interview, MONUSCO Commander, 14 February 2021, Goma). Experience shows that the use of force is important to effectively protect civilians and to achieve other PKOs goals. The achievement of MONUC in supervision of 2006 elections was due to the effective use of force to deter any spoilers.

Both PKOs in DRC and Sudan (Darfur) suffered little cooperation from the respective government (host nations). The role and responsibility of host nations has been discussed in Section 4.7 above. In DRC all MONUC and MONUSCO have been accorded very little cooperations and at times it threatened to revoke the consent. Coleman (2014) provides that in 2009 during the celebration of 50 years of the DRC independence, President Joseph Kabila called for peacekeepers to start retreating arguing that the country was stable (IPI, 2011). The DRC government has remained on record for repeatedly asking for the withdrawal of the MONUSCO and accusing them of interfering with the country’s sovereignty (Ilunga, 2019). Coleman (2014), provided that in 2009 during the celebrations of 50 years of the DRC independence, President Joseph Kabila called for peacekeepers to start preparing to withdraw, arguing that the country was stable enough to resolve its security challenges (IPI, 2011). Kabila reiterated this call in 2018 when he said,

“Congo is not Lebanon or Cyprus where the UN has deployed peacekeepers for more than 30 years” (Big Man in Congo, 2018).

Likewise, PKOs in Sudan (Darfur) had the same challenges of limited cooperation. Tubiana (2013), present that, though GoS gave consent for UNAMID deployment, that consent was not translated into cooperation in the field. Instead, UNAMID’s operations were always obstructed by the GoS. According to Kreps (2007), from the beginning, the GoS was reluctant to support the deployment of UNAMID and therefore, it deliberately frustrated its deployment. It took more than five months for Sudan to start allowing troops to deploy in Sudan. On the same, the GoS interfered with UNAMID operations (AU, 2018). The GoS deliberately delayed and sometimes refused to issue visa to UNAMID staff, to set curfew, to restrict air and ground movement especially into conflicting areas and deliberately delayed custom clearance especially for important equipment without any sound reasons (Kreps, 2007). The GoS took a long time to allocate land for UNAMID bases. The deployment challenges mentioned took more than three years. Sometimes the GoS was going against Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) which the GoS signed. “On some occasion, the GoS used the UN colours and insignia on their vehicles and helicopters for the purpose of disguising which brought confusion in mission area” (Interview, former UNAMID Staff, 25 March 2021, Nyala). The GoS also rejected troops from some countries without sound reasons. For example, President Omar el Bashir stated as follows:

We refused to receive engineers from Norway and Sweden, and we will not accept this even in future. We are convinced that the elements whom they insist to send to us from Sweden and Norway

are intelligence elements; namely, MOSSAD and CIA. The boots of those who blasphemed the prophet Muhammad would never walk on Sudanese land” (AFP, 2007).

However, there were arguments raised that it was not right for the UN to give such power to the GoS such as to decide which countries should be part of UNAMID because the GoS was also an actor in the conflict. The views of respondents to the differed on this matter. Some were surprised as to why the UN let terrorist government (GoS) to decide about the composition of UNAMID. But the analysis shows that Al-Bashir wanted troops from Africa because the troops from the latter source did not have interests in Sudan compared to the motives of Western countries. There were those who failed to understand Al-Bashir who denounced troops from Europe because they blasphemed Prophet Muhammad, while the same were deployed in Sudan in the United Nations Mission.

Regardless of the different infringements of SOFA such as access denial, targeting peacekeepers, obstruction of UNAMID operations, the UN and AU never stood up to condemn (Mamiya et.al 2020). “It seemed the members of the UNSC and AUPSC were divided. That is why they failed to force the GoS to fulfil their commitment” (Interview, former UNAMID staff, 25 March 2021). As a retired general put it, “the Al-Bashir government perceived UNAMID as a ‘Trojan horse’ which tries to infiltrate European spies into Sudan. They believed the intention was just to topple his government” (Interview, Retired General, 23 October 2020, Dar es Salaam).

The GoS had bad relations with all international institutions in Darfur and also with its local populations. “We had a big challenge in dealing with the government which

was not accepted by the population. The GoS sometimes used to stop us from dispersing relief services to some areas for the reasons that those areas were ‘enemies’ of the government” (Interview, Retired UNAMID Deputy Force Commander, 25 October 2020, Dar es Salaam).

There was a challenge whereby some AGs in DRC and Darfur did not sign ceasefire agreements. MONUC and MONUSCO failed to disarm the AGs because most of them were not signatory to the Lusaka Peace Accord (Yabadi, 2011: 8-9). Some important actors to the conflict such as Mai Mai Banyamulenge did not sign it and some of those who signed it did not fulfil their obligations and so, war continued soon after the agreement. For the Darfur, Prendergast, and Jensen (2007) show that there was also the lack or slow implementation of different agreements which the UN signed with different parties especially the warring parties in Darfur. This trend which was commonly referred to as “barking without biting” affected the Darfur peace process as those parties (especially the GoS) disrespected the agreement. Because of this, UNAMID failed to achieve cessation of hostilities as they were keeping the peace which indeed was not there (De Waal, 2007). In addition, even those who were signatory to the agreement also failed to respect the agreement. These AGs did not respect the agreement and as such, they targeted UNAMID troops. Government forces orchestrated some of these attacks for intimidation and retribution. For example, the report of Panel of Experts in Sudan (2008) shows that in 2008 government forces attacked UNAMID base in Muhajeria (UN, 2008). UN (2021) provide that from 2007-2020, UNAMID recorded 295 fatalities, the second

highest in the history of UN missions. The leading was the 40-year UN Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) where there were 323 fatalities.

The external interference was also a challenge particularly to DRC. Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi continued intervening in the DRC for different reasons. The International Business Publications (2009) showed that Uganda's intervention in the DRC meant to fight the ADF-NALU while Rwanda was more concerned with the presence of FDLR in the DRC. Burundi on their part was engaged in the DRC affairs in search of FNL which operated from the DRC. This situation links with political economy theory which Ikelegbe (2005) concluded that the resource interest was the main influence of the interventions from neighboring states all of which wanted to exploit the country's natural resources under the disguise of trying to resolve the conflict. "Rwanda will continue to intervene in the DRC as long as the FDLR are still in that part of Africa" (Interview, member of diplomatic corps, Dar es Salaam, 24 November 202). A retired civil servant in Kinshasa differed with the above statement saying:

Rwanda's intervention in the DRC is more for economic reasons than security reasons. Rwanda has no minerals. It is exporting tantalum and tungsten from the DRC. Where do you think these minerals come from? If you go to Rwanda, ask for the area called "Merci Congo". This area has been built from money obtained from smuggling minerals from the Congo (Interview, retired civil servant, Kinshasa, 24 February 2020).

This fact is linked with the political economy theory which Mitra and Ray (2014), sum up that civil wars or other forms of conflicts supported by natural resources are more likely to last long because peace processes are always abandoned by the war

instigators. It is also supported by Reyntjens (2001) who pointed economic reasons as the motives for neighbouring countries to intervene in the DRC.

The international community did not react when Rwanda invaded the DRC in the pretext of fighting the FDLR. The UN felt guilty after the UN failure to stop the genocide and as such the UN has been accepting any claim raised by Rwandese in support of invading the DRC to fight those who perpetrated genocide (Interview, Yaniki, 16 February 2021, Goma).

The other challenge is slowness in interventions. According to Brosché (2022), there also was slowness in intervention in the Darfur conflict and this was attributed by different factors. The first was SC politics whereby China, Qatar and Russia stood against the deployment of PKOs in Darfur because they perceived it was an internal issue. The second reason was the bureaucratic procedures of the UN to deploy PKOs which involve many stages and procedures. On this, the former French President Nicolas Sarkozy said that silence was killing Darfur (Murphy, 2007). This is also discussed in detailed in Section 5.4.4.4 below.

For UNAMID, there were challenge of equipment and weapons. Powerful countries which are the traditional providers of equipment to UN PKOs hesitated to do so for UNAMID which was ostensibly an “African dominated mission”. This was in fear of mismanagement, and they were not confident with how hybrid management may protect their equipment (AP, 2007). There were also logistical problems caused by poor infrastructures, especially roads which were not passable during the rainy seasons. This affects both PKOs in DRC and that of Darfur. For Darfur, there were inadequate resources, lack of mission support personnel, electricians, plumbers, and others (Adeniji, Halidu, & James, 2015). Luqman (2012) noted that UNAMID had

big financial challenges especially during their first two years as countries and agencies pledged to donate funds for the mission but did not do so on time. Troop contributing countries also procrastinated in meeting their obligations.

Another challenge was the indiscipline of some peacekeepers which also has been discussed in detail in Section 5.4.4.8 below. For example, Kovatch (2016) points out that UN Peacekeepers in the DRC had the highest rate of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) among all the UN missions. Due to the increasing level of SEA in UN PKOs, the UN adopted UNSCR 2272 of 2016 calling for the UN to repatriate all military and police units that proved beyond reasonable doubt to have been involved in SEA (UN, 2016a). Sometimes civilians used to formulate false accusations against peacekeepers on SEA. They knew that to avoid being implicated, peacekeepers were likely to negotiate to settle down the case by paying the amount of money because they knew that the UN had zero tolerance policy on SEA (Interview, MONUSCO peacekeeper, 12 February 2021, Goma). On the Darfur, there were reports of SEA in UNAMID, but it was difficult to find evidence for that. Analysis shows that the SEA in the Muslim world was and still is a sensitive issue, and no one would give evidence even women and girls who were supposedly victims of rape. Lastly, there were problems related to extra-marital relationships between UNAMID officials and peacekeeping forces resulting in bearing children outside marriage (Adeniji, Halidu & James, 2015).

There was a challenge to UNAMID where the AU could not fund UNAMID, for which the UN bore the burden. Therefore, although the partnership called for equal voice by all parties, the UN dominated the scene. Also, AU lacked experience in

running PKOs. The analysis shows that the cooperation between the UN and the AU was sometimes shrouded with mistrust, conflict, and tension which hindered performance especially in the beginning. Therefore, the hybrid between the two different organs (UN and AU) with many disparities in terms of experience and resources sometimes brought complexity in running PKOs. “Instead of dual, the mission had been duelling” (Interview, former UNAMID staff, 23 March 2021, Darfur).

Doss (2009) points out that PKOs in DRC and Darfur faced the challenge of limited troops. For example, up to 2008 when MONUC was at its maximum, it had approximately average of one soldier to protect about 900 civilians which was and still is quite low compared to the international ratio which Quinlivan (1995) notes is three peacekeepers to protecting 1000 civilian population. Their strength was minimal compared with the number of AGs.

5.2.4 Objective3: The Effectiveness of UNPKOs in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur)

5.2.4.1 General Assessment of the Effectiveness of PKOs

The discussions on effectiveness of PKOs have been covered in Section 2.3 and 4.5 above. Through those discussion, it was agreed the protection of civilians (POC) which basically stands as the fundamental duty of any PKO be used to assess the effectiveness of PKOs. Principally, POC is an integrated and coordinated activity by civilians and uniformed mission components within mission’s capabilities and areas of deployment, through the use of all necessary means, including deadly force to

protect civilians under imminent threats for their lives (UN, 2020f). Hultman (2017) shows that POC has been the major task of about 98% of PKO' mandates and has unambiguous directives, that POC is a priority in terms of allocation of resources and military capabilities. Holt and Berkman (2006) asserted that, the International Committee of the Red Cross defined POC as all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of individuals in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law. Prevention of war, supporting development activities advocating for international legal principles and DDR processes fall under the ambit of POC (Holt & Berkman, 2006). It should be recalled here that the concept of POC remains also as the core and one of the original aims of establishing the UN whereby explicitly it is provided that the aim of the UN is to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war (UN, 1945), that is to prevent civilians from the miseries of war.

The DPKO admitted on its website that POC is “a challenging mandate and yardstick by which public officers are often judged” (UN, 2013b). The biggest failure of the UNAMIR in Rwanda was the failure to protect civilians from the effects of war (Winfield, 1999). This means that POC is a very important and critical function of any PKO and if failed, then the mission can be regarded as having failed in its mandate.

The decision to launch early attacks on M23 when Kampala Peace talks were continuing was in protection of civilians. The attackers started by posing threats to civilians and by killing, harassing and kidnapping them. If it could have not been for the POC issues, perhaps they would not have tested our early fire power” (Interview, former FIB Commander, 12 August 2020, Dodoma).

The UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) established by UNSCR 1270 of 1999 was the first UN mission with the emphasized mandate of POC (UN, 1999d). Nevertheless, POC has evolved over time and has been given more emphasis following the UN failures in the 1990s especially in Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia where there were mass killings and atrocities to innocent civilians (Ruggeri, Dorussen & Gizelis 2017). Following the report of those failures, POC became the central agenda of the UN and in 1999, the UN adopted UNSCR 1265 of 1999 emphasizing POC to be the fundamental duty of any PKO (UN, 1999c). The UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was the first mission with the emphasis on POC put in actuality (UN, 1999a).

POC has also been stressed by the UN High Level Independent Panel on PKOs of 2015 which observed that the fundamental principles of PKOs (consent, impartiality, and limited use of force) should never be an excuse for failure in POC (UN, 2015b). The former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld stressed that the UN can and should never justify being witnesses to serious atrocities to civilians, even if mandates only allowed force in self-defense (Wills, 2009). These two examples signify that if POC is achieved by a PKO, then that mission will be assessed as effective. A UNAMID staff commented that “you can do everything in mission area but if you fail to protect civilians, you are nothing” (Interview, former UNAMID Staff, 28 March 2021, Darfur).

5.2.4.2 Effectiveness of PKOs in the DRC

As discussed in Sections 2.3, 4.5 and 5.2.3.1 above, POC will be used to assess the effectiveness of PKOs in DRC. It will be analysed using seven selected indicators namely, reduction in the number of violations of cease-fire agreements by conflicting parties, decrease in the number of recorded deaths and casualties, cut in the number of recorded incidents of violations of IHL and IHRL, decline in the number of grave violations against children's rights, decrease in the recorded numbers of civilians killed as a result of inter- or intra-communal violence, diminution in the number of new IDPs and refugees recorded and increase in the number of armed elements that voluntarily lay down their weapons. These indicators in all cases affect the efforts for the POC in a given area.

According to UN Peace Agreements Database, there have been about 18 Peace Agreements in the DRC since 1999. Basically, almost all the agreements have been violated with the exception of the Lusaka cease fire agreement which remains applicable up to now. Some of these agreements were Declaration of Fundamental Principles of the Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations signed on 4 May 2001, peace agreement between the government and the CNDP signed on 23 March 2009, the Agenda for Dialogue between the government of the DRC and the M23 on the situation in Eastern Congo signed on 16 January 2013 and Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the region signed on 24 February 2021.

The main agreement which is still applicable to date was the Lusaka cease-fire agreement which was signed on 10 July 1999 (Barrera, 2015). This agreement has

remained as the source and basis for the deployment of the MONUC under UNSCR 1279 of 1999 (UN, 1999b). During focus group discussion it was alluded that, the main objective of the agreement was just to stop the fights but not to bring permanent peace in areas of conflict. The terms and conditions for the agreement were difficult for the government to fulfil. The formation of M23 was the result of the agreement.

In 2020 about 2,487 people were killed including 492 women and 251 children in the DRC (UNJHRO, 2020). This was an increase of 142% compared to figures of 2019 where 1,029 were killed including 243 women and 73 children. AGs and other militia, particularly ADF-NALU were held responsible for these killings (UNJHRO, 2020). When researcher visited in Beni, he observed about 89 new graves on the graveyard indicating that there is an increase of new killings in the area. Traditionally, in DRC when group of people have been killed, the society around that particular area are used to bury them at once at the same graveyard. The focus group discussion further identified that ADF-NALU was leading among the AGs for causing deaths and casualties among innocent civilians for just reprisal after the FARDC and the UN launched operations against the group. Surprisingly, according to UNJHRO report, state agents such as police, FARDC and others were also responsible for the death of many innocent civilians. The report indicates that state agents were responsible for 43 percent of all the documented cases of human rights violations such as extrajudicial executions. The number of people killed was expected to increase as the ADF-NALU had adopted suicide attack tactics. A diplomat in Tanzania commented “the DRC requires strong reforms in the country’s Security Sector to enable security organs to observe and abide by their specific

responsibilities. Poor training, weak leadership, indiscipline, reprisal and others were the main causes of atrocities by the state authority (Interview, Diplomat, 16 October 2020, Dare es Salaam).

The killing of Italian Ambassador to the DRC, Luca Attanasio on 23 February 2021 in North Kivu province by unknown AGs was a clear sign that the situation in Eastern DRC was and still is not stabilized (UN, 2021e). The killing of the ambassador happened in the same region where in 2018 British tourists were kidnapped by AGs before they were released unconditionally (UN, 2019c). The shooting of the UN helicopter presumably by M23 rebels killing 8 peacekeepers on 29 March 2022 in Eastern DRC shows that peace was and still is a tentative matter (UN, 2020e).

According to the UN Joint Human Rights Office, from 1 January 2019 to 30 June 2020, the ADF-NALU alone were responsible for killing 1,066 civilians, wounding 176 and abducting 717 in North Kivu and Ituri in the DRC (UN, 2020i). During the same period, 59 children were recruited, and many civilian houses were attacked and looted which led to displacement of people. Government forces were responsible for these incidents (UN, 2020i). For example, according to UNJHRO, from October 2019 to June 2020 about 14 civilians were killed, 49 injured and 297 detained by government forces. These human rights violations increased the distrust of the population towards government defence forces and security organs. In 2020 alone, the UN Joint Human Rights Office recorded about 7,909 violations and abuses of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in the DRC.

