GENERAL HISTORY OF AFRICA - V
Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century
UNESCO General History of Africa

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Note on chronology

It has been agreed to adopt the following method for writing dates. With regard to prehistory, dates may be written in two different ways.

One way is by reference to the present era, that is, dates BP (before present), the reference year being +1950; all dates are negative in relation to +1950.

The other way is by reference to the beginning of the Christian era. Dates are represented in relation to the Christian era by a simple + or − sign before the date. When referring to centuries, the terms BC and AD are replaced by 'before the Christian era' and 'of the Christian era'.

Some examples are as follows:

(i) 2300 BP = −350
(ii) 2900 BC = −2900
    AD 1800 = +1800
(iii) 5th century BC = 5th century before the Christian era
    3rd century AD = 3rd century of the Christian era
## Key for Maps

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<td><em>Niger</em></td>
<td>Rivers, lakes</td>
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<td>●</td>
<td>Site of town</td>
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Institute of Egyptology, Charles University, Prague, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.9
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For a long time, all kinds of myths and prejudices concealed the true history of Africa from the world at large. African societies were looked upon as societies that could have no history. In spite of important work done by such pioneers as Leo Frobenius, Maurice Delafosse and Arturo Labriola, as early as the first decades of this century, a great many non-African experts could not rid themselves of certain preconceptions and argued that the lack of written sources and documents made it impossible to engage in any scientific study of such societies.

Although the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were rightly regarded as essential sources for the history of ancient Greece, African oral tradition, the collective memory of peoples which holds the thread of many events marking their lives, was rejected as worthless. In writing the history of a large part of Africa, the only sources used were from outside the continent, and the final product gave a picture not so much of the paths actually taken by the African peoples as of those that the authors thought they must have taken. Since the European Middle Ages were often used as a yardstick, modes of production, social relations and political institutions were visualized only by reference to the European past.

In fact, there was a refusal to see Africans as the creators of original cultures which flowered and survived over the centuries in patterns of their own making and which historians are unable to grasp unless they forgo their prejudices and rethink their approach.

Furthermore, the continent of Africa was hardly ever looked upon as a historical entity. On the contrary, emphasis was laid on everything likely to lend credence to the idea that a split had existed, from time immemorial, between a 'white Africa' and a 'black Africa', each unaware of the other's existence. The Sahara was often presented as an impenetrable space preventing any intermingling of ethnic groups and peoples or any exchange of goods, beliefs, customs and ideas between the societies that had grown up on either side of the desert. Hermetic frontiers were drawn between the civilizations of Ancient Egypt and Nubia and those of the peoples south of the Sahara.
It is true that the history of Africa north of the Sahara has been more closely linked with that of the Mediterranean basin than has the history of sub-Saharan Africa, but it is now widely recognized that the various civilizations of the African continent, for all their differing languages and cultures, represent, to a greater or lesser degree, the historical offshoots of a set of peoples and societies united by bonds centuries old.

Another phenomenon which did great disservice to the objective study of the African past was the appearance, with the slave trade and colonization, of racial stereotypes which bred contempt and lack of understanding and became so deep-rooted that they distorted even the basic concepts of historiography. From the time when the notions of ‘white’ and ‘black’ were used as generic labels by the colonialists, who were regarded as superior, the colonized Africans had to struggle against both economic and psychological enslavement. Africans were identifiable by the colour of their skin, they had become a kind of merchandise, they were earmarked for hard labour and eventually, in the minds of those dominating them, they came to symbolize an imaginary and allegedly inferior Negro race. This pattern of spurious identification relegated the history of the African peoples in many minds to the rank of ethno-history, in which appreciation of the historical and cultural facts was bound to be warped.

The situation has changed significantly since the end of the Second World War and in particular since the African countries became independent and began to take an active part in the life of the international community and in the mutual exchanges that are its raison d’être. An increasing number of historians has endeavoured to tackle the study of Africa with a more rigorous, objective and open-minded outlook by using—with all due precautions—actual African sources. In exercising their right to take the historical initiative, Africans themselves have felt a deep-seated need to re-establish the historical authenticity of their societies on solid foundations.

In this context, the importance of the eight-volume General History of Africa, which UNESCO is publishing, speaks for itself.

The experts from many countries working on this project began by laying down the theoretical and methodological basis for the History. They have been at pains to call in question the over-simplifications arising from a linear and restrictive conception of world history and to re-establish the true facts wherever necessary and possible. They have endeavoured to highlight the historical data that give a clearer picture of the evolution of the different peoples of Africa in their specific socio-cultural setting.

To tackle this huge task, made all the more complex and difficult by the vast range of sources and the fact that documents were widely scattered, UNESCO has had to proceed by stages. The first stage, from 1965 to 1969, was devoted to gathering documentation and planning the work. Operational assignments were conducted in the field and included campaigns to collect oral traditions, the creation of regional documentation
centres for oral traditions, the collection of unpublished manuscripts in
Arabic and Ajami (African languages written in Arabic script), the com-
pilation of archival inventories and the preparation of a Guide to the Sources
of the History of Africa, culled from the archives and libraries of the
countries of Europe and later published in eleven volumes. In addition,
meetings were organized to enable experts from Africa and other continents
to discuss questions of methodology and lay down the broad lines for the
project after careful examination of the available sources.

The second stage, which lasted from 1969 to 1971, was devoted to
shaping the History and linking its different parts. The purpose of the
international meetings of experts held in Paris in 1969 and Addis Ababa
in 1970 was to study and define the problems involved in drafting and
publishing the History; presentation in eight volumes, the principal edition
in English, French and Arabic, translation into African languages such as
Kiswahili, Hausa, Fulfulde, Yoruba or Lingala, prospective versions in
German, Russian, Portuguese, Spanish and Chinese, as well as abridged
editions designed for a wide African and international public.

The third stage has involved actual drafting and publication. This
began with the appointment of the 39-member International Scientific
Committee, two-thirds African and one-third non-African, which assumes
intellectual responsibility for the History.

The method used is interdisciplinary and is based on a multi-faceted
approach and a wide variety of sources. The first among these is archae-
ology, which holds many of the keys to the history of African cultures and
civilizations. Thanks to archaeology, it is now acknowledged that Africa
was very probably the cradle of mankind and the scene — in the neolithic
period — of one of the first technological revolutions in history. Archaeology
has also shown that Egypt was the setting for one of the most brilliant
ancient civilizations of the world. But another very important source is
oral tradition, which, after being long despised, has now emerged as an
invaluable instrument for discovering the history of Africa, making it
possible to follow the movements of its different peoples in both space and
time, to understand the African vision of the world from the inside and to
grasp the original features of the values on which the cultures and insti-
tutions of the continent are based.

We are indebted to the International Scientific Committee in charge of
this General History of Africa, and to its Rapporteur and the editors and
authors of the various volumes and chapters, for having shed a new light
on the African past in its authentic and all-encompassing form and for
having avoided any dogmatism in the study of essential issues. Among
these issues we might cite; the slave trade, that 'endlessly bleeding wound',

1. Volumes I and II have been published in Arabic, Spanish, Korean, Portuguese,
Chinese and Italian; Volume I has been published in Kiswahili and Hausa; Volume II in
Hausa; Volume IV and Volume VII in Arabic, Spanish and Portuguese.
which was responsible for one of the cruellest mass deportations in the history of mankind, which sapped the African continent of its life-blood while contributing significantly to the economic and commercial expansion of Europe; colonization, with all the effects it had on population, economics, psychology and culture; relations between Africa south of the Sahara and the Arab world; and, finally, the process of decolonization and nation-building which mobilized the intelligence and passion of people still alive and sometimes still active today. All these issues have been broached with a concern for honesty and rigour which is not the least of the *History*'s merits. By taking stock of our knowledge of Africa, putting forward a variety of viewpoints on African cultures and offering a new reading of history, the *History* has the signal advantage of showing up the light and shade and of openly portraying the differences of opinion that may exist between scholars.

By demonstrating the inadequacy of the methodological approaches which have long been used in research on Africa, this *History* calls for a new and careful study of the twofold problem areas of historiography and cultural identity, which are united by links of reciprocity. Like any historical work of value, the *History* paves the way for a great deal of further research on a variety of topics.

It is for this reason that the International Scientific Committee, in close collaboration with UNESCO, decided to embark on additional studies in an attempt to go deeper into a number of issues which will permit a clearer understanding of certain aspects of the African past. The findings being published in the series 'UNESCO Studies and Documents – General History of Africa' will prove a useful supplement to the *History*, as will the works planned on aspects of national or subregional history.

The *General History* sheds light both on the historical unity of Africa and also its relations with the other continents, particularly the Americas and the Caribbean. For a long time, the creative manifestations of the descendants of Africans in the Americas were lumped together by some historians as a heterogeneous collection of *Africanisms*. Needless to say, this is not the attitude of the authors of the *History*, in which the resistance of the slaves shipped to America, the constant and massive participation of the descendants of Africans in the struggles for the initial independence of America and in national liberation movements, are rightly perceived for what they were: vigorous assertions of identity, which helped forge the

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2. The following eleven volumes have already been published in this series: *The peopling of ancient Egypt and the deciphering of Meroitic script*; *The African slave trade from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century*; *Historical relations across the Indian Ocean*; *The historiography of Southern Africa*; *The decolonization of Africa: Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa*; *African ethnonyms and toponyms*; *Historical and socio-cultural relations between black Africa and the Arab world from 1935 to the present*; *The methodology of contemporary African History*; *The Educational Process and Historiography in Africa*; *Africa and the Second World War*; *Libya Antiqua*. 

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universal concept of mankind. Although the phenomenon may vary in different places, it is now quite clear that ways of feeling, thinking, dreaming and acting in certain nations of the western hemisphere have been marked by their African heritage. The cultural inheritance of Africa is visible everywhere, from the southern United States to northern Brazil, across the Caribbean and on the Pacific seaboard. In certain places it even underpins the cultural identity of some of the most important elements of the population.

The History also clearly brings out Africa’s relations with southern Asia across the Indian Ocean and the African contributions to other civilizations through mutual exchanges.

I am convinced that the efforts of the peoples of Africa to conquer or strengthen their independence, secure their development and assert their cultural characteristics, must be rooted in historical awareness renewed, keenly felt and taken up by each succeeding generation.

My own background, the experience I gained as a teacher and as chairman, from the early days of independence, of the first commission set up to reform history and geography curricula in some of the countries of West and Central Africa, taught me how necessary it was for the education of young people and for the information of the public at large to have a history book produced by scholars with inside knowledge of the problems and hopes of Africa and with the ability to apprehend the continent in its entirety.

For all these reasons, UNESCO’s goal will be to ensure that this General History of Africa is widely disseminated in a large number of languages and is used as a basis for producing children’s books, school textbooks and radio and television programmes. Young people, whether schoolchildren or students, and adults in Africa and elsewhere will thus be able to form a truer picture of the African continent’s past and the factors that explain it, as well as a fairer understanding of its cultural heritage and its contribution to the general progress of mankind. The History should thus contribute to improved international co-operation and stronger solidarity among peoples in their aspirations to justice, progress and peace. This is, at least, my most cherished hope.

It remains for me to express my deep gratitude to the members of the International Scientific Committee, the Rapporteur, the different volume editors, the authors and all those who have collaborated in this tremendous undertaking. The work they have accomplished and the contribution they have made plainly go to show how people from different backgrounds but all imbued with the same spirit of goodwill and enthusiasm in the service of universal truth can, within the international framework provided by UNESCO, bring to fruition a project of considerable scientific and cultural import. My thanks also go to the organizations and governments whose generosity has made it possible for UNESCO to publish this History in different languages and thus ensure that it will have the worldwide impact it deserves and thereby serve the international community as a whole.
Description of the Project

B. A. OGOT*


The General Conference of UNESCO at its 16th Session instructed the Director-General to undertake the drafting of a General History of Africa. The enormous task of implementing the project was entrusted to an International Scientific Committee which was established by the Executive Board in 1970. This Committee, under the Statutes adopted by the Executive Board of UNESCO in 1971, is composed of thirty-nine members (two-thirds of whom are African and one-third non-African) serving in their personal capacity and appointed by the Director-General of UNESCO for the duration of the Committee’s mandate.

The first task of the Committee was to define the principal characteristics of the work. These were defined at the first session of the Committee as follows:

(a) Although aiming at the highest possible scientific level, the history does not seek to be exhaustive and is a work of synthesis avoiding dogmatism. In many respects, it is a statement of problems showing the present state of knowledge and the main trends in research, and it does not hesitate to show divergencies of views where these exist. In this way, it prepares the ground for future work.

(b) Africa is considered in this work as a totality. The aim is to show the historical relationships between the various parts of the continent, too frequently subdivided in works published to date. Africa’s historical connections with the other continents receive due attention, these connections being analysed in terms of mutual exchanges and multilateral influences, bringing out, in its appropriate light, Africa’s contribution to the history of mankind.

(c) The General History of Africa is, in particular, a history of ideas and civilizations, societies and institutions. It is based on a wide variety of sources, including oral tradition and art forms.

(d) The History is viewed essentially from the inside. Although a scholarly work, it is also, in large measure, a faithful reflection of the way in

*During the Sixth Plenary Session of the International Scientific Committee for the Drafting of a General History of Africa (Brazzaville, 1983), an election of the new Bureau was held and Professor Ogot was replaced by Professor Albert Adu Boahen.
Description of the Project

which African authors view their own civilization. While prepared in an international framework and drawing to the full on the present stock of scientific knowledge, it should also be a vitally important element in the recognition of the African heritage and should bring out the factors making for unity in the continent. This effort to view things from within is the novel feature of the project and should, in addition to its scientific quality, give it great topical significance. By showing the true face of Africa, the History could, in an era absorbed in economic and technical struggles, offer a particular conception of human values.

The Committee has decided to present the work covering over three million years of African history in eight volumes, each containing about eight hundred pages of text with illustrations, photographs, maps and line drawings.

A chief editor, assisted if necessary by one or two assistant editors, is responsible for the preparation of each volume. The editors are elected by the Committee either from among its members or from outside by a two-thirds majority. They are responsible for preparing the volumes in accordance with the decisions and plans adopted by the Committee. On scientific matters, they are accountable to the Committee or, between two sessions of the Committee, to its Bureau for the contents of the volumes, the final version of the texts, the illustrations and, in general, for all scientific and technical aspects of the History. The Bureau ultimately approves the final manuscript. When it considers the manuscript ready for publication, it transmits it to the Director-General of UNESCO. Thus the Committee, or the Bureau between committee sessions, remains fully in charge of the project.

Each volume consists of some thirty chapters. Each chapter is the work of a principal author assisted, if necessary, by one or two collaborators. The authors are selected by the Committee on the basis of their curricula vitae. Preference is given to African authors, provided they have requisite qualifications. Special effort is also made to ensure, as far as possible, that all regions of the continent, as well as other regions having historical or cultural ties with Africa, are equitably represented among the authors.

When the editor of a volume has approved texts of chapters, they are then sent to all members of the Committee for criticism. In addition, the text of the volume editor is submitted for examination to a Reading Committee, set up within the International Scientific Committee on the basis of the members' fields of competence. The Reading Committee analyses the chapters from the standpoint of both substance and form. The Bureau then gives final approval to the manuscripts.

Such a seemingly long and involved procedure has proved necessary, since it provides the best possible guarantee of the scientific objectivity of the General History of Africa. There have, in fact, been instances when the
Bureau has rejected manuscripts or insisted on major revisions or even reassigned the drafting of a chapter to another author. Occasionally, specialists in a particular period of history or in a particular question are consulted to put the finishing touches to a volume.

The work will be published first in a hard-cover edition in English, French and Arabic, and later in paperback editions in the same languages. An abridged version in English and French will serve as a basis for translation into African languages. The Committee has chosen Kiswahili and Hausa as the first African languages into which the work will be translated.

Also, every effort will be made to ensure publication of the General History of Africa in other languages of wide international currency such as Chinese, Portuguese, Russian, German, Italian, Spanish, Japanese, etc.

It is thus evident that this is a gigantic task which constitutes an immense challenge to African historians and to the scholarly community at large, as well as to UNESCO under whose auspices the work is being done. For the writing of a continental history of Africa, covering the last three million years, using the highest canons of scholarship and involving, as it must do, scholars drawn from diverse countries, cultures, ideologies and historical traditions, is surely a complex undertaking. It constitutes a continental, international and interdisciplinary project of great proportions.

In conclusion, I would like to underline the significance of this work for Africa and for the world. At a time when the peoples of Africa are striving towards unity and greater co-operation in shaping their individual destinies, a proper understanding of Africa's past, with an awareness of common ties among Africans and between Africa and other continents, should not only be a major contribution towards mutual understanding among the people of the earth, but also a source of knowledge of a cultural heritage that belongs to all mankind.
The struggle for international trade and its implications for Africa

M. MALOWIST

Introduction

In 1500 the geo-political map of the world revealed the existence of a number of major, relatively autonomous regions which were to some degree interlinked either through trade or through conflict. First, there was the Far East represented by Japan and China which, together with the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions covering the Molucca Islands, Borneo, Sumatra and India itself, were the world’s source of spices. Next, was the Middle East which covered a vast area including the Arabian peninsula, the Safawid empire and the Ottoman empire which was soon to include North Africa. Then there was Europe with its Slavs, Scandinavians, Germans, Anglo-Saxons and Latins, all of whom still remained confined within its borders. Finally, there was Africa with its Mediterranean seaboard in the north and its Red Sea and Indian Ocean coastlines which were becoming increasingly involved in the international trade with the Far East and the Orient.

The period from 1500 to 1800 was to witness the establishment of a new Atlantic-oriented geo-economic system, with its triangular trading pattern linking Europe, Africa and the Americas. With the opening up of Atlantic trade, Europe – particularly Western Europe – gained ascendancy over the Americas and African societies. Henceforth, Europe was to play a leading role in the accumulation of capital generated by trade and plunder on a worldwide scale. The emigration of Europeans to trading settlements in Africa and the territories of North and South America gave rise to the establishment of supporting overseas economies. These were to play a decisive long-term role through their contribution to Western Europe’s rise to power over the rest of the world.

The period from 1450 to 1630 is recognized in the historical sciences as a phase of considerable economic, political and cultural expansion in most European countries, particularly in western and south-western Europe. As time went on, Europe became more markedly divided into the economically advanced north-west, the less developed countries of the Iberian peninsula, and the vast areas of central and eastern Europe which, although not without development, were becoming more and more dependent on western markets.
This was also a period of overseas expansion into the vast territories bordering the Atlantic and even into the Pacific. From the beginning of the sixteenth century, the African coast was one such area, although the situation in North Africa differed from that in the sub-Saharan region. Competition in the basin of the Mediterranean was strong between Spain, Portugal, France and Muslim North Africa. Also, the Ottoman empire was gaining more and more influence. In 1517, the Ottomans conquered Egypt and subsequently subjugated a large part of the Arab peninsula, gradually establishing their rule over Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers, where Ottoman Regencies developed under Turkish protectorates. These constituted a great danger to European navigation and to the southern coasts of Italy and Spain. In Morocco, however, the Portuguese managed to dominate a large part of the coast as far as Agadir (Santa Cruz du Cap d’Aguer) and Säfi, while the Castilians established bases in Tiemcen and Oran.1

These conquests were of great importance as they gave the Portuguese control of the termini of some long-established and important gold- and slave-trade routes from Western Sudan through the Sahara and the Maghrib to the Mediterranean. The termini of other important routes, running both latitudinally and longitudinally, were under the control of the Turks and of the more or less autonomous representatives of the Ottoman Porte in Africa – Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. Portugal’s control of the trade termini came after almost a century of expansion in West Africa and ensured that part of the gold and slave cargoes – previously sent in their entirety to the Muslim world – were intercepted by the Europeans.2 The decrease in the supply of gold to the Maghrib resulting from the European expansion in Africa is a matter which should be investigated further. It seems likely that the results of such investigations would make the conquest of the curve of the River Niger by the Moroccans in 1591 more comprehensible; this conquest enabled the latter to control certain gold- and slave-trade routes running from West Africa to the Maghrib and Egypt. The famous campaign of Djüdar Pasha is a typical example of the great conquests so characteristic of the sixteenth century. It is worth adding that Djüdar Pasha himself was a renegade of Iberian background, that his army was dominated by similar types. These renegades brought with them the tradition of the Spanish and Portuguese conquests.3

The opinion of the age – that the coasts of West and East Africa would long remain under the economic and political domination of Portugal – was to be confirmed. Portugal also exerted a certain cultural influence on its black trading partners. Throughout the fifteenth and the early sixteenth centuries the Portuguese established numerous trading posts on the West African coast and made the coastal population and its rulers permanently interested in trade with the Europeans. After 1481–2 the most important

1. See ch. 9 below.
2. V. de Magalhães Godinho, 1969, pp. 184, 217.
3. See ch. 2 below.
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place on the Gold Coast was the fortress of El Mina. Other trading posts also grew up in that region, such as Axim, Shamma and Accra. When setting up trading posts the Portuguese sought the permission of the local African rulers and, through various payments, tried to win their goodwill.

In East Africa, methods were different with the Portuguese crushing the defences of Sofala, Mombasa and other coastal towns, leaving garrisons there and levying taxes for the King of Portugal. At the same time, the Portuguese tried to take over the gold, ivory and metals trade between the coast, its hinterland and India. The profitability of the different factories and Portuguese trading posts in Africa varied. In the early sixteenth century, trade in El Mina, at the mouth of the River Gambia in Sierra Leone and in Sofala, brought large profits mainly from the purchase of cheap gold and also from the trade in slaves supplied from the hinterland. Arguin — the oldest Portuguese factory — continued to lose importance, however.4

Trade with Africa brought Portugal great profit. According to J. Lúcio De Azevedo's calculations, the Crown gains, which had amounted to some 60 million Portuguese reals in the 1480s, reached 200 million reals during the rule of King Manuel (1491–1521) and at least 279.5 million reals by 1534.5 This increase was undoubtedly achieved through profits from trade not only with India but also to a large extent with Africa. Moreover, the considerable inflow of African gold made it possible for John II and his successor, Manuel, to stabilize their silver coinage, to mint the cruzados — a high-value gold coin — and, more importantly, to expand the fleet and the state and colonial administration.6 This fact was of great significance, not only politically but also socially, as it opened opportunities for the aristocracy and gentry to obtain numerous prestigious and profitable offices. Former opposition from the aristocracy to the centralistic policies of the monarchs was thus eliminated and the state became a more cohesive entity.

Trade with Africa, and subsequently with India, accelerated the development of the Portuguese trader class which had been relatively weak even in the fifteenth century. Thus, Portugal might have been thought — in the early sixteenth century — to have entered upon a path of lasting economic and political expansion. However, its backward and sluggish socio-economic structure eventually prevented this from happening. Overseas expansion necessitated large financial outlay and the purchase of gold and slaves depended on supplying Africa with large quantities of iron, brass and copper goods, cheap textiles and some silver, foodstuffs and salt. These goods were not produced in Portugal but had to be bought from foreign visitors or in Bruges and, later, from the major European trade centres at that time. The expansion of the fleet depended on the import of timber and other forest products, mainly from the Baltic countries which also

Africa: the main points of European trade contact during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries
supplied some grain – deficient in Portugal since the fourteenth century. This matter has still not been fully investigated but obviously much of the profit from foreign trade would have been allotted to the purchase of the foreign goods needed for economic exchange in Africa. Portugal was unable to develop its own production because of its weak demographic potential (in 1550 it had only 1.4 million inhabitants) and the severe competition from foreign, particularly industrial goods, long popular on the Portuguese market.

Europe’s economic boom triggered a gradual rise in prices from the 1470s. During the second half of the sixteenth century this rise became enormous, affecting mainly agricultural products and industrial goods. The relationship between the rise in prices and the increase in Portugal’s profits from overseas trade has not yet been investigated – although it seems that it was not to Portugal’s benefit. Monopoly of trade with Africa or India helped but little. Besides, it had been instigated on quite different economic premises. The high expenditure associated with overseas expansion was profitable only when the Portuguese could impose on their black trading partners terms of trade profitable to themselves – that is, buying cheap and selling dear. This, however, made it necessary to limit or even exclude from the trading ports immigrants from Europe, particularly from countries other than Portugal. To this end, a strong fleet had to be maintained to deter European rivals heading for Africa. This was a costly enterprise which proved almost beyond Portugal’s means to attain.

By the 1470s, Portugal among others was already engaged in armed conflict with Castile. The outcome, thanks to the temporary supremacy of the Portuguese fleet and to diplomatic manoeuvres, was the elimination of Castile from West Africa by the treaties of Alcaçovas and Tordesillas in 1481 and 1493, and the granting to Portugal by Pope Alexander VI of exclusive rights for economic and political expansion in the south-eastern Atlantic. The discovery and conquest of America – and European politics in general – turned Castile’s attention away from African affairs. Relations between Portugal and its other rivals on the West African coast and subsequently in East Africa developed differently, however, particularly as those rivals were countries more economically advanced than Portugal.

The Portuguese rulers, John II and Manuel, were compelled to seek support for their colonial activities among the big financiers of Italy and south Germany. The Italians, particularly those from Florence, who had settled in Lisbon and Antwerp or had commercial agents there, put large sums in cash or goods at the disposal of the Portuguese rulers. These loans were subsequently repayed by cash or goods imported from overseas. From the 1480s and possibly earlier, some of those bankers, such as Bartolomeo Mar-Chioni, Sernigi and others, became actively engaged in trade with

9. ibid., pp. 185–203.
Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century

Africa and rewarded the Portuguese kings adequately. The Portuguese king's accounts from Bruges and subsequently Antwerp reveal that there were strong financial links between the Crown and major firms such as those of Frescobaldi, Affaitati and Fuggers. In the first stage of expansion, the Portuguese rulers managed to monopolize the importation of gold from Africa and, to a large extent, the slave trade — or at least its indirect profits. This was done by a system of costly trading licences granted mainly to Portuguese traders and to foreigners more rarely. During difficult periods, the Portuguese Crown often gave traders its rights in Africa, with the exception of El Mina. The geographical limits of the area in which trading was allowed were specified on the licences.

In the mid-1520s the Portuguese encountered their first difficulties in the purchase of gold, even in the region of El Mina. It is probable that the Portuguese were by then already unable to supply the coast of Africa with enough goods to keep gold supplies steady. There is no doubt that vast resources of gold still existed in the hinterland of El Mina and Accra but the situation favoured Portugal's European rivals, namely the French, English and Dutch who had more capital at their disposal. Moreover, they traded in goods mostly produced in their own countries, not imported. Finally, neither France, England nor Holland was yet burdened by an overdeveloped administration controlling its overseas trade and colonies. The Portuguese apparatus was both costly and slow to adapt to the changes so characteristic of overseas trade. Traders arriving in Africa from France, England or Holland were able to supply more goods than the Portuguese and sell them more cheaply. Sources dating from the 1570s prove that although the Portuguese understood this situation they were unable to alter it.

The slave trade

Portugal was initially attracted to Black Africa by its gold, previously exported to the Islamic countries. The Portuguese, however, soon discovered a second African product attractive to Europeans, namely slaves. Though slavery in Africa differed from that known to Europeans, the tradition of exporting slaves to the Arab countries was an old one in large parts of the continent, particularly Sudan. This tradition seems to have facilitated somewhat the organization — during the 1400s and 1500s — of regular purchases of slaves by the Portuguese from a large part of West Africa, particularly Senegambia, a long-standing economic partner of the Maghrib. The Portuguese, who penetrated farther and farther inland in the south-eastern part of West Africa, successfully applied the trade methods used in Senegambia. Realizing success depended on the cooperation of local chiefs and traders, they worked to interest them in the slave trade. The Portuguese also realized that such trade would lead to

increased fighting between peoples and states, because prisoners of war soon became the main subject of the trade. The Portuguese soon abandoned their moral objections to the slave trade, believing, as did many in Europe, that it enabled blacks to reach salvation whereas had they remained in their own countries, they would as non-Christians have been damned to eternal perdition.

Soon another argument for the slave trade was propounded – that blacks were descended from Ham, who had been cursed, and for that reason were condemned to permanent slavery. Such ideological motivations should not be underestimated. It should be added here that black slaves appeared in Europe at a time when trade in white slaves from the Black Sea zone was almost dead. From this time on slaves were identified as Negroes, other representatives of the black race being unknown.

Throughout the 1400s and early 1500s, the main market for ‘the black merchandise’ was Europe, particularly Portugal and the Spanish countries and, to a certain extent, islands in the Atlantic such as Madeira, the Canaries, the Cape Verde Islands and subsequently St Thomas Island – although the number of slaves transported to these islands was limited by the small size of the islands themselves. The main incentive for the slave trade in Madeira, the Cape Verde Islands and, in particular, St Thomas Island was the introduction of the cultivation of sugar cane and cotton. Slavery could not develop to any great extent on the European continent because there was no economic reason for it. The Africans who were brought into Portugal and the Spanish countries were mainly employed as domestic servants or semi-skilled artisans in the towns. There is no evidence that Africans played an important role in agriculture, the foundation of Europe’s economy. V. de Magalhães Godinho estimated the number of slaves brought from Arguin between 1451 and 1505 as between 25,000 and 40,000. The export of slaves from other parts of Africa was minimal then, except to Muslim countries. According to Curtin’s estimates, the number of slaves taken from Africa by the Europeans between 1451 and 1600 amounted to about 274,900. Of these Europe and the Atlantic islands took about 149,000, Spanish America about 75,000 and Brazil about 50,000. These figures are characteristic of the early period of the Atlantic slave trade – prior to the great development of the plantation system in the New World. They corroborate the thesis that it was the discovery of America and its economic development by the whites that gave impetus to the trade. The enormous shortage of labour in Spanish colonies where local populations were already too few to carry out the heavy production tasks demanded by the Spaniards is currently seen as the main reason.

12. This was the opinion of many Portuguese writers. E. de Zurara, 1949, chs 7, 14, 25 and 38; J. De Barros and I. De Asia, 1937, p. 80.
15. See ch. 4 below.
Certainly, in early modern times large numbers of blacks were concentrated in those areas of the American lowlands with a tropical climate. However, any attempts at large-scale black recruitment into the mining industry in the high Andes were unsuccessful, though great masses of Indian labourers managed to survive there. At the peak of Potosi's development in the late 1500s the number of Africans there was only about 5000 out of a total population of about 150,000. Again, an attempt to recruit them to mining failed.

The first Africans in America were brought there from Europe by the Conquistadores. They were slaves mainly from Senegambia and either had been brought to Europe previously, or had been born there. They were called ladinos in America because they knew Spanish or Portuguese, and were at least partly influenced by the civilization of the Iberian countries. They were highly thought of, contrary to the bozales, who had been brought directly from Africa and had been influenced by quite a different culture. The demand for black labour was already great in the Antilles in the early 1500s and grew rapidly with the territorial expansion following the Spanish conquests. Because of the high mortality rate of the Indians, and the largely unsuccessful defence of their interests by the Castilian clergy and the Crown, the demand for labour increased steadily and supplies of black slaves — from Europe and, above all, Africa — became a major concern for the new lords of America.

The Portuguese in Africa also had major problems. Throughout the fifteenth century they had been increasingly interested in buying slaves and, during the 1500s and later, those territories which could supply large numbers of slaves became more and more attractive to them. This was the basis for Portuguese expansion in Congo (which had no gold and silver) from the early sixteenth century, and their subsequent conquest of Angola, preceded by the rapid development of the slave trade in the island of Luanda. The need for large numbers of slaves also affected the settlers in St Thomas Island who wanted them for their own plantations and to sell to the Spanish American colonies and also, from the late sixteenth century, to Portuguese Brazil. The size of Brazil's black population was only several thousand by the late 1500s but the following century saw an increase in this number to 400,000/450,000, an increase associated with the development of the sugar-cane plantations.

The conquest of America and the demand for black labour also created great problems for the Castilian Crown. While it was necessary to ensure supplies of slaves for the colonists it was also clear that this was a source of great profit to the Royal Treasury through the costly licencing system. Licences were granted by the Castilian Crown and importers undertook to bring in a certain number of slaves for the colonists within a certain

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time, usually five years.) The price of the licence rose steadily as the demand for slaves grew. R. Mellafe correctly maintains that the Crown willingly granted import licences for huge numbers of slaves because the larger the number the higher the fee.\(^{19}\) The first to obtain licences—often monopolistic—included aristocrats close to the throne, such as Charles V's Chancellor, Gouvenet, in 1518, and also great capitalists, such as the Welser family, Heinrich Ehinger and Jerome Seiler in 1528,\(^{20}\) probably in connection with their settlement and mining plans in Venezuela. There were Africans in Venezuela from an early date brought there by financiers as well as Conquistadores and others who bought them as slaves from the Portuguese in Africa or Europe. It was, however, unavoidable that potential slave traders would try to eliminate the costly offices of the Portuguese and to intercept both the purchase and sales of 'the black merchandise'. In Africa those who wanted to break into the trade had to overcome obstacles set by the Portuguese, while in America they had to resort to contraband trade as the Castilian Crown permitted only those to whom it had granted licences to import slaves. This was not an insurmountable difficulty, however, as the Spanish colonists in America were permanently short of labour and were therefore willing to buy workers from smugglers. Slaves were brought in through illegal harbours—a procedure favoured by the Spanish colonial officers who derived an additional source of income from bribes. Foreigners found the system particularly attractive as they were often paid in gold or silver, the private export of which from Spanish America was officially allowed only as far as Seville and Cadiz, the centres of the strong Castilian colonial administration. Private people were in principle prohibited from exporting gold and silver from Spain.

Thus, all seemed to favour increased exports of blacks from Africa to America, except that the trade only really boomed when the great sugar-cane plantations began to be established. It transpired quite quickly that in both Spanish America and, subsequently, in Brazil that the Indian population could not stand the steady hard work on the plantations, whereas Africans made excellent plantation labourers. In mining their role seems to have been only small, with the possible exception of mines on the island of San Domingo, in Venezuela and in certain other tropical territories in Mexico.

Hence from the early 1500s, but more particularly from 1550, Africa played an extremely important though undesirable role as a supplier of labour and of some gold to the developing world economy.

It is worth mentioning, however, that the Portuguese position was becoming more precarious. In Morocco, they suffered severe blows from the Sa'ādi shārīfs' holy war against the infidels. In 1541 the Portuguese lost Agadir and soon after were compelled through financial difficulties to give up almost all their Moroccan ports. The year 1560 witnessed the first

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bankruptcy of the Portuguese Crown. The maintenance of a colonial empire while bringing enormous profits to part of the aristocracy, the gentry and some traders, had ruined the Crown and its Treasury and had laid an increasing burden on many of the population.

Arrival of new European powers

From the 1520s, the French — and from the 1550s the English, too — became dangerous rivals of the Portuguese in Africa. From the late sixteenth century, however, the Dutch became even more dangerous. Initially, only individual French traders, such as the well-known Jean Ango of Dieppe, or individual trading companies, were active. In the trade with Africa neither the French King nor the English Crown were directly involved. In 1531, 1537 and 1539 Francis I even tried unsuccessfully to stop his subjects from making expeditions to Africa as he was wary of straining relations with Portugal at a time when France was in sharp conflict with the Spanish Habsburgs. Traders from Rouen, La Rochelle and Dieppe had sent ships to Africa even earlier. In 1525 the King of the Congo captured a small French ship and delivered it with its crew to the Portuguese.21 French expansion was at its strongest in the region of Cape Verde and Senegal where the French often looted Portuguese ships returning with a cargo of African gold or goods from India. Many other French ports, such as Le Havre and Honfleur, participated in this French expansion during the sixteenth century. Nantes gradually came to dominate this trade. In the last quarter of the sixteenth century the position of the French in Senegambia became very strong, particularly in such centres as Gorée, Portudal, Joal and Rufisque (Rio Fresco) in Wolof country. The French brought with them textiles from Normandy and Brittany, spirits and metal goods, and possibly firearms. The latter seem to have made the situation favourable for the French, because the Portuguese Crown for a long time and very stubbornly prohibited imports of firearms to Africa, whereas the local rulers were very eager to get weapons. The French bought mostly gold and ivory, and also malaguetta pepper, hides and palm oil. Slaves were not yet important to them. They were dangerous rivals to the Portuguese on the Pepper and Gold Coasts in the mid-sixteenth century,22 apparently importing many more goods than the Portuguese. This was particularly painful for the Portuguese in the region of El Mina where in 1556, for example, the French and English brought in so many goods and sold them at such low prices that the Portuguese agent in El Mina was unable to buy any gold.23 This was exceptional, however, and the position of the Portuguese soon improved again. During the religious wars in Europe, French expansion may have weakened somewhat but this has not yet been

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corroborated. Some firearms were apparently sold to local rulers on the Cameroon coast but the position of the French was strongest in Senegal where they often co-operated with the tangomãos, emigrants from the Cape Verde Islands and predominantly mulatto. They pushed the Portuguese out of the estuaries of the Rivers Senegal and Gambia, only to be pushed out in turn by the English at the end of the sixteenth century.24

English expansion in Africa in the sixteenth century was similar to that of the French. Initially they had lively economic contacts with Morocco, following the expulsion of the Portuguese after 1541 from most of their Atlantic ports which were then left open to the ships of other European countries. In the 1550s and the early 1560s, English trading companies sent several expeditions, reports of which have survived. They visited the West African shores as far as the Gulf of Benin, buying mostly gold, hides and small numbers of slaves. Portuguese reports reveal that by the late 1500s the English were in contact with the population of the Gold Coast, though they do not seem to have been greatly interested in the slave trade.25 Even as late as 1623, Richard Jobson refused to buy black slaves in the region of the Lower Gambia, though the Portuguese were quite active there and co-operating with African traders.26 Little is yet known about English expansion in other regions of West Africa. However, by 1600 their position was very strong on the fringes of Senegambia, whence they had ousted both the Portuguese and the French. In 1588 the first English company for trading with Guinea was established mainly by merchants from London and Exeter already active in trading expeditions to the mouth of the River Gambia.27 There is no evidence, however, that this company developed to any great size. Possibly the English found that looting Castilian ships on Atlantic waters was, at the end of the sixteenth century, more profitable than trading with Africa.

It was at exactly this time that the Dutch made their appearance on the shores of Africa. They were then in a state of war with Spain and repudiated the Pope's subdivision of the Atlantic. They treated Portugal, which was then ruled by Philip II, as an enemy state. The huge capital amassed by traders and their strong fleet made it possible for the Dutch to develop their expansion in India and Africa on a scale not yet achieved by the English or the French. A Dutch scholar, H. Terpestra, believed that the expeditions to the African countries had initially been organized by companies launched predominantly by medium-scale traders, interested in a quick return of capital. Expeditions to the East Indies were, however, organized by major capitalists, often rich emigrants from Antwerp, who could invest their capital for longer periods.28

26. R. Jobson, 1623, p. 112.
27. Cf. note 25 above.
From 1593 to 1607, about 200 ships sailed to Africa from Holland, and in 1610 and 1611 about twenty ships a year were apparently expedited. In 1594 and 1595 the Dutch came to Gorée. A few years later they reached the Cape of Benin where they bought cotton textiles and cowry shells which they took to the Gold Coast where they exchanged them for gold and silver. In 1611 the Dutch built the port of Nassau in Moree on the Gold Coast, their first fortified trading post on the West African coast. They also developed trade with the Accra region. The Portuguese were no rivals for the Dutch who could supply large quantities of goods at low prices because of their wealth and their efficient trade networks. In this respect they had the edge over the English and the French. Dutch imports into West Africa consisted of iron, brass, copper and tin ware, cheap textiles of diverse origin, spirits, weapons, various adornments, goods of everyday use and even spectacles which enjoyed varying popularity. As a result of these imports (the large-scale character of which was such a surprise to Pieter de Marees in 1601–2) supplies of gold from the interior to the Gold Coast increased again, predominantly to the benefit of the Dutch. The Dutch also imported to Africa sugar from St Thomas Island: they dominated this trade for some time, transporting the semi-finished product to the refineries of Amsterdam.

Dutch expansion in West Africa developed more or less spontaneously. In 1617 the Dutch were so strong in Senegambia that they were a dominant force in the island of Gorée and had largely eliminated not only the Portuguese but also the English and the French from trade in Joal, Portudal and Rufisque. They held their strong position for over fifty years. At the same time their ships visited Loango, the Congo and Angola. Initially, like the English and the French, they were little interested in the slave trade. The turn of the sixteenth century, however, heralded a new phase of European expansion in Africa in which the slave trade grew in significance to become of the utmost importance to the Dutch as well. This phase began with the purchase of slaves in El Mina, Accra, Arda, Benin and the Nile delta and also Calabar, Gabon and Cameroon. The slaves were sold in return for sugar to the plantations on St Thomas Island (then occupied by the Dutch) or were transported to Brazil. From the area around the mouth of the River Senegal, the Dutch sent the Wolof, who — according to O. Dapper — were thought to possess great physical strength and be well-suited to work on the plantations. The conquest of Angola in 1641 was closely associated with the labour needs of the Dutch in Brazil, thus following the Portuguese model. Though the Dutch lost north-eastern Brazil and were also ousted from Angola in 1648, the close association of

31. K. Ratelband, 1953, pp. XCV, CXV, 114, 118, etc.
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Throughout this period, East Africa was of little interest to the Europeans. The Portuguese, who dominated Sofala and who politically subordinated other coastal towns, did not penetrate into the interior. They reached no farther than Tete and Sena on the River Zambezi, where they bought small quantities of gold on the local market. Supplies of gold and possibly other goods from the hinterland to the coast had already diminished by the mid-sixteenth century, and there is nothing to indicate that they increased subsequently. The reduction in the supplies of gold to Sofala had a bad effect on the position of such towns as Kilwa, Mombasa and Malindi, which – prior to the arrival of the Portuguese – had been active in supplying gold and other goods to traders from India and Arabia. This decline may have been caused by the dislocation of Muslim trade on the East African coast, but it also seems likely that some political disturbances took place along the trade routes linking the ports with the hinterland. This matter calls for further investigation. Attempts by the coastal inhabitants to secure the intervention of the Turks from the Arab Peninsula against the Portuguese miscarried. The expansion from the seventeenth century of the Imâmate of Oman to the East African coasts and islands brought about some changes in the late 1600s, confining Portuguese power to Mozambique alone. However, it was not till the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries that these changes became very marked.

It should be added here that in the southern tip of Africa the first signs of European expansion appeared during the seventeenth century in the form of colonies of Dutch (and German) peasants, called the Boers, who were settlers sponsored by the Dutch East India Company. However, this phenomenon was insignificant during the seventeenth century and even long after. Nonetheless, the pressure of the Boers on the San which turned them into slaves, drove them off their lands and almost exterminated them, was a dangerous omen for the African population.

Africa as a reservoir of labour

P. D. Curtin estimates that between 1451 and about 1600, 274,900 blacks were brought to America. Over the next few years this number increased to 1,341,100 to reach 6 million in the eighteenth century. Of these, according to estimates by F. Maura accepted by P. D. Curtin, some 400,000 to 450,000 slaves were imported to Brazil between 1575 and 1675. In the eighteenth

37. See ch. 23 below.
century, the figure reached almost 2 million. Throughout the 1700s, the importation of black labour to the English and French Antilles increased enormously and supplies to Cuba also grew. The above figures symbolize a radical, though gradual, change in European attitudes towards Africa which ceased to be a rich source of gold and became, first and foremost, a reservoir of labour without which many European estates in America could neither exist nor develop. This change—which was noticeable from the mid-seventeenth century—had, by the end of that century, become quite marked. The rapidly developing sugar-cane plantations were the main factor behind the enormous increase in demand for black labour. This process had started in Madeira, the Canaries and the Cape Verde Islands—particularly St Thomas Island—as early as the fifteenth century. It spread to Brazil in the second half of the sixteenth century, where it developed on a large scale in the north-eastern region. The Dutch occupation far from interrupting the process even stimulated it. The situation changed only when the Dutch were expelled from Brazil and transferred techniques used in the Brazilian sugar refineries to the islands in the Caribbean, which gradually became dominated mainly by the French and the English. Because of keen competition from the islands, the sugar-cane plantations were pushed into second place in the economic life of Brazil. With gold and diamond mining in Central Brazil (and from the 1800s, coffee production in South Brazil), the high demand almost trebled seventeenth-century slave imports.

Supplies of slaves to English and French estates in the Caribbean also increased enormously. In the English colonies, slave imports rose from 263,700 in the seventeenth century to 1,401,300 in the eighteenth. The situation was similar in the islands occupied by France, with San Domingo importing the greatest number—almost 790,000 slaves, mostly direct from Africa, in the eighteenth century. The cultivation of sugar cane was also started in Cuba, with similar consequences regarding labour requirements. Dutch Surinam and the English and French estates in Central America and the northern tip of South America also absorbed great numbers of black slaves. In North America, the tobacco plantations in Virginia and the rice plantations in Maryland laid the foundations for the further extension of the slave trade. A marked increase took place there in the eighteenth century when almost 400,000 slaves were brought into the English colonies. Subsequent development of the cotton plantations in the nineteenth century changed the southern territories of the United States into a vast area based on a slave economy. In the northern part of the colonies, dominated by medium- and small-scale grain cultivation, there was little need to increase the import of slave labour.

39. P. D. Curtin, ibid.
40. ibid.
41. Ibid.
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PLATE 1.1 Negro slaves washing for diamonds in Brazil
Demand for black labour in the American colonies presented Western Europe with an unprecedented task. Moreover, it came at a time when radical political and economic changes were taking place in Europe. During the second half of the seventeenth century the decline of Spain and Portugal became increasingly evident. Holland, then at the peak of its power, started to be slowly ousted by England and France whose economies were developing rapidly. From the late 1600s England and France had had more and more influence regarding the character and pace of white expansion in Africa, while the Spaniards and even the Dutch came to play marginal roles. With the Portuguese, their progress in the conquest of Angola allowed them to retain an advantageous position in this important zone of the slave trade.

In the seventeenth century, Holland, England and subsequently France, as well as certain other countries, set up companies for trading with Africa and for transporting slaves to America. Thus resources began to be concentrated to this end. The companies obtained from their governments monopoly rights for trading with Africa and were therefore able to control prices. In return, they were obliged to build new forts and to maintain the old ones protecting the European trading posts on the coasts. The European position in Africa was therefore buttressed by the English, Dutch and French companies. The number of European forts increased greatly during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, particularly on the Gold Coast and nearby.

Meanwhile, whites in Africa were at loggerheads among themselves. Their rivalries did not merely echo the rivalry of the Great Powers in Europe. The traders and trading companies were striving to obtain the most convenient trading posts on the African coast. They did so in time of war, and there were frequent changes in possession among the diverse rival European groups, each of which was supported by its own government. The governments which backed the companies were interested specifically in the development of the American plantations based upon black labour and in increasing their profits from the slave trade. It was, therefore, unthinkable for the Great Powers, and also certain weaker European countries, to leave Africa to its own devices. Even Sweden, Denmark and Prussia tried to involve themselves in African affairs without, however, much success and eventually withdrawing.

The activities of the companies, however, were not as fruitful as expected. Of the English companies, the first two were not particularly active. The Royal African Company, founded in 1672 and in which the King of England himself had a share, met with constant difficulties despite controlling a large part of African external trade on the western coasts in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. Its policy met with strong disapproval from both the American planters in the English colonies and many merchants in England. The planters protected the high slave prices imposed by the

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Company, while those English merchants who were not members of the Company also craved access to the African coasts and the highly profitable slave trade. After 1689, the Company's privileges were gradually curbed and access to the African trade was granted to others, too. In the mid-eighteenth century the Company ceased to exist.

In England an era of free trade with Africa had already begun a few years earlier. The merchants of Liverpool — which had been for almost half a century the main centre of what was known as the 'triangular trade' — were the most powerful. The trade operated as follows: the Liverpool merchants sent their ships with English goods to the African coast to be traded for slaves; these they transported to America to be sold to planters in the English, Spanish and Portuguese colonies; in turn, they brought back colonial goods to England. In the eighteenth century the trade treaties which the English forced from both Spain and Portugal gave them easy access to Spanish and Portuguese possessions in America. The English West Indies, Barbados and Jamaica in particular were — during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries — areas of large-scale, compulsory settlement for Africans brought there to work on the sugar-cane plantations and, subsequently, on cotton, coffee and other plantations, too. Both Barbados and Jamaica sold slaves to the growing number of tobacco and rice planters in Virginia and Maryland in exchange for grain and other products from the North American colonies.

The great successes of the Liverpool merchants during the eighteenth century were made possible — as was realized long ago — through the rapid industrial development in the English Midlands, particularly of metals in Birmingham and of textiles in Manchester. The Liverpool merchants were able to supply Africa — more regularly and more cheaply than could other Europeans — with knives, weapons and other metal goods, which were in high demand, as well as with textiles. During the eighteenth century, England gradually became the power with the greatest economic involvement on the African coast. England's influence was felt from Senegal to the boundaries of Cameroon. Though England lost its outposts in Senegal to France in 1799, its position in the Gambia and Sierra Leone had become stronger. England also occupied a leading position in the Gold Coast's slave trade which had greatly increased since the mid-seventeenth century. Trade in the Bight of Biafra and the Benin Cape, including Calabar, was tremendously important: during the eighteenth century the number of slaves transported far exceeded 1.3 million. Slave exports from Whydah, Porto Novo, Lagos and other Gold Coast ports also increased enormously. It was not only the English who were active there. Though France and Holland held weaker positions both, particularly France, developed a strong trade in the Slave Coast — in Senegal and in the region of Cameroon and

44. O. Patterson, 1967, pp. 16–29.
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Loango. The merchants of Nantes were in the forefront of this activity. Angola, in the late 1600s the most important source of black labour, was still under Portugal’s influence during the second half of the eighteenth century and Portugal continued as a large-scale supplier of slaves to Brazil.

Attempts at settlement started on a modest scale with the whites in Angola. Along the coast, however, from Cape Verde to the Congo, European expansion retained its trading character. European factories and settlements such as Saint-Louis set up in 1626, were all scattered along the coast, near convenient bays and usually close to conglomerations inhabited by Africans. El Mina, Accra, Whydah, Porto Novo, Badagri and both old and new Calabar – all famous in the eighteenth century – and others were settlements where white incomers met the blacks who supplied the slaves and also took European goods. The African rulers mostly reserved for themselves priority in trading with Europeans, but the role of black traders was also important. Even in Angola the Portuguese caught few slaves themselves, using for that purpose local agents who bought or kidnapped slaves in the interior.

The territorial extent of the slave trade in Africa is difficult to assess. Herskovits and Harwitz are now thought to be wrong in believing that only the coastal zone was ravaged. Undoubtedly the problem was most painful for the hinterlands of the ports, but information circulated as early as the sixteenth century concerning the long journeys made by slaves from their places of origin to the ports. During the large-scale export of Africans in the eighteenth century, slave-catchers had to penetrate the interior in order to reach their most important suppliers – the rulers of such powerful countries as Asante and Dahomey, and traders from Calabar. Their hunting zone must have been in the very heart of the continent, north of their own places of residence. The old African states, such as Benin or Oyo, were much less involved. The Congo, which entered a period of complete disintegration in the eighteenth century, was never an important supplier of slaves.

The Europeans were not particularly interested at this time in territorial expansion in Africa (with the exception of Angola). They obtained slaves, through their factories and numerous bays where, moreover, they sold their own wares including rum and weapons. Europe was not yet ready to start the conquest of Africa mostly because of Africa’s harsh climate and European helplessness in the face of tropical diseases. The early Europeans, the Brazilians and the North Americans who first made an appearance on the African continent therefore did everything to win the friendship of the African rulers by supplying them generously with whatever goods they wanted. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the community of interests between the European slave-traders and the slave-suppliers – the African rulers, dignitaries and traders – became even stronger. It is worth

47. J. D. Fage, 1969a.
mentioning here that the movement for the abolition of slavery, started in the second half of the eighteenth century, was strongly resisted in England not only by the planters of the West Indies but also by merchants in the metropolis. It also became clear later that the kings of Asante and Dahomey, and no doubt certain other African rulers, were also definitely opposed to the abolition of the slave trade.

The main area of European interest in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was the west coast of Africa. There was little slave-trading on the eastern coast, and it was not until the eighteenth century that European slave-traders started to invade that area. The great distance from the east coast to the American markets made the transport of East Africans to the New World more difficult though not impossible. Numerous inhabitants of present-day Mozambique therefore had to face a tragic journey across the Atlantic to Brazil in particular. P. D. Curtin estimated the numbers brought to the Americas from central and south-east Africa between 1711 and 1810 at about 810,000, or 24 per cent of the total number of persons imported. There is, however, no information as to the number of those who came from the eastern coast and its hinterland. Small numbers of black slaves were exported by the French after they occupied the islands of Réunion and Mauritius. And in East Africa, the export of slaves to Arabia, carried on by the subjects of the Imam of Oman, increased during the eighteenth century. When the centre of this activity shifted from Oman to Zanzibar, the effects were tragic for the population of East and Central Africa. It seems, however, that the ravaging raids of the Arab slave-catchers took place mainly in the nineteenth century.

In North Africa, the Europeans only put an end to the activities of the Barbary pirates in the eighteenth century, finally depriving them of their basic source of income. It would be interesting to find out whether this had any influence on the policies of the ruling élite in Algiers and Tunis—then deeply involved in the piratical expeditions—particularly concerning the local native populations.

The expedition to the River Niger in 1591 seems to have had no lasting effect on Morocco. The conquerors quickly made themselves independent of their metropolis, and their descendants—the Arma—set up their own small states which, however, of short duration. There is no evidence of any important changes having taken place in the trade between Morocco and the curve of the Niger. Slaves and small amounts of gold continued to be exported from West Sudan. The slave trade, however, seems to have been considerable as, at the turn of the seventeenth century, the sultans of Morocco possessed an army composed of slaves which, for a certain period, also exerted a strong influence on the country’s politics.

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PLATE 1.3 The political cartoon, 'Men and Brothers!!'
Conclusion

The following may be said of Africa’s external contacts from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century:

1. Africa’s west coast and hinterland was the area most strongly involved with the rest of the world.

2. Initially, the Europeans were interested in the purchase of African gold but, from the 1550s, the slave trade became more important. With slaves, the Europeans were able to foster the economic development of a large part of America and the Caribbean. The slave trade also accelerated the accumulation of capital in Europe, particularly in England, and in Africa.

3. European expansion in Africa was proto-colonial and was largely confined to trade. Exchange between the two parties was unbalanced with the Europeans selling cheap goods in return for huge numbers of slave labourers. Thus, though at that time the Europeans made little attempt to conquer Africa, they greatly damaged its demographic situation.

4. Africa’s role as a market for European industrial products, as early as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, has probably been underestimated.

5. The advantages accruing to Africa from these contacts included the introduction of new crops such as maize, manioc and cassava. This in no way could have compensated for the huge demographic losses, let alone the sufferings of large numbers of human beings abducted to strange lands overseas for hard labour on the plantations.
Largely as a result of internal factors such as demography and ecology or under the impact of external forces such as the slave trade, Christianity, Islam and capitalism, African social, economic and political structures were continuously transformed between 1500 and 1800. This chapter discusses these transformations and the new structures that emerged. It will be evident from this analysis that in most parts of the continent the idea of timeless African structures or institutions is a historical myth with no real substance.

New social structures

Islam and Christianity

The first noticeable changes and new structures were social. In the religious area, European and Middle Eastern philosophies and religions began to impinge, with Christianity and Islam becoming political forces in new areas. The religious problem became a crucial one for civilizations which, by virtue of their own visions of the world, had previously ignored conflicts of this kind.

Any ground gained by Christianity in the coastal areas of East Africa during this period was lost with the assassination of Father Conçalo da Silveira, a Portuguese priest who had been trying to bring the Mwene Mutapa Nogoma under Christian and Portuguese influence in 1560. Islam, on the other hand, made gains in Ethiopia with the conquests of Ahmād Grañ (1531–5) and those of the Mai of Bornu (Bornu) and the askiyas of Songhay in the Sahara and Western Sudan.

1. See ch. 24 below.
The transition from captive to slave society

The second important change was the replacement in most of Africa of the black African *jonya* system by the European and Middle Eastern slave-owning system.

The *jonya* (from the Mande word *jon* meaning 'captive') was found mainly in Western Sudan and the Niger–Chad region. A *jon* (*jaam* in Waalo, *maccuba* in Fulfulde, *bayi* in Hausa) belonged to a certain lineage. He was not transferable, he owned the bulk of what he produced and, in societies in which the system flourished, he belonged to a socio-political category that was part of the ruling class and thus had a share in the sovereignty of the state and its political apparatus. Both as a system and a social class *jonya* played a considerable and novel role in the states and empires of Ghana, Takrûr, Mali, Kânem–Borno, Asante, Yoruba and Mutapa. The élite of the royal slaves — the Mande *jon tigi*, the *farba* of the Takrûr *jaami buur* and the Hausa *sarkin bayi* — belonged to the dominant ruling class in the state and society. They exercised some power, made fortunes and could even themselves own slaves such as the Mande *jombiri jon* and the slaves-of-captives of Dahomey.

Oriental and western slavery, on the other hand, in both its ancient and later its Western colonial form which gained a hold on eighteenth-century Africa, set out to base a mode of production on slaves as chattels or commodities with few rights, to be bought, sold and inherited. Sometimes they made up the bulk of a society's labour force, as in the Athenian system and the colonial plantation slavery of medieval Arabia and post-Columbian America. Its influence gave rise to a conflict that continued to afflict the African continent into the twentieth century.

Increasing instability and continual warring contributed, if only on demographic grounds, to the rise of *jonya* in the sixteenth century until it began to overlap geographically with the slave-owning system and the colonial form of slavery within the new overlying social structures. Where Islamic institutions were introduced, as in Songhay, Hausaland and the East African towns, the two systems were often confused.

With the setting up of Muslim states or emirates — which progressively took over Western Sudan through the *djihâds* and the revolutions of Karamokho Sambegu in Futa Jallon around 1725 and of Sulaymân Baal in Futa Toro in 1775 — Muslim law and tradition was established in the region. At the same time, the slave-owning system was replacing the *jonya*. The founding of the Sokoto caliphate by ‘Uthman dan Fodio at the

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2. *Macamos* were gangs of slaves surrounding the Mwene Mutapa, i.e. they corresponded to the Sudanic royal captives (*furba jon*, *tonjon* or *jaami buur*).

3. The study of slavery within African societies has been undertaken in several major works, e.g. S. Miers and I. Kopytoff, 1977. This work reveals the wide range of related institutions to which the term 'slavery' could be applied and attempts to define 'slavery' in the indigenous African context. See also C. Meillassoux, 1975; P. E. Lovejoy, 1981; A. G. B. Fisher and H. G. Fisher, 1970.
FIG. 2.1 Political entities of the Sahel between the eleventh and sixteenth centuries
Source: adapted from map drawn by P. Ndiaye, Department of Geography, University of Dakar
beginning of the nineteenth century further accelerated the process; and the Islamization of the Saharan Negro-Berbers and their conquest by the Saharan Arab Hassan kabîlas took it a step further, progressively converting the semi-feudal harâţïn⁴ (which featured a warlike aristocracy combined with conquered sedentary peoples), into a more or less slave-owning system. Jonya did survive, however, amongst the traditional aristocracy of Western Sudan and the Niger-Chad region, which had suffered little or no Muslim influence. Until colonial conquest, jonya continued to wield some power in the Wolof, Serek, Hausa, Kanëmbu and Yoruba states. The empire of Segu, with its furba jón, is reminiscent of that of the mansa with their tonjon. Until colonial conquest the states of Kayor, Siin and Yatenga were largely controlled by the warrior or administrative élite of the captive class.

The spread of feudal structures

The third change was the spread of feudal structures in either pure or distorted forms among the agrarian civilizations of Africa.

Feudalism as a political structure, a mode of production or a socio-economic system entailed not only ties of fealty, vassalage or suzerainty but, in particular, an opportunity to speculate and to make a profit out of the means of production. That this right was based on land ownership, territorial mastery, or control of a person, thing or some means of production, was unimportant. Property, which dominated European and Middle Eastern thought, system of government and political and socio-economic structure, featured in the Western and Eastern feudalisms which came to bear on the predominantly agrarian civilizations of Africa. Their influence was to be seen wherever land tenure or control over a territory led to duties, taxes, land rents, share-cropping systems, tenant farming, agricultural wage labour or land renting.

The socio-economic structures of sub-Saharan Africa differed from those of Europe and the Middle East and from the feudal system in particular. There was no speculation in the means of production, even in the class societies and states of sub-Saharan Africa, because of historical and ecological conditions. Before the advent of Islamic law or the Western-inspired mailo land system (which introduced a tenancy system into Uganda in 1900), land was not a source of income in black Africa. European-type ownership, as a right to use and transfer things and even people (that is, slaves), was almost non-existent. Those who appropriated or passed on a plot of land or a hunting, fishing or food-gathering area worked on the basis of user rights which entailed neither lucrative speculation nor the possibility of sale. Thus sub-Saharan agrarian society gave rise to lamana—a land tenure system which precluded land-renting, tenant farming and share-cropping, even though the taxes imposed by the state, the authorities and the chiefs were levied on agricultural and pastoral production. The

⁴ Originally serfs.
mode of production peculiar to black Africa entailed above all production for consumption. People produced for their own use, without the control of the means of production.

Interaction between the different social structures gave rise to hybrid, heterogeneous societies, generally rather poorly described by scholars blinkered by pre-conceived ideas of history. African society, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, thus contained marginal areas of debased feudalism mixed with lamana. Feudalism held sway where there was production for exchange and the lamana system of production for consumption had been broken down or modified.

In Egypt, the Turkish beylik (beylic) system helped to foster the feudal system and feudalization. The Ottoman regime took over in Egypt a landed nobility which had itself established cliental or seigniorial relationships. This rural aristocracy was protected, as in the Middle Ages in Europe, by odjaks (Turkish fortresses and garrisons). Great local chiefs ruled the carsh (ethnic area) and the dwars (tented camps) according to a hierarchical system. They subordinated khames (vassals, serfs) and small communities to themselves, as in the case of the Makhzen. In the Sahel and the Mauritanian Sahara, religious families and djuad (warrior chiefs) took over and vassalized confederations of small communities under the cloak of religious brotherhood or by right of conquest. In southern Oran the Awlād Sīdī Shayḳh imposed tribute on the Chaamba nomads, who undertook allegiance to them. The Hassan warriors established the same worma\(^5\) (obligations of fealty) over the ḥarāṭin and the marabout families north of the Senegal river, and exacted the muud al-hūrum from the Haal-pularen.

The chief Turkish and native dignitaries in the Maghrib were often granted large estates by the beys which they ran on a tenancy, rental or share-cropping basis. As in Egypt, the beylik controlled the up-to-date economic activities, and monopolized manufacturing industry, the mills, the arsenals, the mint, the building yards and the resources of piracy. It had a hold over the cereal, oil, salt and textile trades, and controlled the trade routes (caravan termini and sea-ports) and foreign trade. The guilds of craftsmen and merchants were under its supervision. The merchant middle class itself worked as an intermediary for the Ottoman regime.

In the rest of North Africa and northern Ethiopia the feudal system developed differently because of ecological conditions which in some areas made land ownership less concentrated. The great beylical estates of the Maghrib extended over a wide area, and gave rise to the widespread distribution of azel (fiefs) worked by the khammāsat (tenant farming) system on a one-fifth basis. At the regional level, the pattern was still one of milk (small family holdings) and carsh (community or group holdings) but always within the speculative feudal superstructure.

In Egypt and the rest of North Africa some centuries of Graeco–Roman

\(^5\) Worma introduced the idea of allegiance or fealty into Takrūr languages where such a bond did not exist.
rule had already prepared the ground for the transition to feudalism, the *iktīs* system of the Mamluks. Under the Greek and Roman occupation these areas had become the granaries of the Imperial regime which had developed *ager publicus* and the Colonate there with the help of slave labour and thoroughly oppressed and exploited peasantry. In the sub-Saharan region the transition to feudalism took place under outside influence.

In northern Ethiopia, for instance, there emerged a landed gentry which created estates. This came about because the Ethiopian nobility subverted the principles of ambilineal descent and equal partible inheritance thereby creating among themselves trans-generational ‘families’. They also claimed properties such as cattle and produce from such land. The economy of the region was based on plough agriculture, and a significant number of the emerging nobility were able to hand over their newly acquired estates intact to their heirs. Also, political office was gradually concentrated within this group and, hence, the holding of public office became critical to the accumulation of wealth. Consequently, northern Ethiopia exhibited marked tendencies towards greater class differentiation based on the accumulation of land property and political power.

These semi-feudal situations were extended by Christian northern Ethiopia to the southern areas where the *ketema* (garrison towns) were established with a *neftemia* (landed élite) colonizing the *gasha* (occupied lands). The *gabar* (peasant) who worked the lands for the benefit of the landed élite was, like the *fallāh* (pl., *fallāhin*), similar to a serf, or at least a tributary or client obliged to pay the *gabir* or *siso*, depending on whether he was a share-cropper or a tenant farmer.

In the Great Lakes region, especially its southern area which comprises much of present-day western Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda and Uvira in north-eastern Zaire, the institutions of clientship constituted a semi-feudal bond which developed to harmonize the relationship between pastoralists and agriculturalists. It was a contract between a pastoralist donor, who provided cattle, and an agriculturalist recipient who put his services and those of his family and future generations at the disposal of the donor and his heirs. These contracts differed from society to society and changed over the years. In Takrūr a *surga* or *dag* would agree of his own free will to be maintained by a rich man or an influential political leader for his own benefit. Such manifestations of semi-feudal structures cannot apparently be attributed to external influence but have to be explained in terms of internal developments.

The main factors contributing to the adoption of the Ottoman feudal socio-economic system were the spread of the Muslim Emirate with the advent of the *askiya* in Western Sudan, the expansion of the empire of the Islamized *Mai* of Borno and the introduction of *deployed* law as a result of conversion and the *djihāds*. In Songhay the *askiya* kept part of the tra-
African political, economic and social structures during this period

ditional socio-economic structure. Like the Ethiopian aristocracy, who colonized southern Ethiopia, they introduced many innovations to the lands they conquered. Askia Muhammad and his successors distributed concessions after the Mamluk style: they set up ḥiti (fiefs) on the ḥaradj lands seized from non-Muslims and gave to their favourites not the serfs, the non-transferable land or their property, but the usufruct of the duties, taxes and fees payable to the state. The ta'rîkhs (chronicles) are full of details of this kind.

In the emirates the Muslim law of the djihads was adopted, thus implanting more firmly European and Middle-Eastern feudal, semi-feudal or tributary socio-economic structures. The almamia of Futa Toro and Futa Jallon and the Sokoto caliphate were simply copied from Ottoman land tenure and taxation systems. The jom leydi (master of the land), the jom lewre, jom jambere and jom jayngol (who had the usufruct of the Futa lands) were progressively absorbed, not into feudal forms of allegiance but into a feudal-type socio-economic structure.

The new legal system established under the emirate introduced feudal-type land speculation. The njoldi (symbolic payments attaching to the master of the land), kwangal (fishing grounds), yial (hunting grounds), hore kosam (grazing land) and gobbi (mines), were transformed into annual dues payable to those in power, and were collected under state supervision. Even the office of the tax-collector became negotiable for a fee, as did most of the official posts within the system. Share-cropping, tenant farming and land rental became the rule. In the Islamized areas the landless peasants, dispossessed by conquest or the new legal system, became an important factor. The Sereer refø rekk (serfs), the Tarkür, samba remoru, baadolo and navetaan and the Hausa talakawa emerged as counterparts of the Mediterranean and Saharan khames, harätin, falïàlfin and gabas. The leydi hujja (Fulfulde for land bond) introduced the Ottoman system of land tenure. The njoldi was the annual ground rent and the cootigu the fee payable by tenant farmers, share-croppers and sub-tenants. The eastern Muslim system of land control appeared in the bayti maal or leydi maal and the leydi janandi which were state-owned, and the habüs which belonged to the religious community. The land was, however, only partly subjected to Maghribi forms of vassalage. In some cases Makhzen types of tax exemption were to be found. Under the leydi urum allegiance was owed

8. Jom lewre — the first occupant and clearer of the land; jom jambere — a person entitled to clear the land with an axe; jom jayngol — a person entitled to clear the land by burning.

9. These dues, which were of various kinds (cereals, joints of game, honey beer, chicken, goat, etc) were originally primarily of ritual significance, i.e. meant as offerings to the 'spirit of the place' that was occupied. They were given on taking possession, sometimes at harvest time, and most commonly at funerals and ceremonies of succession to the laman, or first occupant.

10. The Makhzen kabîlas were exempted from tax and their lands were under the control of central authority. In return for this submission, the Makhzen chiefs levied taxes on the neighbouring kabîlas, the raia.
by means of the *worma* (bond of fealty), coupled with the *muud al-hürum* or *muudul horma* tax.

From the sixteenth century onwards, socio-economic structures from different backgrounds were therefore combining. The result was the emergence of a new social order – an emiral or dominant form of government\(^\text{11}\) in which feudal structures were superimposed on the African *lamana*. This development of socio-economic structures affected the form of the *mansaya* state: in Western Sudan and Nigeria, which were becoming Islamized, the eastern Muslim institution of the emirate replaced it or was superimposed on it. In the Gulf of Guinea and Central and East Africa, where Christian rulers appeared among the Mani Kongo and the Mwene Mutapa, the institutional influence of Christian feudal monarchy was increasingly apparent.

**Architectural and artistic developments**

Finally, there were also some important architectural and artistic developments. The men who built the towns in the Nile valley, the Maghrib, Sudan and the coast, and erected the Yoruba palaces, the edifice known today as the Zimbabwe ruins, the houses, palaces and mosques of the East African coast and the *tata* surrounding the Hausa cities were at once architects, masons, decorators and town planners. The round or pyramidal strong clay or stone huts and the tiered Jolla houses were in the same architectural traditions as the Koutoubia of Marrakesh, the tomb of the *askiya* at Gao and that of the caliphs at Cairo. In the earlier period great emphasis was placed on good architecture, as witness the ruins of Awdâghust, Kumbi, Kilwa, Jenne and Axum. After the sixteenth century new advances in architecture continued to be made, perhaps mainly in Western Sudan and Nigeria, but the towns of North Africa and the Nile valley declined with the collapse of their erstwhile prosperity. The *askiyas*, however, who carried on the tradition in West Africa, were great builders, like their Moroccan contemporary, Abû 'l-'Abbâs al-Manṣûr.

Sonni 'All and *Askiya Muḥammad* resumed the construction of the great canal running along the River Niger. In Morocco, al-Manṣûr’s accession to power coincided with a definite, if short-lived, vogue for large public works. The architectural traditions of the Sahel and the Islamic world nevertheless increasingly spread southwards. Sudanese architectural style, of which the mosques at Sankore and Jenne were the prototypes, spread from the sixteenth century. *Askiya Muḥammad* built Tendirma out of nothing and founded the *Ṣiddî Yaḥya* mosque. In this context, large bodies of masons, cabinet-makers and decorators grew up who, in Western Sudan and the Maghrib, gave rise to fraternities and castes.

In Ethiopia, the Gondar period (\(c\).1632–\(c\).1750) witnessed the development of new architectural styles promoted by the court. In Gondar itself

\(^{11}\) The term dominant or emiral regime is used here to denote the hybrid social forms that emerged in black Africa following contact with Islam; cf. P. Diagne, 1967.
and in other towns, the emperors' families erected huge and beautiful palaces, castles, churches and libraries with elaborate interior decorations. In the Swahili-speaking coastal regions of East Africa major architectural changes occurred from about 1700 to 1850. New patterns and motifs were introduced, and the houses themselves were of original designs and great craftsmanship with excellent plaster-carving. Architectural developments were accompanied by productivity in related fields such as wood-carving, especially door-carving and furniture-making.

New economic structures

The main new economic structures that developed during this period were the caste system of production, which replaced the guild or corporation system; the predatory economy, mainly in North and East Africa; and the trading-post or entrepôt economy, mainly in Central and West Africa.

A craft economy and a caste-and-guild society

Medieval urban civilization had contributed to the division of labour through the development of crafts, manufacturing and industrial processes. But in the sixteenth century development was uneven—depending on the area and the type of society—with different tendencies showing themselves in the various social contexts.

The civilizations of Western Sudan, the Niger-Chad region and the Sahara, for instance, developed crafts, manufacturing and industrial activities on the basis of more or less closed, inbred castes. With the growing influence of Takrûr and the Saharan civilizations, the caste system crystallized, most noticeably in the civilizations of southern Senegal, Mande territory and Hausaland. The Takrûr caste system—and members of it—migrated to Kayor, Jolof, Siin and Salum. The Mande nyamankala (caste system) long raised the status of the blacksmith's trade until the dijhâds brought the Takrûrians to the area. For example, Sumaguru Kante, who played a prominent role in the rise to power of the Mansa dynasty and the state of Mali, was originally a blacksmith. Metalworkers were held in high esteem among the Fon and Yoruba but there, too, the impact of immigration from Takrûr and the Sahara was to upset the prevailing order. In Songhay, the askiya already governed a society in which the caste system had developed, become stratified and taken ideological root.

The Torodo revolution at the end of the eighteenth century accentuated the caste system in Takrûr by deepening class divisions. The Sebbe peasants, the Subalbe fishermen and even the Buruure Fulbe nomadic herdsmen were progressively debased. They were not identified with the benangatoobe (sakkeebe or cobblers, mayilbe or blacksmiths or gawlo, griots,

12. See ch. 24 below.
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eetc.), but were subject to segregation among the nangatoobe (upper caste). The Torodo marabout élite increasingly came to regard as low-caste the defeated Ceddo and Denyanke aristocracies and everyone except members of the marabout lineages eligible for high office. In the Negro–Berber societies of the Sahara, religious, ethnic and racial divisions gradually came into play in caste hierarchies.