This was an average of 569 violations per month (UNJHRO, 2020). This data shows that there was an increase of 21% Hrviolations compared to 2019. There were many unrecorded human rights violations done by AGs and government forces because as a result of the nature of incidents, locations where they occurred and absence of authentic recording agents and system. During the visit to Kiwanja, DRC the researchers witnessed mass graves, burnt villages and left-over human remains. A civilian in Goma commented that, “not all AGs commit human rights violations against civilians, others like FDLR protect them because they are part and parcel of the society (Interview, Goma resident, 12 February 2021, Goma).

According to the Security Council Report of 2020 on Children and Armed Conflicts in the DRC (UN, 2020h), between 2014-2020, there were over 11,500 grave violations against children verified by the UN. This was a 60% increase compared to the figures between 2008-2014 where 7,155 violations were recorded and verified. The UNICEF report of 2021 shows that during 2021 there was an estimated 50,000 displaced people in the DRC including 27, 000 children (UNICEF, 2021). The children lacked water access, shelter and food. These incidents were done by more than 40 parties to the conflicts including government security forces. The report showed that in 2017 government security forces committed about 49% of all criminal incidents (UN, 2018a). The report further showed that about 7,700 children were separated from armed groups, and of those, 1,500 were separated before they re-joined AGs again (UN, 2018a). They included all six major violations against children in times of war: recruitment or use of children in armed conflict, sexual violence, attacks on schools or health facilities, killing and maiming, abductions

and denial of access to humanitarian services for children A resident in Beni observed that:

Most Congolese families have more than three children. When war breaks out, children are left behind as parents especially mothers could not run with them, resulting in violations against the children by AGs. Children were also vulnerable to recruitment into the army by AGs. In Kasai, AGs attacked schools and took about 110 students who were believed to be recruited into rebel groups". (Interview, Beni resident, 26 February 2021, Beni)

Karbo and Mutisi (2012) assert that there were more than 500 ethnic groups in the DRC alienated in tribes, clans, and families which were the sources of inter- or intra-communal violence based on the control of resources, especially land and minerals. Inter- or intra-communal violence can actually result in the formation of AGs to defend themselves from other communal groups (Hoffmann & Vlassenroot, 2014). Huggins (2010) argues that in the DRC, land, especially at local level was and still is treated as an important factor associated with a people's identity and power. Land has caused many antagonistic relations between ethnic groupings. Basically, the historic conflicts amongst the Tutsi, Hema and Banyamulenge pastoralists against farmers' communities in the DRC were amongst the factors that led to the involvement of Rwanda in the Congo conflicts (Beaudoin, 2013).

There have been many communal conflicts in the DRC including the conflicts between Tutsi and Hunde in Masisi, the conflicts in Ituri between Hema and Lendu and the conflict in Fizi between Babembe and Banyamulenge all of which were based on control of land (Willame, 1997). United Nations Joint Human Right Office asserted that between 2017- 2019 a total of 701 people were killed as a result of inter-communal tensions in the DRC. This was an increase of 205 people compared

to the number of incidences during 2015-2017 (UNJHRO, 2019). “Most communal conflicts were not resolved because the residents of Goma lacked strong grassroots leadership to manage local conflicts” (Interview, Beni resident, 13 February, Goma). During the visit to Beni, a researcher witnessed crowds of cows grazing. He was informed some of them came from Uganda.

The conflict in the DRC has produced numerous refugees and IDPs. According to UNHCR, in 2017 the DRC had 4.49 million IDPs and 630,500 refugees hosted in neighbouring countries of which 78% were women and children. About 53% of all the refugees were under 18 years of age (UNHCR, 2018). However, according to 2021 UN High Commission for Refugees Global focus (UNHCR, 2021), the numbers of IDPs in the DRC were 5,059,095 in 2018; 7,699,931 in 2019 and 6,999,218 in 2020. From this data, there appears to be a decrease of about 7% IDPs in 2020 compared to 2019. On the other hand, the report shows that the number of refugees decreased by 14% from 630,500 in 2017 to 540,000 in 2021 (UNHCR, 2021). When visited Kiwanja, the researcher observed some unoccupied camps within IDPs camps meaning that some people had left the camps.

The decrease in the number of refugees and IDPS was a result of different measures taken by different actors encouraging IDPs and refugees to return to their villages after improvement of the security situations there. However, a Beni resident observed “the issue is not improvement of security situation, but the living conditions in most of the IDP and refugee camps which are very bad and so force people to return where they had been living before” (Interview, Beni Resident, 26 February 2021, Beni).

During the focus group discussion, it was revealed that because of ethnic relations, some cows from neighbouring Rwanda and Uganda are grazing in DRC.

After signing different peace agreements in the DRC, there have been different initiatives to encourage combatants from different AGs to voluntarily lay down their weapons. The adoption of UNSCR 2098 of 2013 and UNSCR 2147 of 2014, supported the development of comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRRR) programmes (UN, 2013c) and (UN, 2014b). Also, the UN called for the Congolese government to initiate well-coordinated Security Sector Reforms (SSR) and MONUSCO supported the efforts made. The defeat of M23 in 2013 by the FIB and FARDC forced several other AGs to surrender and lay down their weapons through the DDR programmes.

The report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, 2018 provides that DDR I and II programmes (2016-2018) succeeded and as a result 111,053 ex combatants were reintegrated compared to previous figures of (2014-2016) where about 80,234 combatants were integrated (OIOS, 2018). The trends have been slow because of the lack of funds, poor living conditions, the lack of sustainable economic activities and incidences of violence in the DDR camps. From this data, there has been an increase in the number new armed elements undergoing the DDR process. A former combatant observed:

We were about 800 combatants willingly demobilised in 2014 after being promised acceptance for enrolment in FARDC, but we went back to re-join our former AGs after the government failed to fulfil their promise. For example, I decided to come back alone in 2019 and became a motorcycle taxi driver by using the money I got from the sale of my

collected minerals. Most of my colleagues are still lingering in the camps. (Interview, former combatant, 27 February 2021, Beni)

From the interviews, documentary reviews, observations and focus group discussions, it can be analysed that the effectiveness of MONUC and MONUSCO on POC has been low. Apart from the decrease of about 7% of IDPs in 2020 compared to 2019 and an increase in the number new armed elements undergoing DDR process, all other indicators show that there has been an increase in concerns for POC the DRC. This has been and still is one of the main indicators of ineffectiveness of PKOs. Interviews with Congolese citizens and MONUSCO staff highlighted arguments for the effectiveness of UNPKOs in the DRC. Most of the normal Congolese citizens especially from areas which are affected by conflicts (North and South Kivu), particularly in Beni area, harbour negative views about the assumed effectiveness of UN forces. Their argument can be summarized from one of the interviews:

If the UN gives MONUC/MONUSCO POC as their priority task, why are they failing to protect us? Why is the situation not improving and the number of people killed is always on the increase? Why has MONUSCO failed to eliminate the AGs while its arsenals (drones, gunship, artillery and others) and their numbers are much bigger compared to those of AGs who are few and using only machine guns and Rocket Propelled Gun (RPG)?” (Interview, Goma resident, Goma, 12 February 2021)

Over time, citizens know other contingents that are not committed to protecting them; they are simply there for their interests especially economic benefits. They know some contingents are involved in smuggling minerals, others are spies and others are there to sexually abuse women and children and ignore their families. The UN forces have been in the DRC for so long, reinforcing the perception that

MONUSCO and other beneficiaries intentionally do not want to finish the conflict in the DRC.

Some of them, especially those living in Kinshasa (educated), are always assessing the effectiveness of POC on a bigger picture, admitting the effectiveness and weakness of PKOs in the DRC. A respondent had this to say:

Due to the size of the country, poor infrastructure networks and nature of terrain (jungle), it is difficult to ensure POC for all the Congolese who are scattered in different areas within the DRC. Contrary to other missions, the UN in the Congo face a complex conflict, with much external influence and different actors who keep instigating the conflict to benefit from the country's natural resources. The UN has done a lot and if it is not because of their presence the situation could have been much worse and perhaps the country could have been divided into two or more. It is because of the UN that some social and economic development initiatives have been realized such as schools, health care centres, and others" (Interview, Beni resident, Beni, 20 March 2021).

The observation from focus group discussion was that the obligation to protect civilians lies in the hands of the government of the DRC. UN forces are there to supplement the efforts by the Government on POC. Why is DRC blaming UN forces for the weakness of the government? The Congolese on the affected areas also are benefit from the UN mission. They are getting a lot from the mission in terms of business opportunities.

On the other hand, many MONUSCO staff/peacekeepers saw troops and budget cut, understaffing, limited resources, working in volatile condition with partial consent from the government and limitations on the part of FARDC troops, as obstacles in accomplishing their mandate. They acknowledged that

MONUC/MONUSCO cannot protect civilians alone without the support from the government. Therefore, the government should take the lead in the POC.

It is inspiring to note that UN Missions in the DRC have been good, although not as much as expected, operating with comparatively limited resources and troops. The forces have been trying to do their best to accomplish habitually unrealistic mandates. Measuring effectiveness needs to revisit the mandate given against the means given to undertake a task (Interview, MONUSCO staff, 23 March 2021, Kinshasa).

The violent anti MONUSCO demonstrations in the DRC started in 2014 after the population felt insecure due to increased incidents of killing innocent people. Nantulya (2019) assert that from 2014 to 2018, the number of deaths of civilians and MONUSCO troops linked to ADF-NALU reached 700. According to the Human Rights Watch (2019), more than 1900 civilians were killed and more than 3,300 abducted in North and South Kivu from June 2017 to June 2019 (HRW, 2019). However, from 2019, there have been new waves of increases of killing of civilians in Beni area.

According to the Organisation for World Peace, reacting to that from 24 November 2019, there was a series of anti-MONUSCO violent demonstrations in different parts of North Kivu where protesters attacked UN bases and staff housing, expressing their anger over UN Peacekeepers (OWP, 2019). Researcher witnessed several offices at the MONUSCO headquarters which was set on fire and looted by demonstrators including the mayor's office. Demonstration took weeks before they were stopped by defense and security organs. The opinion poll conducted between May and September 2016 by BERCI in 2016 on PKOs in the DRC indicated that the

population especially in the areas where MONUSCO were deployed wanted MONUSCO to leave.

The ineffectiveness of PKOs in the DRC may also be linked with the political economy theory. It should be recalled that the conflict in the DRC is a “mineral conflict” (Maystadt, 2014) meaning the minerals provide motivation and means to fuel and sustain conflicts (Kennes, 2005; Prunier, 2009). According to Mitra and Ray (2014), civil wars or other forms of conflicts fought over natural resources are more likely to last very long because peace processes are always abandoned by the war instigators and pay more interest on looting the conflict area of available natural resources. Also, the discontinuation of conflicts (war) will only be possible if the warring parties are financially enabled to maintain their forces and enhance the procurement of weapons. But each TCCs taking part in PKOs have interest particularly economic ones other than the real objectives of resolving conflicts. Because of that, then the effectiveness of PKOs will never be realised.

Apart from the weakness in POC, MONUC/MONUSCO have been helpful in maintaining the general security of the DRC. Although not as much, they have supported AGs to undergo DDR process, set conditions to ensure smooth delivery of humanitarian aid, facilitated to repatriate civilians from Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi and enabled people living in IDP camps to return to their homes (Koko, 2011). MONUC played a central role in reforming FARDC, especially the payment system of its soldiers in order to reduce the level of looting and corruption.

5.2.4.3 Effectiveness of PKOs in Sudan (Darfur)

Equally, the effectiveness of PKOs in Sudan (Darfur) is analysed using POC as discussed in Sections 2.3, 4.5 and 5.2.3.1 above. It will be analysed using seven selected indicators namely, reduction in the number of violations of cease-fire agreements by conflicting parties, decrease in the number of recorded deaths and casualties, cut in the number of recorded incidents of violations of IHL and IHRL, decline in the number of grave violations against children's rights, decrease in the recorded numbers of civilians killed as a result of inter- or intra-communal violence, diminution in the number of new IDPs and refugees recorded and increase in the number of armed elements that voluntarily lay down their weapons. These indicators in all cases affect the efforts for the POC in a given area.

On the decrease in the number of violations of cease-fire agreements by conflicting parties, it can be seen that since the eruption of the Sudan (Darfur) conflict in 2003, different actors such as the UN, and the AU have been working and operationalizing different initiatives to bring parties to the conflict and the government of Sudan onto the negotiating table. Chad, particularly former President Deby, spearheaded several initiatives since the spill over of conflict in Darfur affected Chad. During focus group discussions, it was learnt that President Deby was so much attached with Darfur conflict because he was originated from the Zhagawa tribe which was part of the conflict in Darfur (Flint and De Waal, 2008). In some peace initiatives, rebels did not take part. They questioned the impartiality of President Deby as a mediator due to his known close relations with the government (Marchal, 2007). According to UN Peace Agreements Database there have been more than 25 ceasefire /peace

agreements in Darfur since 2007. The notable agreements included the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) of September 2003, Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) in 2005, Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of 5 May 2006, the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) of 14 July 2011 and Juba Agreement of 3 October 2020.

From the indicators, generally, almost all the peace deals were violated in varying degrees. The focus group discussion found that, the Juba Agreement of 2020 was implemented although the conflict within the transitional government continued to threaten implementation of the agreement. The failure of most of Darfur peace agreements was attributed largely by mistrust between the government and the AGs, weakness of the mediation process, divisions among rebel groups, the nature and quality of mediators and others (Interview, Darfur resident, 23 March 2021, Darfur).

The decline in the number of recorded deaths and casualties also point to success or otherwise of PKOs. According to Uppsala Conflict Data Programme, in 2003 the deaths resulted from conflicts in Darfur reaching 3,673 while in 2020 they reached 319 (UCDP, n.d). This means, there has been a decrease in the number of deaths and casualties. However, according to a report of Human Rights Watch, violence in Darfur has been increasing since the withdrawal of the UNAMID in December 2020 (HRW, 2021). The government forces which took UNAMID responsibility to protect civilians failed to fully execute its obligations resulting in resurgence of devastating violence with scores of people killed and injured resulting in massive displacement of people. Sometimes members of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) watched without

intervention when violence such as looting, killing, and massive destruction of properties happened. “How can you protect civilians using UNITAMS which have no mandate to protect civilians”? (Interview, Darfur resident, 23 March 2021, Darfur). Since the coup attempt of 25 October 2021 and the matching anti-government demonstrations, more attention on security has been given to incidents happening in the capital city of Khartoum and leaving Darfur unattended, making it vulnerable to attacks (Interview, Diplomat, 12 November 2021, Dar es Salaam). When researcher visited Darfur on 16 March 2021, he observed about 800 people coming back to their villages with their belonging from IDP camps. This was a sign of improvement of security situation in the area.

The performance of PKOs of using decreased incidents of violations of international humanitarian law yielded mixed results. The signing of different peace agreements especially the Juba Agreement of 3 October 2020 was believed to reduce incidents of violations of International Humanitarian Law. However, the report of Amnesty International (2020) showed that between December 2020 and June 2021 the violation of human rights increased where armed groups allegedly killed more than 89 people. During the same period, records show that armed groups looted, raped, burnt houses, markets and shops.

HRW (2021) alluded that two weeks after the closure of the mission (16 January 2021), 150 people were killed, more than 190 injured and about 50,000 were displaced after Arab militias attacked Massalit residents in al-Genaina city. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the group of Janjaweed militias formed and

administered by the Sudanese National Intelligence and Security Services have been accused of committing these atrocities. It was believed that these incidents were happening due to the vacuum of security organs as many had been deployed in Khartoum to respond to political turmoil in Sudan which was caused by the coup attempt of 25 October 2021. This fact has been substantiated during interviews whereby a Darfur resident commented that, “Security forces focused more attention on Khartoum incidents leaving Darfur vulnerable to violations of human rights” (Interview, Darfur resident, 16 March 2021, Darfur).

According to UNSG report on Children and Armed conflicts in Sudan, S/2020/614 (UN, 2020g), between January 2017 to December 2019, there were 714 grave violations against children in Darfur affecting 679 children. Paradoxically, one third of those incidents were caused by the government defence and security organs. The remaining two thirds were caused by other AGs and their respective splinter groups. Precisely, 213 violations were recorded in 2017 alone, in 2018 the figure stood at 293 and in 2019, there were 208 cases of grave violation against 199 children (76 girls and 123 boys) {(UN, 2020a) - “A/74/845-S/2020”}.

In the same report of 2021, from January to December 2020, the UN confirmed 292 grave violations against 274 children (131 girls and 143 boys) {(UN, 2021a); “A/75/873-S/2021/437”}. From this data, the number of grave violations against children was seen to be increasing. These incidents included all six major types of violations to children: recruitment and use of children in war, rape and other

types of sexual violence, killing and maiming, attacks on schools and health centres, abductions and denial of access to humanitarian services.

Despite the presence of peacekeeping forces, the recorded numbers of incidents of inter- or intra-communal violence increased. These were conflicts between non-state groups which were organised along communal lines (Brosché, 2022). It should be noted that in Darfur, communities were classified into villages inhabited by sedentary groups of men and women as well as nomadic groups of mobile pastoralists. Each community had about 80 tribes, out of those, 27 can be categorized as Arabs (coloured) and the rest were non-Arab mostly black Africans. According to Uppsala Conflict Data Program Database, between 1989 and 2002 all major inter communal conflicts were between Africans fighting with Arabs. This took a different turn and from 2002 six out of seven conflicts were categorized as Arabs fighting Arabs. The focus group discussion alluded that, the main source of the conflicts included clashes over access to natural resources especially land and water, livestock trespassing, closure of routes for herds of cattle, and cattle raiding. According to UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the intercommunal incidents in Darfur increased by half in 2020 as compared to the same period in 2019. Precisely, from June to December 2020 about 28 incidents were reported while during the same period 2019, only 15 incidents were recorded (OCHA, 2021a). According to UNHCR report, in December 2019 alone, about 41,000 people were displaced in West Darfur as a result of inter communal clashes between Masalit and Arab tribes in El Geneira (Alert, 2022).

The reduction in the number of new IDPs and refugees was among the few indicators of effectiveness of peacekeeping which recorded a declining trend. According to UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), since 2019, the number of IDPs and refugees has progressively declined in Darfur (UN, 2020l). The UN High Commissioner for Refugees and European Asylum Support Office (EASO) recorded 1.6 million IDPs in Darfur for the year 2020 while in 2019, there were about 1,900. Also, the number of Darfur refugees in Chad were 390,000 in 2019, and in 2020, there were 370,000 (EASO, 2020). The researcher managed to observe number of new IDPs in Darfur which were not occupied by people meaning that IDPs were reduced.

After different initiatives including the signing of different peace deals, most AGs agreed to cessation of hostilities hence encouraging people to return to their villages. However, the ousting of President Al-Bashir, ending of UNAMID operations in Darfur and internal conflict within the transitional government threatened the resurgence of hostilities in Sudan which triggered a new wave of refugees and IDPs. In March 2020, the UNSC assessed five major IDP camps in Darfur, Kalma, Golo, Sortony, Nertiti and Menawashei and concluded that the areas were the most volatile because of violence caused by tribal militia (UN, 2020g). A resident in Darfur commented:

Following internal fights within Chad that led into the death of President Deby of Chad on 19 April 2021, the security situation in Chad became antagonistic and no longer conducive for refugees. That was why most of the refugees decided to return to Darfur. Also, some IDPs in Darfur decided to return to their areas/villages because of insecurity situation in IDP camps and also due to the deterioration of security situation within those camps as well as poor humanitarian support from International

Humanitarian agencies especially after the end of UNAMID operations in Darfur (Interview, Darfur resident, 14 March 2021, Darfur).

Due to the deteriorating security situation, the Office for the coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) predicted that in 2022 about 6.2 million civilians (almost half of Darfur people) needed humanitarian assistance (OCHA, 2021). Observation on the increase in the number of armed elements that voluntarily laid down their weapons show that although initial steps pointed to a promising future, the availability of funds threatened to throw it into disarray. According to Dabaga, (2015), after signing different peace deals in Darfur, different AGs agreed to voluntarily lay down their weapons through the DDR programmes.

From 2006 up to 2015 about 31,000 ex-combatants were demobilised under DDR programmes. “This was an ongoing exercise depending on the willingness of the combatants and the availability of funds” (interview, former UNAMID DDR officer, 20 March 2021, Dar es Salaam). According to the Report by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS, 2020), a significant number of ex-combatants underwent the DDR process. The process was in line with the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of 2006, the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) of 2011 and the Juba agreement of 2020. However, the process was affected by the lack of sustainable alternative economic activities and funds. For example, out of 4,027 former combatants who were demobilized in 2020, only 315 received their reintegration support, which delayed the process (CSG, 2020). It was noted from one of the interviewees:

It is not possible for the whole of Darfur population to hand over their weapons because of two reasons: there were some tribes (especially

nomadic) who had the tradition of owning weapons for the security of their animals. Secondly some people maintain that the government and the international community needs first to remove those reasons which made them own threatening weapons” (Interview, Darfur resident, 23 March 2021, Darfur).

The general analysis from the defined indicators, data collected, observations, focus group discussions and links with the economic theory, indicates that there had been mixed result about the effectiveness of PKOs in Sudan (Darfur). From the general assessment, the mission seemed to have been at least successful on POC. What remained surprising was the increase in the number of grave violations against children and increases in the incidences of inter-communal violence. It was expected that the two factors would decrease their effects because they were the result of effective POC. Data shows that grave violation of the rights of the child was largely due to the recruitment of children into war. Analysis indicated that AGs were recruiting children to strengthen their capability after losing troops from wars which they had fought for some time. This statement relates with the comment from Musharaff, a Darfur resident who commented that “what we are worried about now is for children in schools as the AGs are targeting schools for recruitment into war” (Interview, Musharaff, 23 March 2021, Darfur).

For the issue of increases in incidences of inter-communal violence, analysis indicated that because people were coming back from refugee camps in Chad and from IDP camps, it was found that those areas which they occupied before they left as refugees had been taken by other communities or tribes. In the absence of government mechanism and word to resolve the issue, these communities organized

themselves to fight each other. This was expressed during one of the interviews: “our fertile land was retaken by Arabs. We do not have a place to live and do economic activities. What is left is for us to fight for our rights?” (Interview, Sadick, 23 March 2021, Darfur).

On a brighter side, it was argued that the number of people killed had decreased because many had run away from Darfur and lived in IDP camps and others fled the country to seek refuge in Chad. “We do not expect the number of people killed to increase while the vulnerable population continues to be decreased” (Interview, Peacekeepers, Darfur, 29 March 2021). Up to 2020, about 370,000 refugees from Darfur were still in Chad and IDPs had 1.6 million people (UN, 2020g). There was an argument that poor living conditions in IDPs and refugee camps contributed to the people’s decision to return. On the decrease in the number of recorded incidents of violations of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, it was also argued that the unavailability of targets caused the decline of these acts. “Many vulnerable people were not in Darfur. What do you expect. (Interview, Salama, 30 September 2020, Dar es Salaam)

The interviews with people from both Darfur and UNAMID staff/peacekeepers had almost the same conclusion that PKOs in Darfur had at least managed to protect civilians. This fact has been augmented by observation whereby during his second visit to Darfur, the researcher observed the improvement of security situation. Also, the general performance of the mission itself which was closed in December 2020 after the perceived improvement of the security situation in Sudan. However, other

observers see the ousting of Al-Bashir in 2019 as having helped a lot in the return of peace in Darfur. Others see the closure of UNAMID operations as the cause of the pressure for the transitional government of Sudan to pay attention to the overall security situation of the country. It was observed that it was too early to close down the UNAMID operations because the transition into peace for many social and economic activities had not yet been realized. The UN could have taken time until the political situation in Sudan stabilized before deciding to close the mission. There was doubt whether UNITAS which had no forces were able to deal with the POC issue should the situation worsen. There were signs of re-emergence of conflict as the conflict within the transitional government itself continued to be uncertain. Others sees the reduction in the number of people killed should not be taken as the sole reason to justify achievement POC while the source of conflict had not yet been addressed.

The shortage of troops, equipment, restrictions of movement by the GoS and limitations in access to humanitarian assistance affected the achievement of POC. The populations living in those areas were treated by the GoS as enemies and so they were targeted and attacked by the government forces and Janjaweed. “We were running away from our own defence and security organs fearing being attacked by them instead of running to them for our protection” (Interview, Shaban, 24 March 2021, Darfur). There were challenges in the setup of the mission as UNAMID had to report to SRSG of UNAMIS all matters related to POC. This complicated the POC in general taking into consideration the distance between the two headquarter establishments. Despite limited cooperation received from the host nation,

UNAMID managed at least to protect civilians and as a result, the mission was officially closed on 31 December 2020. The Sudanese defense and security organs had to take charge of the security of Darfur and the GoS had to extend state authority to Darfur (AU, 2019).

The idea of closing down UNAMID operations in Darfur was linked to the political economy theory. It should be recalled that the primary source of the conflicts in the DRC and Darfur was political and economic amassment of wealth marginalization of communities (Brosche & Rothbart, 2013). Therefore, after the ousting of Al-Bashir and the promise of transitional government to come up with equal distribution of political and economic benefits (Juba agreement, 2020), the conflicts were reduced in such a way that UNAMID felt the need and necessity to close down their operations. This move was in line with the observations by Collier and Hoeffler (2006) who alluded that the contest for the control of economic assets, resources and political systems were and are the basic causes of conflicts in human society.

5.2.4.4 Factors Influencing the Effectiveness of PKOs in DRC and Sudan (Darfur)

There are factors that has been influencing the effectiveness of PKOs in DRC, Sudan (Darfur) and elsewhere where PKOs are undertaken. These factors which have been presented in Section 4.5.3 are conflicting Interests of Actors Participating in PKOs, Participation of developed countries in UN PKOs, Mandate of PKOs, UN bureaucracy, role of superpowers in running PKOs, relationship between the components of PKOs, compatibility and commitment and discipline of peacekeepers.

5.2.4.5 Conflicting Interests of Actors Participating in PKOs

There have been different and conflicting interests among the troops contributing countries (TCCs) as they participated in PKOs with financial benefits taking precedence. Jett (2000) pointed out that apart from resolving conflicts as envisaged by the UN, member states and other actors in peace have been using the UN through PKOs as a springboard to pursue their economic and related interests. The national interests which TCCs endeavour to actualize by using PKOs are mainly monetary gains realized through reimbursements (Carnahan, Durch and Gilmore (2006). It is argued that UN politics and interests dominate all aspects of PKOs from creating mandates, securing troops and other resources up to operationalising the PKOs in the field (Baregu, 2011). “There are people/countries/organisations which see the conflicts in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur) as opportunities for their economic survival” (Interview, Peacekeeper, 23 October 2021, Dar es Salaam).

Generally, big PKOs such as DRC and Sudan (Darfur) are mega projects involving major transactions and coordination which require heavy logistical support chains. Boutwell and Klare (2000) show that the biggest manufacturers and suppliers of the needed resources especially equipment and materials are multi-billion companies from P-5 members such as US, Russia, France, Germany, China, UK, and others, and these countries have a big influence in PKOs. This has been in line with the political economy theory where the beneficiaries wish to maintain their economic gains which they have been getting from the PKOs (Kennes, 2005). The possibility of

these beneficiaries to instigate conflict or to prolong conflicts cannot be easily dismissed.

Manufacturers benefit by supplying the UN and TCCs with equipment and weapons (UN Owned Equipment ‘UNOE’ and Countries Owned Equipment ‘COE’). The price of some of the weapons and equipment which was deployed in UNAMID and MONUSCO are seen from the table below:

Table 5.1: Buying prices for different types of equipment used in peacekeeping operations

S/No	Equipment	Price
1.	Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC)- Wheeled	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Missile Equipment - US\$ 1,076,381 · Infantry Carrier Armed Class I- US\$ 784,299 · Infantry Carrier Armed Class II - US\$ 652,267 · Infantry Carrier unarmed Class I - US\$ 578,416 · Infantry Carrier unarmed Class II - US\$ 314,374
2.	Support Vehicles (Military patterns)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Truck recovery (more than 5 tons)- US\$ 386,766 · Truck Tanker (more than 10,000 litters) - US\$ 420,853 · Truck maintenance (Heavy) - US\$ 279,340 · Truck Crane (110-24 tons) - US\$ 221,179
3.	Reconnaissance vehicles	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Wheeled more than 50 men - US\$ 718,628. · Wheeled more than 25 men - US\$ 401,968
4.	Self-Propelled Artillery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Medium Howitzer - US\$ 1,074,888 · Light Howitzer - US\$ 980,585
5.	Tank	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Main Battle Tank Medium - US\$ 1,575,686 · Main Battle Tank Heavy - US\$ 1,758,644 · Tank Recovery Vehicles - US\$ 1,489,871
6.	Electrical generators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · 201-500Kva – US\$ 164,773 · 76-100Kva- US\$ 76,447
7.	Engineering Equipment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Bulldozer Heavy – US\$ 301, 519 · Crane Mobile (25-30 tons)- US\$ 323 936 · Drilling ring Self-propelled - US\$ 223,528
8.	Medical and Dental Equipment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Dental equipment set – US\$ 161,564

Source: UN, (2017) Continent Owen Equipment Manual.

Table 5.1 above shows the unit price of some equipment needed and used in Peacekeeping Operations. It has been realized that manufacturers make big business out of UN missions. An example is as a former peacekeeper commenting as follows:

Our battalion of 750 troops had 48 APCs, 26-gun trucks, 12 cargo trucks, 4 water bowser trucks, 3 fuel tankers, 5 salon cars, two medium workshop trucks, 3 field ambulances and 36 generators. There were other logistical support resources such as four field kitchens, washing machines, water purification plants and others. Each troop member carried his personal weapon apart from the support weapons supplied to a company. This was just one infantry battalion out of about 14 which were deployed in MONUSCO in 2015. The procurement of all this equipment needed hefty budgets. (Interview, Peacekeeper, 12 August 2020, Goma)

Another area of budgetary consumption was the area dealing and overseeing supplies of food for peacekeepers. The UN is responsible for providing balanced rations with a total intake of 4,500 calories per troop per day (Little and Langholtz, 2019). The UN has been contracting private companies to supply the rations which is also a big business. Due to the profits gained through involvement with PKOs and with the influence of these companies, most of which were international, there was a lot of lobbying for the prolonged stay of the missions in the conflict areas. The analysis shows that, in fact, it was not in the best interest of the companies to see the missions conclude their stay in conflict areas. During focus group discussions, it was realized that during extensions negotiations of missions, representatives of different companies which supply those mission are also travelling to New York. It was learnt that they are going there for lobbying.

On the other hand, each TCCs involved with UN PKOs have its own interest (Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 2010). For the developing countries, which

dominated UNAMID and were also and still are dominating MONUSCO today, their contribution in most cases was to seek financial benefits through reimbursements from the troops and equipment. The signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the UN and the TCCs is the baseline for the rate of reimbursement of COE (UN, 2018).

Participation in peacekeeping also provides an opportunity for some countries to give experience to their troops relating to various aspects of military operations. South Africa, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Ukraine have deployed different types of aircrafts in MONUSCO giving their troops wider experience in areas of actual wars (UN, 2020k). Furthermore, some countries use PKOs to test their new weapons and armament. In 2013, South Africa deployed Rooivalk combat helicopters in the DRC as a new capability to face the AGs (Olivie, 2018). “The reality was that in 2011, South Africa procured 12 Rooivalk combat support helicopters for their army. Since the equipment was new to the SA army, they deployed three of them with MONUSCO in 2013 to test their capability and get the touch of their performance in actual war situation.” (Interview, Peacekeeper, 10 February 2021, Goma). The additional objective was to test the capability the new war machines.

Apart from reimbursement which TCCs receives from COE as mentioned, TCCs also benefit from UNPKOs reimbursement from the troops and the allowances which individual troop members receive per month (Berman, Sams & Institute for Security Studies, 2000). Scobell (1994) assert that the participation of Fiji in PKOs since 1978 was and has been a big source of foreign exchange for the islands. The UN also

reimburses US\$73 every month to TCCs for every individual troop to cover for clothing, equipment, personal weapons and ammunitions (UN, 2020d). This meant that a country like Rwanda which was the second in contribution to UN Peacekeeping mission with 6335 troops (police and military) (UN, 2021d), gained about US\$ 26,280.00 as reimbursement for troops each year and only under this category. According to Aoi, De Coning and Thakur (2007), and due to the scramble of troops to join PKOs, corruption dogged the selection process. For example, 60% of troops joining UN PKOs in Ghana would be selected through normal procedures and 40% through “protocol lists” (Aoi, De Coning & Thakur, 2007). “After our battalion started to participate in PKOs, they have been demanding parking slots in the camps as most of them now own cars” (Interview, former UNAMID commander, 23 November 2020, Dar es Salaam).

On the other side Aoi, De Coning & Thakur, (2007) presents that current reimbursement rate has not increased since 2002, which led into states facing rising deployment costs due to inflations which reduce their capability to operate effectively and efficiently. Also, there are weaknesses in the mechanisms for reimbursing states for the costs of deploying their contingents’ equipment. The system is primarily designed to compensate states for the costs associated with the use of their equipment in UN operation, not for state of the equipment. This means that TCCs are not abided to contribute their best equipment to UN operations but to deploy older and less valuable items, because the same rate is paid for any serviceable item of a particular type.

There was another factor, namely, job security. PKOs in the DRC and Darfur, included military, police and civilians (integrated). As of 2021, MONUSCO had 2,970 civilians and in 2016 UNAMID had 2,982 civilian staff serving in different areas and with different capacities (UN, 202g and UN, 2016b). Most of the civilians are permanently employed by the UN in PKOs and others are temporary employees. In most cases, if the mission is closed most of these civilians lose their jobs. “The demonstrations organized in Darfur after the closure of UNAMID operations were organised by some UNAMID staff and civilians” (Interviews, Shaura, 16 September 2021, Dar es Salaam).

Some benefits of involvement in PKOs accrue to host countries. According to 2015 Report of the Independent High-level Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), some PKOs host countries benefits the local people by way of housing, markets, restaurants, new kinds of foodstuff and other human needs at international standards (UN, 2015a). “Majority of clients here in my shop are MONUSCO personnel” (Interview, Saidomba, 20 March 2021). Most of UNAMID staff officers in Darfur were accommodated in privately owned houses before the change in security situation took effect. Also, there was the creation of employment opportunities for local people. In 2016, 40-50 percent of all civilians working with UNAMID were nationals from the conflict plagued areas (UN, 2016b).