One last striking aspect in the development of craft or industrial organization concerned state control. In Mediterranean civilizations, the trend was towards state monopolies in a number of activities, such as weaving, shipbuilding, arsenals, refining and foreign trade. The black African state seldom exercised such control, even with the expansion of the armaments and weapons industries. One feature of this phase was the contrast between the versatility of country-dwellers and the marked specialization of townsmen. In agriculture and stock-breeding the division of labour and the proliferation of trades and crafts had developed little. Farmers, fishermen, stock-breeders and hunters remained versatile with each plying many trades such as blacksmith, basket-maker, mason, woodcutter, carpenter, weaver or shoemaker as needed. Sometimes women, or specific age-groups, specialized in a given type of work – mainly specific trades, such as metal-, wood- and leather-working, that were implicated in the development of castes.

State industries also developed, with arsenals for weapons and even for the building of river- and ocean-going fleets, both in Western Sudan and on the West Atlantic coast and also in Mediterranean and Indian-Ocean countries.

The multiplicity of wars sometimes lent fresh impetus to metal-working. In the sixteenth century Sonni ‘Ali reorganized the Songhay arsenals, setting yearly production targets for the workshops. Egypt became skilled in metallurgy and produced Damascus steel. Large communities were engaged in iron-, copper-, gold- and silver-working. The precious-metal industry in Egypt and North Africa continued to be supplied with gold from Wādī Allaga in Nubia, Sofala and Western Sudan. The Mande blacksmiths, organized on a caste basis, exported their techniques to the new towns that had sprung up as a result of the Atlantic trade. The Sudanese garassa, tögg and maabo – who made ploughs, axes, swords, spears, arrowheads and household tools – perfected their techniques and, by the end of the eighteenth century, were repairing firearms. It was in this sector that new technologies were most quickly absorbed. Craftsmen working in gold and silver stimulated trade in the süks (markets) of towns in the Maghrib, Egypt and Western Sudan. Berber and Wolof jewellers were outstanding for their gold and jewellery filigree work. The minting of gold coinage – of long-standing in the north and on the Swahili coast, particularly at Zanzibar and Kilwa – moved southwards to Nikki. The

14. The large-scale development of state armaments industries in black Africa took place mainly in the nineteenth century.
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Fig. 2.2 African trade routes in the sixteenth century
Source: adapted from map drawn by P. Ndiaye, Department of Geography, University of Dakar
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Swahili also manufactured beautiful jewellery and other silver and gold items. Ceramics gave rise to industries, pottery (like basketry) remaining a female preserve. The glass industry continued to develop, spreading throughout Yoruba country, Nupe, Hausaland, Egypt and the Maghrib. Among the Shona in the Southern Zambezi region, mining technology was quite advanced with gold- and copper-mining industries sustaining the economies of the region up to the eighteenth century.15

Leatherworking flourished most in Nigeria, where stock-breeding provided ample raw materials. Footwear from the new centres of Kano, Zaria and Abeche competed with the leather goods; and large quantities were exported from Siyu, in the Lamu archipelago which had become a major centre of leatherwork by 1700. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, basketry and carpet-weaving also took their place among the industries of the Niger–Chad region. The manufacture of paper, which replaced papyrus, developed chiefly in Egypt under the influence of Samarkand.16 Sudan did not lag far behind and gradually began to turn out manuscripts with Känem producing Kur’ans (Qurans) that were sold throughout the Muslim world.17 Trades associated with the food industry, which had grown up in the Middle Ages in the northern towns and those of Western Sudan, also became established in Nigerian cities. North Africa, particularly Egypt, specialized in growing and refining sugar. The extraction of olive, palm and groundnut oil, and the butchery, bakery and grocery trades in general remained cottage industries. In the textile field, the growing of cotton and the weaving of cotton cloth were well established on the Zimbabwean Plateau and the Zambezi valley by the sixteenth century.18 The Swahili city states were also famous for fabrics: Pate, for example, produced excellent silk,19 and cotton was grown, spun and woven. In Central Africa the raphia cloth of Kongo was renowned from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries.

The predatory economy

Prior to the sixteenth century, long-distance trade had played a major role in the economy of Africa. This had encouraged high productivity and had led to the rise of urban civilizations and the forging of strong links between town and country which had slowly transformed the countryside. Between 1500 and 1800, however, the predatory economy – the outcome of Spanish and Portuguese expansionism, from 1600 both violent and destructive – was introduced with the decline of the ports and market towns that had been enriched by the medieval trans-Saharan trade apparent from 1592

17. G. Nachtigal, 1876.
onwards when the Christian kings of Spain and Portugal began expelling the large colonies of Jews and Muslims who had settled in the Maghrib and at Tunis and Algiers.

Spain had occupied Palma, in the Canary Islands, and had taken Tenerife in 1495, followed by Melilla in 1496. In 1505 it had established itself at Mars al-Kabir and in the same year the Portuguese had occupied Agadir, followed by Säfi in 1508. In 1509 Cardinal Ximenes had seized Oran and in the same year Algiers came under Spanish control followed, in 1510, by Bougie; Tunis Dellys, Cherchel and Algiers all paid tribute to Spain. In 1513 Portugal had extended its sway to Azemmür.

By this time the Arab-Berbers and the Ottoman Porte felt compelled to
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oppose European aggression and the corsairs, sailing under the Ottoman flag, helped to redress the balance of power. In 1514 one of the Barbarossa brothers, Abū Yūsuf, recaptured Djidjelli and Algiers with his brother, Khāyr al-Dīn, consolidating the reconquest. Tunisia and Algeria came under Ottoman sovereignty once again, and remained so, at least nominally, until the nineteenth century, despite Charles V of Spain’s expeditions against them (he was defeated before Algiers in 1541). In 1551 Siṅān Pasha occupied Tripoli in the name of the Ottoman Porte followed by Tunis in 1574. In the mid-1500s, Morocco asserted its independence having reconquered Agadir, Sāfi and Azemmūr from Portugal thanks to the djiḥād of the Banū Sa‘ād, founders of the Shārīfian dynasty. At al-Makhazen, Abū ʿl-ʿAbbās al-Manṣūr, an ally of Queen Elizabeth I of England, routed an army of 20,000 Portuguese.

Despite their clashes with European powers, the North African states continued to preserve their freedom but their progress was impeded in the sixteenth century by the breakdown of the world economic order. Henceforth, the ports of the Maghrib and North Africa lived mainly by piracy and on tributes and duties, rather than by trade or new industries. The main activities of the states were dictated by the logic of the predatory economy. The Turkish corsairs took the place of the medieval merchant class in catering for the prosperity of the Ottoman ruling military élite. The ports of Salé (Morocco), Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli enjoyed the protection of the privateer fleet which, in the 1600s, enjoyed its golden age in the Mediterranean.

In 1558, thirty-five galleys and twenty-five brigantines were engaged in piracy from the port of Algiers, a city with a population of only 20,000. Nevertheless, economically it was in a sorry state. In 1580 it was stricken by famine and lost one-third of its population. It continued to attract people, however, and, by the eighteenth century, had a population of 100,000, including 25,000 Christian slaves. Sixteenth-century Tripoli had a population of 40,000 comprising 3500 Turks, 35,000 Arab-Berbers and 2000 Christians. Its corsairs ravaged the Mediterranean – the scene of the anti-European struggle – and throughout the eighteenth century, too, there was continual instability in the western Mediterranean. The Ottoman regencies of Algiers and Tunis were almost constantly at war with one or other European power with confrontations alternating with treaties. In this context mercantile capitalism and the merchant class stood to gain nothing.

It is against this background that the Moroccan expedition against Songhay in Western Sudan should be seen, likewise the djiḥāds which the Muslim communities of black Africa, influenced by the Maghrib, undertook against the entrepôt economy on the Atlantic coast. The Moroccan ruler, Abū ʿl-ʿAbbās al-Manṣūr – who had defeated the Portuguese – endeavoured with the conquest of Songhay in 1591 to re-open the gold and slave routes. In 1593 the capture of Timbuktu made it possible to bring 1200 slaves across the Sahara. Djiḏar Pasha’s venture served only
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to hasten the downfall of this trade. It put an end to what was the largest if not the most powerful empire in Western Sudan in the sixteenth century.

Tripolitania and Egypt were more sheltered from the consequences of the decline of the Saharan trade and maintained their traditional trans-Saharan routes. The Ottoman Porte, which was established in Egypt and at Tripoli, bolstered Känem–Borno by means of an alliance and deliveries of arms, and so maintained a flow of north–south trade – vital for its own supplies – until the nineteenth century.

The societies in this area did not, however, escape the overall decline. The oriental civilization of which they had become part was decaying. Its feudal structures did not facilitate the development of the areas it influenced in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, or the interior – in the Niger–Chad region and Western Sudan.

The predatory economy, of which piracy in the Mediterranean was a component, certainly contributed to the halting of economic and technological growth in the southern Mediterranean. But socio-economic and political structures also played a part in the stagnation and under-development of the area and its hinterland. The decline of Mediterranean Africa meant the decline of a whole sub-system which played a prominent role in the economic and political geography of the medieval world.

All the countries of the Nile and East Africa, and those in the Niger–Chad region and Western Sudan, were affected in differing degrees. As Chapter 28 on Madagascar reveals, in the western Indian Ocean the years 1680 to 1720 became known as the ‘the period of the pirates’. Countries in direct contact with the new European hegemonies were physically disrupted by the predatory economy, although their decline was also due to their inability to revivify a socio-economic structure increasingly influenced by the backward East. They were also handicapped by their inability to quickly establish power relationships that would have saved them from the unequal balance of trade characteristic of the period.

The decline of the countryside: poverty and insecurity among the peasantry

The predatory economy caused trade between town and country to stagnate and therefore affected the relationship between them. Their activities and produce had been complementary. Towns had broken the closed circle of subsistence farming, accentuated the division of labour and contained the seeds of the new society. They had provided the background for scientific and technological development and the growth of trade and specialized crafts and industries. They had created new economic, social and cultural values and represented the forefront of progress. They had given rise to new production technologies and more sophisticated consumption patterns. It was urban crafts and industries that had, until then, stimulated large-scale agriculture, stock-breeding, fishing and hunting and their auxiliary
industries. They had been responsible for the planting of sugarcane and cotton on an industrial scale and the growing of dye plants, such as madder, indigo, saffron and henna, and also perfume plants. Hydraulic installations, roads and stock-breeding for wool, milk and meat all owed their development to the towns.

The sixteenth century, however, brought disruption and crisis to that world. Urban depopulation brought decline to the rural economy, leading to widespread poverty among the peasants and the reversion to bush of large tracts of arable land. Increasingly insecure, the country-folk sought refuge in the depths of the forest where, cut off from the high-consumption culture of the towns, they withdrew more and more into family or village self-sufficiency. Subsistence farming and production for consumption. The Maghribi and Egyptian peasant produced olive oil and cereals for himself, and kept domestic animals. The West Atlantic peasant made palm oil, planted cassava and yams and learnt to grow bananas and maize. The farmer-stock-breeders of the savannah filled their barns with rice, millet and fonio, and made their own karite- (shea butter nut) groundnut- and palm-oil. Exchange of produce and barter were the main forms of trade.

This rustic life was further disrupted by the slave trade which drained the peasant population, for, when wars between rival aristocracies no longer furnished sufficient captives, the gap was bridged by slave-raiding and the devastation of the countryside, especially south of the Sahara. Depleted of able-bodied men, the village economy declined: people disappeared from traditionally inhabited areas and, in some regions, peoples continually on the run reverted to a migrant economy of hunting and food-gathering with many moving into the savannah region towards the forest.

Even methods of production regressed. The strong correlation between innovation, the need for sophisticated techniques and abundant means is well known; and the general unavailability of resources in the African countryside accentuated technological regression or stagnation.

The warrior aristocracy drained a great deal of manpower from the land which, in black Africa in particular, was demographically ruinous for the country areas. The ruling élites gave up farming and relied instead on raiding using the services of the freemen and slaves they had captured.

It became more and more burdensome for the peasantry to support these idle élites particularly in the troubled Western Sudan and Niger-Chad regions which, with their dry farming and extensive migrant agriculture, found it increasingly difficult to feed their people. The baadolo, the samba remoru (poor peasants of Takrûr) and the talakawa (poverty-stricken farmers and herdsmen of Hausaland and the Niger-Chad area), came to constitute the great mass of the peasantry in the savannah lands. They led as hard a life as the Egyptian fallâhin, the Ethiopian gabor and the Saharan and Maghribian harâûns and khames.

The oppression of the African peasantry by the rural and urban élites increased with the tightening of the fiscal screw on rural farmers. Under
Turkish Muslim law taxation was increased in the *daru khurudj* (non-Islamized) lands. Muslims were made to pay not only the *zakāt* (the only tax to which a Muslim was liable) but also the *kharādj*. There was also an increase in land speculation through share-cropping and tenancy.

As the black market in local taxation rights became widespread in Muslim countries, the weight of taxation imposed by the élites on the peasants and rural craftsmen increased. The plundering of wealth and the capture and enslavement of the peasant masses attained gigantic proportions. To the *galag* (tax) payable to the political chief of the Takrūr aristocracy was added the *moyal* (meaning literally spoliation) which entitled members of the élite to appropriate wealth wherever possible.

In such a situation the leaders of the *djīhāds* and the Christian messianic movements found it easy to enlist the mass support of the peasantry. Men of religion promised equality and an end to all troubles. They designated the traditional aristocracies and the Europeans as the disruptive factors and the causes of social injustice.

From the seventeenth century, the peasantry’s political role increased. Peasant revolts rooted in the decline of the countryside swept the continent like a religious revolution, thus paving the way for resistance to colonial conquest. It was a revolt not of captives or slaves but of the largest, most heavily exploited class, the small peasants. The Torodo revolution in the Senegal Futa, supported by the landless *samba remoru*, was a revolt against both the *muudul horma*, imposed by the Moorish *kabīlas*, and the oppressive eastern Muslim tax system introduced by the Islamized Denyanke aristocracy. The decline and breakdown of rural economies were not always similar in nature or extent, economic ossification being proportional to the under-development of the traditional commercial towns and their ruling classes.

The countries of the Nile and the Indian Ocean

The impact of the predatory economy on the countries of the Nile and the Indian Ocean was equally disastrous. The East African ports had been known for their trading activities since the eleventh century. Although not as important either in size or influence as the Western Sudanese and North African towns, they nevertheless formed the framework of a substantial urban commercial civilization in touch with Arabia, Persia, India, China and the Mediterranean. The Portuguese invasion set off the progressive ruin of this urban commercial complex. By 1502 the destructive Portuguese occupation had begun and in the same year, Kilwa and Zanzibar were placed under tribute by Portugal. In 1505 Francesco d’Almeida sacked Kilwa and Mombasa, and then built Fort Santiago at Kilwa. He prohibited all trade between these towns, and the merchants left for Malindi and the

Comoros. Lamu and Pate were occupied. The process of disruption had begun.

With the exception of Luanda and Mozambique none of the stations set up by the Portuguese and later by the Dutch, English and French was as big as an average town in Western Sudan or as important even as the Swahili and East African ports of the tenth to sixteenth centuries.

The entrepôt or trading-post economy

While the predatory economy became widespread in the areas bordering the Mediterranean, the Nile and the Indian Ocean, the entrepôt or trading-post economy became the structure in the areas bordering the Atlantic Ocean. Trading entrepôts concerned themselves little with creative business. The new maritime entrepôt towns were fortresses before becoming centres of commercial civilization – scenes of violence and spoliation.

On the Guinea and equatorial coasts, the Portuguese – who established the entrepôt economy in the sixteenth century – looted more than they bought. They had little to offer economically: they even imposed tributes and the goods they exchanged rarely came from their own businesses. Apart from some wine and iron bars, the Portuguese goods were imported. It was local and regional produce that was exchanged for gold, slaves, leather, gum, ivory, amber, yellow civet, cowries, cotton and salt. In the Gulf of Guinea the Portuguese bought goods from the Akan and resold them on the Nigerian coast or in the Congo or Angola. In Senegambia, they took up residence in the ports and became successful local merchants. In the seventeenth century, when European industry began to produce textiles and hardware, deflation in the towns became still worse.

The depots contributed nothing to local prosperity. Before 1800, Albreda, Cacheu, Santiago de Cabo Verde, El Mina, Ketu, Calabar and San Salvador were the most important depots and none had as many as 5000 inhabitants. The principal feature of the entrepôt economy was the Atlantic slave trade. At the height of the trade none of these depots was also a centre for complex trading operations in local craft products or a market place for commercial or entrepreneurial activities of a large native population. The slave-trade depot was, above all, an instrument of depopulation. Statistics do not agree as to the number of slaves exported or the number of victims of the slave trade in Africa: figures range from 25 to 200 million. 21

The direct and indirect contribution of the trading-post economy to world prosperity, however, was considerable. After the opening of the American mines, the trading posts supplied a substantial part of the world's gold and silver. Moreover, the bulk of the labour force which developed the American continent originated from them. In a word, they kept world trade going. They were the fountainhead of industry, finance and European

21. See ch. 4 below.
and international capitalism. France, a leading power in the eighteenth century, provides one example. Its trade, which in 1716 amounted to 100 million pounds, had grown by 1789 to 400 million pounds. In the same year it had a trade surplus of 36 million and 57 million pounds respectively. In 1774 the West Indies alone accounted for 126 million pounds' worth of exports to France and 185 million pounds' worth in 1788. In the same years, trading-post imports for all Senegambia did not exceed 5 million pounds.22

The predatory economy, moreover, operated on the basis of one-sided speculation. Contrary to general supposition, there was no genuine equal three-way trade until the middle of the eighteenth century. The European navigators who took up the entrepôt trade - particularly the Portuguese, as already noted - put nothing into it. European produce amounted to very little. The iron, copper, textiles and hardware that, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, were to compete with local products were of little importance in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Portuguese were mainly middlemen. They bought salt, cowries, Senegambian loin-cloths and local or Indian fabrics on the coast of East Africa, and traded them for gold, gum, slaves and other goods to export to America or Europe. They took this trade away from the native merchants.

Thus, when European navigators gained a foothold in the economic network, they brought normal inter-African trade to a halt and set up their own monopoly of middlemen operating from the entrepôts. Africans no longer traded between Saint-Louis and Portendick, Grand Lahou and El Mina, Angola and Kongo or Sofala and Kilwa. Pombeiros Lançados and tangomaos (middlemen) made the role of the merchant class their exclusive preserve. The bulk of business was controlled by Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, English and French monopoly concerns. The Portuguese middlemen, who lived either in the trading posts or in the interior, organized the network of trade on the basis of their markets and feiras (fairs) and defended them by force.

This Portuguese network was used by the other maritime powers from the sixteenth century onwards. The only impediment to monopolistic control was opposition by African governments when they were capable of it, and the difficulties and risks the Europeans faced in getting to the slave-trading points in the interior. It was a period of clashes between the Guinea coast Lançados, middlemen and slave-traders, on the one hand, and the companies on the other, with the former demanding a free hand in petitions to Santiago and Gorée. Detailed information is available on trade in the entrepôt fortresses and the seasonal trading stations from the time of the Portuguese until the arrival of the Dutch, French and English. It is a story of violence and continual conflict. The Atlantic and Indian Ocean trading posts were destroyed, rebuilt and changed hands in a struggle between the European, Ottoman and Omani maritime powers against the stubborn

resistance of local rulers, who levied dues and duties or curva\textsuperscript{23} that were either paid or refused. In addition to the risks of the business, the entrepôt economy had one main characteristic: it was not conducive to the rise of a merchant class such as might have created on the coast something comparable to the achievement of the long-distance trade which thrived on the integration of town and country and the growth of crafts, manufacturing and industry. In the trading posts, apart from the European merchants, most people were laptos (native interpreters). In 1582, out of the 15,000 inhabitants of Santiago and Fogo, 13,400 were slaves and 1,600 were Europeans who controlled the economy. Before the nineteenth century,\textsuperscript{24} the Atlantic trading posts, with the exception of the Loango coast, had no category of native slave-traders such as had operated in Kilwa, Mogadishu, Mombasa and the Mediterranean ports.

Finally, the technological innovations that revolutionized Europe had little impact. The African economy suffered most from competition from European industry and business. From the eighteenth century onwards, European traders ruined the native crafts and industries of the coast by wrecking the traditional networks. By cornering the ports they paralysed the links between the coast and the interior. Thus the European states which annexed the coastal areas demarcated Portuguese, Dutch, French and English spheres of influence even before the colonial conquest, and determined their development and political geography in the eighteenth century. From Moroccan expansion into Songhay to the shifting fortunes of the internecine wars in Western Sudan, most upheavals on the African political scene originated in the process of disruption set off by the European hegemonies in the sixteenth century.

New political structures

The African political scene had already reached a state of balance and stability in the period between the twelfth and sixteenth centuries. In the sixteenth century, Mediterranean Africa constituted a sub-system within Arab–Ottoman sovereignty, Morocco, Ifrîkiya and Tripolitania being one area of it. Egypt was an entity on its own. The Nile area, consisting of Nubia and Ethiopia, linked to the south with the Great Lakes state of Bunyoro–Kitara, the Swahili city states and Southern Zambezi which, in the late sixteenth century, was dominated by the state of Mutapa. Southern Africa as yet had few state structures. In Central Africa one system was dominated by the Kongo and Tio states, another by the Luba state. But the peoples in the forests had no state structures. Western Sudan and the Niger–Chad region adjoined each other, with ever-changing borders. Both were in contact with Nubia and Ethiopia.

\textsuperscript{23} Curva in areas under Portuguese control, and duty in English-speaking regions.

\textsuperscript{24} P. Diagne, 1976.
The development of the political map was to reflect external pressure and its repercussions. The internecine wars which played havoc with the political scene shattered the existing boundaries and balance of power. New states emerged: either those which were best-armed, such as Känem-Borno, or those with most outlets to the sea, such as Kayor in Senegambia, Dahomey in the Gulf of Guinea, Angola in Central Africa and Changamire in Southern Zambezi.

The character of the African state itself altered. Huge areas without rulers or sovereigns and hitherto peopled by farmers, nomadic herders and hunters, were conquered and turned into states with centralized structures. The village structures of Bantu Africa, and also of the Kabyle or Saharan Berbers, was replaced by the Maghribi Makhzen, the autocratic black African mansaya or farinya, 25 Ottoman beylik feudalism or the Muslim emirate. Political power increasingly passed out of the hands of the clan and ethnic community chiefs and laman (territorial chiefs) and into those of the political aristocracies of the mansaya, the landed nobility of the nefienia, the Maghribi beylik and sultanate, the Sudanese emirate or even the mani (Christianized Bantu kings) surrounded, European-fashion, by their princes, counts and chamberlains.

From the sixteenth century onwards, political life centred increasingly around the coastal areas, the privateering ports and the trading posts. The aristocracies collected tithes from them. African governments had revenue departments to tax foreign trade. The Mediterranean alcaïds had their counterparts in the alkaati, alkaali or simply alcaïds of Gorée, Portudal, San Salvador, Sofala and Kilwa. Many treaties were concluded in an attempt to codify this taxation system. Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Tripolitania signed many trade agreements and short-lived treaties of friendship with the Europeans and even the Americans. In 1780 a war between Morocco and Spain was ended by the Treaty of Aranjuez, which redefined their borders and codified their trade relations. About the same time, Algeria was at war with the United States of America and compelled it to pay ransom to the pirates: the United States of America also paid Morocco 10 000 dollars for the same reason. From 1796, they paid 83 000 dollars a year to Tripoli, and also paid 21 000 dollars to Algiers in 1797, in addition to 642 000 dollars for the freeing of some of their nationals.

At Saint-Louis in Senegambia at the end of the eighteenth century, the aristocracies shared between them 50 000 pounds – one-tenth of the budget of a colony that derived its revenue from foreign trade. In the sixteenth

25. Farinya comes from Fari and Pharaoh meaning ruler in Soninke, Mande, etc. The Mande mansaya was a socio-political system, whose dominant ruling class was a polyarchy composed of an élite of laymen or priests, freemen or slaves, caste or guild members, noblemen or commoners. It was financed by the taxes which those controlling the machinery of government levied on trade and produce. It was not a landed aristocracy or proprietor class whose appropriations of the means of production entitled them to a share of the surplus wealth generated.
FIG. 2.3: Political areas from the Sahara to the equator in the sixteenth century

Source: Adapted from map drawn by P. Nature, Department of Geography, University of Dhar
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century, the Portuguese required tribute to be paid to them in the Swahili ports of Sofala, Kilwa and Mombasa.

It took wars, the destruction of trading posts (as the Zimba did in Mozambique in the sixteenth century) and prohibitions on trade (as often happened in Senegambia, Angola and the Kongo) to persuade the European powers and their merchants to resume paying taxes. But these more or less regular sources of income were the cause of wars among the aristocracies and ruling classes throughout the continent.

Political entities were predominantly areas in which a balance had been achieved and which had developed in relation to their domestic circumstances. They varied in size and in the stability of their frontiers and governments. Some were to remain unchanged until the colonial conquest. Some were confederations of states and others unitary states or chiefdoms with limited jurisdiction. Sometimes they were a clan, or an independent lamana in which the first occupants lived a completely autonomous existence.

The instability introduced by the predatory and entrepôt economies thus set the pattern, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, for states and economies which could no longer base their economic, social and political development on a foundation of order and cohesiveness.
The nature of population mobility

One of the main ways in which the history of precolonial Africa differs from the history of Europe and most of Asia is in population mobility, especially the mobility of farmers. African farmers, working with tropical and subtropical soils, were much more mobile than farmers in Europe or Asia who practised intensive agriculture, renewing the fertility of the same plot of land year after year. This could not be done over most of Africa and agriculture had to be extensive, moving from field to field each year. This resulted in a population not tied to definite plots of land but more mobile than elsewhere. It was the same with the pastoralists, although their techniques of coping with the environment were more comparable with those used by Asians – especially central Asians – and with transhumance in Europe. Nevertheless, population mobility is a basic characteristic to be considered in any study or reconstruction of Africa’s past, and its influence on both societies and cultures must be carefully assessed.¹

This volume gives evidence of many migrations from the trekboere at the Cape to the Somali and Oromo in the Horn of Africa, to the Ngbandi of Ubangi,² the Jaga in Central Africa, the Tuareg in the Niger bend, the Mane in Sierra Leone, the Fulbe all over West Africa and all the populations of Madagascar. It may seem that between 1500 and 1800 nobody remained in the same place. By the late sixteenth century Portuguese reporters were already speculating that the Mane, Jaga, Zimba and Oromo migrations from West, Central and East Africa were all related.³ They were caused, said the Portuguese, by a single mass of vagabonds. Migrants, they felt,

¹. The bibliography of population mobility in Africa is congruent with the bibliography of African history itself. In this chapter, references will be made mostly to other chapters in this volume and their bibliographies should be consulted for further study.
². H. Burssens, 1958, p. 43.
³. As late as 1883, A. Merensky still airs such views. He linked Oromo migrations to Jaga, Fulbe and Zimba movements – but not to those of the Mane – and claimed furthermore that the Zimba were responsible for the immigration of south-eastern Bantu speakers south of the Limpopo! As a Transvaal missionary his speculations reflect the Boer claims in South Africa. Sources such as these have left the impression that the sixteenth century saw a huge upheaval in sub-Saharan Africa. This impression is false, a product of the confusion
were the antithesis of a settled, well-regulated life: they were barbarians as opposed to civilized people. As late as 1963, a trace of this stereotyped attitude still exists in Trevor Roper’s dismissal of African history as the ‘meaningless gyrations of barbaric tribes’. Although the stereotype coalesced in the sixteenth century, a discussion of population movement could be placed in any of the volumes of this history. We shall see that, continent-wide, it was no more characteristic of the period 1500 to 1800, than any other.

Much of the history of Africa was understood until recently as a ‘saga of unrelenting migration’, comparable to the historiography of the great Germanic invasion that destroyed the Roman empire and left epithets such as ‘Vandal’ or ‘Hun’ in their wake. Apart from being derogatory, this conception also reduced all population movement to migration only, and mass migration at that – a view which has thoroughly confused the understanding of what happened in different cases.

‘Migration’ means the movement of a population from one country to settle in another. In zoology it means also the seasonal movement of populations but when speaking of people the correct term for this is ‘transhumance’. So much for dictionary definitions. Migration is a concept expressing a relationship between people, space and time implying an alteration in this relationship. In this very general sense we speak of population movement and not of migration proper. Hence the causes have to do with the organization of space, either because the ratio of people to resources alters – through, for example, overpopulation or climatic catastrophe – or because people reorganize space and its resources on a relatively large scale. The prominent large-scale spatial organizations in Africa were states and trading networks.

Just as Europeans stressed migration, so did Africans in their oral traditions. Many speculated cosmological origins and told of founders or populations who came from elsewhere – a place of genesis. There was also a countervailing stereotype that people emerged from the soil and were thus owners of the land. But it was the first concept that fuelled the preconceived ideas already held by foreign scholars who envisaged constant invasions with peoples pushing each other around like billiard balls on a billiard table. With each conquest a new wave of refugees (restvolker) was sent out in search of a haven in some remote area, or perhaps themselves to disturb yet other populations. Ratzel incorporated in the very foundations of modern anthropology the notion that migration alone explained cultural and social similarities. Later the Kulturkreise school viewed cultures as mixes involving layers of pristine cultures: and resulting from countless

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migrations. Through Frobenius and Baumann these ideas found their way into African studies.

But the commonly held view that Africans were forever on the move does not hold, despite all the evidence of migrations. In a crucial article, Hair documented the remarkable ‘stability’ of all the coastal languages from Senegal to the Cameroons, and this stability can be seen in most farming societies on the continent after 1500. The temptation now is to dismiss all migrations as figments of the imagination and to deny the very real mobility of both individuals and groups – for linguistic or cultural stability does not entail immobility.

Like the concept of ‘migration’, the notion of ‘stability’ in this context involves people, space and time and stresses the absence of change. But both concepts are generalizations – approximations of real occurrences in the past whose particulars are deleted. They are also relative concepts. Given a large enough area, such as the lands east and north of the White Nile, the migration of such people as the Jie becomes a stability, a mere adaptation of people to the requirements of the land and its climate. At the other extreme, any displacement of a village ten kilometres away can become a migration. It is the same with time. When people drift over many centuries, and huge periods of time are taken as a unit, migrations appear where smaller temporal units would not show them. The Bantu migration, which extended over perhaps two millennia, is such an example. And the number of people required to move before the label migration can be applied varies from individuals to communities. In this essay the term migration will always apply to the movement of communities at least the size of villages.

Hence to understand the historical record we must first deal with normality: the usual movements of people in the making of their livelihood. With this background we can then better understand the unusual and the abnormal and discuss the different processes by which population movement actually occurs. Then we can turn to the kinds of evidence that survive about such unusual movements and conclude with an overview of major movements in Africa between 1500 and 1800 as they are discussed in the chapters to follow.

Mobility and land use

As there are four main ways to exploit the environment for food production – hunting and gathering, the herding of domestic animals, agriculture and fishing – so there are four main patterns of usual movement associated with these activities. Because they are normal, usual and do not lead to the displacement of communities over space, they cannot be called population movements, let alone migrations.

Hunters and gatherers roam a range which is fairly stable as long as the population density is adapted to the requirements of the way of life. Such people, organized in camps, need a range and must frequently move their camps within it, usually once every two weeks as is known from the Ituri pygmies and the Kung San in Botswana. This is necessary both to follow game and to find clusters of suitable vegetal food. With seasonal variation comes variation of movement. In the forest this is most obvious during the honey-gathering season; while in the near desert of the Kalahari, for instance, the movements of mammals towards or away from water-holes, as well as the fruiting of trees, dictate such annual movements. The mobility is high, yet such populations can sometimes remain stable for long periods, exploiting the range over and over again.

Herders are also mobile. The animals on which they depend need water, grass and salt and the availability of these commodities varies with the seasons. In the Sahara, for instance, nomads typically live near the edge of the desert or major oases during the dry part of the year and spread far and wide over the desert when the rains come. Their movements are called transhumance and they often followed the same routes year after year. In regions with extremely low populations and particularly erratic rainfall, such as northern Fezzān, the same routes were not followed each year but the transhumance patterns were still regular when viewed over a decade or more. Such movements could involve enormous distances for camel herders, such as the Rigeibat of the western Sahara, and often implied complex reciprocal movements between nomads herding different kinds of stock, according to the various requirements of camels, goats, cattle and sheep. Thus the ranges of the Tuareg and the Fulbe overlapped in the Sahel just as those of the cattle-keeping nomads (Bakkāra) in the Sudan overlapped with those of camel-herders, such as the Kabābisch, further north. Moreover, nomads also cultivated a few crops and exchanged food with specialized hunters or gatherers where they existed – as did the eighteenth-century trekboere in South Africa. Otherwise they relied on vegetal food produced by farmers, so that at the edge of their ranges there had to be agricultural settlements. Thus space was exploited in various ways by different complementary groups, each with its own mobility over the same area. Herding, however, was more susceptible than hunting or gathering to climatic fluctuation, especially to short-term changes. In recent droughts, the hunter-gatherer San did not have to alter greatly their movements over the range, but the neighbouring Tswana farmers and stockbreeders suffered famine. There is evidence that some groups, such

10. ibid.
as the Khoi herders near the Kalahari, would become hunter-gatherers (San) during such times. But although herding was sensitive to variations in rainfall, the effects of drought were less dramatic than on farming, especially cereal farming.

Farmers were also mobile because they moved from field to field. Because soil fertility was restored by means of fallow regeneration, new fields had to be made each year to rest the exhausted soil. Villages had to move whenever the fields became too far from their homes. In recent times this has occurred every ten years on average, with some cycles as short as five years or as long as twenty. Favourite locales, with a combination of irrigation and the annual deposition of rich silt, were rare. Ancient Egypt was such an example and oasis agriculture developed from such practices. These farmers did not have to move from field to field and the population was quite stable. Apart from Egypt, and the belt of wet-rice cultivation on the western Guinea coast, permanent fields were extremely rare in Africa because methods of intensive fertilization could not usually be efficiently developed.

Most villages moved. But their movements were more or less circular over a stable territory, again given low densities of population. Mobility may have been greater before the introduction of cassava as a staple crop round about 1600. Moreover, mobility and direction of movement were not dependent on the state of the soils alone. In many cases — including for instance all the villages of the tropical rainforest in central Africa — farmers relied equally on trapping and hunting, with some gathering too. This meant that, as with the Nzabi of Gabon, the next siting of the village could be dictated as much by the needs of trappers as farmers. Complex patterns of movement, but always in the same territory, could result. The greatest menace to this way of life was climatic variation: not enough rain, or too much, could destroy the year's crop. Moreover, the exact timing of the rains was crucial and even near the well-watered equator there could be famine. Thus at Loango near Pointe-Noire in Congo it was not the lack of rain that was feared but the timing. To have no rain after planting was a disaster and so was continuous rain which prevented planting. 'Normal' years were comparatively rare. Every five years or so the farmer in Zambia had to expect drought, so he had to build up reserves each year in preparation. The frequency of drought was higher in regions close to the deserts but nowhere was it negligible. In most cases two successive years of drought brought a shortage of food and three could mean famine, despite other food-gathering activities which rapidly gave out where population densities were too high.

In short, for farmers as for herders or gatherers there were limits to population densities and there were optimal densities which varied with the environment — or the micro-environment. Soils, rainfall, topography

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and supplementary sources of food all had to be taken into account, as did existing technology and arrangements for the sharing or other distribution of food. The ratio of land to farmers could change without dramatic impact provided technology changed. Otherwise inward or outward movement was the mechanism used to adjust population density to land and vice versa. Outright population control was yet another mechanism.

Fishermen lived in fixed sites and their settlements rarely moved. Yet seasonal changes in the levels of the rivers forced them to undertake expeditions, sometimes of hundreds of kilometres as on the Zaire or Kasai rivers, to live in camps on sandbars while leaving their families at home. This pattern was most typical of the Zaire, Niger and Benue basins and provided the model for migratory movement. Stability was greatest on the shores of the oceans or the great lakes. Because they had boats fishermen had a cheap means of transport by water, and this turned many into traders, mediating between different land groups. Also, they could easily move themselves and their belongings to sites far away, if they felt so inclined. Thus fishermen, who needed to move least of all, were as well prepared to do so as hunter-gatherers or herders and could do so more easily.

So far, we have only considered the major factors involved in usual movement. Where symbiosis was more developed or economies were complex, the patterns and requirements for siting territory were also more complex. Imagine the farming village near the Congo bend that provided agricultural produce to both fishermen and hunter-gatherers while depending on them for meat, fish, pottery and perhaps other products. The movements of both hunters and farmers had to be co-ordinated and could not take them too far from the fixed points of the fishing villages. Moreover, as communal mobility was part of the way of life it obviously allowed people to move for other reasons than the requirements of land use. High mortality, quarrels or defensive needs easily led to a decision to move, especially among the farming population which, unlike herders, did not depend on fixed poles of transhumance during a few crucial weeks every year. This facility they shared with the hunter-gatherers even while paradoxically lacking the transport of the herders and fishermen.

Apart from collective movements, there was usually much individual mobility. Women often married into foreign villages; sons went to live with their mother’s kin; slaves, pawnbrokers, traders and pilgrims, reputed medicine men, hunters and even other rare specialists were often on the road. The mobility of individuals in Africa was at least equal to that obtaining in most parts of the world and the stereotyped idea of untouched ethnic groups is as false as the one of perennial wandering.

Although the following sections deal only with movements by a community in an unusual fashion, it should be stressed that the boundary between usual and unusual movement for individuals was much more tenuous, even though the resulting population displacements could be spectacular. The sale of slaves after 1660 could be seen as a usual event.
with individuals moving. Yet the slave trade to the Americas was certainly the largest single demographic movement in Africa. Even the sale of slaves and their removal to North Africa and beyond, although possibly more than ten times smaller than the Atlantic slave trade, was still more important than any other movement of population within the continent, except perhaps the most massive migrations.

Urbanization also represents movement of population. By 1300, the population of Zimbabwe city\(^\text{14}\) could have been 10,000. If so, it was the product of an internal migration that had absorbed a hundred villages. When Zimbabwe had to be abandoned, because its soils were exhausted and a permanent settlement could no longer be maintained,\(^\text{15}\) the dispersal of its people to villages represents an equally important population movement.\(^\text{16}\) But urbanization and the slave trade apart, there is very little evidence of such individual or even small family movements and more will only be known about them if and when it becomes possible to calculate population densities as they varied decade by decade and area by area. But such movements did exist and historians should never forget the possibility that individual mobility alone could build up or deplete population densities. Population increases have always been seen as an effect of natural increase but immigration is just as likely to have played a role, with the reverse holding for a decrease of population.

Processes of unusual movements of population

Unusual population movements by communities fall into two major groups—drift and migration. Drift is gradual, slow movement, an extension of the usual patterns of mobility and food production into new territory. Sudden movement, which departs sharply from the usual mobility and productive activities, is called migration. Drift does not ordinarily entail the desertion of the original settlements, although it may eventually. Migration, on the other hand, ordinarily means abandoning the territory of origin. Both drift and migration encompass several distinct processes. Drift is called expansion when it enlarges a territory held by a group and diaspora when it is discontinuous and new distinct settlement results.

\(^{14}\) D. N. Beach, 1980a.

\(^{15}\) P. S. Garlake, 1973; D. N. Beach, 1980. This is a cogent illustration of the constraints imposed on forms of settlement by shifting agriculture and herding on natural grazing grounds.

\(^{16}\) A clear case of considerable individual mobility leading to the re-ordering of the population over a landscape, is not only the growth of the early city of Jenne-Jeno, Mali, from about -200 onwards and especially after +250, but its decline after +1000 which was concurrent with the rise of Jenne city only some three kilometres away. Smaller satellite settlements grew along with Jenne-Jeno, with a certain time lag, and declined before the city itself was abandoned by +1400. The whole site-territory of Jenne-Jeno and of Jenne city, dramatically shows the effects of individual mobility over this small portion of space. Cf. R. J. McIntosh and S. Keech-McIntosh, 1982.
Migration will be called mass migration when it occurs on a large scale involving a whole people; band migration when it concerns only a fraction of the population, usually warriors on the rampage; and élite migration when it involves minute groups, sometimes even individuals, whose immigration leads to changes of great significance in the host society. Elite migration is almost an individual movement but it must be included here because of its effects, its frequency and the claims made for it as a form of migration.

The number of people involved in such movements, their duration, the distance travelled, the motivations which triggered them — including push factors (factors which induce or force people to emigrate) and pull factors (factors which attract people to immigrate) — and their impact are the features which established the significance and the magnitude of a movement. These questions should be considered in each case studied. But such indicators cannot be used as a basis for classification because they are too variable in meaning. For instance, the distance travelled does not make sense by itself: several hundred kilometres in the Sahara, for example, may correlate to less than fifty in a densely settled area. Motivations are very varied. Natural catastrophes, such as drought, may or may not be involved. The mix of push/pull factors is so variable that each case risks becoming a type on its own. Numbers are often not available and usually too unreliable to be useful as criteria for a typology. Thus it is the characteristics of the movement itself — with its antecedents and consequences — which are now described for each of the five migration types.

Expansion

Expansion has occurred countless times because of the natural mobility of most African populations, and its character differs according to the way of life common in the parent society. Shifting cultivation becomes expansion when drift occurs primarily in one direction rather than in a haphazard or circular pattern. The unit of migration is the village, but the movement in the same direction of all the villages in a community or a large number of them, leads to expansion. The distances involved are usually small, often no more than ten to twenty kilometres. The frequency of movement is low, no more perhaps than once in every ten or more years. The time involved may therefore be very long and the population will always look stable even though expansion is in progress.

In the forest, Mongo expansion from the areas around the equator, in the great bend of the River Zaire to the south, began long before 1500 and was still in progress in 1900 in much of the area between the Zaire in the west and the Lomami in the east. The goal seems to have been the attractive environment of the river valleys of the lower Kasai and Sankuru and the richer fringes of the forest further east. The effect was to create a flow from nuclei of higher population density around the equator and the first degree
south, southwards to the river valleys and fringes.¹⁷

Such a movement could easily be accelerated either by increasing the distances travelled during each move or by moving more frequently, say every two or three years. The expansion then became conscious and in response to specific goals, often pull factors or attractions. The Nzabi people of Gabon/Congo, for example, in a mere half-century moved from their lands in the east of the great Ogowe bend to the south-west so as to be closer to the trade routes and derive wealth from them, and to exploit new mineral resources.¹⁸ The rush of the Fang from the Upper Comoe to the Gabon estuary occurred in a mere twenty years and then continued for another forty towards the Ogowe delta at a slightly less feverish pace. Villages still moved only once every few years but long distances of up to, say, forty kilometres were not unusual. The Fang movements have been well studied with respect to the process of moving itself. At no point was it necessary to abandon the usual way of life. When a village moved, it bypassed other Fang villages on its way to the lands beyond. The whole expansion occurred by leap-frogging, all within a single environment, with scouting provided by hunters on their usual rounds.¹⁹

Expansion by pastoralists proceeds in different ways. The most common way is for members of a younger generation to leave the centre or pole of transhumance of their elders and move with stock into fresh pastures. Because such areas are only found where rainfall is too sparse or unreliable for farming, herders were usually constrained by environmental variables. Maasai expansion, for example, occurred first in this fashion until all suitable lands were occupied. The whole process lasted from about 1600 to about 1800.²⁰ A well-documented case is that of the trekboere in South Africa who had established their way of life near the Cape in the second generation of European settlement, from about 1680 onwards. From the start, the first pastoralists complained about overpopulation, even though the population was sparse. But the land was arid and great acreages were needed to pasture the flocks. By 1700 a family felt crowded if it could see the smoke from a neighbour’s chimney. Then the younger sons would emigrate with part of the stock and an ox-wagon and venture further afield. Until about 1780 this expansion continued into lands occupied primarily by other stockbreeders (Khoi groups) who could be chased away. But then the trekboere came up against a frontier of much better-watered land held by Xhosa farmers and stockholders.²¹

In some cases, the transhumance routes were very long and involved more than one centre or pole. The Awlād Sulaymān of Libya had been

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moving back and forth between the Sirte area near the Mediterranean and the Fezzān oases in south Libya, according to the seasons. After a disastrous defeat in 1842 near Tripoli they were forced to abandon the Sirte pole. They established a new pole to the south of Fezzān along the caravan route to Borno. First their pole was in Borku, later in Kānem, despite the determined resistance of Tuareg groups into whose territories they were penetrating. By 1850 they had reached Lake Chad and after initial reverses came, by 1870, to dominate the whole area between Fezzān and Chad. This movement involved armed bands and fighting so that it can be easily seen as a case of migration by bands. But the overall process is clearly similar to that of other pastoralists and consisted of the establishment of a new territory by shifting one of the two extreme poles of transhumance.

Even hunter-gatherers can show drift. This may be the explanation for the presence of Baka hunters in eastern Cameroon. These pygmies speak Ubangian languages but are to the west of any Ubangian settlement by farmers. The situation would be best explained not by a mass migration but by a gradual extension to the west of their hunting ranges from sites near the Upper Sanga river. Large expansion movements are diagnostic of population redistributions. Often they indicate the colonization of areas previously exploited in a more extensive fashion. One of the deepest and longest trends in the history of Africa has been the inexorable advance of people in larger and larger numbers, moulding the environment more and more to suit their ways of life, rather than being determined and limited by it. Thus the expansion of Bini-speaking peoples in the forest west of the Niger started around the onset of the Christian era and probably ceased only around 1200 when Benin City began to develop. Although data are lacking for the Igbo expansion east of the lower Niger this was well under way by 1800 (Igbo-Ukwu) and resulted in a complete transformation of the landscape from a natural forest to a domesticated one, accompanied by the build-up of high population densities. In the case of the Bini speakers, there was more adaptation to an existing environment, exploited in a novel way by farmers. In the case of the Igbo, farmers destroyed the original environment. Hence it is natural that such expansions occurred from areas of relatively high densities to those of low densities. The overall effect was to raise densities everywhere as Africa’s population expanded. To attribute such movements to over-population is only correct in a very limited sense, as the notion refers to how people such as the trekboere felt, while densities were in fact very low. Over-population is a relative measure of pressure put on the land by existing methods of exploitation. Shifts in technology could relieve this just as population control or emigration could.

Expansion movements must have occurred from early dates in Africa,

first by hunters and gatherers and later by populations that had developed more land-intensive technologies. In some cases, long-term deterioration of resources due to climatic change was involved, the most spectacular one being the desiccation of the Sahara. The archaeology of Mauritania shows how farmers were gradually forced south by this phenomenon between perhaps -1500 and the rise of the kingdom of Ghana by +700.25

More rapid expansions, such as those of the Fang, Nzabi, or Awlād Sulaymān, are due to other causes. In the first two instances, the attraction of trading routes and centres provided a goal or pull factor. In the last, the defeat in Tripolitania was a push factor while the knowledge of the trade route to Chad provided a direction for travel.

In no case was a sudden catastrophe such as a famine or an epidemic a cause for the expansion of farmers. Under extreme crisis conditions their usual way of life could not be maintained. Economic and socio-political structures broke down and when movement occurred it was mass migration, rather than ordinary, orderly expansion. Moreover, such cases seem to have been extremely rare.

Expansion did not necessarily mean dispossession of the autochthones by the newcomers. Often a mixture of populations occurred and new societies emerged or, as in the Fang case, autochthones adopted the culture of the immigrants. New societies and cultures could be spawned by new mixes. Thus the Mongo drift southwards formed a variety of new societies, including what was to become the famous Kuba.26 In other cases the autochthones were slowly displaced, as may have happened when south-eastern Bantu speakers met San hunters and perhaps also on meeting Khoi herders, although here there is also evidence of absorption. The billiard-ball effect – the expulsion of one population by another which then, in turn, dispossessed a third which itself then conquered or acquired new lands elsewhere – seems almost never to have happened. Expansions produced few refugees given the population densities usually involved.

Diaspora

When drift is discontinuous, and leads to new settlements separated from the parent settlements by foreign population, diaspora occurs. Nearly all diasporas are linked to trade or pilgrimage. Perhaps the only exception is the spread of Fulbe herders over suitable tracts of land all over West Africa. Such lands were ecological 'niches' not occupied by others who only found a very marginal use for their resources. Thus the autochthones did not oppose Fulbe occupation. It is best, in fact, to see this case as yet another example of ordinary expansion not much different from similar examples such as the Turkana, Nandi or Maasai in Northern Kenya and Tanzania.27

27. See ch. 27 below.
The most typical diasporas grew out of trade. The Phoenician, Greek and Arab settlements on the Horn coast, the European forts and the nucleus of the colony of Cape Town are all diasporas, having been founded by traders from overseas. Cases of carriers by water and fishermen were also numerous. In the period under review the Bobangi are an example. The inhabitants from a large village at the mouth of the Ubangi river began to found trading posts and daughter settlements all the way down the Zaire to the mouth of the River Kasai. They mixed with others, acquired large numbers of dependants, and formed a new ethnic group called the Bobangi, all this between about 1750 and 1850. On the east coast Swahili society and culture developed in a similar way and spread from the coastal borderlands of Somalia and Kenya to as far south as Ibo island off Mozambique and the Comoros. Some medieval settlements on north-eastern Madagascar may be attributed to them. But diasporas could also spring up along overland routes. Mande traders formed Jahanka diasporas from the Upper Niger to the coast of Senegal and Joola (Dyola) settlements from the Upper Niger to the Ajan coasts. Yarse traders, who were Mossi-speakers, organized a network of posts and trading centres in the Mossi countries.

Some diasporas were due to the yearly hadṣdj to Mecca. Here individuals or small groups were in fact prominent. When for one reason or another they could not continue on their way, they settled. This is the origin of the nineteenth-century Takrüri settlements in Sudan. The Takrüri were people from West Africa who remained in the Sudan and congregated into settlements of their own, just as djallāba (traders), often from the Dongola reach, formed their own quarters or settlements along the trading routes. Most of the marabtin bilbaraka in Barţa were the offspring of pilgrims, usually North Africans.

Diasporas also typically maintained contact with their centres of origin through trade or by being located on a pilgrim route. In some cases such contact was indirect or no longer maintained with the centre of origin. By the fifteenth century the inhabitants of Sofala, for example, communicated easily with Kilwa, less easily with cities further north, and no longer had special ties to the Lamu archipelago or the Bajun Islands in the Swahili heartland. This is merely a result of continual hiving off. It is no different from the case of Cerne, a colony of Carthage (and not of Tyr), on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. Even European diasporas had a tendency to become re-oriented by trade. Thus the culture of Cape Town was that of the East Indian Dutch empire, centred at Batavia, rather than that of Holland; Mozambique was for centuries directly dependent on Goa, while Angola, after 1648, almost became a Brazilian dependency.

Diasporas are highly visible movements of population. They are a sign of long-distance communication and they flourish when trade routes grow. Although some had begun long before 1500, most of the known cases

belong to the period after 1500 and attest to a further facet of man's control over space. They occur where populations are well settled and where their economies are beginning to be complementary to each other, or are beginning to exchange goods with the world outside Africa. Their presence is a sign of success in man’s struggle to settle space.

Mass migration

When a whole people – men, women and children – leave their homeland with all their belongings to travel long distances for a year or more, this constitutes a true mass migration. Such spectacular upheavals of population are linked to spectacular catastrophes. The numbers involved may be very great. Some eighty thousand Vandals are said to have crossed into Africa in 429 at the invitation of an unhappy Byzantine governor and in the face of further defeats by the Visigoths of Spain at their rear. Their movement was, however, only part of the massive reshuffling of populations that was then occurring in Europe.\textsuperscript{30} The greatest invasion of North Africa, by the Banū Hilāl and Banū Sulaym from 1052 onwards, has been linked tentatively to recurrent droughts in Arabia. Their numbers were large and the migration continued until about 1500 when it entered Mauritania. This migration, and the allied drift of Arabs in the Sudan and then Chad, changed the cultural map of all northern Africa which became fully Arabized.\textsuperscript{31} True mass migrations are dramatic. They have immense consequences and it is not surprising, therefore, that they are rare. In the period between 1500 and 1800, the Oromo mass migration and expansion, with attendant movements by communities belonging to other cultures, was the only fully fledged mass migration in Africa. The famous Nguni migrations, that convulsed Africa from the Cape to Nyanza, are the only instance in the nineteenth century.

Mass migrations pose great problems. Scouts must have information as to where the migration can go. The migrants must be fed as they cannot sustain themselves by customary methods. The march usually required a different socio-political organization than had existed before. In many cases society was organized around military groupings. Subsequently migrants often had to create new economic and social forms as well as adapt to novel environments. This process often led to raiding and pillaging, even when pastoralists moved with their herds. Snowballing – the incorporation of numerous members of populations encountered on the way – was common, as such societies also became totally or partially disrupted. The process also usually occurred in spasmodic stages. It led to large-scale fighting, created refugees and set off ancillary migrations or rapid expansions. In short, such population movements are cataclysmic and lead to a dramatic new relationship and adaptation of people to space over huge areas. No

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wonder then that, although the primary movements might be fairly quick, the whole process, down to the settlement of the last refugee, could take more than a century. Thus the Oromo upheaval started perhaps in the 1530s but stable conditions returned only around 1700. However, compared to the great expansions by drift, such time scales are short.

Obviously, this picture applies best to the most extreme occurrences. Earlier, when documentation is scant, it is often difficult to distinguish between mass migration and fast but massive spread, especially by pastoralists. Thus the expansion of the Luo, over many centuries and over many varying environments, is often understood as a mass migration. It involved whole populations, it created many ancillary movements and it disturbed a large area, mainly east of the White Nile. For much of its duration, it was accompanied by similar large-scale movements of other groups in the southern Sudan and northern Uganda. But the time-scale is very deep, perhaps half a millennium, and what evidence there is points to drift rather than mass migration as people usually moved with their flocks and stopped to raise crops. Parts of the Oromo movement also show such characteristics. These examples show that the distinction between mass migration and massive expansion is not always clear-cut and that drift will also occur during such times. In the end, however, there still remains a sharp distinction based on both the productive capacities and the militarized structure of a large body of people on the march. The processes are not identical.

Drift and mass migrations can be mixed. Thus the Luo movements were mostly expansion but the sudden explosion of the Kenya Luo during the eighteenth century can be regarded as a mass migration. They then overran populous areas and used force to gain control over new lands. Conversely, the Oromo movement began as a mass migration and in its later stages, before and especially after 1700, became an expansion.

Mass migrations are cataclysmic upheavals. Usually they are attributed to equally cataclysmic causes, often to a sudden change in climate, such as drought with ensuing famine and epidemics. Sometimes, however, they are not. The Vandal migration, for example, was not accompanied by natural disaster, although it is linked to other migrations and to the fall of the Roman empire. Relative over-population is advanced as a cause for the migration of the Banū Hilāl, the Oromo and the mfecane but so far there is little proof of this. Such proof as there is comes from attributing all mass migrations to over-population following a sudden unfavourable change in the ratio of population to resources. This may be a fallacy in so far as that while the process consists indeed of redistributing populations over land areas, the cause may vary. Pressure at the initial point of migration is only one possibility but whether or not there was population pressure in the Oromo heartland, it was the mutual destruction of Christian and Muslim kingdoms that triggered the direction of the Oromo flood, if not the flood

32. See ch. 26 below.
itself. As to the *mfecane*, archaeologists are attempting to show a rise in population in the heartlands. By itself this is not a full cause. It needs to be linked convincingly to the rise of military leaders — of which there is evidence — and to what seem to be precursor movements in Zimbabwe. Population pressure may well be involved in all cases — if only because there are so many migrants in mass migrations — but it is inadequate by itself as a complete explanation.

### Band migration

Migration by bands, always armed, involves a relatively small number of people, mostly young males, constituting but a fraction of a population. Its consequences, while spectacular, are less severe than those of mass migration and less durable than large-scale drift. The usual process was for bands of warriors to strike out to conquer with or without a single leader. In the Zimba case, Santos speaks of the lord of a little kraal, most ambitious of human honour, who “decided that for this purpose it would be expedient to sally out of his country with an armed force and destroy, rob and eat...” In the Jaga case, there may not have been a single leader. In the Tyokosi case, the band was composed of mercenaries. In some instances — the Jaga and the Zimba, for example — the bands finally dissolved after defeat, in others — such as the Mane, the Tyokosi and the Imbangala — they succeeded in establishing chiefdoms or a kingdom.

Because the scale of band migration was small, even if the destruction wrought by it could be great, it created less turbulence than mass migrations, provoked fewer secondary migrations and less snowballing, and took less time than any of the other processes discussed so far. In most cases the pull factors were stronger than the push factors even though in some, such as the Korana and Gonaqua movement to the Orange and Caledon rivers, the push factor, here the *trekboere* expansion, was at least equally strong. Such movements were sometimes the outgrowth of state formation — such as the Zimba from Maravi and the Tyokosi in relation to Asante — or a reaction to the expansion of trade from which the migrants wished to reap profits, as in the case of the Jaga. Again over-population, due to factors such as sudden drought or other calamities in the home area, may be involved — as with the Imbangala — but so far there is no hard proof in any of these cases. One of the major difficulties in discussing such band migrations is the question of whether or not they are part of a larger mass migration. Thus the Ndebele invasion of Zimbabwe and the Kololo
invasion of Zambia\textsuperscript{38} by themselves are band migrations, but they also form part of the mass migration of the mfecane. It is still not completely clear whether the Jaga and Imbangala bands were independent, as all authors now hold, or whether they formed part of a larger mass movement.

The Imbangala case is an instructive example. Bands formed near the Kwango river, perhaps produced by internal changes in the expanding Lunda state. They mixed with marginal autochthones of Ovimbundu and Mbundu polities. They went on the rampage for years as allies of the Portuguese, who were conquering and carving out a state in Angola, then settled by 1620, just out of reach of the Portuguese near the Kwango river. They drove out the original population, who migrated or drifted as far as the Kasai river. There had been no relative over-population in the area of origin of the first Imbangala bands and the movement did not alter the ratio of people to land between Cuanza and Kasai. But a state did result, namely the kingdom of Kasanje, which became the premier entrepôt for the processing of slaves from inner Africa on the route to Luanda. The Imbangala case, therefore, can only be called a re-organization of space in terms of socio-political structures and trade, nothing more.\textsuperscript{39}

Elite migration

Elite migration is a favourite subject of oral traditions about the founding of states. The first king is a foreigner, often a hunter; he comes from elsewhere, alone or with a few companions; and while the population movement involved is insignificant the socio-cultural results are spectacular. In Malawi, for example, the foundation of the Maravi state was attributed to the Phiri clan whose ancestors were said to have come from Luba country far away in Shaba. In the north a series of related élites, the Ngulube, founded the kingdom and chiefdoms there.\textsuperscript{40}

Some of these stories may well be fictitious and express no more than the stereotyped idea that a king had to be a foreigner, because kingship stood apart from the population, enveloped in an aura of sacredness and mystery. His place of origin had to be either the most prestigious place people could imagine or the one most removed from their own civilization. Some traditions, however, are better founded. Thus the Kuba tale of how Shyaam a Mbul a Ngoong, a Bushoong who had fled his country, came from the west and formed a kingdom out of antagonistic chiefdoms, at the very least reflects influences from the west on the Kuba. It has been shown that linguistic influences from the west entered the Kuba area and then radiated outwards, from the court, which supports the notion of cultural domination.\textsuperscript{41} It is, however, unlikely that such an effect was obtained from

\textsuperscript{38} Cf. UNESCO, \textit{General History of Africa}, Vol. VI, ch. 5.

\textsuperscript{39} J. C. Miller, 1976; J. Vansina, 1966a.

\textsuperscript{40} See ch. 21 below.

\textsuperscript{41} J. Vansina, 1978, pp. 59-65 and 187.
the immigration of one person and certainly not from an exiled person returning to his homeland.

In a study of population movements, such élite migrations of very few or indeed even one person are unimportant. But for a study of the development of socio-cultural formations, especially states, they can assume considerable importance. They do not change the ratio of people to resources over space in general, but they re-organize the space occupied by a population through a new distribution of resources according to a novel hierarchy. Hence an extended discussion of these episodes is found in Chapter 2.

Documenting population movements

The major sources documenting population movements in Africa are oral, linguistic, archaeological and written. But all present difficulties when used for this purpose. Unwise use of them has sometimes led in the past to the creation of spurious migrations. Hence a word about the documentation before an overview is given of the main movements between 1500 and 1800.

Oral literature cannot record long-term expansion because daily life is so little disturbed by it and the movement so slow that it is hardly noticeable. Therefore, if a tradition claims that a whole population came from a certain place by a process described as expansion it is suspect. No oral tradition can encompass a mass migration because the scale of events is too large. Traditions deal, therefore, with episodes of mass migrations and tend to confuse them with band migrations which, being more localized but equally spectacular, are well recorded. The expansion of a diaspora is often recorded in part because settlement A, for example, knows it was founded from settlement B and settlement B knows it was founded from settlement C and so on. The movements of élites can be very well recorded: the movements of the ruling family of the Mangbetu, for example, are told for almost two centuries before their kingdom was founded.42

But traditions are ideologies and they reflect cosmologies. If the researcher does not take this into account, erroneous conclusions can result. If a cosmology places all origins in one spot, then obviously it requires migrations from that spot to the territory where people live now. If it includes a paradise it has to record movement away from it. The Kuba, for example, claimed that they stemmed from downstream, from an ocean, and the Fang and the Komo claimed points of origin in relation to the most upstream or downstream points of the rivers they knew. All these people, moreover, orient themselves by upstream or downstream, so all movements can only be told in terms of such cardinal directions. Their traditions of origin are all spurious as history, except those dealing with

42. C. Keim, 1979; Col. Bertrand.
the last movements, of whole groups or élites, involving known and recognized sites nearby.\(^{43}\)

Ideology is also responsible for such themes of origin as the foreign hunter becoming king, found from the Igala of lower Niger to the kingdoms of the southern savannah and those of the Great Lakes area, to the Shamba kingdom in Tanzania or the Fipa state between lakes Tanganyika and Rukwa. This is a stereotype, like the one in the African Sahel from the Nile to the Atlantic Ocean, in which foreign knights kill snakes and deliver people — itself a variant of the St George legend. This should not be taken literally as an élite movement, but as an expression of the ideology of the state.\(^{44}\) Since, however, it is possible that a foreigner or a small group may have founded a state, each of these tales should be checked by other means. Certainly the precise symbolic value and the ideological worth of the statements must be studied. We reject, for example, the notion that the kings of Rwanda fell from heaven, but link them to the princes of Nkole on the basis of a linguistic clue. We must likewise reject the concept of the foreign origin of the first king of Burundi, the unkempt Ntare from the wilds. Ntare may have been foreign but the traditions cannot help us to determine whether he was.\(^{45}\)

Another error often made in the interpretation of traditions is taking the part for the whole. The traditions of the origins of the Kamba, the Meru and the Gikuyu in Kenya may all have some truth in them. But they all seem to have elevated the story of one small portion of the population into that of the whole population.\(^{46}\) This happened to such an extent with the Mangbetu that, after the kingdom had been established about 1800, a new genealogy was drawn up and imposed by the founder and the kingdom took the name of what may have been the name of an ancestor of this one man.

In general the stress on origins in traditions, and the abundant use of stereotypes even for clan, lineage, village or family histories, make it fairly easy to recognize doubtful portions of oral traditions and to establish whether and to what extent traditions can contribute as documentation to such questions.

The use of linguistics, which is quite common, can be more difficult because alternative historical explanations are often possible. The general rule is that when speakers of two languages mix, those in the majority end up by imposing their language on the minority. Hence massive expansion or mass migration leads to the spreading of the language of the expanding


or migrating people. When, conversely, diaspora or band migration is involved, bringing small numbers of newcomers into contact with greater numbers of autochthones, it is the newcomers' languages that disappear. Most of the apparent exceptions are not exceptions. Thus, in diasporas, compact settlements of newcomers in contact with their homes of origin keep their languages, even though bilingualism is very common. Band migrants who maintain a closed community can also keep their language, as in the case of the Tyokosi or the Mende of Sierra Leone as opposed, say, to the Imbangala whose original kernel lost its language.

But there are genuine exceptions. In these cases the minority language can even take over the majority because of its special prestige. Ndebele and Kololo, for example, survived in Zimbabwe and Zambia after the conquests. Their prestige stemmed less from the conquest itself and more from the fact that soon afterwards their languages came to be committed to writing and were taught in school. Otherwise both Ndebele and Kololo would have been absorbed by the majority languages, Shona and Luyi, just as French at the English court finally gave way completely to English several centuries after the conquest.

A second basic rule for linguistic evidence is that in contact situations the ousted language always leaves traces. Such traces, in the form of loan words, expressions (calques), alternations in syntax, morphology and onomastics (personal and place names) can always be studied to document specific features of the contact. Examples include the impact of Khoi and San on the Bantu languages of south-eastern Africa; the position of the diaspora language called Bobangi as basically a northern language with very heavy Kongo influence (zone H); and the foreign inputs in Kiswahili.47

One can even distinguish between various processes of population movement. Diasporas are the easiest to detect because of the massive effects of prolonged plurilingualism and sometimes the creation of creoles. Afrikaans is a creole because of the massive changes in its morphology and even syntax, confirmed by the number of words it has of Malay, Portuguese, Bantu and Khoi or San origin. Bobangi is the equivalent of a creole between closely related Bantu languages, with typically simplified grammar and multiple-origin vocabulary. Expansion is characterized by much sparser loans unless the populations involved were fairly even in numbers. Signs of the absorbed languages are found in major toponyms and some loan-words. The situation is clearly differentiated from mass migration by the fact that the language distributions over an area larger than the region directly affected are fairly congruent with supposed genetic ties. One argument, for instance, against mass migration for the Fang and their related neighbours is that their language block (A 70) fits in well with other groups of A languages. At the same time, evidence for some disturbance stems from the fact that A 70 languages split A 80 languages into two unequal blocks. Mass migrations, such as the Oromo, impose their lan-

languages in very irregular-looking areas of distribution, but often still in a single block, or one with a few outliers. That block does not fit in well with genetic relationships. Considerable loans, due to the impact of snowballing, can be detected. Often more than two languages are involved in the mix. This situation allows us to state that a case such as the movements of the Langi, whose language is Luo with Karamo influences, is probably not due to mass migration, as there are only two sources for its composition. The fact that it is basically a Luo language also indicates that the Luo were the majority, something not indicated by the oral traditions. Band migrations which form compact groups may leave their language behind them -- or traces of it in several languages on their path -- when they finally move on. If the numbers are small and the languages involved closely related, no distinct traces remain, which is the case of the Jaga and the Zimba, as opposed to the Mane, the Imbangala and others.

But the main difficulty is that loans, unless they are studied very extensively by the method of 'Words and Things' (Worter und Sache), can easily be attributed to other causes such as trade contacts, an official state language, a ruling family (as in the Kuba case), or a prestigious religious tongue. Detailed studies have very rarely been pursued in Africa, even though the results of admittedly arduous study can be very revealing. The organization of large-scale research in this field is urgently needed.

Archaeology has been a major source in the postulation of expansions or migration. Finding similar or identical elements of material culture (objects) or identical customs (such as burial in urns) in different places is usually interpreted as a sign of migration or other population movement. The rationale is that such elements, especially patterns of decoration and fabrication, are not likely to be invented independently, so that they must have been diffused. In such matters as burials or pottery, diffusion is thought to have been due to migration. However, in archaeological theory there has been a retreat from migrationism with the recognition that independent invention occurs more often than was thought and that items could have been diffused by many other means.

Nevertheless, in many cases movement of population seems to have been involved. Given a sharp break in pottery style on a number of sites, for instance, and the introduction of a new uniform style, it is hard to avoid the inference. It is on such evidence that the assumption rests of an expansion or migration from south-east Africa to Zimbabwe around 1000. This supposed movement, called *kutama*, is as well-documented archaeologically as it could be. Yet it is conceivable -- although not probable -- that a new style of pottery simply spread like a new fashion without any movement.

Unfortunately there are many more dubious cases. When pottery suc-

cessions are divided into styles, with many transitions, not only is the number of styles unclear but the inference that immigrants brought new styles is unwarranted. Clearly this is a product of the analysis, not of the data themselves. Such mistakes have occurred on the Zimbabwe site and others.

Some authors still use ethnographic distributions as evidence for migration. This was fashionable once but the approach is now totally discredited. Thus to argue from the presence of crossbows among the Fang that they must stem from Ubangi where other populations used them, and that migration was involved, is clearly unreasonable. Similarly, to look for resemblances in hats, smelting furnaces or martial headgear as arguments for a northern origin of the Beti of Cameroon is unwarranted. Such elements could spread without population movement, similarities could be accidental and in many cases independent invention is quite likely. Ethnographic similarities without linguistic evidence are useless and even if diffusion is shown, diffusion by movement of population remains to be proven.

The marshalling of valid data into an overall hypothesis can also lead to gross errors. One of the most famous cases is that of the so-called Fang migrations. The Fang, Bulu, Beti and Ntumu were all believed to have come from the north, crossing the Sanaga all together or with a separate crossing for the Bulu, and to have fled from attackers into an environment that was new to them: the rain-forest. But this is a conflation of all sorts of traditions which are not identical and which are in large part an expression of cosmology. There is no evidence for any other early home of the Fang apart from the headwaters of the Comoe, Ntem and Ivindo. They moved after about 1840 not as a mass migration but as a rapid expansion. And this movement has no relationship to those postulated for the Bulu, Beti or Ntumu.

A most difficult case is the Jaga migration, a band migration first reported in 1591 on the basis of the testimony of a Portuguese who arrived years after the event and left in 1583. The event occurred in 1568. Various authors have debated the question. Some are now convinced that there never were any Jaga. The most extreme opinion holds that the Portuguese invented the migration to intervene in the affairs of the kingdom of Kongo during a succession dispute. Other authors do not agree and maintain that some immigrants definitely entered Kongo in 1568 even if most of the Jaga were Kongo peasants in revolt. We may never know for certain.

52. P. Alexandre, 1965, is the latest author to attempt an overview. Cf. also H. Ngoa, 1981.
The major population movements 1500–1800

Only one part of the continent was subject during this period to major redistributions of population and the ensuing creation of new societies and cultures. This is the Horn area, south of the Abbay or Upper Blue Nile, including most of what is now Somalia and northern Kenya, as well as the lands east of the White Nile, north of Nyanza lake and south of the Sobat. Several movements were clearly involved. The most spectacular was the migration of the Oromo into Ethiopia about 1535. Other Oromo groups migrated or expanded to the south as far as the River Tana and even to the hinterlands of the coastal cities. From 1500 onwards, Somali movements of expansion occurred on a large scale. They are not well-known due to lack of study and, in part, because population movements have been obscured by the vagaries of the titanic struggle opposing Ethiopia of the Muslim emirate led by Ahmad Grañ. By 1700 a large part of Ethiopia was under Oromo control, Christian and Muslim influences in the south-west had disappeared, the Somali and Oromo were locked in competition for good lands all the way to the Tana river and smaller stable populations had been driven out of Shungwaya, a territory just north of the Somali–Kenya border near the ocean. These groups, the future Miji-Kenda peoples, settled in kaya, which were large, well-defended sites behind the major port-cities of Kenya.56

Further west, population movements had begun much earlier, perhaps about 1000 when the movement labelled the ‘Luo migration’ started along the White Nile. East of the Nile there are no sound data for earlier periods. It is clear, however, that a large number of groups were involved, mostly the so-called Karamojong group and to their east, the Turkana, and southern Nilotes, such as the Nandi as well as the Maasai. All these people, like the Oromo and Somali, were primarily pastoralists, except for the Luo group. All were attempting to exploit ‘empty’ territories – lands with lower population densities – more intensively than the preceding hunters and gatherers or pastoralists.57 The environments determined the arenas to a large extent. Luo groups needed well-watered lands, the Karamojong needed lands with a higher rainfall than the southern Nilotes or Maasai and they, in turn, needed wetter lands than the camel nomads – the Somali and some southern Oromo groups. The Oromo, who had been cattle keepers in their homeland, showed it was possible to acquire a new technology – in this case camels – and thus occupy new lands. But this was the exception. By and large, each group had its own strategy for exploiting resources in given environments, and its organization for defence (usually age-grades), and strove to occupy a maximum amount of land. In a few cases, however, during the later expansions, armed struggles occurred between populations which exploited their environments in similar ways.

57. See chs 26 and 27 below.
This occurred in the eighteenth century; when the Kenya Luo wrested land from their neighbours, and in Maasai country by the nineteenth century when different Maasai groups began to fight each other for land. Clearly population pressures were involved here.

These population movements were in effect the story of the colonization of marginal lands, at least until the eighteenth century. The wettest lands near the Nile were first occupied by farmers who also kept cattle and then defended the land against all comers. Groups arriving later sought to extend their ranges, often against competition as their numbers increased. The whole movement, compared to the state of affairs elsewhere in the continent, proves by contrast how stable Africa was as a whole. All other major areas had been occupied and settled by populations using technologies well suited to the land and to their levels of population at the time. Elsewhere in the continent man had mastered space: here the struggle was still going on.