Because of the big economic benefits gained from UNPKOs, there have been reports of corruption especially in procurement of goods and services. According to Pyman (2013), the UN acknowledged that procurement in UN system became an area full of

temptations for corruption. Pyman (2013) also present that the Procurement Tasks Force which was set in 2006 to investigate incidences of corruption in the Oil for Food scandal in Iraq found that a former UN procurement officer had received about S\$ 1 million as bribe or “kickback” from the contractors who worked in the Oil for Food Programme. The involvement of Benon Sevan (the UN head for Oil for Food Programme) and Koffi Annan’s son Kojo in sloppy UN procurement practices ruined the image of the UN (Raphael, 2004). The task force also revealed 15 corrupt schemes relating to UN contracts worth S\$ 630 million which led to the removal of 32 companies from the UN contractor list and found 15 UN staff guilty of criminal offences and 27 guilty of internal misconduct violating UN procedures. The analysis shows that, If the referred companies were ready to give money as ‘kickbacks’, it means PKOs are a big business, and as such the concerned are ever ready to give anything to prolong the stay of the mission in conflict areas. “I suspect some of the big companies may have been involved in instigating prolonged conflicts by paying the AGs” (Interview, Mundesa, 10 February 2021, Goma).

Even so, economic benefits cannot explain all the contributions of peacekeepers. Krishnasamy (2002) argued that Pakistan’s involvement in UN PKOs in the DRC and other missions aimed at gaining international support of major powers over the Kashmir conflict with India. India, on the other hand used PKOs to bolster her chances of becoming a permanent member of the UNSC (Bullion, 1997) in tandem with the then looming UN reforms. In a broader perspective, states that were inspiring to have permanent seats in UN Security Council such as Brazil, India,

Indonesia, Germany, Japan, Nigeria and Pakistan, participated in UN PKOs as a way of increasing their diplomatic influence in the UN (Findlay, 1996).

From the data given by respondents, focus group discussions, observations, documentary review which are research tool for study, and political economy theory, deployment of PKOs in the DRC and Darfur have been seen to dominate the interests lists particularly pecuniary ones. While the UN (2020b) asserts that PKOs is a collective investment in global peace, security and stability, on the other hand, there is a long chain of those who are there to benefit economically from PKOs. There have been fights between big international multibillion companies to get contracts to supply goods and services to PKOs, sometimes leading to incidences of corruptions.

While the Resolution of the UN Summit of September 2005 set different reforms such as instituting an ethical code of conduct, strengthening internal oversight and accountability, the implication of the UN in Oil for Food scandal ruined UN reputation (Gordon, 2007). TCCs have been fighting to contribute troops to PKOs using their influence in the UN system. Troops joining PKOs have invariably not been ready to take risks because their primary mission was not to resolve conflicts but to maximise their reimbursement for goods and services rendered. Within the TCCs, there have been struggles between troops and staff officers to get chances to participate in PKOs. Some host nations also wanted to benefit from the deployment of their citizens in PKOs.

5.2.4.6 Participation of Developed Countries in UN PKOs

The permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5) are in the lead in contributing to the UN PKOs budget but in reality, they contribute minimal portions of troops to participate in UNPKOs (UN, 2020d). The countries that finance PKOs are commonly known as PKOs Budget Contributing Countries (BCC). Apart from China, of the P-5 none of them is among the 30 major UN troop contributing countries (TCCs). For example, apart from China with 221 troops in MONUSCO, the rest of the P5 members have less than 15 troops in MONUSCO (UN, 2020k). Additionally, China was the only country within the P-5 group that was invited to send troops to Darfur (Reeves, 2007). Data shows that the US which contributes 27.89% of the UN PKOs budget, has only 32 troops participating in all the UN PKOs (UN, 2020d). According to Better World Campaign (2017), in determining the contribution of each UN member state to regular budget and PKOs, the UN considers Gross National Income, population, and debt of that particular country.

Table 5.2: Troops contributed by major TCCs and Major PKOs' BCC

Troops contributed by Major PKOs' Budget contributing Major TCCs and their % of Contribution to PKOs Budget countries							
S/No	Country	%of the PKOs Budget	No of Troops	S/No	County	%of the Budget	No of Troops
1.	USA	27.89	32	1.	Bangladesh	0.0001	6,426
2.	China	15.21	2,263	2.	India	0.1668	5,508
3.	Japan	8.56	4	3.	Nepal	0.0007	5,390
4.	Germany	6.09	558	4.	Rwanda	0.0003	5,115
5.	United Kingdom	5.79	527	5.	Ethiopia	0.0010	4,880
6.	France	5.61	613	6.	Pakistan	0.0230	3,891
7.	Italy	3.30	933	7.	Egypt	0.0372	2,802
8.	Russia Federation	3.04	79	8.	Indonesia	0.1086	2,792
9.	Canada	2.73	58	9.	Ghana	0.0030	2,483
10.	Republic of Korea	2.26	531	10.	China	15.21	2,263

Source: The UN (2020d), Document A 73/350/add.1 of 24 December 2020

This sort of specialisation seems to have evolved, not out of a specific policy but through practice. Yun (2015) observed that the contribution of Western countries to PKOs rose and fell especially in Africa significantly after the failure of the USA contingency in Somalia. The failure was due to the complexity of the security situation in that country. In Somalia two US helicopters were shot down, killing 18 US peacekeepers. The US hastily withdrew its troops in Somalia after this incidence owing also to growing pressure at home not to send US troops to conflict areas in Africa. The emergence and rise of terrorism have complicated the PKOs involvement in peacekeeping missions worldwide in general. Kassebaum and Hamilton (1994) show that the superpowers, especially the USA now hesitate to contribute troops to PKOs if the same troops are to be under foreign command.

There is also cost implication on this. Gaibullov et al. (2015) asserted that the annual cost of maintaining the Bangladesh troops was US\$ 4,553 (2015), Ghana US\$ 5,555 (2014), India US\$ 9,768 (2014); Nepal US\$ 1,892 (2015); Pakistan US\$ 3,417 (2012) and Senegal US\$ 9,571 (2011). Similarly, the annual cost of maintaining USA troops was US\$ 138,465 (2013), Canada US\$ 137,054 (2011), France US\$ 119,273 (2009) and Italy US\$ 156,181 (2011). During the period under review the UN used to reimburse US\$ 12,336 annually per troop (UN, 2008). Nevertheless, in 2017 the cost of maintaining one peacekeeper was UUS\$ 20,000 annually while one USA soldier cost US\$ 800,000 (Novosseloff, 2017). Therefore, most P-5 countries and other superpowers needed to subsidize their troops which was too costly when compared with the rates in developing countries which, in many cases make profit out of PKOs (Bobrow & Boyer 1997).

The impression given by this information is that developed countries have been carrying the burden of financing PKOs while at the same time contributing to a lesser number of troops in UN PKOs. During focus group discussion, it was learnt that these countries de facto pays developing/underdeveloped countries to undertake PKOs. The P-5 countries preferred to contribute troops to PKOs organized by NATO than by the UN because the UN operations have had many restrictions and procedures which put at risk the security of the deployed troops.

From this exposition, it can be deduced that developing countries seem to be prone to making profit out of PKOs for their troops. This corresponds with the argument raised by Sheehan (2011) who asserted that the provision of troops to PKOs does create benefits to concerned and involved developing countries, but the venture appears too costly for the developed part of the world. Due to their economic weaknesses, developing/underdeveloped countries often fail to acquire needed technology in terms of sophisticated weaponry, intelligence gathering equipment and capacity to prepare their troops through good and effective training. A resident in Dar es Salaam commented “if USA, with all their lethal weapons and technologies failed to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan for 20 years, it means, PKOs require more than the to be able to contain rebels in Africa” (Interview, Mgumba, 23 September 2020, Dar es Salaam).

It was also learnt from focus group discussion that, involvement of developed nations in PKOs is important because they have resources which enable the acquisition of needed technologies in terms of sophisticated weaponry systems, intelligence

gathering equipment and good and effective training. These are important elements for the capability needed to enable peacekeepers to face contemporary security challenges. An interviewee intimated as follows:

Yes, we acknowledge the capability of developed countries in terms of equipment, arsenal, and training but PKOs need more than that. The failure of US forces in Somalia leading to their withdrawal in March 1994 and American recent failure to exterminate the Taliban in Afghanistan for 20 years proves this fact. We cannot generalize that the failure of PKOs, especially in Africa, is due developed nations contributing minimal numbers of troops (Interview, Diplomat, 23 September 2021, Dodoma).

5.2.4.7 Mandate of PKOs

The question of mandate of PKOs has dominated discussions on whether the mandate helps to determine and facilitate their efficiency and effectiveness in the field. To be effective such a mandate must be feasible, clear and without any ambiguity and should reflect the realities of the situation on the ground and is operational in line with the adequacy of resources available (Punga, 2011). Most of the time, there have been a mismatch between the mandate given to PKOs and the real situation of their operations on the ground (Gibbs, 1997).

While the UN continues to issue mandates based on chapter VI of the UN Charter, Dos Santos, Phillips, and Cusimano (2017) observe that the operational situation of the forces on the ground does not in most cases suit the requirements of UN Chapter VI mandate. Similarly, the Brahimi Report observes and recommends that in order to be effective, PKOs should and must have clear, credible, and achievable mandate (Brahimi, 2000). As already hinted before, ONUC/MONUC/MONUSCO and AMIS/UNAMID had varied mandates which guided and

justified their level of effectiveness. ONUC/MONUC/MONUSCO and AMIS/UNAMID also became victim of changes in their mandates due to the fluidity of the security situation in which they operated, and which required the adoption of a mandate which fits well with the security situation in the field area of operation.

In order for a UN mission to be effective, there must be no gap between the mandate given and the level of resources supply for the task in the field. (Brahimi, 2000 & Jet, 2000). General Dallaire (Dallaire, 2003), who was a Force Commander for UNAMIR between July 1993 and September 1994 provide testimony of the difficulties they experienced and went through when the UN failed to provide them with the means, objective and purpose of their operation which required them to fulfil their mandate in a defined time period. That shortcoming resulted in their failure to stop the genocide in Rwanda. In many cases the lack or inadequacy of resources incapacitates the fulfilment of a mandate as crafted by UNSC.

The general analysis indicates that there is always a mismatch between reality on the ground and the provision of a mandate. Van de Lijn (2006) alluded that most of the time the mismatch between a mandate and the reality on the ground is caused by the fact that the formulation of mandates is commonly based on negotiations which sometimes require a balance between agreement to accommodate positions of all members of the Security Council especially the P-5. To do so, the mandate in question might include ambiguous language which may require interpretation that will rest in the hands of the PKOs leadership in the field. "Sometimes the formulation of a mandate is based on "template approaches" rather than specific facts

on the ground as argued by a MONUSCO staff (Interview, MONUSCO Staff, 26 February, Kinshasa).

In some circumstances, leaders of PKOs will be implementing mandates based on their own interpretations of what the UN originally provided. This has been the main challenge that led to the ineffectiveness of MONUSCO and UNAMID in the area of POC. Also, the parties to the conflict might use the weakness of the mandate to manipulate the mandate and affect the effectiveness of the PKOs. The lack of clarity of mandate prevents its effectiveness because it is from the mandate that the capability of peacekeepers is built. Holt, Taylor and Kelly (2009) show that one of the reasons for the resignation of the MONUSCO Force Commander, General Vicente De Villegas on 2008 was the controversial mandate which was not realistic.

5.2.4.8 UN Bureaucracy

UN peacekeeping has been and continues to be dominated by heavy top-down organisational administration with complex procedures for approval of an idea or project involving a number of levels of scrutiny of the idea or project levels (Agada, 2008). This might be caused by the fact that the UN is made up of countries with varying priorities, interests, influences, power levels. Under UN procedures, room for taking initiatives by commanders in the field remains limited. Winckler (2015) provides that the bureaucratic red tape in the UN system is based on the fact that the UN has multiple levels of discussions and consultations before a decision is reached. For example, it took the UN two years from 1999 to 2001 to decide to deploy MONUC troops (Roessler & Prendergast, 2006). On this Agada (2008) provides that

Nicolas Sarkozy, the former French President commented that “the UN silence and procedural undertakings resulted in killings in Darfur and called for the UN to quickly react”. A respondent aptly captured this point:

The UN operations are all about procedures. The institution has many principles, standard operating procedures, guidelines, manuals, all of which have been prepared in New York which peacekeepers in Beni (DRC) are expected to follow without assessing the practicability of the decisions. Most of the guidelines fail to work on the ground because those who prepare them are not conversant with the situation on the ground and sometimes, they have been prepared by civilians who have never fired even a pistol” (Interview, UN Staff, Dar es Salaam, 15 October 2020).

Weiss (1995) alluded that when PKOs were deployed in good time and with all the necessary resources, the chances of success are high. In some cases, the heavy hierarchy and bureaucratic procedures are used by some contingents as an excuse for their laxity and inaction.




Figure 5.1: Bureaucratic procedure in acquiring goods in mission areas

Source: Constructed from UN Generic Guidelines to TCC’s

RBB - Results Based Budgeting

R & I – Risk & Insurance

Figure 5.1 above, provides brief information collected as well as the views of the respondents. In summary, due to UN bureaucratic procedures, it takes more than one year for required goods in the field to be procured and supplied. Figure 6.1 shows that it takes up to four months from the adoption of a UN resolution to the time when the needed funds are made available. This seriously affects military operations as sometimes goods are urgently required for fulfilment of a given sensitive operation. The UN bureaucracy has damaging consequences as many conflicts are reported to have failed in effective containment and timely action due to the cumbersome UN procedures.

During the discussion leading to the creation of the UN in 1945, the question of UN permanent force was tabled and then dropped (Russell & Muther 1958). Instead, it was proposed that the UN should have “special agreements” with member states for the creation of standby collective capability for intervention where needed. However, due to the cold war era, that arrangement remained stillborn (UN, 1945). The situation has remained so even after the then UNSG Boutros-Ghali conceived the idea of creating UN rapid reaction force in 1995 under “Supplement to the Agenda for Peace” (UN, 1995). The Brahimi Report recommended that for the UN to be effective in ensuring timely interventions, member states may enter into partnership with each other to form brigade size forces with all military capability ready for deployment in 30 days after the adoption of UNSC resolution (Brahimi, 2000). As of now, that arrangement has not yet been actualized. PKOs must be supported by sound logistical support at all levels (Brahimi, 2000). Doyle and Sambanis (2011)

asserted that one of the challenges of PKOs in the DRC and Darfur was the inefficiency of logistical support services.

5.2.4.9 Role of Superpowers in Running PKOs

Developed countries, especially the members of P-5, contribute enormously to the budgets of PKOs (UN, 2020d). This renders these countries an upper hand in decisions on issues related to PKOs. De Coning (2021), Gibbs (1997), De Jonge Oudraat (1996), Jakobsen (1996) and Durch (1993) assert that, due to this unfortunate situation, these countries assume the dominating power to decide on where, how and under what strength the UN should or should not deploy PKOs. According to De Coning (2021), PKOs in Africa are currently in crisis because the UN and multilateralism (P-5) are in crisis wanting to cut down the budgetary allocations to PKOs. This position was spearheaded by the United States during the Trump administration and was later adopted by members of the UN SC (Hille, 2020). MONUSCO was and still is hard pressed to cut down the ceiling of troops because of budget tightness. “Apart from improvement of security in Darfur, other reasons for the early closure of UNAMID operation in Darfur was the pressure from developed countries” (Interview, Mohamed, 28 March 2021, Darfur). Indeed, “he who pays the piper calls the tune”.

Table 5.3: Budget analysis of PKOs for the DRC and Darfur for the past seven years

S/No	FY	Budget (S\$ Billions)	Reference
1.	2015/16	8.30	(UN, 2015)
2.	2016/17	7.86	(UN, 2016)
3.	2017/18	6.80	(UN, 2017)
4.	2018/19	5.811	(UN, 2018)
5.	2019/20	6.511	(UN, 2019)
6.	2020/21	6.58	(UN, 2020)
7.	2021/22	6.38	(UN, 2021)

Source: UN (2020d).




Figure 2.2: Budget analysis in chart for the PKOs in DRC and Darfur

The analysis from Table 5.4 above, information collected from respondents indicate that the budget of the UN PKOs continued to drop over the years. As a result, some missions such as the MONUSCO and others have remained are under pressure from the UN to scale down their troops and equipment. While the UN Joint Human Rights Office shows that more than 1,300 people were killed between January and June 2020 by AGs in the DRC, being three times more during the same period in 2019. The UN cut down its budget for MONUSCO (UNJHRO, 2020).

5.2.4.10 Relationship between the Components of Peacekeeping Operations

As alluded to above, contemporary PKOs have three components, civilians, military and police. As of 2021, MONUSCO had 2,970 civilians and in 2016 UNAMID had 2982 civilians staff serving in different areas with different capacities (UN, 2021b & UN, 2016b). Moreover, after the cold war, the UN used to appoint civilians to be Heads of Mission and overall authority of military, police and civilian components in most of the missions (UN DPKO/DFC, 2008). However, there was minimal integration and cooperation between and among these components, especially in the field. The main reason was power, especially who controls who. Military thought that they are the traditional owners of PKOs due to the dangerous and risky tasks they undertake. The former UNSG Dag Hammarskjold was once quoted saying “Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it” (Dandeker and Gow 1999). With the new settings, the Head of Mission is SRSG, who in most cases is a civilian. The question remained as to how can a civilian control military operation? Hawkins et al. (2006) alluded that in most cases these civilians are in almost all cases minimally conversant with military operation requirements.

As one of the respondents hinted: “there are few missions where there are no frictions between the components. Military have inborn arrogance of superiority over civilians and civilians want to control military because they are facilitators of operations” (Interview, MONUSCO staff, 15 February 2021, Goma).

Findlay (1996) argues that the increase of civilian components in PKOs de-value the military by considering them as just among the many. Unfortunately, civilians have

increased the military tasks in the field where the military are now also involved in protecting the civilian components of the PKOs. This fact has been augmented by the comment from one peacekeeper who said, “70% of our tasks now in MONUSCO involves escorting logistic convoys and protecting humanitarian and civilian components. Only 30% is spent on POC which is unfair (Interview, Peacekeeper, 12 September 2020, Dar es Salaam).

5.2.4.11 Compatibility and Commitment

PKOs troops were from different TCCs, with different military backgrounds, language, experience, culture and traditions. Novosseloff (2019) points out that there was the lack commitment for some TCCs in taking risks in PKOs especially when the TCCs deployed their forces thousands of kilometres away from their home countries. MONUSCO troops came mainly from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (UN, 2020k). “There was no connection between them in terms of race, culture, language, geographical proximity and other determinants.

As such they had little, if any, connection between their origins and the DRC to necessitate their taking risks apart from benefiting as mentioned above” (Interview, Yanik, 23 February 2021, Goma). In contrast, the achievement of FIB in fighting M23 was attributed to the connection between the DRC and the TCCs (Tull, 2018). SADC member states contributed troops into the FIB and the recruited forces had adequate knowledge of the region and had connection with the DRC, with closely related cultural practices and conducted many joint military exercises and training together. They also went to the DRC with the needed political will to fight in the

spirit of the UN, the AU, the SADC and ICGLR. A Darfur resident posed a tantalising question: “do you think the troops from Europe or America would risk their lives to support us in the conflict? They have been saying, ‘we cannot die in an African jungle’” (Interview, Shabaa, 24 March 2021, Darfur).

Anecdotal evidence seems to support the hypothesis that the distance to the area of deployment and the weak cultural and other connections had an impact on the commitment of the peacekeepers to the country. The troops especially from far away countries were always under pressure from their government to avoid loss of life or casualties. The UN should reconsider this factor as geographical proximity gives commitment to the peacekeepers. It is also in line with the concept of “African solutions to African problems”. This argument has been supported by the comment that “I think the achievement of UNAMID was because it was ‘an African mission’ where there was moral commitment of troops to support their fellow Africans” (Interview, Sambisi, 12 September 2020, Dodoma).

5.2.4.12 Discipline of Peacekeepers

There is a lack of proper training which compromises discipline, professionalism and efficiency. International Alert (2010) accused Pakistan peacekeepers in the DRC of smuggling minerals in collaboration with different companies around the Great Lakes Region of Africa. Escobales (2008) reported that peacekeepers in the DRC were engaging in illegal trading with AGs by exchanging weapons confiscated during the DDR programme with gold. Krishnasamy (2002) points out that troops in Darfur were also involved in SEA although it was difficult to prove this due to the

sensitivity of SEA issues in the Arab world. To show the gravity of SEA in mission areas the UN adopted UNSCR 2272 of 2016 calling for the UN to repatriate all military and police units proved beyond reasonable doubt to have been involved in SEA (UN, 2016a).

The UN “zero tolerance policy regarding SEA” should be enhanced to safeguard the UN reputation in all UN mission areas. Similarly, the UN should continue to repatriate all underperforming contingents and staff officers as well as all those that proved to involve themselves in SEA.

5.2.4.13 Participation of Women in Peacekeeping Operations

As alluded in chapter 2.3, the some TCCs are reluctant to deploy women in PKOs since they are protected, and they are not supposed to take part in conflict/wars. But in reality, women need to play a great role in all PKOs deployed. Most of time when war or any conflict broke out, women and children are the ones who suffers most because men are used to run away or go to fight. As such when PKOs are deployed, women are the ones who are found on the mission area. Always women feel comfortable when talking to their fellow women (Peacekeepers). This fact has been observed by the UN and has set a target of reaching 15 percent of all peacekeepers by 2028. Currently women account to 6.5% of all peacekeepers (UN, 23). Its reduction has affected the effectiveness of PKOs as one woman in Goma pointed out during interview. “Four men (peacekeepers) came to questioned me if real I was raped. I failed to tell then the truth because a felt shy to talk to men about me being raped”. (Interview, Goma women, 12 February 2021, Goma).

5.2.5 Comparison Between PKOS in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur)

As pointed out, these two cases (PKOs in DRC and Darfur) have similarities and differences. These are;

5.2.5.1 Similarities Between the PKOs in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur)

Novosseloff (2019) presents that the DRC and Sudan (Darfur), constitute Africa's sites of horrible conflicts that have afflicted the African continent for years. The UN has approached these and other conflicts on a case-by-case approach, dispatching peacekeeping missions in response to eruption of conflicts. In the case of the DRC, the conflict has spanned decades, ranging from the time of the cold war, from the first to third generation peacekeeping. The Sudan (Darfur) crisis, on the other hand, is a relatively newcomer in the African conflict map, arising in the post-cold war era (Karlsrud, 2015). Sudan (Darfur) also depicts a case where the AU took some leading steps in redressing, although later on it paired with the UN to form the hybrid mission. The two missions (PKOs in DRC and Darfur Sudan) are therefore comparable in so far as they are in Africa and at some point, ran concurrently. They share dynamics and some of the actors, such as the UN and AU are involved in both conflicts. The study highlights the PKOs mandate, budget allocations and geo-politics in the bid to compare them.

Referring to Section 5.4.4.3 above, both the DRC and Sudan (Darfur) ONUC/MONUC/MONUSCO and AMIS/UNAMID suffered from controversial mandates given. As discussed in Section 5.2.1.1.1 above, it is believed that the formulation of ONUC mandate was based on balancing agreements in the UNSC to

accommodate positions of both the Western and Eastern blocs. In fact, throughout their existence, ONUC suffered from ambiguous and limited mandate. For example, ONUC was not mandated to use force against any foreign troops, which incapacitated ONUC to execute its mandate effectively. The lack of clear interpretation of the mandate resulted in the ONUC to launch two offensive operations in Katanga without the authorization of the UN SG (Durch, 1993). Peace building activities done by ONUC were an innovation as it was not clearly stipulated in the given mandate. The UN learnt from the weaknesses and limitations of ONUC mandate and improved future UN peacekeeping operations (Jett, 2000).

The mandate of MONUC and MONUSCO changed many times from just three pages of detailing of mandate in 1999 when it was deployed to 17 pages mandate in 2018. Up to 2002 the UN had passed about 11 resolutions and had extended the MONUC mandate six times. POC was mandated only ‘within the mission’s capabilities’ (UN, 1999). When MONUSCO was replacing ONUC on 1 July 2010 through the UNSCR 1925, it had assumed broader mandate compared with its predecessor, the MONUC (UN, 2010c). The major changes made in the mandates of PKOs in the DRC was in 2010, when MONUC was changed to MONUSCO, in 2013 and the UN introduced the FIB and again in 2021 when the UN reformed FIB (UN, 2021).

As for many UN missions, UNAMID underwent a series of changing mandates refined periodically to meet the changing situations on the ground with emphasis on POC. However, since 2013, the mandates required UNAMID to start downsizing

their troops culminating in the closure of the mission in December 2020. The tradition of extending the mission mandate for a maximum of one year was criticised because the tasks given in the mandate could not be fulfilled in the given short period.

The same could be said for the mandate of the AMIS in Sudan (Darfur), which was also limited. What AMIS deployed in Sudan (Darfur) on 28 May 2004, were military observers without any mandate to protect civilians who were exposed to violence (Hottinger, 2006). The mandate was made based on article 3 of the AU Charter which restricts the AU from interfering with internal affairs of member states (AU, 2007). On 20 October 2004, the AU decided to expand the AMIS mandate to include the POC (AU, 2004).

The UN also set an ambitious mandate for both missions, comprising too many tasks which were ordinarily impossible to fulfil in the duration of one year. For example, the MONUC mandate covered about 41 tasks. As a result, the mission failed to fulfil many of the tasks due to limited resources (UN, 1999). Soon MONUC were given a multidimensional mandate with about forty tasks, POC taking precedence. Under that situation, it was difficult for peacekeepers to focus on a specific mandate consistently. The prioritization of the tasks within the mandate was left to the commander in the field who was supposed and expected to make a situational assessment and determine which task should be given priority over which.

As already observed in Section 5.2.3.1, POC is a critical indicator of the level of performance of PKOs. This notably became challenging to both missions in the DRC

and Sudan (Darfur), and complicated by ambiguous or ambitious mandate. Luqman (2012) found that UNAMID failed to effectively protect civilians. This resulted in atrocities to civilians. One of the reasons for the failure in POC was the obstructions by GoS. MONUC/MONUSCO were criticized by some scholars on the same inaction in protection of civilians. The biggest failure noted was recorded in November 2012 when MONUSCO watched helplessly when M23 rebel group took the city of Goma.

While the mandate of the peacekeeping operation is critical for its success, peacekeepers need financial facilitation. What could be said about the changing mandate could also be observed in relation to financing of peacekeeping operation both in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur). Both started modestly and later on expanded their areas of operation in terms of number of troops, equipment and annual budgets. Over time, as peacekeeping approached their third generation, they became more integrated, multidimensional and complex, involving a range of components, including military, civilian police, political affairs, rule of law, human rights, humanitarian, reconstruction, public information and gender. PKOs were mandated not only to maintain peace and security but also to fulfil other different complex tasks such as to support political processes, to facilitate negotiations to attain comprehensive peace agreement, support for DDR process, supporting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, undertaking security sector reforms, promotion and safeguarding human rights and setting up transitional administration process of a country.

ONUC was the largest and most expensive UN peacekeeping venture in the UN up until the 1990s with 19,828 troops deployed at their peak and it cost the UN US\$ 400,130,793. ONUC proved to be highly costly to the extent of stirring financial crisis and the UN had to divert its resources from other UN activities to cover peacekeeping expenses in Africa. According to General Assembly (GA/10955) of 24 June 2010 (UN, 2010a), in 2010/2011 UNAMID and MONUC were the most expensive missions. UNAMID had 17,308 troops and an annual budget of US\$1.82 billion while MONUC had 20,586 troops (uniformed) with an annual budget of US\$ 1.37 billion.

By comparison, UNMIS had 10,519 troops and annual budget of US\$ 938 million and UNFIL had 12,200 troops and annual budget of US\$518.71 million. These costs do not include those of FIB in MONUSCO in 2013. FIB comprising 3,069 peacekeeping troops of infantry, artillery, special forces, reconnaissance company, Unmanned Air System as well as attack helicopters. Reimbursements for the resources involved was much higher compared to other missions. The PKOs in the DRC and in Sudan (Darfur) operated with minimal support from respective host governments. The deployment of MONUC and even MONUSCO was not supported by the DRC government.

Similarly, the GoS initially denied the deployment of any PKOs in Sudan (Darfur). It changed its position slightly later when it emphasized that only an African mission would be allowed. Despite this consent, the GoS offered minimum support and sometimes interfered with the operations of the mission. At times, the national army

targeted peacekeepers (UN, 2007). Apart from improvement of security situation in Sudan (Darfur), it is said that another reason for the closure of UNAMID operation in Sudan (Darfur) in 2020 was pressure from the government of Sudan.

Both missions faced the challenge of inconsistencies, redundancies and overlaps not only because of the changes in mandate but also leadership style. In a span of 20 years, from 2000 to 2020, MONUSCO had been led by nine SRSG. Sudan (Darfur) had been under three SRSG from 2015 to 2020. All these high-ranking mission leaders had their own styles of leadership and strategies to achieve their objectives. Changing them frequently affected the overall performance of the mission. Implementation of strategies initiated by one leadership slacked after the change of leadership. Several SRSG innovated novel ideas and pushed for their implementation. These included Island of Stability, Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), the UN Security and Stabilization Support Strategy and others. In Sudan (Darfur) innovations such as firewood and water point patrols which were initiated by one of SRSGs during their term was not effectively fulfilled and was abandoned after the change of leadership.

Last but not least, both MONUC and UNAMID faced more or less similar challenges on the ground. In the DRC more than 100 AGs were at large, mostly in the Eastern part of the country in Ituri and South Kivu provinces. Similarly, in Sudan (Darfur) was ravaged by at least half a dozen AGs. MONUC and UNAMID were deployed following weak ceasefire agreements. According to Tubiana (2013), UNAMID was

deployed with many inherent challenges, the biggest being that not all AGs were signatory to the 2006 DPA, and as such some of the AGs did not respect the DPA.

Similarly, MONUC operated in partial consent. Some important actors in the conflict such as Mai Mai Banyamulenge did not sign the Lusaka Agreement and those who signed it did not fulfil their obligations and so fighting continued soon after the agreement was signed. External armed groups chiefly the FDLR and ADF-NALU originating from Rwanda and Uganda failed to abide by the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement which wanted them to withdraw from the DRC.

5.2.5.2 Differences Between the PKOs in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur)

One of the notable differences between MONUC/MONUSCO and UNAMID was that in the DRC PKOs were under the supervision of the UN all along. It should be recalled that ONUC were deployed on 20 July 1960 after adoption of the UNSCR 143 of 1960 and remained under the UN until its closure in 1964 (UN, 1960a). The MONUC was deployed in the DRC after the UN adopted UNSCR 1279 of 1999 and continued to be under UN until it was changed to MONUSCO in 2010 (UN, 1999b). MONUSCO was formed after the UN adopted the UNSCR 1925 of 2010, and since then to date, the area is under the UN (UN, 2010c).

On the contrary, UNAMID started as AMIS monitoring compliance of the agreement including the modalities for the establishment of the CFC and deployment of observers. For the entire duration of the conflict the area was under AU. Nevertheless, due to different challenges which affected effectiveness of the troops,

the UN adopted UNSCR 1769 of 2007 for the deployment of joint United Nations-African Union Mission in Sudan (Darfur) (UNAMID), under the initiative of the African Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) and UNSC to replace AMIS (UN, 2007a). UNAMID remained under the supervision of both the AU and the UN throughout the duration of the conflict. It was the first mission with UN chain of command and dual reporting procedures (UN and AU). On this, the former UN Secretary Gen Ban Ki Moon said “UNAMID is an unparalleled joint operation which reflects shared determination to end the tragedy in Sudan (Darfur) once and for all” (Moon, 2015: 2).

The international community reacted differently to the two missions. After the eruption of the first Congo conflict of 1960, the UN responded swiftly by adopting the UNSCR 143 of 1960 to deploy ONUC (UN, 1960a). The assassination of Patrice Lumumba, for example, has long been linked with the Central Intelligence Agency. It is said that the cold war was actually hot in Africa, where the East and the West were involved in proxy wars, especially in the DRC (Morrison, Kiras, & Fraser, 1997). Even as the cold war ended, the first and second Congo wars in 1997 and 1998, had regional dimensions (Barrera, 2015). From the initiatives of these actors, the deployment of the MONUC, MONUSCO and FIB were realised. There were different initiatives from these actors ranging from political, social, and economic development projects.

In contrast, after the 2003 crisis, the UN was slow to react to the Sudan (Darfur) crisis until 2004 (Lanz, 2015). According to Brosché (2022), there was

procrastination in instituting intervention in the Sudan (Darfur) conflict. The slow action was attributed to different factors. The first was SC politics where China, Qatar and Russia stood against the deployment of PKOs in Sudan (Darfur) because the referred interested nations perceived it as an internal issue. The second reason was the bureaucratic procedures of the UN in acting to deploy PKOs.

The AU, IGAD and individual countries especially Chad remained in the forefront in resolving the Sudan (Darfur) crisis. Such initiatives include the 2004 ceasefire agreement which resulted into the deployment of the AMIS (Hottinger, 2006). Later, the UN was fully involved in all the initiatives supported by the AU, EU, IGAD, the Arab League, ICC and individual states. The deployment of UNAMID came from these initiatives (Kreps, 2007). Generally, apart from funding, the AU has been fully involved in the Sudan (Darfur) conflict than UN compared to the DRC conflict.

It was also noted that there were differences in how the peacekeepers conducted themselves. One of the issues, which of late has beleaguered peacekeeping operations has been Sexual Abuse and Exploitation (SEA). Although there were disciplinary cases for both PKOs in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur), Kovatch (2016) points out that the UN PKO in the DRC had the highest rate of SEA cases among all the UN missions. The DRC peacekeepers were also accused of involvement in illegal mineral trade in exchange for weapons and arms. There have also been cases of looting property. For example, companies owned by businessmen from Pakistan and India operating around the Great Lakes Region such as Farrel Trade and

Machanga Ltd have been accused of colluding with Pakistan peacekeepers in the DRC (MONUC/MONUSCO) to smuggle minerals (International Alert, 2010). Similarly, HRW (2007) asserts that Pakistan peacekeepers in MONUSCO involved themselves in smuggling Gold from Ituri. For Sudan (Darfur), it was very difficult to substantiate SEA cases due to the sensitivity of SEA issues in the Arab world. Although there were reports of SEA in UNAMID, it was difficult to establish evidence pertaining. It was known that SEA in the Muslim world was and still is a sensitive issue, and no one would dare give evidence even women and girls who were victims of sexual. Nevertheless, for a grave crime such as this to be perpetuated by an international force, it was difficult to contain such information for a prolonged period.