It has been suggested that droughts played a major role in these movements. One can imagine that they were a product of drier conditions associated with a supposed Little Ice Age, from 1450 to 1750, and point to drought conditions in the western Sahel too. There the collapse of Songhay and its rather ineffectual replacement by Moroccans had led to sizeable Tuareg expansion south of the Niger bend and even to Tuareg–Fulbe clashes. But these movements were quite localized compared with the movements in north-eastern Africa. Even the advance of the Moors, or the evacuation of the lands near Air by Gobir Hausa who retreated south, although a possible consequence of desiccation, still remain mainly evidence for an orderly movement of cultural and ethnic boundaries along with shifting climatic borders. Space was still under control. The great movements occasioned by the Banū Hilāl, the Banū Sulaym and other Arabs in Sudan and Chad were over. The land was colonized and even the bad conditions from 1600 to 1750 did not disrupt the whole pattern of large-scale settlement. Therefore it is unlikely that, by themselves, droughts can explain the overall mobility of population in the north-east; nor is it likely that the collapse of a strong Ethiopian empire was the sole cause. We must think in terms of fundamental stresses between relatively high densities of population, in the Oromo heartland, for example, and on the Nilotic side of the south Ethiopian highlands perhaps, with the relatively low densities in northern Uganda and northern Kenya and in the dry rift valleys of both Kenya and Tanzania. By 1700 all of these lands had been occupied by new groups with societies and economies that permitted higher densities.

Elsewhere movements of this nature were occurring on a much more modest scale. In southernmost Africa the trekboere were colonizing the Karroo veld by ousting or killing its pastoral occupants, while in Namibia...
both Herero and Namib were expanding to the detriment of the original San and Dama. The fringes of the Kalahari were being settled as were the arid lands of northern Uganda and northern Kenya. Yet to the south-east a major area of disequilibrium was building up. In south-east Africa populations were becoming too numerous for their resource bases. The first signs, perhaps, were the movements of the Tonga north into southeastern Zimbabwe, the band migrations of raiders in Zimbabwe itself, and the end of the ‘filling up’ of southern Zimbabwe by settlers from the better lands to the north. The next big upheaval was to start there after 1800.

Massive but slow drift, a certain sign of adaptation of population densities to land, was occurring meanwhile in the rain-forest of Central Africa and in the savannahs of what is now the Central African Republic during the whole period. The drift of Mongo groups south from centres of higher density near the equator has been mentioned. Immigration led to the development of strong chiefdoms north of the lower Kasai and the Kuba kingdom. Further east, population densities were also low in some savannah areas and some Mongo language speakers settled there. Between the Rivers Zaire and Ubangi some higher densities built up – but in patches. It was still possible for a people such as the Ngbandi to drift south from the Ubangi river valley. But by the eighteenth century there were signs of relative over-population and after 1750 a new people, the Zande, were born. They expanded by rapid drift, creating successive chiefdoms east towards the Nile. On the grasslands of the Central African Republic and Cameroon there also occurred movements of slow drift by farmers, mainly Gbaya and Banda, but documentation for this area is still scant. In the western part of the Central African rain-forest constant emigration by drift was taking place from the Mbam/Sanaga confluence to places of lower density further south and perhaps west, while a minor centre of density in Equatorial Guinea was sending immigrants northward.

One can point to minor drifts almost everywhere, even in West or North Africa, as the mobile populations constantly adapted to relative differences of population density, as is evident by mentions of such movements in every regional chapter. But compared to mass migrations, the orderliness of the process is important. For that orderly and slow process was the sign of true stability.

Among the smaller movements, those that occurred around states being formed or collapsing are the most numerous. In West Africa, the breaking up of the Jolof state by 1520 may not have involved any of these, but the slow collapse of the Mali empire is said to have led to the Soso (Susu), Baga and Nalu drifts from Futa Jallon and to the Mane band migration which, after a rampage through parts of Liberia and Sierra Leone, led to the emergence of new chiefdoms and new cultures there. The Mande

60. See ch. 23 below.
61. See ch. 18 below.
people are one of the main results. The development of the Mossi states may be connected to the northward movement of the Dogon who settled on the Bandiagara scarp, while further south Mande troops founded Gonja. The emerging state of Asante led to a small displacement of the Akwamu near the Volta river and, more importantly, to a larger expansion in the south-east by Baule and Agni groups. The Tyokosi war band, which ultimately settled in northern Togo, comprised people from Asante but also Mande and was involved in mercenary operations for one of the Mossi kingdoms.

In Central Africa fewer such movements are known. The expansion of the Lunda empire first, then of the Yaka kingdom of the Kwango, led to movements of armed bands. The ones in southern Lunda and the one that founded the Kazembe kingdom are the best known. But a group of populations between Kwango and Kasai, near the fifth parallel south, may have begun to move before 1800 as a result of raids by both the Yaka and the Lunda, but perhaps also because of the inducement of more regular rainfall and better terrain. In Malawi a spectacular rise of armed bands occurred as a byproduct of the creation of the Maravi and Lunda states about 1600. The Zimba, who came from this area, first raided northern Mozambique and the hinterland of Kilwa. They are said — but are they the same band? — to have ravaged the coastal lands north to Malindi and further. At least one other band settled in the highlands of Zimbabwe but was later destroyed. In Zimbabwe itself small movements of expansion and raiding cannot be confidently associated with state expansion or contraction, except for a few cases such as the Manyika expanding to the barren Inyanga highlands and three smaller expeditions from the Changamire state. Other small movements here had more to do with the colonization of relatively empty land in the south. Madagascar is perhaps the prime example of population movements related to the emergence of kingdoms and chiefdoms. The story of the Maroserana movements, with the attraction of other groups and the flight from their path of yet others, is telling. By 1500 the population on the island was still very mobile and had not effectively settled and not all the land was yet under human control. By 1800 most of these lands had been organized into states of various sorts. Space had been tamed. A major difference from other parts of Africa, however, was the prominence of state formations during the taming process.

Similar developments on the mainland were confined to portions of central Tanzania, all of southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique. Here the rise of the kingdoms and chiefdoms of the Bena, Sangu, Hehe, Makua, Lundu, Yao, and further consolidation of some Nyamwezi polities,

63. See chs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 below; also C. H. Perrot, 1981.
64. See chs 19 and 20 below.
65. See chs 21 and 22 below; also D. N. Beach, 1980a.
66. See ch. 28 below.
similarly provided a framework for stabilization.

The impressive further development of trading routes south of the Sahara led to the creation of new diasporas or the strengthening of older ones and also to some other population movements, usually over short distances. From west to east the Jahanka, Joola, Yarse, Hausa, Bobangi, Vili, Hungaan, Bisa, Yao and Swahili diasporas are the best known. To these must be added the European diasporas of which the French on the Senegalese coast, the Portuguese in Luanda and Mozambique, the Portuguese agents, lançados, pombeiros and prazo personnel, and the Dutch at the Cape influenced Africa most in this period. Many of both the European and the African diasporas were involved in the slave trade as the trading routes became busier, better organized and longer. Peoples living near such major routes sometimes moved closer to them and sometimes fled from them. Thus the Itsekiri expanded to the coast, not far from their former lands, in order to be on the sea route to Benin. The Efik moved from the vicinity of Arochuku to Old Calabar on the Cross river and founded a major port there. The Duala descended the Wouri river for the same reason in the eighteenth century. In Gabon, a number of people drifted slowly towards the mouth of the Ogowe delta to participate more in the trade. Some, on the other hand, fled from these regions towards the Ngunie river. The population between Kwongo and Kasai seems to have moved away from the trade route and the raiders in the vicinity, while Bemba groups in Zambia moved closer to the route developed in the nineteenth century. Many in Zimbabwe seem to have moved away from the turbulence created by the Portuguese feiras in colonizing the south. But all these movements at any given time were small-scale indeed. They too represent no more than dynamic readjustments to new larger-scale organizations of space for trade or for socio-political control. Movements similar to these also occurred in or near the trading routes and the new political centres in northern Africa.

**Conclusion**

Space had been tamed in most of Africa long before 1500 and no lands remained completely unused by that date. Over most of the continent, settlement was of sufficiently low density that processes of expansion solved problems of pressure on the land. The main exception was eastern Africa from the Horn to the Zambezi, excluding the Great Lakes area and including Madagascar. The northern half of this area saw mass migration, an uprooting of previous patterns of settlement and quite active drifts by expanding herders. In the southern half and on Madagascar, where farming was more prominent, social reorganizations with the emergence of a

67. See ch. 27 below.

68. See ch. 15 below.

69. See ch. 18 below.
network of kingdoms and chiefdoms provided the means for greater sta­bilization of settlement and more intensive use of the land.

Drought and famine are not sufficient explanations for the occurrence of mass migrations and active expansions in the northern part of this area because the fringes of the Sahara in both west and north Africa, also affected by droughts, were not similarly affected by migrations or rapid expansion. Slower drifts were the response here.

Population increase in Africa cannot have been dramatic during these centuries since it was mostly easily controlled by these mechanisms. Only here and there do we see the emergence of quite intensive technologies for land use which, in turn, allowed higher densities of population. The lower Casamance, Igbo country, the Cameroon grasslands with their 'domesticated' vegetation, the mountains in the Great Lakes area along the western rift with their systems of irrigation and/or intensive cultivation of bananas, small spots such as the Kukuya plateau with its novel forms of fertilization or the valley of the Upper Zambezi where floods were used, all are still exceptions in western and central Africa. In northern Africa, including Egypt, with the largest oasis in the world, intensive oasis agric­ulture was millennia old by this time. We cannot here go into the reasons why population increase was not greater but we must at least indicate that the large flow of emigrants from the continent, especially as a result of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, is part of this question. It is remarkable that the parts of the continent affected by this trade, West and Central Africa, were also quite stable compared to eastern Africa, and that the slave trade did not occasion massive turbulence (massive relocations of population) although minor movements are associated with it.

Outside eastern Africa, group mobility was affected most by the rise and fall of states and by the extension of trading networks. Despite the collapse of some larger states in the Sahel of West Africa, the percentage of areas controlled by states on the continent was higher by 1800 than it had been by 1500, and there was some turbulence around the fringes of each emerging state.

Long-distance trading routes and diasporas were old in West and North Africa by 1500 and even in Central Africa some elements existed. A network of such routes developed there in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when routes reached from coast to coast. Diasporas developed everywhere as the need arose for the conduct of trade. Such trading networks enlarged the scale of resource exploitation just as states organized larger territories than chiefdoms or confederations of villages. Long-distance routes con­nected Africa to the world outside and were drawing the continent into the hierarchical organizations of space affecting most of the globe. From 1500 onwards this meant increasingly a world system in which Europe became dominant.

These three centuries must be seen as a portion of a much longer evolution. Compared to the previous half-millennium, the population was
much more stable than before and the mastery of communities over space more evident. Yet, in the nineteenth century, one major upheaval was still to shake eastern and southern Africa when population build-up in southern Africa led to the *mfecane*, in the absence of a technological revolution that could have prevented it. But once again, the rest of the continent did not experience this instability and it is clear that most of Africa had achieved mastery over space long before 1500. The relationship of population to land resources and available technologies had produced a stable situation in which intricate cultural elaborations and such social complexities as urbanization flourished.

But, as this chapter also shows, we still know little about movements of population. Historical demography and technological history is just beginning in Africa. We need more data and we particularly need to replace the vague notion of 'migration' with more refined analyses. Then we shall be better able to chronicle a fundamental theme in African history. It is one that moves very slowly: the successive colonizations of Africa by its inhabitants.
Africa in world history: 
the export slave trade from 
Africa and the emergence of 
the Atlantic economic order 

J. E. INIKORI

Introduction

While slaves from Africa south of the Sahara may have been sold in the area around the Mediterranean in ones and twos in ancient times, the export of slaves in significant quantities from black Africa to the outside world dates from about the ninth century.1 This trade served mainly the area around the Mediterranean (including Southern Europe), the Middle East and parts of Asia. Though the export slave trade from Africa in this direction lasted several centuries, even into the early twentieth century, the numbers exported annually were never very great. However, with the opening up of the New World to European exploitation, following the voyage of Christopher Columbus in 1492, a much more extensive slave trade from Africa, in terms of annual volume, was added to the older trade. This is generally known as the trans-Atlantic slave trade which lasted from the sixteenth century to the mid-nineteenth. Both trades were conducted simultaneously for almost four centuries, removing millions of people from Africa. The place of this trade in world history has hitherto not been properly demonstrated.

It must be noted that trade in slaves has not been limited to Africa. In fact, the world has known chattel slavery and large-scale trade in slaves since the days of the Roman empire. An examination of the historical records will easily show that all races of the world have at one time or another sold their members into slavery in distant lands. The story is told that the mission to convert the English people to Christianity in the late sixth century was connected with the sale of English children in the market at Rome – victims of the frequent fights that the Anglo-Saxon tribes had among themselves during which they captured and sold one another as slaves.2 The same is true of other European territories. For many centuries ethnic groups in East and Central Europe (particularly the Slavs from


2. The story is that a Roman monk once saw English children being sold in the market at Rome and felt sorry that the English people were not Christians. When later this monk became Pope Gregory the Great, he ordered in +596 a party of monks to go and convert the English people to Christianity. See T. Cairns, 1971, p. 50.
whose ethnic name the word slave is derived) supplied slaves to the Middle East and North Africa.

Yet, from the point of view of world history, the export slave trade from Africa, particularly the trans-Atlantic trade, is unique in several respects. The sheer size of the trade, the geographical extent of the regions of the world involved, and the economics of the trade — at the level of slave supply, employment of slaves to produce commodities for an international market, and trade centred on the products of slave labour — all these put the slave trade from Africa apart from all other slave trades.

The difficulty of demonstrating the place of the export slave trade from Africa in world history is at once tied up with the problem of understanding and explaining the historical origins of the contemporary world economic order. The controversy surrounding the latter subject arises from a number of factors: first, the tyranny of differing paradigms conditioning the thought patterns of different scholars; second, the intrusion of political influences into scholarly explanations; and third, inadequate information at the disposal of many scholars. The views expressed on the subject by some well-known scholars may be quoted to illustrate.

In his analysis of the historical origins of the contemporary international economic order, the Nobel-Prize-winning black economist, W. Arthur Lewis, opined that: 'The Third World's contribution to the industrial revolution of the first half of the nineteenth century was negligible.'

Looking at the other side of the coin — the effects of the evolving international economy on Third-World economies — the late Bill Warren declared:

There is no evidence that any process of underdevelopment has occurred in modern times, and particularly in the period since the West made its impact on other continents. The evidence rather supports a contrary thesis: that a process of development has been taking place at least since the English industrial revolution, much accelerated in comparison with any earlier period; and that this has been the direct result of the impact of the West ...

Again, writing recently from the political angle, the development economist, P. T. Bauer, stated that

Acceptance of emphatic routine allegations that the West is responsible for Third World poverty reflects and reinforces Western feelings of guilt. It has enfeebled Western diplomacy, both towards the ideologically much more aggressive Soviet bloc and also towards the Third World. And the West has come to abase itself before countries with negligible resources and no real power. Yet the allegations can be shown to be without foundation. They are readily accepted because

the Western public has little first-hand knowledge of the Third World, and because of widespread feelings of guilt. The West has never had it so good, and has never felt so bad about it.\(^5\)

While far from being the majority position, these are views for which support can be readily found in the literature on the subject. They all bear traces of the three factors stated earlier. However, one particularly striking feature of the three views quoted is the apparent non-consideration of the slave trade from Africa and New World slavery. This seems to be a fairly common feature of existing studies of the historical origins of the contemporary world economic order. The explanation is possibly that historians have not tried to show simultaneously the effects of the slave trade from Africa in global terms.

In this chapter, an attempt is made to analyse the consequences of the slave trade from Africa in the context of the evolution of a world economic order from the sixteenth century as a way of reaching a better understanding of the international economic issues of our time. For this purpose, an economic order may be defined as a single system of economic relations embracing several countries, simultaneously allocating functions and distributing rewards to the countries involved through the mechanism of a trading network. The development of such a system of international economic relations entails the evolution of economic, social and political structures in the individual member countries or sub-regions within the system which make it possible for the operation of the system to be maintained entirely by the forces of the market. Once so developed, any important modification of the system can only arise from a deliberate political action, occasioned possibly by a change of regime in one or more countries within the system.

It is held in this chapter that an economic order linking together a vast area comprising diverse regions of the world emerged in the Atlantic zone in the nineteenth century. The regions within the order were Western Europe, North America, Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa. This order was structured in such a way that Western Europe and later North America formed the core territories, while Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa formed the periphery, with economic, social and political structures to match. The extension of the Atlantic economic order to incorporate Asia and the rest of Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries produced the world economic order of the twentieth century which has been undergoing more or less minor changes in its character to date. It is important to note that the core and peripheral areas of the nineteenth-century Atlantic economic order have continued to maintain their positions ever since, even within the wider order. The developments of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries only increased the core areas by one or two territories, while considerably expanding the periphery.

Africa in modern history

FIG. 4.1 Atlantic commerce in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
The main thrust of this chapter is to demonstrate that the slave trade from Africa was a key factor in the development of the nineteenth-century Atlantic economic order. To develop this theme, efforts have been made to show the role of the African slave trade and New World slavery in the capitalist transformation of Western Europe (with special reference to Britain) and North America, and the role of the same factors in the emergence of dependency structures in Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa by the mid-nineteenth century. Due to the limitation of space and the wide area covered by the chapter, it has not been possible to give descriptive details at the level of sub-regions. The analysis is focused mainly on the broad issues.

Methodology

In all studies of society, a key factor that makes communication between scholars difficult and gives occasion to heated disagreement is the differing conceptual frameworks providing differing lenses through which different scholars view the same social facts. This explains much of the controversy surrounding discussions on underdevelopment and dependence, as is partly reflected in the views cited above. Central to the disagreement in the said discussion is the problem of whether or not social change should be differentiated for purposes of analysis. The practice by scholars, as far as this is concerned, seems to depend considerably on the conceptual framework at their disposal. One practice is centred on an undifferentiated view of all social change as leading to economic and social development. On the other hand, especially among scholars within the dependency and under-development tradition, social change is differentiated: a distinction between two directions of social change, one leading to economic development and the other to underdevelopment and dependence. Both are change, however, and can therefore, be studied historically.

Looking at the historical processes leading to the present state of affairs in the economies of the world, the undifferentiated view of social change proves incapable of offering a satisfactory explanation. Social change has been taking place in all societies over the centuries. If all social change leads ultimately to economic development, then surely most economies in the world should by now be developed. Yet, by any proper definition of the term ‘economic development’, only a few economies in the world today are developed. The vast majority still need very drastic measures if they are ever to become developed: measures such as those undertaken by Stalinist Russia and China. It thus follows that the social change which led these economies over the centuries to their present situation is something other than a process of development. The latter historical process is what some analysts characterize as a process of underdevelopment and dependence whose features are distinguishable analytically from those of the development process.
The approach of the underdevelopment and dependency tradition needs some further elaboration. Social change entails economic, social and political structuring. Some mixture of economic, social and political structures produces economic development, but others create a stumbling block for the attainment of economic development. Processes of social change that produce the structures for development should be seen as the development process, while social change giving rise to structures that ultimately create barriers to development which can only be eliminated through drastic political action, should be characterized as an underdevelopment and dependency process. Analytically, therefore, three types of economics are distinguishable: undeveloped, developed and underdeveloped economies.

For the purposes of understanding the analysis in this chapter, these three terms need to be defined. A developed economy should be taken to mean an economy with strong internal structural and sectoral linkages, supported by advanced technology and social and political structures that make it possible for self-sustained economic growth to be maintained. An underdeveloped and dependent economy should be understood to mean an economy that is structurally and sectorally disarticulated by certain internal structures arising from the character of previous international relationships which make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for advanced technology and strong structural and sectoral linkages to develop within the economy, giving rise to a situation where the economy's expansion or contraction depends entirely on the external sector.

Finally, undeveloped economies are those that possess neither the structures of development nor those of underdevelopment and, hence, are still free to move easily in either of the two directions, depending on the kind of opportunities that are presented.

6. By structural linkage we mean linkages between mining, capital-goods industry and consumer-goods industry. And by sectoral linkage we mean links between the sectors: mining and industry, agriculture, transport and commerce. For an economy to be described as developed, the sub-sectors within industry must be fully developed and linked, and all the sectors of the economy must be strongly integrated. Only in this way can self-sustained growth be maintained and dependency eliminated.

7. A situation of total dependence on the external sector must be distinguished from that of interdependence between the economies within the world trading system. As Dos Santos puts it: 'A relationship of interdependence between two or more economies or between such economies and the world trading system becomes a dependent relationship when some countries can expand through self-impulsion while others, being in a dependent position, can only expand as a reflection of the expansion of the dominant countries ...'
T. Dos Santos, 1973, p. 76.

8. This type of economy must not be confused with underdeveloped economies. R. Warren (1980, p. 169) is certainly wrong in his statement that 'There is no reason to abandon the view that underdevelopment is non-development, measured in terms of poverty relative to the advanced capitalist countries.' Even if a literary meaning is sought, the term underdevelopment makes better sense if it means a process of capitalist transformation that is blocked and therefore incomplete. This situation cannot be the same as that of natural backwardness, which non-development or underdevelopment implies.
Thus, to understand the global effects of the process through which the international economy was created, we need to examine the kinds of economic, social and political structures to which that process gave rise in the different economies it embraced. Then, it will be possible to determine which of the structures conform with development or underdevelopment and dependence. Particularly useful for this purpose is an important hypothesis provided by the underdevelopment and dependency tradition: that during the mercantilist epoch, the capitalist transformation of what became the core countries of the evolving world economy produced at the same time a consolidation and further extension of pre-capitalist social formations in what became the peripheral territories.

If this is true, then the development of the core countries led to both underdevelopment and dependency structures in the periphery. This chapter is organized around this hypothesis for the purposes of testing it against the historical evidence.

The volume of the slave trade from Africa

To make a fair assessment of the role of the slave trade from Africa in world history, it is important to establish an estimate that is reasonably close to the real volume of the trade over the centuries. In this regard, considerable progress has been made with respect to the more important branch of the trade, the trans-Atlantic slave trade. This progress centres on the estimates published in 1969 by Philip Curtin. Since then, other specialists have published the results of their detailed researchers centred on different portions of the estimates. A comparison of these recent estimates with those of Curtin for the relevant components is shown in Table 4.1.

As can be seen from the table, the results of these researches since 1976 show unanimously that Curtin’s figures are much too low. Much of the Atlantic slave trade still awaits detailed research. The kind of detailed work done by David Eltis for Brazilian slave imports, 1821–43, is yet to be extended to Brazilian imports in the eighteenth, seventeenth and sixteenth centuries. The volume of British slave exports in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and many other subject areas, still await detailed research. When these researches are complete, it will be possible to have global figures based entirely on the detailed work of specialists. However,

9. The period 1500–1800 is usually referred to as the period of mercantilism whose central feature was the struggle among West-European countries to dominate the expanding world trade of the period to their exclusive advantage.

10. In Marxist terms, pre-capitalist social formations are constituted by the primitive communist, the ancient, the slave and the feudal modes of production. There are some other variants of the pre-capitalist modes of production. For a useful discussion of issues relating to pre-capitalist social formations, see J. G. Taylor, 1979.


### TABLE 4.1  
Estimates of the volume of the Atlantic slave trade made since 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Component estimated</th>
<th>Estimated number of slaves</th>
<th>Curtin’s estimate for the same component</th>
<th>Percentage difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J. E. Inikori</td>
<td>British slave exports from Africa 1701-1808</td>
<td>3,699,572</td>
<td>2,480,000a</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. A. Palmer</td>
<td>Spanish slave imports 1521-95</td>
<td>73,000</td>
<td>51,300b</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Vila Vilar</td>
<td>Spanish slave imports 1595-1640</td>
<td>258,664</td>
<td>132,600c</td>
<td>102.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. B. Rout Jr.</td>
<td>Spanish slave imports 1500-1810</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>925,100d</td>
<td>62.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Eltis 1977</td>
<td>Trans-Atlantic slave exports from Africa 1821-43</td>
<td>1,485,000</td>
<td>1,104,950f</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Eltis 1979</td>
<td>Brazilian slave imports 1821-43</td>
<td>829,100</td>
<td>637,000e</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Eltis 1981</td>
<td>Trans-Atlantic slave exports 1844-67</td>
<td>634,700</td>
<td>539,384g</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Stein</td>
<td>French slave exports 1713-92/3</td>
<td>1,140,257</td>
<td>939,100h</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a* J. E. Inikori, 1976; P. D. Curtin, 1969, Table 41, p. 142.

*b* J. E. Inikori, 1976; P. D. Curtin, 1969, Table 5, p. 25.

*c* P. D. Curtin, 1969, Table 5, p. 25.

*d* P. D. Curtin, 1969, Table 77, p. 268.

*e* P. D. Curtin, 1969, Table 67, (p. 234) and Table 80 (p. 280).

*f* P. D. Curtin, 1969, Table 67 (p. 234) and Table 80 (p. 280).

*g* P. D. Curtin, 1969, Table 67 (p. 234) and Table 80 (p. 280).

*h* P. D. Curtin, 1969, Table 49, p. 170.

the estimates resulting from the post-1976 research do show a clear pattern that can form the basis of a reasonable statistical inference relating to the whole trade. One major point about these estimates is that they cover all the important centuries of the trade. They suggest, in particular, that the most substantial upward revisions of Curtin’s estimates are to be expected for the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the period for which more detailed research is needed.

Both the pattern and the magnitude of the revisions shown by the post-1976 research suggest that a 40 per cent upward revision of Curtin’s global figures would bring the estimate reasonably close to the real volume of the Atlantic trade. Applying this to Curtin’s total figure of approximately 11 million worldwide, gives a figure of about 15.4 million.

13. See the estimates given in Table 4.1.
14. Paul Lovejoy has given a rather amazing interpretation of the results of this recent research. Rather than studying the pattern of the revisions coming from the research and making a statistical inference, Lovejoy makes a questionable selection from them, mixes his selected figures with unrevised figures from Curtin (which form a large proportion of the total) and arrives at what he calls a ‘new estimate’. This ‘new estimate’, Lovejoy claims, confirms the accuracy of Curtin’s original estimate. See P. E. Lovejoy, 1982. Apart from the errors of judgement involved in Lovejoy’s selection of figures, the most curious thing in his ‘estimate’ is the use of Curtin’s own original figures to confirm the accuracy of Curtin’s estimates. This is a misleading exercise, especially because the results of the researches since 1976 show clearly that Curtin’s figures for the period before 1700 are the ones that require the largest upward revision. Yet these are the ones mostly used by Lovejoy. In my view, the method used by Lovejoy is unhelpful. If we must use global figures in our various works before the needed research is concluded, the best we can do is to make statistical inferences based on the results of recent research.
For the trade across the Sahara, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, the existing estimates are less firmly founded, due to the weaker database. However, there are two estimates of this branch of the trade which command a reasonable amount of confidence. These are the estimates by Raymond Mauny and Ralph Austen. Mauny computed 10 million for the period 1400–1900. Austen's figures, on the other hand, amount to roughly 6,856,000 for the period 1500–1890. The latter figure is made up of 3,956,000 for the trans-Saharan trade and 2,900,000 for the trade across the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. In general, Austen's estimates seem more securely based and are, therefore, to be preferred to Mauny's. Thus, taking both branches of the trade together, about 22 million people were exported from black Africa to the rest of the world between 1500 and 1890.

The capitalist transformation of Western Europe and North America in the era of slave trade and slavery

When Christopher Columbus arrived in the Caribbean in 1492, the West European economies were by definition undeveloped. Subsistence agriculture and self-employed handicraft manufacturing were still the dominant economic activities, in terms of the proportion of the working population employed. Manufacturing was still part and parcel of agriculture — a part-time occupation for a people whose main employment was agriculture in which the bulk of the output was consumed directly by the direct producer himself. Social and political structures were such that extra-economic coercion still dominated the distribution of the social product.

However, some important structural changes occurred in Western Europe during the three centuries or so preceding the arrival of Columbus in the New World. The growth of population and its regional redistribution during the Middle Ages stimulated considerable development of inter-regional and international trade within Western Europe and thus provoked important institutional changes in a number of countries. Production for market exchange within and between the countries of Western Europe expanded while subsistence production began to weaken. There were important developments in the organization of land and labour intended to improve the efficient utilization of these factors, particularly the development of property rights in land. These were accompanied by some changes in social structure. All these developments which occurred between the

late Middle Ages and 1492 were important in providing the conditions which made West European economies responsive to the opportunities offered by the emergence of the Atlantic system following the arrival of Columbus in the Americas.

While all the economies of Western Europe underwent changes in the late Middle Ages there were important differences from one country to another. In particular, the combined effects of the wool trade and population expansion in England made developments there most remarkable.  

In summary, in order to properly understand what happened between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, two points need to be stressed about developments in Western Europe during the centuries preceding the emergence of the Atlantic system. First, the commercialization of economic activities increased throughout Western Europe thereby enhancing the operation of market forces. This explains the ease with which the impact of the Atlantic system was communicated directly and indirectly to all the economies of the region. Second, significant differences in the level of institutional change in the different countries of Western Europe, coupled with further differences in access to opportunities emanating from the Atlantic system in the centuries that followed, explain the differing rates of capitalist transformation in the countries of Western Europe between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries.

In analysing the impact of the evolving Atlantic system on the economies of Western Europe, two periods are distinguishable: 1500–1650 and 1650–1820.

Between 1500 and 1650 the economies and societies of the Atlantic region were not yet structured in a way that enabled market forces to fully maintain the operation in the area of a single economic system that could allocate functions and distribute rewards to the member units. In consequence, Western Europe used its military superiority to command resources from other economies and societies in the region. For this reason, the pre-Columbus transformation process in Western Europe continued in much the same pattern, with much of the international exchange of commodities occurring within Europe, as the resources from the rest of the Atlantic area were brought to Western Europe in exchange for little or nothing.

The most important resources that came to Western Europe from the rest of the Atlantic area during this period were silver and gold. These came mainly from Spanish America (the Spanish colonies in the New World), the gold trade from West Africa having declined as the economics of the slave trade and slavery took hold. From Spain, the silver and gold from the New World were distributed throughout Western Europe. Table 4.2 shows the quantities imported into Spain between 1503 and 1650.

As the imported bullion went into circulation as a medium of exchange, the process of commercialization of economic activities accelerated all over

Western Europe. The interaction of the rapidly increasing quantity of money in circulation with population expansion produced what is known in European history as the price revolution of the sixteenth century. The conditions created by this phenomenon were particularly important for the early development of capitalist agriculture in Western Europe, particularly in England.19

The import of American bullion also gave a fillip to the growth of international trade within Europe. By law only Spanish nationals and Spanish-owned ships were allowed to take goods to and from Spanish America. The trade was restricted to only two ports in the whole of Europe, Cadiz and Seville. In addition, the Spanish American colonies were forbidden to produce their own manufactured goods. Yet, the mineral wealth of the colonies encouraged the dominant classes in Spain to depend on other European countries for all sorts of imports to meet the needs of Spaniards in Spain and in Spanish America. Even the trade of Cadiz and Seville with Spanish America was dominated by alien European merchants through various underground arrangements.20

In this way, Spain became the centre of a large-scale international trade within Western Europe in the sixteenth century. This trade, which was

dominated by Holland, France and England, provided the channel through which American bullion poured into the major economies of Western Europe and fuelled their transformation process. The silver and gold from Spanish America left Spain within months of arrival, so much so that it was said: ‘Spain kept the cow and the rest of Europe drank the milk’. This continued through the seventeenth and into the eighteenth century.

From 1650 to 1820, the structuring of the economies and societies of the Atlantic area reached its climax and the process of capitalist transformation in Western Europe came to depend on the Atlantic system. The role of the latter system in the economic development of Western Europe during the period can only be fully appreciated when viewed against the background of the general crisis of the seventeenth century in Western Europe.

The economic expansion of sixteenth-century Western Europe, associated with the growing imports of American bullion and population expansion, came to a halt as the effects of both factors weakened. The import of American bullion reached its peak in the 1590s and declined thereafter. Population growth also decelerated as European societies tailored their demographic behaviour to the level of economic opportunities. The situation was worsened by the policy of economic nationalism, bordering on

economic warfare, that was adopted by a number of West European countries particularly France, during the seventeenth century. The high tariff walls erected by France, England and others to protect home industries aggravated the economic situation in Western Europe, resulting in a general crisis. International trade within Western Europe collapsed. The ongoing process of capitalist transformation was halted in some countries, while a reverse process occurred in others. The worst hit of all was Italy which was transformed 'from the most urbanised and industrialized country of Europe into a typical backward peasant area.'

The nature and origin of the seventeenth-century crisis show clearly that for the capitalist transformation process in the region to be completed, Western Europe needed much greater economic opportunities than Europe alone could offer. As Professor Hobsbawm points out, 'The 17th century crisis cannot be explained by the inadequacies of the equipment for Industrial Revolution, in any narrowly technical and organizational sense.' It cannot be explained by the shortage of capital either. '16th century Italians', says Hobsbawm, 'probably controlled the greatest agglomerations of capital, but misinvested them flagrantly. They immobilized them in buildings and squandered them in foreign lending ...' But the Italians were behaving rationally.

If they spent vast amounts of capital non-productively, it may have been simply because there was no more room to invest it progressively on any scale within the limits of this 'capitalist sector.' (The 17th century Dutch palliated a similar glut of capital by multiplying household goods and works of art ...)

Thus, what explains the crisis is inadequate economic opportunities in Western Europe. It follows from this, that for as long as Western Europe depended virtually on internal economic opportunities, the region had little or no chance for a full capitalist transformation.

The changes that occurred in the structuring of the economies and societies of the non-European areas of the Atlantic between 1650 and 1820, offered immense opportunities and challenges which completely altered the economic situation in Western Europe generally, but very much more so for those countries that had greater access to those opportunities. In the New World, a major element in the economic and social structuring of the period was the growth of plantation agriculture. The production of precious metals continued to be important, particularly as Brazil entered large-scale gold production in the eighteenth century. But the key element in the structuring of the economies and societies of the New World during the

24. ibid., p. 42.
period was large-scale plantation agriculture. In mainland North America, the products were mainly tobacco and cotton, but in Latin America and the Caribbean, sugar was king. The scale of operation of the new economy necessitated a complete repopulation of the New World.

A great volume of trade was organized around the shipping of goods to Africa and the Americas, the shipping of slaves from Africa to the Americas, and the shipping of produce and precious metals from the Americas to Western Europe. As an example, sugar legally imported from the Americas into Western Europe reached at least 151,658 tons per annum in the 1740s and 193,005 tons in the 1760s. Since the colony-owning West European countries restricted the movement of goods in and out of their American colonies, their control of the distribution of American commodities in Europe became a major factor in the growth of intra-European trade in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The main beneficiaries of these developments were England, France and Holland. As an illustration, the official value of England's foreign trade (imports plus exports) rose from an annual average of £8.5 million in 1663–9 to £28.4 million in 1772–4 and £55.7 million in 1797–8. This growth was directly or indirectly due almost entirely to the expansion of the Atlantic system. France and Holland had similar experiences. For England, re-exports centred on New-World produce made up 37.1 per cent of all exports in 1772–4, while the comparable figure for France is 33.2 per cent in 1787. It is not for nothing that a French economic historian declared:

The eighteenth century can be truly called the Atlantic stage of European economic development. Foreign trade, and especially trade with the Americas, was the most dynamic sector of the whole economy (for instance, French colonial trade increased tenfold between 1716 and 1787), and furthermore the demand from overseas was stimulating the growth of a wide range of industries as well as increased specialization and division of labour. Owing to the superiority of sea transport over land transport, the eighteenth century European economy was organized around a number of big seaports, the most prosperous being those with the largest share in the growing colonial trade, such as Bordeaux or Nantes; each of these had, not only its own industries, but also its industrial hinterland in the river base of which it was the outlet.

26. R. Sheridan, 1970, Table 1, p. 22.
28. For 1663–9 and 1772–4, see R. Davis, 1969, pp. 92, 119, 120. For 1797–8, see P. Deane and W. A. Cole, 1967, Table 13, p. 44. The 1797–8 figure is for Great Britain, while the others are for England and Wales. All the figures include all imports, domestic exports and re-exports. The eighteenth-century figures are at 1697–1700 constant prices.
The growing economic opportunities associated with the expanding Atlantic system offered increased employment stimulating population growth all over Western Europe after the seventeenth-century decline. This contributed considerably to the growth of domestic markets in England, France and Holland which combined with growing exports to provide the demand pressures that provoked the inventions and technological innovations of the eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century industrial revolutions in Western Europe. In this way, the phenomenal expansion of commodity production, trade, finance and shipping which occurred in the Atlantic area between 1650 and 1820 provided the needed opportunities for the economies of Western Europe to overcome the crisis of the seventeenth century, break the shackles of traditional economic and social structures, and complete the process of capitalist transformation. The first country to complete the process was England. The forces which this development unleashed, and the lessons that it offered, helped the rapid completion of the process in the other West European countries that had shared positively (directly or indirectly) in the opportunities emanating from the expanding Atlantic system.

The part of the New World that in 1783 became the United States of America, while operating under important political constraints as colonial territories between the seventeenth century and 1776, also shared positively in some important ways in the expanding Atlantic system during this early period. The economies of these territories were probably among the most undeveloped in the Atlantic area at the time Columbus arrived in the Americas. Population densities were among the lowest in the New World at the time, and there was nothing to compare with the ancient civilizations of South America in terms of economic and social organization. For many decades after their settlement by the European colonists, these territories were overwhelmingly dominated by subsistence activities. The growth of opportunities for market production which occurred in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was directly related to the expansion of the Atlantic system from the mid-seventeenth century to the nineteenth.

Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the magnitude of the involvement of these territories in the Atlantic system in the years immediately preceding the declaration of independence and the formation of the United States of America.

On average, the total annual value of the Atlantic trade of British North America during these years was £8.4 million (imports plus commodity and invisible exports). With a total population of 2.2 million in 1770, the

31. It has now been firmly established that the growth of population in England in the eighteenth century was due to earlier and more universal marriage. This in turn was due to growing employment opportunities. See J. E. Inikori, 1984 for more details. The analysis is based on evidence produced by E. A. Wrigley, 1983 and D. N. Levine, 1977.


### TABLE 4.3  Total earnings (£) from commodity and invisible exports by British North America, 1768-1772

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1768</th>
<th>1769</th>
<th>1770</th>
<th>1771</th>
<th>1772</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain and Ireland</td>
<td>1658 000</td>
<td>1852 000</td>
<td>1818 000</td>
<td>2113 000</td>
<td>2135 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All the West Indies</td>
<td>979 000</td>
<td>1131 000</td>
<td>1272 000</td>
<td>1287 000</td>
<td>1498 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Europe and the Wine Islands</td>
<td>520 000</td>
<td>805 000</td>
<td>741 000</td>
<td>721 000</td>
<td>762 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>16 000</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>18 000</td>
<td>34 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>3 173 000</strong></td>
<td><strong>3 818 000</strong></td>
<td><strong>3 856 000</strong></td>
<td><strong>4 139 000</strong></td>
<td><strong>4 429 000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 4.4  British North American imports (£), 1768-1772

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1768</th>
<th>1769</th>
<th>1770</th>
<th>1771</th>
<th>1772</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain and Ireland</td>
<td>2908 000</td>
<td>2115 000</td>
<td>3112 000</td>
<td>5382 000</td>
<td>4135 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All the West Indies</td>
<td>524 000</td>
<td>767 000</td>
<td>792 000</td>
<td>676 000</td>
<td>939 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Europe and the Wine Islands</td>
<td>81 000</td>
<td>85 000</td>
<td>80 000</td>
<td>69 000</td>
<td>88 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>56 000</td>
<td>189 000</td>
<td>85 000</td>
<td>104 000</td>
<td>265 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>3 569 000</strong></td>
<td><strong>3 192 000</strong></td>
<td><strong>4 069 000</strong></td>
<td><strong>6 231 000</strong></td>
<td><strong>5 427 000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Note* The invisible exports were made up largely of earnings from shipping.

Atlantic trade of these territories was £3.8 per head of population. This magnitude of involvement in the Atlantic system stimulated the growth of the domestic market and production for market exchange, as it encouraged specialization, raised per capita income and influenced the rate of migration into the area.

As the British North American colonies moved gradually from subsistence activities to market production under the impact of the Atlantic system, three economic regimes comprising the southern, middle and northern (mainly New England) colonies became distinguishable. The combination of natural resources and the availability of cheap African slave labour encouraged the southern colonies to expand plantation agriculture, first rice and tobacco, then cotton. The middle colonies, however, took to foodstuffs production on family-sized farms utilizing family labour. In the northern colonies, relatively poor natural resources for agriculture combined with the availability of deep natural harbours and forest resources for shipbuilding encouraged early specialization in trade and shipping.\(^{34}\)

In this way, the south produced virtually all the plantation commodities

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34. See D. C. North, 1961.
that were exported to Europe, while the north produced the bulk of the invisible exports – shipping, merchants’ services, insurance, etc. The middle colonies, meanwhile, produced footstuffs for export as well as some invisible exports. Production in the south was dependent on African slave labour, while the market for the output was mainly in Europe. For the middle and northern colonies, the restructuring of the Caribbean economies that accompanied the growth of slave plantations produced a division of labour between the Caribbean (British and non-British) and North America which provided a large market in the Caribbean for the foodstuffs of the middle colonies and for the shipping and other services of the northern colonies. Thus, the economies of the three North American sub-regions were tied up with the slavery system of the Americas, either in the production process or in the market.\(^{35}\)

British North America’s large-scale involvement in the Atlantic system during the colonial period, produced differing economic and social structures in the southern, middle and northern colonies. In the middle and north, production was based on free white labour, property widely spread, and incomes more evenly distributed. In the south, the predominance of plantation agriculture dependent on African slave labour produced a population with a large proportion of slaves, a large concentration of property and an extremely uneven distribution of income. Of the 697,000 slaves in the United States in 1790, 642,000 were in the south, being 36 per cent of the total population of the southern states.\(^{36}\) While the structures in the middle and northern territories encouraged the growth of the home

35. The economies of the southern colonies were tied to the slavery system at the level of production, while those of the middle and northern colonies were tied to New World slavery at the market level, since it was the structure of the slave plantations of the Caribbean that created the markets for foodstuffs and commercial services on which the middle and northern colonies largely depended at this time. The following figures of export earnings from the major commodities and services (annual averages for 1768–72) give an indication of the structure of North America’s export trade during the colonial period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>£s sterling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco 766,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipping earnings 610,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bread and flour 410,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice 312,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish 287,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigo 117,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These six items together made up 64.4 per cent of total export earnings for British North America during these years. Tobacco and rice were slave plantation products that came from the southern colonies. Bread and flour came from the family-sized farms of the middle colonies, while fish and shipping came largely from the northern colonies. (The figures here are from J. F. Shepherd and G. M. Walton, 1972, p. 258.) The imports were mainly manufactured goods, and came largely from England, while England retained only a small proportion of the colonies’ exports. The tobacco went almost exclusively to England and Scotland, but over half of the quantity was yearly re-exported to continental Europe.

market for mass consumer goods, the structures in the south restricted the growth of that kind of domestic market and encouraged the import of luxury goods from abroad. In this way, while the foundation for self-sustained economic growth was laid in the middle and northern colonies during the colonial period, dependency structures were built up in the south.

After the achievement of independence, the economy of the southern states continued to depend on African slave labour. The phenomenal expansion of cotton production in the southern states between 1790 and 1860, depended entirely on black slave labour. In consequence, the economic and social structures of the colonial period were maintained in the south, even in the new territories into which cotton plantations expanded in the nineteenth century. In 1850, of the total population of 8,983,000 in the old and new south, 3,117,000 were slaves, being 34.7 per cent. Property and income distribution remained skewed; the dependency structures were further strengthened.

However, with the attainment of independence, the politically independent US government adopted economic measures which gradually turned the south from dependence on Western Europe to dependence on the northern states. The ship-owners and merchants of the north-eastern states, aided by government protection, took over the shipping of southern cotton to Europe and the import of European manufactures for southern plantation owners and their slaves. At the same time, the expansion of cotton production in the south provided a growing food market which stimulated the growth of commercial food production in the west and the flow of immigrants into the western territories. This regional specialization, centred on southern slave plantations, provided a large domestic market

37. Cotton production in the southern states increased from 4,000 bales of 500 lb each in 1790, to 3,841,416 bales in 1860. In the 1850s, about 76.5 per cent of the total output was exported. H. U. Faulkner, 1924, pp. 201-2.
39. An Act of 4 July 1789 allowed a discount of 10 per cent in the duties charged on imports into the United States carried by American-built and American-owned ships. Another Act of 20 July 1789 imposed a duty of 6 cents per ton on American-built and American-owned ships, and 30 cents per ton on foreign-built and foreign-owned ships, entering US ports. Both Acts encouraged the growth of ship-building and ship-owning in the north-eastern states of the USA. The tonnage registered in foreign trade grew from 123,893 in 1789 to 981,000 in 1810. During the same period, US imports carried by American-owned ships increased from 17.5 per cent to 93 per cent of the total, and US exports carried by American-owned ships from 30 per cent to 90 per cent. By 1862, US shipping tonnage registered in foreign trade was 2,496,894, and about 75 per cent of US exports by this time came from the south, cotton taking about 60 per cent and tobacco, rice and refined sugar taking the remaining 15 per cent. (For all these figures, see H. U. Faulkner, 1924, pp. 201, 202, 218, 219, 228 and 233.) The incomes generated directly and indirectly by southern exports, and the earnings made by north-eastern shipowners and merchants in foreign trade, formed the foundation of US industrialization from 1790 to 1860. See D. C. North, 1961.
which encouraged the growth of import-substitution industrialization in the north-east, nurtured by government import controls. In this way, the industrialization of the United States of America up to 1860 was based primarily on the southern slave plantations: the United States took advantage of its political independence at the right moment to manipulate the forces operating in the Atlantic area to the benefit of its economy, aided by the favourable structures that developed in the middle and northern colonies during the colonial period. The dependency structures of the southern states thus acted as essential conditions for the capitalist transformation of the northern and western states.

The evolution of under-development structures in Latin America and the Caribbean

By our definition, the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean were undeveloped when Columbus arrived in the area. Three main factors were responsible for the general level of undevelopment: population, geography and isolation from the rest of the world.

The probable size of the population of all the Americas by 1492 has been a subject of much debate. There have been estimates as low as 8.5 million and as high as 112 million. The more recent research of the Berkeley School, however, indicates that a range of 50 million to 100 million is more plausible. Relative to the large geographical extent of the Americas, even the highest figure is small. Moreover, people were concentrated in about three areas — middle America, comprising the ancient kingdoms of the Aztecs and the Mayas; the Inca empire of ancient Peru; and the Caribbean island of Hispaniola, now made up of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The rest of the New World was characterized by extremely low population densities. It has been said that population densities of less than 10 persons per sq. km applied to over 90 per cent of the geographical area of pre-conquest Latin America.

The low population densities in large areas of pre-Columbus America had adverse effects on the development of trade and the division of labour.

40. For further details relating to Western Europe and North America, see J. E. Inikori, 1979 and 1981.
42. For the estimates of the Berkeley School see W. Borah and S. F. Cook, 1963; also S. F. Cook and W. Borah, 1971–4. For a recent synthesis see W. M. Denevan, 1976.
43. Based on a variety of Indian and Spanish records, and using sophisticated statistical methods, W. Borah and S. F. Cook have put the population of pre-conquest Central Mexico at between 18.8 million and 26.3 million. W. Borah and S. F. Cook, 1967, p. 205. Cook and Borah have also estimated the population of Hispaniola at between 7 million and 8 million by 1492. (B. Keen and M. Wasserman, 1980, p. 30.) Cook and Borah’s estimates have been subject to considerable recent criticism as being on the high side.
Areas with high population densities, however, were separated from one another and from the sparsely populated areas by thick forest, mountains and deep valleys. These made communication difficult and restricted the development of intra-American trade. In this situation, sea-borne commerce would have been important in pushing the frontier of trade from the sea coast to the interior, as happened in North America in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, the isolation of the Americas from the rest of the world up to 1492 did not make this possible. Because of this isolation, the rich natural resources of the Americas had little commercial value and therefore made little or no contribution to the development of population and trade.

Consequently, while the ancient civilizations of Central and South America had reached a high level of cultural development by 1492, their economies were basically undeveloped. They needed external commodity trade with the rest of the world to give economic value to their resources, encourage the growth and spread of their populations, stimulate the development of intra-American trade, and set in motion the process of capitalist transformation.

Contrary to these requirements, the trading opportunities that followed the arrival of the Europeans in 1492, came under conditions which led to the evolution of structures of underdevelopment rather than development. First, the West European countries forcefully took control of the natural resources of Latin America and the Caribbean. The Indians were humiliated and demoralized. When the labour demands and the unfamiliar diseases brought by the Europeans were added, the Indian population collapsed everywhere in Latin America and the Caribbean. The demographic catastrophe of Central Mexico in the sixteenth century vividly demonstrates the point. The estimated population of 18.8 to 26.3 million in the area before the European conquest, fell to 6.3 million by 1548 and to 1.9 million in 1580. By 1605, it was down to approximately 1.1 million.45

The virtual elimination of the entire Indian population led to two important results. The first is that the phenomenal expansion of commodity production for sea-borne trade with Europe and North America – which occurred between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries – was made possible only by a massive import of African slave labour. The second is that the agricultural land in Latin America and the Caribbean was taken over by European colonists and put into large estates that came to be known as hacienda or lazenda. It will be shown subsequently that both developments provided trading opportunities that stimulated the capitalist transformation of Western Europe and North America, while at the same time producing underdevelopment and dependence in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The magnitude of contraband slave imports into Spanish America in

the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries makes it almost impossible to show
the quantitative contribution of African slave labour to the production of
precious metals in Spanish America during those centuries. However, a
census taken in Spanish America by the clergy in 1796 was reported to

46. The evidence produced by E. Vila Vilar indicates the magnitude of the contraband
imports: 'D. Fernando de Sarria, the deputy governor of Cartagena, was able to verify that
between 1516 and 1619 duty had been paid on only 4816 blacks, whereas in reality 6000
had entered in little more than a year – from May 1619 until December 1620. He contended
that the boats that arrived with 15, 25, 37 and 45 'pieces' actually had on board 200, 300,
and 400. The visitador Medina Rosales testified that it was common for merchants, when
paying duty, to declare far fewer 'pieces' than they were actually transporting; he had
proven that one vessel that declared 68 was carrying 440; another declaring 45 had 200 on
board; and another that declared 65 introduced 260; and he contended that in one year,
from 10 June 1620 to 18 July 1621, 6443 slave 'pieces' had entered the port of Cartagena.
Juán de Orozco, treasurer of Santa Marta, wrote to the King in 1631 that every ship that
arrived with blacks carried 400 'pieces', although duties were only paid on 100; and
D. Martín de Saavedra, president of the audiencia of San Domingo, testified in 1637 that
slaving vessels going to Cartagena with 150 registered, in reality carried 300.' E. Vila Vilar,
have shown that people of African origin numbered 679,842 in Mexico and 539,628 in Peru. 47 While one cannot ascertain the accuracy of the census, these figures indicate that African slave labour was crucial to the economies of colonial Mexico and Peru. In Brazil, export production of sugar in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries depended entirely on African slave labour. While the Brazilian gold boom of the eighteenth century brought many European traders and mining capitalists to the country, actual production still virtually depended on African slave labour. This is borne out by the ethnic composition of the Brazilian population in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In 1798, of the total population of 3,250,000, people of African origin numbered 1,988,000, of whom 1,582,000 were slaves. In 1872, approximately 5.8 million out of the total population of 9.9 million were people of African origin, of whom 1.5 million were slaves. 48 Thus, people of African origin made up 61.2 per cent of the total Brazilian population in 1798, and 58 per cent in 1872. The slave populations were concentrated in those regions producing gold and agricultural products for export to Europe and North America. For example, of the 1,566,416 slaves in Brazil in 1873, 1,233,210 (79.2 per cent) were in six export-producing provinces: Bahia, Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul. 49 The largest concentration — 351,254 — was in Minas Gerais, the gold-producing province.

In the Caribbean Islands, the domination of export production by people of African origin is reflected by the transformation of the ethnic composition of their populations after 1650. Before the mid-seventeenth century, the production of subsistence crops had dominated the islands' economies and export production was marginal. From the second half of the seventeenth century, the large-scale import of African slave labour and the expansion of plantation agriculture made it possible for export production to grow rapidly, while the production of subsistence crops was drastically reduced. Thus, the combined populations of Barbados, Jamaica and the Leeward Islands in 1660 was made up of 33,000 whites and 22,500 African slaves, but in 1713 the whites numbered 32,000 and African slaves, 130,000. 50 This means that the slave population increased from 40.5 per cent of the total in 1660 to 80.2 per cent in 1713. Similarly, in the French West Indies, the combined population of Martinique and Saint-Domingue in 1678–81 was made up of 6786 whites and 7397 African slaves, 51 but by 1780 of the total population of 514,849 in all the French West Indies, only 63,682 were

47. J. E. Inikori, 1976, p. 204.
48. T. W. Merrick and D. H. Graham, 1979, Table III, 2, p. 29. The Indian population was 252,000 in 1798 and 386,955 in 1872. The European population in both years was 1,010,000 and 3,787,289, respectively.
whites, 437,738 were African slaves and 13,429 were free blacks.\textsuperscript{52} So, the population of African origin in the French West Indies grew from about 52 per cent of the total in the late seventeenth century to about 88 per cent in 1780.

It was this massive transplantation of African labour into Latin America, the Caribbean Islands and the southern territories of North America that produced the phenomenal expansion of commodity production and trade in the Atlantic area between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. This, in turn, provided the stimulating opportunities and challenges under pressure of which the process of capitalist transformation was completed in the major West European countries and North America. This same historical process, however, produced structures of underdevelopment and dependence in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Because the total population was made up largely of slaves, the vast majority of the people in Latin America and the Caribbean earned incomes far too low to make them regular members of the market. In consequence, the growth of the domestic market for mass consumer goods was highly restricted. Lacking a growing mass domestic market to encourage the flow of resources into the development of industrial production for home consumption, the profits from mining and plantation agriculture went for the purchase of manufactures imported from Europe, or were repatriated to finance investment and consumption in Europe. The situation was aggravated by colonial laws which restricted the establishment of industries in Latin America and the Caribbean during the colonial period. In this way, Latin America and the Caribbean taken together, provided a stimulating market for manufacturers in Western Europe, particularly British manufacturers who supplied the British colonies as well as Spanish and Portuguese America, directly or via Spain and Portugal.\textsuperscript{53} For example, the official value of British exports to the British West Indies between 1714 and 1773 amounted in total to £43.4 million (virtually all manufactured goods). During the same period, the official value of commodities exported to Britain by these British West Indian colonies amounted to £101.3 million.\textsuperscript{54} This shows the importance of the New World markets to British manufacturers as well as the magnitude of resource repatriation from the slave plantation colonies.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{52} E. Williams, 1970, p. 153.
\textsuperscript{54} E. Williams, 1970, p. 151.
\textsuperscript{55} A common feature of the slave plantation economies of the New World was the tendency for the level of production to exceed the level of consumption within the territory of production. This was also true of British North America. Between 1714 and 1773, the southern slave plantation colonies of Carolina, Virginia and Maryland exported to Britain commodities worth officially £46.6 million, while New England, New York and Pennsylvania (non-slave colonies) exported goods totalling only £7.2 million. However, the three slave plantation colonies imported from Britain during the same period goods worth only £26.8 million, while the three non-slave colonies imported goods worth £37.9 million.
PLATE 4.4  Negro slaves cutting sugar cane on a plantation in the West Indies, c. 1833
The non-development of any important industrial sector gave rise to disarticulated economies in Latin America and the Caribbean, with the mining and agricultural sectors linked strongly to economies in Western Europe and also, later, to the economy of the United States. Associated with this development was the emergence of vested economic interests tied strongly to imports and exports. The mining magnates and the agrarian oligarchies in Latin America and the Caribbean saw their interests only in imports and exports. The merchant class that grew out of the conditions that prevailed from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries also became enmeshed in imports and exports. The highly skewed distribution of property and incomes associated with the plantation and slave economies ensured that there were no other groups that could rival these three (the mine-owners, the agrarian oligarchy and the merchants) in economic and political power. Hence, even after the major countries of Latin America had become politically independent in the nineteenth century, state policies continued to favour the production of primary commodities for export and the import of manufactured goods. This was further encouraged by the outcome of the industrial revolutions in Western Europe and the United States in the nineteenth century. These industrial revolutions, nurtured by the Atlantic system, led to the explosion of demand for foodstuffs and raw materials of all types. At the same time, the tremendous reductions in manufacturing costs brought about by the industrial revolutions so cheapened manufactured goods traded in the Atlantic area that the opportunity cost of setting up the domestic production of manufactured goods for home consumption was raised considerably for the newly independent Latin American countries. Thus, by the mid-nineteenth century, the economies and societies of Latin America and the Caribbean had become so structured that underdevelopment and dependence had become entrenched.

The laying of the foundations of dependency structures in Africa

Christopher Wrigley wrote:

... there is one unexpected conclusion that does seem to be rather forcibly suggested by recent archaeological work, namely, that the intensive peopling of sub-Saharan Africa did not start with the first signs of agriculture, or of iron-working, but only about a thousand

(E. Williams, 1970, p. 151.) Thus, commodity production occurred largely in the slave plantation territories, while consumption was concentrated mainly in the non-slave territories of the Atlantic. The non-slave territories of British North America derived their purchasing power largely from their sale of foodstuffs, shipping and merchants' services to the Caribbean slave plantations and also to the slave plantations of the southern colonies of British North America.
years ago or rather less, at the beginning of what in Bantu Africa is called the Later Iron Age. If this is really so, radically new perspectives are opened up. There is now room for demographic expansion to have been proceeding rapidly at the time of the first European contacts ... 56

The available indirect evidence lends much support to this conclusion. Local sources in Africa speak unanimously of general population migrations during the first half of the present millennium. While these sources often refer to political causes, these population movements certainly had something to do with increasing ratios of population to resources in the older places of settlement, forcing some groups to move into unsettled or sparsely settled territories. 57 Also, the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are often referred to as a period in Africa history during which important changes occurred in the organization and technology of production, both in agriculture and manufacturing, and after the sixteenth century there followed a long period of stability and stagnation. 58 Again, rapidly growing population during the preceding centuries must have been an important factor in these changes.

The evidence thus shows that African societies were going through major processes of transformation when the Europeans arrived in the late fifteenth century. Recent archaeological findings indicate that a high level of social and economic transformation had already been attained in a number of

56. C. Wrigley, 1981, p. 18. According to Thurstan Shaw's calculation, the population of Africa in c. -10,000 was 2 million, and 5 million in c. -3000 (T. Shaw, 1981, p. 589). Further, Posnansky says that the total population of sub-Saharan Africa before + 1000 was 'well under 10 million'. (M. Posnansky, 1981, p. 727). For the year +1500, Shaw has concluded that archaeological evidence supports the figure of 20 million as the population of West Africa (T. Shaw, 1977, p. 108). Taking these figures together, the indication is that the population of West Africa grew rapidly between 1000 and 1500. This is so because, if we assume that about one-third of the total population of sub-Saharan Africa in 1000 was located in West Africa, then the West African population increased from about 3 million in c.1000 to about 20 million in c.1500.

57. Jan Vansina says that most of the population migrations in the African rain-forest before 1600 involved movements from high to low densities (J. Vansina, 1981, p. 758). Again, Dike's account of migrations into the Niger delta in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries also shows movement from high to low densities – from Benin to the Delta (K. O. Dike, 1956, pp. 22–5). See also ch. 3 above.

58. For Senegambia, Curtin says that the period from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century was one of comparative stability in agricultural technology, after the developments of the two previous centuries (P. D. Curtin, 1975, pp. 13–15). See also M. Malowist, 1966, and the debate which ensued between A. G. Hopkins, 1966 and Malowist. Neville Chittick also talks of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as the period of greatest prosperity on the East African coast (H. N. Chittick, 1977, p. 209). The process seems to have started somewhat later in the interior of East Africa. As Unomah and Webster say: 'The years from 1500 to 1800 were marked by considerable population movements throughout this region [the East African interior]. Sparsely populated areas were settled, larger societies were created and new states were founded.' (A. C. Unomah and J. B. Webster, 1976, p. 272).
places by that time.\textsuperscript{59} However, the relatively short period of time the processes had covered by the late fifteenth century meant that economic and social structures in Africa still conformed basically to our definition of underdevelopment. The total population relative to the available agricultural land was still very small. The relatively small population was scattered over the huge continent, with groups separated from one another by long distances and difficult terrain.\textsuperscript{60} The emergence of massive desert between black Africa and the Mediterranean and the Middle East (the centres of international commerce for many centuries) reduced black Africa’s trade with the rest of the world to commodities with very high value but relatively low transport costs—gold and slaves. Both conditions limited the development of the division of labour, the growth of internal trade, the evolution of market institutions, and the transformation of the pre-capitalist modes of production still overwhelmingly dominant. Thus, the ongoing population expansion needed to proceed for some centuries to raise the ratio of population to agricultural land sufficiently for social differentiation, economic and political organization to be further elaborated. More extensive external trade based on bulky commodities—agricultural, industrial, mineral, etc.—was also needed to interact with internal factors to speed up the process of structural transformation.

The establishment of a seaborne commerce between Africa and Western Europe from the second half of the fifteenth century seemed at first to offer the kind of opportunities that black Africa needed for rapid economic and social transformation. The gold trade expanded. Trade in agricultural commodities, such as pepper, was initiated. Some stimulus was even given to African cloth producers as the Portuguese and the Dutch participated in the distribution of African cloths to different parts of the African coast.\textsuperscript{61}

These early developments, however, were short-lived. When the vast

\textsuperscript{59} See for example T. Shaw, 1970. Northrup says, ‘Taken as a whole, the material remains of Igbo-Ukwu are evidence of a craft industry highly developed in skill and artistry. While both earlier and richer than other evidence, the Igbo-Ukwu finds do not diverge from the general trends of cultural development in southern Nigeria. Yet these craft industries were but the summit of an economy about whose base Igbo-Ukwu gives very little information. Despite this lack of direct evidence, it is clear that such specialists and their customers could only have existed in a society producing an agricultural surplus capable of supporting them.’ (D. Northrup, 1978, p. 20).

\textsuperscript{60} In East Africa, the relatively prosperous coastal towns were not brought into regular trading contact with the East Africa interior until well into the eighteenth century. As Roland Oliver says: ‘The reasons for this strange disjunction between coast and interior are certainly in large measure geographical. Behind the narrow coastal plain, the land rises towards the great central plateau, in shelf after shelf of dry thorn scrub, hard to inhabit and difficult to cross. . . . During Iron Age times at least, then, the focal area of human development into dense populations and larger societies has lain in the centre of the subcontinent, 1300 kilometres or more from the sea.’ R. Oliver, 1977b, pp. 621–2. See also A. C. Unomah and J. B. Webster, 1976, p. 272.

\textsuperscript{61} For these early developments see J. W. Blake, 1977, and A. F. C. Ryder, 1969.
resources of the Americas became accessible to Western Europe after 1492, and with the virtual elimination of the Indian population as a consequence of the conquest and the diseases introduced by the European conquerors, the role of Africa in the evolving Atlantic economic system was altered. The population which Africa needed to build up in order to provide the internal conditions necessary for a complete structural transformation of the continent's economies and societies was transferred massively to the Americas where it was employed to develop large-scale commodity production and trade. The conditions created over a period of about three centuries by this massive transfer of population discouraged the development of commodity production in Africa, both for internal trade and for export, and laid the foundation for dependency structures in the continent.

The first crippling impact of this forced migration was the elimination of the ongoing population growth and the outright depopulation of large areas of the continent. Earlier in the chapter, it was estimated that about 22 million people were exported from black Africa to the rest of the world between 1500 and 1890, 15.4 million across the Atlantic and 6.9 million across the Sahara, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. These figures of actual exports have to be properly interpreted to relate them to demographic processes in black Africa during the period.

The main issue to examine is the extent to which these exports reduced the reproductive capacity of the populations of black Africa. This requires an analysis of the age and sex composition of the exported population.

62. See above, pp. 80–83.
because it is the number of females of child-bearing age that will determine the magnitude of the reduction in reproduction capacity.

In the trade across the Sahara and the Red Sea, young and attractive females predominated because demand was largely for concubines. It is generally believed that the sex ratio in this branch of the trade was two females to one male. This view is not based on any hard data. However, it has been confirmed by census evidence relating to the population of black slaves in Egypt in the nineteenth century which shows that the ratio of female to male slaves was about three to one.63

For exports across the Atlantic, recent research now provides hard data with which to show sex ratios for the 404,705 Africans imported into different New World territories during the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.64 This represents about 3 per cent of the estimated total exports to the Americas. While the size and the spread of the sample over time and space are quite good, there is rather an over-representation of the Congo–Angola region, being over 50 per cent of the total. East Africa, however, is not represented at all in the sample, although it is reasonable to assume that the East African ratio must fall somewhere within the range for Western Africa. Overall, the sample shows that females made up 32.9 per cent of the 404,705 slaves in the sample.

An important element revealed by an examination of the data for the Atlantic trade is the consistent variation of the sex ratios according to regions of origin. A sample of 43,096 slaves analysed by the writer,65 shows this clearly (see Table 4.5). The regional variation shown by this sample is further confirmed by a sample of 55,855 slaves landed in the West Indies in the years 1781–98 (see Table 4.6).66

From these two sets of data it is clear that the Nigerian area, from the Bight of Benin to the Bight of Biafra, exported the largest proportion of females, ranging from two-fifths to one-half of total exports. However, the other major exporting area, the Congo–Angola region, regularly exported a larger proportion of males than the general average. It is thus likely that the over-representation of the Congo–Angola region in the sample has had a depressing effect on the proportion of families calculated earlier from the 404,705 slaves. This regional variation of the sex composition of the population exported is very important in assessing the demographic impact of the exports at the micro-regional level.

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65. J. E. Inikori, 1982, Table 2, p. 23. The sample covers the years, 1764–88, and relates to slaves imported into Jamaica.
Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 4.5</th>
<th>Sex ratios of slaves from different regions of Africa, 1764–88</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>African region</strong></td>
<td><strong>Percentage male</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>72.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windward Coast</td>
<td>65.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold Coast</td>
<td>66.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whydah</td>
<td>57.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>49.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonny</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calabar</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>68.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>68.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source J. E. Inikori, 1982, Table 2, p. 23.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 4.6</th>
<th>Sex ratios of slaves landed in the West Indies, 1781–98, by region of origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>African region</strong></td>
<td><strong>Slaves landed</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegambia</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>5 544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windward Coast</td>
<td>3 420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold Coast</td>
<td>2 721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bight of Benin</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bight of Biafra</td>
<td>18 218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo–Angola</td>
<td>12 168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>13 279</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source H. S. Klein, 1978, Table 3, p. 30.*

For the whole of black Africa, the evidence analysed above shows that the number of females annually exported was of a magnitude that must have drastically reduced the region’s reproduction capacity. Considering the additional population losses caused by the exports to the Americas—losses due to mortality between the time of capture and the time of final export, and deaths arising from the wars and famines associated with the gathering of captives for export—along with the 6.9 million exported to the other parts of the world (mostly females), the evidence indicates strongly that the population of black Africa declined absolutely from at least 1650 to 1850.

This overall decline was not evenly shared among all the sub-regions. When the regional variations in the sex ratios shown earlier are related to the regional distribution of the total exports, a fair assessment of the
FIG. 4.2 Sources of the Atlantic slave trade from Africa in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (after J. E. Inikori)
demographic impact at the micro-regional level can be made.\textsuperscript{67} An examination of the evidence in this way indicates that the ultimate territories that provided the numbers exported through the Bight of Benin, the Bight of Biafra and Congo–Angola must have suffered serious depopulation.\textsuperscript{68}

Again, because the enslavement of the exported population was largely through military operations and other forms of violence, the export slave trade had a serious distorting impact on African political and social structures. The views of some contemporary observers may be cited to illustrate the point. In 1679, the Director-General of the Dutch West India Company on the Gold Coast (now Ghana), Heerman Abramsz, reported that since the introduction of firearms following the stepping up of the export slave trade, the whole Coast has come into a kind of state of war. This started in the year 1658, and gradually this has gone so far, that none of the passages could anymore be used, and none of the traders could come through.\textsuperscript{69}

In about 1730, another officer of the Dutch company reported:

\begin{quote}
In the first place it should be observed that that part of Africa which as of old is known as the 'Gold Coast' because of the great quantity
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{67} On the basis of the evidence now available, the following may be taken tentatively as the regional distribution of the total numbers exported by way of the Atlantic trade:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>African sub-region</th>
<th>Percentage of eighteenth-century export</th>
<th>Percentage of nineteenth-century export</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senegambia to Gold Coast</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bight of Benin</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bight of Biafra</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Central Africa</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-east Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The percentages are based on evidence summarized by P. E. Lovejoy, 1982. While Lovejoy's method and global figures are certainly wrong, some of the evidence is useful and the percentage distribution based on it may be taken tentatively as an approximation. Although East Africa was already exporting large numbers to the Indian Ocean islands in the eighteenth century, it did not export any significant numbers to the Atlantic territories until the nineteenth century. On the other hand, account must be taken of the large number of slaves which mainland East Africa sent to the clove plantations of Pemba and Zanzibar in the nineteenth century when considering the demographic impact of the slave trade on East Africa.

\textsuperscript{68} There is a growing amount of evidence which when properly interpreted indicates strongly that a large proportion of the exports through the Bights of Benin and Biafra came from that part of the West African middle belt extending from the eastern boundary of Nigeria to the eastern boundary of modern Ghana. This area, especially the Nigerian portion, also made large contributions to the slave trade across the Sahara which took mostly females. Since the exports through the Bights also included a large number of females, it appears certain that the generally low population densities of the area in the nineteenth century and afterwards are due to the slave trade.

\textsuperscript{69} Heerman Abramsz to Assembly of Ten, 23 November 1679, in A. van Dantzig, 1978, p. 17. The Assembly of Ten was the governing body of the company in Holland.
of gold which was at one time purchased there by the Company as well as by Dutch private ships, has now virtually changed into a pure Slave Coast; the great quantity of guns and powder which the Europeans have from time to time brought there has given cause to terrible wars among the Kings, Princes and Caboceers of those lands, who made their prisoners of war slaves; these slaves were immediately bought up by the Europeans at steadily increasing prices, which in its turn animated again and again those people to renew their hostilities, and their hope for big and easy profits made them forget all labour, using all sorts of pretexts to attack each other, or reviving old disputes. Consequently, there is now very little trade among the coast Negroes except in slaves . . .

Later in the eighteenth century, an African observer, Olaudah Equiano, wrote in the same vein:

From what I can recollect of these battles, they appear to have been irruptions of one little state or district on the other, to obtain prisoners or booty. Perhaps they were incited to this by those traders who brought the European goods I mentioned amongst us. Such a mode of obtaining slaves in Africa is common; and I believe more are procured this way, and by kidnapping, than any other.

These illustrative observations taken from a large body of similar evidence show the strong link that existed between the export slave trade and the frequency of wars in Africa during the period. The causal relationship was, of course, very complex. The illustrative observations have not adequately brought out the full complexity of the relationship. The fact is, however, that – directly and indirectly – the export slave trade stimulated frequent wars which distorted the political and social structures of African societies.

One major distortion was the creation of military aristocracies that became so politically influential that they determined the direction of state policy in virtually all major African states of the period. The existence of a large export market for captives meant that the military aristocracies saw war more as a source of captives to be sold than as a means of acquiring more territories whose natural and human resources could be exploited for the benefit of the ruling class through an effective integration into a larger state. This had an adverse effect on the ultimate size of these states and on political stability within them. This is why many of the states that emerged during the period were very limited in size, never achieved real political

70. Enclosure in the Minutes of the meeting of the Directors of the Chamber of Zeeland, held 7 February 1730, in A. van Dantzig, 1978, p. 240.

71. P. D. Curtin, 1967, p. 77. The European goods mentioned earlier by Equiano to which reference is made here are fire-arms, gunpowder, hats and beads. The description by Equiano suggests that these goods were taken to his homeland by the Aro traders of south-eastern Nigeria.

72. For details of this see J. E. Inikori, 1982.
stability and collapsed rather quickly either from within or at the very first sign of trouble from a formidable enemy.

The existence of these military aristocracies, in interaction with the prevailing economic conditions, also stimulated the growth of the slave mode of production in several African societies. Under the structural impact of the export slave trade, first across the Sahara and the Red Sea, and more extensively later across the Atlantic, the various forms of personal dependence that had existed in Africa were transformed into institutions that more or less conformed to chattel slavery of the Western type. Large proportions of the populations of major African societies came to be held under these conditions by people who were connected directly or indirectly with the export slave trade, either as merchants or as government functionaries. With these structures already in place, and under conditions of extremely low population relative to the available cultivable land, the expansion of ‘legitimate commerce’ that followed the elimination of the export demand for slaves in the nineteenth century further provoked the expansion of the slave mode of production in Africa.  

The overall consequence of these historical processes covering a period of more than three centuries was to alter the direction of the economic process in Africa away from development and towards underdevelopment and dependence. The elimination of the population expansion that was in progress up to the sixteenth century, brought to a halt processes leading to the expansion of intra-African trade, the development of internal markets and market institutions, the commercialization of agriculture and a general development of the division of labour. The prevalence of generally low population densities throughout the continent, with vast areas such as the West African middle belt virtually empty of people, retarded the development of production for market exchange. The growth of the slave-trade mode of production in large areas of Africa during the period had the effect of further limiting the development of internal markets and market production. Moreover, the Atlantic slave trade in various ways obstructed the development of commodity trade with Europe that would have stimulated the growth of internal trade and market production. Hence, subsistence production of foodstuffs remained overwhelmingly dominant in African economies by the middle decades of the nineteenth century. This virtually eliminated capital accumulation in agriculture and, therefore, the growth of productivity in food-crop farming for the domestic market. W. Arthur Lewis has demonstrated brilliantly that present-day prices received from the world market by African producers for their primary commodities, are determined by the low level of returns to African foodstuffs farmers producing for the domestic market, owing to the low  

74. For details of this point, see J. E. Inikori, 1983. See also J. E. Inikori, 1982, Introduction.
FIG. 4.3 The West African middle belt
Map published by kind permission of the American Geographical Society
productivity of these foodstuffs farmers. What Arthur Lewis does not seem to be aware of is that the origins of the low productivity of African foodstuffs farmers are traceable through more than three centuries from the seventeenth century, further worsened by the economic impact of colonialism in the twentieth century.

The low level of division of labour and the limited size of the domestic market were unfavourable for the development of manufacturing beyond the handicraft stage. The development of manufacturing was further affected adversely by the uncontrolled import of European and Oriental manufactures in exchange for captives. Thus, with limited internal markets, non-capitalized agricultural and industrial sectors, small-scale states dominated by merchants and warriors depending for their subsistence on a slave mode of production, the foundation was firmly laid for the African economies to become dependent on the industrialized economies of the Atlantic area for the sale of their primary commodities and for the supply of manufactured goods and services, as the export slave trade ended in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. The full edifice was completed by colonial rule that started from the late nineteenth century.

Conclusion

The conclusion that flows from the foregoing evidence and analysis can now be summarized. At the time Christopher Columbus arrived in the Americas in 1492, the economies of the Atlantic area were all undeveloped, by definition. In Western Europe as well as in Africa and the Americas, manufacturing was at the handicraft stage and was part and parcel of agriculture, the overwhelmingly dominant sector. Precapitalist modes of production were everywhere dominant. In this circumstance, the economies of the Atlantic area could not effectively operate under a single system ruled by market forces. Thus, initially, Western Europe had to bring its naval and military superiority into play. By the middle decades of the nineteenth century, the economies of the Atlantic area had moved distances apart, with mechanized industries concentrated in the fringe areas of the Atlantic – the north-western part of Europe and the north-eastern part of

75. As Arthur Lewis puts it: 'A farmer in Nigeria might tend his peanuts with as much diligence and skill as a farmer in Australia tended his sheep, but the return would be very different. The just price, to use the medieval term, would have rewarded equal competence with equal earnings. But the market price gave the Nigerian for his peanuts a 700-lbs.-of-grain-per-acre level of living, and the Australian for his wool a 1600-lbs.-per-acre level of living, not because of differences in competence, nor because of marginal utilities of productivities in peanuts or wool, but because these were the respective amounts of food that their cousins could produce on the family farms. This is the fundamental sense in which the leaders of the less developed world denounce the current international economic order as unjust, namely that the factorial terms of trade are based on the market forces of opportunity cost and not on the just principle of equal pay for equal work.' 1978, p. 19.
the USA – while the greater part of the Atlantic region was dominated by
the production of primary commodities: commercial foodstuffs production
and plantation agriculture in the western and southern USA; plantation
agriculture in the Caribbean; mining, large-scale livestock raising and
plantation agriculture in Latin America; and subsistence food-crops
farming and part-time gathering of wild products for export in Africa (the
export of captives having been cut off). The economies and societies of the
Atlantic area had become so structured that a single economic system ruled
by market forces had emerged. Only determined political actions in one or
more of the member countries could now radically alter the structures and
the international (as well as inter-regional) division of labour that had
become entrenched. Barring such actions, the situation was bound to be
self-perpetuating, as the advantageously placed fringe areas of the Atlantic
further exploited the situation to their economic and political advantage.

The evidence and analysis we have presented all show that these develop­
ments derived ultimately from the export slave trade from Africa. It is
clear from the evidence that the industrial revolution in England in the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and the one in the north-eastern
USA in the nineteenth, could not have occurred at the time they did
without the phenomenal expansion of commodity production and trade in
the Atlantic area from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century. The same
expansion of production and trade provided the basis for the industrial
revolutions that occurred later in the nineteenth century in north-western
Europe. There is no doubt whatsoever that it was African slave labour,
provided through the export slave trade from Africa, that made possible
this phenomenal expansion of commodity production and trade in the
Atlantic area during the period.

While this expansion stimulated the growth of free wage labour to
become the dominant form of labour in north-western Europe and the
north-eastern USA, in the rest of the Atlantic area the slave mode of
production expanded. Particularly in Latin America, the Caribbean and
the southern states of the USA, the expansion of the slave mode of
production provided the conditions for unequal development that facili­
tated the rapid development of capitalism in north-western Europe and
the north-eastern USA. The concentration of mechanized industries in
these fringe areas of the Atlantic by the nineteenth century was made
possible by the large market which the conditions of unequal development
made available to manufacturers in these areas. The evidence thus supports
the hypothesis that the historical process that produced capitalism in north­
western Europe and the north-eastern USA produced at the same time a
consolidation and further extension of pre-capitalist modes of production
in Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean and the southern states of the USA.

From the conditions created by the economic order that had emerged
in the Atlantic area by the nineteenth century, the fringe areas of the
Atlantic, equipped with their instruments of mechanized industry,
launched an economic and political onslaught on Asia, the Pacific territories and the rest of Europe: an onslaught that finally produced the contemporary world economic order. It is important to note that at the time the Atlantic economic order was being constructed between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, Western Europe could not establish with Asia a firm trading link based on the exchange of European products with those of Asia. For several centuries Western Europe had to depend on American bullion to maintain its trade link with Asia for want of commodities the Asians considered a better bargain than their own products. This is borne out by the composition of exports to Asia by the English East India Company in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (see Table 4.7). A large proportion of West European imports from Asia during the same period also went to Africa and the Americas as re-exports.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total exports (Ten-year average in £s sterling)</th>
<th>Percentage precious metals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1661-70</td>
<td>133 464</td>
<td>67.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1691-1700</td>
<td>332 613</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1721-30</td>
<td>650 008</td>
<td>83.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751-60</td>
<td>988 588</td>
<td>65.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source P. Kriede, 1980-3, Table 25, p. 84.

By the nineteenth century, however, Western Europe and North America were able to integrate the economies of Asia firmly into the Atlantic economic order, as the Asians found it difficult to resist the products of mechanized industry from Western Europe and North America. Machine-produced textiles from England and North America poured into Asia, forcing the region into the production of raw materials to meet the ever-growing demand of the new industries. In this way, assisted by colonial rule, the Atlantic economic order was extended to the rest of the world, resulting in the world economic order of the twentieth century. It can thus be validly said that the twentieth-century world economic order was constructed originally with the sweat and blood of Africans. Because the population of Africa was forcefully transferred to the Americas for this purpose at a time when Africa needed a growing population and external commodity trade in order to develop commodity production and transform its pre-capitalist social formations, all the latter developments were arrested. Hence, Africa entered the twentieth century as the most economically backward major region of the world. Between the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth century, colonial rule contributed immensely to the maintenance of this position of Africa among the major regions of the world. The latter subject, however, is beyond the scope of this chapter.

76. P. Kriede, 1980-3, Table 25, p. 84.
Europe and the Americas

When Africans first arrived in Iberia or the rest of Europe is difficult to document. However, it is likely that some Africans north and south of the Sahara made their way into Iberia during the great trans-Saharan trade of ancient times.

Africans also accompanied Muslims on their Iberian campaign in 711 and the ensuing centuries of Muslim-Christian warfare saw Africans fighting as soldiers and serving as slaves. Indeed, as early as the thirteenth century Moorish merchants were selling sub-Saharan Africans at fairs at Guimarães, in northern Portugal.¹

When Portugal captured Ceuta in 1415, a sustained European penetration of inner Africa was launched. By 1435 the Portuguese had reached Senegal and were in Congo by 1483. Africans were taken to Lisbon from 1441, a precedent which led to the forced immigration of Africans in the modern slave trade. Indeed, between 1450 and 1500 Portugal imported an estimated 700 to 900 African slaves annually. By the beginning of the seventeenth century there were an estimated 100,000 slaves in Portugal and its Madeira Islands. In 1468 the Portuguese crown initiated the famous asiento (monopoly) over the trade in slaves south of the Senegal river.

The growing number of African slaves had to be justified and the papal bulls of Nicholas V (1454) and Calixtus III (1456) provided the necessary justification by establishing Portugal's expansion into Africa as a crusade to Christianize. Consequently, enslavement of Africans by Christians came to be viewed as advantageous to the 'pagan' indigenes. This argument was further supported by the biblical myth of Ham whose descendants were said to be cursed and subjected to slave status. The strength of this biblical and church dimension provided an inestimable basis for earlier ideas on the 'savage' and 'inferior' nature of Africans.²

In Spain and Portugal black slaves worked in mines, on farms, in construction, as soldiers, guards, domestics, couriers, stevedores, factory labourers and concubines. Even those who were not slaves were invariably

¹. A. Luttrall, 1964, p. 64.
². J. Walvin, 1972, pp. 10-12, 32-47 and 115-52.
found doing the most menial and arduous tasks.

The sale and use of slaves were primarily urban phenomena, largely because the import of such labour occurred at port-cities and towns. The principal urban areas were Barcelona, Cadiz, Seville and Valencia in Spain, and Lisbon in Portugal. Urban life provided opportunities for slaves to escape and, in some cases, to purchase their freedom. It is not surprising, therefore, that 'free' blacks also congregated mainly in urban settings where they sought to cultivate a community spirit with institutions reflective of black concerns. Religious brotherhoods were organized in Barcelona about 1455, in Valencia in 1472 and in Seville in 1475. Those organizations sponsored recreational activities, festivals and social events; they raised money to purchase and free other slaves; and they bought burial plots which, for blacks, usually had to be in separate areas.3

Some free blacks achieved distinction in Spanish society. Cristóbal de Meneses became a prominent Dominican priest; Juán de Pareja and Sebastián Gómez were both painters; and Leonardo Ortez became a lawyer. In 1475 Juán de Valladolid was appointed supervisor over the blacks in Seville. More distinguished, however, was Juán Latino, a black scholar who received two degrees at the University of Granada in 1546 and 1556 respectively; he also taught there, although apparently without an official faculty appointment.4

Although African servants accompanied Nicholas Ovando when he assumed his post as the first Spanish governor of Hispaniola in 1502, and while appeals by Pierre Bartholome do Las Casas and others were made to increase the supply of African slaves, there was no official policy for the slave trade to the Americas until 1518 when Charles I of Portugal proclaimed the Asiento do Negroes, thereby accelerating competition for African slaves.

Portugal, although a part of Spain between 1580 and 1640, established a virtual monopoly of the slave trade in 1600 by securing from Spain a contract to supply the Spanish colonies with African slaves. The Dutch obtained the contract in 1640; the French in 1701; and in 1713 the monopoly went to England in the form of the asiento, following the War of the Spanish Succession. England thus became the greatest slave-trading power.

Although the English had a monopoly to supply slaves elsewhere, the number of Africans in England itself also increased. After William Hawkins sailed to West Africa in 1530, subsequent voyages brought African slaves to England. By 1556 Elizabeth I observed that there were too many 'blackmoores' in England and that they should be returned to Africa. From the eighteenth century in particular, West Indian planters on home visits brought with them Africans as domestic slaves and body-guards. Military and naval officers and captains of slave vessels did likewise. Indeed, to have such black servants became a mark of distinction. Gradually this status

4. ibid., p. 18; V. B. Spratlin, 1938.
symbol achieved widespread acceptance, as did the recognition that such servants were cheap labour, and newspapers advertised widely for 'Negroes'.

Most of these Africans were brought to urban areas which facilitated escape into the crowd, the selling of their labour and the development of close relations with liberal persons who opposed slavery. Newspapers in London, Bristol, Liverpool and elsewhere not only advertised slaves but also appealed for the return of escaped slaves. As the demand for slaves increased, kidnapping increased. Slave-hunters in England gained a certain distinction as they specialized in tracking down Africans who did not have the protection of the society or its laws. Africans were frequently picked up and claimed by Europeans on the basis of colour, and in many cases identified by marks burnt into their skins by slave-owners. Colour made Africans targets for enslavement in Europe as in Africa; and the psychological effects of this control by whites over blacks cannot be overestimated. The process of dehumanising the African was thus well in practice by the eighteenth century.\(^5\)

The presence of Africans in England increased demands to know their status. Some English people felt that conversion to Christianity should bring freedom and the rights of civilized men. Granville Sharp was one of the Englishmen who fought for the abolition of slavery. From 1767 and starting with the case of the African Jonathan Strong, Sharp championed the cause of the African slaves by rescuing Africans and fighting court cases for their freedom. The most important of these was that of James Summerset, in 1772, a slave who escaped and was recaptured. The African community in London followed the case closely as they knew the significance the outcome could have for them all. Lord Mansfield, who ruled on the case, did not in fact abolish slavery but he did rule that a slave-master could not legally compel a slave to accompany him abroad – a decision that signalled the beginning of the erosion of slavery in England. At that time it was estimated that some 15,000 Africans were resident in England, some of them living in poverty as pariahs.\(^6\)

From the fifteenth century, the African presence in France received increasing attention. This was the period when French sailors frequented various parts of the West African Coast, particularly the Cape Verde Islands and the Senegal river. Many brought Africans to France, first as evidence of their voyages and later for sale. By 1595 the Portuguese captain, Álvarez d’Almeida, noted that many Africans in Africa spoke French and had visited France.

While enslavement of Africans did occur in France, it is clear that its development was not initially intended. Indeed, a royal court in 1571 proclaimed that: ‘La France, mère de la liberté, ne permet aucun esclave’. However, practices varied and some Africans were enslaved while others

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5. F. O. Shyllon, 1974, pp. 5-10.
6. ibid., pp. 17-23 and 141-64.
remained nominally free in hostile communities. Several observers noted the African presence in French cities such as Anjou, Lyon, Orléans, Nantes and Paris. They were active as servants, menial labourers and even as pages for the nobility; some were also used in parades and in other forms of entertainment. There were also those who distinguished themselves as soldiers, such as those in the Saxe-Volontaires Regiment which was formed with blacks from Guinea, Congo and Madagascar. In the eighteenth century they won acclaim in several European battles.\(^7\)

The most distinguished black in the French military, however, was to be Alexandre Dumas who was born in the nineteenth century to a Frenchman and his African mistress. Subsequent generations of this Dumas family established their mark both in the military and the arts. But most Africans in France were domestics with lives less harsh than their brothers' in slavery.

From the end of the seventeenth century, Africans arrived in France in significant numbers and, during the eighteenth, royal policy permitted French slave-owners in the Americas to bring their slaves to France. Thus blacks became a more common sight in France.

Much less has been published about the African presence in other parts of Europe. However, a number of Africans, especially Ethiopian envoys and pilgrims, visited Europe during the late Middle Ages and by the fifteenth century Ethiopian monks and other Africans including some slaves, were living in Venice, the Vatican and neighbouring cities.\(^8\)

Venetians were slave-traders and slave-owners too. Although most slaves seem to have been of European and Asian origin, some were Africans. Indeed, the trade in African slaves increased after the fall of Constantinople had restricted the Black Sea traffic. Most seem to have been obtained from Egyptian ports, a point which suggests that their origin included the Nile valley of the Sudan.\(^9\)

Documentation is too scanty to generalize about the Africans' lives in Venice and neighbouring areas. Some reports assert that they became absorbed into local families, thereby accounting for their virtual disappearance by the late eighteenth century. Also relevant to their status is the fact that unfree persons were excluded from certain crafts, so African slaves and servants probably suffered this disadvantage. Some observers, however, have noted that slaves were granted the protection of the law. All slaves had to be baptised and this may have encouraged more lenient conditions.\(^10\) However, slaves were unfree and unequal and the physical and psychological limitations suffered require more study before final conclusions are reached.

The most decisive and dramatic aspect of the African dispersion occurred

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10. ibid., pp. 53 and 57.
across the Atlantic Ocean to the Americas.\textsuperscript{11} For most of the fifteenth century that traffic in people was primarily a Caribbean, Central and South American phenomenon as the Portuguese developed plantations in Brazil and the Dutch in the Guyanas. The sixteenth-century phase of the traffic coincided with African participation in the exploration of the Americas. Thirty Africans accompanied Balboa during the exploration of Mexico and one reportedly planted and harvested the first wheat crop there; 200 accompanied Alvarado to Quito and some joined Pizarro's expedition in Peru. Perhaps the best known was Estevanico who played an important part in the Spanish exploration of New Mexico and Arizona territories. Africans also participated in the French expeditions in Canada, notably

Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century

with Jesuit missionaries, and in the conquest of the Mississippi valley.\textsuperscript{12}

In 1619 a Dutch vessel brought twenty ‘negars’ to Jamestown as indentured servants. This initiated a demand for black labourers and led to various practices restricting the freedom of Africans and limiting their choice as workers. This culminated in the official establishment of slavery in the North American English colonies in 1660 and, by the end of the century, Africans were legally relegated to the position of chattel slaves — property to be disposed of as their masters saw fit, without regard to the African as a human being and with no likelihood of state restraint. This was a system of slavery designed for maximum economic gain and entrenched by the European belief in and argument for the inherent inferiority of Africans because of colour and physical type.\textsuperscript{13}

Meanwhile, Britain and Spain were fighting for dominance in the Caribbean. In 1627 Britain took Barbados and in 1655, Jamaica. The sugar plantations there demanded a large labour force which, over the next forty years, increased almost ten-fold with large numbers of slaves being imported from the Gold Coast, Angola, Congo, Nigeria, Dahomey and, by the 1690s, Madagascar.

British and French dominance in the Caribbean was secured by the latter part of the seventeenth century. Chattel slavery in Jamaica and Barbados developed early and provided the model for North America. In addition, the Caribbean areas were utilized as ‘seasoning’ stations for the ‘breaking in’ of African slaves. But because a high proportion of seasoned Africans also knew about conditions in the Caribbean and, in some cases, were involved in plots and revolts, they also served as models for slave resistance in North America.

Slave revolts represented the highest stage of the struggle for freedom from slavery, and areas with high black-slave population densities generally had more frequent and severe conspiracies and revolts. In British Guyana, for example, the slave population at its peak constituted about ninety per cent of the total population; Jamaica, Brazil and San Domingo (Haiti) had similar large black concentrations; and Cuba was not far behind. In the United States, however, blacks were in the majority in only two states, Mississippi and South Carolina.

Excluding San Domingo, the greatest African slave revolts in the Americas occurred in Jamaica and Guyana. The first was the Maroon War in Jamaica in 1725, when bands of slaves fled into the mountains to establish their own community. In 1739, the British were forced to sign a treaty with Captain Cudjoe, from the Gold Coast, who agreed to send back any runaway slaves in return for rights of self-government and a tax-free existence.

Guyana, which included the areas of Essequibo, Berbice and Demarara,

\textsuperscript{12} R. W. Logan, 1940; J. W. Johnson, 1941.

\textsuperscript{13} The most authoritative single source on blacks in the United States is J. H. Franklin, 1967.
FIG. 5.1 The Americas and Africa
Source: adapted from map drawn by Dr Dulal C. Goswami, Geology and Geography Department, Howard University, Washington DC
suffered several serious revolts during the eighteenth century, culminating in the largest in 1823. During the 1740s black resistance led the Dutch to sign a treaty of friendship with the Coromante leader, Adoe. He and his followers had embarked on a programme of total European extermination but were confined to a small area. By mid-century another Coromante-led group made another unsuccessful bid to take over the colony. But the 1760s were especially noteworthy, marked by the Great Rebellion (1763-4) when Cuffy organized Africans and Creoles in what some observers have viewed as a prelude to the San Domingo revolt. In Mexico African slaves staged important revolts in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the objective of organizing African communities, while similar efforts were pursued by Maroons in Panama, Colombia and Venezuela, by blacks in Peru and slaves in the Leeward and Windward Islands, Cuba and elsewhere.14

It was in Brazil that the African armed struggle reached impressive proportions for an extended period - prior to the San Domingo epoch. Small-scale revolts had long been part of Brazil’s history of slavery but it was the state of Palmares which, for most of the seventeenth century, from 1605-95, established an autonomous African community estimated at 20,000 inhabitants originally Bantu from the Congo-Angola region. They sought to model their society on their homeland and resisted both the Dutch and Portuguese until they finally succumbed in 1695.15

These freedom struggles illustrate the nascent African nationalism in the Caribbean and Latin American segments of the diaspora. The objectives were not merely vengeance or escape to the hills but to establish areas where Africans would have political control and could defend themselves against their enemies. African religions such as obeah and vodum, were important as organizing tools. So too was Islam, especially in Bahia where it helped to solidify the Hausa and the Yoruba.16

Scores of major plots and conspiracies and several serious insurrections by Africans also occurred in North America during this same period.17 Most plantations were far from any terrain suited to rebel activity, such as the mountains of Jamaica or the jungles of Guyana. But escape to live among the Indians or others was an option taken by a considerable number of slaves in some of the southern colonies, as in the flight to the Seminole Indians in Florida with whom the escaped slaves later raided neighbouring plantations. Insurrections also occurred in Virginia and Maryland in the early eighteenth century as soon as it became clear that a pattern of

enslaving Africans for life was replacing the indentured system, and as the Carolinas adopted extensive plantation production using slave codes developed in the Caribbean.

In 1730, conspiracies involving slaves were uncovered in the three colonies of Virginia, Carolina and Louisiana. They were led by Africans who had previously been involved in revolts in West Africa. The following year there was a mutiny aboard a slave ship lying off the shore of Rhode Island and, four years later, a group of slaves destroyed themselves and their captors aboard the slaver, *Dolphin*. The most serious revolt of this period took place in 1739 in South Carolina as Cudjoe was checkmating the British army in the mountains of Jamaica. It is recorded as Cato’s Rebellion.¹⁸

In the northern American colonies, where there were fewer than 3000 Africans among approximately six times as many whites and where there were no plantations, there were similar troubles. In 1712 a group led by a Gold Coast African tried to burn down New York City. A similar attempt was made in Boston in 1723. In 1741, the most widely publicized episode occurred – another attempt at arson in New York City, the details of which are still in dispute. Two years before the Declaration of Independence was signed, there was another scare in Boston. It is significant that this first cycle of plots and revolts in North America tended to be led by Africans recently imported and still fighting against enslavement. By 1772 suggestions were being heard in several parts of the American colonies that all free blacks should be deported to Africa or the West Indies. Free blacks were regarded as instigators of resistance.¹⁹ Hangings and similar brutal treatment were applied to those caught following revolutionary activities. There were certain safety valves in North America not present in the Caribbean. In the far north, for example, there was the possibility of escape. There were also European groups – particularly the Quakers – in both the north, and the south and in Canada, who spoke out against slavery and were prepared to assist escapees. Despite this, however, between 1700 and 1750, many North American Africans seem to have been influenced by the Maroon Rebellions in the Caribbean.

Between 1750 and 1775, events affecting Africans were moving towards a climax in both North America and the Caribbean. The establishment of British dominance was accompanied by the growth of the anti-slavery movement in Britain. This led, in 1772, to the famous Lord Mansfield Decision which made it illegal to hold a person a slave within the British Isles. In the American colonies a white movement developed whose objective was to sever English political power. It engendered a philosophical debate on whether or not blacks, too, should be free.

The North American colonies proclaimed their Declaration of Independence in 1776. Many of the Africans in the colonies, however, had long

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¹⁸. ibid.
¹⁹. ibid.
been demanding their own freedom and it was therefore natural for the literate among them – both slaves and freemen – to join Europeans in expressions of the right to be free. Some Africans fought side by side with the whites against the British. Indeed, one, Crispus Attucks, was the first to die in the struggle against England in 1770, the prelude to the American War for Independence in which several took up arms and are recorded with their African names. Some deserted and were given their freedom by the British.\(^\text{20}\)

In French San Domingo, where by now there was a sizeable mulatto population, a group of coloured volunteers helped the colonists fight the British at Savannah, Georgia. The struggle for freedom in North America had begun; but it was of a curious nature with Europeans in America seeking freedom from Britain while, at the same time, Africans were seeking freedom from both Britain and the American colonists and were fighting both groups.

The Africans of the American diaspora were an integral part of a world dominated by European powers where great economic and intellectual forces were reshaping political and social structures. Some had an understanding of those forces and by their very presence and actions in the midst of that European system had some influence on European decisions. They were divided, to be sure. Some were convinced that salvation lay in the assimilation of European values and goals; but others were committed to their African-ness and were prepared to risk their lives in protest and resistance against European suppression.

One means to salvation was the Sierra Leone experiment which followed Lord Mansfield’s 1772 court decision that a master could not forcibly remove his slave from England. That decision, and the influx of Africans liberated because they had fought with England against the independence of the United States, resulted in a sizeable black community in London. Abolitionists thus pursued the idea of resettling liberated Africans in Africa where it was hoped that a society founded on free labour would spread Christianity, develop a western-style economy and contribute to the abolition of the slave trade. Thus, in 1787, over 400 liberated Africans were sent from England and settled in Sierra Leone. That was the first practical application of group repatriation of African ex-slaves.

Perhaps the first organized and self-financed effort by Africans to achieve that goal occurred under the leadership of Paul Cuffee in the United States. Cuffee was impressed by the potential of the Sierra Leone experiment and set himself a goal of reuniting blacks wanting to return to Africa; he also wanted to develop trade with Africa. Cuffee’s ideas and efforts had little immediate effect other than the repatriation of thirty-eight Africans in 1814; however, his example was to inspire others of future generations.\(^\text{21}\)

While Europeans in the United States were consolidating themselves

\(^{20}\) B. Quarles, 1961, is the best source for this subject.

\(^{21}\) H. N. Sherwood, 1923.
and establishing institutions as expressions of their culture and their independence, Africans, feeling disillusionment and frustration reinforced by racial pride, also established a number of institutions. They started calling themselves ‘Africans’ – a significant step as most had been kidnapped as children and had had little with which to cultivate and sustain as African ethnic identity. Black codes forbade them to speak African languages or practise their religions; and families were frequently divided by sale.

It is noteworthy, therefore, that in 1787 an African Methodist minister in the United States, Richard Allen, in protest against attempts to segregate him and others in a white church where they had been worshipping, broke away to form the Free African Society which had both religious and social objectives. Africans in other parts of the United States began to follow the same pattern, sometimes applying the same name to their own voluntary associations. At the same time, a Barbadian-born preacher and businessman in Boston, Prince Hall, who had been initiated as a Mason by some British soldiers during the American War of Independence, tried to secure a charter for a lodge of free black men. When the white Masons refused him, he made application to the Masons of the Scottish Right who granted the charter and authorized him to organize the African Lodge with himself as grand master. This was the first western-style fraternal organization among black men. In a sense it was a continuation of a practice enjoyed by Africans in Africa – the formation of secret societies. These activities laid the foundation for what became Afro-Americans’ two strongest types of institution in the nineteenth century – lodges and religious organizations – which bound blacks together on a national scale.22

Another important institution came into being in 1787, founded not by blacks but whites wanting to assist blacks. It was called the Free African School of New York and was opened by the Manumission Society with forty students.

While the African label represented blacks’ determination to identify themselves with the traditions and culture of their homeland, these organizations were also carriers of western values such as thrift, puritan theology, personal advancement through hard work and education, concern for the less fortunate and service to society. Such was the motivation of George Liele, for example, who founded Baptist churches in the United States and Jamaica in the late eighteenth century. Africans would later utilize those ideas in their concern for Africans elsewhere. Such pioneering innovations among American blacks would in future years help provide a basis for an evolving community identity in the United States, the Caribbean and Africa.

Most Afro-American leaders of these times were self-educated or had received only a few years of formal education. Some, however, made significant achievements: Phyllis Wheatley, who was born in Africa around 1753, became a renowned poet. Gustavus Vassa, who was born in Benin 22. See A. Hill and M. Kilson, 1969.
Plate 5.2 Phyllis Wheatley, an eighteenth-century servant who became a distinguished poet
in 1745 and taken to America and later to England, was active in the anti-slavery movement and wrote the important book, *The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Oloudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa*, which condemned slavery. Benjamin Banneker, sometimes called ‘the Ethiopian’, became a noted mathematician and astronomer who prepared an almanac and served on the commission which defined and laid out Washington, DC.\(^{23}\)

![Plate 5.3 Benjamin Banneker, a free black who became a well-respected mathematician, an inventor and a planner of Washington D.C.](image)

Africans in Europe also contributed to the struggle for freedom and human dignity. Anton Armo studied at the Universities of Halle and Waltenberg and then returned to help his fellow Africans in the Gold

\(^{23}\) Banneker was referred to by contemporaries as ‘fresh proof that the powers of the mind are disconnected with the colour of the skin’. See J. H. Franklin, 1967, p. 157.
Likewise, Philip Quaque and Jacobis Capitein of the Gold Coast also studied in Europe and returned to work at home. Ottobah Cagoano, who was freed by the Mansfield Decision in 1772, later wrote *Thoughts and sentiments on the evil and wicked traffic of the slavery and commerce of the human species*. Ignatius Sancho’s posthumously published letters confirm him too as an important spokesman for Africans abroad. In addition, a number of African emissaries were active in Europe, including representatives from Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea and the Gold Coast. In Europe, as in the United States, African protestors found some white allies, such as the Paris-based Société des Amis des Noirs.

It was in the Americas, however, that the freedom struggle first reached dramatic international proportions. Throughout the Americas small groups of blacks had gained their freedom, a few had never been slaves, but they all developed their own way of life and although powerless to influence general public policy, followed with interest world developments affecting black people. As a group, both they and the black slaves were profoundly influenced by the events on the island of San Domingo (Haiti).

Just two years after the United States of America had adopted the constitution that gave moral and legal sanction to slavery, a revolution erupted in France with the slogan: Liberty! Equality! Fraternity! It shook the structure of the French settlement on San Domingo, a prosperous sugar colony where 500,000 slaves and 24,000 free persons of colour lived under the domination of some 32,000 French settlers known for their opulence and cruel treatment of their slaves. The free African population, which included several slave-owners, took the revolutionary French slogan seriously and demanded full equality with the whites. Then, in 1791, the great black masses moved under the leadership of an illiterate fieldhand, Boukman, who bound his followers with voodoo ritual and African-style secret oaths to rise against their masters. The revolutionary government in Paris dispatched an army to restore order. It was at this stage, that one of the most remarkable figures in history appeared on the scene – a literate, Christian, slave-coachman, diaspora-born with an African father – Toussaint who took the name L’Ouverture (The Opener).

Toussaint called for guerrilla action to support his small army and, within five years, had defeated Napoleon’s invading army – with assistance from yellow fever. He restored order and prosperity to Haiti and was proclaimed throughout the world for his military ability, administrative skills, humanity and statesmanship. His reputation spread rapidly, reaching blacks in the United States through black sailors who played an important role in disseminating information throughout the black world.

The success of the African liberation movement in Haiti created terror among whites in the United States who feared that American Africans

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might also seek their freedom through violence. More stringent legislation was passed, police security was tightened and steps were taken to restrict the movement of blacks in the country and prevent black immigration, especially from Haiti. On the other hand, Africans in the United States were inspired by the achievement of their brothers in Haiti. Haiti and Toussaint L'Ouverture thus became symbols inspiring blacks in other parts of the Americas and the Caribbean to seek their freedom with the possibility that independence could be theirs.

The nineteenth century opened with a major conspiracy in the United States. Gabriel Prosser, a black preacher, organized and led over a thousand slaves in a march against Richmond, Virginia. The aim was to win freedom but word leaked out giving the governor time to call out the militia to re-establish order. Many Africans were arrested and executed including Prosser – but the link to the Haitian example and its legacy remained.
Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century

By the dawn of the nineteenth century, Africans in the Americas and Europe were on the brink of a new era. Despite the differences between the application of European and American laws pertaining to enslaved and free blacks, attitudes were basically the same. No European or American system accepted blacks as equal and really free, although there were several instances of greater flexibility in black roles. Blacks did learn to read and write, for example, even when laws forbade such; intermarriage occurred although repulsive to most; and travel — national and international — facilitated the development of networks. Africans of the diaspora knew they were pariahs abroad. Furthermore, they realized that their deprived status stemmed from their African identity and heritage. Consequently, their efforts to organize community institutions included aspirations to redeem black people and their heritage. This psychological unity prevailed and indeed became a source of strength among African peoples culminating in the Pan African movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Africans in the diaspora, however, could not escape the influence of their physical and social environments. Their language and life-styles changed and their values and goals were modified. Their perspective of the world, themselves and others came to reflect the centuries of inculcation by Euro-American culture and the memory of their African heritage, though strong and determined, was nevertheless clouded by years of absence and miles in distance. Diaspora Africans in Europe and America thus became cultural intermediaries between indigenous Africans and Euro-Americans.

Asia

While the forced migration of Africans to Europe and the Americas is a relatively recent chapter in world history, the trade in black slaves to Asia constitutes a much older, continuous aspect of history. *The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea*, written c. + 50, refers to slaves taken from the Horn of Africa — and there is no reason to believe that this was the first instance of the trade.

The intermingling of peoples on both sides of the Red Sea seems to have roots in prehistoric times. But from the seventh century and the birth of Islam, a kind of cultural unity evolved throughout the Indian Ocean—Red Sea areas. Several coastal towns in East Africa became Islamized and Muslims increasingly dominated trade, including the slave trade. That it had become significant in parts of Asia is revealed by the Zandj revolts in Mesopotamia during the ninth century. Although the Zandj were exterminated, their revolts contributed to the collapse of the Abbāsid Caliphate and what H. Deschamps called the ‘first model of a great tropical construction project involving the labour of hundreds of Negro slaves’ — constructing dams in southern Iraq. A little earlier, in the eighth century, two African slaves had been observed in the court of the Emperor of China; and in the twelfth century, some Cantonese were using African slave
labour. Sources also remind us of the continuity of the trade in East Africans: al-Mas‘ūdī wrote about it in the eleventh century; al-Idrīsī in the twelfth century; and Ibn Batūta’s fourteenth-century account of prosperity in Kilwa also related to the slave trade.

The northern coast of the Mediterranean Sea remains woefully under-investigated by researchers of African diaspora history. Serious research is particularly needed in Turkey and its neighbours on the major entrepôts for slaves from Tripoli and Benghazi over many centuries and the transit zone for the inland traffic. A notable example of that traffic was the purchase in Constantinople in 1696 of several African boys for Emperor Peter the Great of Russia. One was Abram Petrovich Gannibal, the great-grandfather of Aleksander Pushkin. Gannibal appears to have been born in Ethiopia where he was captured by Turks. How many other African slaves arrived in Russia and neighbouring areas via Turkey is not known but the numbers were probably small. That and the fact that in Russia slavery was abolished during the first quarter of the eighteenth century would probably explain why Africans there became servants instead of slaves. Although more documentation is necessary, black slavery and its accompanying disabilities do not seem to have developed in Russia.

Most slaves imported into Asia were children, with girls constituting the largest numbers. From the East African ports, slaves were normally taken to the Arabian Red Sea port of al-Mukha (Mocha), from which many were either marched or reshipped to al-Hudaydeh (Hodeida), Djidda, Mecca and other entrepôts in Arabia. Others were reshipped to Persian Gulf ports such as al-Sharīkah (Sharjah), Sur Muscat, Bandar Abbās, Bandar-e Lengeh, Bahreīn, Būshahr (Bushire), Kuwait and Basra. Indian ports usually received shipments from al-Mukha or the Persian Gulf, although some allotments came directly from East Africa. The Indian ports included Bombay, Goa, Surat, Karikal, Pondicherry, Calcutta, and various places in Kutch, Gujarat, and the coast of south-east Asia and China, and on several islands in the Indian Ocean.

In Arabia, Oman held the key position in the naval and commercial strategy of the Middle East and thus spearheaded Arab involvement in the slave trade. Its capital, Muscat, commanded the approach to the Persian Gulf, through which large numbers of African slaves were transported. Omani Arabs captured the East African ports of Kilwa and Zanzibar in 1784 and 1785 respectively, and from that time claimed sovereignty over several towns on that coast. After the Sultan of Oman had gained control


of Zanzibar and parts of the East African coast in the late eighteenth century, demand increased for slaves to harvest Arab-owned clove and coconut plantations in the region.

There had been people of black African origin in Yemen and Hadramaut since ancient times. Most seem to have come from Ethiopia and in Aden they appear to have been seen as a caste of 'untouchables'. In several other areas of southern Arabia black slaves from Africa served in armies of local sultans, as concubines and domestic servants, eunuchs, crewmen and dock workers, administrators and agricultural labourers in salt marches and sugar and date plantations.

Africans were settled on many Indian Ocean islands. The Dutch collected slaves in East Africa and Madagascar and took them to Indonesia; the French and the British settled East Africans as slaves on the Mascarene Islands of Bourbon (Réunion) and Mauritius. Indeed, one observer records that from 1670 to 1810 about 160,000 slaves were imported into the Mascarenes from Madagascar, the East African coast, West Africa and

30. See ch. 25 for details.
India. Bourbon’s slave population was estimated in 1808 at 53,726, mostly from Madagascar and Mozambique. The African settlements of the Mascarene Islands were enlarged with the expansion of the slave trade in the nineteenth century. But even before then, there had emerged a community of Creoles whose influence would be exerted in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It has also been observed that some Africans reached the Malay states with merchants and with Muslim pilgrims returning from Mecca.

There were far more African slaves in South Asia than other parts of Asia. This may have resulted from its longer and more profitable trade with Africa due to strong Muslim control over the prosperous western coast of India and the settlement of Indians in East Africa. In any case, African slaves are prominent in India at least by the thirteenth century. Queen Raziya, sovereign of the Delhi Sultanate, for example, became attracted to a Habshi (African) slave named Djalalud-ud-dīn Yākūt whom she appointed as royal stable-master. Another African, Mālik Sarvar, was a slave of Sultan Muḥammad in Delhi and became deputy sultan in 1389.

The second half of the fifteenth century witnessed the assertion of an African presence in another part of northern India, Bengal. Africans had migrated there from the coastal region of Calcutta, the area of Dacca, and several inland regions. The ruler of Bengal, Rukn-ud-dīn-Barbak (1459-74), used to promote loyal Africans to responsible military and administrative posts. There were thus several Africans of high rank among the king’s estimated 8000 African slave-soldiers.

When Barbak died, a period of instability ensued. In 1486 Shāhzāda, eunuch commander of the palace guards, led a group of Africans in a successful coup and assumed the title of Barbak Shah. He was, however, subsequently murdered by another African, Amir-ul-Imona Malih Andil (Indil Khān), loyal to the former Indian ruler. Indil Khān became Saif-ud-dīn-Fīruz and ruled for three years. When he died, he was succeeded by Nasr-ud-dīn Muḥammad, a minor whose identity remains unclear; but his regent, Ḥabesh Khān, was an African. Then in 1490 an African guardsman, Sīdī Badr, seized the throne as Hams-ud-dīn Abu Nasr Muzaffar Shah with an army of 30,000 including a reported 5000 Ethiopians. When he died in 1493, Africans were removed from their posts and

33. R. Maxwell, 1932. This is another area demanding serious research.
34. The vast area of today’s South Asia was not unified at this time and thus contained scores of different ethnic and political entities. The largest country to emerge, and which included most of the regions discussed in this section, was India, which is the term adopted here.
35. Habshī and Siddī are terms used interchangeably to denote Africans in Asia. For a general history of this subject, see: J. E. Harris, 1971.
expelled from the kingdom; but they left their mark during that short period of dominance.\(^{37}\)

In Gujarat Africans served in armies from at least the thirteenth century, by which time they had become an important political and economic factor. In 1576 the government of Gujarat is reported to have paid a tribute of 400 slaves who were 'children of Hindu chiefs and Abyssinians'.\(^{38}\) Some were descended from slaves captured during the Muslim Arab invasion of Ethiopia in 1527. Others were brought to Gujarat in 1531 by Mustafā bin Bahrām, a Turkish commander who helped Muslim Indians defend themselves against Portugal.\(^{39}\) In 1537 Ahmadābād is reported to have had as many as 5000 Africans in government service.\(^{40}\) These early Africans seem to have formed a nucleus from which Africans migrated to other parts of the region.\(^{41}\)

Several Africans distinguished themselves in Gujarat during the sixteenth century. Yakūt Sabit Khān Ḥabshi (Ulūgh Khān), Khayrāt Khān and Jhumāhar Khān became important military commanders; while Ikhtiyār-ull-Mulk organized a force of some 20 000, including Afghans, Rajputs, Gujaratis and Africans, to challenge the troops of the Mughul Emperor Akbar. Although he was defeated, Ikhtiyar won the respect of Akbar and Gujaratis alike. One former African slave, Shaykh Sayyid al-Ḥabshi Sultān, served as a soldier in Jhumāhar Khān's army. When he retired, he purchased some land, made the pilgrimage to Mecca and opened his lands to feed hundreds of poor people daily. He also established a library which attracted many scholars.\(^{42}\)

In 1573 Sayyid (Ṣā'īd) constructed a mosque in Ahmadābād and the chronogram for its construction reads: 'For the sake of Allāh he erected this mosque, and the builder Ṣā'īd.' The Sīdī Ṣā'īd mosque, as it is known, is of simple design with a roof of arches and beautiful arched perforated windows with exquisite tracery and floral patterns. A renowned authority on Indian and Eastern architecture, James Fergusson, has observed of this mosque:

> It would be difficult to excel the skill with which the vegetable forms are conventionalized just to the extent required for the purpose ... but perhaps the greatest skill is shown in the even manner in which the pattern is spread over the whole surface. There are some exquisite specimens of tracery in precious marbles at Agra and Delhi, but none quite equal to this.\(^{43}\)

\(^{37}\) ibid., pp. 214 and 215.
\(^{38}\) K. K. Basu, 1932.
\(^{41}\) For notes and paintings of Kutch personalities, including Africans, see B. N. Goswamy and A. L. Ballaepecola, 1978.
\(^{43}\) J. Fergusson, 1876.
Fergusson and a colleague wrote:

It is probably more like a work of nature than any other architectural detail that has been designed, even by the best architects of Greece of the Middle Ages.\(^{44}\)

M.S. Commissariat wrote:

This lovely and world-famous mosque is the last noble specimen of the great creative period of the Muslim architecture of Gujarat.\(^{45}\)

Another African, Sïdï Bashïr, built a noted mosque in Āhmadābād. It is unique in that it has two shaking minarets, each comprising three stories. When one minaret is shaken, the vibration is carried to the other. This style is reported to have been an innovation at the time.

Not far from Gujarat is Janjira Island which, in ancient times, was part of the prosperous commercial activity of northwestern India, including what are today Bombay and the Konkan coast. According to one tradition, the Siddis of Janjira descended from Africans who arrived from Gujarat in 1489 when an Ethiopian in the service of the nizām (king) of Āhmadnāgār disguised himself as a merchant and took 300 boxes of merchandise to the island. The merchandise included Siddi soldiers who, on command, took possession of the island, appointed one of their number king and thus laid the foundation for the dynasties of the Siddī nawabs (kings). Most of the Africans on Janjira, however, can probably be traced to the East African slave trade.\(^{46}\)

From about the 1530s the Portuguese developed political and economic control over parts of the west coast of India, especially the Konkan coast where many African slaves were imported. The number of slaves imported at any one time was small – between six and ten – but their arrival was fairly continuous to about 1740, when Portuguese maritime dominance was seriously challenged by the French and the British. Most slaves were from Mozambique, although the Portuguese also seized African slaves when they defeated the Muscat Arabs in Diu in 1670. The slaves were generally used by the Portuguese in businesses, on farms, as domestics or in other menial jobs. Some were trained as priests and teachers for religious schools, especially in Goa which became Portugal’s headquarters for its East African and Asian colonies.

During that time, Janjira retained its autonomy and, by the seventeenth century, the Siddis had become the island’s principal land-owners and comprised its largest Muslim group. A council of elders of the major Siddi leaders chose a nawab who acted as head of state and religion. With the advice of the council he could appoint and dismiss state and religious officials. From this political base the Janjira Siddis expanded their power

\(^{44}\) J. Fergusson and T. Hope, 1866, pp. 86–7.
\(^{45}\) M. S. Commissariat, 1957, p. 505.
\(^{46}\) J. E. Harris, 1971, pp. 80–7, discusses Janjira's history.
over the island and along stretches of the Indian coast. They dominated the north-western coast as seamen and, in 1616, became an important ally of Mālik Ambar, a Ḥabshi king in the central part of India known as the Deccan. Both forces fought the Mughuls for many years. Some indication of the significance of the Janjira Siddis' role is reflected in the assessment of the Indian scholar, K. M. Panikkar, who stated that their naval activities caused the Mughuls to develop an Indian fleet. The Indian military historian, Sir Jadunath Sarkar, has written that the ‘Abyssinians of Janjira’ were a mighty power.47

Because of the control the Siddis wielded over the Konkan coast of India, the British East India Company made repeated efforts to enlist them as allies during the seventeenth century. The Siddis continued to exercise independent power in the area, however, and later also negotiated with the Dutch. It was not until 1759 that the British were able to curb Siddi power, and Janjira did not become subject to direct British control until the nineteenth century.

The Janjira Siddis exercised considerable influence on Indian history. How they were able to wield such power over the indigenous groups is not entirely clear, but without doubt their Muslim religion and their maritime and military skills were major factors. It is of great importance that this small group of African migrants had such an impact on the policies and actions of Great Britain, Portugal and the Netherlands, as well as on local Indian states.

Africans also settled along parts of the Malabar coast. Black Jews of Cochin and Kerala in southern India, who were descendants of African slaves, settled along the Malabar coast during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Most became menial labourers and intermarried with local inhabitants and other Jews.48 The Portuguese were responsible for settling African slaves along parts of the Malabar coast, especially around Goa which became one of its headquarters in the sixteenth century. Black slaves were used as soldiers in Goa and Ceylon and also in Macao in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.49

The Italian scholar and traveller, Pietro della Valle, reported that blacks from West and East Africa (Guineans and Mozambicans) were part of the shipments to the Portuguese territories.50 In Portuguese India, black slaves performed several menial tasks throughout the territory, including the carrying of water in huge jugs. The slaves also served as bearers and escorts for the Portuguese and African women were frequently kept as mistresses.

Another part of India, the Deccan, witnessed the most dramatic assertion of power by a single African, Mālik Ambar, an Ethiopian who was sold as a slave in Ethiopia, the Hiḍjāz, al-Mukha and Baghdad before finally

50. E. Grey, 1892, pp. 50–1.
PLATE 5.5 Mālik Ambar, an African king in India in the seventeenth century
reaching India. Ambar spent much of his life in Aḥmadnagār where there were thousands of Africans; Ambar himself recruited 1000 for his guard.

Ambar’s greatness stems from the fact that he became a commander of a large army for the king of Aḥmadnagār and resisted several Mughul attacks, thereby preventing the Mughul emperors from conquering the Deccan during his lifetime. He ruled supreme in the area around Aḥmadnagār for nearly a quarter of a century (1602–26). During that time he founded towns, constructed canals and irrigation schemes, stimulated trade with Asians and Europeans, attracted scholars and poets to his court and fostered the construction of some of the most impressive buildings in the Deccan.51

Mālik Ambar’s activities confirm two significant points: first, that individual Africans played influential roles in Indian history; and second, that Africans managed to win support and respect from diverse Indians while retaining a sense of their own identity.

Conclusion

The history of African people has been so much influenced by perceptions stemming from the intercontinental slave trade that it is necessary to emphasize that Africans of their own volition migrated between continents as merchants, clerics, seamen, adventurers and so on. This early free black presence abroad is greatly in need of study to provide a more complete and realistic account of world civilization.

It was, however, the intercontinental slave trade which, more than anything else, established a world black presence.52 It was the nature of this trade and its consequences which, especially in the Americas and the Caribbean, caused Africans to organize freedom struggles which over the years established the common concern for the redemption of Africa and the liberation of blacks throughout the world. This process began during the early modern era and by 1800 showed real signs of an international base when Haiti’s Toussaint L’Ouverture emerged as an international symbol of black freedom. This process continued, despite colonial rule, and may indeed be the greatest historical consequence of the African diaspora.

52. See ch. 4 above.
The history of much of sixteenth-century Africa and Arabia was dominated by the Ottoman empire, a new Islamic power that had formed in Asia Minor and the Balkan peninsula and which, during the 1500s, went on to subjugate a large part of the Arab countries in West Asia and North Africa.

It was in 1516 that the state of the Mamluk sultans in Syria and Egypt collapsed under the attack by the Ottoman army. Ottoman–Egyptian relations had been strained since the 1480s. But in 1514, when Sultan Selim I led his first successful campaign against Persia, the fast-expanding power on his eastern frontier, the Egyptian rulers finally decided to take a firm stand against the Ottoman threat. Selim responded with force. Two years later, during his second Persian campaign, he determined to break the Mamluk–Safawid (the Syrian dynasty) coalition once and for all.

On 24 August 1516, the Ottoman army routed the Mamluk troops at the battle of Mardj Dabik plain north of Habab. The Ottoman victory was largely due to its army’s technical superiority but it was also greatly helped by the defection to the Ottomans of the vice-regent of Habab, Amîr Khâyr Bey, and his troops at the critical moment. The victory behind him, Selim went on to occupy Damascus without encountering much resistance and then to take all Syria and Palestine south to the Sinai Desert making Syria a buffer state between the Ottoman empire’s eastern frontier and Egypt.\(^1\)

The new leaders in Egypt, however, seemed intent on regaining their lost Syrian territory and Selim was finally persuaded, both by his own advisors and the Mamluk amîrs who had defected to his side at Habab, to crown his campaign with the conquest of Egypt. He continued his march south meeting little resistance on the way to Cairo where he routed the Mamluk troops led by Tûmân Bey, the last of the Mamluk sultans, in a short battle at Raydânîyya on 23 January 1517 which brought the Mamluk sultanate to an end.

Military superiority was not the only reason for the Ottoman victory over the Mamluks, although the most obvious one. The main reason was the difference politically and economically between the two states. In Europe and Asia Minor the Ottomans dominated territories that were economically advanced. They had mines and raw materials, their pro-

\(^1\) Ahmâd b. al-Ḫâdîdj Abû ʿl-ʿAlî, 1962, pp. 143ff.
duction being concentrated in a number of centres connected by international trade which offered opportunities for the further growth of the empire. The Mamluk states, on the other hand, had almost no mineral resources and depended almost exclusively on agriculture and international transit trade, profits from which had rapidly declined particularly since its main branch – the trade in eastern spices – had been seized by the Portuguese. The importation of precious metals from other African countries was also declining. The Mamluks had been trying to solve these problems for many years by drawing on internal economic reserves, confiscating land and increasing taxes, all of which had intensified the local inhabitants’ hatred of the foreign Mamluk exploiters and had fostered their hopes for the collapse of the regime.

Selim’s victory at Mardj Dabık in 1516 had far-reaching consequences for both West Asia and North Africa. It sealed the fate of the Egyptian Mamluk sultanate; it saved Persia from another Ottoman invasion; and it saved Syria from impending destruction by providing a period of stability during which to consolidate its strength – thus in time becoming, ironically, a permanent threat to the Ottomans. The conquest of Egypt also altered Ottoman policy which was now directed at controlling the Mediterranean Sea routes and led the empire to attempt the conquest of other North African Arab countries.

The newly conquered former Mamluk territory included regions of great economic, political and strategic importance. Egypt was particularly important because of its intensive agriculture, its large population and its Red Sea coastline which imposed upon its new rulers the task of continuing the fight for supremacy in the Indian Ocean against the Portuguese. In addition, the prestige of the Ottoman sultans was enhanced by the fact that – like the Mamluk sultans before them – they became guardians of the two sacred cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina, and also of the pilgrim routes from Asia and Africa.

Before leaving Egypt in September 1517, Selim placed Khäyr Bey, the Mamluk defector, at the head of the Egyptian province which was to be kept as one administrative unit. Khäyr Bey’s rule saw the transition to full Ottoman control in the newly gained territory. He was entrusted with the management of all former Mamluk Egypt, although the extent to which he could enforce his power was limited. He governed more as a sultan’s vassal than a provincial administrator, even though his commission was formally renewed so that he held office until his death in 1522. He retained his Mamluk title Malik al-umara (King of Commanders) and conducted his court according to Mamluk ceremonial. He surrounded himself with former Mamluk dignitaries willing to serve the new regime entrusting them not only with important tasks in the field of financial administration but also with political and military assignments. In addition, the old forms of administration were left untouched and the administrative personnel kept almost unchanged. The organization of justice continued to be based on
the system of four Supreme Judges, one for each School of Law.

Selim left Khâyr Bey to control the province’s income at his own discretion. The regular presents sent by Khâyr Bey to Istanbul, the Ottoman seat of power, were not so much obligatory deliveries to the state treasury as gifts paid from his own resources and expressing his personal indebtedness to the sultan.

Khâyr Bey worked hard to control the resources of the new province. To do so – and also to curb the power of the Mamluk dignitaries – he abolished the iktâ‘ (extant feudatory tenures) and incorporated them into the state property, their former holders being allotted fixed salaries to be paid from the provincial treasury. He also revised endowment properties. These measures made it possible to draw up more accurate and detailed land registers and enabled him to fulfil his commitment to supply the two sacred cities, Mecca and Medina, with corn.

Khâyr Bey’s powers, however, were not unlimited. Selim had left strong
troops in Egypt to further consolidate Ottoman control and, if necessary, thwart any attempt by the Mamluks to re-seize power. They comprised infantry detachments (one of Janissaries and one of Azabs) and two cavalry detachments (the Tüfenkjis and the Gönüllüs). To the Janissaries was allocated the most important task of guarding the Cairo Citadel, the administrative centre and seat of the provincial governor and the treasury. The Azabs were to guard all roads to Cairo, forming garrisons for the small fortresses built to protect agricultural areas from raiding nomads. The two cavalry detachments were used to slowly entrench Khäyr Bey’s rule throughout the province. The units, however, were badly disciplined and in order to retain control of them Khäyr Bey formed cavalry detachments of his own, recruited from among former as well as new Mamluks.

When Khäyr Bey died in 1522 the process of incorporating Cairo — the centre of a state which had been independent for centuries before it became an Ottoman province — was well under way and everything augured well for the imminent completion of the exercise.

The Ottoman administration and conflicts within the ruling class

The beginning of the new period — which began with Khäyr Bey’s death — was marked by revolts against Ottoman supremacy. The first revolt — a timid attempt at insurrection against the first vice-regent by two Mamluk regional administrators at the beginning of the period — was quickly suppressed. The second revolt in 1524, however, was far more serious being instigated by the new vice-regent himself, Aḥmad Pasha, who declared himself Sultan of Egypt and started minting his own coins. With the help of some Arab groups he succeeded in capturing Cairo but was ultimately ejected from the city after having been betrayed by the Beduin chiefs who had at first supported him.²

These events, however, made clear to the Istanbul government the need to define more precisely Egypt’s position within the Ottoman empire. They did so by issuing a decree called the Kanûn Naįme which sought to regulate the political, military, civil and economic life of Egypt. The decree, in effect, introduced the Ottoman system of administration into Egypt. According to this system the ruler of Egypt, the wāli (vice-regent), who had always held the rank of pasha, was accorded certain privileges not enjoyed by the vice-regents of other provinces and reminiscent of the customs at the Istanbul court. As his seat he was given the Cairo Citadel, the seat of the former sultans. Four times a week he was to convene a meeting of the Diwān (executive council) which consisted of military commanders, financial and court administrators, port commanders and other dignitaries. The vice-

² The revolt of Aḥmad Pasha is usually connected with Safawid anti-Ottoman plans which also included subversive activities in Egypt.
PLATE 6.2 The Janissaries, as portrayed in a sixteenth-century Turkish miniature
regent’s prestige was further enhanced by the establishment of his personal guard called Müteferrikaş, like the Istanbul Sultan’s own personal guard.\(^3\)

The Kanûn Nâme also adopted a number of Mamluk customs and forms in the field of civil and financial administration. Egypt was divided into fourteen districts each headed by a kâşif whose task it was to maintain the irrigation system and levy taxes from the farmers. The region south of Asyût was left under the Arab shaykhs of the Hawwâra group who had gained control of the area after 1517 and were recognized by the then vice-regent, Kháyr Bey, as regents of the Upper Nile.

An important function of the Kanûn Nâme was the enactment of the odjak̄s (imperial troops) introduced to Egypt by Sultan Selim I.\(^4\) In reward for their loyalty during Ahmed Pasha’s revolt, the Janissaries became the main prop of the Sultan’s power. Their commander, the Agha, was one of the most prominent members of the executive council and the mint was situated in the area of their barracks in the citadel. The Mamluks were also rewarded by the creation of a new odjak̄ of umerā-i-sherâkise (Circassian amîrs) which was gradually added to by Mamluks from Cairo as were the Müteferrikaş and Ġhaushes (central messengers), also established by the Kanûn Nâme.

All the soldiers based in Egypt drew regular payments from the provincial treasury. The top men – the vice-regent, the Supreme Judge (who had replaced the previous team of four Supreme Judges) and the twenty-four highest military and administrative personnel known as Sandjak Beys – were paid säliyâne (annual salaries) also from the treasury.

These payments and salaries were paid from the income generated by taxes on land, industrial and commercial undertakings in the towns and cities, customs duties and the head tax paid by worshippers of religions other than Islam. These were paid under a new administrative and financial system introduced in Egypt according to which each village or group of villages comprised a mukataat and which was both a financial and an administrative unit. Each mukataat was administered by a civilian called emîn.\(^5\)

The whole tax system was based on the feudal rent paid in the form of land tax\(^6\) which was levied by the administrators of individual areas. The

3. In addition the reception of a new vice-regent by local dignitaries was regulated by a special ceremonial.

4. The Ottoman troops were composed of six odjaks, to which Sulaymân added a seventh called the Odjak of Çerkes (Circassian). The odjaks were: the Müteferrikaş, the Çavuşhân, the Gönüllüyân, the Tüfenkîyân, the ‘Azabân, the Mustahfizân and the Çerâkise. See A. K. Rafîk, 1963, pp. 144-6.


6. The exact yield of the land tax was not known when the Kanûn Nâme was enacted as the cadastral survey was not completed until 1576. Due to the prevailing law and order in sixteenth-century Egypt, the countryside prospered and the amount of arable land was increased by cultivating new fields or recultivating old. It was not until the 1608 land register, that a complete inventory of agricultural land became available.
taxes on town-dwellers were levied by kāshifs, or enīn (tax collectors), who drew fixed annual salaries irrespective of the amounts collected. The Arab shaykhs in the region south of Asyūt were, in accordance with the iltizam system, assigned their respective areas from which, as multazims, they could levy taxes and retain them provided they guaranteed the agricultural work and paid a fixed part of their takings to the provincial treasury in return for their leased privileges.

From 1525 the income remaining after covering all expenses had been sent each year to Istanbul instead of Hidjaz. The regular dispatch of this hazne or hazine (treasury) was one of the vice-regent’s most important tasks. During the sixteenth century it was sent regularly, its total several times exceeding the agreed sum of 400,000 guldens. A separate sum was also set aside for the purchase of agricultural produce for the Sultan's kitchen. Egypt also fulfilled its obligations towards Mecca and Medina.

The Kânûn Nâme also made it legal to take dues from individual holdings which were regarded as iltizams. At first this new ruling applied to agricultural holdings, but it spread to other holdings during the sixteenth century as the odjakṣ and their officers grew more powerful and the power of the representatives of Ottoman rule decreased. Officers, and even regular soldiers, gradually took over all positions of control within the holdings while the tax collectors were slowly reduced to mere officials with no influence on taxation or any other aspect of fiscal policy.

This process reflected the changing political relations within the ruling class. Towards the end of the sixteenth century two levels of political power crystallized in the country. One consisted of official executors of political power appointed by Istanbul and headed by the vice-regent. The other consisted of the odjakṣ and their officers, and the Sandjak Beys with their Mamluk retinues. Although unofficial, this group had at its disposal both military and economic power and, from the late 1500s onwards, its significance in Egypt’s political life became more and more apparent.

7. According to the iltizam system, which superseded the mukata‘ât system by about 1658, lands of every village or group of villages were offered for public auction and the highest bidders (the multazims) were given the right to collect taxes from the peasants and such lands became their iltizam.

8. Corresponding to 16 million silver paras.

9. The endowments established for Mecca and Medina by the Mamluk sultans were broadly recognized and, in addition, the Ottoman sultans founded new ones. Egypt was sending not only considerable cash sums to Hidjaz but also natural produce and maize in particular. In addition, it was supplying a cover for the Ka‘ba from the special endowments account.
PLATE 6.3 Porcelain façade of the burial chamber of Ibrāhīm, Agha of the Janissaries c. 1652, in the mosque of Akṣunkur (747/1346–748/1347)
Ottoman influence in North-east Africa

Throughout the sixteenth century Egypt played an important role in the expansionist foreign policy of the Ottoman empire. Because of its geographical position it formed a natural link between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean, with the trade route bringing eastern goods to Europe passing through the Red Sea and Egypt itself. At the time of Selim’s conquest of Egypt, in 1517, Eastern trade was in Portuguese hands. After subjugating Egypt, therefore, the Ottomans faced the task of removing the Portuguese from the Indian Ocean or at least hindering their penetration of the Red Sea.

A welcome opportunity to intervene in the Indian Ocean was provided by the ruler of Gujarat in his entreaty to Sultan Sulaymān for help against the Portuguese who had occupied the port of Diu. Sulaymān Pasha, the Egyptian vice-regent, was entrusted with the campaign. On his way to Diu in 1538, he seized Aden, in Yemen, and established Ottoman administration there. Although his attempt at driving the Portuguese out of Diu failed, he disembarked on his return journey at the port of ʿKūsayr in Upper Egypt and, after reaching Aswān, continued his march south along the River Nile to North Nubia, where he pushed the Arab groups out of the river valley area, finally reaching Wādī Halfa. On the island of Sāy he built a fortress which was to become the southernmost point of Ottoman Egypt.

It was difficult to secure Upper Egypt, dominated as it was by the Hawwāra shaykhs and, in the middle of the century, Ottoman supremacy there had to be re-established through an expedition, led by the former vice-regent of Yemen, Özdemir Pasha, who re-occupied Ibrīm, Aswān and Sāy, garrisoning them with Bosnian troops. A new province called Berberistan was established headed by a kāshif directly subordinate to the Cairo vice-regent.

In 1557, Özdemir Pasha took Massāwa on the Red Sea coast as well as Zaylā’ (Zeila, Zalha), the town opposite Aden, and also conquered part of the interior ruled by the Ethiopian king. Massāwa became the centre of Ḥabesh, a new Ottoman province in Africa which played an important role in the Ottoman defence of the Red Sea against the Portuguese and also in securing trade with Yemen and the East African coast further south. As the Portuguese had succeeded in excluding both Arabs and Ottomans from the Indian Ocean trade, the creation of these Red Sea posts was of great importance to the continuation of the transit trade which, under the pressure of international developments, was changing from eastern spices to coffee beans. Because of the new popularity of coffee the Egyptian transit trade, far from declining, continued to bring considerable revenues to the country’s coffers.

10. In the 1560s, the digging of a canal across the Isthmus of Suez was under consideration, having been suggested by the Grand Vizir Mehmed Pasha Sokollu. Later, however, this suggestion was forgotten.
The creation of the provinces of Egypt and Ḥabesh was the culmination of Ottoman influence in North-east Africa. From 1517 to the 1580s Ottoman power in Egypt was at its zenith. No symptoms of Istanbul's decline had yet appeared: on the contrary its power was even further consolidated. In 1575, for example, areas south of the southern town of Girgā were united into one administrative unit and in 1583 the Province of Upper Egypt was created, the Hawwāra chiefs being replaced as administrators by an official from Cairo.

Traditionally, Upper Egypt had occupied a distinctive place within the political organization of the Nile valley states. It was different from the rest of Egypt in its politics, its social systems, its peoples, its religions and its geography. Being so distinguished it had often been the refuge of movements directed against authority. It's political importance had been enhanced by its economic importance which was based, among other things, on its control of the trade routes and the traffic on the Nile. The

11. The Upper Egypt sub-province was also very large and, during the 1600s, even increased in size. Arab kabilas were ejected from the Bahnsā area in 1640, from the region of Asyūt and Affīh in 1694, and from the vicinity of Aswān, Manfalūt and Minya in 1698.
Ottomans showed their interest and respect for this vital territory by accrediting it a special position within the Egyptian province.

Like the administrator of all Egypt, the administrator of Upper Egypt bore the title of wāli (vice-regent) and stood second in the administrative hierarchy to the provincial administrator himself. The office was held exclusively by an official with the rank of Sandjak Bey and the vast financial and administrative machinery under his control was organized according to the system used in Lower Egypt. His political importance and his loyalty were also emphasized by the considerable number of troops at his disposal.

Internal military conflicts

The period of internal peace started by the suppression of Aḥmad Pasha’s revolt in 1524 lasted about sixty years. In the 1580s, as a result of its dependence on the general socio-economic well-being of the Ottoman empire, Egypt began to experience the first symptoms of economic difficulties. These soon sparked fierce conflicts between the various components of the ruling military stratum.

Between 1598 and 1609 a few revolts broke out, spearheaded by the economically weak spahi cavalry corps who had been most badly hit by the
recent soaring inflation. Their revolts served to weaken the position of the vice-regents who were only able to fulfil their obligations to Istanbul by exploiting the rivalry between the spahi cavalry and the loyal odjaks, trying at the same time to balance one against the other for the sake of preserving peace in the province. As a result of these revolts, the spahi corps was henceforth excluded from the struggle for power among the odjaks.

The subsequent years saw the growth of the importance of the twenty-four Sandjak Beys who came to form a group in some ways comparable to the highest amirs of the former sultanate. Their high rank entitled them to hold foremost political office and, until the 1620s, they were generally assigned the office of Serdar, commander of the military operating within or beyond Egypt's borders. In addition, they were entrusted with the command of both the Amir al-Khazna, the units responsible for escorting the Egyptian treasury to Istanbul, and also with the command of the Amir al-Hadjdj, the unit which gave protection to the pilgrim caravan travelling to Mecca. One Sandjak Bey was also appointed administrator of Upper Egypt. As Deşerdârs they also controlled the financial administration of the province. The growth of their political influence was shown, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, when the Kâ'im Makam (deputy vice-regent) was selected from among them.

Through skilful use of the military and economic powers of the vice-regent they reinforced the position they had gradually built up in political life by gaining control, as tax collectors, of a large section of the agricultural holdings.

Their first significant political coup was the removal in 1631 of vice-regent Müsâ Pasha, whom they replaced with the deputy vice-regent, Riďwâñ Bey al-Fâkârî, chosen from among their own ranks. Despite Müsâ Pasha's protests, the Sublime Porte complied with their wish, thus creating a precedent to be repeated several times in the years to come. Although Müsâ Pasha's removal seemed to have been prompted by the assassination of a certain Kaytâs Bey, and the confiscation of his property, the real motives of the beys and the odjaks went much deeper: Müsâ Pasha had started cutting back their salaries.

In 1517 the military had been allowed to introduce himâye (protection charges) — caution money protecting the conquered townsfolk from looting. Even the inhabitants of Cairo had paid it. Over the years, however, these charges had escalated until they had become a means by which the soldiers exploited urban populations for their own enrichment. Müsâ Pasha's attempt to eradicate what amounted to the illegal taxation of the townsfolk had caused his downfall. And the odjaks, newly reinforced by the admission of traders and craftsmen who now enjoyed the same extortionist privileges as they did, were too powerful for the Istanbul government to attempt to overrule them.

Müsâ Pasha was replaced by Riďwâñ Bey al-Fâkârî who ruled as vice-regent until his death in 1656. He was also the leader of the Faşâriya, a
political group made up of beys and their Mamluk retinues. The Fakârïya was opposed by the Kâsimïya, which also consisted of beys and their retinues and which also sought followers among the nomads and the townsfolk. The struggle between these two groups also involved the odjaks, the Janissaries supporting the Fakârïya and the Azabs the Kâsimïya, with the overall result that, by the end of the seventeenth century, Egyptian society was completely divided.

Ridwân Bey secured his position by obtaining a Sultan’s decree appointing him life commander of the pilgrim caravan while his ally in the south, ‘Alî Bey, by another Sultan’s decree, was appointed life vice-regent for Upper Egypt. The Fakârïya was thus well-placed politically, with its two top men firmly entrenched in the provincial hierarchy. By the mid-1600s Cairo was dominated by them. After Ridwân Bey’s death, however, the top positions in the Fakârïya were seized by younger men whose recklessness resulted in internal disagreements and the consequent collapse of the party.

In 1660, after driving the Fakârïya out of Cairo the Kâsimïya, with the vice-regent’s support, succeeded in gaining, albeit briefly, the office of vice-regent of Upper Egypt and also that of deputy vice-regent of the province. But before the Kâsimïya could consolidate their position, their leader, Ahmad Bey Boshnagî, was assassinated in 1662 on the orders of the vice-regent himself.

These events were testimony to the efforts of the Sublime Porte to reassert its authority in Egypt. Incontestable proof of its success had been provided in 1661 when it had managed to suspend all non-military personnel in the seven odjaks and also to increase by 20 per cent the multazims’ payments from their benefices in order to cover the treasury deficit caused by rapid inflation. Despite the unpopularity of these measures, the Istanbul court continued to introduce further steps. In 1670 the vice-regent, Kara Ibrâhîm Pasha, was instructed to carry out fiscal reform with the help of the army. After a radical rearrangement of the budget and four years of intensive negotiations with all interested parties, he doubled the sum of the treasury, bringing it to 30 million paras. (Some important benefices were still in the possession of the odjaks and these Kara Ibrâhîm had to confirm in 1672.)

The principles of this reform became the basis for solving fiscal problems from this time until 1798. But success was short-lived and soon the level of the treasury had fallen again. The decision to weaken the economic influence of the odjaks — whose financial resources included both legal holdings and illegal takings — had come too late. The legalization, in 1672, of the extant holding of benefices had significantly strengthened the position of the Janissaries and Azabs, who controlled the most lucrative holdings.

12. The Janissaries controlled profits from customs houses in all ports except Suez which was one of the vice-regent’s benefices. The Azabs controlled profits from granaries, and landing places in Bülâk and Old Cairo, and entertainment tax.
Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century

to the detriment of the ghaushes and müteferrikas. It also helped to turn the hitherto open system, which permitted easy changes in the holding of benefices, into a closed system dominated by acute controversy.

The weakening of the pasha’s position during the first half of the seventeenth century and the disposal of the beys’ parties in the 1660s had enabled the odjaks to seize those benefices based on the exploitation of the townsfolk. The beys, with no means of access to urban exploitation, continued to exploit the rural people, drawing their income from the agricultural holdings.

Between about 1670 and 1750, political life became even more complicated. The odjaks vied with one another but, in addition, they were also torn by internal conflict generated by party affiliation. Some factions supported the Faqāriya and others the Kāsimiya, the rivalry between these two parties having become embedded in those odjaks in which they were canvassing support with the aim of eventually dominating them completely. The most contentious issues were the main elements of political and economic power: the holding, and possible redistribution, of benefices, illegal takings from odjaks’ members’ economic activities and illegal protection charges on traders and craftsmen attached to the odjaks.

The most strife-ridden odjak was the Janissaries’ which controlled the most lucrative benefices. The protagonist of the internal struggle for almost twenty years was Bashodabashi Küchük Meḥmed. Meḥmed had been expelled from Egypt in 1680 because of his opposition to other top-ranking Janissary officials. Later he had returned and joined the Gönüllüyân odjak where he won the support of the Agha who introduced him to the Faqāriya. Ibrāhīm Bey, the Faqāriya leader, helped Küchük Meḥmed rid the Janissary odjak of its Kasīmi commanders and, from 1692, to dominate it himself. Before long he had forced the top officials of all seven odjaks to approve his decision to abolish some of the protection charges and all the other illegal charges demanded by the Janissary and Azab tax-collectors from the customs houses in Alexandria, Rashīd and Būlāk. With the vice-regent’s support, Küchük Meḥmed was able to put these new rulings into

13. The odjaks’ ambitions to possess holdings officially and also to create illegal sources of income were fuelled by their increasing contact with local inhabitants, resulting from their own economic activities and, in particular, from exposure to traders and craftsmen who were now admitted into their ranks. Their clients were, in particular, rich coffee dealers, and this rapprochement was the basis of the odjaks’ claim on protection charges as well as a 10 per cent cut of a deceased client’s wealth. The new odjaks’ members, the traders and craftsmen, were not altogether losers, however, as membership guaranteed protection as well as exploitationist privileges, which turned them into an influential group closely connected to the odjaks.

14. These practices also fell contrary to the shari’a (Islamic law) and were criticized as mazālim (abuses). The Istanbul court wanted their removal to prevent possible political difficulties. The main burden of exploitation was borne by the people whose plight was worsened by bad harvests, inflation, famine and epidemics. In the late 1600s in 1678, 1687 and 1695 popular riots broke out which had some bearing on political leadership.
The main reason for this move — which, though favoured by the people, made enemies of many Janissaries, led by Mustafa Kazdoglu — was fear of a repetition of the riots of 1678 which were caused by continuous inflation and rising maize prices.