The differences in resource endowment were one area which set apart AMIS and UNAMID from MONUC or MONUSCO. According to Ekengard (2008), AMIS initially had only 7,000 troops to cover the whole of Sudan (Darfur) without helicopters and APC. There was the lack of interpreters and the lack of information sharing system. Powerful countries which traditionally provided equipment to UN PKOs hesitated to do so for UNAMID which was ostensibly an “African dominated mission”. This was in fear of mismanagement, and they were not confident in how hybrid management may protect their equipment (AP, 2007). In the DRC the situation was as not as bad in terms of equipment supply compared to Sudan (Darfur). Many countries and stakeholders fulfilled their pledge timely.

5.2.6 Objective 4: Development and Recommendations of Strategies to Enable UNPKOs to Operate more Effectively and Fulfil their Mandate

The current UNPKOs operates in a different environment from that of the Cold War era to the contemporary environment we are facing today. It is reality that since its formation, the UN and its PKOs has seemingly shown effectiveness despite different challenges. However, of currently, there have been different argument of the failure of PKOs which affects its effectiveness. Its failure has been evidenced not only from its inability to stop ethnic cleansing in Rwanda and Bosnia but also to dealing with the current security threats such as terrorism as what have been presented. There are challenges/factors which have been seen from the study which need to be adjusted for the PKOs to regain its lost reputations. The recommendation of strategies to enable PKOs to operate more effectively and fulfil their mandate have been discussed in detail in section 5.4.4 above on factors influencing the effectiveness of PKO.

These strategies are; there must be no conflicting interests among the troops contributing countries (TCCs) to PKOs as most of them participate in PKOs with financial benefits taking precedence. Apart from resolving conflicts as envisaged by the UN, member states and other actors in peace have been using the UN through PKOs as a springboard to pursue their economic and related interests. The conflicting interests always lowers the effectiveness of PKOs and at times instigate conflicts. Therefore, the UN should ensure all TCCs fulfil mandate as stipulated by the UN. Also, participation of the permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5) countries to PKOs must be enhanced because it has been observed that they are

leading in contributing to the UN PKOs budget but, they contribute minimal troops to participate in UNPKOs. Their participation will enhance the effectiveness of PKOs as they have resources which enable PKOs to be effective.

On the other hands, the UN should be issuing mandate to PKOs which are feasible, clear and without any ambiguity. Mandate should reflect the realities of the situation on the ground and is operational in line with resources available. Most of the time, there have been a mismatch between the mandate given to PKOs and the real situation of their operations on the ground which lowers the effectiveness of PKOs. The UN should reduce the Bureaucracy in taking decisions and should give more room for commanders on the field to take initiatives. Because of bureaucracy, the UN takes more time in deciding deployment of PKOs which affects its effectiveness. When PKOs deployed in good time and with all the necessary resources, the chances of success are high.

All members of the UN should be given equal opportunity in the decisions on issues related to PKOs. Basically, developed countries, especially the members of P-5, uses their enormously contribution to the budget of PKs to dominate power to decide on where, how and under what strength the UN should or should not deploy PKOs. This affects the effectiveness of PKOs as most of time deployments of PKOs are based of their interests. On the same line, there must be good relations between components of PKOs, military, Police and Civilians as they are minimal integration and cooperation between and among these components, especially in the field. The main

reason was power, especially who controls who. This affects the effectiveness of PKOs.

Troops deployed must be compatible to the environment, disciplined and must be committed to PKOs. Basically, PKOs troops were from different TCCs, with different military backgrounds, language, experience, culture and traditions. The UN should ensure that peacekeepers are deployed from TCCs from compatible environment, culture and traditions. There must be well coordinated training to ensure that troops are well professional and disciplined. Lastly, the UN should frequently be reviewing the reimbursement rates as TCCs are suffering from inflation and the rise of living costs. This affects TCCs which sometimes decides to deploy weaker equipment because of minimal reimbursement.

The recommendations suggested have been categorised into all actors to PKOs the UN, Regional Organisations, TCCs and Host Countries. The UN which is responsible for formulations of policies, deployment of PKOs and running all PKOs have many issues as pointed out which are recommended to be rectified. Regional organisations which have been mandate under chapter VII of UN Charter as important partner in PKOs has areas for enable PKOs to be effective. This is because we have witnessed the cooperation between UN and regional organisation in deployment of PKOs. On other side, TCCs are the key for PKOs as they contribute troops who are taking part in PKOs as such they also have part to enhance effectiveness of PKOs. Lastly, the host nations where which PKOs are deployed have contribution to enhance effectiveness of PKOs.

5.2.7 Questions Raised by the Researcher

There were four questions which the researcher raised. These were how can and are the principles of peacekeeping be applied in each unique case? Were the UNPKOs in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur) successful and effective? What were the reasons for the UN to delay and respond late and reluctantly to humanitarian sufferings in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur)? How can the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur) cases be evaluated within the context of humanitarian interventions worldwide?

In principle, all the basic guidelines and principles of PKOs were applied in the case of the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur). But the reality in the actualization of those principles, namely consent, impartiality and minimum use of force were not compatible with the contemporary Peacekeeping environment of the time. Peacekeepers today operate against complex armed groups such as terrorists and criminal gangs. The environment calls for PKOs to be more robust, flexible with strength and military capacity to operate in varying environments and situations with a wide range of operations. In most cases, the PKOs in this generation have chapter VII mandate, which makes room for a wider range of operations.

The study concluded that the PKOs in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur) have not been successful despite all the effort's made. This has been due to the different kinds of failures, especially the events and circumstances for the POC were called to bear. From the established empirical evidence, it is unfair to argue that the PKOs, in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur) were effective while most of them actually failed to protect civilians, the fundamental and core function of PKOs. The failure has

resulted onto increase of violence, population displacement, extortion, rape and murder, to mention but a few.

The study established that the security situation in Eastern DRC is still clouded with violence and people's fear as armed groups continue to intensify their human rights violation of civilians. The researcher visited Goma, Beni, Kiwanja, Munigi, Rutchuru and Ituri and observed that most of the villages, especially in Beni, were empty with only remains of burnt houses and household items. There were no economic activities going on at all. A few people who appeared to carry on their daily lives and activities lived in sustained fear. No hospital or school was open and operating, some of the schools were burnt down. Even though peacekeeping troops were on duty patrolling Beni and Ituri areas, there were very few people who could be seen, and all the streets were almost empty. The researcher was informed that most people in the villages around Beni area were killed and others ran in disarray in fear of the ADF-NALU. This justifies the silence and almost total inactivity in the villages around Beni. Goma portrayed an opposite image where there was normal life with people engaging in their economic and social activities including children and teachers going to school and people going to hospitals, banks and cultural activities booming. The UN troops were seen patrolling the streets and ensuring peaceful living in Goma.

The study found that there is the general concern over the UN decision to close the UNAMID operations in Sudan (Darfur) in December 2020. The concern was based on the fact that the situation on the ground had not yet improved to allow UN forces

to close their operations. The researcher managed to visit Sudan (Darfur) areas such as Al-Fashi, Nyala and Hurun where he observed that the people there were living in fear, many still in hiding, and some IDP camps were not closed as there were few people still walking about there. It was proven that some people escaped from the IDP camps because armed groups often targeted those camps, especially Hurun, where some medical facilities and schools were still closed and inoperative.

Furthermore, the study found that the international community reacted differently on the status and functioning of the two missions. The international community seems to have been interested to have the conflict in the DRC sustained but were of no classifiable position about the situation in Sudan (Darfur). After the eruption of the first Congo conflict in 1960, the UN responded swiftly by adopting the UNSCR 143 of 1960 to deploy ONUC (UN, 1960a). From the initiatives of the actors of the time, the deployment of the MONUC, MONUSCO and FIB were actualized. In consequence, there were different initiatives for peace from these actors ranging from encouraging the people to engage in political, social, and economic development projects.

In contrast, after the 2003 crisis, the UN was glaringly slow to respond to the Sudan (Darfur) crisis until 2004 (Lanz, 2015). But there was glaring laxity in initiating intervention in the Sudan (Darfur) conflict. The inaction on the part of the UN was attributed to by different factors. The first was the SC politics where China, Qatar and Russia stood against the deployment of PKOs in Sudan (Darfur) because they perceived that the move was an internal issue. The second reason was the

bureaucratic procedures of the UN which have many stages of approval before clearance is given for the deployment of PKOs in a conflict area.

The AU, IGAD and individual countries, especially Chad have been in the forefront in resolving the Sudan (Darfur) crisis. Such initiatives included negotiations that resulted in the 2004 ceasefire agreement. The agreement led to the deployment of the AMIS (Hottinger, 2006). Later, the UN was fully involved in all the peacebuilding initiatives and were supported by the AU, EU, IGAD, the Arab League, ICC and other individual states. The deployment of UNAMID came from the negotiated initiatives of these peace actors (Kreps, 2007). Generally, apart from injecting funding, the AU has been fully involved in the Sudan (Darfur) conflict than the UN compared to the AU events in the DRC conflict.

The study examined how the DRC and Sudan (Darfur) cases can best be evaluated within the context of humanitarian interventions for the protection of human lives. The PKOs in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur) proved to be ineffective especially in matters of protection of civilians. In order to be more effective, the UN needed to reform the creation, composition and mandates of PKOs. However, efforts to reform the UN PKOs appear to have been in initiation and negotiation for a long time since the mid-1990s and characterized by different proposals which took too long to get approval for implementation. The UN (1992) provided the “Agenda for Peace” concept of 1992 and 1995, the establishment of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKOs) in 1992 and its separation into DPKO and Department of Field Support (DFS) in 2007. These initiatives and recommendations were intended to

improve the effectiveness of PKOs. The “Brahimi Panel” produced the “Brahimi Report of 2000”, the endorsement of the “Responsibility to Protect (R2P)” concept in 2005 and the establishment of Counter Terrorism Office in 2017. All these efforts were intended to improve PKOs after a series of their past failures. On the other hand, the UN has had no firm standing army for deployment and as such it organises PKOs through voluntary contribution of troops by member states of the UN. In addition to resolving conflicts as expected by the UN, member states and other peace actors have also been having their own interests.

5.3 Summary

In this chapter research findings on effectiveness of PKOs in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur) have been discussed. It has been organised according to specific objectives and questions raised by researcher. The chapter has concluded that, UN PKOs in DRC and Sudan (Darfur) were deployed as the effort of the UN to resolve conflicts. Both missions have been encountered with challenges mainly on the area of mandates and less cooperations from host nations. By focusing on POC, this study concluded that PKOs in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur) have not been successful despite all the effort's made. On the same, the chapter came up with strategies to be used for the UNPKOs in order for them to fulfil their mandates more effectively. From questions raised by the researcher, the chapter learnt that, apart from the fact that UNAMID was under the partnership of AU and UN, but all UN PKOs basic principles have been applied in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur). Also, as pointed out, PKOs in DRC and Sudan (Darfur) has been ineffective by looking on POC. Furthermore, the study found that the international community reacted

differently on the status and functioning of the two missions whereby, they at least reacted swiftly in the DRC conflict as compared to Sudan (Darfur) conflict. Lastly, in the examination on how the DRC and Sudan (Darfur) cases can best be evaluated within the context of humanitarian interventions for the protection of human lives, it has noted that the PKOs in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur) proved to be ineffective as such there must be reforms in the area of PKOs.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Introduction

The summary of this research, conclusions, and recommendations based on the interpretation of the findings are presented in this chapter. The chapter also includes the contribution of this study to knowledge. The chapter is organised in five sections. Section one summarises of the whole study. The second is the presentation of conclusions from the findings in each specific objective that are presented in chapter four. Section three presents the recommendations based, the fourth about the contribution of this study to knowledge, and the fifth recommends areas for the future research.

6.2 Summary of the Findings

This study analysed the effectiveness of PKOs using those in DRC and Sudan (Darfur) as snapshots of PKO events in Africa and the world. It examines scholarly arguments and experiences of practitioners in the area of peace and security vis-a-vis the role and impact of UN PKOs particularly in Africa. The study was carried to answer the puzzle regarding the question about the ineffectiveness of PKOs, especially in Africa. There are many examples of failed PKOs, such as those in Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia, which resulted into unimaginable atrocities including mass murder of civilians. In countries such as the DRC, UNPKOs have extended presence for several decades with limited or no achievement of their intended outcome of eliminating violence and restoration of peace and functional

governance. The theoretical base that guided the study was the political economy theory, developed by William Stanley Jevons (Jevons & Black 1970). The theory's premise is that materialism drives human beings to fight (Faleti, 2006). Therefore, political and economic motivations of TCCs in PKOs have affected the effectiveness of the PKOs. The motivation of most TCCs to participate in PKOs are primarily economic.

The researcher visited Goma, Beni, Kiwanja, Rutchuru, Munigi and Ituri in the DRC, and in Al-Fashi, Nyala and Hurun in Sudan (Darfur). DRC and Darfur were selected as cases in the study because they are Africa, share similar mission characteristics, and involved complex and expensive deployment of UN PKOs. The study population included the affected local people in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur), scholars of peacekeeping, and senior and junior UN staff members. Others were members of the diplomatic corps; AU, SADC, ICGRL, IGAD staffers; and senior staff of forces in some countries, who had a command of knowledge on peacekeeping. Some of the latter were Tanzania's TPDF commanders and police officers that worked with MONUSCO, UNAMID and other missions. One hundred respondents comprising men and women of different ages, racial backgrounds, and knowledge about PKOs were interviewed in this study.

The study employed qualitative research approach, which focuses on understanding a phenomenon from a closer perspective or its interpretation from the worldview of the people of interest to the study. The study abided to ethical considerations, including that of securing research approval of clearance from relevant authorities. The main

thrust of the study was to find answers to the following research questions: What was the origin and purpose for which the UN created and deployed PKOs in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur)? What was the mode of operations of the UNPKOs and what challenges did they face in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur)? How effective have the UNPKOs been in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur)? What strategies should the UNPKOs deploy to meet their mandates more effectively?_

The following is the summary of the main findings of this study which is presented as per research questions raised in chapter one.

Research Question One: (What was the origin and purpose for which the UN created and deployed PKOs in the DRC and the Sudan -Darfur?). All PKOs in DRC originated from UNSC resolutions and purposed to resolve conflicts in the conflict zones inconsistent with the main objective of the UN, which is the maintenance of global peace and security. The PKOs in Sudan (Darfur) originated from the AU and UN under AUPSC and UNSC with purpose of resolving conflict in the Darfur, in line with UN and AU objectives of maintenance of peace and security.

Research Question Two; (What were the modes of operation and challenges to the UNPKOs in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur)?The mode of operation used in both missions has been peace enforcement (using force). This stemmed from increased security challenges to the peacekeepers, which helped make PKOs evolve into those of fourth generation. Besides force, the PKO missions have also used basic operations to protect civilians. These are sending patrols, camera surveillance, setting

check points, deployment of temporary and permanent operation bases in vulnerable areas. Quick reaction forces were also installed and made available on demand. All UNPKOs were guided by the UN's principles of consent, impartiality and minimum use of forces.

Both the DRC and Sudan (Darfur) missions suffered challenges of complex security environments. The contemporary PKOs environment have faced AGs that were small-scale, lightly armed, high-tech, and mounted groups capable of inflicting severe damage in short periods of time. This is a considerable challenge to the operations of peacekeepers. Other challenges to the PKOs have been controversial, ambiguous and limited mandates; limited support of host governments; and frequent change of leadership.

Research Question Three: (How effective have the UNPKOs been in the DRC and the Sudan – Darfur?) (Darfur) have been ineffective especially in the protection of civilians. The political economy of PKOs and competing interests contribute significantly to the ineffectiveness of PKOs in DRC and Sudan (Darfur). Economic incentives are the major driving force deployment of UN troops. The commitment to the mission is not primary to many parties in the PKOs, and because of that, the thrust of peacekeepers to take risks is minimal.

Research Question Four: (What strategies should the UNPKOs deploy for the effective discharge of their mandate? One of these is that TCCs must not have conflicting interests with the overarching mission of PKOs. Secondly, the

P5 members UNSC need to contribute more troops to missions besides their major budgetary contributions to the operations. Thirdly, the UN should develop a culture of issuing feasible, clear, and consistent mandates. Fourthly, the UN should reduce bureaucratic red tape in decision making. All members of the UN should be given equal opportunity in making decisions on issues related to PKOs. In addition, the UN should reduce the bureaucratic inertia to effect rapid and effective decision making in PKOs. Fourthly, it is important to consolidate good relations, integration, and interoperability between the components of PKOs, military, police and civilians especially in the field. Fifth, compatibility of troops to the theatre of deployment, discipline, professionalism, and commitment need to be criteria of requirement for recruits and entire PKOs for effective missions. the missions. Lastly, the UN review personnel reimbursement rates to TCCs for resilience against inflation and rising living costs for troops and their families in their countries of domicile.

6.3 Conclusion

PKOs are crucial in the enforcement of global peace. However, they have had been weak in realising their missions and especially the protection of civilians including DRC, Darfur, Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia. Their weakness manifests especially in resolving contemporary security challenges. In the case study areas DRC and Darfur, security continues to be worse as murder, rape, torture, and other atrocities are on the increase. DRC presents the worst example of effectiveness of PKOs. UN PKOs have been present in the country in various guises from 1960 to date and have evolved to meet the challenges in the field. However, security and human welfare in the country have worsened. Similar is the case in Sudan (Darfur). Investments in PKOs in the

study areas are not commensurate with the intended outcomes of peace restoration and sustainability.