In the summer of 1694, tension within the Janissaries’ odjak reached a critical level. At the same time a low flood of the River Nile caused a sudden rise in maize prices. True to form, Küçük Mehmed moved against possible speculators, fixing grain prices and excluding middlemen from its distribution. He thus brought together the Janissaries and the Azabs who controlled the grain stores, a liaison which culminated in the assassination of Küçük Mehmed. Once again the odjaks had access to their lost benefices and the freedom to determine food prices. The subsequent escalation in the price of all basic commodities caused famine in 1695 followed by epidemics a year later. It was only the abundant floods of 1697 that brought an end to this series of crises.

Since 1688 conditions had been aggravated by the continuous decrease in the value of the currency and by 1692 the situation was critical. In an attempt to balance the deficit in the value of the treasury, the provincial administration increased by 4 per cent the deliveries from the iltizams. Istanbul, however, demanded that the treasury be delivered in valuable coin, a move strongly opposed by the odjaks who were deriving huge profits from the devaluation, as were their merchant-clients. It was this opposition that wrecked the attempt at financial reform and change in the tax system prepared by the financial expert, Yâsîf al-Yahûdî, in 1697.

A new wave of price increases, resulting from an influx of valueless currency from other parts of the Ottoman empire in the early 1700s, gave the Janissaries the opportunity to snatch the monopoly of the maize trade from the Azabs. The main problem, once again, proved to be the protection charges which neither odjak would relinquish. The deadlock was finally solved by a compromise which avoided the main problem but which was acceptable to the odjaks. It was decided that trimmed coins might be used only as weighed metal and that fidda diwânî (fine silver coins) be minted instead. Price lists of basic commodities were issued and the export of coffee to Christian lands banned. But although the mint decree slowed down the decline of the para, the real problem of protection charges remained unsolved and tension between the odjaks continued and yet another political crisis loomed.

It finally broke about 1710, its main cause being the export of coffee to Christian countries. The rapid increase in coffee exports, in response to rising demand in Europe, had caused prices to soar. The coffee wholesalers and their Janissary patrons had profited to such an extent that the other odjaks felt quite overshadowed. The problem of protection charges once

15. Suggested reforms included the stamping of currency, the introduction of 10 per cent duty on coffee in stock, a state monopoly in coffee-roasting, the hall-marking of textiles and the taxation of houses and shops.
again came to the fore but discussions as to its solution were forestalled by the split of the Janissary odjak into a Fakārīya and a Kāsimīya party. The split resulted in an unprecedentedly fierce clash within the odjak in which the beys also participated.

The main instigator was Bashodabashi Ifrandj Ἀḥmad who was in favour of the Janissaries involving themselves in economic activities. Although he was backed by the Fakārīya, the Kāsimīya succeeded in expelling him from the odjak in 1707. By 1709 tension was again high with the Janissaries in isolation against the united front of the other odjak. At this point Ifrandj Aḥmad, still with the support of the Fakārīya, was taken back into the Janissary odjak and those Kāsimīya officers responsible for his expulsion in 1707 were themselves expelled. The Fakārīya position was now secure and the followers of Ifrandj Aḥmad's policy united. But a decree sent from Istanbul was to deal the Janissaries a serious blow. The decree, which stipulated official policy on the current problems, ordered that an immediate stop be put to all abuses as well as the patronising relations between military and non-military personnel. In addition, the mint was to be moved from the Janissary barracks into a new building.

At the end of 1710 the crisis was worsened still further by a rupture between the two leading Fakārīya beys, Ayyüb and Kāytās, with the latter going over to the Kāsimīya—a move which led to the return of the expelled officers. The delicate power balance thus disturbed, the crisis developed into an armed conflict in which the beys were also fully engaged. Ayyüb Bey, the Fakārīya leader, and the vice-regent of Upper Egypt, Mahmūd Bey al-Kabīr, backed Ifrandj Aḥmad, while the rivals were joined by the Kāsimīya leader Ayyaz Bey, Ibrāhīm Shanab, Meḥmed Bey Kutamish and the former Fakārītite, Kāytās Bey. After a two-month siege of the citadel, Janissary resistance collapsed in June 1711, the Fakārīya beys fled Egypt and Ifrandj Aḥmad was executed.

Following the events of 1711 and the preceding twenty years of struggle, the influence of the Janissary and other odjaks waned, leaving the field clear for the beys and their Mamluk retinues. Since the mid-1600s the Sandjak Beys, and also members of the Ottoman hierarchy, had been forming their own Mamluk retinues. By 1700 affranchized slaves and Mamluks of many houses, including the Kazdughliya, Čutamishiya, Baldifiya, and Djulfiya, were already holding most offices and many of the benefices. From 1711 there followed a period of about twenty years during which new political patterns took shape as the beys once again took the limelight on the Egyptian political stage.

Despite the economic and political crisis in its final years, the odjaks' rule in Egypt had witnessed great economic and social change. Agricultural production had increased as had trade in Egyptian goods, the profits from which were surpassed only by those from the transit trade. Profits from coffee in particular had contributed significantly to general prosperity.

The healthy state of the economy had been accompanied by a high rate
of population growth which had resulted in the extensive cultivation of the land and the expansion of production and trade in the towns. The population of Cairo had soared to 300,000, surpassing its previous peak of 250,000 at the beginning of the fourteenth century.

An ongoing problem had been currency devaluation which had been noticeably aggravated by Ottoman defeats in Europe. Apart from this aspect, however, Egypt had not been affected by the events taking place on the battlefields of Europe: even trade was carried on as normal, while odjak participation in the wars was negligible. Under these conditions of peace, the social character of the odjaks had changed gradually. Permanently garrisoned in Egypt, the soldiers had begun to integrate with the local people, mostly through inter-marriages, until only their military status and some privileges and duties distinguished them from the Cairo townsfolk. Their discipline during these peaceful times, however, declined and they naturally deteriorated militarily.

The struggle for power, after 1711, continued at two levels both between and within the individual political groups. In 1714 the top man of the ruling Kaşimiya party, Kaytās Bey, was killed by his subordinates who thus seized riyaşa (leadership). However, one of them, İbrahim Bey Abū Shanab, soon died, leaving İsmâ'îl Bey, son of Aywaz Bey, its only leader and their position of power soon collapsed. The Mamluks of Abū Shanab formed an opposition group, the Shanabiya, which, in co-operation with the Fakârîya beys, ousted İsmâ'îl Bey together with the entire Aywazide faction of the Kaşimiya. The Shanabiya leader, soon formed a duumvirate together with the Fakârîya leader, Dhū 'l-Fakâr. This new liaison, which amounted to a political compromise, had been dictated by a new economic crisis precipitated by the fall of the previous Shanabiya leader, Mehmēd Bey Cherkesî. Like others before him, Mehmēd Bey Cherkesî had tried to alleviate the growing tension by forcing the odjaks to relieve taxation and relinquish their illegal takings. At first the odjaks seemed willing to compromise but upon hearing that traders and Hawwâra Arab members were to be expelled, tempers flared and Mehmēd Bey Cherkesî was assassinated.

The relentless fight between the beys gave the vice-regents an opportunity, after 1720, to strengthen their authority. It was for this end that they had taken part in the various infightings, even backing the assassinations of İsmâ'îl Bey and Mehmēd Bey Cherkesî. After the collapse of the Kaşimiya party in 1729, the vice-regents continued their meddling with the Fakârîyas now headed by three men: Mehmēd Bey Kütumush, the Janissary Kâhya 'Uthmân (Osman) and the Azab Kâhya Yûsuf.

In 1736, the rivalry between these leaders offered vice-regent Bakir Pasha an opportunity to try to divert the odjaks' legal and illegal takings to the treasury. When he met resistance he had all three representatives assassinated. Although the Sublime Porte did not approve of this move it did, however, ban the alienation of the benefices of the odjaks – in the
interests of the state. The new leadership of the Egyptian military stratum, represented by 'Uthmān Bey Dhu 'l-Fākār and the Janissary Kāhya Ibrāhīm Ḥazdoghlu and supported by the odjaks, refused to submit. The opposition was reinforced by representatives of the 'ulamā' (sing. 'ālim) – the religious brotherhoods.

With Ibrāhīm Ḥazdoghlu at the head of the Janissary odjaks, the Ḥazdoghluṭiya, a strong Fakārīya faction which had hitherto remained in the background, came to the fore. Its leaders were not of the rank of Sandjak Bey but the group had therefore not lost any of its leaders through assassination and had remained comparatively intact. From 1743, when Ibrāhīm Kāhya forced 'Uthmān Bey to emigrate, leaving himself as the only leader of the military stratum, the Ḥazdoghluṭiya became the only ruling party and remained so until 1798. After 'Uthmān Bey had left the country, Ibrāhīm Kāhya joined forces with Riḍwān, the Kāhya of the Azabs and the leader of the Djulfiṭiya, a smaller Fakārīya faction. This duumvirate, composed of the two most powerful military detachments in Egypt, ruled undisturbed for ten years from 1744. Neither took the rank of Sandjak Bey but each nominated three of his own Mamluks to the bey corporation. While Riḍwān Kāhya indulged in building activities, his hobby, Ibrāhīm Kāhya, turned Egypt into his personal domain: he seized the richest material resources, built up a strong retinue of Mamluks and thoroughly enriched himself.

Despite the seeming stability of the duumvirate, however, symptoms were forming of the approaching doom of the socio-economic structures on which the power of the military rested. Under the duumvirs, the odjaks' collective authority was replaced by the personal power of what amounted to two despots. Only because of the sound economy – stable prices and a stable currency – was internal peace maintained. The underlying unrest became apparent as soon as Ibrāhīm Kāhya died in 1754. Riḍwān Kāhya was the first victim: he was killed during a Janissary revolt precipitated by his proposal to impose yet another tax on coffee. The odjaks were rebelling in defence of their much-eroded privileges but also as an expression of antagonism towards the increasing power of the Mamluks who, as beys and odjak officers, were now assuming substantial authority both politically and economically. The decline in the odjaks' political power was directly connected with their economic decline in the 1720s, 1730s and 1740s, caused by the loss of some profitable benefices and a decrease in the takings from other sources – in particular the trade in spices and coffee which was facing competition from the Antilles. The impoverishment of the merchants by the duumvirs had also

16. Within the traditional system of exploitation, the odjaks had offered their clients some of the privileges enjoyed by the ruling stratum. But the duumvirs' exploitation offered no such compensation. Exploitation was worsened by confiscations, forced loans and other drastic measures directed in particular at the traders. The booty, meanwhile, was divided quite openly between the two rulers.
The Ottoman conquest of Egypt impaired *adıaks* profits. After 1760, *adıaks* power weakened still further as the *adıaks* degenerated into mere reserves for Mamluk retinues whose members were allowed to hold the rank of officer.

Cultural development

The extinction of the sovereign Mamluk sultanate and the transformation of Egypt into a *wilaya* (province) of the Ottoman empire led to significant cultural changes that clearly reflected newly forming social, economic and national relations. Education was also affected, as was the role of Arabic as the medium of cultural expression.

After the fall of the Mamluk sultanate, Cairo ceased to be the spiritual centre of the Sunnite world, which it had been since 1261. Its exalted position was strengthened by the presence of the Abbasid Caliphs and the developed educational institutions headed by the ancient Azhar, to which seekers of knowledge came from all over the Islamic world. They came to Cairo to study, to teach at the numerous *madrasas* there, or to work as officials in the state administration where political authority and economic prosperity were turning the capital into a city bursting with life. Although the Azhar remained a school of high prestige for students from Arab countries even after 1517, those who wanted to achieve success in public service were increasingly forced to attend Istanbul schools which prepared their graduates for service in any part of the vast Ottoman empire. No less attractive were teaching posts at these schools, from which a way was frequently found to high public office and rank. Istanbul and other cities of the Central Empire thus usurped the place which, until 1517, had incontestably belonged to Cairo, even in the eyes of Arab Ottoman subjects.

The incorporation of Egypt and other Arab countries into the Ottoman empire, in whose public and cultural life Ottoman–Turkish occupied a leading position, accentuated the decline of Arabic as mediator of Islamic–Arabic culture. At that time, New Persian literature and literature in Turkish languages was flourishing and the spiritual culture of Islam was being expressed through them. The loss of political independence by some Arab countries stopped the use of Arabic as a language of state administration, and also impaired its literary use. With the exception of religious and legal themes, literature – including scientific literature – was generated and consumed by the ruling stratum, which did not know Arabic but could appreciate works in Turkish or Persian. Unlike Arabic culture and literature, Persian culture experienced a period of great creativity between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries.

As in all Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire, the culture of Egypt fell under strong Ottoman–Turkish political, social and cultural pressure resulting in its gradual integration into the new Ottoman–Turkish variation of Islamic civilization. It nevertheless retained a certain character of its own which was to become the starting-point and the regulator of the Arabic
national revival in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This character was retained by the Arabic and Egyptian literature of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, although this literature fell into the background of official literary activities. This period, usually described as the time of deepest decline for Arabic literature, bore nothing new in the classical genres but did bring about a new orientation of literary production. Writings in the Arabic language were directed at readers from the middle strata of townsfolk, such as the ‘ulamā’ of lower levels, the clerical intelligentsia, traders and craftsmen whose mother-tongue was Arabic. This re-orientation resulted in literature with a strong popular character in genre and language.

This trend was particularly pronounced in poetry. As the Dervish orders became more widespread, mystic ṣūfī poetry gained much favour and popularity. It concentrated, under the influence of Ibn al-Fārid, on praising the Prophet Muhammad, whose glory was also sung in the mawlids (legendary prose narratives about Muhammad).¹⁷

Satire was also introduced during this period, the most remarkable being Hazz al-kuhūf (Shaking the Peasants’ Heads) by al-Shirbini (dated 1787) in which the author ridiculed the thick-headedness and rudeness of farmers as well as the narrow-mindedness and haughtiness of the ‘ulamā’, using the form of a commentary on a satirical poem by the fictitious village poet Abū Shaduf ibn Udjayl (Father of Weighbeam, son of Calf). The language of this work is the Arabic of Egyptian countryfolk. In one of his poems, Kasid Abū Shaduf, he deals with the exploitation of the peasants by the administration and relatives and the injustices meted out to them. Another poet was Hasan al-Badrī al-Hidjâzî (died 1719) who, in addition to a collection of poems on religious themes, wrote an independent collection of moralizing satires commenting upon remarkable events and criticizing contemporary society.

Apart from this poetry addressed to a wide public (one of the authors of which was also the Chancellor of the Azhar, ‘Abdullāh al-Shubrawî (died 1758) who wrote a small collection of love poetry and seasonal poems and a panegyric on Muḥammad and other outstanding personalities) there appeared formalistic poetry with a tendency towards self-conceited eccentricities. Its representative in Egypt was Abdullāh al-Idkāwî (died 1770) who also, like his contemporary Yūsuf al-Hifnāwî (died 1764), wrote on art.

Narrative folk prose was enriched by another work, a novel on the conquest of Egypt by Selim I. It deals with the heroic resistance to foreign aggression by the last Mamluk Sultan, Tūmān Bey. The author of this novel was Aḥmad ibn Zunbul, the writer of a concise history of the same event which forms the thematic basis of the novel.

¹⁷. Muḥammad ibn Riḍwān al-Suyūtī (died 1766) was the author of one such popular poem. Less popular (because of their rhetorical character) were the writings of Ā‘ishah al-Bā‘uniya and the physician ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Humaydi (died 1587).
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Scientific literature, however, did not develop during this period. On the contrary its decline continued, marked by a lack of originality in the processing of knowledge and fruitless comment on writings of reputable authorities from the past. The ideal of Islamic society, into which Ottoman ideologists tried to fit society, did not require or allow disturbance of critical analysis. Commentaries and glossaries — common enough during this period — although reacting to the demands of the times in detail, could not present an objective image of society.¹⁸

In this respect, historiography had better possibilities. However, in Egypt it suffered from a lack of patrons and persons interested in historical works. Apart from the works by Ibn Iyās which, although concluded in 1552, are considered to be part of Mamluk historiography, the historiographic works produced during this period were of poor quality, especially in their methodology. Only a few books can be considered lengthy chronicles containing well-arranged materials.¹⁹ Frequently, they are but dry chronological lists of sultans, vice-regents and supreme judges, or short summaries of Egyptian history until the author's time.²⁰ There are also a few detailed treatises on certain events, often based on personal experience.²¹ A number of historical booklets were written in verse and others in the spoken language.²² While the last Mamluk chronicle by Ibn Iyās covers the beginning of the Ottoman period, the last decades of the eighteenth century are described in the greatest work of this kind written in the nineteenth century, the chronicle by al-Djabarti, the last writing of its kind in the Arabic literature of the feudal period.

Mere commentary, although often sterile, produced a significant work by Muḥammad Murtadā al-Zabīdī (died 1791), the many-volume dictionary Tādż al-arus, a commentary on al-Fīrūzabādī's Al-Ḵāmūs. Philology was also treated by al-Khafādji (died 1659), the author of a large collection of biographies of outstanding personalities.

A favourite genre was treatises on pilgrim routes to Mecca and Medina as well as writings on destinations of pilgrims and the tombs of outstanding personalities, in particular scholars and shaykh saints.

The veneration of Saints, an expression of the faithful, was connected with the rapid advancement of the Dervish orders and the interest in mystics, both of which spread widely in Egypt from the sixteenth century.

¹⁸. A number of small treatises were compiled on the problems of the times, particularly in the field of applied law, in addition to concise handbooks which were often of textbook character.
¹⁹. For example, the Chronicle of Ahmad Chelebi covering the period from 1517 until 1737.
²⁰. Typical of this kind of writing are the books by al-‘Shāki, MarT ibn Yusuf and al-Sharkāwī.
²¹. The best of them is Wāk'at al-Sanāḏik (Clash of the Sandjak Beys) by as-Sālihi, dealing with the revolt of the Faḵārīya beys in 1660.
²². There is a book by al-Ghamrī in verse and the Dermirdesh Chronicle in the spoken language.
Greatest popularity was enjoyed by the Ahmadîya, an order founded by Aḥmad al-Badawî (died 1276), whose tomb in Tantâ was the centre of a special cult. Its numerous branches were widespread, especially the Bayyûmiya, Shaʿrâwiya and Shinnâwiya. Among the influential orders, mention must be made of the Kâdirîyya, Rifâiyya and Nakshbandiyya, whereas the Ibrâhîmiyya, Demirâshçiyya, Bakrîya and many others were of less importance. The Dervish orders were headed by nakîb al-asrâf (a representative of the Prophet’s descendants), a shaykh from the al-Bakrî family which derived its origins from the first Caliph Abû Bakr. The Dervish orders associated with certain social strata, including some social groups and had representatives of some professions within their ranks. The social structure of the orders and their firm organization gave their leaders significant political power through which to influence public life. The orders were also of cultural significance. They contributed to the education of the people through whom their members came in touch with spiritual culture mediated by written literature, mostly poetry. This contact also stimulated independent interest in the written word and independent creation. Mystic poetry was cultivated by a number of authors such as the pleiad of the members of the al-Bakrî family, ‘Abdullâh al-Shaʿrâwi, Aḥmad al-Dardîr and others who, in their poems, treatises and lectures to their colleagues, did not always conform to the dogma of Islam.

Throughout the eighteenth century, Egypt did not experience the advantage of the printing press, although from 1729 both Turkish and Arabic books were printed in Istanbul. Copying by hand continued to be the only way of multiplying literary works.

Cairo and other Egyptian cities are still adorned by numerous architectural monuments built during the Ottoman period. An outstanding place is occupied by buildings serving religious or educational aims and financed from endowments bequeathed by persons who had ordered them to be built – vice-regents, top adîjak officers, beys and even Ottoman sultans and other members of the dynasty. Like the profane objects which often formed part of the material basis of the endowment, these buildings are marked by a number of local Egyptian elements represented, of course, in unequal proportion to the imported Ottoman elements. They can be found both in the general architectural conception and, more frequently, in the decor, such as the use of marble stucco or coloured windows,23 the imported elements being mostly represented by the manâra (the large central dome), the faience wall panelling and the flowers painted on the ceiling and wall plates.24 The extant relics also confirm that domestic architecture also

23. Local elements are represented, to the highest degree, in the al-Burdaynî Mosque (from 1611).
24. The best-known mosques are Sulaymân Pasha’s, in the Cairo Citadel (1538), Sinân Pasha’s in Bülâk (1571) and the Mâlika Saffya Mosque (1610). An important synthesis is represented by the Mosque of Muḥammad Bey Abû ’l-Dahab (1774).
preserved the traditional arrangement in principle. Although fashionable Ottoman elements found more place in interior decoration, especially in the use of faience panelling, the traditional use of wood and marble generally

25. For example, the houses of Zaynab Khatun (1713), Djamaluddin al-Dahabi (1637) and al-Sihaymi (1648-1796).
prevailed here, too. The size and comfort of these dwellings testify to an advanced form of housing for the well-to-do townsfolk - a testimony to the progressive changes within Egyptian society and the increasing importance of traders, the nucleus of the future bourgeois class. These changes took place in Egypt analogously to development in the entire Ottoman empire, although somewhat delayed in comparison to its European counterparts and Syria.

Economic decline and attempts to achieve independence

After the deaths of Ibrāhīm Bey and Riḍwān Kāhya, fierce fighting broke out within the Kazdughléya. For a while a number of beys, all of them former Mamluks of Ibrāhīm Kāhya, took turns at its head. One of them, Ḥusayn Bey Sābundjī, had conferred upon him in 1756 the honorary title of Shaykh al-Balad, a title not previously in regular use.26 Shaykh al-Balad ‘Alī Bey al-Ghazzāwī, who, in 1757, ousted Husayn Bey, was opposed by a group led by ‘Abd al-Rahmān, an influential Janissary Kāhya. ‘Abd al-Rahmān, who was keen to preserve his influential position in the background of public events, decided to replace al-Ghazzāwī with a bey whom he considered to be his man, ‘Alī Bey, also known as al-Djinn (the devil). In 1760, while al-Ghazzāwī was in Mecca, ‘Abd al-Rahmān forced the beys to accept his man as the new Shaykh al-Balad.

‘Alī Bey soon proved to be extraordinarily ambitious and energetic. He secured his position in Egypt27 and then, through his contacts at the Sublime Porte, also succeeded in persuading Istanbul that he was the only person capable of putting Egypt to rights.

At the time of ‘Alī Bey’s ascent to power, relations between Egypt and the Sublime Porte were somewhat strained. The main reason was the ever-increasing treasury deficit, now tens of millions of paras. In 1761 the Istanbul government decided to intervene militarily in Egypt. However, in 1763, ‘Alī Bey, exploiting the nervousness of the Egyptian party and the embitterment of the court, secured - in exchange for promising to eradicate the treasury deficit - financial assistance from Istanbul plus Sublime Porte approval of his retention of all the properties he had confiscated from his adversaries. He pledged to pay the treasury deficit for the past ten years,

26. The first bearer of this unofficial title seems to have been Mehmed Bey Cherkesi. It meant merely a senior grandee among the Egyptian beys.

27. To neutralize the influence of the rest of the Kazdughliya, ‘Alī Bey promoted to the rank of Sandjak Bey Ibrāhīm Kāhya’s Mamluk Ismā‘īl and two Mamluks from his own retinue, Muḥammad Bey Abū ‘l-Dahab and Aḥmad Boshnak who was later known as al-Djazzār (the butcher). He also disposed of a number of older leaders such as ‘Abd al-Rahmān, the Janissary Kāhya who was leader of the Kazdughliya, and Ṣāliḥ Bey, the only remaining leader of the Kāsimiya.
a total of 91 million paras, and to deliver the sum of 50 million paras earned by the sale of the confiscated benefices.\textsuperscript{28}

His repression of landowners and the politically influential triggered the
28. The confiscated benefices, or those whose holders had died, were re-allocated to beneficiaries against the payment of \textit{hulwān}, a special tax usually eight times the annual income from the benefice.
formation of an opposition led by Şâlih Bey. In 1765 Şâlih left for Upper Egypt to join forces with Shaykh Humâm who was, in practice, the independent leader of the Hawwâra Arabs who were already sheltering many of 'Alî Bey’s enemies.

Aware of the potential threat of this group, which had dominated Upper Egypt, 'Alî Bey planned a campaign against it. But the leader of the expedition, Ḥusayn Bey Kashkash, a former Mamluk of Ibrâhîm, made use of the force entrusted to him and, in co-operation with opposition elements in Cairo, forced 'Alî Bey to flee to Syria. A year later, however, he returned – with the support of the Sublime Porte – reconciled himself with Şâlih Bey of Upper Egypt and, in 1768, ejected Ḥusayn Bey Kashkash and Khalîl Bey who had ruled as duumvirs during his absence.

As soon as 'Alî Bey had fulfilled his promise to the Sublime Porte to pay off the deficit, his policy underwent a radical change. Also in 1768 he deposed the vice-regent and appointed himself both vice-regent and deputy vice-regent. 'Alî Bey’s efforts to combine in himself both vice-regent – the titulary head of Egyptian administration – and Shaykh al-Balad, the foremost political power, were again demonstrated in 1769 when he deposed the new wâli soon after he had been appointed. However, despite being ruler of Egypt, whose subjugation to the Sultan was entirely formal, 'Alî Bey did not go so far as to declare himself an independent sovereign. Nevertheless, he usurped the right to mint coins of his own and his name was introduced into Friday prayers. He also tried to utilize all resources exclusively for strengthening his political and economic power by boosting the army and developing agriculture and trade. He also opened commercial negotiations with prominent European powers.

His ambition, cleverly disguised as service to the Sultan, was further fuelled in 1770 when his office entitled him to take part in the dynastic strife of the Hâshimite amîrs in Mecca. The solution, through Egyptian intervention, and the replacement of the Ottoman vice-regent in Djidda by an Egyptian bey, was a definite gain for 'Alî Bey against the Sultan’s supremacy in Hijâz. Stimulated by this success, 'Alî Bey began cherishing the idea of unifying – under his reign but still within the framework of empire – the areas that had once formed the territory of the Mamluk sultanate: Egypt, Hijâz (dominated by the vassal dynasty of the Hâshimî Katâdites) and Syria.

That same year, 1770, 'Alî Bey saw his chance to dominate Syria. The unsuccessful war currently being waged by the Ottomans against Russia, and the destruction of the Ottoman navy by the Russian fleet at Cheshme, practically excluded the possibility of a counter-measure against him, particularly as the vice-regent of Damascus was currently endangered by the rebellious administrator of Akka and Galilee, Shaykh Zâhir 'Umar. Moreover, to harness support for his decentralizing activities – and assist-

29. His nickname was Bulut Kapan (Cloud-catcher).
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PLATE 6.8 'Ali Bey, vice-regent of Egypt
ance in time of need – ‘Ali Bey had contacted the commanders of the Russian fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Despite the initial reluctance of Ismā‘îl Bey, the commander of the troops sent by ‘Ali Bey to support Shaykh Zāhir ‘Umar, the allied army, reinforced by further units led by Muḥammad Bey Abū ‘l-Dahab, defeated the Istanbul troops and took Damascus. However, perhaps through fear of retaliation by the Porte, or because of the Porte’s readiness to appoint Muḥammad Bey as the ruler of Egypt should he first dispose of ‘Ali Bey, the two beys assured the sultan of their loyalty and returned to Cairo with their army. At the beginning of 1772, Muḥammad Bey was forced to take shelter in Upper Egypt where he joined the Hawwārī Arabs and the Kāsimiya supporters. And when a punitive expedition sent against the southern rebels had defected to the other side, together with their commander, Ismā‘îl Bey, ‘Ali Bey’s power collapsed. In spring 1772 forces loyal to ‘Ali Bey were defeated and ‘Ali Bey had to commit his office to his rival, Muḥammad Bey. With the help of his allies in Syria and Palestine, ‘Ali Bey made one more attempt to return to power but his scanty support was soon dispersed and he himself died soon after in captivity.

Although inspired by Egypt’s past, some features of ‘Ali Bey’s career foreshadowed future developments. These included his ruthlessness in disposing of adversaries and, in particular, his activities in the Arab peninsula and Syria, his personal use of the country’s economic resources and his increasing political independence of central government. That his success was shortlived no doubt resulted from the extent of his social and political ambition and its restraint by the Mamluk houses and the fickleness of their allegiance.

During ‘Ali Bey’s time, symptoms arose of the prolonged socio-economic crises which continued, with varying intensity, until the nineteenth century. ‘Ali Bey’s interest in agriculture was prompted by the need to increase the feudal rent. His harsh taxation, which first affected the rural areas, was undoubtedly a main cause of the impoverishment of the farmers. It drove them to the towns where they were also unable to make a living as more and more traders and craftsmen were also suffering from high taxes, to be paid in advance, and the high deliveries on inheritances. General impoverishment – the result of the drastic exploitation of every level of society – grew worse during subsequent years and was dramatically intensified by a series of epidemics.

The new Shaykh al-Balad’s fulfilment of obligations, characteristic of his loyalty, gave the Porte hope that at last they had a pro-Ottoman ruler in Egypt. In 1775 Muḥammad Bey dispatched more than 130 million paras as the annual payment. The same year he sent an expedition against Shaykh Zāhir ‘Umar on the sultan’s orders. But, during the siege of Akka, Muḥammad Bey died and Egypt’s engagement in Syria came to an end. Egyptian troops vacated the occupied territory and henceforth the beys lost interest in Syria, confining their activities to Egypt alone.
PLATE 6.9 The mosque of Muhammad Bey Abū 'l-Dahab, 1188/1774
The Porte took every opportunity to interfere in the struggles for power which broke out between members of the Mamluk élite after Muhammad Bey's death. It supported whichever magnate promised, in exchange for the right to confiscate the estates of the defeated rivals, to send the Porte the largest portion of the tax levied from the new benefice holders. This attitude reflected an important change in the function and aims of the benefice system, and showed that the Porte had no intentions of intervening directly in Egyptian affairs, being content merely to utilize the Mamluk squabbles to drain as much money as possible from the province.

In the struggle for supreme power, which lasted almost ten years, the main protagonists were three Kazdughliya beys, Ismā'īl, originally a Mamluk of Ibrāhīm Kāhya, and two former Mamluks of Muhammad Bey Abū 'l-Dahab, Murād Bey and Ibrāhīm Bey. The first phase of the struggle was concluded in 1778 when Murād Bey and Ibrāhīm Bey together succeeded in forcing Ismā'īl and his followers to leave Egypt. The second phase consisted of fights between the two victors. Ibrāhīm, although officially recognized as Shaykh al-Balad, was prevented by Murād from entirely controlling the situation. This rivalry gave the Porte the chance to manoeuvre and manipulate the two adversaries with the aim of increasing to the maximum the sum of the annual payment. The Porte however was not able to make full use of this opportunity and the two leaders confiscated more and more resources, including the benefices explicitly reserved for certain offices which they were not able to hold.30

After 1778 they gradually gained control of the whole administration of the province, having seized all its resources which they utilized for their own ends, in particular to cover the costs of fighting one another. Ibrāhīm did not fulfil his obligations as Shaykh al-Balad sending, if anything, a small fraction of the stipulated amount to Istanbul. In 1784, at the beginning of an economic crisis that was to last until 1792 – when the two rivals were reconciled and agreed to rule the province together – the Sublime Porte considered its interests in Egypt endangered as it was unlikely that the duumvirs would pay the deficit of the last five years.

In view of this, central government decided to renew direct control over Egypt through military intervention. In July 1786 Ottoman expeditorial troops, under the command of Hasan Pasha, disembarked at Alexandria and Rashid. During their march they dispersed the Mamluk troops but Murād and Ibrāhīm retreated to Upper Egypt together with the remaining force. Hasan’s first task in restoring the sultan’s authority was to break the military power of the two usurpers and mould the loyal Mamluk elements into an instrument obedient to the demands of the Porte. He accomplished this by creating a new set of beys and garrison commanders appointed from among the various Mamluk houses. The Sultan’s moral authority was

30. For example, the income from the customs house in Suez, seized in 1779 and formerly reserved as the iltizam for the vice-regent: it consisted mainly of duties on the import of coffee.
enhanced by a number of edicts emphasizing the Islamic character of his regime versus the tyranny of the two rebels. The sultan also promised tax relief and the return to the righteous principles of the \textit{Kânûn Nâme}.

As the main aim of the punitive expedition was the enforcement of the regular delivery of the treasury, Hasan Pasha prepared a number of fiscal decrees to secure the fulfilment of the obligations of the province towards both the Porte and the sacred cities of Hidjâz. But before he could implement these instruments, he was sent elsewhere on a military mission.

The Porte’s military intervention in Egypt did not have the expected results. Hasan Pasha had not succeeded in subduing the two rebel \textit{beys}. Moreover, the \textit{division} of Egypt into a lower part, ruled by the sultan’s representative, and an upper part dominated by the two rebels, became accepted as a reality, particularly after the two rebels, following a brief expulsion to Nubia, had in 1787 restored control over all the points in Upper Egypt occupied by Ottoman or loyal troops. Although Hasan Pasha had made some changes in the holding of ranks and offices, Isma’il Bey being appointed the new \textit{Shaykh al-Balad}, the Mamluk regime remained intact and with it all the pre-conditions for the old problems to re-emerge.

The political crisis that followed the death of Muḥammad Bey Abū ’l-Dahab was seriously complicated from 1783 by economic and social difficulties such as poor harvests, starvation, price increases and currency devaluations. These problems were aggravated by the stormy political atmosphere, administrative disorganization and tax pressures. An unusually severe epidemic in 1791, however, simplified the political situation by claiming as its victims a large number of loyal \textit{beys} including Ismâ’il Bey. Murâd and Ibrâhîm were thus able to enter Cairo again without resistance in the summer of the same year and take up rule over all Egypt.

The Porte consented to their rule on condition that the normal obligations be fulfilled. The two new leaders, in 1792, signed an agreement with the Porte stipulating the total sum to be paid and the method of payment. This agreement, however, was kept but reluctantly and the total sum sent was always insufficient. The return to power of the two \textit{beys} meant the restoration of the harsh, extortionist regime that Egypt had experienced before Hasan Pasha’s expedition, its consequences for the country being even more disastrous. Because Egypt had for ten years been disrupted by political anarchy, economic mismanagement and the relentless plundering of resources and reserves, all attempts to arrest the general decline were doomed to failure, despite the fact that almost all the money drained by the tax apparatus had remained in Egypt. The critical state of the economy was a reflection of the oppressive politics whereby the majority of the people was controlled by a small élite made up of Mamluk \textit{beys} and their retinues. Central government lacked the strength to dispose of them and Egyptian society was not yet ready to do the deed itself. But the ousting of the Mamluks was not in fact so far away. In the summer of 1798 the first impulse was provided by a most unexpected source – the French.
military expedition to the Egyptian coast under the command of Napoleon Bonaparte.

Conclusion

The period from the fall of the Mamluk sultanate in 1517 to the French expedition of 1798 was one in which Egyptian development was largely determined by its own inner dynamics but also by the Ottoman empire of which it was a component. Unlike the European areas of the empire, however, Egypt was little affected by the political development of the centre, and its socio-economic development of the centre, and its socio-economic development did not reach the stage where the beginnings of a new social class, the bourgeoisie, was spawned. Socially, therefore, it did not cross the boundaries of the late stage of the social formation traditionally called feudalism.31

The incorporation of Egypt was, however, a significant gain for the Ottoman empire which undoubtedly enhanced its economic capacity and political strength. Relations between central government and the Egyptian province, however, fluctuated considerably throughout, leading to a permanent strained atmosphere between the two. First, as in other provinces, it was political and economic relations that were a source of conflict. But progressive Ottoman decline produced even more frequent and fierce social clashes which, combined with political and economic crises, led to continuous decentralizing efforts. The aim as yet was to dominate the economy of the country and its political institutions, not to create an independent state.

The growth of separatist forces in Egypt in the late 1700s was no isolated phenomenon in the Arab countries of the Ottoman empire. More or less independent states arose in Tripolitania, Iraq and Syria at this time, some of them being the hereditary holdings of their rulers.

In Egypt, however, some aspects of this first stage of the development of separatist forces were also characteristic of its development during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These included the activities of the Egyptian beys in the Arab peninsula and Syria (the first step of Mehmed ‘Alī’s expansionist policy), and the reluctance of the beys, as well as Mehmed ‘Alī, to rid an almost independent ruler of the last vestiges of subjection to the Ottoman Sultan.

Hasan Pasha’s expedition in 1787 foreshadowed that of Napoleon Bonaparte in its course and its effect on the subjected inhabitants. It also

31. The author is aware of the specific character of feudalism in the countries of West Asia and North Africa as treated by a number of scholars (cf. Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. ikṭā‘).
The Ottoman conquest of Egypt

revealed the military inadequacy of the Mamluk regime – a vulnerability Napoleon’s expedition showed up in full light. Moreover, as an attempt to destroy decentralizing forces and strengthen ties between the province and central government, the Ottoman expedition appears to have been the first significant example of the Ottoman’s nineteenth-century attempts at centralization.

Egypt’s increasing interest in territories beyond its borders, its contacts with the representatives of foreign powers and its efforts to enter into independent commercial relations with other regions, all showed that it had broken out of its centuries-long isolation and started to participate actively in the development of its region. The isolation from which it was slowly emerging was finally overcome when France embarked on its colonial expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean. In connection with the increasing problems of the Eastern question and the spread of European colonialism, Egypt became a country of major importance for world politics.
Introduction

The period under discussion has been characterized by population movements from within the Sudan and from outside. In the north the slow penetration of the Muslim Arabs in large numbers over a long period of time— which was at an advanced stage at the beginning of our period—led to the gradual assimilation of the Christian Nubians and others in the larger pan-Islamic world. The process of cultural and ethnic assimilation was a two-way process: it led to the Arabization and Islamization of large numbers of Sudanese peoples on the one hand and the indigenization of the Arab immigrants on the other.

The impact of Islam and Arabic culture on the Southern Sudan was negligible. The expansionist energies of the Nilotes from the South had succeeded in arresting the southward march of the Arabs as well as the spread of Islam. Indeed the Nilotes, especially the Shilluk and the Jieng (Dinka), posed a serious threat to the northern Muslim states until the end of the period.

This chapter will therefore be dealing primarily with the establishment and expansion of the two Muslim savannah states (the Fundj and the Fursultanates), their relations with each other and their interaction with non-Muslim African societies which were also in the process of formation from diverse linguistic and cultural groups during this period.

The chapter will also attempt to show that the expansion of Islam constitutes an important factor in the history of the Sudan during this period.

In its southerly expansion, the process of the Arabization and Islamization was halted during this period in the water divide (consisting of the Sudd, Baḥr al-Ghazāl and Baḥr al-‘Arab) thus creating a cultural

1. The Sudan refers to the eastern part of Bilād al-Sūdān which in Medieval times included the Christian Kingdom of Nubia, and then the Fundj and the Fursultanates, and in the present chapter is roughly equated with the modern Republic of the Sudan. The official usage of the term Sudan as a political or administrative entity is associated with the Turco-Egyptian regime 1821-85.
frontier between what came to be known as the northern and southern Sudan. The existence of this cultural frontier has deeply coloured our interpretation of modern Sudanese history.

From the southern Sudanese perspective the relations between the two regions have been presented largely in terms of the aggression and economic exploitation of raiding parties from the Fundj in the Upper Nile, and later from the Für in the Bahr al-Ghazal region. From the northern perspective, on the other hand, political, economic and social changes have tended, until recently, to be explained in terms of Muslim and often Arab immigrants, 'The wise strangers' from the north or east. State formation in Northern Sudan is hence explained according to this perspective instead of historical analyses of the economic bases of these states and their social and cultural formation.

By the twentieth century the 'North' is presented as Arab and Muslim, and the 'South' as African (or negroid) and 'pagan' (or 'animist'). Thus the frontier becomes increasingly defined in religious and ethnic terms. Such a conception was largely propagated by the writings of anthropologists and colonial administrators. The elaborate racial terms and prejudices which evolved on both sides of the frontier tended to portray each region as a separate ethnic and religious entity with little or no contact between the two.

The historical reality was of course more complex than this. First, the 'frontier' between these two regions was frequently shifting — and not always southward or westward. For instance from about the middle of the seventeenth century to 1861, the Shilluk who occupied the Upper Nile, pushed the frontier northward to Ilays. From this area they raided the Fundj sultanate and the Nuba mountains.

Secondly, the frontier was not only constantly shifting; it was also a wide zone extending over a few hundred kilometres — for example, in the area of the Upper Nile. The same was true for the western area. What the Für sultanate raiders, the djallâba (traders) and the Baçekâra Arabs regarded as a frontier was, by 1800, a huge territory. Furthermore, within the frontier itself, cultural, ethnic and social transformation was taking place all the time with people becoming Arabs, Für, Fundj, Shilluk, Naath (Nuer) or Jieng according to political and economic circumstances. Indeed, the process of social transformation and ethnic integration that was heralded by the coming of the Arabs and Islam in Nūba and Bēdja land was still at work along this huge frontier in the period under discussion.

Thirdly, within the northern Muslim sultanates themselves the process of ethnic change was a complex phenomenon. To begin with, the process of Arabization — which embraced Arabs and a host of indigenous Sudanese people — was more of a cultural connotation than an ethnic one. Regardless of a few exceptions, the term Arab was progressively being emptied of nearly all its ethnic significance. The Baçekâra Arabs who live along the

frontier between the two regions are a case in point. Another example is provided by the heterogeneous indigenous peoples such as the Bong-Bagirmi language group comprising the Kara, Binga and Gula, the Nanda and Feroge. By the eighteenth century, each sultanate was divided into a number of chiefdoms most of which were plural societies. Moreover, the social formation of these sultanates was further complicated by the factor of slavery. Many of these slaves, who were brought from the southern regions, formed an important part of the armies of the sultans, others were completely assimilated in their new societies. Furthermore, trade in slaves as well as in other frontier commodities such as ivory and ostrich feathers, not only linked the two Sudanese regions but also linked Sudan in general and the frontier in particular to world markets.

Finally, largely as a result of migrations, political and economic factors, the population had crystallized during this period into the present population of the Sudan. With the exception of Westerners from central and Western Bilad al-Sûdân (such as the Takrûr and the Fulbe) and the Rashayida from Arabia, no new ethnic groups emerged in the Sudan in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries, and the major population movements were virtually completed by 1800.

The 'Abdallâbi state

During the second half of the fifteenth century, a confederacy of Arab kabîlas led by their chief 'Abdallâh, nicknamed Djammâ' (the Gatherer), succeeded in conquering the kingdom of "Alwa." Contrary to what is commonly accepted, the conquest of Sôbâ was not a joint undertaking of the Fundj and the Arabs, but was accomplished by the Arabs alone. The conquest of Sôbâ was an indication of the preponderance of Arab influence and it marked the beginning of Arab ascendancy in eastern Bilad al-Sûdân.

'Abdallâh Djammâ' and his descendants, the 'Abdallâbi, administered the new regime from Kerri, north of Sôbâ, on the main Nile. Sôbâ thus lost its importance and was indeed in ruins when Daudi Reuben the Jewish traveller, passed by it in 1523. The choice of Kerri was probably determined by its easy access to the Buţâna Arabs whose support was essential to the 'Abdallâbi. It also controlled movements, especially of trade, along the Nile valley and across it to the western bank.

The extent of the new state is not easy to determine. The 'Abdallâbi hegemony seems to have extended over the Arabs in northern Djazîra, the Buţâna, east of the Nile, and possibly over some of the Bëdjâ groups. The Arabized chieftainships which dotted the area between Shandi and the Egyptian border, and which seemed to have participated in the Arab assault

7. S. Hillelson, 1933, p. 60.
against Sôbâ, remained loyal to the head of the Arab confederation. The exact relation between them is not clear; but later, the 'Abdallâbi as overlords had the authority to confirm the appointment of new chiefs.

The independent existence of the 'Abdallâbi state did not last long enough for it to evolve its own institutions. By the beginning of the sixteenth century it was confronted with a formidable enemy - the Fundj, who were cattle nomads migrating down the Blue Nile. The two migratory forces clashed, probably in competition over pasture in the northern part of the Dżazïra. At Arbadj, in 1504, the Fundj defeated the 'Abdallâbi and their king was reduced to the position of vassal. As junior partners, the 'Abdallâbi continued to rule the northern part of the Fundj sultanate until the Turco-Egyptian conquest of 1820.

The Fundj sultanate

The Fundj were cattle nomads, whose remote origin gave rise to many contradictory hypotheses. Their kingdom is known in Sudanese traditions as al-Sultana al-Zarka (the Black Sultanate). Daudi Reubeni, who visited them in 1522–3, described their monarch as a black Muslim who ruled over a nation of blacks and whites — referring to the indigenous population and the Arabs respectively. While visiting Sennàr in 1772, James Bruce, the Scottish traveller, recorded that the Fundj were by origin Shilluk raiders who descended from the White Nile. Yet some Sudanese traditions, probably of Arab origin, attribute an Arab ancestry to them, through an Umayyad refugee who came via Ethiopia. He married an indigenous princess and hence inherited her authority. He is referred to in Sudanese traditions as the ‘blessed man’ who brought new customs.

It is not clear at what date the Fundj dynasty began to claim Umayyad descent. In the light of Reubeni’s remarks, at least king 'Umâra Dunkus, who defeated the 'Abdallâbi, was a Muslim. But it seems that, as a result of the impact of the new Muslim society over which they extended their hegemony and as a consequence of commercial and cultural relations with Egypt, the Fundj were rapidly Islamized. Like other converts on the fringes of Islamic societies, the Fundj tended to associate themselves with the Arabs and thus adopted an Arab ancestry. By so doing they hoped to increase their prestige in the Muslim world and to enhance their moral authority over their Arab subjects. However, it is significant to note that Ibn (son of) Dayf Allâh, when referring to the ruling élite called them ‘kings of the Fundj’ and ‘kings of the Arabs’ (that is, kings of the ‘Abdallâbi

and the Dja‘aliyyūn) implying that there was an ethnic difference between the two groups.14

Having asserted their suzerainty over the ‘Abdallābi territories, the Fundj ruled their domains from Sennār which became their seat of government. The ‘Abdallābi shaykh (chief), while retaining virtual autonomy in his former domains, became the Fundj vassal and bore the title of Mānjīl or Māndjuluk which Fundj monarchs bestowed on their principal vassals. However, it appears that from the beginning, relations between the Fundj and their junior partners were antagonistic.

In an attempt to shake off Fundj dominance, Shaykh Adīb I, who came to power just after the middle of the sixteenth century, challenged the Fundj, defeated them and drove them into Ethiopia. Under Dakīn (1568/9–1585/6) the Fundj were able to regain their former position but conceded to Adīb I the right to appoint judges in his domains. Dakīn’s policy of re-organizing the kingdom and introducing new regulations appears to have upset the delicate balance between the two sides and driven Adīb into open rebellion. At Karkodj, a few miles north of Sōbā, a Fundj army inflicted a crushing defeat on the ‘Abdallābi and killed Adīb I in 1611/12. His clan took refuge in Dünkūla. A settlement between the Fundj and the ‘Abdallābi was negotiated through the good office of Shaykh Idris wad al-Akbār, the influential religious dignitary.15 Except for Arbadjī, which was transferred to Fundj, the status quo was restored: the descendants of Adīb, bearing the title of wad ‘Adīb, continued to rule directly as far north as Hadjar al-‘Asal, including over most of the nomadic groups and indirectly over the chieftaincies in the Nile valley to the border of Ottoman Nubia at the Third Cataract. The settlement gave the sultanate a fairly long period of stability. However, in about the middle of the seventeenth century, the Shaykīyya chieftaincy challenged the ‘Abdallābi hegemony and asserted its independence from the Fundj sultanate.16

The extension of the Fundj sultanate

The extension of Fundj authority as far as lower Nubia, which was originally dependent on the ‘Abdallābi, seems to have been viewed with suspicion by the Ottomans, who conquered Egypt in 1517. Although frontier clashes were reported, the Ottomans did not press the issue until the reign of Sultan Sulaymān the Magnificent (1520–66). To avert the Portuguese threat to the Red Sea, the Ottomans sent a naval expedition against them in the Indian Ocean; and decided to conquer Ethiopia, a Portuguese ally. On a return voyage from a naval expedition Özdemir was instructed to put an end to the ‘rebellious’ Fundj in Nubia, where two

factions were fighting one another. Özdemir captured the strategic frontier fortresses of Ibrîm and Dirr. At Säy, between the Second and Third Cataracts, he built a fortress which constituted the southern limit of Ottoman Egypt. Effective administration of the new Ottoman province, hence known as Berberistan (the land of the Berberines or Nubians), appears to have been established when a garrison of Bosnian soldiers was installed at the fortresses of Aswān, Ibrîm and Säy.¹⁷

After his retirement from the governorship of Yemen in November 1554, Özdemir Pasha had several interviews with the Sultan, during which they discussed the affairs of Egypt, Yemen and Habesistān.¹⁸ He was later commissioned to conquer Habesistān. After detailed preparations in Egypt, the expedition started off up the Nile. At Aswān, Özdemir could not control his unruly troops and had to call off the campaign. There it was understood that the expedition was directed against Fundjistān (the land of the Fundj) and not Habesistān. Later, in 1577, a certain Sulaymān Pasha was instructed to undertake the conquest of Fundjistān. However, the campaign never materialized.¹⁹ The Egyptian frontier was finally consolidated at Hannīk after some fighting between the ‘Abdallābi and the Ottomans in about 1622. Hannīk lies half way between the Third Cataract and Mushu, the Fundj frontier post in the north.²⁰

The administration of Ottoman Nubia was entrusted to an officer bearing the title of Kashif. The office then became hereditary in the family of the first Kashif who lived at al-Dirr. Likewise, the descendants of the original Bosnian troops, who intermarried locally, continued to garrison Ottoman fortresses in the district.

Özdemir is also credited with establishing an Ottoman base against the Portuguese and the Ethiopians: Sawākin, which was nominally dependent on Mamluk Egypt, passed to Ottoman suzerainty, and Massawa was annexed in 1557. Thenceforward the coastal strip between the two ports constituted the province of Habes. At Sawākin, an Ottoman garrison, headed by a governor with the rank of sandjak was stationed. When the Portuguese threat was over, Sawākin resumed its activities as the main commercial outlet of the Fundj sultanate. Relations between the Ottoman governor and the Fundj were at first unfriendly and at times deteriorated into armed confrontation. In 1571, according to Ottoman sources, the Fundj (or perhaps more accurately the Bëdja) attacked Sawākin and besieged it for three months. However, because of extensive commercial transactions between the two sides a more friendly atmosphere developed. Sawākin rose to a position of importance, which it retained unchallenged

¹⁸. Ottoman sources use the term Habesistān or Abyssinia to include all territories south of Egypt as far as the island of Zanzibar or Mozambique in East Africa. See G. Örhanlü, 1974, p. 21.
¹⁹. ibid., pp. 34–5, 77.
PLATE 7.1  The port of Sawakin, as portrayed in a nineteenth-century engraving
The Sudan, 1500-1800

until the beginning of the twentieth century. The Arabized Béda clan, the Ḥadāriba, who once dominated the region of ‘Aydhāb, played a leading role in the trade. Later, it was from the Ḥadāriba that the Ottomans chose the local ruler known as the Amīr.21

By the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Fundj appeared to have consolidated their position at Sennār. Their direct rule extended from Arbadjī to the south of Fazūghlī, which probably constituted the northern limits of the Ethiopian border. The expansion of Fundj power in a westerly direction across the Dżazīra into Kordofān was initiated by Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḫādir. In about 1554 he defeated the chiefs of the Sakādī and Moya Hills. Both chiefs were confirmed in their offices after embracing Islam and agreeing to pay an annual tribute.22 The increasing pressure of the Nilotic peoples on the White Nile at the expense of Sennār apparently led to a direct confrontation between the Fundj and the Shilluk, who inhabited most of the region of the White Nile. Sultan Bāḍî II Abū Dikn (1644/5-1718), whose reign constituted the golden age of the Sultanate, established a Fundj garrison and a bridgehead at Alays on the White Nile. The administration of Alays was entrusted to a member of the Fundj dynasty whose rank was second to that of the ‘Abdallābi chief. From that strategic point the Fundj were able to check all movements across the river and also to check the Shilluk, who appear to have entered into an alliance with them.23

Then the Fundj penetrated the Nuba mountains, one of the principal slave-raiding regions. There the newly established Islamized kingdom of Taḵalī was reduced to subordinate status.24 Likewise the Fundj extended their suzerainty over the northern hills of al-Dāyr and Kordofān, which later became the scene of intensive competition with the Musabba’āt. The numerous prisoners captured from among the non-Muslim ‘hill-Nūba’ were accommodated in villages around Sennār. The prisoners formed a slave-bodyguard to protect the sultan. Their numbers were later increased by raids and purchase. The establishment of a slave-army dependent on the ruler is not unprecedented in Islamic annals: it was first adopted by the Abbasid Caliph al-Mu’tasim and also by the sultan of Dārfūr in the eighteenth century. The practice was viewed with grave concern by the traditional warriors, the Fundj aristocracy, who revolted against it during the reign of Bāḍî III (the Red, 1692–1716). Although the sultan succeeded in containing that outbreak, the Fundj aristocracy was able to assert its power and depose his son Unsa III who was accused of leading a dissolute private life. This marked the end of the direct line of ‘Umāra Dunkūs.

24. There is disagreement regarding Fundj-Taḵalī relations at this time. The earlier theory of a tributary relation has recently been challenged by J. Ewald, 1983, p. 10.
Unsa III was followed by Prince Nül in 1720.

Despite the intervention of the Fundj aristocracy, the state continued to rely on the slave-army. A further crisis was precipitated during the reign of Bādī IV Abū Shullūkh (1721–62), the last effective Fundj monarch. During the first half of his reign, Bādī IV, described as ‘just and prosperous’, left the affairs of state to his minister Dōka. On Dōka’s death, Bādī banished the *ahl al-usūl* (members of the old lineage and rank) and with the support of his Nūba slave-army and Für refugees, assumed arbitrary rule. To rid himself of the antagonized Fundj notables, Bādī sent them on a campaign against the Musabba’āt who had encroached on the Fundj domains in Kordofān. After initial setbacks, the Fundj army, under the command of Muhammad Abū Likaylik, won a decisive victory in 1747. Thereafter, Abū Likaylik retained his command over the Fundj forces in Kordofān, where he ruled as viceroy for fourteen years.25

Meanwhile, the Fundj had fought two wars with Ethiopia, both largely triggered by border disputes but neither of which had led to any radical changes. The record of their relations includes many examples of positive co-operation and economic interdependence. To the Christians of Ethiopia, Sennār had long been their principal land outlet with the outside world. Through Sennār the Ethiopians obtained new bishops from Egypt and exchanged commercial commodities with the merchants. It was also along this route that European Christian missionaries found their way to Ethiopia – the land of Prēster John.

The first Ethiopian war occurred at the beginning of the seventeenth century. When Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḳādir was deposed, he was granted political asylum by Emperor Susenyoś of Ethiopia who appointed him governor of Cheleqa which controlled the movement of trade caravans on the border. The reigning Fundj sultan was anxious because, despite an exchange of gifts between Susenyoś and Bādī I, relations had deteriorated into border skirmishes and slave-raiding. Frontier clashes escalated during 1618 and 1619, when large numbers of troops, using a limited number of muskets, were involved. The fact that the two monarchs conducted the war from their capitals, indicates that the war did not constitute a formidable threat to either side. The war ended in favour of Ethiopia.26

The second Ethiopian war began in the form of border raids against the Kalabāt–Dindera region to impose tributes. In March 1744, Iyasu II marched at the head of a large Ethiopian army against Sennār. The two armies met on the banks of the Dindera, in a pitched battle, during which the Ethiopians were routed and the emperor barely escaped death. The resounding Fundj victory was attributed to Prince Khamīs Djunkul of the Mussabba’āt and his followers who had taken refuge in Sennār. Although relations between Sennār and Gondar remained strained for many years,

trade routes were kept open. The Fundj victory was celebrated with religious fervour by Bādī IV and his subjects. It was also echoed in Istanbul where the Ottoman Caliph was said to have been ‘pleased with the victory of Islam’.  

The progress of Islam

The establishment of the Fundj-‘Abdallābi sultanate gave the country a measure of unity and stability that facilitated the spread of Islam by individual Muslim scholars who brought Islamic learning and introduced ṣūfī mysticism. They were welcomed by the rulers and encouraged to settle in the country. Before this the spread of Islamic doctrine had been accomplished by two groups – traders and, primarily, nomadic Arabs. The first group, whose contacts continued for more than nine centuries, acted as propagators of Islam: the combination of commercial activity with proselytization had always been a visible phenomenon on the margin of Islamic societies. The second group, although not well versed in Islamic doctrine and not moved by religious zeal, was largely responsible for the spread of Islam primarily through intermarriage with the indigenous Sudanese people. The process of Arabization was normally followed by Islamization. The efforts of these two groups were, at times, augmented by those of individual teachers.

The early Fundj period witnessed a rise in the number of Muslim teachers, some of whom came from Egypt, the Ḥijāz, Yemen and the Maghrib. The majority were, however, Sudanese some of whom had studied in Cairo and other holy places. On his return from Cairo in the middle of the sixteenth century Maḥmūd al-‘Arakī, the first Sudanese Muslim scholar, established seventeen schools on the White Nile. In about 1570, Ibrāhīm al-Būlād ibn Djabīr, a descendant of Ghalām Allāh ibn ‘Ayd, introduced the teaching of the two Mālikī textbooks: the Risāla by Abū Zayd al-Ḵayrawānī, and the Mukhtasar by Khalīl ibn Ishāk. These books helped in establishing the predominance of the Mālikī rite. Its ascendancy was further sustained by cultural impact from the Maghrib and western Bilād al-Ṣūdān, where the Mālikī school predominated.

The first trained Muslim scholars were primarily concerned with the teaching of the sharī‘a (Muslim law), and with its administration. To transmit orthodox teaching and to raise the level of religious sophistication were not easy tasks in a vast, isolated and backward country. Before orthodox Islam had struck root, a more popular and less exacting type of Islam was introduced.

Most of the ṣūfī tariqās (religious orders) were introduced from the Hīdžāz. The first of these and probably the most popular was the Ḫādirīyya, after ‘Abd al-Ḵādir al-Djīlānī (1077–1166) of Baghdad. It was introduced  

28. J. S. Tringham, 1949, p. 82.
by Tâdj al-Dîn al-Bâhârî, of Baghdad, who came from Mecca in 1577 at the invitation of a Sudanese merchant pilgrim. He stayed for seven years in the Djazîra, during which he initiated many prominent Sudanese (including Shaykh Adîb I) into the Kâdirîyya order.

Another order, the the Shâdhiliyyâ, was introduced by Hammâd ibn Muḥammad al-Madjdhûb (1693–1776), a member of the Dja’aliyyûn Kabila, who studied in the Hîdjar. The Madjdhûbiyya, as the order came to be known locally, and the Madjâdhîb clan developed into an ethnic theocracy in the region south of the Albara confluence. There, they played an important role in temporal and spiritual matters.

When Sûfism reached the Fundj kingdom, it had already reached a low ebb throughout the Islamic world, being no longer merely a means of deepening religious conviction, as it had become tainted by some unorthodox practices. In the absence of proper religious instruction, people had come to believe that baraka (blessings or goodness) emanated from a holy man who acted as an intermediary between man and God. They also believed that such mystical powers or functions could be inherited by such a man’s descendants or could be exhibited by him after his death. This attitude led to a significant emphasis on the cult of saints. Sûfî teachers were generally endowed with grants of land, or tax exemption and some acquired considerable political influence such as that attained by Idrîs wad al-Akbâr and the Madjâdhîb. They became more revered by the rulers and their subjects than the jurists.

However, by the seventeenth century, the two functions could no longer be distinguished. The jurists, realizing the gratifying position attained by their rivals, tended to combine the teaching of law with Sûfî leadership. This development was clearly reflected in local usage, where the title fakî (a corruption of the Arabic fakîh, a jurist; pl. fukâhâ) was indiscriminately applied to the jurist and the mystic.

Through the many centres of religion they established, and through the great influence they wielded, the fakîs offered elements of continuity and stability to the heterogeneous and fluid Fundj society. Through their teaching of Islamic doctrine they provided a unifying factor and through the loyalty they enjoyed they superimposed a wider loyalty to Islam. Their missionary zeal was not confined to the Fundj kingdom, but radiated as far as Kordofân, Dârfûr and Borno. Indeed, celebrated Sudanese jurists attracted students from the region between the Djazîra and Borno.29

Islam progressed in a similar manner in Kordofân and the newly established Für sultanate. Dârfûr was affected by Islamic currents initially from the Maghrib and central Bilad al-Sûdân and then increasingly from the Fundj kingdom. Islamic influences were felt in Kânem, which wielded great influence all over the region, well before the eleventh century.30

29. For example, al-Ḵâddâl had 1500 students from the Takrûr and Arbâb al-Khashin had 1000 students from the region between the Djazîra and Bornu.

The Sudan, 1500–1800

Trade and the state

The territories of the Fundj and the Für sultanates were traversed by a number of long-distance trade routes that connected them with Egypt and the Red Sea. These routes played an important role in strengthening economic and cultural links with the outside world. The Fundj and the Für sultans, like most kings of the Sudanic belt, had a vested interest in long-distance trade which enjoyed their patronage and protection. The exchange of slaves, gold, ostrich feathers and other African products for fine cotton textiles, jewellery, weapons and other luxury items complemented one another. Besides the revenue they levied at the customs posts, the sultans needed luxury goods to maintain their prestige and to reward their loyal supporters.

External trade ran along two main axes which took a west–east and a south–north direction. The first connected Borno–Wadai with Sennār, through Kobbie – the principal commercial centre in Dārfūr – and Kor-dofān. From Sennār it proceeded directly to Ƙoz Ṣađāb and Sawākin, or by way of ƙandī. Beside commercial transactions, it also carried Muslim pilgrims across what came to be called the Sudan Road.

Through the Sudan Road, the Eastern Sudan was laid open to cultural influences from the Western Sudan and North Africa. African Muslim scholars – who developed strong relations with the Nile valley and the Ḥijāz – followed this route whose starting-point seems to have been Dārfūr, which also attracted pilgrims from the countries west of Lake Chad. By the beginning of the nineteenth century the route was known throughout the Sudan belt as far as Futa Toro in the west. Being shorter and less expensive it was traversed by pilgrims who could not afford the cost of a desert journey through Egypt in the company of commercial caravans. Pilgrims travelled mostly on foot, and benefited from the charity and the protection of the Muslim peoples. Although some of these pilgrims, including scholars, settled in the Eastern Sudan, they should not be confused with the migratory trends of some West Africans such as the Fulbe who had established sizeable communities in Dārfūr (and elsewhere) by the beginning of the nineteenth century. These pilgrims seem to have carried on considerable trading activities en route, in asses, books, and other merchandise. The writing of amulets was also one of their major activities.

The second route commenced at Sennār from which a regular trade caravan set out twice a year to Egypt. It went through Kerri (and later Halfāyat al-Mulay) directly across the Bayūda Desert (or from another point down the Nile) through Dönkūla and Salima to Asyūt in Upper Egypt. However, owing to the chaos caused by the rise of the Shaykīyya in the eighteenth century, this standard route was abandoned in favour of another that followed the eastern bank. This one went from Sennār via Shandī, al-Damār, across the Atbara to Berber and then across the Nubian
FIG. 7.1 Trade routes of the Sudan (after Y. F. Hasan)
Desert under the protection of the ‘Abābda Arabs, to Isna in Upper Egypt.

At the Salima Oasis, the Nile route was joined by the Darb al-‘Arba‘īn (Forty-Days Road), the main artery of Für trade to Egypt. It started at Kobbie then went to Suwaynī, the last Für border point, across the desert via the Salima and the Khārdja oases into Asyūṭ. Another trade route took a north-westerly direction to Tripoli and Tunisia via Fezzān.31

Through its wide hinterland and strategic position Sennār developed into an important commercial centre. Describing Sennār in 1701, Father Krump wrote:

In all Africa, as far as the Moorish lands are concerned, Sennār is close to being the greatest trading city. Caravans are continually arriving from Cairo, Dünkūla, Nubia, from across the Red Sea, from Nubia, Ethiopia, Dārfūr, Borno, the Fezzān and other kingdoms. This is a free city and men of any nationality or faith may live in it without a single hindrance.32

Most of the foreigners who came to Sennār were merchants and a few were craftsmen. The bulk of the trade was probably in the hands of the Sudanese Djallāba (traders). As middlemen in the trade between Sennār and Egypt, the Danākla and the Dja’aliyyūn of Shandī acquired commercial experience and adequate capital to venture into new territories. The enterprising Djallāba also played an important role in the Für trade and were instrumental in the development of commercial centres in Dārfūr. Although the Sudanese Djallāba and others from Upper Egypt were the chief financiers of the long-distance trade, the ultimate control of that trade, its organization and safety seemed to rest with the sultans of the respective kingdoms. At times the sultans dispatched their own caravans to Cairo.33 In Dārfūr, the long-distance trade was more or less under state control. Through these trading caravans, the Für sultanate became better known to the outside world.

The commercial ascendancy of Sennār was affected by the Fundj–Für rivalry over Kordofān and by the Shilluk raids which rendered the Kobbie–(al-‘Obeid)–Sennār route unsafe. Hence that trade took a northerly direction into Shandī.34 When Bruce visited Shandī in 1773 it was a large commercial centre, under the autonomous rule of the Sa’dāb Dja’aliyyūn.35 By the beginning of the nineteenth century Shandī had attained such great commercial importance that Burckhardt described it as having succeeded Sennār as the grand rendezvous for Nubian caravans and the market for Ethiopian and Für commerce.36

32. T. Krump, 1710.
35. J. Bruce, 1805.
In the East the Hadāriba of Sawākin were also active in the long-distance trade between the Red Sea and the Nile. They procured African products and slaves from Shandï and exchanged them for Indian goods at Sawākin — the most important slave centre after Cairo and Massawa.37

The movement of slaves down the Nile was an ancient phenomenon. The practice was continued by the Arabs when they concluded the bakt treaty with the Nubians, after which through the dispatch of four hundred Nubian slaves annually, the Arab world came to favour them as domestic employees. Their fighting qualities as bowmen also recommended them to serve as slave troops. Black slaves had been eagerly sought by the Tulunids (868–935), the Ikhshidids (935–69) and the Fātimids (969–1171) of Egypt to fill the ranks of their armies.

As a result of this long practice, demand for black slaves increased. However, because of its sparse population, Nubia could not meet the needs of the Islamic world and Arab traders had to tap other sources south-west of Nubia. It was through this Arab (the term is used vaguely to include Arabs and their subjects) intervention that the slave trade received further stimulus acquiring great importance which continued until the last decades of the nineteenth century. At first the slaves included Nubians and Bēdja, then with the increase in demand, they were procured from Kordofān, Dārfūr and, eventually, from the Baḥr al-Ghazāl, Borno–Wadai and other adjacent lands in central Bilād al-Siǧdān. Slaves offered for sale at Shandī by the end of the eighteenth century included Ethiopians and Nūba from Kordofān, Dārfūr, Borno and Dār Sīlā.

Slaves were acquired through conquest, kidnapping or purchase and the role of Arab dealers varied from time to time and from one region to another. It seems, however, that most Arab traders were not engaged in the primary acquisition of slaves (except during the nineteenth century) but relied mostly on African suppliers or middlemen. Both Arab traders and African suppliers utilized fully ancient customs and institutions that lent themselves to such practices. The Arab merchants were mostly content to obtain slaves in return for the commodities they peddled.

The external demand for black slaves for military purposes shrank during the time of the Ayyubids (1172–1251) who disbanded black troops in favour of white slaves. This policy was continued by the Mamluks (1251–1517) during whose regime the army was almost exclusively recruited from white slaves.

However, demand for black soldiers continued to be felt in other places, particularly in the newly established Fundj and Für sultanates where they constituted the core of the army. In the nineteenth century Muhammad ‘Alī Pasha, Viceroy of Egypt, began to recruit black slaves for his modern army, most of whom were purchased from the Sudan. Although Muhammad ‘Alī abandoned his original idea of a black army, Sudanese soldiers

continued to constitute a sizeable section of the Egyptian army throughout the nineteenth century.

The decline of the Fundj sultanate

The visible decay of Sennār as the leading commercial centre was matched by political decline. At Sennār, with the increase of Bāḍī IV's repressive measures, members of the Fundj aristocracy who had accompanied Abū Likaylik to Kordofān and whose families had suffered most, induced the general to depose the sultan. Abū Likaylik marched with his army into Sennār, deposed Bāḍī and replaced him with his son Nāṣir in 1762. The success of the revolt of Abū Likaylik was an important landmark in the history of the sultanate. Henceforward Shaykh Muḥammad Abū Likaylik and his successors, who were called wazirs, became effective hereditary rulers or regents of the kingdom until its downfall. The Fundj sultans were indeed no more than puppets in the hands of the Hamadj regents. The shift in power is aptly summarized by the Fundj chronicler in the following words: Bāḍī ' ... was the last of the kings with power and with him ended the real monarchy. After him the power of binding and loosing passed to the Hamadj.'

The term 'Hamadj' was applied by Sudanese Arabs to some of the ancient peoples of the Dżazîra. Although accredited with a Dja'ali pedigree they were neither Fundj nor Arabs. The emergence of the Hamadj hegemony, under the leadership of Abū Likaylik probably represented the resurgence of an ancient people who became Arabized and Islamized.

On the death of Abū Likaylik in 1776/7, the Fundj kings began to conspire with the provincial governors, particularly the 'Abdallah, to oust their regents. The descendants of Abū Likaylik were themselves handicapped by their own internal struggle for power. Indeed, the last fifty years of the Fundj sultanate were punctuated by intrigues, revolts and civil wars among the competing factions.

In the north, the control of the 'Abdallah chiefs over the Nile valley also declined: the Sa'dāb of Shandī, and the Madjādhīb of al-Damār became virtually autonomous. The Shaykīyya warriors who became a major force in the region of Dünkūla were harassed by the Mamluks of Egypt. In 1811, they fled from Muḥammad 'Alī's massacre, established a camp at Dünkūla al-'Urdī and fought the Shaykīyya. In the west, the Fundj, harassed by the Für sultanate, were ultimately driven out of Kordofān. When the Turco-Egyptian forces approached Sennār in 1821, the sultanate was too feeble to muster any resistance.

Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century

FIG. 7.2 Kingdoms and sultanates of the Sudan (after Y. F. Hasan)
The Für sultanate

The Für sultanate was one of the Islamic kingdoms that flourished in the savannah belt of Bilād al-Sūdān. It occupied the western fringe of the eastern Bilād al-Sūdān. To the west lay the Sultanate of Wadai, and between the two states there existed a number of small semi-independent kingdoms whose allegiance was divided between the two sultanates. To the east, the plains of Kordofān, which separated the Für sultanate from the Fundj kingdom, were a cause of dispute between the two states, primarily for economic reasons. There, the Musabbaʿāt, cousins of the Für sultans, were also at loggerheads with the rival states, while attempting to consolidate their hold over Kordofān. The Libyan Desert in the north and Bahr al-ʿArab in the south formed natural borders to the state. The central region, dominated by Djabal Marra, the cradle of the Für sultanate, was the meeting place for a number of trade routes. These caravan routes brought economic prosperity, cultural influences and human immigration.

The early history of the Für sultanate is obscure because of the scarcity of written sources. According to oral tradition the Für state was preceded by two indigenous dynasties: Dādjū and Tundjūr. The Dādjū kingdom flourished during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. On losing control over the trade they were succeeded by the Tundjūr at the beginning of the fifteenth century. They first established their authority over the central region and gradually over Dārfūr and parts of Wadai. It was probably during the reign of the Tundjūr (c.1400–1600) that Islamic influences were first felt. They resulted from wide commercial contact with the Muslim world, and the gradual penetration of the region by Arab immigrants. However, the proper Islamization of the region began with the establishment of the Für sultanate in the early seventeenth century.

The Für sultanate owed its name to the Für, an indigenous Sudanese people who lived around Djabal Marra, and who originally might have been connected with the peoples of western Bahr al-Ghazāl. It is not clear why they moved down to the savannah from their mountain base.

R. S. O’Fahey has suggested that the rise of the Für sultanate, like that of other Islamic kingdoms of the Sudanic belt, was a product of the long-distance trade. He links its establishment with expansion of trade across the Forty-Days Road. The association between trade and the spread of Islam has been noted by many scholars; in the case of the Für sultanate, trade was an important factor in developing the state itself and strengthening its contacts with its neighbours.

The Kayra sultanate flourished from about 1640 to 1874. It was restored in 1898 and was finally annexed to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan in 1916. Sulaymān Solondzungu was probably the founder of the dynasty (c.1640–

40. Y. F. Hasan, 1972, pp. 72–82.
41. ibid., pp. 82–5; P. M. Holt, 1961; R. S. O’Fahey and J. L. Spaulding, 1974, p. 121.
42. R. S. O’Fahey, 1971, p. 87.
He is remembered as a conqueror who drove out the Tundjür and annexed the area around Jabal Marra. He was assisted in these campaigns by Arab groups comprising camel and cattle nomads such as the Habaniyya, the Ma'aliyya, the Rizaykät, and the Misayriyya.

The policy of expansion and consolidation started by Sulaymân Solongdungu was pursued by his successor Ahmad Bukr b. Mūsā (c.1682–1722), who pushed on to the north and north-west annexing the strategic state of Dar Ḷīmr. This expansion brought the Kayra dynasty into contact with the Zaghâwa whose territories became a source of conflict between the Sultanates of Wadai and Dârfūr. The Kayra consolidated their position in Dar Zaghâwa by marriage alliances and by supporting one section against the other. Competition for control of the borderlands was resolved in favour of the Kayra sultanate, and Wadai continued to pay the tribute which it had formerly paid to the Tundjür kings. However, Sultan Ya'küb renounced the tribute, invaded Dârfūr and penetrated as far as the important commercial centre of Kabkâbiyya. After two years of military preparation, during which he obtained weapons and firearms from Cairo, Bukr drove the invaders out of the country.\(^\text{43}\)

Until the end of the eighteenth century the political history of Dârfūr was dominated by the struggle of two factions of the Kayra dynasty: the sultans who sought to centralize their own power and other princes who wanted to strengthen the powers of the dynasty as a whole. The struggle was triggered by Sultan Bukr’s desire that the sultanate should pass to each of his sons in turn. Bukr had no less than a hundred children, five of whom ascended the Fūr throne. His first successor, Muḥammad Dawra, started by eliminating his brothers or proscribing them in Jabal Marra, and naming his son Mūsā as successor. However, he soon changed his mind and replaced Mūsā by his younger brother ‘Umar Lel. Mūsā retaliated by revolting against his own father. When ‘Umar Lel came to power hostility between him and his uncles, the sons of Bukr, increased. Sulaymân ibn Ahmad Bukr took refuge with the Musabba‘āt who, after an unsuccessful bid for the Kayra throne had to migrate to Kordofân. Sulaymân’s attempt to enlist the support of the Musabba‘āt and that of the Sultan of Wadai failed. However, his action provoked ‘Umar Lel to invade Wadai in about the middle of the eighteenth century. After heavy fighting, the Sultan of Wadai, Muḥammad Djawda, defeated the Fūr army and captured the sultan.

The conflict continued into the reign of the sixth sultan, Abu ʿI-Ḵāsim b. Ṭahmāb. To consolidate his position, Abū ʿI-Ḵāsim turned against his brothers and recruited slave troops rather than the traditional ethnic levies. By this action the sultan ‘completely alienated himself from the free men of his country preferring slaves and heaping upon them riches and places of honour’.\(^\text{44}\)

Abū 'l-Kāsim’s dependence on slave troops was opposed by large numbers of the traditional title-holders. Indeed, it produced tensions similar to those that developed in the Fundj kingdom during the reign of Badī IV.

During the battle against the Wadaians, Abū 'l-Kāsim was deserted by the traditional war chiefs and ethnic levies and was left with his slave troops. There he was wounded after he had lost the day. The old Für nobility and traditional soldiers hailed Muḥammad Tayrāb ibn Aḥmad Bukr as the new sultan. Muḥammad Tayrāb followed his predecessor’s practice and created a standing slave-army called the Kurkwā (spearmen in Für). Slaves from the Turundj of the Nuba mountains, the Dading from Dār Tama and others were incorporated into it. One of the Kurkwā corps, Muḥammad Kurra, a eunuch, became one of Tayrāb’s masters of the royal grooms. Later he attained great distinction and became Ab Shaykh, a post that commanded great authority.

Having failed to expand westward against his formidable foe, the Sultan of Wadai, Tayrāb, concluded a treaty which remained effective for a hundred years. He then turned his efforts eastward against the Musabba‘āt, who must have regained power in Kordofān after the withdrawal of Abū Likaylik in 1761–2. The change in the direction of expansion was probably dictated by other factors such as Tayrāb’s desire to curb the Musabba‘āt’s attempt to establish a strong state in Kordofān and to control the trade routes, the sources of slaves and gold in southern Kordofān. The arrival of large numbers of enterprising djallāba and religious teachers from the Fundj kingdom and the increasing commercial links with Egypt might have influenced the sultan in that direction. His immediate objective was probably to remove his brothers and other members of the old Für nobility out of Darfur to pave the way for the succession of his son, Ishāk: Tayrāb, at the head of a large army moved against Hāshim, Sultan of Kordofān. The latter, deserted by his army, took refuge in the Fundj kingdom; while Kordofān remained in the hands of the Für until the Turco–Egyptian conquest. Tayrāb himself died at Bara.

A struggle over succession ensued between the supporters of Ishāk and his uncles, the sons of Aḥmad Bukr. Muḥammad Kurra succeeded in rallying the support of the second faction for ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, the youngest son of Aḥmad Bukr. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān was a pious and scholarly young man with neither ethnic connections nor support from among the new forces in the state. In the civil war, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān emerged victorious. The new sultan rewarded Muḥammad Kurra with the position of Ab Shaykh – a rank that was second only to that of the sultan. As the chief, Muḥammad Kurra was from about 1790 to 1804 the strongest man in the state.


Abd al-Rahmān marked his victory by establishing a new fāshir (royal residence) at Khor Tandalti, east of Djabal Marra, in 1741–2. Until then the Fūr sultans had had no fixed capital. The growth of a permanent capital at al-Fāshir, and the consolidation of the centralizing forces and Islamizing influences in the reign of Abd al-Rahmān marked the apogee of the Kayra sultanate. His reign was marked by increasing contacts with the outside world through trade and the arrival of religious teachers. The state prospered from trade along the Forty-Days Road. G. W. Browne, who visited Dārfūr in 1793–6, describes the role of the king as follows:

The king is the chief merchant in the country, and not only despatches with every caravan to Egypt a great quantity of his own merchandise, but also employs his slaves and dependants to trade with the goods of Egypt, on his own account, in the countries adjacent to the Sudan. 47

The sultans utilized the trade to strengthen their political position by purchasing arms, armour and luxury goods with which to reward their loyal subordinates and allies.

Both trade and religion were stimulated by the infiltration of the Dja‘aliyyūn and the Danākia. Abd al-Rahmān exchanged presents with the Ottoman sultan, who bestowed on him the honorific title of al-Rāshid (the just). He also corresponded with Bonaparte in 1799 during the French occupation of Egypt.

The adoption of Islam in Dārfūr was probably a much slower process than in the Fundj kingdom. Earlier trends of Islamization were speeded up in the eighteenth century. Sulaymān Solongdungu was credited with the introduction of Islam as a court religion and the promotion of Islamic practices. Some of Dārfūr’s religious families claim that their ancestors had settled in the sultanate during the reign of Sulaymān. However, African religious practices and rituals co-existed with Islam at the Kayra court for some time. 48 Islam received further encouragement from Aḥmad Bukr who built mosques and schools; while Muhammad Tayrāb obtained religious books from Egypt and Tunisia. Abd al-Rahmān al-Rashīd, himself a Muslim scholar, encouraged jurists and mystics from other countries to settle in his land. Among these was Umar al-Tunisi, a Tunisian Arab, who was later followed by his own son, Muḥammad, whose account of Dārfūr is one of the main sources for its history. 49 Other scholars came from Egypt, the Ḥidjāz, the Nilotic Sudan and western Bilād al-Sūdān. From the last region came Mālik al-Futāwī, a member of a religious family, who taught Abd al-Rahmān before he became sultan. Later, he became minister to Sultan Muḥammad al-Faḍl. Since the execution of justice rested in the hands of the sultan and the traditional title-holders according to customary law, the appointment of Izz al-Dīn al-Djāmī as the Grand Kādi (Chief

47. G. W. Browne, 1799, p. 301.
49. al-Tunisi, 1965.
Judge of the *Sharīʿa Court*) was probably in an advisory capacity.

As an inducement to settle, the sultan offered religious teachers lands through the *hakura* (tax exemption) system, as enjoyed by their counterparts in the Fundj kingdom; some holy men adopted a mediatory role. By the end of the eighteenth century, it is clear that the sultan and his immediate associates who had no ethnic affiliations had gone a long way in developing external trade and adopting Islamic institutions to govern the affairs of the state. This approach helped in changing the ethnic structure of the state and weakening the ancient religious practices that had existed for some time. The emergence of a new class of merchants, jurists and mystics was instrumental in bringing this change about. However, the Kayra dynasty, despite its connection with an Arab ancestry, had its roots among the Für. Although Arabic was used in diplomacy and trade, Für remained the language of the court.

On the death of 'Abd al-Rahmān in 1801–2 his son Muḥammad al-Faḍl succeeded him with the help of Muḥammad Kurra. The new sultan soon fell out with his chief minister, Muḥammad Kurra, and killed him. Muḥammad al-Faḍl ruled for forty years, during which the state began to decline.

The Southern Sudan

Despite the existence of major anthropological works by eminent scholars such as W. Hofmay, D. Westermann, C. G. Seligman, E. Evans-Pritchard and his many students and F. M. Deng on the Jieng, Naath, Anywa, Shilluk and Azande, historical research on Southern Sudan is still in its infancy. The same applies to archaeological investigations, which have been concentrated on Northern Sudan, and to historical linguistic research. From the meagre evidence, however, certain broad outlines are beginning to emerge. From linguistic evidence, for example, it is becoming increasingly clear that the homelands of both Nilotic and probably Central Sudanic cultures lie within Southern Sudan. According to available data it is also evident that most of the language groups involved in the history of Southern Sudan belong to Greenberg's Nilo-Saharan family, as shown overleaf.

Much of Southern Sudan and Northern Uganda was probably occupied by speakers of Central Sudanic languages until the last decades of the last millennium when the area began to be colonized by Eastern and Western Nilotic speakers. Indeed, one of the major historical themes during our period is the progressive Niloticization of the former Central Sudanic

52. For an assessment of the extent of our ignorance, see J. Mack and P. Robertshaw, 1982.
speakers in Southern Sudan. Today the region is mostly occupied by the Nilotes, with only the Moru and Madi living to the west of the White Nile to remind us of the former presence of the Central Sudanic speakers.

Roland Oliver has attempted a synthesis of Iron Age archaeological evidence on the early history of this region which tends to confirm the linguistic picture. He envisages two centres of Iron Age cultures, one to the east of the Nile swamps in the Sudan–Ethiopian borderlands and the other on the ironstone plateau of the Nile–Congo watershed. These two cultures – the former Nilotic and the latter Bantu – were separated by Central Sudanic cultures. As the Nilotes moved southwards into the Bantu areas, there occurred a meeting of two Iron Age cultures which had hitherto developed separately. The result was an intensive Iron Age pastoralism among the Bantu-speakers, which he argues, could only have come from the Nilotes.

Regarding the Sudan, Oliver identifies two Iron Age periods among the Nilotes. First, there was the Early Iron Age, which coincided with the Later Iron Age of the Bantu. In Western Equatorial and Baḥr al-Ghazāl

54. R. Oliver, 1982. See also his chapter in J. Mack and P. Robertshaw, 1982.
provinces, this period is identified with Iron Age pastoralists, the Luel, who kept humpless cattle and who built artificial mounds in order to raise their wet-season settlements above flood level. It has been suggested by J. M. Stubbs, C. C. T. Morison, S. Santandrea and G. Lienhardt that the Luel were probably an advance party of Northern Luo-speakers. Their pottery was mostly plain or decorated with twisted fibre roulettes.

Then there was the Later or Recent Iron Age of the Nilotes, and it is this that concerns us in this chapter. The transition from the earlier to the later cultural complex seems to have coincided with the appearance of the humped cattle on the Bahr al-Ghazāl and the full development of transhumance, especially among the Jīeng. The humped cattle probably spread southwards with the Bàkkāra Arabs following the fall of the kingdom of Dünkūla. It is also worth noting that this Arab penetration of the Northern and Central Sudan which occurred in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries not only coincided with, but might have triggered, the Western Nilotic migrations. 55

The rapid expansion of the Western and Eastern Nilotes southwards and eastwards may therefore be linked with the spread of intensive cattle-keeping made possible by the introduction of humped cattle and combined with cereal agriculture. This combination provided a means of food production suited to drier areas which enabled the Nilotes to occupy many areas which had hitherto been avoided by Bantu-speakers.

The Shilluk kingdom

In Southern Sudan, the Shilluk constitute the largest component of the Northern Luo group, the others being the Luo of Bahr al-Ghazāl and the Anywa who straddle the Sudan–Ethiopia border. Their first settlement was near Malakal, under their leader, Nyikang (c. 1490–1517) after defeating and driving out the Fundj—the previous inhabitants of what was soon to be the heartland of the Shilluk, the area between Tonga in the south and Muomo in the north. This area which lies at the confluence of the Nile and the Sobat and controls Lake No, must have been of the highest strategic importance. This small group of Luo-speakers incorporated Fundj and Nūba elements among others. It was these diverse elements, reflecting different cultures and economic traditions, that combined in the crucible of history to form what became known as the Shilluk nation from the second half of the seventeenth century.

During this formative century, the Shilluk established a mixed economy of cattle-herding and cereal agriculture. The population was essentially sedentary: transhumance, which characterized the life of the Jīeng and Naath, was lacking. The Shilluk lived in a string of villages on the west bank stretching from Muomo to Tonga, a distance of one hundred miles.

FIG. 7.3 Peoples of the Sudan (after Y. F. Hasan)
Frontiers and socio-economic interdependence

By the beginning of the seventeenth century, this area already had a bigger population than it could support. The intensive pressure on the land had not changed even by the nineteenth century, according to G. Schweinfurth who claims it was the most densely populated region of those parts of Africa then known to the outside world, including the Nile valley in Egypt.\(^5^6\) The Shilluk began to expand into two frontier areas. Northwards, they attempted to control the White Nile from Muomo to Alays, a distance of about three hundred miles, studded with islands and thick mimosa forests. Although unsuitable for agriculture the region provided abundant game, fish and honey to the Shilluk frontiermen. From the reign of Odak Ocolo (c.1600–35) to 1861, the Shilluk dominated this region which was named by the Muslim peoples ‘Baḥr Scheluk’, and the inhabitants as the ‘River Shilluk’.

The second frontier area was the region between the Nile and the Nuba Hills. The numerous references in tradition to Shilluk–Nüba activities in this area imply that it was an important frontier zone for both the Nüba and the Shilluk before it was occupied by the Bağkāra Arabs in the second half of the nineteenth century.

In their book, *The Kingdoms of the Sudan*, R. S. O'Fahey and J. L. Spaulding have written:

> The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were a period of change in the riverain Sudan, of adjustment to cultural and economic development impinging from the surrounding countries, and of accommodation to two intrusive groups – the Arabs and the Nilotic-speakers, particularly the Shilluk. The unification of Nubia early in the sixteenth century may be seen as both a Nubian reaction against the invaders and a positive response to the new economic and social circumstances that the intrusive forces had created.\(^5^7\)

The history of the Shilluk during this period must be viewed against this broader canvas. They looked to the northern and western frontiers as areas of economic opportunities which provided what P. Mercer has termed ‘an alternative source of supply.’\(^5^8\) These zones also absorbed excess population.

We learn from Shilluk traditions, for example, that during the reign of *Reth* (King) Odak Ocolo, they supported Dārfūr in its struggle with the Fundj sultanate for the control of the White Nile trade. With the capitulation of Taḵāli, the Fundj and the Shilluk were left confronting each other along the White Nile, both apparently exhausted after three decades of warfare.

\(^{56}\) G. Schweinfurth, 1873, p. 85.
\(^{57}\) R. S. O'Fahey and J. L. Spaulding, 1974, p. 15.
But this temporary peace was soon disturbed by the arrival of another Jii-speaking people— the Jieng — who invaded the southern region of the Fundj from about 1630 onwards. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Jieng expanded into southern Djazira, and gradually altered the balance of power in the region. Their presence there was a threat to both the Shilluk and the Fundj, and the two combined forces against the Jieng, whom they regarded as a common enemy. They succeeded in preventing the Jieng from expanding northwards or westwards, and instead forced them eastwards towards the Ethiopian border.

This alliance between the Fundj and the Shilluk against the Jieng marked the beginning of a socio-economic interdependence that the Shilluk established with different groups at different times — the Fundj, the djallaba, the Baqkar Arab, the Arab freebooters, the European traders and the Mahdists — usually to exploit the Jieng. It shows that such socio-economic alliances had not yet adopted a racial or ethnic ideology, for we see the Shilluk again and again combining with the above groups to exploit a related Jii-speaking group. Racial ideology in the Southern Sudan was to be a post-Mahdiyya-period phenomenon. Historians concerned with the development of patterns of socio-economic dependence should study the relationships between the different groups in the Upper Nile — the Shilluk, Fur, Fundj, Nuba, Arabs, Jieng and Naath — to appreciate how often frontiers changed and how various groups became incorporated into different socio-economic systems.

The development of political and social institutions

During the second half of the seventeenth century, political developments occurred which were to affect significantly the socio-economic processes in Shillukland. A sense of national unity was forged among the diverse peoples who had settled in the country, and a more centralized form of administration was established under the Reth. One of the main consequences of this development was the gradual introduction of the royal monopoly of economic resources as well as of local and long-distance trade.

The three names associated in Shilluk history with this development are Abudhok, a queen and daughter of Reth Bwoc, and one of the many powerful women in Shilluk history; her half-brother Dhokoth; and Tugo, Dhokoth’s son Reth Dhokoth (c.1670–c.1690) is remembered for having organized successful raids down the Nile and westwards into the Nuba mountains. The Great Famine of 1684 (Umm Laham in Arabic) was probably responsible for sending many Shilluk fleeing northwards, to raid or settle in Bahr Scheluk. The Great Famine and the Shilluk have been

59. The Jii-speaking peoples are the Western Nilotic-speaking peoples comprising the Luo-speakers as well as the Jieng and Naath. They all use the term ‘jii’ meaning ‘people’, hence the name.

held responsible for the destruction of seventeen religious schools located between Alays and the confluence of the Blue and White Niles.\textsuperscript{61} The raiding parties of Dhokoth returned with much booty. They also brought back many captives, largely from the region to the east of Kâkâ, who were settled at Athakong where they formed part of the bodyguard for \textit{Reth} Dhokoth.

The military and economic successes of \textit{Reth} Dhokoth were largely responsible for the centralization of the powers of the \textit{Reth}. The process of consolidation was completed by his son and successor Tugo (c.1690–c.1710), who founded the village of Fashoda and made it the permanent residence of the \textit{Reth}. Formerly, each Shilluk \textit{Reth} reigned from, and was buried in, his native village. The elaborate installation ceremony for a Shilluk \textit{Reth} was also instituted by Tugo. His fame spread rapidly both within and outside the kingdom. There seems also to have been a correlation between the rate of political centralization and the development of a social hierarchy in Shilluk society.

By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Fundj empire was disintegrating as discussed above. As the power of the Fundj along the White Nile declined, that of the Shilluk increased correspondingly. By 1772, when James Bruce was at Sennâr, he had no doubt that the Shilluk were in control at Alays.\textsuperscript{62} He further suggested that the Shilluk raided as far down the river as the confluence of the two Niles. This suggestion was later confirmed by Brun-Rollet who contended that the site of the present Khartoum had been a settlement of importance until 1780 when the Shilluk raided the town, destroyed it and massacred all its inhabitants.\textsuperscript{63}

The last two decades of the eighteenth century witnessed the final collapse of the Fundj sultanate. This further helped to consolidate Shilluk control of the White Nile region. The English traveller, George William Browne, who stayed in Dârîfûr for four years (1793–6) and who wrote a book on commercial activities in the region, recorded that the Shilluk were in complete control of the river at Alays, where they provided an important ferry service for the caravan traders travelling between Sennâr and al-‘Obeyd.\textsuperscript{64}

The decline of Shilluk power

During the reign of \textit{Reth} Nyakwaа (c.1780–1820) there occurred a mass migration of the Jieng, probably the Rueng and Ngok sections, across the River Sobat. This meant that the White Nile area from Lake No in the south to Alays in the north, which for one-and-a-half centuries had been completely dominated by the Shilluk, was henceforth to be shared with

\textsuperscript{62} J. Bruce, 1805, Vol. VI, p. 390.
\textsuperscript{63} C. E. J. Walkley, 1935, p. 227.
\textsuperscript{64} W. G. Browne, 1799, pp. 452–3.
other Jii-speakers. But that was not all. A year after the death of Nyakwaa, the armies of Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha, Viceroy of Egypt, invaded Sudan, ended the Fundj administration and installed Turco–Egyptian rule, whose aim was to exploit the Sudan for the benefit of Egypt. A clash with the Shilluk, the dominant power along the White Nile, was inevitable. Despite sustained Shilluk resistance, from 1821 the Shilluk frontier steadily retreated southwards before the encroaching Arab intrusion and the Turco–Egyptian regime.

In order to dominate the White Nile the Shilluk had to control the waterways. This control, in turn, depended on their canoe or water power. They possessed a large number of vessels and were fine oarsmen. During a raid or a military expedition, groups of thirty or forty canoes travelled together. They therefore constituted a formidable military force in the region. To quote Mercer again, ‘... before the foundation of the Turkish White Nile shipyards, the Shilluk canoes had no superiors or even rivals in the region.’

But a Turco–Egyptian government shipyard had been established in 1826 at Mandjara and, thenceforth, the naval supremacy of the Shilluk on the White Nile was successfully challenged.

The peoples of the Bahr al-Ghazāl

The country south of the Bahr al-Ghazāl and west of a line from Meshra al-Rek, Rumbek, and the point where the boundaries of modern Sudan, Zaire and Uganda meet, was occupied by peoples belonging to two major language families: the Ubangian (Niger–Congo) and the Central Sudanic (Sahara–Nile). Speakers of these languages had been settled there since remote times. Indeed, Central Sudanic seems to have developed in the Nuba area many millenia before the Christian era, either close to the Bahr al-ʿArab or in the area of Wau. These people there were farmers with cereal crops, who also kept cattle and hunted a good deal, the area only being settled along the water-courses. The site of Djabal Tūkyī (lat. 5°19' N, long. 30°27' E), dating to c.180–220, can be attributed to them.

Speakers of these languages were found before 1800 from the vicinity of Hofrat-en-Nahas to the borders of the rainforest in the south and on both banks of the Upper Nile downstream from Lake Albert.

Ubangian speakers arrived from the west (Central African Republic) and settled mostly to the west of the Central Sudanic speakers or in between Central Sudanic speaking communities, which is understandable given the very light settlement of peoples in the area. Ubangians were farmers who had first based their economy on yams but later shifted in part to cereal crops, in part to bananas, according to the local environment. They did not keep cattle, which implies substantially different attitudes towards

wealth, including bride-wealth, from those of the Central Sudanic people.\textsuperscript{68}

We know very little about the past of these people before 1800 because nineteenth-century developments led to the breaking up of their communities. By 1800 slave-raiders from Darfur were already active in Dar Fertît and Dar Banda, south of Hofrat-en-Nahas, while the Zande conquest of the peoples further south was beginning. The Zande absorbed the people they overran and elsewhere, especially in the north, large-scale emigration into the Central African Republic occurred as Banda speakers and others fled from the slave-raiders. The inquiries of F. Santandrea\textsuperscript{69} show yet another reason why oral traditions have remembered so little of the earlier history: there were no large political units in the area. This alone explains the relative ease of the Zande conquest. It also means that clan traditions—the traditions of the leading families of small units living in dispersed settlements, hamlets or sometimes villages—simply did not go back very far. No narrative tradition could be found about any event before 1800. The only genealogies that went back further were three lists of Bongo clans\textsuperscript{70} where the founding generations of the chiefly line started between 1650 and 1705. This merely indicates that the people were there then, in the Wau-Tonj area during the eighteenth century, and also that the social organization of these Bongo groups was of a slightly larger scale than that of other groups, although less than neighbouring Nilotic groups. A Bongo tradition also shows, however, how much centralization was resisted. Several Bongo political units followed Ngoli, a hero who organized resistance against the Azande. But ‘rival chieftains’ murdered him as soon as he had successfully repulsed the Azande!\textsuperscript{71}

All that can be said, therefore, for the period covered by this chapter is that Darfur began to exercise informal control over Dar Fertît well before 1800 and required tribute in copper from the inhabitants near Hofrat-en-Nahas, while some Arab or Fur families established themselves as leaders over small groups in the area of Raga. More research is obviously needed throughout the area. Data on ways of life, exchange and trade, eventual population movements before 1880 could perhaps still be gathered.

\textsuperscript{69} F. Santandrea, 1964 and 1981.
\textsuperscript{70} F. Santandrea, 1964, pp. 136–8.
\textsuperscript{71} ibid., p. 132.
In Volume IV it was shown that during the fifteenth century Spain and Portugal had launched their offensive against North Africa, particularly against Morocco. Since 1415 – the year in which the Portuguese conquered Ceuta – they gradually occupied many important coastal places on the Atlantic littoral, making them into bases for their raids into the Moroccan hinterland.

All these events had lively repercussions; they aroused firm resistance and a keen desire to liberate the towns conquered by the Portuguese. The various zāwiya Shaykhān1 and religious brotherhoods actively encouraged this spirit, using it to consolidate their power and prepare the population to fight the invaders, who were regarded as the protagonists of a new crusade.

Some of the shāfīs of Dar‘a, led by Abū ‘Abd Allāh, known as al-Ḵā‘im bi-‘Amr Allāh (he who rises at the command of God), accordingly appointed themselves to fight the infidels and drive them from the forts they were occupying. The proclamation of al-Ḵā‘im bi-‘Amr Allāh, made in 1511, marks the beginning of the Sa‘ādī dynasty. The struggle lasted some forty years, and was directed partly against the Portuguese and partly against the Waṭṭāsid kings.

In southern Morocco, the Portuguese were threatened to such a degree that they remained within their fortified places. Subsequently, Portuguese colonization declined at an increasing pace. The shāfīs and the religious leaders (called marabouts by European historians) stepped up their attacks on the Portuguese forts, and the assaults were often bloody.

The Portuguese were also threatened from the north by the fighters of Salé, who continually harried Arzila (Asila) and the other presidios occupied by the Portuguese, who were thus driven out of Ma‘mūrā (now called al-Mahdiyya), at the mouth of the Sebu river.

During this period, the struggle between the new dynasty of the Sa‘ādī settled in the south and the old Waṭṭāsid–Marinid dynasty had a disastrous effect on Morocco, since it weakened both sides and prevented them from freeing all the posts occupied by the Portuguese. Fortunately, after an

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1. The zāwiya is a cultural and religious centre; when fortified and manned by defenders of the faith, it is called a ribāṭ.
indecisive battle between the Wattāsid Sultan Ahmad and the Šārīf Ahmad al-ʿArādj at Tadla in 1527, a treaty was concluded which gave the Saʿādī the Sūs and Marrakesh and left the rest of the country in the hands of the Sultan, with Fez remaining the capital.

These provisions gave Morocco twelve years of peace, of which the Saʿādī took advantage to strengthen and organize their forces and concentrate on the struggle against the Portuguese.

At this juncture an important event took place. The Governor of Sūs, the Šārīf Muḥammad al-Mahdī, had extended the sugar plantations on his land and developed the sugar trade. But the Portuguese held the export monopoly from the port of Agadir, which they still occupied. The Saʿādī Sultan therefore decided to liberate Agadir, which the Portuguese called Santa-Cruz du Cap d'Aguer. Muḥammad al-Shaykh had already built up an army strong enough to tackle the Portuguese and drive them out of Agadir. With the help of artillery he began to besiege the Portuguese port. After six months, the sultan at last managed to breech the defences.

The capture of Agadir created a considerable stir in Portugal. The Portuguese immediately evacuated the towns of Sāfi and Azemmūr (1542), though they held on to Mazagān (al-Djadīda) because it was easier to defend.

With these victories the šārīfs appeared as champions of the djihād and Muḥammad al-Shaykh as the hero of national liberation, which brought him great prestige throughout the country. He could now renew his struggle against the Waṭṭāsids and attempt to reconquer the north of Morocco, which the latter were still governing under the Treaty of Tadla.

Muḥammad al-Shaykh, after expelling his rival brother, Ahmad al-ʿArādj to Tafilālet, became the sole leader of the Saʿādī and was free to finish with the Waṭṭāsids. He set out to capture Fez, possession of which would give him supreme power in Morocco.

The struggle between the old and new dynasties swayed to and fro for some ten years, until Muḥammad al-Shaykh finally entered Fez on 13 September 1554. But the Sultan’s main concern was the threat from the Turks in Algiers. In his view, the only real danger for Morocco came from the Ottoman Empire, which had subjugated all the eastern and western Arab countries, a fate which the Moroccans, with their traditional sense of independence, could never accept. To safeguard his country from a Turkish invasion, he therefore decided to force the Ottomans out of Africa. The two elder sons of the Saʿādī Sultan, ʿAbdallāḥ and ʿAbd al-ʿRāḥmān, had taken Tlemcen in 1550, but the Turks had reacted immediately. The Pasha of Algiers formed a large army commanded by the convert Hasan Corsa (historians call the European converts who served the Maghreb states

2. It is known that the production of sugar dates back to the early Middle Ages, and that Morocco was the chief exporter. See D. de Torres, 1667, ch. XXXV; and recently, P. Berthier, 1966. Mr Berthier's research was encouraged by the author's ministry during the 1950s and is the best work on the subject.
FIG. 8.1 Morocco in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (after M. El Fast)
Tlemcen was then reoccupied by the Turks (1552). To carry through his grand design of conquering Algeria, Muhmmad al-Shaykh sought an alliance with Spain. Talks were arranged with the Count of Alcaudete, the Spanish Governor of Oran, and the two sides agreed to mount an expedition against Algiers. Two thousand Spanish cavalry in the pay of the Sultan were to join this Moroccan-led operation. The Turks got wind of the preparations and Şaläh Ra'îs therefore asked the Sublime Porte for money and reinforcements to attack Oran, then occupied by Spain. At this point, Şaläh Ra'îs died, and it was Hasan Corsa who led the attack on Oran. However, the Turkish fleet, which was to have blockaded the Spanish fort by sea, was recalled to fight the Christian fleet of Andrea Doria, then threatening the Bosphorus. The Sultan, now rid of a dangerous rival, could turn to the conquest of Algeria. He began by laying siege to Tlemcen and succeeded in capturing it.

In 964/1557 the Sultan Muhammad al-Shaykh was assassinated by an officer of his own guard who was in the pay of the Ottoman government. This dramatic end, however, made no difference to the determination of the Sa'âdî to press on with clearing Morocco of all foreign occupants and defending it against all fresh incursions by foreign powers, even a Muslim one such as the Ottoman empire which, as already noted, had extended its domination over all the Arab countries. In other words, the new Caliph, Abü Muḥammad 'Abdallah, who had been proclaimed uncontested Sultan after the murder of his father, followed the policy laid down by his predecessor. He was given the name of al-Ghâlib Billâh (victor through the strength of God).

Although unavenged for his father’s murder, the new Sultan felt in a position to turn against the Portuguese in an attempt to dislodge them from Mazagân. He set out to rebuild his army, obtain the most modern weapons and organize a vast psychological campaign with the help of the zâwiya and the chiefs of the brotherhoods. In particular, Sîdî Ahmâd u Müssa, who had great influence in the Sûs and a reputation for holiness not only in his own region but throughout Morocco, roused all the kabîlas against both the Turks and the Portuguese. When, therefore, al-Ghâlib Billâh felt himself strong enough to besiege Mazagân (then called al-Brîza, and later al-Djadîda), he made preparations and assembled a large force of infantry and cavalry armed with highly efficient weapons, including twenty-four pieces of artillery, ten of which were heavy guns and comprised the famous Maymûn (‘lucky charm’).

Although this attempt to deliver Mazagân was unsuccessful, it showed the Portuguese that they had to reckon with a genuine new power. As for the Sultan, he considered that the Portuguese threat to the interior of Morocco was averted, and he turned to developing his kingdom’s prosperity. He encouraged trade with the European states, especially France. A document reveals, for example, that in 1570 the merchants of
Rouen signed an act of association with Morocco whereby they were allowed to trade with that country, chiefly with the towns of Säfi, Tarûdant and Marrakesh.\(^3\)

In architecture, al-Ghälib Billâh is known as one of the greatest builders of the Sa'âdî dynasty. He constructed a great mosque in Marrakesh, and he also restored the Almohad Mosque in the present-day Casbah of Agadir. In general, Moroccan art, handed down from the previous dynasties, became more ornamental and splendid.

The reign of Mawlây ‘Abdallâh al-Ghälib Billâh was on the whole calm and prosperous. He died peacefully in 1574 after seventeen years as Sultan. His succession proved more difficult. Transgressing the long-established rule whereby the family’s eldest male had a prior right to succeed over the eldest son of the late ruler, it was Muhammad, the son of al-Ghälib Billâh, who was proclaimed Sultan. This ushered in a period of turbulence for Morocco, fortunately very short, which ended with the victorious Battle of the Three Kings.

The new Sultan took the title of al-Mutawakkil, but is still known mainly by the descriptive name of al-Maslukha.

Mawlây ‘Abd al-Mähli, the eldest of the Sa'âdî princes and uncles of al-Maslukha, considered that the throne should have been his. When al-Ghälib Billâh’s son was proclaimed Sultan of Fez, he took refuge first at Sîdjiilmäsa, later in Algiers and eventually in Constantinople. He entered the Ottoman army and took part in the Turkish reconquest of Tunis, where he displayed great courage.

On his return to Constantinople, Mawlây ‘Abd al-Mähli therefore found the Caliph very well disposed to help him regain the throne of his ancestors. Murâd ordered the Wâhi of Algiers el-Hadj ‘Alî to provide the Sa'âdî prince with a small armed force. When this force reached Morocco it met with no opposition, since the people were all on his side. Al-Mutawakkil was abandoned by his army and forced to flee, leaving Mawlây ‘Abd al-Mähli to enter Fez on 31 March 1576, where he was welcomed by the population with wild enthusiasm.

Al-Mutawakkil escaped towards the south. Pursued and defeated by the Sultan at the Wâdî al-Cherrât between Rabat and Fedâla, he succeeded in fleeing once again and managed to retake Marrakesh. The Vice-Sultan of Fez, the Sultan’s brother Mawlây Ahmad, was given the task of driving him out of Marrakesh and taking him prisoner. The first part of this task was duly performed, but al-Mutawakkil managed to escape, for the last time. He made towards the north and asked the Governor of Vélez de la Gomera for refuge in his town. The request was passed on to King Phillip II, who authorized the Governor to take in the fugitive, on condition that he be accompanied by no more than ten members of his family.

Mawlây ‘Abd al-Mähli, once freed – at least for the time being – from the encumbrance of al-Mutawakkil, began to reorganize the state, replenish

its coffers and rebuild the army, and he made his brother Mawlāy Ahmad Caliph in Fez.

He found the treasury empty, and could have levied fresh taxes to redress the situation, but he felt that this would ruin rather than enrich the country. He therefore thought of more effective methods which would not involve his subjects financially. He expanded the navy, had new ships built and repaired or modernized the older ones. This stimulated many different crafts and increased trade with the rest of the world, especially Europe. His policy was a success and had beneficial effects in all fields.

Success was however also due to the personality of Mawlāy 'Abd al-Mālik, who was highly esteemed by the Europeans. There are many eulogies of him by foreign authors. The French writer and poet Agrippa d'Aubigné in particular gave a flattering portrait of this king, telling us among other things that the Sa'ādī Sultan 'knew Spanish, Italian, Armenian and Slav. He was also an excellent poet in Arabic'.

The Battle of the Three Kings

In the sixteenth century, as noted above, Portugal built up a powerful empire which controlled vast territories in America, Asia and Africa. At the time when the dethroned Sa'ādī Sultan al-Mutawakkil took refuge at Vélez de la Gomera, this empire was ruled by the young King Don Sebastián, who since his earliest childhood had dreamed of conquering Morocco, using it as a base for conquering the entire Maghrib, and finally pushing on towards the East to deliver Christ's tomb from Muslim hands. In his search for help to regain his throne, al-Mutawakkil turned to the King of Spain, who refused to receive him or to grant him the least support in his desperate venture. He then contacted Don Sebastián. The King of Portugal seized the opportunity for, having decided — against the advice of his counsellors — to mount the expedition of which he had always dreamed, he regarded the dissident Moroccan's arrival as a key factor in bringing round all his opponents. Public opinion in Portugal, worked up by extremist propaganda — especially among the clergy — was enthusiastic, and greatly encouraged the reckless expedition being prepared by the young king.

For his part, Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Mālik, informed of all these preparations, tried to dissuade the young King of Portugal from his rash venture; it was not that he doubted his own possibilities or courage — indeed, he was supported by his people and especially by the Djazülite religious movement and its leader Abū 'l-Maḥāsin Yūsuf al-Fāsî; but since he was anxious to preserve his people and country from the evils of war, and to work for the maintenance of peace, he decided to try to persuade King Don Sebastián to give up his expedition. He therefore wrote the king a letter which is unique in the history of diplomacy, not only for its substance but for its

4. The chief of the Shadilite Djazülism was the forebear — eleven generations ago — of the author of this chapter.
moving tone of sincerity, wisdom and desire for peace. The French archives possess the Italian translation of this document, which has been published in Count Henry de Castries’ *Sources inédites de l'histoire du Maroc*. Substantially it reads as follows:

That which you are preparing to do, that is, to wage war against me in my country, is an injustice and an act of aggression without reason, for I wish you no ill, think no evil of you and have taken no evil action against you. Why then do you venture to deprive me of my rights and to give them to another in exchange for vain promises which he will be unable to keep so long as I am alive? You come to drive me from my kingdom, even though, with all that you possess and all that your states contain, you will be unable to gain your desire. Do not believe that my words spring from cowardice. On the contrary, know that if you do not heed these recommendations you will expose yourself to certain destruction.

I am ready to come to an agreement with you in person, at whatever place you choose. I do all this in order to save you from destruction. I add that I am willing to come with you before your court of law, which never takes things away from one person to give them illegally and unjustly to another. And I accept in advance the judgement of that court...

God is my witness for everything I say! Know further that I am informed that certain of your attendant lords proffer advice which will lead you to disaster.5

This letter, which displays the lofty sense of responsibility and deep love of peace of Sultan Mawlay ‘Abd al-Malik, also shows his diplomatic skill: in facing Don Sebastián squarely with his responsibility, he made it clear at the same time by his warning that the real aggressor and fomenter of trouble in the Mediterranean region was in fact the young King of Portugal.

However, Don Sebastián continued to prepare for war.

Another example of Mawlay ‘Abd al-Malik’s understanding of Don Sebastián’s psychology and character emerges from the accounts of Moroccan historians. They relate how, knowing that the King of Portugal saw himself as the paragon of chivalry and fearless courage, and that he was imbued with the noblest sentiments, Mawlay ‘Abd al-Malik wrote to him as follows on learning that he had landed at Arzila (Asila):

It is no mark of chivalry or of a noble soul to attack defenceless people living peacefully in their townships, and not to wait for one’s opponents to come and match one’s strength. If therefore you are a true Christian, wait where you are until I arrive in your vicinity.

When Don Sebastián received this letter, his attendants, especially Muḥammad al-Maslukh, advised him not to comply because, they said, it was a trick; on the contrary, he should make haste to attack and occupy first Larache (al-Arish) and then al-Ḵaṣr al-Kabīr. But Don Sebastián’s lofty concept of honour prevented him from exposing his reputation to ignominious dishonour. He therefore decided not to move from Arzila, where he remained nineteen days until the eve of the battle.

There is no trace of this correspondence in the European documents. On the other hand, it is noted that Don Sebastián hesitated between following the coast by sea, or going overland, to besiege Larache. A council of war was held at Arzila to consider the two alternatives. Most members of the council, led by al-Maslukh, were for going by sea, but the King favoured going by land so as to be able to display his valour and martial accomplishments – and so it was decided.

The Saʿādī forces set out from Marrakesh northwards and were continually joined by large numbers of volunteers. In addition the Sultan had ordered his brother, the Caliph at Fez, to get to al-Ḵaṣr al-Kabīr before him with the contingents from Fez and its region and in particular with the élite corps of young archers (the Rima) from the capital, together with the disciples of the Džažūlī ṭawiya of al-Ḵaṣr al-Kabīr.

Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Mālik had decided to establish his command post at al-Ḵaṣr al-Kabīr because this city was near the Portuguese possessions from which the King of Portugal was expected to attack. It was, moreover, the centre of the Džažūlī movement led by Abū ’l-Maḥāsin Yūsuf al-Fāsī, who lived there and had his ṭawiya there.

When the Saʿādī army arrived at al-Ḵaṣr al-Kabīr, Mawlāy Aḥmad was already there with the élite corps of young archers from Fez. Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Mālik charged them – once Don Sebastián had crossed the Wādī al-Makhāzin (which gave its name to this decisive battle) – to destroy the bridge across the river so as to prevent the defeated Portuguese from finding their way towards the sea; the order was carried out during the night of 3–4 August 1578.

The next day the ‘Battle of the Three Kings’ took place, which should be regarded as one of the most important battles in the history of mankind, and especially in the history of Morocco and Islam. Among Arab historians it is known as the Battle of Wādī al-Makhāzin, and among Spanish and Portuguese historians as the Battle of Alcazarquivir.

6. Only Moroccan historians have commented on it.
Fig. 8.2 The stages of Don Sebastián’s progress towards the site of the ‘Battle of the Three Kings’ at Wādī al-Makhāzin, 30 July to 4 August 1578 (after M. El Fasi)
The day of the battle

After meticulous preparations to raise one of the largest armies of that time, which he based at Tangier, Don Sebastián made for al-Каşr al-Kabîr, the headquarters of Mawlây ‘Abd al-Mâlik.

On the Monday morning at the end of the month of Djumâdâ’ 11 in the year of 986 of the Hegira (4 August 1578) the opposing camps prepared for battle. It was an historic day; the culmination of centuries of conflicts between Muslims and Christians, which had begun in Spain and then spread to Morocco. It was also the day for which Don Sebastián had been preparing since his childhood, and which would in his eyes be the first step in his conquest of the world. For the Muslims, on the other hand, it was a day on which thousands of martyrs would fall in the defence of their just cause.

The opposing forces prepared to attack, each employing its own tactics. The Christian army was drawn up on the field of battle in a square, with a body of legionaries in front. German troops held the right flank and Spanish and Italian ones the left. The cavalry, less numerous than the infantry, advanced on each wing. There was also a small body of supporters of Muḥammad ‘the Flayed’ (from three hundred to six hundred men, depending on the source).

The Moroccan army was deployed in the form of a crescent, from within which the Sultan Mawlây ‘Abd al-Mâlik directed the battle from a litter. He had been taken ill on the way from Marrakesh but, though his state had worsened so that he could not move, his mind remained clear and active. The tips of the crescent were manned by the cavalry, with the infantry and artillery in the centre.

After the dawn prayer, the mercenaries flung themselves on the left flank of the Muslims, taking them completely by surprise. Sultan ‘Abd al-Mâlik, seeing his troops beginning to crack, rose from his litter and drawing his sword, he managed to push his way forward. The Sultan’s action gave new courage to his soldiers; unfortunately he succumbed from his efforts but, before passing away, he instructed his servants to conceal his death, since the battle had only just begun.

As the battle raged, with many men killed on both sides, the Muslims continued to advance while the Christians fell back, until they eventually turned and fled across the fields towards the bridge. Finding it destroyed, they threw themselves into the river in an effort to cross, but were carried away by the current and drowned.

Don Sebastián however stood firm, displaying the greatest courage. But his courage could not save him: he was struck down on the field of battle along with thousands of his soldiers and devoted servants. Muḥammad the Flayed tried to flee and threw himself into the river, where he drowned. His body was recovered and brought to Aḥmad al-Manṣūr, who was proclaimed king after the victory (which gave him his name, al-Manṣūr, the Victorious).
It is not known exactly how many were killed on each side, but the slain Muslims numbered several thousands. Of the Portuguese and their allies almost none escaped, since nearly all those who avoided drowning or who survived the battle, were taken prisoner. Tradition has it that there were nearly fourteen thousand Christian prisoners.

While negotiations were proceeding on the ransom to be paid for Don Sebastián’s body, it was taken first of all to Fez; but al-Mansúr was too proud to accept any offer, especially as the ransoms for the prisoners, in particular for those of noble blood, had yielded him sums which certain historians see as the origin of his nickname *al-Dhahabi* (the Golden). More gold was received from the Portuguese than had been brought back after the conquest of the Sudan. Al-Mansúr refused a ransom for the body of the unfortunate King. He therefore decided during the negotiations to inform the King of Spain, Philip II (the successor to his nephew, who had died unmarried) that he was willing to return the King’s body without any payment of any kind.

The consequences of the Battle of the Three Kings

This decisive battle had major consequences which for many centuries set their mark not only on Islam and Morocco, but also on Europe and Portugal. The victory imparted fresh vitality to the Sa‘âdī dynasty and gave Morocco peace and prosperity in all fields of economic and cultural life. The ransoms paid for the thousands of Portuguese prisoners also greatly enriched the Sa‘âdī dynasty, and its fame spread throughout the world.

In regard to economic development, one particular case deserves note: the sugar industry, temporarily in decline (although Morocco was the world’s principal exporter of sugar), again became flourishing.

The same was true for industry of all kinds and the arts. Encouraged by the Sa‘âdī and the newly-rich middle class, architecture in particular developed and achieved outstanding refinement, as attested by the masterpieces which are still to be seen, especially in Marrakesh. The Moroccans’ newly recovered stability and their lofty feelings of pride also produced a wealth of art, poetry and literature during this period, such as for example, the works of ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Fishtâlī and al-Maḳḳarī ibn al-Ḳāḍī.

The repercussions of the Battle of the Three Kings on international politics were equally impressive. The result was a substantial decline in Portuguese influence in the Muslim world, particularly in the Gulf countries. The battle finally put an end to the threat from crusaders to the countries of the East. It was in fact the last of its kind, and scotched any intention of those harbouring the idea of a crusade. The Sa‘âdī victory also strengthened the power of the Ottoman empire, and Europeans are right

8. Architecture had stagnated for some time after the weakening of the Wāṭḥāsid dynasty.
to consider this Moroccan victory as a victory of all the Muslims, precisely because it epitomized Muslim solidarity.

On the other hand, the victory resulted in the Ottomans abandoning any idea of conquering Morocco, which remained the only Arab territory outside Turkish influence. The Arabic language thus retained its purity and authenticity in Morocco, and continued to be used for many centuries. The style of Moroccan epistolary literature and of the decrees issued by the king’s ministries remained untainted by any foreign influence. This explains why the texts written during the time of the Sa‘ādī and ‘Alawites (and up to the reign of Mawlāy Hassan I) give the impression of having been written during the glorious age of the Umayyads in Spain and of the Almoravids, Almohads and Marinids in Morocco.

We have dwelt at length on the Battle of the Three Kings because of its
intrinsic importance, particularly for Morocco. As Professor Lévi-Provençal rightly says:

One must not criticize Moroccan historians for dwelling on this famous battle and according it the importance which it truly merits... We can now prove that the ransom of the Portuguese nobles taken prisoner during this battle contributed even more than the conquest of Sudan to the immense wealth of Sultan ‘Abū l-‘Abbās al-Mansūr (winning him his nickname of al-Dhahābī, ‘the Golden’). All the European powers in financial straits tried to negotiate loans from Morocco. The Chorfa Empire even practised a policy of alliances, and, especially if ‘Abd al-Mālik had not died, might very well have joined the European concert of nations in the same way as the Ottoman Empire’.

Sa‘ādī expansion in the sixteenth century

Al-Mansūr reigned for a quarter of a century and devoted himself to consolidating the power of the Sa‘ādī, developing his kingdom in every possible way and establishing economic relations with the main states of the time.

After the victory of Wādī al-Makhāzin, he set out to liberate the cities still in the hands of Europeans: Arzīlā (Asīla), Tangier, Ceuta and Mazagān. He succeeded in driving the foreign occupants from Arzīla (1589), but Tangier was not liberated until the following century, by the ‘Alawite Sultan Mawlāy Ismā‘īl, and Mazagān (al-Djadīda) by his grandson Muḥammad III: Ceuta passed into the hands of Phillip II, King of Spain, who inherited the kingdom of Portugal. Along with Melilla and three other presídios it remains a Spanish dependency to this day.

Al-Mansūr’s consummate success encouraged him to look beyond Morocco’s traditional boundaries with a view to restoring the situation as it was at the time of the Almoravids and thus unifying Islam. But this was in fact only a pretext, the real motive for his campaign being expansionism, an age-old desire of all great powers. This is why one should avoid judging historical events according to present-day concepts and ideas, bearing in mind that, from Alexander the Great to Napoleon, and before and after them, history has produced many conquerors.

Moroccan opinion was, however, against al-Mansūr’s Sudanese expedition, a most unusual attitude for that time and much to Morocco’s credit. Al-Mansūr called a council of war before undertaking the campaign, and explained his plans. In his history of Morocco, H. Terrasse writes that ‘Almost everyone was against the venture, because it was too risky and above all because it would mean waging war against other Muslims’. The

FIG. 8.3  The empire of Ahmad al-Mansur, 'the Golden' (1578–1603) (after M. El Fasi)
‘ulamā’, the true representatives of the people, also took this view and, in judging this historic event, it is their view which counts.

But al-Manṣūr overrode this advice, and decided on his own to mount what Moroccan historians call the Sudanese Expedition. We do not think it worthwhile to describe it in detail since all the works on the history of Morocco, in both Arabic and European languages, do so at length, but the salient facts ought to be mentioned.11

After building up Morocco into a prosperous, united and envied state, al-Manṣūr died in 1603. There was then a period of instability in Morocco. As often happens after the death of a ruler, a power struggle broke out among his successors, who engaged in endless internecine strife. In al-Manṣūr’s case it was his sons and grandsons who drenched Morocco in blood for half a century. This situation led to the emergence of several claimants to power over and above members of the Sa‘ādī family.

In all parts of the country, adherents of religious brotherhoods rose up in the name of patriotism to restore peace and fight against the Spanish and Portuguese, who had taken advantage of the weakness of the last Sa‘ādī and had blockaded the coasts of Morocco.

The most famous and most genuine of all these leaders in the war against the first colonizers of modern times was certainly Abu ‘Abdallah Muhammad al-‘Ayyāshī of Salé. A war leader loved by some and feared by others, he managed temporarily to pacify the areas under his control, in particular the town of Fez. Despite all his successes he never laid claim to supreme power, since he was a true saint; he was assassinated, on the orders of his enemies, the Moriscos of Rabat, in 1051/1641.

In 1046/1636-7, for the first and only time in the Middle Atlas, the grandson of a Shaykh universally renowned for his learning and holiness rose up and declared himself Sultan of the whole of Morocco. This claimant’s name was Muḥammad ibn Mīḥammad ibn Abu Bakr al-Dalāl. His grandfather founded a zawiya in the Middle Atlas which was destroyed by the second ‘Alawite king, al-Rashīd ibn al-Sharīf, and whose location is almost unknown today. It became almost as prestigious a centre of Islamic studies as Karāwiyyīn University at Fez. Several celebrities in the fields of Islamic learning in the eleventh century of the Hegira (seventeenth century of the Christian era) passed through Dīla zawiya.

Abū Bakr Muḥammad’s son followed in his father’s footsteps and went on running the spiritual and intellectual affairs of the zawiya, which developed still further. On his death, he was succeeded by his son.

Since al-Manṣūr’s death in 1012/1603, ten of his descendants competed for power for a little over half a century. During this long period two kings managed to reign for more than twenty years, with interruptions for the success of their brothers and cousins, who took power and later lost it – to

say nothing of the claimants from among heads of zāwiyas and other adventurers. Other rebel claimants to the throne made life difficult for the last Sa‘ādī in the north and the south. In the Tangier area of al-Khaḍr Ghaylân, a disciple of Muḥammad al-Ayyāshī claimed to continue the wars against the Portuguese undertaken by the great warrior of Islam. What is remarkable about these events is that all these claimants to the throne of Morocco made themselves out to be saviours of the unity of the country and champions of stable government.

The Ghanâtë were a faction of the A‘rāb (Arab nomads) who were driven out of Cairo by the Fātimids and invaded the Maghreb in successive waves, destroying everything in their path including houses, forests and all kinds of installations. In the sixth century of the Hegira (twelfth century of the Christian era) they had been brought into Morocco by the Almohad Ya‘kūb al-Maḥṣūr. The Almohads, Marinids and Sa‘ādis used them as mercenaries in their wars inside and outside Morocco. In the end they settled — where they remain to this day — on the fertile plains of the Atlantic coast, driving its inhabitants into the mountains of the Middle Atlas; it was they who were responsible for the real Arabization of Morocco.

In 1069/1658-9, in the reign of Abu al-‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Shaykh ibn Zaydān, a caid of the Shḥbanātē by the name of ʿAbd al-Karīm ibn Abū Bakr al-Shbānī and known as Karrūm al-Hājjādī rose up in Marrakesh against Sultan Aḥmad, known as Mawlāy al-ʿAbās (though the sultan’s mother was a Shḥbanātē). She advised him to approach his maternal uncles and try to win them over. Once Karrūm al-Hājjādī had Sultan Aḥmad in his hands, he put him to death, declared himself Sultan and occupied the Royal Palace at Marrakesh. His reign lasted some ten years, marked by extortion, injustice and cruelty. Poverty became the rule, particularly in the south. Even his followers and supporters, exasperated by these ills raining on the country, wanted to get rid of this tyrant. One of those close to him surprised him in his palace and threw a spear at him which killed him on the spot. His son Abū Bakr ibn ʿAbd al-Karīm was proclaimed sultan in his place, and reigned for a time until he died forty days before the ‘Alawite sultan Mawlāy al-Raḥīd reached Marrakesh.

The early sultans of the ‘Alawite dynasty

All these pretenders to the throne and would-be unifiers of Morocco who stained the country with blood after al-Maḥṣūr’s death failed in their attempts. The honour of setting up a strong, lasting and beneficent government was to fall to the Shārīfian dynasty of the ‘Alawites, who reigned over Morocco for three and a half centuries. This longevity was due to the principles enshrined in the policy always followed by the ‘Alawite sultans: their firm attachment to the integrity of the country; fidelity to all the noble ideals of Muslim civilization; and the importance attached to the development of education at all levels.
This means that unlike the motives underlying all the preceding dynasties, except the Marinids, the 'Alawites were not out to champion a religious cause. Their aim was solely political, namely to unify the country, set up a strong, stable government and propagate learning.

The first question, however, is who these 'Alawites were. They were a family whose descent from the Prophet has been scientifically established by the great scholars of Morocco: al-Arabï al-Fâsi, his nephew, the Shaykh al-Islam 'Abd al-Kâdir, al-Imâm al-Yûsî and others quoted by the author of the Kitâb al-Istiksa.12

The descendants of the family formed a religious aristocracy which acquired great prestige among all the peoples of the Tafilâlet. Al-Hasan's great-grandson Mawläy 'Ali al-Shârîf became very famous. He had nine sons, one of them being Mawläy al-Shârîf, who went on living in the Tafilâlet and whose fame spread throughout southern Morocco. The instability that prevailed in Morocco led the Filälí to proclaim him Sultan. At the time, as we have seen, Morocco was divided between the Diläwîyya of the Middle Atlas, who occupied Fez; Ibn Hassûn, who reigned over the Sûs and the High Atlas; al-Khadr Ghaylân, who was ravaging the northwest; and other adventurer-bandits who took advantage of this instability to pillage towns and villages.

In the Tafilâlet itself, a family was occupying a fortress, Tabousamt, in opposition to the 'Alawite shârîfs. One side was supported by the Diläwîyya and the other by Abû Hassûn, and there was fighting between them. Mawläy al-Shârîf was captured and imprisoned by Abû Hassûn, but was rescued by his son, Mawläy M'hammad. His father abdicated in his favour and he was enthroned as king of Morocco in 1050/1640. This was the beginning of the 'Alawite dynasty. The word "Alawite" comes from the name of their ancestor Mawläy 'Ali al-Shârîf of Marrakesh. This dynasty is also called 'Hasanî or Filâlî, from Tafilâlet, the old Sidjilmâsa.

Mawläy M'hammad was not acknowledged by his brother Mawläy al-Rashîd, and left the Tafilâlet. He began by roaming about in the towns and among the kabîlas of the south and the north: he went to the Todgha valley, to Demnät, to the Dila zawiya and to Fez.

His brother for his part raised an army and marched on the Dar'a, which was occupied by Abû Hassûn. He fought several battles against the latter, and drove him out of this area. He then marched on the zawiya of Dila and gave battle against the Diläwîyya, but was defeated. He decided to lay siege to Fez. This time he succeeded in occupying it in 1060/1650. But he had to abandon it forty days later in order not to expose his soldiers to certain defeat. Having failed to establish himself in Fez, he made for eastern Morocco. He occupied the town of Udja and advanced on Tlemcen. The

13. Generally speaking the word "Alawi" is used to denote all the descendants of 'Ali, cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet. But the 'Alawite of Syria have nothing to do with the Caliph 'Ali.
FIG. 8.4  The principalities of northern Morocco in the early seventeenth century (after M. El Fast)
whole of western Algeria was invested by his troops.

An agreement was then reached between Mawlāy Mḥammad and the Turks who governed Algeria, and he returned to Uджda. Mawlāy Rashīd, still pursuing his plan to ascend the throne of Morocco which his family had just set up, came and established himself at Tāẓā.

In addition to the renown, Mawlāy Rashīd now had the money and men to pursue his plans to achieve power. He promised his companions that once on the throne of Morocco he would regard them by instituting a symbolic festival, which would take the form of choosing a student at Karāwiyyin University and enthroning him as Sultan of the Tolba (King of the Students) for a fortnight, during which festivities would be organized by the students on the banks of Wādī Fāz. Having conquered the whole Tāẓā area, he declared himself Sultan. When his brother Mawlāy Mḥammad heard about all this, he came to meet him to put a stop to his exploits. Battle was joined between them, but did not last long, Mawlāy Mḥammad having been felled by a bullet that killed him at the outset of the encounter. Mawlāy Rashīd mourned him— but it must be recognized that it suited his purposes. This was in 1075/1664. This year saw the beginning of the conquest of Morocco.

Mawlāy Rashīd started by occupying Tāẓā. He went then to Tafilālet, the family birthplace, where one of his deceased brother’s sons had risen up against his uncle. When this rebel learnt of Mawlāy Rashīd’s arrival he fled and the new sultan was able to enter his native town peacefully. After many vicissitudes, he entered Fez in triumph in 1076/1666. The taking of this capital, without which no government can maintain itself in Morocco, marked the definitive establishment of the ‘Alawite dynasty.

Mawlāy Rashīd first set about organizing the administration. He distributed money to the ‘ulamā’, and made them his privy counsellors. He appointed the scholar Ḥamdūn al-Mazwār al-Kādī of the capital. All these actions won him the devotion of the Fāsīs, who were known for their reluctance to accept the first comer without first judging him worthy of their trust.

He spent the next two years pacifying the whole of northern Morocco, and at the end of 1078/1668 he prepared to reduce the zāwiya of Dīlā’ which, though weakened, still constituted the only authority in the Middle Atlas area. Arriving in the plain of Fāzāz, al-Rashīd’s army met the troops of Muhammad al-Ḥāḍīj al-Dīlā’ī who suffered a defeat without precedent in their history. Mawlāy Rashīd entered the zāwiya with his troops, treated its occupants humanely and did not shed one drop of blood. He ordered the aged Dīlā’ī to be moved to Fez, to live there with all the members of his family. This happened in the first month of 1079/1668.

14. This student tradition lasted from the days of Mawlāy Rashīd to the present. As it had been discontinued, I reintroduced it in the early days of independence, when I was Minister of Education and Rector of Moroccan universities. It has since fallen into disuse again.
After this victory, it only remained for Mawlây Rashîd to crush the last pockets of resistance in southern Morocco. In the month of Safar 1079/July 1668 he decided to liberate Marrakesh from the Shbanâte. He succeeded in occupying it, captured Abû Bakr ibn Karrûm al-Ḥâdīdj al-Shabânî and some members of his family and had them put to death.

The last local power still to survive in the Sûs was that of the Samlâliyûn. The founder of this principality had died in 1070/1659 and been replaced by his son Muḥammad. In 1081/1670 Mawlây Rashîd besieged the town of Tarûdant, occupied it and marched on the fortress of Ighîl, capital of the Samlâliyûn. He took it and killed the members of this maraboutic family and their leading supporters. With this victory the whole of Morocco was pacified and ‘Alawite power finally established.

A year and a half later, in 1082/1671, Mawlây Rashîd met his death in a riding accident.

This account of the last Sa’âdî and the beginning of the ‘Alawite dynasty has been largely a history of events, because the strife that then prevailed, the insecurity and the instability of the government did not permit developments in letters and arts. It was only under Mawlây Rashîd that Morocco resumed its cultural traditions and its social and economic achievements. Mawlây Rashîd held scholars and men of letters in great esteem. He had himself studied at the Karâwiyyîn University.

Mawlây Rashîd built the biggest madrasa (college) in Fez. This is the madrasa modestly called Madrasa Cherraṭîn,15 from the name of the street in which it was built. He built another madrasa in Marrakesh. Among his monumental works he was responsible for the construction of the bridge over the Wâdî Sebû, fifteen kilometres east of Fez.

On the economic side, he lent traders considerable sums to develop their businesses and thus create prosperity for all the people. He ordered a reform of the coinage which took the form of devaluing the mouzouna from 48 fals to 24 fals. The bronze coins which were shaped, were struck in order to make them round. As regards his work for the community, he took a great interest in the water problem, especially in the desert areas: thus he had many wells dug in the deserts of eastern Morocco, particularly in the Dar‘a, which was on the route taken by caravans of traders and pilgrim caravans on their way to Mecca.

By and large, historians all agree that Mawlây al-Rashîd’s reign was marked by remarkable progress in all realms, unbroken peace and beneficent prosperity after the long years of strife and poverty.

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15. When I was Rector of Karawiyyîn University, I officially renamed it al-Madrasa al-Râshidiyya.
The reign of Mawlāy Ismā‘īl

The history of Mawlāy Ismā‘īl is full of outstanding achievements. This ruler completed the task begun by his two brothers — that of unifying Morocco by putting it under a single throne as it had been in the days of its might and greatness. It was he also who strengthened the basis of the state founded by his two brothers and laid the foundations of the State of Morocco that has safeguarded Morocco’s heritage up to the present. Lastly, it was he who saw to it that Muslim law was extended to all parts of Morocco, in order to give the country religious as well as political unity.

He concerned himself greatly with matters relating to the Muslim religion and proselytization on its behalf, even with European kings such as Louis XIV of France and James II of England, to whom he wrote inviting them to embrace Islam. He strictly observed the precepts of Muslim law and led an austere life, having never in his entire life drunk any intoxicating drink. Christian historians have described him as cruel, violent, despotic and prone to anger for no reason except for the pleasure of seeing bloodshed. All these allegations are false. What led them to paint this picture of him was that they believed the stories of European prisoners, who had naturally been treated in accordance with the fashion of the time — that is, with retaliatory violence. Every one of these prisoners, once released and back in their own countries, started to give exaggerated descriptions of the ordeals they had endured — so much so that the idea of Mawlāy Ismā‘īl’s violence and cruelty came to be believed by Europeans.

Moreover, the Sultan’s ambassadors were sent to European capitals: Ibn Hāddū to London, and al-Ḥāḍḏīj Muḥammad Ṭāmīm in turn to Paris and Versailles. Conversely, delegations from the European states came to seek his friendship. He maintained personal relations with the Kings of England and France, and intervened in the affairs of these two states: he had intelligence agents there, who enabled him to be thoroughly conversant with what was going on. He showed perspicacity in politics, saying, for instance: ‘The King of Spain is a child, who leaves it to Heaven to govern his country; the King of England has no freedom of action; the King of Austria is obliged to satisfy the great electors. The King of France is the only one who really governs’. Here he was referring to Louis XIV, who at that time was one of the greatest monarchs in Europe.

Such was the ruler who came to the throne of Morocco after the death of his brother Mawlāy Rashid. His proclamation took place on Wednesday 16 Dhū ‘l-Ḥijdād 1082 (16 April 1672).

The notables of the towns and kabīlas came to swear allegiance to him, except for those from Marrakesh. This was because his nephew Āḥmad ibn Muḥriz, having learnt of the death of his uncle Mawlāy Rashid, had gone in haste to that city and asked its inhabitants to proclaim him Sultan. He had the support of many followers, especially among the people of the Sūs. Mawlāy Ismā‘īl thus had no choice but to nip this threat in the bud.
PLATE 8.2  Sultan Mawlay Ismāʿīl
Only a few days after his proclamation he marched against his nephew and did battle with him and with the Hauz kabila who had joined cause with him. He defeated them, entered Marrakesh and forgave the people their lack of haste in swearing allegiance to him, excusing them because of his nephew's rebellion. The latter had fled after his defeat, but started scheming again, urging the people of Fez to revolt and proclaim him Sultan, in which he succeeded.

When he heard about all this unrest, Mawläy Ismā'īl decided to deal first of all with his nephew. He marched against him and forced him to flee a second time, into the Sahara. Then he advanced on Fez and laid siege to it until it surrendered, but later decided to make Meknes his capital. On his return to that town he gave orders for the building of palaces, houses, walls, stables, warehouses and other large buildings. He had gardens and ponds laid out, to such good effect that this town came to rival Versailles (which King Louis XIV, abandoning Paris, had taken as his capital). At Meknes, the building work went on for several years.

Aḥmad ibn Muḥriz, having twice tried in vain to seize power in the capitals of both the north and the south, tried a third time to revolt against his uncle. He entered Marrakesh for a second time, occupied it in 1085/1674–5 and fortified himself there, where his uncle pursued and besieged him. The siege lasted nearly two years, at the end of which time Ibn Muḥriz fled for the third time, to the Süs. Mawläy Ismā'īl then made his entry into Marrakesh and this time he gave his army orders to castigate those of the townspeople who had supported Ibn Muḥriz.

One of the domestic political events of Mawläy Ismā'īl's reign was the revolt by three of his brothers, Mawläy al-Ḥarrān, Mawläy Ḥāshim and Mawläy Aḥmad, which broke out at the end of Ramadan of 1089/1678–9. The rebels were recognized and supported in their campaign by the Ait 'Attā kabila. The Sultan marched against them at the head of an impressive army, and the opposing forces met at Djabal Saghrū. Victory went to Mawläy Ismā'īl, whose soldiers showed great courage. Following this victory the three brothers fled into the Sahara.

After taking refuge in the Süs, Ibn Muḥriz suffered various ups and downs, while his uncle, taken up with the important domestic and foreign affairs of state could not give him his full attention. In 1096/1684–5, when in Meknes, Mawläy Ismā'īl learnt that his brother al-Ḥarrān and his nephew Ibn Muḥriz had joined forces and occupied the town of Tarūdant. The Sultan marched against them at the head of a huge army and besieged Tarūdant. During the siege Ibn Muḥriz was killed. Thus ended the adventures of this rebel, who had caused Mawläy Ismā'īl much anxiety for over fourteen years. As for Mawläy al-Ḥarrān, he remained besieged in Tarūdant. When the royal army took Tarūdant by storm, al-Ḥarrān fled into the Sahara.
Mawlay Ismahil’s campaigns to recover the Moroccan towns occupied by the Europeans

Before the advent of the ‘Alawite dynasty, Morocco was split between agitators and Christians, and was coveted by all other nations: this state of affairs having been brought about, as we have seen, by the betrayals and civil strife for which the last Sa‘addi rulers were responsible. Mawlay M‘hammad and then his brother Mawlay Rashid after him of course endeavoured to put an end to this situation and unify Morocco under a single throne and a single king; and they were followed in this by their brother, the great Mawlay Ismahil. It was to the latter that the role fell, after consolidating the achievements of his two predecessors, of completing the unification of Morocco by liquidating Christian colonization.

The re-taking of al-Mahdiyya
The port of al-Mahdiyya which was then called al-Ma‘murä, was one of the biggest ports in Morocco. Pirates of various nations attempted to occupy it. It was from this port, which came under Salé, a town then settled by Andalusians, that Moroccan ships sailed to fight the Spaniards and other enemies. Taking advantage of the Moroccans' weakness as a result of the quarrels between al-Mansur’s sons, the Spaniards in 1023/1614 occupied al-Mahdiyya and held it until Mawlay Ismahil decided to re-take it from them. He marched against the town, besieged it and cut off its water supply, and in 1092/1681 occupied it and took prisoner all the Spaniards who were there.

The re-taking of Tangier
Tangier had fallen under the sway of the British after one of their kings married a Portuguese princess. Already Mawlay Rashid had sought to make this town part of Morocco again, but he died before he could liberate it. Given its importance, Mawlay Ismahil did his utmost to rescue it, and to this end he deputed one of his greatest generals, by name ‘Ali ibn ‘Abdallah al-Rifi, to besiege it. Here there is a discrepancy between the Moroccan and European versions of the reason why the English evacuated this town. Though both versions agree that the English evacuated Tangier without striking a blow and after demolishing the towers and fortifications, Moroccan historians say that the English did this because of the severity of the siege to which General ‘Ali al-Rifi subjected them. European historians claim that this evacuation took place for reasons of domestic politics: the English government and Parliament were afraid that the Duke of York, who had converted to Catholicism, would take Tangier as an operational base in order to attack King Charles II and seize power. This is why the English sovereign supposedly ordered Lord Dartmouth to evacuate Tangier.

Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that another reason for this evacuation
was the difficulty the English had found in repelling the Moroccans' attacks. Experience has sufficiently taught us that Europeans did not as a rule give up an inch of occupied Muslim land without being beaten and compelled to do so.

Be that as it may, Moroccan troops led by General ‘Alī ibn ‘Abdallāh al-Rīfī, entered Tangier in Rabi‘I of 1095/February 1684. Wasting no time, the General set about rebuilding what the English had demolished and restoring the mosques, walls, towers and everything else that they had destroyed during their stay and in their flight.

The re-taking of Larache
The loss of Larache was one of the greatest disasters for the Muslims of Morocco; for this town had not been forcibly occupied by the Spanish enemy, but had been ceded to them by one of the kings of Morocco in exchange for their support in regaining power. While the sons and grandsons of al-Mansūr the Sa‘ādī fought for the throne, the Europeans tried to exploit this situation: they all wanted to occupy Larache, which was then an important strategic centre. Muḥammad Shaykh had fled to Europe to ask the foreign kings for military assistance against his two brothers. King Philip III of Spain heard of this and negotiations took place, at the end of which the pretender to the Moroccan throne agreed to cede Larache to the King of Spain in return for help in regaining his throne. The bargain having been struck, Muḥammad Shaykh returned to Fez and the Spaniards occupied Larache in 1019/1610. Larache remained under Spanish rule for over eighty years, until the advent of Mawlāy Ismā‘īl. This great king threw a large army against the town, besieged it and hemmed in the Spaniards for over five months. Fierce fighting took place between besiegers and besieged, and the Moroccans won a brilliant victory. The re-taking of Larache, which took place on Wednesday 18 Moharram of 1101/1 November 1689, gave the Moroccans enormous joy, equalled in intensity only by the grief they had felt at its loss.

The re-taking of Arzila
The port of Arzila had fallen into the hands of the Portuguese at the beginning of the reign of the Banū Waṭṭās. After being recovered by the early Sa‘ādī kings, it was re-taken a second time by the Portuguese. Changing hands in this way, it eventually fell to the Spaniards. When General Ibn Ḥaddū had finished with Larache he received orders from the Sultan to advance on Arzila and besiege it. Worn out, the besieged inhabitants sued for their lives; and this was granted subject to the Sultan’s approval. But fearing the worst, they fled by night in their ships. The Moroccans then entered Arzila in 1102/1691.
The Armies of Mawlây Ismā'īl

The Wadāya militia

The Moroccan kings raised their armies either from kabīlas of their own clan or from allied kabīlas. The Almoravids, for example, relied on the Ṣanḥāda kabīlas (Lamtūna, Lamṭa and others), while the Almohads were supported by the Maṣmūda kabīlas. This was so until the advent of the Sa'ādī: they recruited their soldiers from the kabīlas of Beduin Arabs introduced into Morocco in the time of al-Mansūr the Almohad, who had settled in the south of the country. From these kabīlas the Sa'ādī raised a body of troops known as the ‘Wadāya militia’. The Wadāya had dispersed following the decline of the Sa'ādī. During his stay in Marrakesh, Mawlây Ismā'īl had the idea of reassembling them and making them into soldiers in order to buttress his regime. These new recruits were given uniforms and taken to Meknes, the capital. They were merged with the men of the Shbanâte and the Zīrāra.

Their numbers having grown, Mawlây Ismā'īl divided them into two groups: the first was sent to Fez, and the second stayed at Riyād in Meknes.

The Bawākhir militia

Mawlây Ismā'īl pondered a great deal about what makes nations strong, stable and feared. Eventually he realized that this depends on their military might. But he also realized that a nation’s decadence results from the acquisition of excessive authority by the army and its chiefs. He therefore decided to establish a militia composed of slaves. Such people are naturally inclined to obedience, which is an essential prerequisite for discipline; and since they are at their masters’ mercy, they are naturally inclined to obey them.