The failures of PKOs have eroded the trust and confidence of local people towards UN PKOs. The violent anti-UN PKOs demonstrations in Eastern DRC exemplify the dissatisfaction of local population with the PKOs. Similarly, the dissatisfaction of some host government with PKOs has grown, and some have begun sanctioning for their exit. An opinion poll conducted in DRC showed the people in the country wanted the PKOs to leave because they felt unprotected. The missions in DRC and Sudan (Darfur) failed in the POC despite it being core and takes precedence in the formulation most UN mandates.

This study acknowledges the challenges of complexity in the current security environment especially in Africa, and those which originate in the UN itself. These limit the achievement of PKO in conflict zones. There is the presence of AGs that are small-scale, lightly armed, agile, with high-tech, and with mounted groups. These are capable of inflicting serious damage in a short time. Their hostility is hard to adapt to given that they do not model themselves as traditional adversaries do. There are also evolving threat threats of violent extremism, transnational terrorism, and transnational organised crime that are hard for PKOs to adapt to for effective counteraction. The challenges from within UN include the controversial and fragmented mandates, slow reaction to security threats, unjust allocation of financial and human resources, generally unprofessional conduct in PKOs stemming from

competing economic interests. The political economy underpins many of these challenges. Such challenges explain the failure of many missions in the POC.

The UN needs to and should review and address all these and other related challenges to PKOs for results that are commensurate with the effort and resources. There must be efforts to change the science and art of conducting PKOs. The contemporary environment calls for PKOs to be more robust, flexible, and with strength and military capacity to operate in variable environments. In most cases, the contemporary PKOs should be robust and granted the chapter VII mandate, which makes room for a wider range of operations.

The study therefore recommends that the UN should develop mechanisms for the commitment of peacekeeping forces to the maintenance of peace, including instituting clear and achievable mandates of PKOs. The current short-term mandates of six months and one year are unrealistic. The UN should ensure all peacekeeping forces are committed to bringing peace and are given clear and achievable mandates with inbuilt protection of civilians as core and priority. Deadlines for the accomplishment of the mandate should be realistic and based on cumulative experience of the UNPKOs in the field. The Security Council should strive to gain deeper knowledge of inherent and imminent problems before developing mandates and committing troops.

Regional organisations should strengthen their conflict prevention mechanisms by using various means of intervention in conflict areas before the need to deploy UN

PKOs becomes necessary. TCCs should commit to instil professionalism by training personnel and providing the UNPKOs with competent military and civilian personnel that can meet contemporary security challenges. In addition, host countries should commit fulfilling their obligations fully as agreed during the signing of the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA). The “consent” provision to the host countries should not be interpreted otherwise, for example interfering with UN Operations in the countries.

This study is therefore timely with the increasing demand for reforms in the UN and its auspices. These recommendations this research provided are directed to all actors in PKOs. Enhancement of effectiveness of PKOs will help restore trust of UN among member states, especially those in the devilling world. The UN originated from wars, with a prime mandate to maintain global peace and security. Therefore, reforms shall help consolidate its legitimacy.

6.4 Recommendations

Based on the findings of this research, the following are recommendations directed to each of key players in PKOs, including the UN, Regional Organisations Troops Contributing Countries, and host nations.

6.4.1 United Nations

As alluded in section 2.3 above, the UN was established principally to maintain international peace and security using different measures. However, the PKOs have been the most effective way of forging global peace and security, especially in

Africa. However, there have been many arguments related to ineffectiveness of PKOs giving examples of failure of PKOs in Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia. PKOs in DRC and the Sudan (Darfur), are examples where despite of deployment of PKOs, the security situation continues to be worse as murders, rapes, tortures, and other inhuman actions are on increase. Therefore, the following are the recommendations to be undertaken by the UN to improve the effectiveness of PKOs.

- i) As alluded from sections 5.4.4.3; 5.4.4.7 and 5.4.4.8 above, PKOs mandates given are often controversial, and some peacekeepers are not committed to the mandates. It is recommended that the UN develops mechanisms to commit peacekeeping to the restoration and maintenance of peace. This includes instituting clear and achievable mandates for the PKOs. Protection of civilians should remain the key priority. The UN needs to avoid short term mandates such as those of one year or six months because they are unrealistic. Deadlines for the accomplishment of mandates should be realistic and need to base on the professional and cumulative experience in the field.
- ii) Section 5.4.4.3 above indicates that there is always mismatch between the given PKO mandates and the state of affairs in the field. This is partly because of the need for consensus among all members of the UNSC and basing on “template approaches” evidence on the ground. It is recommended that the UNSC should commit to developing a comprehensive and a richer knowledge base of the problems and dynamics in the conflict areas, and then issue mandates backed by the knowledge base.
- iii) Section 5.4.4.3 indicates that while the UN continues to issue mandates based on chapter VI of the UN Charter. Quite often the mandates do not suite

operational environment on the ground. Contemporary PKOs must be robust in tandem with the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter (enforcement). It is thus recommended for the PKOs to be made robust by giving robust mandate with increased weaponry capability capable of confrontation and deterrence to the AGs and use force when necessary.

- iv) There is poor co-ordination and co-operation among the components of PKOs, which include the military, police, and civilians. The main reasons is competition for power. Therefore, the UN should always ensure internal and external coordination and cooperation among components of PKOs. The cooperation and coordination should be reviewed and enhanced to increase efficiency and reduce internal contradictions.
- v) According to Section 5.4.4.2, there is less participation of developed countries in UN PKOs. There is an urgent need for the permanent members of the UNSC to increase contribution of troops in the PKOs. The involvement of developed nations in PKOs will consolidate the contemporary security environment because they have resources that will effectively support the fulfilment of the PKOs mandates.
- vi) Section 5.4.4.1 above shows that, the reimbursement rate to the TCCs has not changed since 2002. This makes participation in UN peacekeeping financially less attractive for states facing rising deployment costs. The mechanisms for reimbursing the cost of the equipment for the states' contingents is also weak because it takes time for the UN to reimburse. The UN should therefore conduct regular reviews of the rates in relation to inflation and other cost-related items to bolster the participation of TCCs.

- vii) Section 2.3 above alluded that there is limited deployment of women peacekeepers. The most affected people in conflict areas are women and children. These would feel free to interact with their fellow women than men. The UN decided to set a target of 15% women of all peacekeepers by 2028. The TCCs are the ones that make choices of the troops to deploy. The UN should persuade TCCs to deploy more and qualified women in PKO to meet the target.

6.4.2 Regional Organisations

Section 2.3 provide that; Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provides for the involvement of regional arrangements and agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security. Regional organisations are more likely to succeed in peacekeeping oversight due to their rich local knowledge or similarity of the conflict zone to their areas of domicile. It is therefore recommended that regional organisations should strengthen their conflict prevention mechanisms by using different means of intervention such as deployment regional forces in conflict areas before the need to deploy UN PKOs becomes necessary.

6.4.3 Troops Contributing Countries

As alluded from section 5.6.3 above, the UN has no standing army for deployment of PKOs. It organises PKOs through voluntary contribution of troops by member states. The TCCs sign agreements with the UN to deploy troops for PKOs. Therefore, TCCs are therefore important in PKOs. Therefore, the following are recommendations for effective discharge of their mandate.

TCCs should provide the PKOs with competent military and civilian personnel to meet contemporary security challenges. They should conduct all Pre-deployment Training (PDT) that reflects specific mission mandates. The training should pay heed to the language and culture factors in the host the population as one of the key inputs in the training.

- i) According to Section 5.4.4.8 above, some peacekeepers lack proper training, which compromises discipline, professionalism, and efficiency. Therefore, TCCs should enforce professionalism in the peacekeepers they deploy to rid peacekeepers of misconduct in missions.
- ii) According to section 5.6.3 above, there is a weak link between mission leadership and TCCs. It is recommended that there must be a well-established network of the mission leadership and TCCs. The mission leadership will be able to interact conveniently with the TCCs leadership on demand to enhance the effectiveness of PKOs.

6.4.4 Host Countries

Host countries are those with conflicts the in which PKOs are deployed. The UN seeks consent from the host countries before it deploys troops there. According to Section 5.3. both PKOs in DRC and Sudan (Darfur) received limited co-operation from the respective government. It is therefore recommended that host nations should commit themselves to fully fulfil obligations agreed during the signing of Status of Force Agreements (SOFA). This can be done by the UN to come with strictly rules which force these countries to abide with it. Host nations should give maximum cooperation to Peacekeeping Forces irrespective of their sources and

command. Host nations should not misuse the “consent” provision by interfering with UN Operations.

6.5 The Contribution of the Study to Knowledge

The study found that PKOs in DRC and Sudan (Darfur) are ineffectiveness especially on the area of protection of civilians. The ineffectiveness of PKOs in DRC and Sudan (Darfur) corresponds with the Political economy theory. This is because political and economic incentives have been the driving force for most of actors to the conflict and PKOs. This has led to ineffectiveness of PKOs. It has been noted that PKOs have lost their reputation among the local populations and host governments. The violent anti-UN PKOs demonstrations being witnessed especially in Eastern DRC is the expression of dissatisfaction with the PKOs. The findings of this research contribute to literature and the knowledge base in the area of peace and security.

6.6 Areas for Future Research

This study analyzed the general conduct of UN PKOs in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur). In the course of the study, the UNAMID, which was deployed in Sudan (Darfur) to carry out PKOs closed its operation on 31 December 2020 after the perceived improvement of the security situation in that part of Africa. It should be recalled that the UNAMID was the first hybrid mission in the history of the UN and the AU. UNAMID was the first mission with UN chain of command dual reporting procedures involving the United Nations and the African Union. This study established that it was the first time that the command of UN PKOs was shared by

international bodies from Africa and the UN system. *Less known what has been the extent to which the security situation in Sudan (Darfur) has continued to improve after the closure UNAMID Operations.* This is an area that certainly needs further research. Another area of research interest is *the analysis of the politics and dynamics that prompted the closure of UNAMID.* Was it triggered by the removal of Al Bashir from office in 2019 or the by the deployments and effectiveness of UN hybrid missions?

Another area of further study is the need to *study for the causes of recent civilian demonstrations, attacks on peacekeepers, and their disruption of peacekeeping missions.* The peacekeepers in the DRC and Central African Republic have been victims of this phenomenon. Some have been killed, some injured, and UN property vandalised by angry mobs of angry civilians. It is puzzling that local populations turned heel from being friendly and supportive to the peacekeepers turning against peace-keeping missions. Further research is needed in this area.

Finally, there is the need to conduct *studies to further test the applicability of the political economy theory to effectiveness of PKOs in countries that have minimal or no precious natural resources.* The political economy theory has been useful in explaining the conflict situations in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur). It would be of interest to examine the underlying motives for PKOs in various theatres of conflicts including in host countries with no precious resources. Djibouti could be a fitting case.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: Interviews Guide

The following interviews guide has been structured such as to respond to and in synchrony with the research objectives of the study:

1. **Objective 1:** To examine the origin and purpose of UNPKOs as deployed in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur);
 - a) In your considered views, how has UN peacekeeping evolved over time?
 - b) What conditions across nations determined this evolution?
 - c) What are the fundamental principles of the UN PKOs?
 - d) What processes are followed in and for the deployment of UN PKOs?
 - e) How are UN peacekeeping mandates formulated?
 - f) How are PKOs funded?
 - g) Kindly outline the historical backgrounds to the DRC and Sudan (Darfur) conflicts.
 - h) What was the basis and background that led to the deployment of UN PKOs in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur)?
 - i) What were the mandates of UN PKOs in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur)?
 - j) Why in your opinion does Africa have many Peacekeeping Operations compared to other continents?
 - k) Do you think the UN is doing enough to promote and maintain international peace and security?
 - l) Why has there been no perpetual peace in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur) in response to the presence of the UN PKOs there?
 - m) Who were the main actors and interest takers in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur) conflicts?
 - n) What do you think motivated the peace actors to send PKOs to the DRC and Sudan (Darfur)?
 - o) How in your view do the peace actors pursue their interests in the conflict areas where the PKOs are deployed?

- p) How, in your view does the pursuit of peace actors' interests impede peace keeping operations?
- q) What are or have been the main differences between the peace actors in the DRC conflict and those in and Sudan (Darfur)?

2. Objective 2: To analyse the mode of operation and challenges faced by UNPKOs in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur);

- a) What are the contemporary threats facing peacekeepers in the field?
- b) Are peacekeepers able to face the contemporary security threats?
- c) How does policy challenge the performance of PKOs?
- d) What are relations between components of PKOs?
- e) Are the host nations fulfilling their commitment according to SOFA?
- f) Who are the relations between Peacekeepers and local populations?
- g) Are mandates given conform with the situation on the ground?
- h) Is the time to fulfil mandates given enough?
- i) Are peacekeepers or local populations involved in formulation of mandates?
- j) Are the troops getting enough information and training according to the environment they are going to operate?
- k) Are the equipment/weapons allotted enough to face contemporary threats?
- l) Is there any coordination between various peace actors present in operations areas?

3. Objective 3: To examine and assess the effectiveness of Peacekeeping Operations in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur)

- a) What were the mandates of peacekeeping missions in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur)?
- b) In your view, to what extent has or has not the execution of the given mandates been successful and why?
- c) What main factors influenced the execution of mandates of the missions in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur)?

- d) What pre-deployment training did the mission receive before they were sent to the DRC and Sudan (Darfur)? (Probe for ways in which this training was in accordance with UN Standard Operating Procedures).
- e) What assortment of equipment were supplied to the missions?
- f) To what extent were the supplied equipment adequate and effective in building and maintaining peace in the conflict areas?
- g) Was the deployment of the troops timely enough for the protection of people's lives?
- h) What conditions, if any, do you think delayed the deployment of troops in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur)?
- i) Where the troops were not deployed in time, how did this affect the PKOs?
- j) Who, do you think were the main commands for these missions?
- k) In your view do you think the commands and control of troops in both missions affected the achievement of the given mandates and objectives?
- l) In your view, to what extent did the host countries cooperate with the missions?
- m) How did the working environment in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur) affect the accomplishment of PKOs objectives?
- n) What do you consider to have been the main challenges faced by the UN PKOs in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur)?
- o) What were the responsibilities of the governments of the DRC and Sudan in resolving the conflicts in their respective states?
- p) To what extent have the UN PKOs contributed durable peace in Africa?

4. Objective 4: To Suggest strategies which can make Peacekeeping Operations more effective in accomplishing their mandates in Africa.

- a) Were the mandates given by the UNSC suitable enough for building peace in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur)?
- b) Do you think the Pre - deployment training of the peacekeeping troops was enough for the troops to be well prepared as peacekeepers? If no what improvement should be made in the training programme?

- c) What views do you have about the rate of reimbursement which the UN provides to TCCs?
- d) Were the resources given to peacekeepers enough to enable them to effectively accomplish their missions?
- e) What comment do you have about the state of cooperation between UN Missions and host nations in relation to the different components of UN PKOs?
- f) What procedures were used by the UN to select commanders to lead the different UN PKOs? Was the procedure appropriate and effective in identifying good commanders for the PKOs?
- g) What is your comment about the role and position of women in PKOs? Do you think the UN PKOs should continue to involve women?
- h) What is your comment on the effectiveness of TCCs and other peacekeeping actors in fulfilling their obligations to build and maintain peace in a conflicting state?
- i) Do you think the procedures used to deploy PKOs were effective for the mitigation of conflicts in Africa?
- j) Do you think the United Nations Peacekeeping Policy is supportive enough of and sufficiently promote the effectiveness of PKOs?
- k) Why do you think there have been increasing numbers of fatalities and injuries of Peacekeepers in the DRC and Darfur for the past 10 years?

APPENDIX II: Focus Group Discussion Guide

Opening Remarks (3 Minutes)

I thank you all for coming to this brief meeting. The main objective of this meeting is to share ideas, experiences, observations and challenges relating to efforts in progress for assuring and building peace and security in Africa. The sharing will involve a comparative analysis of the roles and contributions of PKOs in the DRC and Darfur, Sudan. In conducting our discussion, there are a few rules to keep in mind.

- a) Everyone is expected to be an active participant in sharing experience.
- b) There will be no “right” or “wrong” answers to any question asked. Feel free to share what you know about a question posed.
- c) Speak freely and, in any order, you like, and please do not interrupt anyone else while he/she is making a point or observation.
- d) In order to maintain anonymity, your names will not appear in the notebooks given.
- e) I request that anything that is said during our session is kept confidential and should not be repeated or shared with anyone that is not a member of this discussion groups. If no one has a question here to ask, please let us start our free discussion.

II. Self-introduction. (5 Minutes)

Before we start, I would like to request everyone to introduce himself / herself and brief profile.

III. Comments/Recommendations (2 minutes)

If there are any comments and or recommendation in relation to our discussion, you are welcome to share.

IV. Discussions (45 minutes)

In carrying out our discussion, I will serve as moderator. I have a colleague who will be taking notes. The notebooks given will be for you to organize your points. I will be using some guiding questions for our discussion. You are welcome.