Mawlây Ismā'īl bethought himself of this solution when he was organizing the Wadāya militia, as mentioned above. One of the secretaries of the Makhzen was Muḥammad ibn al-Ḵāsim ‘Alīshī,16 whose father was also secretary to al-Mansūr the Sa'ādī. ‘The king had a militia of slaves’ he said to Mawlây Ismā'īl, ‘and I possess the book in which my father recorded their names’. He showed him this register, and told him that there were still a great many of these slaves in the Marrakesh area and that he would be able to collect them together and enter their names again in a special register in order to make them do military service. Mawlây Ismā'īl entrusted this task to him, and gave orders in writing to the chiefs of the kabīlas in the area to give him help and assistance. ‘Alīshī accordingly set about tracking down these slaves and eventually enrolled them all. He carried

16. Contrary to what is stated in al-Nāṣirī, 1954–6, Vol. IV, p. 26, where his name is given as ‘Umar ibn Ḫāsim, I actually possess a letter in his handwriting written on behalf of the Vizir al-Yaḥmādi and signed Muḥammad Ibn Ḫāsim. The same name is given for this person in a letter from Mawlây Ismā'īl to our ancestor Shaykh al-Īslām Siddī Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Ḵādir al-Ŷāsī. Al-Du’a Bṣij-Ribāṭī also refers to him by this name.
out a full recruitment — to such good purpose that not a Negro remained in all these *kabīlas*, whether slave, half-caste or freeman. Public opinion was shocked by this measure, especially the ‘*ulamā*’, repositories of Islamic law, which forbids the exploitation of free men. This question gave rise to a long controversy between the king and the ‘*ulamā*’ of Fez, and to a voluminous correspondence part of which still exists. These are the famous letters from Mawlāy Ismā‘īl to the Shaykh al-Islām Abū ’l-Su‘ūd al-Fāsī.\(^{17}\)

To revert to Mawlāy Ismā‘īl, I must make the following general comment about him. If, as Europeans claim, he was really savage, cruel and despotic, then a mere scholar, strong only in faith and law, could not have stood up to him. But Mawlāy Ismā‘īl was convinced that he was acting in accordance with Muslim law in this matter which he regarded as the best thing he could do for Morocco and Islam. What encouraged him further to maintain his position was the diminution of his responsibility in the matter by virtue of the part played by Muḥammad ibn Ḥāsim ‘Aḥīfīn in reducing free men to slavery: ‘Aḥīfīn claimed that they, or at any rate their fathers, had already been slaves in the days of the Sa‘ādī. Furthermore, Mawlāy Ismā‘īl had the concurrence of certain more accommodating ‘*ulamā*’, such as the scholar who wrote an undated and unsigned letter to Shaykh al-Islām al-Fāsī, saying *inter alia*:

> Why did you not say in your letter [the one to Mawlāy Ismā‘īl]: Lord, victorious by God’s grace and rightly guided in all his actions, particularly the recruitment of these slaves before their reduction to slavery and the precautions taken as regards Muslim law: this question having been thoroughly considered, nothing remains to be done after all the justifications that have been put forward. Everything is in the hands of our Lord — God send him victorious! — who acts in accordance with the directives of ourselves and the other ‘*ulamā*’ of the day; all that in order to have a clear conscience, may God keep him forever for ourselves and all Muslims! Moreover he has an ample sufficiency of papers on this subject, such as to convince any sceptic or critic. To speak thus is to speak the truth. This is what you ought to have done, without fear of contravening divine or human laws in any way. I hope you will show yourself more conciliatory in your correspondence to our Lord — may God support him! So that he may be satisfied with it. It is because I hold you in esteem that I have given you this advice.

The correspondence on this subject between the Sultan and the ‘*ulamā*’ went on until the death of Sīdī Mḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Kādir al-Fāṣī in 1116/1704–5, and had certainly begun in the last decade of the eleventh century. But the earliest letter from this correspondence that has survived is the one dated 28 Dhī al-Ḥijja 1104/July 1693. In it, the Ruler asked the aforesaid Sīdī Mḥammad to study ‘Aḥīfīn’s arguments about the reduction of free men to slavery, to state whether this operation was in accordance with...
PLATE 8.3 Letter No. 12, part of the correspondence between Sultan Mawlay Ismail and Shaykh al-Islam Sidi Muhammad al-Fasi
with the law, and to say whether he approved of it or not. This scholar no
doubt answered this question frankly, or else insinuated that the law did
not allow free men to be reduced to slavery. The disagreement got worse,
until the Sultan, vexed, wrote a letter about which the author of al-Istiksä
said 18

In the same month of Dhū 'l-Ka'da of the same year, that is 1108/
1696–7, the kādī and the 'ulamā' of Fez received a letter from the
Sultan upbraiding them for not giving their agreement to the reduction
to slavery of the men entered on the register. A second letter arrived
in which the monarch praised the people of Fez, severely criticized
the 'ulamā', and ordered the dismissal of the kādī and the notaries
public of this city.

The first letter to which this passage from al-Istiksä refers is part of my
family collection. It deals with many repeated questions which may be
summarized as follows: the Sultan had thought it necessary and essential
to organize an army to defend the territory of Islam. In this long letter he
developed his point of view about the institution of this army of slaves,
and asked the recipient to distribute it to the 'ulamā' and ask them for their
replies. We possess only one letter of reply, from Sīdī M'ḥammad, in which
he says his last word: 'As to the man who cannot be proven to be a slave,
scholars are unanimous that he is free and that it is by no means lawful to
own him or to dispose of his person either by selling it or in any other way,
for men are born free'.

It was at this juncture that the Ruler, in order to convince the Shaykh
al-Islām of the need to organize the army of the Bawākhir, resorted to
the following method: by a letter dated Dju'mādā' I of Muharram 1109/December 1698,
he called him to witness that he had freed all the slaves he had made into
a militia and that he held them in mortmain to defend the territory of
Islam.

We do not know what Sīdī M'ḥammad's reply was, but in some cor-
respondence on this subject dated not far from the scholar's death (Radjab
1115/Autumn of 1703) we find a clue which is not directly related to the
matter but refers to the enrolment of the people of Fez in the corps of
archers. It seems that the Sultan had also consulted the scholar about this
latter question, and had probably received an unsatisfactory reply. So he
took the opportunity to write him a long letter, the full text of which will
be found in the collection of Mawlāy Ismā'īl's letters referred to above.

In the following year Sīdī M'ḥammad died, and Mawlāy Ismā'īl continued
to ask the 'ulamā' of Fez for their agreement. The affair had all sorts of ups
and downs until 1120/1708–9, when the King finally forced them to

18. This correspondence, which is of fundamental importance from the historical, social,
legal and religious points of view, was published by the author of this chapter, with
photocopies of the documents, in a special number of the journal Hesperis-Tamuda pub-
lished in 1962 for the third centenary of Mawlāy Ismā'īl's accession to power.
Morocco

approve the Diwān al-ʿAbīd (Register of Slaves).

Such is the history of the formation of the Bawākhir militia – in concise form, admittedly, but based on unique and important documents. This militia initially helped a great deal to maintain peace and security in the unified country. Mawlāy Ismāʿīl had established forts and citadels (kaṣābas) in all parts of Morocco, from the frontier with Algeria to the southernmost limits of the Sahara. These forts were garrisoned by soldiers who lived with their families and whose sons received special training, an account of which is called for here.

Thanks to this powerful militia, Mawlāy Ismāʿīl managed to restore Morocco’s strength and prestige in the eyes of the great nations of the day, which then began to fear it. This militia also enabled him, as we have said above, to maintain security in Morocco and give people confidence and peace of mind.

Mawlāy Ismāʿīl appoints his sons viceroys in the various parts of Morocco

This selection was one of the things that caused Mawlāy Ismāʿīl the greatest difficulty. The point was that the sovereign had a very large number of
children: at the time of his death, there were 500 boys and as many girls. Hence he could not satisfy them all. In these circumstances, he would have done better to have adopted from the outset the solution he finally arrived at after bitter experience.

In 1111/1699–1700, he divided the provinces between his sons as follows: Mawlây Aḥmad (nicknamed al-Dhahâbî) was sent to Tadla with 3000 Negro soldiers; Mawlây ‘Abd al-Mâlik was sent to the Dar’a at the head of 1000 horsemen; Muhammad al-‘Alem to the Sūs with 3000; and Mawlây al-Ma’mûn al-Kabîr to Sidjîlmâsa. The latter set up his base at Tizîmî with 500 horsemen, but he died two years later and was replaced by Mawlây Yûsuf in 1113/1701–2. Mawlây Zaydân was sent to eastern Morocco, and launched expeditions against the Turks, once even entering the town of Mascara where he sacked Amîr ‘Uthmân Bey’s palace. His father removed him from office, in view of the pact between himself and the Ottoman Caliph, and replaced him with Mawlây Hâﬁṣ.

Those of Mawlây Ismâ’îl’s elder sons who did not receive viceroyships felt injured. Indeed, some of them even tried to occupy provinces by force, such as Mawlây Abû Naṣr, who attacked his brother Mawlây ‘Abd al-Mâlik, defeated him and took possession of the Dar’a. The defeated prince fled. The Sultan sent his son Mawlây Sharîf to recover the Dar’a province from Abû Naṣr, and it was then assigned to him instead of to ‘Abd al-Mâlik, who had shown himself incapable of defending himself. In the midst of all this, Mawlây Muhammad al-‘Alem rose up in the Sūs, had himself proclaimed Sultan and marched on Marrakesh, which he besieged and occupied. Mawlây Ismâ’îl sent his son Mawlây Zaydân against him, and fought against the rebel for two years. Having seen the untoward consequences of this experiment in the shape of squabbles between his sons during his lifetime, some of them even going so far as to claim the throne, Mawlây Ismâ’îl began to send to Tafîlîlêt all his sons who had reached the age of puberty. He set each of them up in a house, mostly with their mothers; he gave them a certain number of palm-trees and a plot to cultivate, and also a certain number of slaves to help them in their work. The sovereign was wise to do this, for he had too many sons, who could not all lead a princely life in Meknes or the other towns of Morocco. Thus by sending them to Sidjîlmâsa he solved this problem. In 1130/1717–18 he removed all his sons from office except Mawlây Aḥmad al-Dhahâbî, Governor of Tadla, who had succeeded in his task given that in his twenty unbroken years of operation there had been not one uprising in his province either directed against him or fomented by him against his father.

Following this measure the country had peace and quiet, and Mawlây Ismâ’îl’s constructive work during the last ten years of his life was apparent. The Moroccans took up trade and agriculture and helped to develop the country’s wealth, encouraged as they were by complete security. Thus historians agree that during this period there were no robbers or highwaymen any more, thanks to the severe measures taken both against people
guilty of crimes and also against their accomplices. The result of this situation was great well-being and easy circumstances, as a result of the means possessed by the overwhelming majority of the population.

Mawläy Ismäïl had stayed on the throne for fifty-seven years. No king of Morocco or of anywhere in Islam before or after him had reigned for so long except al-Mustansir al-‘Ubaydī, who was proclaimed at the age of seven and reigned until he was sixty-seven. He died on Saturday 28 Rādjab 1139/21 March 1727.

Mawlāy Ismā’īl’s successors

After Mawlāy Ismā’īl’s death the inevitable occurred, that is to say that his many sons, who already during his lifetime had fought over the regional government their father had granted them, started to rise up with the object of acceding to supreme government. For decades none of the claimants managed to establish a strong and lasting government. The first of them, Mawläy ‘Abdallāh, was enthroned and deposed several times.

The part played by the Bawākhir militia, set up to maintain order and ensure peace, was a pernicious one. Similar institutions in the Muslim dynasties from the Abbasids of Baghdad to the Ottomans with their Janissaries were a disaster for the dynasties and for the people who suffered under them.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century a great king, Sīdī Muḥammad ibn ‘Abdallāh or Muḥammad III, came to the throne of Morocco. He restored order, strengthened the power of the monarchy and made Morocco a country respected by all nations.

His primary interest lay in the development of trade and to that end he set about modernizing the ports, in particular the port of Mogador, which has since been given the name of Essaouira (meaning ‘little wall’ or, according to another etymology, ‘little plan’, after a construction plan of the port which was circulated among the workers). He signed trade agreements with a number of European states, including an agreement in 1757 with Denmark concerning the port of Sāfi.

Muḥammad III’s reforms extended to other domains.19 He took an active interest in the Karāwiyyīn of Fez and drew up reforms concerning syllabuses, texts to be studied, subjects to be taught, and so on.

As far as religion is concerned, he believed in the original purity of Islam, which rejects what is known as maraboutism, or the veneration of saints and the act of requesting them to intercede with God for the good of humankind. Such fundamentalist tendencies remained in check, however, because in the late eighteenth century the Wahhābī movement in Arabia was demanding much more radical reforms than any of those which Muḥammad III wished to see. During this period he was on excellent terms with the Shārif of Mecca, Sourour, to whom he had given one of

his daughters in marriage. As the Wahhābis were enemies of the Shārīfs of Mecca, Muḥammad III wished to avoid any reform which coincided too closely with Wahhābi ideology. Nevertheless, the power of the brotherhoods declined considerably during his reign and during the reign of his son, Mawlāy Sulaymān.

As regards foreign relations, Muḥammad III continued throughout his reign to conclude agreements with foreign countries. He recognized the independence of the United States of America; suggested to Louis XIV that he abolish slavery; and supported the Ottoman empire in its conflict with the Russian empire. In 1767 he expelled the Portuguese from Mazagān, but died suddenly while preparing to besiege Ceuta.

In conclusion, the reign of Muḥammad III can be said to have had a major stabilizing effect on the State and on the authority of the ‘Alawite dynasty. So peace-loving was he that he went to war only once, to liberate Mazagān, and he resolved all domestic and foreign issues through negotiation and dialogue. Overall, such prudent and realistic policies were beneficial to the Moroccan people, who, during the second half of the eighteenth century, enjoyed general prosperity and complete security.

20. Contrary to common belief, the name of this coastal town on the Atlantic, to the south of Casablanca is not of foreign origin. It is the name of a Berber kabila, the Banū Mazghāwa, who lived in the vicinity of Mazagān. For the same reasons, the town of Algiers also bore this name, known to geographers and Arab historians as ‘Jazu un Bani Mazghāwa'.

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Algeria, Tunisia and Libya: the Ottomans and their heirs

M. H. CHERIF

The early sixteenth century was marked by a profound crisis which put an end to the old state structures in the Maghrib and the former balances implicit in them. Thanks to the intervention of the Ottomans in Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli – and of the šārif's of the Saharan provinces in Morocco – this troubled time gave way to a new order which took longer to emerge in some countries than others but which finally brought some stability to the Maghreb until the structural crisis of the early nineteenth century which heralded colonial domination.

What was the underlying significance of this crisis? How did the Ottomans help to establish stability in the sixteenth century? To what extent did they remain alien to the societies they dominated, and to what extent did they become integrated into the conquered countries? It is clear that the situation of Algiers was different from that of Tunis, and that of Tunis from that of Tripoli – although how different is hard to determine. It is also clear that the eighteenth century, a period of relative stability, exhibits new characteristics in addition to those of the seventeenth century, which was marked by experiment and fluctuation.

The sixteenth-century crisis and the Ottoman solution in the Maghreb

This crisis affected the entire Arab world. It was an economic crisis, evidenced by the decline of the monetary economy in favour of the subsistence economy, and was due in part to the re-routing of the main trade traffic. It was also a social and political crisis consequent upon the weakening of the unifying factors of society – political and military forces, groups formed by large-scale traders, and the class of the 'ulamā' (Islamic scholars). It was also a cultural crisis involving great change and with it a pathological attachment to things of the past – ideas, behaviour, customs and tastes. This multi-faceted crisis occurred at a particularly dangerous time since a rival world, Europe, was awakening economically (through major discoveries and the rise of capitalist trade), politically (through increasing centralization and the increase in absolute monarchies) and
culturally (through the Renaissance which was changing ways of thinking, habits and techniques).

Only the Osmanli Turks, on the fringe of the Muslim world, adapted to the times to some extent by using certain modern techniques or ideas including firearms and efficient military and administrative organization. Although limited (it did not involve significant internal changes in Muslim society), the Ottoman response to the challenges of the period was nonetheless a way out for societies and states in full decline and exposed to outside threats such as the Maghreb states at the beginning of the sixteenth century.

The crisis in the Maghreb

The Maghreb was in a state of crisis at the end of the 'Middle Ages', plagued by a dwindling population, the dislocation of the economy and of society, and incurable political weakness.

The numerous underlying reasons were inherently structural. First, there was the alarming proximity of the desert and its rapid encroachment on substantial areas of the Maghreb whenever there was a prolonged drought or land was left untended for long periods as at the end of the 'Middle Ages'. Second, there was the juxtaposition of different modes of production and societies: Arab gaba'il (groups); groups assimilated with the Arabs; Berber mountain communities, sedentary rural populations and town-dwellers. Third, there was the very flexibility of society's unifying elements, whether social, economic or spiritual and, fourth, the lack of technological and cultural progress.

The Hilâlian nomads² have often been blamed for the decadence of the Maghreb during the late 'Middle Ages' but this accusation has been ruled out - at least in its unqualified and partisan form.³ However, through their activities and organization, their division into opposed or allied (but always separate) segments, their way of life and their warrior ethic (their 'noble irregularity', to quote Jacques Berque), the Arab gaba'il (or groups assimilated with the Arabs) represented an element of weakness for the central government - the Maghreb's soft underbelly. When drought or political crisis weakened central authority, these groups would promptly seize the opportunity to take up arms to restore the means of their livelihood or to participate in the general struggle for power.

1. The term 'Middle Ages' is inadequate when applied to Muslim history, but we have borrowed it from European historiography as a universally accepted convention. We might also add that the end of the fifteenth century was a real turning-point not only for Europe but also for the other civilizations. With firearms, the development of world trade and the beginnings of capitalism, modern times really began.

2. Arab groups from Upper Egypt, who invaded the Maghreb from the mid-eleventh century onwards and swarmed over the plains in the interior, subjugating the former populations of these regions or converting them to their mode of life and their culture.

During the 1300s and 1400s epidemics and famine, as in Europe, had the peoples of the Maghreb reduced in total population to between 3 and 6 million. As a result production had decreased, cultivation in lands perpetually under threat from encroaching desert had been compromised and security in sparsely occupied territories had deteriorated. At the same time the treasures of America, which poured into Seville from 1503 to 1505, were to devalue considerably the Old World’s money reserves and help establish the power first of their original owners, the Iberians, and later of those who had seized them in the service of the New World economy, particularly the Dutch, English and French.  

The gradual decline which affected the cities of the Maghreb from the eleventh and twelfth centuries onwards (except for certain towns on the great trade routes or on the coast and with a few interruptions in the thirteenth century) became a rapid deterioration by the late 1400s and early 1500s. Commercial life was paralysed, trade delayed and food shortages and poverty were rife. Leo Africanus invariably attributed this poverty, which he saw everywhere, both in the cities and in the regions cultivated by sedentary populations, to oppressive taxation – which sometimes weighed absurdly on the populations still liable to it – and to the consequent depredations of the nomads.

The nomads were indeed freeing themselves from the yoke of the state and extending their control and pastoral way of life to the greater part of the country. They took advantage of the vacuum created by depopulation and the low level of farming and used violence in order to subsist – or to obtain food in excess from weaker populations. The areas cultivated by sedentary populations began to shrink as a result of the nomad offensive. It even happened that tiny fields in which cereals were grown were protected by great walls. Leo Africanus, who noted this around Tunis, concluded: ‘Think of the amount of grain obtainable from a small walled enclosure, tended with such care and toil! The harvest is not enough for even half the year!’

Such were the circumstances in which the multi-secular states of the Zayyānids (or Banū ‘Abd al-Wadids) in Tlemcen and the Ḥāfṣids in Tunis began to founder. The disorganization of trade and the decrease in taxable commodities led to a dwindling of their resources. Troops and the bureaucracy, already badly maintained, became far less efficient. Added to this were the effects of the ikṭā’ (concessions) of land or taxes granted by impecunious sovereigns to the powerful warrior groups. Soon the cities which were far from the centre of power were to become autonomous (Tripoli, Bougie, Constantine in the Ḥāfṣid kingdom) and the great confederations were to reign supreme in the areas over which they ranged. The Bitād al-Makhzen (country under state authority) was gradually reduced to a limited area around the sultan’s residence with the exception of a few

pockets of allegiance farther afield. Insecurity was still rife and the Ḥafṣid sultan himself had to take up arms in the early 1540s to defend his herds from nomad raiders almost under the walls of his residence.6

The domination of the Zayyānids in Tlemcen and the Ḥafṣids in Tunis and the eastern Maghreb had already been severely shaken— from the late 1400s and from 1530 respectively when the Spaniards and the Ottomans gained a foothold in these possessions.

Foreign intervention in the central and eastern Maghreb

The political vacuum or the lesser resistance put up by the Maghreb could account for this intervention but it was motivated, above all, by the needs or the designs of the conquerors. Their initiatives must be seen in the light of the religious passions of the time: the crusading spirit of the Spaniards, who had barely completed the reconquista of their land; and the defence of Dar al-Islām combined with the ideal of ghāţī (conquest)7 on the part of the Ottomans. Moreover, the coastal strongholds of the Maghreb were of undeniable strategic interest to the two protagonists, either to protect their own possessions from the assaults of the other (who might be aided by religious minorities such as the Muslims from Andalusia or the Christians from the Balkans), or as bases for a possible offensive.8 Significantly the Spanish offensive in the Maghreb, from 1505 onwards, came shortly after the first arrivals (1503–4) of precious metals from America,9 which afforded them the means of pursuing a vigorous expansionist policy.

The Spaniards in the central and eastern Maghreb

From 1505 to 1574, the kings of Spain repeatedly tried to secure footholds on the coasts of the Maghreb. One has only to recall the great expeditions of Pedro Navarro in 1505–11 (against Oran, Bougie and Tripoli), of the Holy Roman Emperor in 1535–41 (against Tunis and Algiers), and those of Don John of Austria, who recaptured Tunis from the Turks in 1573 (two years after his great victory over the Turkish fleet at Lepanto). The gains were limited, however, as the conquest of the interior of the Maghreb and the conversion of the indigenous inhabitants rapidly proved impossible. The Spaniards contented themselves with occupying a few presidios (towns) (Oran in 1509–1708 and 1732–92; Tripoli in 1510–51) and building a number of powerful fortresses on African soil, such as Peñón at the entrance to Algiers (1511–29) or Goulette in the outer harbour of Tunis (1535–74). With Goulette, the aim was to hold the town in check and, above all, to guard the southern coastline of the Strait of Sicily.

This policy of limited occupation had to be supported by a constant

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FIG. 9.1 Algeria, Tunisia and Libya in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries
search for local allies or protégés. The most famous were the Ḥafṣid sultans who, from 1535, subtly played see-saw with both the Spaniards and the Ottomans. The last Ḥafṣid sultan, Muḥammad (1573–4), even agreed to share power in Tunis with the Christian commander of the capital. The last Zayyānids of Tlemcen, like Ḥafṣids, also contracted intermittent alliances with the Spaniards, until their capital fell to the Turks and they were finally removed from power in 1551–4. Nor did the Iberians disdain alliances with lesser chiefs, such as the Shābbiya, masters of Kayrawān and central Tunisia in about 1550, or the Banū Amīr and Banū Rāshid in the Oran area.

In general, however, the religious and cultural barriers were such that no durable rapprochement between the Spaniards and the indigenous chiefs was possible. As was to be expected, the Muslim Turks took advantage of this.

The Ottomans' fight against the Spaniards
The first Turks to wage war on the Christians in the Maghreb were the Raʾis corsairs. They acted first on their own initiative, although in agreement with the local sovereigns and aided by the local inhabitants, as in the case of the Barbarossa brothers, ‘Arrūdj (or ‘Urūdj) and Khayruddīn (or Khidhr), from about 1500 to 1519. At about that time, after the defeat and death of ‘Arrūdj, Khayruddīn appealed to the Ottoman sultan, whose sovereignty he recognized and the Maghreb iyāla (regencies) thus came into being. Thanks to the Janissaries and the weapons provided by Istanbul, Algeria was gradually subjugated by Khayruddīn and his successors, in particular Şālah Raʾīs (1552–6) and the all-powerful beylerbey of the ‘odjaks of the West’, Killidj or ‘Ildj ‘Alī (1568–87). For about forty years (1534–74), East Ifríkiya was the scene of a long struggle between Spain and Turkey in which Ḥafṣid sovereigns and the local chiefs, such as the Shābbiya of Kayrawān, intervened actively – although not always to their advantage – and corsairs of great repute, such as Torgut (or Dragut) – around the middle of the century and until his death just off Malta in 1565 – won renown. The principal stages in the Turkish conquest of the eastern Maghreb were the taking of Tripoli in 1551, Kayrawān in 1557, Djerba in 1558 and, lastly, Tunis in 1569 and again in 1574. Thereafter, both protagonists, Spaniards and Ottomans, were called to other theatres of operations and the situation stabilized in favour of the Turks who remained masters of the central and eastern Maghreb, with the exception of the enclave of Oran, Marsa el-Kabīr and the small island of Tabarka.

The organization of the Ottoman Regencies
These outlying military borderlands, the ‘odjaks of the West’ – as the new African provinces were called – were never completely integrated into the Ottoman political and military system. No regular tribute was paid, nor was there any direct administration by Istanbul, nor were the institutions
characteristic of Europe, such as the timar (fiefs) introduced into North Africa. Initially under the authority of a single warlord, the beylerbey of Algiers, the three Maghreb Regencies were separated after the death of the omnipotent Killidj in 1587.

Each province was entrusted to a pasha appointed by Istanbul and assisted by the diwan (council of high-ranking Turkish officers). The militia of the Janissaries, several thousand in number, was responsible for territorial defence, maintained a minimum of order and played an active part in the raising of taxes and the running of the 'administration'. As such, it was from the start the mainstay of the new regime and its members settled down as lords and masters of the lands they had conquered. Allied to the Janissaries were the corsairs from the Greek archipelago, Albania or nearby European countries such as Italy, Provence and Spain. They had all been converted to Islam, although some were less sincere than others, and like their counterparts in the militia, they were uniformly considered Turks and included in the caste of conquerors whose privileged status they enjoyed.

The Makhzen (administration) fulfilled various simple functions. It collected taxes to meet the cost of waging war and maintaining the corps of conquerors in the country; it kept order and dispensed justice, at least in the towns inhabited by the subject sedentary populations; and it managed the postal service. A small staff of khudja (scribes) and accountants, a few high-ranking political figures (including the pasha), or religious ones (including the kadi or magistrate) and, above all, soldiers of all ranks carried out the many tasks. In time, the Makhzen had to recruit auxiliaries from among the local inhabitants: soldiers such as the Kabyles, or the local horsemen who were taken into the service of the Turks; and civilians such as the Arabic scribes, advisers of all kinds and administrators and lazzam (tax-farmers).

In other respects, society was still managed by local indigenous institutions with the new masters intervening now and then. There were, for instance, local communities which continued to obey their own shaykhs (elected chiefs) and to observe their own 'urf (customs). There were also religious institutions which continued to dispense justice (except when peace was seriously disturbed or the Turks were involved) and to be responsible for public worship, education and charitable works.

Although slight and rudimentary, the new Ottoman organization gave the Maghreb what it needed most – the means of adapting to the modern world. It introduced a disciplined army using firearms, a relatively centralized administration and the acquisition by privateering of some of the money being circulated in the Mediterranean. The new regime was generally well received in the cities which were directly exposed to Christian assault and threatened with asphyxiation since the countryside had regained autonomy. It was also well received by the clergy, particularly the 'ulama who favoured a strong central power. Lastly, some people, including
leading urbanités, prominent rural figures and entire makhzen (groups),
entered its service out of self-interest, choice or tradition. Opposed to the
Turks were all those who had benefited from the freedom of the early
eleventh century, the rural populations which had had their own social and
war-making organizations and to which the new masters signified only
harsh rule and burdensome exploitation. The Turks had to wage long wars
to subjugate the useful areas of hinterland and to establish mah'alla (armed
camps) there, through which to raise taxes and impose a minimum of order.
They also became skilled at playing off saff, (pl. sufs, confederations), one
against the other. Without the power to control the area by force of arms
alone, diplomacy was as important as coercion.

The seventeenth century in the Maghreb: in search of
equilibrium
In the seventeenth century Maghreb society, mostly little changed by the
Ottoman episode, gradually recovered from the crisis of the 1500s. Its
coastal cities, and perhaps its sedentary population, had even developed to
some extent. It was nonetheless still susceptible to the grave crises of
epidemics, famines and civil wars which continued to shake it from time
to time. The Turkish ruling class had undergone some internal changes,
being joined by new elements and becoming to some extent rooted in the
Maghreb. The interests, horizons and characteristics of rulers and ruled
diverged and throughout the seventeenth century the long and complex
hostilities between opposing factions increased. Certain foreign problems
arose concerning relations with the mother-city, Istanbul, and Barbary
privateering, which enjoyed its golden age between 1600 and 1650. The
Regencies grew further apart with their political development following
different lines.

Seventeenth-century Ottoman Maghreb society
Ottoman North Africa comprised the following socio-economic groups:
the city, suburban farmers; semi-sedentary farmers who practised trans-
humance from one to three months a year, nomadic shepherds who travelled
far from their watan (homeland), nomadic camel-herders of the deep desert
and sedentary oasis dwellers. The main urban strata included notable
clerics and merchants, workers, the kulughli (prosperous descendants of
locally married Ottoman immigrants), the Ottoman military establishment
and civilian imperial officers.

The rural people belonged to various kabîlas which were communities
10. kabîla (pl. kabâ'il): 'A large agnatic group, the members of which claim to be
"descended from one common ancestor" and who may "jointly own an area of grazing
land" (Encyclopaedia of Islam, new edn., Vol. IV, pp. 334–5). In the General History of
Africa the plural is given as kabîlas.
thought to share a common patrilineal descent. Genealogies justified why and how various smaller groups were entrusted to an elected shaykh assisted by an informal council composed of the heads of the smaller ḫablīs. Above the ḫablya there existed saff (pl. sufuť) – confederations formed by alliances between ḫablīs. These were stable alignments occurring either within a single ecological zone or uniting groups from different ecological and economic spheres, such as camel-herders, shepherds, semi-sedentary farmers and urban factions. Some territorial groups developed long-term centralized leadership such as the great Tuareg principalities (amenokal-led groups). Some ḫablīs allied through attendance at a common shrine, or allegiance to a common turuk (brotherhood).

Historians, therefore, should not view the rural people as a medley of groups and factions capriciously rebelling against or submitting to the Ottomans. Conversely, it was the dynamics of ecological change and the shifts in saff alignments which dictated whether groups should rebel or cooperate. The existence of the saffs also meant that a single system of political relations operated over large portions of the Maghreb. City politics were only a small part of this wider context. Great blocks, allied to or dominated by the Makhzen, stood in opposition to the ṣiba (dissident blocks).

This increase in territorial stability and consequent reduction in turbulence – at least in the Maghreb’s well-watered regions, the newly-strengthened Makhzen and the saff system – distinguished the 1600s from earlier centuries.

While most of the countryside was Arabic-speaking there still remained substantial Berber-speaking communities, often still Ibadites. They occupied refuge areas such as the mountains of the Tripolitanian Djabal Nafūsa, the Awrās (Aurès), the Grand Kabylia in the central Maghreb and the mountainous areas of the Atlas and the Rif on the west. Berber communities were distinguished from Arab communities by the continued success of their resistance to the Ottomans. They owed this to their location in refuge zones and to their elaborate defence systems. Their successful resistance allowed them to preserve a strong attachment to the different forms of Berber culture. The Berber communities remained distrustful towards the new Ottoman authorities. They remained Berber and mostly preserved their autonomy, refusing, for example, to pay taxes. When they could not maintain their autonomy they became Arabized. Certain over-populated Berber areas, such as Kabylia, however, became zones for the recruiting of regular soldiers for service in Algiers or Tunis (the famous Zwāwa) and perhaps also centres providing seasonal workers and rural pedlars (the emigration of labour witnessed in the nineteenth century doubtless existed before that time).

The village areas (the Tunisian Sahel, for example), the southern oases, the wheat-producing regions under urban control (the Tunisian hanshir and Algerian h’aoush regions), and the flat country of the towns (such as
the Algiers Sahel and the Tripoli Manshiya) were occupied by a society very different from that of the mountain areas. Its members led a sedentary existence. They had some trading links with the outside, well-established or better-defined milk (land ownership) and were influenced by urban economy and culture. All this suggests complex social structures and relationships, attitudes and behaviour more akin to those of town-dwellers than those of the Beduins. The omnipresent patrilineal kinship went hand-in-hand with hierarchical relationships, such as those linking the owner of the means of production to the khammā (one-fifth share-cropper) in the large cereal-producing areas. Certain specialized occupations emerged, including crafts and religious or administrative functions, urban values such as submission to authority spread more easily than in the mountain areas, and the influence of written law – essentially canonical in nature – was stronger. These traits, which were clearly structural, must have been accentuated in the seventeenth century (and even more so in the following century) with the modest but genuine progress in security, the consolidation of urban society and the extension of its influence and, lastly, the establishment of relations with the mercantile European states. These relations must have stimulated the extension of export crops and the economic and social system on which they were based, in particular, the large estates on which cereals were grown with the help of the one-fifth share-croppers.

The oases, far from the sea and the central authorities and maintainers of the caravan trade with Black Africa or the East, were inhabited by better-integrated societies and gave rise to well-entrenched oligarchies or local dynasties, such as that of the Fāsis in the Fezzān.

Although the cities were less prestigious than those of the Arab or Muslim East, they nonetheless made their presence and influence felt throughout the Maghreb. They included the coastal capitals of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli and also former colonizing cities such as Kayrawān, Constantine and Tlemcen. Trade and handicrafts stemming from time-hallowed traditions or stimulated by new discoveries took on renewed vigour from the first half of the seventeenth century onwards. Examples are the chechia (red woollen bonnet) industry in Tunis, whose development was encouraged by the Muslims or Moors driven out of Spain after 1609, and the luxury textile industry which grew up in Maghreb towns. Trade was encouraged, particularly in the coastal towns, initially by privateering and the products and money derived from it, then, from the late 1600s, by the links established with European capitalist trade. Ilm (religious knowledge) slowly revived after the crisis of the sixteenth century, stimulated by the comparative material prosperity of the towns and the consequent increase in the number of wakfs (religious foundations). The revival was also encouraged by the new Turkish authorities who granted their protection above all to the Hanafite scholars of their rite but also to the indigenous Mālikites, for reasons perhaps more secular than spiritual (the desire to legitimize their power, which was alien and largely military).

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PLATE 9.1 Seventeenth-century earthenware vase for storing oil and other liquids, from the Kallaline district of Tunis. Height: 45 cm
At the top of the political and social hierarchy was the ruling class. Although, in theory, made up solely of members of the Turkish army, it was also open to other categories. It was open first to Christians who had converted to Islam, invariably called Turks despite names such as Franciș, İngiliz, Kürsû (Corsican), Sardü (Sardinian) or others hardly Turanian in origin. Their golden age was perhaps in the first half of the seventeenth century, for it was they who introduced modern European technology, especially with regard to military matters and seafaring. They (the corsair captains in particular) played an active role not only in those fields but also in various political and administrative posts (some even attaining to the supreme function of dey (chief of the Turkish militia) in Tunisia and Tripolitania). In these two Regencies, the Turks quickly gave their children by indigenous women (the kulughli whom they regarded as Turks) the functions and privileges previously reserved for themselves. The Turks in Algiers were more exclusivist and refused to do likewise, thus provoking a serious kulughli insurrection which ended in the defeat of the latter and their total exclusion between about 1630 and 1680.

Whereas in Tunis and Tripoli some indigenous people were gradually appointed advisers, secretaries, käids-lazzâm (tax-farmers) and even com-

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**PLATE 9.2** A Tunisian-made, eleven-stringed, melon-ribbed lute (ʻud) of Egyptian type, with ovoid belly in glued wood and mother-of-pearl inlay. Length: 81 cm
manders of the auxiliary military forces recruited locally, in Algiers indi­
genese were excluded. In short the seventeenth-century ruling class in Tunis
and Tripoli began to associate with the local élites, whilst that of Algiers
remained fiercely alien. This difference may have stemmed from the relative
strengths of the indigenous élites. The Tunisian élite was strong both
through historic traditions and their activities. The Tripolitan élite was
strong through the large-scale trans-Saharan trade. However, in Algiers, a
new town created almost entirely by the Turks in the sixteenth century,
the élite was but poorly established.

The political regimes in the Regencies of the seventeenth century

The three Regencies, in principle Ottoman provinces, became largely
independent of the mother-city from the beginning of the seventeenth
century, more because of Istanbul’s impotence than a desire for inde­
pendence. Each Regency developed differently depending on the com­
position of its ruling class and society.

Development was most rapid in Tunis. Soon stripped of any real power
by the high-ranking officers of the territorial forces in the diwân, the
Tunisian pasha was nonetheless kept as a symbol of Ottoman allegiance.
In 1591, however, these high-ranking officers had, in turn, to cede their
places in the diwân to the representatives of the Janissaries. The military
democracy thus installed did not last long. In 1598, a single Turkish
leader – the dey – set up an autocratic regime which tried to balance the
interests of the Turkish caste and those of the indigenous notables. Around
1630, a new authority emerged in the country, the bey or commander of
the territorial forces. This office, held by a mamlûk (freed man) of Genoese
origin, Murâd, enabled its holder to conquer the hinterland at the expense
of the large confederations, until then independent. With the country’s
inland resources and military forces – part Turkish, part local – at his
disposal and through alliances with local notables, the bey gradually con­
solidated his position, concentrated power within his family (the Muradite
dynasty) and adopted a veritable monarchical policy in keeping with the
country’s traditions and the interests of the indigenous notables. In the
end, he prevailed over his rival, the dey, particularly during the armed
conflict of 1673. But the Muradite triumph was shortlived. The crisis of
the late 1600s, the weakening of the Turkish militia, which had been the
most effective instrument of unification, internecine strife between rival
beyactical, Algiers’ intrigues and interventions and lastly, the pro-Turkish reac­
tion of a high-ranking officer in the militia, brought this first experiment
in semi-national monarchy to an end in 1702.

A similar development was to take place in Tripoli, although with some
delay. A dey was appointed there in 1603–4 and a policy analogous to that
of the Tunisian Muradites was adopted between about 1630 and 1672. The
bey was pre-eminent, particularly during the time of Murâd al-Maltî (1679–
and climaxing in the ultimate triumph of the kulughli bey, "Ahmad Kâramânî, in 1711. This progress towards a monarchical regime better integrated into the country was, however, counteracted or delayed in Tripoli by many factors. These included the ill-timed interventions of Istanbul which was trying to regain real power in the country (c.1610 and 1689); the omnipotence of the Beduin confederations (the Mahâmid, Tarhûna and others) which, unable to destroy them, the Turkish power in Tripoli treated with care; the repeatedly lost and regained autonomy of the eastern province, Benghâzî, and the southern province, Fezzân; and, lastly, the meagreness of the country's own resources. Real power rested on the balance struck between the Turks and the civic authorities (which had grown rich through their control of the great caravan trade and through handicrafts), between maritime and land interests, between the towns and the great kabilas, and between the centre and the provinces. In this delicate balance lay the instability of power.

The Algiers régime preserved for longest its original characteristics as a Turkish military province. There the pasha kept some privileges until 1659, after which the diwân of the āghas (high-ranking officers of the militia) seized power. This was not for long, however, as a dey, representing first the corsair captains then the Janissaries, succeeded in seizing power in 1671. His power, however, remained precarious, exposed to the moods of the soldiery, clan conflicts and the hazards of circumstance. From 1671 to 1710, no less than eleven deys were to hold that supreme office. Most were overthrown and killed during revolts by the Janissaries. The Algiers regime was therefore a military regime which became more democratic during the seventeenth century but only for the benefit of the Turkish caste, in the absence of a strong group of indigenous civic authorities capable of exercising their influence over the political regime, as in Tunis and even in Tripoli. However, even the Algiers regime concentrated its power in the deys, although they did not really manage to prevail over the egalitarian or aristocratic tendencies of the Turkish caste until the late 1700s.

The Regency regimes, whether or not exclusive of local leaders, remained close to Istanbul. Their policy towards local communities was of the utmost severity. It was largely based on the use of armed force and aimed at pressurizing their subject peoples to the limits of their capacity to contribute or to resist. From the seventeenth century, however, the ruling class began to use certain local forces - group alliances or rural chiefs - to impose their domination, at least in Tunis. In general, however, antagonistic relationships prevailed. Hence the tendency of the Beduins to revolt, their apparently spontaneous support for any pretender and, finally, the instability of the Maghreb regimes.

That they should survive, let alone achieve a certain degree of success, was dependent on external resources.
External revenue: privateering and trade

Some colonial historiography has improperly reduced modern Maghreb history to privateering equated with piracy. But privateering, as different from piracy as war on land from banditry, only concerned a tiny minority of the Maghreb population and, during the latter part of the seventeenth century, had to contend with the mercantile interests of the powerful European states and their local allies. What was the true position with regard to this privateering and this trade?

**Maghreb privateering in the seventeenth century**

A legacy of the great struggles of the Ottomans against their Christian enemies in the sixteenth century, privateering became the prerogative of the Turkish Regencies in the Maghreb once the Ottomans had made peace with the Spaniards in the Mediterranean and the Ottoman provinces in the West had acquired freedom of action. Privateering continued to be organized or strictly controlled by the various Maghreb states and their principal dignitaries. It observed certain rules, even if these were often transgressed in the course of an activity by definition hazardous and violent. Practised by Turks, Albanians or converted Christians, for personal gain, it remained a monopoly of a faction of the Ottoman ruling class. Much of the material and most of the techniques used in boat-building were borrowed from outside. As a result, privateering never ceased to be a marginal, if not alien, activity in Maghreb life despite bringing in big profits and having considerable political and military significance. Its aims and purposes were many: as a holy war *par excellence*, it helped to justify Turkish conquest and power in the Regencies, bringing in huge profits from slave ransoms and the capture of Christian boats; it was an extremely lucrative activity for the privateers and corsairs taking part in it, the states which took a considerable share of the profits and, indirectly, the entire population of the corsair ports involved in this rather special traffic; and, finally, it helped to make the states practising it feared because of the damage they could do to the trade of even the powerful European states.

The importance of privateering obviously varied from period to period. Its history as an independent force in the Regencies began in about the 1580s. It thus benefited from the prosperity of the Mediterranean in the late 1500s and early 1600s. It then unquestionably reached its zenith as a result of the European wars of the first half of the seventeenth century. Improving their armaments by the adoption of round vessels and Berthon boats (through the self-interested help of the Dutch, the English and others), Regencies were able to build up considerable fleets. Around 1610–30, Algiers is supposed to have maintained some eighty vessels and Tunis some thirty to forty vessels of all sizes.\(^{11}\) The second half of the century saw the irreversible decline of Maghreb privateering with the growth of

\(^{11}\) P. Grandchamp, 1937.
the fire power of European fleets and the mercantile progress made by the big Christian powers. From the 1680s onwards, France and England forced the Regencies to respect their ships and their trade and privateering was
practised only against the nationals of the small Christian powers, with the
tacit agreement or secret encouragement of the big powers, who saw this
as a means of eliminating competition from their less fortunate rivals such
as the Italians and Spaniards. From then on it was only in exceptional
circumstances, such as the European wars (particularly those of the late
1700s and early 1800s) that Maghreb privateering could regain its freedom
of action – and then only temporarily.

Progress in trade between Europe and the Maghreb in the seventeenth century
It may seem paradoxical to discuss progress in trade during this century of
privateering. But in fact privateering never completely obstructed peaceful
transactions and, moreover, it began to die out in the second half of the
seventeenth century. This change would seem to be due, in the first place,
to the influence of the big European states won over to mercantilism and
able, at a certain stage, to impose their views on the Maghreb authorities.
These powers were, for their part, divided into a military faction (pre­
ponderant in Algiers) and a civilian faction, favourable to trade and pre­
vailing over its rival mainly in Tunis (in the last third of the seventeenth
century). These were the circumstances in which trade links with Europe
were strengthened, but on new bases and to the advantage of new partners.

The traditional transit trade declined greatly, with the exception of
trans-Saharan links through Tripoli (where European goods such as metals
and salt were traded for gold dust, slaves, ostrich feathers and senna) and
the time-honoured and imposing pilgrim caravans between the Moroccan
south and Mecca, through the Algerian and Tunisian oases, Tripoli and
Egypt. With these exceptions, it was the maritime trade imposed by the
European states for their advantage which prevailed in quantity and value.

As for exports, the products of the Maghreb countryside were being
directed in ever greater quantities to Europe. Cereals, in particular, were
increasingly in demand in the southern provinces of western Europe. In
response to this demand and to strained finances, the Maghreb states
weighed heavily on trade in rural products – either through the collection
of some, such as cereals, or through the granting of contracts for some of
them to tax farmers (a typical case being the purchase and export of leather,
for which the Leghorn Jews had secured a monopoly in Tunis by the end
of the seventeenth century), or by the charging of heavy taxes on exported
rural products. (The teskere (export permit) was the most usual form of
taxation.) Of secondary importance was the export, mainly to other Muslim
countries, of handicraft products such as red woollen bonnets from Tunis,
luxury textile products and worked leathers.

As for imports, besides the inevitable luxury products for the use of a
small élite, they included the means of controlling the hinterland, such as
weapons (notwithstanding official prohibitions), money, writing paper and,
lastly, some products for the use of local craftsmen (wool and dye-stuffs
for red blankets accounting in the main for the imports of value in Tunis at the end of the seventeenth century).

Without doubt the main beneficiaries of these trade relationships were the European states and their merchants and carriers on whose initiative the ties were established. The great naval expeditions of the 1670s and 1680s aimed to lessen privateering and put European trade on a more convenient basis, with the safety of Christian subjects guaranteed, import duties reduced (to 3 per cent for the English and later for the French) and permission to extract a country’s products on payment of certain duties and on certain conditions. This was the beginning of the policy of unequal treaties.
Paradoxically, these treaties were mostly accepted by the Maghreb authorities not only out of fear of European fire power but also out of self-interest for they derived substantial profits from the sea trade in addition to acquiring European products and weapons with which to control the hinterland. Moreover, a few social groups also stood to gain. These included the tax-farmers connected with European trade (such as the leather-dealing Leghorn Jews), the retail traders, the red-blanket makers who depended on Christians for raw materials and to sell the finished product (Europeans were responsible for transporting it to the Levant) and possibly certain categories of producers (such as the Tunisian Sahel olive-growers and the owners of the large estates on which cereals were grown).

These different trends which emerged in the late 1600s were to continue and be consolidated during the eighteenth century.

The eighteenth century: achievement or respite?

Historians traditionally see the Ottoman eighteenth century as a period of crisis or increasing decadence. How far is this true of the Regencies or Sandjak of the west?

Maghreb societies in the eighteenth century

The Maghreb did not undergo any fundamental changes during the eighteenth century — unlike during the seventeenth. The means of production, social structures, institutions, attitudes and habits all remained unchanged. Some progress, however, can be seen, even if limited to certain regions or groups, such as the extension of cereal-growing on large estates and of the valuable prickly pear which spread well beyond the Andalusian settlements where it was first introduced. There were many favourable signs but not enough to revolutionize the means of production or the structures of society.

These retained the distinctive traits inherited from a distant past (such as patrilinearity and separate communities) or from a recent past (such as an imported ruling class and the ethnic hierarchy in the towns). The only noteworthy changes were those introduced through public service or the growth of trade with Europe. These included the consolidation of certain notable local families at the head of rural communities, in certain religious functions (such as the zawiya and fraternities distinguished and honoured by those in power), in administrative offices such as provincial government or purchasable offices which included various types of leasing. There are well-known incidences of the rise of kulughli families in the Algerian beyliks, such as al-Gullî in Constantine and Bû-Shlaghîm in Oran. Equally well-known are the Algerian Jewish families in Bacri and Bushnâk, who played a leading role in relations between Algiers and Europe in the late 1700s and early 1800s. In Tunis, large-scale lizma (farming-out of the provinces,
customs, etc.) enabled certain families to acquire wealth and power. Families such as the Banū ‘Ayyād and the Djallūf eventually provided the state with its most valued servants. They and their less illustrious counterparts were to give the Tunisian state remarkable stability, greater than elsewhere.

The Tunisian state in the eighteenth century

In the eighteenth century, Tunisia was the best-consolidated Maghreb state and the best-integrated, both for geographical reasons (its plains opening onto the sea) and for historical reasons (its influential urban notables and its long monarchical traditions).

Yet Tunisia remained a province of the Ottoman empire ruled by a veli (governor) appointed by Istanbul. The Turkish caste continued to dominate, both politically and socially, and the regime continued to depend on the militia of the Janissaries and to rule the mass of the population with an iron hand. Turkish sovereignty, however, became increasingly national inasmuch as the bey of Tunis enjoyed complete autonomy. The Ottoman ruling class included the kulughli (the cross-bred offspring of the Turks and the indigenous people) who were entirely integrated into local society, and became more and more accessible to local notables. The militia of the
Janissaries was restricted to a strictly military role, totally divorced from political life, while at the same time, its military influence was counterbalanced by other armed units recruited in the country such as the awāwa, ‘Arab’ spahis, and the mountain horsemen. Lastly, the effects of the policy of force were attenuated by the behs’ practice of contracting alliances with indigenous notables, especially religious leaders, won over to the dynasty by various means and advantages. The eighteenth-century Tunisian regime was therefore of a dual nature, which can be explained both by its origins (foreign military conquest) and by its gradual adaptation to the society of local notables. This dual nature could easily account both for the regime’s difficulties and then, later – in the eighteenth century – its success.

Taking advantage of the 1705 invasion of the Tunisian countryside by the Turkish troops of Algiers, Husayn b. ‘Alï, a kulughli, had himself proclaimed bey and led the resistance against the invader. He then used his victory to eliminate his rivals and found a lasting semi-monarchical regime. Restricting the Turks to purely military tasks, and their representatives – pasha and dey – to a mere honorary role (albeit a necessary one which gave Ottoman sovereignty concrete form), he secured the support of the kulughli, the Andalusians and the local notables and managed to achieve relatively advanced centralization. Economically, this meant that mushtarā (rural products) were bought cheaply, some being sold to European merchants. ‘The bey has such a hold over trade that he can be said to be the only trader in the State’, wrote, not without exaggeration, the French consul in Tunis, Saint-Gervais, in about 1730.12

Nonetheless, contradictions were accumulating between the attempts at centralization and the mostly segmentary nature of rural society, between the removal of the Turks from political life and the Regency’s status as an Ottoman province, and between the subsistence economy and the extensive trade in which the beylik was involved. In 1728, ‘Ali Bāshā, the bey’s nephew revolted. The country split immediately into the bāshiya or pashists, followers of the bey’s nephew, and the husayniya or husseinists, subjects loyal to the reigning bey. The crisis lasted until 1762. ‘Ali Bāshā’s side triumphed first (1735–56), then the sons of Husayn b. ‘Ali. The Algiers troops invaded in support of one or the other, in 1735 and 1756 in particular, with sporadic revolts by various people until 1762.

From that time until just after 1815, peace reigned once again in the Regency of ‘Ali Bey (1759–82) and Ḥammādī Pasha (1782–1814). It was a relatively good period despite the terrible plague from 1784–5 and the famines of 1777–8 and 1804 which indeed seem only to have re-established the precarious balance between the country’s resources and the size of the population. Revenue from external sources increased appreciably owing to the strengthening of trade links with Europe up to about 1790, high European demand for food products during the Napoleonic Wars (1792–1814) and, finally, because the corsairs took advantage of those wars, 12. de Saint-Gervais, 1736.
Plate 9.7  Eighteenth-century ceramic panel from the Kallaline district, Tuns, used as an interior wall decoration. Height: 151 cm
vigorously resuming their activities. This enabled the state to lighten the
tax burden or, at least, not to increase it, thus lessening political tensions.
In addition, the beys followed a policy of alliance with notables of every
opinion. As proof of success there was an absence of serious revolt from
1762 until shortly after 1815 and the bey’s foreign triumphs at Venice
(1784–92), Tripoli (1793–4) and, above all, Algiers (1807). The domination
of Algiers over Tunis, established in 1756, was brought to an end by this
military victory.

This period of equilibrium and success, which Tunis enjoyed for over
half a century, came to an end just after 1815 with the resumption of
European expansion in new circumstances, unfavourable to all countries
outside Europe. Thus began a new era heralding colonial imperialism.

The Algiers Regency in the eighteenth century
As already shown, the Algiers Regency kept an alien and military ruling
class longer than the other two Maghreb regencies. Yet it still underwent
some changes.

Although privateering had greatly declined it was still practised selec­
tively against certain Christian countries such as Spain. The Scandinavian
countries and some Italian states, such as Venice, agreed to pay tribute to
Algiers in order to safeguard their merchant ships. Despite privateering,
trade with the great mercantile states of France and England also developed.
These states were particularly interested in buying cereals, first from the
east, through ‘Le Bastion de France’, near ‘Annāba, in La Calle, then from
the west, through Arzew and later Oran after its recapture by the Regency
in 1792.

Another external source of revenue, war against neighbouring states,
brought in huge profits for the ruling class in Algiers. In particular,
interventions in Tunis in favour of pretenders, in 1735 and 1756, yielded
considerable spoils picked up in passing and a disguised tribute paid by
Tunis from 1756 until about 1807.

In the interior, taxes continued to be exacted in the most traditional
fashion through the mah’alla (armed expedition). These taxes were for the
benefit of the Turkish exclusivist caste. The kulughlis, the offspring of
Turks and indigenous women, were excluded from the militia and higher
state offices, a policy which continually gave rise to opposition. There were
countless Kabyle insurrections, including that of 1767–71, which resulted
in a considerable reduction in taxes. Even more serious were the popular
uprisings in Oran, led by religious fraternities, and the revolts in Con­
stantine in the early 1800s led by local feudal lords who had detected a
certain mobilization of opinion against the Turks. The Constantine revolts
marked the revival of the local chiefs’ powers at a time when the militia of
the Janissaries was showing signs of weakness.

The deterioration of the Janissary militia was not in itself a tragedy as
the same thing had happened in Tunis and Tripoli and had long been anticipated in Algiers. Since the late 1600s power had largely been monopolized by a single chief, the dey. In the eighteenth century, the dey increasingly gained the support of the small body of Turkish dignitaries from amongst whom he had been chosen. Thus the military democracy dear to the Janissaries and the Ottoman râîs was gradually eroded. As a result the Algerian regime became more stable and effective. Only one of the eleven deys who took power from 1671 to 1710 remained in office until he died a natural death, whereas seven of the nine deys who acceded to this supreme office from 1710 to 1798 died naturally. Muḥammad b. ʿUthmân’s exceptionally long reign (1766–91) afforded the Algerian state undeniable stability.

In the provinces, the change was even more marked, for the beys of Constantine, Titteri and the west, with only a small number of Janissaries at their disposal, were forced to rely more on local dignitaries and chiefs. There were even kulughli beys who were blood relations of the great indigenous families (the Quilî in Constantine and the Bû-Shlaghîm or the family of Muḥammad b. ʿUthmân al-Kâbîr in the west). In short, better-
integrated into the country, more civilian than in Algiers, the beys in the provinces showed more clearly that the Algerian regime was changing along the same lines as Tunis and even Tripoli.

These changes were to occur belatedly in the capital itself. At the end of 1817, with the support of the kulughli and the Zwâwa, dey ‘Ali Khôdja decimated the militia of Janissaries, or what remained of it, thus permanently eliminating Turkish military influence as had the beys of Tunis and Tripoli a century earlier. A more rapid nationalization of the Algerian regime could then have been expected, but the French conquest of 1830 put a stop to a trend which had possibly begun too late or in unfavourable conditions when the divorce between the population and its leaders had already become an accomplished fact.
The Regency of Tripoli in the eighteenth century

As in Tunis at the beginning of the century, in 1711 a kulughli officer, Aḥmad Kăramānlî, took power in Tripoli and founded a dynasty of beys which was to rule until 1835. The success of this family is explained by many factors. First, there was the length of the reigns of Aḥmad (1711–45), 'Alī (1754–93) and Yūsuf (1794–1832). Second, there was the existence of multiple alliances between the kulughli and the great urban families of Tripolitania. Third, and perhaps most important, there was the size of the beylik’s revenue from external sources. These included privateering which was revived after 1711 and again from 1794–1805; the resulting direct revenue from captures and prisoners’ ransoms and indirect revenue from the tribute paid by many European states to ensure the security of their merchant ships; the great trans-Saharan traffic across the Fezzān of which Tripoli gained control by repeated expeditions; and the Mediterranean trade with Leghorn and the Levant. This trade was probably responsible for the power of the trading groups in the Tripolitan towns and the prosperity of the Jewish colony in the late 1700s and early 1800s.

The Tripoli Regency experienced grave difficulties during this period. First, there were the many natural disasters, including the 1767–8 famine and the terrible plague of 1785. The country’s resources were limited — hence the serious tensions between the state with its high demands (for it lived in the modern world) and the populations with their modest capacity to contribute.

Second, there was the organization of most of the populations into two great confederations whose memberships fluctuated. Without the support of one or the other the Ottomans could not rule. The struggle between them was perennial and the adversaries of the rulers of Tripoli were always branded as rebels. When rivals to the throne found support in the competing confederations, civil wars erupted such as that in 1791–3 which pitted different members of the Kăramānlî family against each other.

In the third place, Istanbul did not give up its attempts to regain real power in Tripoli, the soft underbelly of the Ottoman Maghrib. In 1793, for example, a Turkish officer, 'Alī Burghŭl, entered Tripoli during a civil war and drove out the Kăramānlîs. Extending this action to Djerba in Tunisian territory, he was counter-attacked by the bey of Tunis, who dislodged him from Tripoli and re-established one of the contending Kăramānlî as bey there in 1794. With the reign of Yūsuf Kăramānlî there followed at first a period of prosperity. He successfully resisted an early attempt by the United States of America to unseat him. Later, however, he was forced to accept treaties with Britain and France that virtually suppressed privateering and protection monies. Thus a major source of revenue was lost for which the trans-Saharan trade could not compensate.

Higher taxation led to strong rural opposition, and declining standards of living fuelled discontent in Tripoli. The dynasty eventually lost credit.
In addition Yusuf also made major miscalculations in his relations with the Djabal Nafusa people and the saff, led by the Awd Sulayman of the Surt and Fezzan, so that he lost his rural power-base. There was also discontent over the increased power of the French and British consulates.
in Tripoli, from where these powers intervened on occasion in the relationships between Libyans.

So when an Ottoman force landed in Tripoli in May 1835, it was well received and the Porte resumed direct control over Libya.

The final source of difficulties for the Regency lay in the Christian endeavours to reduce privateering and impose favourable trading conditions on Tripoli. The most famous war declared on privateering was that waged from 1801-5 by the United States of America when it was first appearing on the international scene. The war ended, however, with a compromise peace. Such was not the case after 1815, however, when the Europeans succeeded in imposing their conditions unilaterally. They eliminated privateering and opened the country to their trade on their own terms. They then began to demand compensation from the Tripolitan regime on every occasion and even without occasion: France demanded payment of 800,000 francs in 1830 because its consul had been insulted, and England demanded no less than 200,000 piastres because the son of its consul had been insulted. With its financial resources exhausted, the Tripolitan state found itself completely paralysed. Undermined in addition by revolts, which it was unable to put down, it was easy prey for the Ottoman empire which re-established itself there in May 1835 to rule for a long time.

Conclusion

In the sixteenth century the Maghreb experienced a grave crisis, the fundamental cause of which was its failure to adapt to the period of firearms, centralizing monarchies and American treasures. The Ottomans provided the countries of the central and eastern Maghreb with a solution to this crisis, by setting up modern systems – military and administrative – capable of ensuring external defence and the minimum of internal order required for collective survival. While fulfilling these functions, however, the Ottomans imposed on their subjects an iron rule and whenever possible, the severe exploitation of their resources – thus contributing to the stagnation of indigenous societies. The Ottoman Maghreb thus superimposed states and ruling classes that were modern, dominating and exploitative, although the situation differed to some extent between Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli at various times.

Rapidly gaining independence from Istanbul (without ever renouncing official allegiance to the mother-city) the ‘adjaks of the West’ gradually separated into independent states which were inclined to be antagonistic. Ten wars took place between the regimes of Tunis and Algiers between 1600 and 1800. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the states developed along different lines (or at a different pace). While the Ottoman ruling class gradually became accessible to the kulughlis and local dignitaries in Tunis and Tripoli, in Algiers it was uncompromisingly exclusivist.
Semi-national monarchies thus emerged in Tunisia and Tripolitania in the eighteenth century while Algiers long remained under a regime greatly influenced by its conquering and alien origins. Nonetheless the general trend towards greater integration of the ruling élite with the local population and greater centralization of a monarchical type was also experienced in the Algerian Regency. But it occurred initially in the provinces and only belatedly from 1817, in the capital. Moreover, this separate and different development of the three Regencies (later accentuated by the diversity of their colonial situations) was to determine the partition of the Maghreb into separate states until today.

The history of Ottoman Maghreb was also determined by its relations with Christian Europe. The latter was the source of many of the instruments of modernity which afforded the states and ruling classes of the Maghreb the means of exercising their hegemony over the local populations: firearms and modern armies, writing paper, currency tokens, precious metals and, finally, men who brought new techniques and ideas with them. Relations with Europe were thus vital to the ruling classes of the Maghreb. First came relations of war (privateering), established by the Ottoman military from their own initiative and mainly for their own benefit. Then came relations of peace – mainly commercial – which were imposed by the great mercantile states and willingly accepted by the civilian faction of the ruling classes and its local allies. These relations first benefited the European capitalism which had established them and, second, the Maghreb states and their local partners – but only while they could defend their interests and attitudes against their European protagonists, until about 1815. This year clearly marked the end of one period and the opening of another – that of exclusive domination by Europe.
Introduction

Senegambia, which comprises the basins of the Senegal and Gambia rivers, lies some distance from the Niger Bend, midway between the Sahara and the forest. Until the fifteenth century it remained a dependency of the states of the Sudan and the Sahara. But its opening up on its Atlantic side with the arrival of the Portuguese gave Senegambia its full geopolitical importance as an avenue for the penetration of expanding Europe’s economic and political domination and as an outlet for the products of Western Sudan.

Despite regional geographical variations and the diversity of its population – which comprised Wolof, Fulbe, Mande (Mandinka), Sereer, Tukuloor, Joola (Dyola, Jola), Nalu, Baga and Tenda – all Senegambia shared a common destiny linked to the meeting in this tip of West Africa of influences from the Sudan, the Sahara and the forest. This unity was enhanced from the fifteenth century onwards by the impact of the Atlantic trade which from then on played a decisive role in the economic, political and social evolution of all the states of Senegambia.

From the fifteenth century, Portuguese trade in gold, ivory, leather and slaves diverted the trade routes from the interior towards the coast and, in the sixteenth century, precipitated the break-up of the Jolof confederacy and the rise of the Denyanke kingdom in the Senegal river valley and of the Kingdom of Kaabu (Gабу) in the Southern Rivers.

During the seventeenth century the division of the coast into Dutch, French, English and Portuguese spheres of influence coincided with the development of the Atlantic slave trade which remained, throughout the eighteenth century, the cornerstone of the Atlantic trade. The Atlantic slave trade led to an era of violence and the warlike and arbitrary ceddo (warlord) regimes exemplified by the reigns of the Damel-Teen of Kayor and Bawol, Lat Sukaabe Fall, and of the Satigi of Futa Toro, Samba Gelaajo Jeegi. Faced with ceddo violence, Islam formed the sole bulwark against the arbitrary rule of the aristocracy. At the end of the seventeenth century the adherents of Islam took up arms in the Marabout War and, although defeated, went on to cause three revolutions in Bundu, Futa
Jallon and Futa Toro during the eighteenth century. The opposition of the Muslim theocracies against the ceddo regimes forms the background to the history of Senegambia suffering the consequences of the Atlantic trade.

The Portuguese monopoly and the re-drawing of the political map in the sixteenth century

At the western tip of Africa, Senegambia is the sector of the African coast most clearly open to the west. Long a dependency of the Sudan and the Sahara, in the fifteenth century it was subjected to the influence of the Atlantic with the arrival of the Portuguese who invested in the area. Portuguese trade in gold, ivory, spices and, before long, slaves, led to the diversion of trade routes towards the Atlantic. This first victory of the caravel over the caravan gave rise, from the middle of the sixteenth century, to profound political, economic and social changes and, in particular, to the re-drawing of the political map of Senegambia.

The Portuguese trade

Senegambia, a dependency of Mali, was soon dominated along the River Gambia by the Mande Juula (Dyula) who, through stages in Wuli, Niani, Niumi and Kantora, linked the Niger Bend to the kola, iron and indigo trade from the forest areas. The Mande conquerors thus founded the Kingdom of Kaabu to the south of the River Gambia which, in the name of Mali, came to dominate all southern and part of northern Senegambia, given that the Gelowar dynasty of Siin and Salum was of Kaabu origin.¹

But in the fourteenth century, the succession crisis that followed Mansa Sulaymān’s death in 1360 facilitated the creation of the Jolof confederacy whose ruler, Njajaan Njaay, extended his rule over all northern Senegambia between the River Gambia and the River Senegal. Jolof’s hegemony was soon undermined, however, and finally broke up in the sixteenth century under the impact of the invasion led by Koly Tengella who, in the fifteenth century, left the Malian Sahel with many Fulbe and settled in the high plateaux of Futa Jallon. In the 1490s the many companions of Koly or his son turned northwards and founded the Denyanke dynasty of Futa Toro in the Senegal valley. During their travels, they undermined the Mande principalities of the Gambia and, despite the resistance of the Beafada, completely transformed the political equilibrium in Senegambia.²

The appearance of the Denyanke kingdom thus coincided with the arrival of the Portuguese, the first Europeans to explore the African coast. They established themselves at Arguin in about 1445 with the aim of diverting towards the Atlantic the trade of the Sudan and Senegambia which, traditionally, had been directed northwards across the Sahara. However, although they tried to penetrate inland, their failure to build a

¹. Y. Person, 1974a, p. 7.
FIG 10.1 Senegambia in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries
fort, in 1488, on the banks of the River Senegal, navigation of which is impeded by the Felu Falls, together with the effective presence of Mali in the Gambia, meant that they had to confine themselves to the coast.

The Portuguese, working out of the Cape Verde Islands, participated in the trade along the coast and at the mouths of the Senegal and Gambia rivers, in the form of cabotage. They established themselves firmly in the Southern Rivers and in the Gambia which was important in the inter-regional trade of Senegambia. Portuguese trade in gold, ivory, hides, spices and slaves was grafted onto the old inter-regional trade in kola nuts, salt, cotton goods, iron and indigo. Even more advantageously, the Portuguese were soon heavily engaged in the major trading centre of Wuli at the starting-point of the caravans that linked the Gambia northwards to the upper Senegal and eastwards towards the Niger Bend. Mali, which was by now in decline, thus had to turn increasingly towards the Atlantic to market its gold.

The Sudanese gold trade, which now ended in the fairs of Wuli and Kantora, occupied a special place in Portuguese trade and contributed much to splitting off the Bambuk and Bure area from its links with the Niger Bend and the Sahara and making it part of Senegambia. The leather trade which at its peak in 1660 involved 150,000 hides as a result of strong European demand, was Senegambia's second export item after gold. In addition there was the trade in ivory, wax and above all slaves, for which Senegambia – half way between Europe and America – was the first and main source of exports by sea to Europe in the sixteenth century. Trade in slaves was particularly important with the Canary Islands, the Cape Verde Islands and Madeira being opened up and, later, the plantation economy in the New World being developed. Walter Rodney estimates that at least 5000 slaves a year were exported from the Southern Rivers between 1562 and 1640. Moreover, from the start, the Portuguese who traded horses for slaves developed a plantation economy in the Cape Verde Islands which enabled them to produce sugar, cotton and indigo and to take over the inter-regional trade of Senegambia. The *Lançados* or *tan-gomaos* (the Afro-Portuguese) gradually asserted themselves as the indispensable middlemen between the European trade and Senegambia which, by the second half of the sixteenth century, was undergoing profound political, economic and social changes and, notably, the re-drawing of the political map.

*The re-drawing of the political map of the states of Senegambia in the second half of the sixteenth century*

Despite its relatively minor scale, sixteenth-century Portuguese trade was already giving rise to an economic and political crisis in the Southern Rivers and accelerating the break-up of the Jolof confederacy in northern Senegambia.

The crisis occurred first in the Southern Rivers – the key to the inter-regional trade of Senegambia – because of its early take-over by the Portuguese.

The crisis thus came early to the area between the Casamance river and the Rio Cacheu where numerous Cape-Verdian traders were operating. Here the Bainuk and Kasanga, who were highly skilled at weaving and dyeing, rapidly became the main customers for cotton from the Cape Verde Islands. The Bainuk also became prosperous through their agricultural produce which was needed both by the European residents and for the provisioning of the slave cargoes. The favourable position occupied by the Bainuk provoked conflict with the Lançados who, in 1570, sought help from Mansa Tamba of the Kasanga. The rivalry between the Bainuk of Buguendo and Bishangor, on the one hand, and the Kasanga states stirred up by Portuguese interests on the other, only ended in about 1590 with the death of Mansa Tamba of Kasa.

From the beginning, however, the slave trade – the hub of Portuguese trading activities – upset the economic, political and social situation in the Southern Rivers in a more enduring way. The Mande, who were specialists in large-scale slave-hunting, consolidated the power of Kaabu which controlled all the land between the River Gambia and Futa Jallon. Kaabu profited from the ruin caused by the passage of Koly Tengella’s forces through the Bainuk, Papel, Kasanga and Beafada, and imposed its rule over most of the Southern Rivers to take advantage of the sea-borne trade.

Similarly, the inhabitants of the Bijago Islands organized themselves systematically so as to participate actively in the hunt for slaves on the mainland. While the women devoted themselves to farming, fishing and house-building, the men made almadies, the famous boats that made up a veritable war fleet and enabled them to spread terror in the Southern Rivers. Thus the mosaic of peoples in the Southern Rivers – the Bainuk, Joola, Papel, Balante, Nalu, Landuma and Baga – were the first victims of the overseas slave trade. The tendency to isolation, especially among the Joola, was therefore intensified in this mangrove region designed by nature as a refuge. However, it was the minority groups in the Tenda area, the Bassari, the Koniaou and the Badyaranke, between the highlands of Futa Jallon and the Southern Rivers, who were the main victims of the slave trade.

The economic, political and social crisis thus came early to the Southern Rivers where it encouraged the isolation of certain coastal peoples to the benefit of the mainland power of Kaabu. The political evolution of the Southern Rivers lineage states towards developed monarchical forms was blocked by the pressure of neighbouring peoples and by the violence engendered by the hunt for slaves which induced defensive and isolationist

reactions. This blockage continued almost until the nineteenth century and the period of colonial rule.

Kaabu, however, became the dominant power in the region after the final decline of the Mali empire. Kaabu, a military power, controlled to its own advantage the Bainuk and Beafada trading network and also seized the Mande principalities along the River Gambia. The Farim of Kaabu continued to be the most active slave-hunters in the area. The Maane and the Saana, who formed the ruling Naanco dynasty in Kansala, strengthened their warlike character and from the beginning symbolized the rule of the ceddo, who dominated political life in Senegambia during the era of the overseas slave trade. The conquest of Siin and Salum by the Gelowar dynasty, which came from Kaabu, bears ample testimony to the power of this kingdom.

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries marked the apogee of the Kingdom of Kaabu which replaced Mali throughout the Southern Rivers until the triumph of the theocratic revolution in Futa Jallon at the beginning of the eighteenth century, which brought expansion inland to an abrupt halt. But the expansion of Kaabu coincided with the development of the overseas slave trade and above all with the take-over by Europeans of the Southern Rivers trade. The initiative in inter-regional trade in the Southern Rivers, so vital for Senegambia, passed from the indigenous peoples to the Portuguese who inserted themselves into the old north-south trading network along the coast and reduced the Beafada, the Bainuk, and especially the Mande and the Bijago, to mere slave-hunters or brokers in the Atlantic trade towards the interior.

Similarly, northern Senegambia between the River Gambia and Senegal in turn saw a profound and lasting re-drawing of the political map in the second half of the seventeenth century.

The Jolof confederacy, already shaken by the massive invasion led by Koly Tengella, broke up completely under the impact of the Portuguese trade which, by favouring the coastal provinces, accelerated the political disintegration of Senegambia. Thus Amari Ngoone, after his victory at Danki over the Buurba Jolof, declared the independence of the maritime province of Waalo, at the mouth of the Senegal river, and Bawol, in the south-west, thus restricting Jolof, strictly defined, to the hinterland. In this way Jolof was much reduced in size, deprived of direct relations with the dominant Atlantic trade and cut off from the trans-Saharan trade to the north by the power of the Denyanke kingdom of Futa Toro.  

The break-up of Jolof followed numerous battles that inaugurated the era of warlord violence. The ceddo monarchies introduced violence into not only relations between the states of Senegambia but also political and social relations within each state. The same process also gave birth to the kingdoms of Siin and Salum, both of which finally freed themselves from the Jolof empire during the sixteenth century.

After the break-up of the Jolof confederacy, the Damel of Kayor, Amari Ngoone, at first tried to impose his rule by annexing Bawol and part of Waalo – the mouth of the Senegal river which was in touch with the Atlantic trade. He took the title of Damel-Teen thus initiating a long series of short-lived unions between the Kingdom of Kayor and the Kingdom of Bawol. The dream of every Damel of Kayor was to become Teen of Bawol and vice-versa. But the duel between Kayor and Bawol soon prevented the Damel from achieving his ambition of unifying the former provinces of the Jolof confederacy under his rule. This failure, however, also facilitated the rise to power of the Denyanke kingdom of Futa Toro.