Guiding questions:

The guiding questions have been structured according to the research objectives of the study I am undertaking:

1. Research Objective1: To examine the origin and purpose of UNPKOs as deployed in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur);

- a) How familiar are you with PKOs?
- b) How often have you had any experience with PKOs?
- c) Think back on your experience relating to different missions you have had contacts with; what processes were followed before the deployment of troops in the mission areas?
- d) How have you been involved in PKOs?
- e) Taking advantage of your background and experience, kindly share your historical background and knowledge of the conflicts in the DRC and Darfur
- f) Do you think the UN PKOs were helpful?
- g) Why do you think Africa has many PKOs compared to other continents?
- h) Do you think the UN is doing enough to maintain peace and security in Africa?
- i) What makes you believe that PKOs in the DRC and Darfur are necessary?
- j) Why do you think there is no permanent peace in Darfur and DRC despite the efforts made and continue to be made by PKOs?
- k) Who are or have been the main actors and their interests, if any, in the DRC and Darfur conflicts?
- l) What motivations do you think drew the actors to the conflict in Africa?
- m) How do you think the actors have been pursuing their interests beyond their engagements in the conflict areas?
- n) How have the interests of peace actors held back efforts to build peace in conflict areas where they were deployed?
- o) What do you think were the main differences between the peace actors in the DRC conflict and those in the Darfur conflict?

2. Research Objective 2: To analyse the mode of operation and challenges faced by UNPKOs in the DRC and the Sudan (Darfur);

- a) What are the contemporary threats facing peacekeepers in the field?
- b) Are peacekeepers able to face the contemporary security threats?
- c) How does policy challenge the performance of PKOs?
- d) What are relations between components of PKOs?
- e) Are the host nations fulfilling their commitment according to SOFA?
- f) Who are the relations between Peacekeepers and local populations?
- g) Are mandates given conform with the situation on the ground?
- h) Is the time to fulfil mandates given enough?
- i) Are peacekeepers or local populations involved in formulation of mandates?
- j) Are the troops getting enough information and training according to the environment they are going to operate?
- k) Are the equipment/weapons allotted enough to face contemporary threats?
- l) Is there any coordination between various peace actors present in operations areas?

3. Research Objective 3: To examine the effectiveness on Peacekeeping Operations in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur);

- a) Please list the main tasks which PKOs perform in mission areas.
- b) Do you think those tasks are helpful in bringing about peace and security in the DRC and Sudan (Darfur)?
- c) Are the referred tasks accomplished effectively?
- d) What positive experiences have you had with PKOs.
- e) What, in your opinion, needs to be improved and how?
- f) Based on your experience, can you list the challenges faced in the efforts to accomplish the mandates of PKOs?
- g) What kind of training do you think the peacekeepers receive? (Probe ways in which the training was in accordance with UN Standards Operating Procedures?)
- h) Do you know of any equipment from home which were taken by the PKO troops for deployment in conflict areas?

- i) How suitable do you think the equipment was in relation to the context in which the troops were operating?
- j) Was the deployment of the troops ordered in time to save people's lives?
- k) What conditions do you think delayed the deployment of the troops in conflict areas?
- l) How did the delay in the deployment of troops affect the peace building processes in the conflict areas?
- m) Do you think the command and control of forces affect the achievement of the mandates of PKOs?
- n) Do you think the countries involved in peacekeeping operations cooperated as expected?
- o) How did the working environment of the troops affect the accomplishments of PKO objectives?
- p) What do you think were the main challenges of UN PKOs in the DRC and Darfur?
- q) What do you think were the responsibilities of the government of the DRC and Sudan in resolving conflicts in their respective states?
- r) In your view, to what extent have the PKOs contributed to durable peace in Africa?
- s) Of all the things we have discussed, what, in your opinion has been most important to you in terms of PKO?
- t) If you were given a chance to decide on the nature and source of missions to deploy, which mission would you have chosen for the DRC and Sudan and Why?

4. Research Objective 4: To suggest and recommend strategies for future more effective deployment of PKOs

- a) Do you think the mandates currently given to PKOs are suitable, and effective for peacebuilding?
- b) Do you think Pre - deployment training currently given to the troops enough for peacekeeping by contemporary peacekeeping missions? If no, what should be done. To improve things

- c) What do you consider to be the most suitable rate of reimbursement which the UN should provide to TCCs?
- d) Do you consider the resources given to peacekeepers are enough to for them to accomplish their missions effectively?
- e) What is your comment on the current cooperation arrangement between the UN Missions and host nations and the relations between the different components of UN PKOs?
- f) What procedures were used by the UN to select commanders to lead different UN PKOs? Was the procedure appropriate for finding good commanders for the UN PKOs?
- g) What in your view was the contribution of women in PKOs? Do you think UN PKOs should continue to deploy women?
- h) What is your comment on the commitment level of of TCCs and other peacekeeping actors for more effective fulfilment of set obligations for bringing peace in a conflict affected state.
- i) Do you consider the procedures used for the deployment of PKOs effective enough for mitigation of conflicts in any given state?
- j) Is the United Nations Peacekeeping Policy supportive enough for the effectiveness roles of PKOs?

V. Concluding question (3 minutes)

In brief, of all the things we have discussed today, what can you conclude?

VI. Conclusion (2 minutes)

- a) Thank you for participating in this discussion. This has been a very successful discussion.
- b) Your views and opinions will be a valuable contribution to the study.
- c) We hope you have found the discussion interesting.
- d) I would like to remind you that any comments featured in this report will be kept anonymous and confidential.

APPENDIX III: Observation Guide

S/No	Category	Points to note
01.	Effects of Conflicts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Physical appearance of populations_eg dressing, whether joyful or not, signs of friendliness • Physical appearance of infrastructure eg roads, schools, health facilities etc • Physical appearance of households. • Economic activities in progress such as industries, fishing, agriculture, markets etc. • Whether Students are attending schools. • Presence of sick and wounded in hospitals. • Presence of social activities such sports. • Demographic settings of the population. • Presence of Internally Displaced Person Camps
02.	Presence of PKOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presence of PK troops. • Peacekeeping activities such as patrols and other peace building activities
03.	Effectiveness of PKOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • extent of Free movement of people. • extent of people's free engagement in economic activities such farming, business etc • Presence of social activities such as wedding, sports • operational status of government institutions such as police, courts etc. • functional state of government social services such as hospital, school etc • Indicators of Rule of law • Operational state of government functions

APPENDIX IV: Ongoing and Closed Un Peacekeeping Missions in Africa

Ongoing UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa			
Sno	Year	Mission	Country
1.	1991	The UN Mission: Organization of Referendum in West Sahara (MINURSO)	West Sahara
2.	2010	UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)	DRC
3.	2011	UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA),	Between Republic of Sudan and South Sudan
4.	2011	UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).	South Sudan
5.	2013	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)	Mali
6.	2014	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)	Central African Republic
Closed UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa			
1.	1960–1964	United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)	Congo
2.	1988–1991	United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I)	Angola
3.	1991	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	Western Sahara
4.	1989–1990	United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)	Namibia
5.	1991–1995	United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)	Angola
6.	1992–1994	United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	Mozambique
7.	1992–1993	United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)	Somalia
8.	1993–1997	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)	Liberia
9.	1993–1994	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR)	Rwanda
10.	1993–1996	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)	Rwanda
11.	1993–1995	United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)	Somalia
12.	1994	United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer	Chad


		Group (UNASOG)	
13.	1995–1997	United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III)	Angola
14.	1997–1999	United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)	Angola
15.	1998–1999	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)	Sierra Leone
16.	1998–2000	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)	Central African Republic
17.	1999–2005	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)	Sierra Leone
18.	2000–2008	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)	Eritrea
19.	2004–2007	United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)	Burundi
20.	2007–2010	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)	Chad
21.	2007-2020	The United Nations – African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur	Sudan
22.	2005–2011	United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)	Sudan
23.	2003-2018	United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)	Liberia
24.	2004-2017	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (NOCI)	Côte d'Ivoire
25.	2003 -2004	MINUCI United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire	Côte d'Ivoire

Source: UN, (2022c). UN Peacekeeping Missions. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en>

APPENDIX V: Clearance Letters

THE OPEN UNIVERSITY OF TANZANIA
DIRECTORATE OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES

P.O. Box 23409
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
<http://www.openuniversity.ac.tz>



Tel: 255-22-2668992/2668445
ext.2101
Fax: 255-22-2668759
E-mail: dpgs@out.ac.tz

Our Ref: PG201902287

6th January 2021


Tanzania People Defence Forces Headquarters,
P.O.Box 194,
DODOMA.

RE: RESEARCH CLEARANCE
The Open University of Tanzania was established by an Act of Parliament No. 17 of 1992, which became operational on the 1st March 1993 by public notice No.55 in the official Gazette. The Act was however replaced by the Open University of Tanzania Charter of 2005, which became operational on 1st January 2007. In line with the Charter, the Open University of Tanzania mission is to generate and apply knowledge through research.

To facilitate and to simplify research process therefore, the act empowers the Vice Chancellor of the Open University of Tanzania to issue research clearance, on behalf of the Government of Tanzania and Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology, to both its staff and students who are doing research in Tanzania. With this brief background, the purpose of this letter is to introduce to you **Mr. MKEREMY, Mbaraka Naziad, Reg No: PG201902287** pursuing Doctor of Philosophy (PhD). We hereby grant this clearance to conduct a research titled **"Peace and Security in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Uncertainty of Peace keeping Operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Darfur, Sudan"**. He will collect his data at your office from 7th January 2021 to 30th August 2021.

In case you need any further information, kindly do not hesitate to contact the Deputy Vice Chancellor (Academic) of the Open University of Tanzania, P.O.Box 23409, Dar es Salaam. Tel: 022-2-2668820. We lastly thank you in advance for your assumed cooperation and facilitation of this research academic activity.

Yours,
THE OPEN UNIVERSITY OF TANZANIA


Prof. Magreth Bushesha
DIRECTOR OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES.

THE OPEN UNIVERSITY OF TANZANIA

DIRECTORATE OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES

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ext.2101
Fax: 255-22-2668759
E-mail: dpgs@out.ac.tz

Our Ref: PG201902287

6th January 2021

Tanzania People Defense Forces (TPDF),

Peacekeeping Training Center,

P.O.Box 9203,

DAR ES SALAAM.

RE: RESEARCH CLEARANCE

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Yours,

THE OPEN UNIVERSITY OF TANZANIA

Prof. Magreth Bushesha
DIRECTOR OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES.



In Reply Please Quote
DFHQ/4430 - 1 (DI)

TANZANIA PEOPLES DEFENCE FORCES

Telegrams: "N G O M E"

Telephone: +255737962064

Fax: +255 26 2963757

E-mail: signalcentrengome@tpdf.mil.tz

Defence Forces Headquarters,
P. O. Box 194,

DODOMA, 10 January, 2021

Open University of Tanzania,
Directorate of Postgraduate Studies,
P.O.Box 23409,
DAR ES SALAAM, Tanzania

Research Clearance

Reference is made to your letters with Reference number PG201902287 dated 6th January, 2021 directed to Tanzania Peoples' Defence Forces and Tanzania Peace Keeping Centre. The Tanzania Peoples' Defence Forces Headquarters wishes to inform you that has accepted to support Mr. Mbaraka Naziad Mkeremy to collect data for his study in Tanzania Peoples Defence Forces Headquarters and Tanzania Peace Keeping Centre. Mr. Mbaraka Naziad Mkeremy may come at any time from January 25, 2021.

Kindly accept assurance of its highest consideration


(R.R. Mrangira, hods)
Major General
For: Chief of Defence Forces

THE OPEN UNIVERSITY OF TANZANIA

DIRECTORATE OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES

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E-mail: dpgs@out.ac.tz

Our Ref: PG201902287

6th January 2021

United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO),

12Av.des Aviateurs Gombe,

P.O.Box Kinshasa BP 8811,

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO.

RE: RESEARCH CLEARANCE

The Open University of Tanzania was established by an Act of Parliament No. 17 of 1992, which became operational on the 1st March 1993 by public notice No.55 in the official Gazette. The Act was however replaced by the Open University of Tanzania Charter of 2005, which became operational on 1st January 2007. In line with the Charter, the Open University of Tanzania mission is to generate and apply knowledge through research.

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Yours,

THE OPEN UNIVERSITY OF TANZANIA

Prof. Magreth Bushesha
DIRECTOR OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES.

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS
United Nations Organization Stabilization
Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo



NATIONS UNIES
Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies
pour la Stabilisation de la République
Démocratique du Congo

MONUSCO
Goma

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM**MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR**

Date: 14 January 2021

No: MONUSCO/FC

To: THE OPEN UNIVERSITY OF TANZANIA
P.O. Box 23409,
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

From: Lieutenant General Marcos de Sá Affonso da Costa (signed by FCOS for FC)
Force Commander

Copy: DCOS Ops

Subject: **RESEARCH CLEARANCE**

References:

A. Your Letter Ref: PG201902287 of 6th January 2021

1. Thank you for Communicating with the mission on clearance of Mr Mbaraka Naziad Mkeremy who wishes to collect data for his study at MONUSCO.
2. The Force has no objection to that. He may visit the mission area any time from 05 February 2021.

COL L. Bortoluzzi Garcia

One Mandate – One Mission – One Force

THE OPEN UNIVERSITY OF TANZANIA
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 ext.2101
 Fax: 255-22-2668759
 E-mail: dpgs@out.ac.tz

Our Ref: PG201902287

6th January 2021

Ministry of National Defense of DRC,

Mont Ngaliema,

P.O.Box 8341,

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO.

RE: RESEARCH CLEARANCE

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Yours,

THE OPEN UNIVERSITY OF TANZANIA

Prof. Magreth Bushesha
DIRECTOR OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES.

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO




Ministère de la Défense
Et des Anciens Combattants



Ref.no. MDNAC/CAB/861 2021

Le Ministère de la Défense Et des Anciens Combattants de la République Démocratique du Congo présente ses compliments à l'Ambassade de la République Unie de Tanzanie en RDC/Bureau de l'Attache Militaire et en référence à sa note no. TZK/DA/1030/368 du 15 Janvier 2021 a l'honneur de reconnaître que M. **Mrekemy Mbaraka Naziad**, a été présenté et soutenu dans l'acquisition d'informations pertinentes sur ses recherches Scientifiques.

Le Ministère de la Défense Et des Anciens Combattants de la République Démocratique du Congo saisit cette occasion pour renouveler à l'Ambassade de la République Unie de Tanzanie en RDC/Bureau de l'Attache Militaire les assurances de sa très haute considération.


Kinshasa, le 19 Février 2021

**AMBASSADE DE LA REPUBLIQUE
UNIE DE TANZANIE EN RDC,
KINSHASA/GOMBE.**

THE OPEN UNIVERSITY OF TANZANIA
DIRECTORATE OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES

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Tel: 255-22-2668992/2668445
ext.2101
Fax: 255-22-2668759
E-mail: dggs@out.ac.tz

Our Ref: PG201902287

6th January 2021

National Defense College,

P.O.Box 5531,

DAR ES SALAAM.

RE: RESEARCH CLEARANCE

The Open University of Tanzania was established by an Act of Parliament No. 17 of 1992, which became operational on the 1st March 1993 by public notice No.55 in the official Gazette. The Act was however replaced by the Open University of Tanzania Charter of 2005, which became operational on 1st January 2007. In line with the Charter, the Open University of Tanzania mission is to generate and apply knowledge through research.

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Yours,

THE OPEN UNIVERSITY OF TANZANIA

Prof. Magreth Bushesha

DIRECTOR OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES.



In Reply Please
Quote: NDC/3320 - 1

NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE-TANZANIA

Telegrams: "N G O M E"
Telephone: "0222 926 602 - 4"
Fax: "0222 926 605"
E-mail: info@ndctz.go.tz
URL: www.ndc.go.tz

National Defence College,
Post Office Box 60234,
DAR ES SALAAM 10 January, 2021

Director of Postgraduate Studies,
The Open University of Tanzania,
University of Dar es Salaam,
Post Office Box 23409,
DAR ES SALAAM, Tanzania.

REF: RESEARCH CLEARANCE

Reference Letter PG201902287 dated on 06 January 2021.

The office of the Commandant National Defence College which is an inter-services Government establishment under the Ministry of Defence and National Service presents its complements to you and has the honour to inform you that **Mr. MKEREMY, Mbaraka Naziad** with **registration number PG 20190227** has been granted permission to conduct research at the College. The Candidate shall collect data from 15 January 2021 to 31 November 2021.

The office of the Commandant takes this opportunity to renew to you the assurance of its highest consideration.

Yours Sincerely,


(**I.M. Mhona, ndc**)
Major General
Commandant


NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE
P. O. Box 60234
DAR ES SALAAM

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

سفارة جمهورية تنزانيا المتحدة

Al-Amarat Street No.33,
Khartoum West,
Tel: +249 183564384
P.O. Box 7268,
E-mail: khartoum@nje.go.tz
Website: www.sd.tzembassy.go.tz
KHARTOUM



الامارات - شارع رقم 33
الغرب الخرطوم
هاتف: +249183564384
ص. ب: 7268
بريد إلكتروني:
موقع إلكتروني:
الخرطوم

The Embassy of the United Republic of Tanzania in Khartoum presents its Compliments to The Director of Postgraduate Studies of The open University of Tanzania and with reference to your letter **Ref No: PG201902287 dated 06 January 2021** has the honor to kindly inform on the acceptance of The Ministry Of defense of Sudan to support **Mr Mbaraka Naziad Mkeremy** in his Data collection regarding his Research on the mentioned subject matter. **Mr Mkeremy** have accepted to visit Sudan on any date from 01 February 2021.

The Embassy of the United Republic of Tanzania in Khartoum avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the General Administration of Open University of Tanzania and Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology the assurances of its highest consideration.



[Signature]
Khartoum, 24th January 2021

Open University of Tanzania
Directorate of Postgraduate Studies
P.O.Box 23409
Dar Es Salaam

PUBLICATIONS