The Satigi, whom European sources describe as the ‘Great Ful’, took advantage of the break-up of the Jolof confederacy to extend his domination over most of northern Senegambia. The Denyanke dynasty thus reached its apogee at the beginning of the seventeenth century during the reign of Samba Lamu. Futa Toro, through its occupation of the mouth of the Senegal river and part of the Malian and Mauritanian Sahel, now had a dual vocation to control both the trade of the Sudan towards the Sahara and the European sea-borne trade.  

The partition of the Senegambia coast and Muslim reaction in the seventeenth century

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Portuguese monopoly of the coasts of Africa was successfully challenged by the arrival one after the other of the Dutch, the English and the French. These new European powers settled on the African coast and embarked on what was to become the encirclement of Africa.

The European powers engaged in sharp competition, imposing themselves on Senegambia through the creation of spheres of influence jealously protected by fortified trading posts along the coast at Arguin, Saint-Louis, Gorée, Fort St James, Cacheu and Bissau.

These trading posts served above all as entrepôts for slaves, the trade in which, from the mid-seventeenth century, became the main activity of the European powers on the African coast. The intense slave trade with its corollary, the hunt for slaves, was the source of profound economic, political and social crises. It brought about violence in relations between states, the militarization of power and the advance of militant Islam. Thus, by the end of the seventeenth century, Senegambia was the scene of a widespread marabout-led movement which sought to unify the states of the Senegal river valley against the noxious effects of the overseas slave trade.

Senegambia from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century

The trading posts and the partition of the coast

The re-drawing of the political map was accompanied by the recrudescence of violence between states and the development of the overseas slave trade which accelerated the political disintegration of Senegambia. It also coincided with the arrival of the Dutch, the French and the English, whose presence on the Senegambian coast was consolidated during the second half of the seventeenth century at the expense of the Portuguese monopoly. The Atlantic slave trade, which had become the cornerstone of colonial mercantilism following the development of the sugar-cane industry in the New World, led to the partition of Senegambia into spheres of influence through the building of fortified trading posts along the coast.

In 1621 the Dutch established themselves on Gorée Island, to be followed in 1659 by the French at Saint-Louis, opposite the Senegal river mouth, while the English built Fort St James in 1651 at the mouth of the River Gambia. The Portuguese were thus progressively eliminated from northern Senegambia and were restricted, apart from their permanent base in the Cape Verde Islands, to Cacheu and Bissau. But they were already being forced to share the rich market of the Southern Rivers with the new European powers. At any event, the building of a string of fortified trading posts, stretching along the coast, completed the redirection of Senegambian trade towards the sea.

The fort of Saint-Louis, at the Senegal river mouth, enabled the French to control all trade along the river between February and May at the various escales (factories) of Desert in Waalo, and Coq and Terrier Rouge in Futa Toro. The building of Fort Joseph in Gajaaga at the end of the seventeenth century ensured a French monopoly throughout the Senegal valley from the river-mouth to the upper river at the gateway to Sudan. France thus sought to make the Senegal river the main highway of the trade of northern Senegambia by attracting to the escales the trade of Arguin and Portendick on the Mauritanian coast and that of the Sudan centred on the Niger Bend.8

Gorée Island, which held the monopoly of trade along the petite côte, was first occupied by the Dutch and later taken by the Portuguese in 1629 and 1645, then by the English in 1667, and finally by the French in 1677. Thus, from Gorée, the French traded with Kayor at the escale at Rufisque, with Bawol at the escale at Portudal and finally with Siin at the escale at Joal. Gorée also tried to extend its sphere of influence southwards into the Gambia through the factory at Albreda and to the Southern Rivers through Bissau and Cacheu. Here the French encountered competition from the Portuguese and above all from the English who were solidly established in the Gambia. Fort St James, originally built by the English, controlled all the trade along the River Gambia, with factories at Jufure and Bintang, as far as the Barakunda Falls, with factories at Sutuku and Fatatenda in Wuli.

Each Mande principality along the River Gambia, which had the enormous advantage of being navigable all year round, was a potential escale for the dominant English trade. The English were thus well placed to conquer the escales of the petite côte in the north and the rivers in the south and, above all, to offer dangerous competition to French trade on the upper river. The Gambia had more facilities to attract the Sudan trade into its orbit, which explains the early colonization of this area by the Mali empire. The Portuguese, driven out of the north, fell back on the Southern Rivers where they established the trading posts at Bissau and Cacheu. But it was already the Lançados from the Cape Verde Islands who kept up the presence here of a Portugal whose economic power in Europe could no longer compete with that of the English, French and Dutch.

Senegambia thus bore along its sea frontage a series of forts, built preferably on islands, whose main function was to divert Senegambian trade towards the coast. These permanent buildings had two purposes: to protect each sphere of influence against competition from other European powers and prevent the states of Senegambia from uniting against the monopoly of European trade.

The massive presence of the Dutch, French and English – following the Portuguese presence in Senegambia (the like of which was at the time only to be found on the Gold Coast) – was closely linked with the emergence of colonial mercantilism. The fever to accumulate money-wealth seized, after Portugal and Spain, the other Atlantic powers who threw themselves into the conquest of the markets of Africa, Asia and the New World.

Each of the European powers, in addition to their fortified trading posts

on the African coast, also set up chartered trading companies whose aim was the monopoly of sea-borne trade. The companies, whose area of activities often extended beyond Senegambia, comprised the Dutch West India Company set up in 1625, the French West India Company set up in 1665 and, finally, the Royal African Company established by the English in 1672. Established with the blessing of the monarchies, these companies symbolized the rise of nation-states in Europe and reflected the new spirit of competition between these powers for the conquest of markets.

The chartered companies to some extent enabled the nobility, which was losing economic ground to the bourgeoisie, to devote itself to overseas trade without risking social disgrace. Hence rivalries in Europe were echoed in Senegambia where the trading posts changed hands among the powers depending on the local or metropolitan balance of power.

The Dutch, who had been the first to upset the Portuguese monopoly, were eliminated from the Senegambian coast in 1677 by the English and the French, except for Arguin and Portendick on the Mauritanian coast where their presence continued until the first half of the eighteenth century in the growing gum trade. Senegambia then remained divided between the French sphere of influence from Saint-Louis to Gorée and the English sphere of influence in the Gambia, while the French and the English contested for the Southern Rivers with the Portuguese. Because of its proximity to Europe and America, possession of Senegambia was vital at a time when the development of the plantations was accelerating, tripling demand for slaves bound for the French or English West Indies between 1651 and 1700.10

Saint-Louis, Gorée, Fort St James, Cacheu or Bissau were transformed into entrepôts for slaves from the interior markets to the slave ships destined for the New World. But until the hunt for slaves and their consignment to the coast from the Niger Bend became systematically organized, it was the coastal peoples and particularly those in Senegambia who formed the main source of supply.

Senegambia's proximity to both Europe and America, combined with the fact that the great slave markets of the Gulf of Guinea and Angola were not opened up until later, explains Senegambia's importance during the early days of the slave trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It seems clear that Philip Curtin underestimates this region's share in the trade which, despite the lack of reliable statistics, he puts at less than 10 per cent after 1640.11 The large size of the Senegambian trade however is no myth, as is shown clearly by Lemaire's account in 1682:

These Negroes are exchanged for cotton pieces, copper, tin, iron, brandy and a few glass trinkets. The profit from this trade is 800%. The hides, ivory and gum are taken to France while the slaves are

11. ibid.
PLATE 10.2 Trophy of weapons and other objects of the peoples of Senegal, drawn by J. Pelcoq at the French colonial exhibition
sent to the French islands in the Americas to work in the sugar plantations. Better ones can be had at ten francs each and they can be re-sold for upwards of 100 écus. For four or five jars of brandy one can often get quite a good slave, and in this way the expense is less in the purchase than in the transport because of the heavy expenses of the ships.\textsuperscript{12}

It is of course impossible to estimate exports from Senegambia quantitatively, but the unequal exchange relations that existed between Europeans and Senegambians must be emphasized as must the consequences of the Atlantic trade on the historical development of this region. Moreover, the scale of the trade is evidenced by the existence of a profound political and social crisis which was the source of a widespread movement led by \textit{marabouts} in the Senegal river valley a few years after the building of the fort at Saint-Louis.

The \textit{Marabout} Wars

After the reorganization of the states during the sixteenth century under impact of Portuguese trade, Senegambia underwent, in the first half of the seventeenth century, an acute economic, political and social crisis. This crisis was manifest particularly in northern Senegambia and was linked both to the intensification of the overseas slave trade and to the Atlantic trade as a whole.

The \textit{marabout} movement, led in the name of Islam by the Moorish \textit{marabout} Nāşir al-Dīn, was aware of the crisis brought about by the European presence in Senegambia.\textsuperscript{13} Under cover of puritanical Islam, the \textit{marabout} movement began in southern present-day Mauritania where Berber society was suffering an acute economic crisis following the decline of the trans-Saharan trade which had accelerated since the establishment of the French at Saint-Louis in 1659.

The island of Saint-Louis, by virtue of its strategic position at the mouth of the Senegal river, was drawing the valley's trade towards the Atlantic, thus breaking up the age-old complementary relationship between the nomadic Berbers of Chamama and the sedentary agriculturalists along the river. The trading monopoly of Saint-Louis thus not only deprived the Moors of the slave labour that had been used for centuries in production and trade with North Africa, but also of the grains from the valley which supplied all the countries of the Sahel north of the Senegal river. The development of slave entrepôts on the coast had redirected the grain trade to the trading posts to meet the growing needs of the slave cargoes during the long wait before departure and the crossing to the New World. This economic crisis exacerbated the political and social antagonism between the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} P. Lemaire, 1695, p. 68.
\item \textsuperscript{13} B. Barry, 1972, pp. 135–59. I have studied this \textit{marabout} movement in detail.
\end{itemize}
Hasaniyya warriors, of Arab origin, the Banū Magħfar, and the Ṣanhāḍja marabouts of Berber origin.

Berber society was caught in a vice between the southward movement of the Hasaniyya Arab warriors and the monopoly of Saint-Louis which was diverting for its own benefit the trade of the Senegal valley. Nāṣīr al-Dīn raised a religious movement based on puritanical Islam to save Berber society from disintegration by conquering the Senegal valley – so vital to the economy of the Sahel. The struggle between the Hasaniyya warriors and the Berber marabouts was thus extended by the proclamation of a djihād in the kingdoms along the Senegal valley. In its original home, Nāṣīr al-Dīn’s movement was an attempt to regulate political and social life according to the teachings of the sharī‘a (Islamic law) in its purest orthodox form, by putting an end to the arbitrary power of the Hasaniyya warriors and establishing a Muslim theocracy.

The proclamation of a djihād in the kingdoms of the river valley was motivated by both economic and religious considerations, to conquer the trade in grains and slaves and to convert the peoples and purify the practice of Islam. In 1677, the success of the holy war in Waalo, Futa Toro, Kayor and Jolof was greatly assisted by the situation in northern Senegambia, then suffering the noxious consequences of the intensification of the Atlantic slave trade during the second half of the seventeenth century. The consequences of the large-scale hunt for slaves formed the main themes of the creed of Nāṣīr al-Dīn’s movement.

This puritanical, even reformist, movement was initially opposed to the continuance of the overseas slave trade and strongly condemned the tyranny of the kings participating in the hunt for slaves. The lack of figures is not sufficient argument to deny the disastrous consequences – economical, political and social – of the Atlantic slave trade.

From the beginning, however, the marabout movement was above all a

14. Chambonneau, the main eye-witness to these events, clearly shows the causes of the movement led by Nāṣīr al-Dīn who, as the Great Servant of God, had the mission ‘to admonish all the kings to change their life style by performing their prayers better and more often, contenting themselves with three or four wives, getting rid of all their griots, minstrels and gens de plaisir, and finally that God did not want them ever to pillage their subjects, much less to kill and enslave them’. He went on, ‘God does not ever allow kings to pillage, kill or enslave their people; rather they must keep and protect them from their enemies, the people not being made for the kings, but the kings for the people’. Until recently, the Mauritanian aspect of this marabout movement was known through the Ta’rīkh of Berber origin published by Ismā‘īl Hamet. Chambonneau’s description, contemporary with the movement, published by C. I. A. Ritchie, throws more light on the true scale of this Muslim revolution in the states along the River Senegal. See C. I. A. Ritchie, 1968, pp. 338 and 339.

15. All the travellers who visited the area after Chambonneau were at one in considering that the success of the Tubenan or marabout movement was due to the effects of the overseas slave trade. Lemaire in 1682 speaks of the Brak who made slaves in his country for the least crime and shows clearly that the success of the marabout was due to the promise made to the inhabitants of Waalo to ‘avenge them for the tyranny of their kings’. Gaby in
defensive reaction by the trans-Saharan trade against the increasingly powerful monopoly of the trading post at Saint-Louis. It opposed not only the trading monopoly of Saint-Louis in the Senegal valley, but also and above all the continuation of the overseas slave trade.

Opposition to the overseas slave trade in no way signified a desire to suppress domestic slavery or the small-scale sale of slaves, an age-old practice whose development within the framework of the trans-Saharan trade had never precipitated such crisis as had the Atlantic trade. Islam, which served as an excuse for the marabout movement, was changing its character. From the religion of a minority caste of merchants and courtiers in the royal courts, it became a popular resistance movement against the arbitrary power of the ruling aristocracies and against the noxious effects of the Atlantic trade.

With the connivance of indigenous Muslims and popular support, the marabout movement swept away one after the other the ruling aristocracies in Futa Toro, Waalo, Kayor and Jolof without any great resistance. After the defeat of the four kingdoms, Nāṣīr al-Dīn replaced the fallen aristocracies with religious leaders who espoused his cause. Chambonneau calls them Burr Jullit (Great Prayer Masters). This marked the triumph in northern Senegambia of Muslim theocracies under the political and spiritual authority of Nāṣīr al-Dīn, with specific features in each of the kingdoms taken over by the marabout movement.

In Futa Toro, although details are lacking, the victory of the marabouts was swift and marked by massive and violent participation in the overthrow of the rule of the Satigi. In Waalo the Brak, Fara Kumba Mbodji, put up strong resistance but was overcome by new marabout recruits from the Futa Toro countryside. The death of Brak Fara Kumba in battle, finally enabled the marabouts to establish themselves and appoint a puppet Brak, Yerim Kode, a member of the royal family, who accepted the conditions of the theocratic system set up by Nāṣīr al-Dīn.16

In Kayor, oral tradition is more detailed on the success of the marabout movement which was greatly assisted by the political crisis within the aristocracy. Here the marabout movement, led by the Xaadi, espoused the cause of the Linger, Yaasin Bubu, who had been removed from office by the new Damel, Decce Maram Ngalgu, who replaced her with his mother. Yaasin Bubu converted to Islam, bringing with her part of the garmi (ruling

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16. B. Barry, 1972, pp. 137-42. Our interpretation of the movement in Waalo was here distorted by an unfortunate confusion with events in Kayor.
class) and its clients. She married the marabout Njaay Sall who killed the Damel, Decce Maram Ngalgu, and installed another ruler, Mafaali Gey, also a convert to Islam because of his political ambition. But Mafaali was soon killed for not respecting the Kur’anic laws, by the marabout Njaay Sall who proclaimed himself vicerey within the framework of the ‘Tubenan’ movement led by Näṣir al-Dīn. Mafaali’s assassination led to a split between the marabout movement and the garmi who, when they lost their claim to the throne of Kayor, appealed to the Buur Salum, Maxureja Joojo Juuf, to intervene.17

But in 1674, the death of Näṣir al-Dīn, in battle against the Hasaniyya warriors in Mauritania, precipitated the decline of the marabout movement, as did also contradictions in the vice-royalties of the states along the Senegal river. The decline enabled the French at Saint-Louis to intervene directly to give their support to the fallen aristocracies in Futa Toro, Waalo, Kayor and Jolof. This reaction by those at Saint-Louis, whose trading activities were almost suspended until the complete defeat of the marabout movement in 1677, had several justifications. They wanted first to prevent the consolidation in the Senegal valley of a large political grouping which, under cover of Islam, might be able to dictate to them their terms of trade. Moreover, they wanted to resume the trade in slaves which was so vital for the prosperity of the plantations in the New World and hence, to the maintenance of the triangular trade. The French at Saint-Louis therefore gave military and financial aid to the various fallen aristocracies to help them regain power.18

Despite Chambonneau’s clear evidence, Philip D. Curtin, on the pretext of ‘decolonizing African history’, tries to deny any relationship between the European presence and the evolution of the societies of Senegambia which he studies in isolation.19 But it was only with their own interests at heart that the French put their support behind the Brak of Waalo, Yerim

18. Chambonneau, an eye-witness to events, is again quite explicit on the participation of those at the trading post of Saint-Louis in the annihilation of the marabout movement. In a first campaign between May and 20 June 1674 De Muchin won the support of the Waalo chiefs and he again went 60 leagues up the river in early July 1674 with ‘the same ships and other small boats so that with the fleet being larger than on the first voyage, it would have struck fear in all those of the Negroes when they were all assembled. ... This Naval Army came back down river after a month and a half where on their arrival in the month of August there were nothing but fireworks and entertainments and a straw Negro was burned’. C. I. A. Ritchie, 1968, pp. 345, 346.
19. This is the major shortcoming of the otherwise very well-documented work by Philip Curtin on Senegambia. I have never intended to deny African societies their own internal dynamism, but to assert that from the fifteenth century onwards their evolution was more and more determined by the European presence. This presence incorporated Africa into the capitalist system whose formation was underway, thus inaugurating the process of its dependence which continues down to the present day through the alliance between foreign capital and the African ruling classes. This evidence cannot be denied on the pretext of ‘decolonizing African history’ unless the intention is to perpetuate the
Kode, who immediately deserted the marabout movement in Futa Toro, Jolof and Kayor. Thus, by 1677, the movement had been almost wiped out and the old aristocracies had recovered their former prerogatives. The failure of this first popular resistance against the overseas slave trade and the arbitrary power of the establishment had lasting consequences for the development of the kingdoms of Senegambia.

In Mauritania, the movement's original home, the defeat of the Berber marabouts ensured the survival of the political power of Hasaniyya warriors who founded the emirates of Trarza and Brakna. In the eighteenth century, enabled through the development of the gum trade to participate profitably in the Atlantic trade, these emirates kept up constant military pressure on the states on the left bank of the Senegal. The Marabout War – known as the Tubenan movement in the European sources and Shurbuba in the Berber chronicles – had more lasting consequences than the Almoravid movement which had started in the same area in the eleventh century.

The Almoravid movement had embarked upon the conquest of the north whereas Nâṣir al-Dīn’s movement had turned southward. Despite its failure, the Almoravid movement had left a permanent mark on the inexorable orientation of the Chamama Berbers who were attracted by the Atlantic trade towards the Senegal valley. They participated increasingly in the political, economic and religious history of Senegambia. While the emirates of Trarza and Brakna participated in the widespread violence between states in the Senegal valley, the zwâwiya marabouts continued to forge close links with the established marabout parties in the kingdoms of Senegambia, thus participating in the Islamic opposition to the military powers. By the end of the seventeenth century, Chamama had become an integral part of Senegambia.

The long Marabout War gave rise to a series of famines throughout the region and above all to the repression of the Muslims. They thus increased considerably the volume of the slave trade to the advantage of the trading post at Saint-Louis and the victorious aristocracy. The defeat of the marabouts, with the complicity of the aristocrats who were the only Africans to benefit from the Atlantic trade, ensured the continued commercial expansion of Saint-Louis. The French at Saint-Louis had finally succeeded in preventing the formation of a large political grouping which might have dictated their terms of trade along the Senegal river.

Political disintegration proceeded ever more rapidly as a result of civil wars and wars between the various kingdoms over who should supply the slave trade. The use of fire-arms became widespread, and autocratic and military governments came to power in all the kingdoms with the ceddo or captives of the crown used as an instrument of the arbitrary rule of the governing aristocracies. But the victory of those at Saint-Louis accentuated the contradiction between the aristocracy and the rest of the population dependence of Africa. On this theme, see P. D. Curtin’s review of B. Barry, 1972 (P. D. Curtin, 1973b).
which turned more and more towards Islam, the chief centre of opposition to the ruling regimes throughout Senegambia.

From this time many marabout families began to leave the coastal areas and the Senegal valley and take refuge inland, notably in Bundu and Futa Jallon, where they tried to consolidate the autonomy of the Muslim communities. The Muslim revolutions in Bundu and Futa Jallon at the beginning of the eighteenth century thus marked the triumph of militant Islam as a reaction against the consequences of the overseas slave trade. Opposition between Muslim theocracies and ceddo rulers thus dominated the history of Senegambia throughout the eighteenth century, the apogee of the era of the overseas slave-traders.

The impact of the overseas slave trade: ceddo rule and Muslim revolutions in the eighteenth century

The Atlantic trade, particularly the slave trade, accentuated the political, economic and social crises in the states of Senegambia throughout the eighteenth century.

In an atmosphere of widespread violence, the ceddo aristocracies strengthened their warlike character and imposed centralized monarchical rule through the support of the crown slaves. In reaction against the arbitrary rule of the aristocracies, Muslim communities formed enclaves within the states or organized revolutions as in Bundu, Futa Jallon and Futa Toro.

The strengthening of ceddo rule and political crises

The Wolof kingdoms of Kayor, Bawol and Waalo, and the Sereer kingdoms of Siin and Salum, underwent the same evolution towards the strengthening and centralization of monarchical power.

Kayar, during the reign of Lat Sukaabe Fall, was the supreme example of the evolution of the ceddo regime towards an autocratic regime and the advent of the warlords in Senegambia. Lat Sukaabe Fall (1695–1720) is seen by tradition as a usurper who took advantage of the unrest in Kayor to bring together the two crowns of Bawol and Kayor under the title of Damel-Teen. He enforced royal monopoly over the sale of slaves and the purchase of fire-arms and thus strengthened monarchical rule by eliminating the Dorobe and Gelowar royal branches to the benefit of his meen (maternal family), the Geej. He also favoured his supporters within the lineages holding hereditary offices and made many marriage alliances to create a vast clientage network which henceforth formed a permanent feature of political life.

Lat Sukaabe instituted sweeping institutional reform to ensure integration of the marabouts into the political system. He appointed Serin Lamb (holders of new titles) to attract the junior branches of the marabout party. The Serin Lamb, of garmi or doomi Buur origin, became agents of central
government responsible for the defence of the frontiers and soon adopted the military ways of the ruling ceddo party. Conversely, the Serin Jakk rejected any compromise with the ceddo rulers and, while devoting themselves to religious activities and teaching, continued to focus the discontent of the peasant masses who were subject to pillaging by the ceddo aristocracy.\textsuperscript{20}

But the strengthening of central authority and especially of the Geej matrilineage, considerably harmed the interests of French trade as Lat Sukaabe Fall, as the head of Kayor and Bawol, could now impose his prices on the posts at Gorée and the factories at Rufisque and Portudal. Furthermore, Lat Sukaabe was a supporter of free trade for all European nations. In 1701, he had André Brué, Director-General of the Compagnie du Sénégal, arrested while attempting to impose a French trading monopoly in this area at the expense of the English in the Gambia.\textsuperscript{21}

Lat Sukaabe's reign is particularly interesting because it marks the eventual advent of the warlords in the Wolof and Sereer kingdoms. He imposed himself through his skill at settling internal political disputes to his own advantage and also because of the royal monopoly on arms import. However, on his death, the French took advantage of the succession crisis to prevent the reunification of Kayor and Bawol under the authority of a single ruler - as was the case in 1736 during the reign of Maysa Ten Wejj. Furthermore, succession disputes between the rulers of Kayor and the rulers of Bawol formed the major source of supply for the slave trade and consequently for the supply of arms to these new warlords who reigned over the Wolof kingdoms on the coast.\textsuperscript{22}

Waalo is another striking example of political and social crisis caused by regular interference by the French at Saint-Louis in the succession crises between the three royal families - the Tejek (Teedyekk), the Loggar and the Joos. This interventionism came at a time when the economic situation was changing due to the growing importance of the gum trade. From the beginning of the eighteenth century, stimulated by the European textile industry, the gum trade - which was monopolized by the Moors in the emirates of Trarza and Brakna - not only helped solve the economic crisis of the late 1600s but also to exert pressure on the kingdoms of the Senegal valley. Waalo, Kayor, Jolof and Futa Toro were all ultimate victims of the contradiction brought about by the French desire to attract the gum trade towards the posts on the Senegal river, to their own exclusive advantage. Their reason was vigorous competition from the Dutch and English in the factories at Arguin and Portendick on the Mauritanian coast. This

\textsuperscript{20} The particularly interesting reforms of Lat Sukaabe Fall have been revealed by Lucy Colvin and dealt with at length by Mamadou Diouf and Abdoulaye Bara Diop: L. G. Colvin, 1974, pp. 587-97; M. Diouf, 1980, pp. 124-30; and A. B. Diop, 1981, pp. 167 and 226.
\textsuperscript{21} J. Boulègue, 1968, pp. 171-93.
\textsuperscript{22} C. Becker and V. Martin, 1975.
competition gave rise to the first gum war between 1717 and 1727 which had lasting consequences, particularly on the development of the Kingdom of Waalo.23

After the failure of Rigaudière's 1723 expedition to recapture the Mauritanian factories from the Dutch, Brué, the officer in charge at Saint-Louis, sought an alliance with the Beccio, Malixuri, the kangam (provincial chief) of Roos Beecio. The aim of this alliance was to induce Alichandora, the Amir of Trarza, to give back the Arguin fort to the French and also to act as a counterweight to the enmity shown by the Brak of Waalo and the Damel of Kayor against the trading post at Saint-Louis. In 1724, supported by Saint-Louis, Malixuri rebelled against Yerim Mbanik, Brak of Waalo. This attempt at secession is a significant reflection of the policy adopted by the French at Saint-Louis who now aimed at defending their interests by promoting political disintegration within the states of Senegambia.24

Furthermore, with the failure of the attempt at mediation between Saint-Louis and Alichandora, Malixuri lost the company's support. This was followed by his defeat at the hands of Yerim Mbanik. By 1734, Yerim Mbanik, with an army of 200 to 300 horsemen and 3000 infantry, half of them carrying fire-arms, had naturally become one of the most powerful kings in the region. This enabled his successors, his two brothers, Njaag

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Aram Bakar (1733–57) and in particular, Naatago (1756–66) to exercise hegemony over the neighbouring kingdoms, particularly Kayor which had been undermined by famine and seven years of civil war. The two brothers then claimed possession of all the territory near the estuary and tried to confiscate all the dues paid by Saint-Louis to the Damel.

This policy of open hegemony pursued by Waalo was overthrown by the English, who occupied Saint-Louis from 1758 onwards, following numerous harassments by the Brak, Naatago Aram, now sufficiently powerful to impose his will on Saint-Louis whose access to trade on the Senegal river he controlled. In his role as gate-keeper of the river, Naatago Aram repeatedly demanded an increase in the dues and the price of slaves. In 1764, Naatago Aram twice blocked Saint-Louis’ trade and forbade access to the upper river through Waalo. The English reacted by giving assistance to the Damel of Kayor, Makoddu Kumba Jaaring, who, by August 1765, had succeeded in recovering most of the territory annexed from him by Waalo.

The English governor, O’Hara, who at first thought of building a fort on the mainland to protect the Saint-Louis trade, took advantage of Naatago Aram’s death finally to break the power of Waalo. O’Hara, whose chief concern was clearly to get as many slaves as possible out of the region for his own plantations in the West Indies, supplied arms to the Moors who overran all the Senegal river area. In 1775, in the Kingdom of Waalo alone, the English took more than 8000 slaves in less than six months. The over-supply of slaves was such that in the streets of Saint-Louis a slave was being sold for one piece of cloth.\(^{25}\)

This tremendous drain of manpower coincided with the beginning of a long civil war lasting almost twenty-nine years, during which two royal families, the Loggar and the Joos, tried to recover the power which the Tejek family had monopolized since the early 1700s. (The succession to the Waalo throne of the two brothers, Aram Bakar and Naatago Aram Bakar, had marked the victory of the Tejek matrilineage over the Joos and Loggar matrilineages following a process identical to the one that had given rise to the Geej monopoly in Kayor.)

But Waalo soon felt the pressure of the Trarza Moors who were becoming increasingly powerful because of the importance of gum. The Moors intervened regularly in the succession disputes which completely ruined the power of the kingdom, which was henceforth incapable of pursuing an independent policy and generating an internal dynamism sufficient to promote the emergence of warlords of the stature of Lat Sukaabe Fall.

The Sereer kingdoms of Siin and Salum underwent a development similar to that of the Wolof kingdoms. But the history of Siin was marked by its small size while the prevailing climate of violence forced it to close itself off from external influences and to practise extensive agriculture to maintain its cohesion. The Buur Siin nevertheless developed a high degree

PLATE 10.4  Warriors from Waalo.
of administrative centralization to control the Sax-Sax appointed in each village by the central government. Conversely, Salum’s development differed because of its larger size, the cosmopolitan character of its population and, above all, its advantageous commercial position on the River Salum. The rich salt pans provided the Buur with significant income and enabled him to participate in the slave trade and ensure the expansion of Salum towards the Gambia.26

Futa Toro, under Denyanke rule since Koly Tengella, underwent an evolution identical to that of the Wolof kingdoms through the permanent disputes between pretenders to the throne, and through the use of violence and the massive use of fire-arms. This endemic political crisis opened the way to frequent intervention by the Moors and the post at Saint-Louis which was above all concerned to satisfy its needs for slaves and gum.

From the beginning, the Satigi’s lack of fixed rules of succession encouraged war among the various claimants, not to mention the numerous usurpations made possible by the power of the sebbe, (sing. ceddo) – the war chiefs. In this climate of violence Bubakar Sire called on the Moroccans for help in 1716 thus giving them the opportunity to interfere in the affairs of Futa Toro which from then on was forced to pay the muudul horma (grain tax).27 In addition, Futa Toro took a direct part in the struggle between Alichandora, the Amir of Trarza, and Brakna. This was the source of the increasing interference by Morocco which used its troops, known as Ormans, in the affairs of the Senegal valley from Waalo to Gajaaga.

In 1720, Alichandora deposed and driven out by his powerful northern neighbours, the Ulad Dellim, sought the help of the Sultan of Morocco. While Alichandora wanted to end Brakna hegemony in southern present-day Mauritania, the Sharif wanted to secure recognition of his suzerainty over the Moorish emirates to the south of Morocco. But the Ormans, numbering 5000 according to Saint-Robert, subsequently acted quite independently and put all the countries along the Senegal river to fire and sword. They ended by splitting into two factions, one of which allied with Trarza and the other with Brakna. Alichandora was defeated in 1722 by the Brakna faction and took refuge with the Beecio, Malixuri, in Waalo. From this time onwards the Ormans intervened actively in the numerous succession crises in Futa Toro during the first half of the eighteenth century. Thus, between May 1721 and December 1724, there was total confusion as Bubakar Sire and Babu Musa replaced one another on the Satigi’s throne at dizzying speed until the legendary Samba Gelaajo Jeegi seized power in 1725 with the help of the Ormans of Gaidy and the commander of Fort Saint Joseph.28

Samba Gelaajo Jeegi (1725–31) is the prototype of the warlord whose exploits, love of danger, boldness and courage still fuel the legendary tales

27. O. Kane, 1974, p. 245.
28. ibid., p. 246.
of the griots in Futa Toro. Sambayel mo Lamotako (little Samba who does not reign) – for having usurped power by force without being enthroned – with his famous mare, Umulatum, and his famous gun, Bubu Lowake (Bubu meaning that which does not need charging), illustrates the violence in Futa Toro’s political life. Samba Gelajo Jeegi was the ceddo leader par excellence, who, with his army of Sebbe equipped with fire-arms, waged forty-five battles during his reign, to the sound of bawdi peyya yiyan (blood drums) and dadde yiyan (war songs/blood songs).29

The saga of Samba Gelajo Jeegi, still marvellously sung in Futa Toro, is magnificently evoked in the two versions published by Amadou Ly and Amadou Abel Sy.30 This poetical evocation of the ceddo epic through the saga of Samba Gelajo Jeegi is still sung by the Sebbe in their war songs: Gumbala, a hymn to dash and courage, is above all the epic song of death in which the ceddo assumes his destiny as a warrior, his faithfulness to his ancestors and to the ethic of his caste. Thus, what is most striking in the Gumbala is the poetry of violence and death and fantastic and excessive horse-rides. The poetry of the Gumbala is a poetry of the macabre, a hymn to the warrior, to his horse, his gun and his lance:

That one is the man who said...
Through the prayers of my mother,
Through the prayers of my father,
God, do not make me die a shameful death,
Do not let me die in my bed,
In the midst of my children’s tears,
And the wailing of the old people.31

Similarly, the Lenngi, sung solely by Sebbe women at marriages or circumcisions, are heroic songs summoning up contempt for death and the protection of honour. The singing of them is thus a great communing both to reaffirm that the future spouses belong to the Sebbe caste and to remind them of the values they have to perpetuate.32 But the saga of Samba Gelajo Jeegi is unfortunately evoked out of its true historical context which was dominated by the violence born of the overseas slave trade and which ultimately explains the emergence of this type of warlord shaped by the ceddo ethic. Futa Toro’s permanently violent state could be accredited to two factors. Morocco, through its army of Ormans, intended to control the Moorish emirates tied into the Atlantic trade circuit through the trade in gum and slaves. Meanwhile, the French at Saint-Louis, whose presence was felt in the Senegal valley from the estuary to the upper river, had one main aim: to extract as many slaves from the area as possible. These external factors created a situation of chronic instability in Futa Toro

29. O. Kane, 1970b.
32. ibid., pp. 438–9.
where the Denyanke military aristocracy was constantly challenging the power of the Satigi by calling on either the Moors and their Orman allies, or the French. Thus, Samba Gelaajo Jeegi, who had first allied with the Moors, later sought help from the French at Saint-Louis to shake off the Moroccan yoke. In 1725, he asked for fire-arms, gunpowder and cannon in exchange for a hundred slaves and for a port to be built in his capital at Jowol. In July 1725, he tried to protect French interests against pillaging by the Moors. It was perhaps this alliance that enabled him to reign without interruption from 1725 to 1731 despite the claims of his two rivals, Bubu Müsä and Konko Bubu Müsä.33

But the French, far from their Saint-Louis base, were unable to put a final stop to the pressure of the Moors who "held all Nigritia crawling under them".34 The French ended, however, by using some factions to bring to his knees Konko Bubu Müsä (an ally of the Tunka of Gajaaga) to the advantage of Samba Gelaajo Jeegi, their ally once again in exile in Bundu. Samba, whose army was made up of an Orman faction, conscripted by Saint Adon in exchange for 2000 bars of merchandise reconquered power from Konko Bubu Müsä between 1738 and 1741. Samba, however, remained a prisoner of his Orman and Moorish allies and attempted in vain to persuade the French to build a fort at Jowol to counteract Orman-Moorish control over him. Samba died shortly afterwards in obscure circumstances. According to tradition, he died according to the ceddo warrior's ideal of courage - at the treacherous hand of his wife suborned by his enemies during his second exile in Bundu:

'You have put Lalo in my meal and that follows our conversation the other day. I know that I shall die from eating this meal, but I shall eat it all the same. No one will ever say that I am afraid of death. I never recoil from death, though I recoil from dishonour'.35

However, the circumstances of the death of Samba Gelaajo Jeegi, legendary hero of sacred violence in a Futa Toro sapped by war, matter little, as, in 1752, the new Satigi, Sube Njaay, holding his fergo in Galam, was in turn driven out by Yaye Hoola and his warriors who ravaged Bundu with the help of Xaaso and the Ormans. Futa Toro seemed to be at its nadir, as the Satigi followed one another in bewildering succession to the sole profit of the Moors who dominated a country having all the necessary conditions for the success of the Muslim revolution in 1776.36

34. ibid., p. 248.
35. O. Kane, 1970b, p. 924.
36. 'The land of the Foulah as usual provides the same thing to say. It is still the prey of the Moors and no one takes any notice any more of the revolutions that happen there because they have no effect at all on the situation of the country. We pay the dues to the one who happens to be there. That happens quickly today.' Col. C6–16. Letter from the Conseil Supérieur du Sénégal, 25 July 1752.
Gajaaga, on the upper river, had also been integrated into the Atlantic trade circuit since the end of the seventeenth century, to the considerable advantage of Soninke traders at the meeting-point of the three ecological regions of Senegambia—the coast, the savannah and the Sahel. But despite the dynamism of Soninke trade which was the main supplier of the countries of the Niger Bend in salt and European goods and of western Senegambia in cotton goods, Gajaaga suffered the same political and economic crises linked to the overseas slave trade and the invasion by the Ormans. The political crisis, which began in about 1700 with the struggle between Tunka Naame of Maxanna, and his cousin, Maxan of Tamboukane, in the province of Kammera, was extended in 1730 by the war between Gwey and Kammera. This conflict broke out after the removal of Tunka Mussa Jaabe of Ciaabu, who was replaced by Bukari Sette of Maxanna, who was then proclaimed head of the Gajaaga confederacy.

These tensions multiplied and led to a series of civil wars between 1744 and 1745 which finally destroyed the unity of the Soninke confederacy, thus paving the way for the invasion of the country in 1750 by Xaaso in alliance with the Bambara of Kaarta. Although the Xaasonke invader was driven back, Gwey and Kammera had been weakened by the endless disputes that had permanently compromised the future of the Gajaaga confederacy.37

Little is known about the development of the Kingdom of Kaabu which dominated southern Senegambia until the victory of the Muslim revolution in Futa Jallon. But the power of Kaabu, which lasted beyond the eighteenth century, was based on trade in slaves which considerably strengthened the warlike character of the Nancio kingdom. Thus, in about 1738, the Mansa of Kaabu was in a position to deliver some 600 slaves a year to the Portuguese alone, while the Southern Rivers, also under Kaabunke control, exported thousands of slaves annually. Kaabu thus strengthened its hold over the coastal provinces while also raiding its inland neighbours, the Bajaranke, Fulakunda, Koniagu and Bassari. With Baram Mansa, who died in about 1705, Kaabu seemed to be at the height of its power under the leadership of the Nancio aristocracy. But the state of permanent war, by its very existence, strengthened the position of the Khorin (provincial war chiefs) and the Soninke warriors famous for their excessive consumption of dolo (alcohol). Here, too, as evidenced by the political crisis of the nineteenth century, dissension among the three royal lineages, Sama, Pacana and Jimara, was the source of numerous civil wars aimed at imposing a single central authority over the kingdom. This situation, more amply documented in the nineteenth century, explains the success of the holy wars


'The land of the Foulah has again changed kings. That is virtually all we have to say about it, as it really makes no difference at all on whose head this crown falls since all power is really in the hands of the Moors.' Col. C6–14. Letter from the Conseil Supérieur du Sénégal, 20 June 1753.
later led from Futa Jallon and Bunda and of the internal Muslim revolutions against the Soninke state of Kaabu.\textsuperscript{38}

Muslim revolutions in the eighteenth century

The military defeat of the \textit{marabout} movement led by Nāṣir al-Dīn in the second half of the seventeenth century was followed by the spread of underground action by Islam against \textit{ceddo} rule and the disastrous consequences of the overseas slave trade throughout Senegambia.

Within the states controlled by the powerful military aristocracies, the Muslim communities gradually strengthened themselves to win political and social autonomy under the leadership of influential \textit{marabout} families. But, increasingly, these Muslim communities, linked to one another throughout Senegambia by a long chain of religious, political and economic ties which transcended national frontiers, embarked on creating new states or seizing power where they were through violence and the proclamation of a holy war.

Thus, at the end of the seventeenth century, Maalik Sy founded the Muslim theocracy of Bundu which was followed at the beginning of the eighteenth century by the Muslim revolution in Futa Jallon under the leadership of Karamokho Alfa. After this victory on the borders of Senegambia, there was an interval until the second half of the eighteenth century before the triumph of the Torodo \textit{marabout} party led by Sulaymān Baal in Futa Toro, the stronghold of the Denyanke regime. These three successes proved the continuity and the solidarity of the \textit{marabout} movement throughout Senegambia, whose history henceforth was to be dominated by the struggle between the Muslim theocracies and the \textit{ceddo} rulers.

\textbf{The Muslim revolution in Bundu}

The repression directed against the \textit{marabouts} after the defeat of Nāṣir al-Dīn led to the mass departure of Muslims from Futa Toro to Bundu where Maalik Sy founded the first Muslim theocracy on the borders of Senegambia in about 1690. Maalik Sy doubtless continued the \textit{marabout} movement being one of the group of Muslim leaders who had received their religious education in Pir or Kokki in Kayor, which had close connections with the Berber \textit{zāwiya}.

Maalik Sy was born at Suyuma, near Podor. After completing his religious education he travelled through Senegambia and finally settled on the borders of Gajaaga with the permission of the \textit{Tunka} of Ciaabu. But the alliance sealed between Maalik Sy and the \textit{Tunka}, who had granted him a piece of land according to the custom of the Jonnu, was soon broken because of the strategic position of Bundu at the terminus of the trade routes from the Gambia.\textsuperscript{39} Maalik Sy, settled in a cosmopolitan area

\textsuperscript{38} M. Mane, 1978, p. 128.
\textsuperscript{39} A. Bathily, 1975, pp. 57–9.
inhabited by Bajaranke, Koniagui, Bassari, Jaxanke, Soninke and many Fulbe from Futa Toro, took advantage of the weakness of Gajaaga to declare a holy war. His religious prestige, and the military organization he set up with the help of Muslims, most of whom had come from Futa Toro after the defeat of the marabout movement, enabled him to found the theocratic state of Bundu.

Maalik Sy supported the Jaxanke marabouts whose commercial interests were constantly threatened by the pillaging of the Gajaaga military aristocracy. The Muslim party thus ensured for itself the control of Falémé whose commercial importance and agricultural wealth were to make it, over the following centuries, the basis of the power of the Sisibe dynasty. Maalik Sy then took the title of Almamy, a Fulfulde version of the title al-Imām which had earlier been adopted by Nāṣir al-Dīn.

Philip Curtin has clearly demonstrated the religious and family connections between Nāṣir al-Dīn's movement and the revolution in Bundu. Although he did not take a direct part in the marabout war, Maalik Sy was nevertheless a keen follower who achieved some of the political and religious aims of the marabout party.

There is no documentation to explain why the first Muslim revolution was successful. But a clear trend can be seen for Muslim communities to consolidate themselves far from the coast, on the borders of Senegambia, to escape the oppressive policy of the ceddo establishment. In this way the fate of Bundu was linked to that of the Muslim communities in Futa Toro and Futa Jallon which lay one on either side of Bundu. Bundu was well situated on the trade routes linking the Niger Bend to the trading posts in the Gambia and it gradually consolidated its position under the Sisibe dynasty at the expense of Gajaaga.

The Muslim revolution in Futa Jallon
The success of the Muslim revolution in Bundu was followed a few years later by a revolution in Futa Jallon, which took place in much the same circumstances. The fate of the mountainous massif of Futa Jallon – a natural obstacle which over the centuries had become a place of refuge for the Jallonke, the Soso and the Fulbe – underwent a complete upheaval during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Koly Tengella's invasion and, above all, the development of the Atlantic trade soon had powerful cultural consequences while also accelerating the movement of the people of the Sudan towards the forest or the coast with many choosing to pass through the highlands of Futa Jallon. Moreover, this major crossing-point was economically revitalized by the existence of large herds of cattle belonging to Fulbe herdsmen who had flooded into the area from the

41. A. Bathily, 1975, p. 58.
42. P. D. Curtin, 1971, p. 22.
fifteenth century onwards, drawn by the abundant grazing areas in the
Futa Jallon highlands.

Futa Jallon, now incorporated into the Atlantic trade, was the scene of
a profound economic and social transformation which was to give rise to
the Muslim revolution at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Walter
Rodney gives an excellent account of the economic, political and social
context of the 1725 revolution which ended in the setting up of the
theocratic state of Futa Jallon by the marabout party. He shows that to
present the revolution merely as a struggle between the unfortunate Fulbe
and their Jallonke masters and exploiters is simplistic.

During the seventeenth century, the Fulbe had probably become the
richest and most powerful social group in the country. This was a result
of the combination of three factors. First, the quest for new grazing grounds
had considerably increased the numbers of Fulbe from Bundu, Futa Toro,
Macina and the Sahel. Second, expansion of the Atlantic trade had led to
large-scale development of the trade in cattle and hides and had thus
strengthened the economic position of the cattle-owning Fulbe. Third,
militant Islam had emerged to serve as an ideology for the construction of
a new economic, political and social order.44

The Muslim revolution in Futa Jallon was, clearly, as in Bundu, a
reaction to the violence and upheavals precipitated by the overseas slave
trade. In fact, the leaders of the Muslim revolution in Futa Jallon were not
all from Macina but also from the Senegal valley where they had had direct
links with Nāṣir al-Dīn’s marabout movement.

Philip Curtin and Levtzion have both clearly shown the religious,
political and matrimonial links between the various marabout families of
Futa Toro, Bundu and Futa Jallon.45 The route linking the Senegal valley
to the Futa Jallon highlands through Falémé was a permanent feature of
the history of the peopling of Senegambia, as is well illustrated by the
travels of Shaykh ‘Umar in the nineteenth century. Bundu was the link in
this marabout movement, whose defeat at the end of the seventeenth century
in Futa Toro was followed by its triumph in Futa Jallon at the beginning
of the eighteenth, with the participation of the various Fulbe, Mande and
Jaxankan peoples of the area. In the context of the large-scale slave-hunts
organized by the powerful state of Kaabu, the Muslim revolution in Futa
Jallon appears as the victory of the marabout party whose prime aim was
to ensure the security of the Muslim community.

This essentially Muslim revolution was not at all an ethnic war between
Fulbe herders and Jallonke settled farmers. Tradition clearly dem-
onstrates the multi-ethnic character of the revolution initially led by twelve
Fulbe marabouts and ten Mande marabouts, who were certainly of Jaxankan
origin. Conversely, the movement was confronted with opposition from
the leaders of Kafu, who were Jallonke, and also from the non-Muslim

Fulbe, who lived in the bush with their cattle. The Muslim Fulbe, who wanted to abolish cattle taxes, and the Mande Juula or Jaxanke, whose trading way of life had always been associated with the practice of Islam, certainly allied to create a vast political grouping in place of the tiny Jallonke chiefdoms which had become incapable of ensuring the security of the populations in the context of the overseas slave trade.

The Muslim revolution was certainly not the work of rootless itinerant pastors, but of Muslims of every background, firmly settled in the refuge area in the Futa Jallon highlands. The marabout party, most of whose members had been schooled in the famous Jaxanke educational centre of Jaxaba, on the River Bafing, was in fact consolidated by the participation of numerous Fulbe who could put their cattle wealth to profitable use in the framework of a gradual sedentarization. The trade in cattle and hides

PLATE 10.5 Fulbe woman of the Futa Jallon
towards the coast gave them economic power while Islam gave them the ideology necessary for the construction of a new political and social order. Thus, after the victory of the marabout party following the holy war against the various ruling Jallonke aristocracies, the Muslim leaders created the Confederation of Futa Jallon under the leadership of Ibrahima Sambeegu. Sambeegu, known as Karamokho Álfà, was the head of the Sediyanke lineage of the Barry family of Timbo, and carried the title Almamy. The Confederation was divided into nine Diwe, sing. Diwal (provinces) whose chiefs bore the title of Alfé and were appointed from among the leaders of the djihàd. The territorial division thus corresponded, initially, to the territory liberated by each of the leaders of the Muslim revolution. Thus Karamokho Alfé, the Almamy and head of the Confederation of Futa Jallon, was above all the Alfé of the Diwal of Timbo, the capital. From the beginning, the power of the Almamy, with his seat at Timbo, was limited by the wide autonomy granted to the chiefs of the provinces of Labé, Buriya, Timbi, Kebaali, Kollade, Koyin, Fugumba and Fode Haaji and also by the existence of a Council of Ancients acting as a parliament at Fugumba, the religious capital.\textsuperscript{46}

The Muslim theocracy in Futa Jallon was thus the outcome of a series

\textsuperscript{46} T. Diallo, 1972, p. 28.
of military campaigns between the marabout party and the leaders of Jallonke Kafu who were fighting to defend their political sovereignty. But the holy war that sealed the victory of the marabout party, at the famous battle of Talansan, was continued by the attempt to convert to Islam the non-Muslim populations of the massif of Futa Jallon. At this level, the Muslims met more opposition from the Fulbe pastoralists who had been leading a nomadic way of life in the area for centuries and were hostile to Islam, which they saw as synonymous with decentralization and political and economic control. This opposition sprang from those Fulbe who subsequently came to form the lowest class of bush Fulbe, exploited by the ruling marabouts. Its very existence belies any superficial racial interpretation of the Muslim revolution as the outcome of an invasion by Fulbe to enslave the indigenous Jallonke. Its existence also explains why hostilities lasted so long and why the theocratic regime was so slow to consolidate itself, obliged as it was to create throughout the first half of the eighteenth century a new political structure to replace Jallonke Kafu.47

On the death of Karamokho Alfa in about 1751, the Almamyship devolved onto Ibrahima Sory, known as Sory Mawdo (Sory the Great). The religious leader of the djihâd was thus followed by the commander of the army who involved Futa Jallon in an aggressive policy against neighbouring countries, on the excuse of waging the djihâd. This policy became the main method of slave-hunting for the domestic needs of the ruling aristocracy and also and above all for meeting the growing demand of the overseas slavers on the coast.

As with the Kingdom of Dahomey or the Asante confederacy, the evolution of Futa Jallon is incomprehensible outside the global context of the dominating overseas slave trade. These kingdoms, originally formed in reaction against the noxious consequences of the hunt for slaves, eventually came to participate in this trade, either to defend themselves against neighbouring kingdoms or purely for financial gain. Islam then became just one ideology among many to maintain and consolidate the power of the ruling aristocracy.

Sory Mawdo, assisted by the leader of the Jallonke kingdom of Solimana, thus engaged in a series of wars against his neighbours to procure slaves and booty. But the alliance was defeated in 1762 by Konde Burama, king of Sankaran, who, in 1762, was able to occupy Timbo following the defection of Solimana. It took an outburst of national energy to stop Konde Burama's army at the gates of Fugumba and it was only in 1776 that Sory Mawdo finally eliminated the threat. The defeat of Sankaran inaugurated a long period of domination of Futa Jallon of Solimana to the east of Timbo. This victory went a long way towards consolidating the power of Sory Mawdo who, until his death in 1791, asserted the authority of the military faction over the religious faction.

Sory Mawdo's death gave rise to much political confusion as his son

47. N. Levtzion, 1975, p. 208.
Sadu was assassinated in 1797/8 by supporters of 'Abdulay Bademba, son of the first Almamy, Karamokho Alfa. It is certainly from this time that the system of alternating rule dates between the two families of Alfaya, descendants of Karamokho Alfa, and Soriya, descendants of Ibrahima Sory Mawdo. This duality, which was a throwback to the political structures of the ceddo kingdoms where there were two or three royal lineages, considerably weakened the central government: it enabled the Council of Ancients, responsible for ensuring respect for the shari'a, to control the power of the Almamy and also enabled the provincial chiefs to consolidate their autonomy.

Despite this weakness inherent from the beginning in the political system, the Kingdom of Futa Jallon was able to preserve its independence up to the period of colonial rule and even to extend its frontiers. But the new regime gradually lost its revolutionary character as the marabout party, once it had made itself safe within the Futa Jallon highlands, changed into a religious and military aristocracy actively participating in the overseas slave trade. As elsewhere, trade in slaves became the monopoly of the state which supervised the trade routes and organized the caravans to the coast. The predominance of the overseas slave trade was a permanent feature of the eighteenth century as the Europeans abandoned products such as gold, ivory and hides in favour of slaves. Thomas Winterbottom, who visited Timbo in 1794, gives a good explanation of the dynamic of the overseas slave trade that forced the Almamies to wage war to obtain slaves as the sole article to be traded for European goods.48

Under these circumstances, the holy war lost its religious character and Islam became a mere pretext for a hunt for slaves amongst the infidels on Futa Jallon's frontiers. The fact that only slaves could be exchanged for European goods explains the oppressiveness of the new regime towards the non-Muslims who, captured in vast numbers, were either sold on the coast or kept in runde (slave villages). The runde was the most typical institution of the new regime in Futa Jallon throughout the eighteenth century49 – for the development of domestic slavery served not only to meet the food requirements of the political and religious aristocracy but also to meet the grain needs of the slave ships. Situated between the Bambara states and the coast, Futa Jallon both participated in raids and bought slaves for its domestic production while also selling the surplus at the coast to buy European goods and the salt needed for its pastoral economy. This trade introduced into Futa Jallon, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a larger number of slaves from many different areas including Bambara, Kisi, Jallonke, Fulbe, Bassari and Koniagui.

This massive presence of slaves, explicable only in the context of the overseas slave trade, has led to a misunderstanding of the internal development of Futa Jallon. For numerous historians, the history of Futa Jallon

is nothing more than the result of the massive invasion of Fulbe who enslaved the Jallonke inhabitants thus triggering a bitter conflict between two ethnic groups. It is, however, quite clear that Futa Jallon's internal development was in fact dominated by the formation of a hierarchical and essentially inegalitarian society based on Islam as the ideology of power. Non-Muslims were discriminated against, having a servile status within the new society governed by the shari‘a, while Muslims had all the rights of free men. The predominance of the Fulfulde language and culture should not obscure the true dynamism of internal development which was marked by the existence of distinct social classes based on Muslim ideology.

Beyond the basic distinction between rimbe (sing., dimo) or free men and maccube or slaves, within the dominant society of free men there was a hierarchical ranking reflecting relations of inequality and exploitation. Among the rimbe there were at the top the las li (the aristocracy of the sword and the lance and the book and the pen). These were the descendants of the great marabout families who had launched the holy war and who monopolized power completely. They formed the political and religious class with its large clientele of vassals and dependants who exploited the vast number of slaves concentrated in the runde.

Next there was the great mass of free men whose condition derived from their position in relation to the ruling political marabout class of learned men. Classed lowest amongst free men were the bush Fulbe, mostly descendants of Fulbe slow to convert to Islam after the djihād. Owning almost no slaves, they worked the land themselves, a task considered unclean by the aristocracy. With cattle as their sole wealth, they were subject to endless taxes and labour dues payable to the ruling political marabout class. However, it was the development of domestic slavery, closely correlated with the Atlantic slave trade, that was the major feature of the evolution of the societies of Senegambia during the eighteenth century. The concentration of slaves into runde in Futa Jallon and in the Southern Rivers was on such a scale that at the end of the eighteenth century there was a series of slave revolts.

The practice of domestic slavery doubtless lay behind the cultural revolution in Futa Jallon where the marabout and political class, freed from agricultural work, came to devote itself to teaching. According to the account of Winterbottom, who visited Timbo in 1794, the new regime set up many Kur‘anic (Qur‘anic) schools throughout the country. A strong political and social organization, based on the shari‘a and the prohibition of the sale of Muslims, enabled Futa Jallon to avoid anarchy and depopulation.\(^50\) It also explains why Futa Jallon should be over-populated despite its relative poverty in natural resources. The theocratic state thus enjoyed a degree of stability guaranteed to its own benefit by the Muslim ruling class which ensured the security and unity of the Muslim community. Despite its limitations the Muslim revolution was followed by a genuine

\(^50\) T. M. Winterbottom, 1803, p. 8.
cultural revolution for the marabouts soon translated the Kur‘än (Qoran) into Fulfulde to facilitate the religious instruction of the masses. This cultural revolution was doubtless speeded up by Cerno Samba Mombeya who, in his well-known work *Le filon du bonheur éternel*, launched the manifesto for the use of Fulfulde as the instrument for the religious education of the people.

I shall quote the Authorities in Fulfulde to make it easier for you to understand.
When you hear them, accept them.
For each man, only his own language enables him to grasp what the Authorities are saying.
Many Fulani do not really understand what they are taught in Arabic and remain uncertain.
Remaining uncertain, in the works of Duty, is not enough in words, is not enough in acts.
He who seeks the Light, free from uncertainty, let him read in Fulfulde these lines by an ordinary man.⁵¹

The outcome was not only a plentiful and rich literature in Fulfulde but also the deeper Islamization of the masses. Thus, the Islam of the cities of the Middle Ages, such as Timbuktu and Jenne, became, through the Muslim revolution in Futa Jallon, a popular Islam which subsequently inspired the formation of a string of theocratic states throughout West Africa. In this connection, Futa Toro constitutes the third link in the long chain of victorious Muslim revolutions in Senegambia during the eighteenth century.

*The Muslim revolution in Futa Toro*
After its successes in Bundu and Futa Jallon, Islam triumphed in Futa Toro during the second half of the eighteenth century through the Torodo marabout party. Here more so than in Bundu and Futa Jallon, there is a clear link between the Torodo movement and Nāṣir al-Dīn’s movement in the late seventeenth century, for the trade movement was a direct continuation of al-Dīn’s both in the forms it took and in its basic aims. At the same time, however, through working closely with the Moorish zāwiya, the Torodo movement did take much of its inspiration from the success of the *Djihād* in Bundu and Futa Jallon at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Thus the leaders of the Torodo marabout party, Sulaymān Baal and ‘Abd al-Ḳādir were former students at the schools at Pir and Kokki in Kayor, which were in close relations with the Daimani zāwiyas in Mauri-

⁵¹ A. I. Sow, 1971, p. 43.
tania. These spiritual heirs of Nāṣīr al-Dīn’s movement later moved to Futa Jallon or Bundu to consolidate their faith in the hope of eventually establishing a theocratic regime in Futa Toro where the latent crisis of the Denyanke regime was to facilitate the victory of the Torodo revolution.

As Saint-Louis is so close to Futa Toro, there are European sources to shed light on the political, economic and social conditions of the success of Islam there, which is not the case in Bundu and Futa Jallon. It seems clear that the same crisis observed in Waalo in the Delta during the eighteenth century also existed in Futa Toro in the middle of the Senegal river valley because of the scale of the Atlantic slave trade and the proximity of the emirates of Brakna and Trarza.

The succession crisis, opened in about 1716 by Bubakar Sire, continued throughout the eighteenth century plunging Futa Toro into insecurity and civil war. The situation worsened during the second half of the eighteenth century with the recrudescence of the overseas slave trade organized by the new English Governor, O’Hara, who facilitated the occupation of Futa Toro by the Brakna and Trarza Moors. In these circumstances the Torodo revolution was directed not only against the Denyanke régime, now incapable of ensuring security in the country, but also against domination by Brakna and the sale of Muslims as slaves. The Torodo party, led by Sulaymān Baal, was therefore able at once to win a military victory against the Ulad ‘Abdallāh at Mboya and thus put an end to the muudul horma (the annual tribute payable in grain to the Moors). After establishing its authority in central Futa Toro, the Torodo party put an end to several centuries of Denyanke domination and, in July 1776, forbade all English trade with Galam in reaction to the ravages perpetrated by O’Hara in 1775 to procure slaves.

The Torodo victory coincided with the death of its famous leader, Sulaymān Baal, who was succeeded by ‘Abd al-Ḵādir Kan, chosen for his religious learning to consolidate the new theocratic regime. Once elected Almamy, ‘Abd al-Ḵādir borrowed many ceremonial practices from Futa Jallon while also maintaining some of the traditions of the Denyanke kingdom – some of whose chiefs retained their domains by going over to the Torodo party. He also redistributed bayti (vacant lands), while confirming the rights of the powerful Torodo families over most of central Futa Toro through the three ‘Abe’ families – the Bosseyabe, the Yirlobe, and the Hebbyabe. From the beginning, ‘Abd al-Ḵādir’s power was limited by ‘Abe’ families who provided most of the great Jaggorde (the Council of Electors), the most well-known of whom were the Ac of Rindiaw, ‘Alī Dundu’s family, which dominated Bosea, ‘Alī Sīdī Yirlobe’s and ‘Alī Maman- du’s. Nevertheless, ‘Abd al-Ḵādir consolidated the new regime and extended its religious influence beyond the frontiers of Futa Toro where its success gave rise to high hopes of change among the Muslim communities which already formed powerful enclaves within the Wolof and…
Sereer states. The example of Futa Toro thus increased the tension between the Muslim reformers and the ceddo ruling classes of Waalo, Jolof, Kayor and Bawol. Many peasants emigrated to Futa Toro in search of security, now reassured by the new regime which had forbidden any trade in Muslim slaves. In addition, ‘Abd al-Kādir promoted religious education in every village and the construction of mosques each in the charge of an imām responsible for ensuring respect for Kurānic law in the new theocratic state.

The Torodo regime, which was consolidating its position in Futa Toro, embarked in 1786 on the conquest of Trarza where ‘Abd al-Kādir wanted to impose, as he had on Brakna, his authority and the payment of tribute. With the Brakna’s help, he defeated Trarza, whose amīr, Ely Kowri, was killed in battle. ‘Abd al-Kādir’s victory, celebrated in a kaṣīda by Mukhtar Wuld Buna, a disciple of the Moorish zāwiya of the Daimani, symbolized the triumph of Islam, as conceived a century earlier by Nāṣir al-Dīn, against the Hasaniyya warriors who blocked the trade routes. ‘Abd al-Kādir rightly considered himself the Commander of the Faithful, the legitimate heir of Nāṣir al-Dīn. His ambition was thus to impose Islamic law on the rulers of Waalo, Jolof and Kayor and extend his rule over the upper river.

But in 1790, the new Damel of Kayor, Amari Ngoone Ndeela, renounced the submission made by his predecessors to Futa Toro and harshly suppressed all attempts at independence on the part of the reformers in the Muslim enclaves in the province of Njambur. He killed ‘Abd al-Kādir’s envoy, Tapsir Hammādi Ibra, and the survivors of the defeat – including the marabout of Kokki’s son – appealed to the Almamy to save the cause of Islam. This prompted ‘Abd al-Kādir to organize a great military expedition with nearly 30,000 people, including women and children, to colonize Kayor.

But the expedition ended in the disaster of Bungoy where the great army was beaten through the scorched-earth tactic brilliantly organized by Amari Ngoone. Numerous Futanke were sold to the slavers and ‘Abd al-Kādir was held prisoner in Kayor although later sent back to Futa Toro. Amari Ngoone was assured that henceforth there would be no more invasions. Oral tradition still retains the memory of the magnanimity of Amari Ngoone who defended with conviction the secular nature of the ceddo state against the religious proselytization of the theocratic state that ‘Abd al-Kādir sought to impose through the holy war. But Baron Roger suggests that the victory of the ceddo party was due to the help given by the slavers in Saint-Louis and Gorée to Amari Ngoone against ‘Abd al-Kādir. This support is to be explained by ‘Abd al-Kādir’s opposition to the sale of Muslims and to the numerous conflicts between Futa Toro and Saint-Louis between 1787 and 1790 which prevented boats from moving to the upper river and

54. L. G. Colvin, 1974, p. 601; Baron R. Keledor, 1829, p. 129.
interrupted the supply of millet to the island.\textsuperscript{55}

With the defeat at Bungoy, ‘Abd al-Kādir’s authority began to wane. Opposition to him in Futa Toro came from ‘Alī Siddi of Yirlabe and ‘Alī Dundu of Bosea, both influential members of the Jaggorde. The powerful Torodo family of Thierno Molle, hostile to the religious strictness of ‘Abd al-Kādir, obliged the Almamy to leave his capital for Kobbilo, on his own lands, while the new unlettered princes, ‘Alī Siddi and ‘Alī Dundu, imposed themselves as sole intermediaries between central government and the western and eastern provinces of Futa Toro.

This internal power struggle coincided with the development of hostilities between Futa Toro and the post at Saint-Louis, whose trade on the river was interrupted between 1801 and 1803. Saint-Louis not only refused to pay the usual dues but also embarked on a punitive expedition of twelve ships to burn a dozen villages in western Futa Toro and capture 600 prisoners, most of whom belonged to the Torodo ruling class. In 1805, Futa Toro took its revenge and in 1806, as the stoppage of commercial activities was already hurting both parties, accepted a new agreement confirming that of 1785.

‘Abd al-Kādir, who had not for some years had access to the fire-arms and goods needed to reinforce his increasingly disputed authority, then embarked on an expedition to the upper river to put down the ravages of Almamy Sega, at the expense of the marabouts of Bundu. He had Sega executed and appointed his own candidate, Ḥammādī Pate, thus precipitating an alliance between Ḥammādī Aissata, the unsuccessful but popular claimant and leader of Bundu, and the king of Kaarta.

The growing hostility of Saint-Louis and the increasing internal opposition by the Jaggorde prevented ‘Abd al-Kādir from breaking the Kaarta–Bundu alliance. In fact, al-Kādir was soon deposed by the Jaggorde after which he allied with Gajaaga and Xaaso. In 1807, however, he was killed by the combined forces of Bundu and Kaarta with the connivance of the second generation Torodo party. His death opened the way for the triumph of the Jaggorde who could now impose an Almamy devoted to their cause and retain a wide degree of autonomy in their respective chiefdoms.\textsuperscript{56}

As in Bundu and Futa Jallon, the marabout party, initially made up of learned men, gave way to a political system in the hands of a warrior aristocracy with no pretence to religious learning, as in the ceddo kingdoms. Power became the monopoly of hereditary lineages now involved in sharp competition and a new Torodo oligarchy came into being, bearing no relation to the ideal of the revolution of 1776. Nevertheless, the Muslim revolution did consolidate for ever the Islamic character of both state and society in Futa Toro in contrast to the ceddo regimes which were still controlling the Wolof and Sereer kingdoms in northern Senegambia.

‘Abd al-Kādir’s failure to impose Islam as the state ideology in the Wolof

\textsuperscript{56} ibid., pp. 209–14.
Senegambia from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century

kingdoms was largely compensated by the considerable progress made by the indigenous marabout parties. Growing numbers of Muslims tried to challenge ceddo violence from within. In Kayor in particular, 'Abd al-Kâdir's defeat at Bungoy led to the departure of large numbers of Muslims from the province of Njambur for the Cape Verde peninsula where they helped to found a theocracy under the leadership of Jal Joop. From Cape Verde the exiles encouraged Lebu opposition to the exactions of the Alkaati of the Damael and Kayor separatist movements. After several years of resistance the marabout party won independence which sealed the first territorial breach and the victory of Islam in the kingdom of Kayor.  

Conclusion

The evolution of Senegambia from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century was profoundly influenced by the impact of the Atlantic trade at the beginning of the process whereby Black Africa became dependent on the dominating power of Europe. Barter (for gold, ivory, gum, hides and slaves) without territorial occupation gave rise, from the second half of the sixteenth century, to the diversion of the trade routes from the interior towards the coast. During this period the Jolof confederacy disintegrated — giving way to the kingdoms of Waalo, Kayor, Bawol, Siin and Salum — while the Denyanke kingdom became dominant in the Senegal valley. In Southern Rivers, Portuguese trade ruined the inter-regional trade of the Bainuk, Beafada, Nalu and Baga and facilitated the rise of the military power of Kaabu which took over from the declining empire of Mali.

The dominance of the slave trade in overseas exchanges during the seventeenth century rapidly led to the partition of the coast into spheres of influence and the building of fortified trading posts. It also led to the strengthening of the violent nature of the ceddo regimes which, in turn, gave rise to a widespread marabout movement hostile to the military aristocracies. After the failure of Nâşir al-Dîn's movement (1673–7), the adherents of militant Islam organized themselves in Bundu, Futa Jallon and Futa Toro.

At the end of the eighteenth century, however, the theocratic states themselves gradually lost their revolutionary character just when Europe was thinking of abolishing the slave trade whose role in the accumulation of finance capital was diminishing. Europe then tried to integrate Senegambia into the developed capitalist system as a direct periphery of the European centre for the supply of raw materials for industry. Senegambia, already ravaged by the profound political economic and social crises of the slavery era, stood no chance of resisting the military conquest embarked upon by Europe during the second half of the nineteenth century.

The end of the Songhay empire

M. ABITBOL

The collapse of the Songhay empire

Reasons for the Moroccan invasion

Mawläy Aḥmad al-Manṣūr, who was installed in power after the battle of Wādī al-Makhāzin in 1578, could not have come to the Saʿādī throne in more propitious circumstances. The victory over Portugal had placed him among the great defenders of Islam, and the money paid to ransom his Christian captives had made him one of the most influential figures on the world scene.

As Caliph, Imam and Prince of the Faithful his ambition was to bring all Muslims together in a ‘single same way of thought’ and to revive the tradition of the djiḥād. Thus the profits he planned to derive from the Saharan salt deposits at Taghāza would be devoted to replenishing the Bayt al-Māl (Treasury) and slaves won in the conquest of Songhay would be set to work in the navy that would eventually fall on the infidel.

But al-Manṣūr’s more lofty motives far from excluded others less intangible – gold and slaves from the Sudan.¹

The slaves were to be used especially in the sugar industry in the south of Morocco, where installations had suffered greatly in the fighting of the previous decades.² As for gold, supplies had dwindled rapidly since the rise of the Songhay empire in the Niger Bend. Al-Manṣūr’s predecessors had twice tried to change this situation: once, between 1537 and 1547, by raiding Wazzān, and again, in 1556–7, by seizing Taghāza. But, clearly not wanting to jeopardize the supply of salt to Black Africa, al-Mahdī, al-Manṣūr’s grandfather, had made an agreement with Askiya Dāwūd of

¹. The main sources of this well-documented phase of the history of relations between Morocco and Sudan are: Sudanese: al-Saʿādī, 1964; M. Kaʿṭi, 1913–14; and O. Houdas, 1966; Moroccan: al-Fishtali, 1964; al-Slawi, 1936; al-Wafrani, 1888–9; European: see H. de Castries, 1923, for a full account of the Moroccan invasion by an anonymous Spaniard.
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Songhay over the immediate sharing-out of dues collected.  
But there were still threats to Morocco’s trade with the Sudan: the Portuguese, who in 1565 tried to reach Timbuktu via Senegal,  
and above all the Turks, some of whose moves suggested that they aimed at extending their supply lines to the southern Maghrib. Examples of the latter include Şâlah Ra‘îs’s expedition to Wargla in 1552, Dja‘far Pasha’s conquest of the Fezzân in 1557 and  Hạsan Veneziano’s expedition to Tûwât in 1578–9.

The Sa‘ādîs’ hopes of benefiting from Taghâza faded as the Songhays developed the new salt desposits at Taghâza al-Ghizlân (Taoudéni).

In 1582 al-Manṣûr seized the oases of Tûwât and Gurâra. Their occupation was officially presented as a measure to restore order in an area where ‘the royal yoke had been thrown off’. But the real objective was to conquer the Sudan and build up a huge empire on the southern flanks of the Ottomans’ African possessions.

In 1583 the King of Borno, May İdrîs Alaöma, gave al-Manṣûr an unhoped-for opportunity to realize his ambitions. Fearing a Turkish advance into his territories from the Fezzân, May İdrîs asked al-Manṣûr for fire-arms with which to fight the non-Muslim groups ‘on the borders of the Sudan’. Al-Manṣûr agreed after extracting from the King of Borno a bay‘a (an act of allegiance) which was duly drawn up and signed.

The following year a Moroccan expeditionary force entered the Atlantic Sahel in the direction of Senegal, but was obliged to turn back in circumstances which are not clear.

The order to attack the Songhay empire was almost given in 1586, but in view of the difficulties presented by the operation, al-Manṣûr put it off for five years. He used the interval to train and equip his army, to obtain all possible intelligence about the Askiya empire, and to persuade his own leading citizens – merchants, ‘ulamâ’ and army officers – of the soundness of his plan.

Tondibi and the causes of Songhay’s collapse

On 30 October 1590 a Moroccan column of between three and four thousand soldiers, together with several hundred auxiliaries, set out from Marrakesh under the command of Djûdar Pasha. The force crossed the High Atlas and went down the Dar‘a valley to Ktawa, where it entered the Sahara. On 1 March 1591, after a forced march of sixty days, it reached the banks of the Niger and eleven days later arrived at Tondibi, only some

7. ibid., pp. 36–40.
FIG. 11.1 Trans-Saharan routes in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries (after M. Abibol)
The end of the Songhay empire

fifty kilometres from Gao, the Songhay capital.

Although Askiya Ishâk II waited until the last moment before mobilizing his troops, he faced the invader with a considerable force. Confronted, however, with the Moroccans’ guns, the Songhay army was crushed on 12 March 1591, after a day of heroic resistance. And so collapsed the last great Sahel empire whose rulers, absorbed in their domestic quarrels, had failed to recognize the extent of the Moroccan threat.

Since the fall of the great Askiya Muḥammad al-Ḥādjḍj in 1529, the court at Gao had been the scene of relentless struggles between different pretenders to the throne which soon turned into revolts threatening the empire itself with destruction. Barely five years before the Moroccan invasion the Songhay empire was almost divided into two as a result of the rebellion of Balama al-Ṣāḍḍūk, whose headquarters were in Timbuktu. Ishâk II put down the revolt, but was left with little time to reunite the country before the Moroccan invasion.

Economically Songhay had for several decades been suffering from the adverse effects of the Portuguese coastal trade. Military reverses in Dendi, Borgu and Mossi (Mosi) country – all traditional sources of slaves for the empire – together with the loss of Taghäza in 1585, exacerbated the social consequences of the economic setbacks. In addition the empire was afflicted with a series of natural disasters including epidemics, drought and food shortages.

In its last days, the empire built up by Sonni ‘Ali and Askiya Muḥammad stretched over a vast area but it lacked the ethnic and socio-cultural framework which had lent a larger measure of unity to Ghana and Mali, its great predecessors in the region. Songhay had not succeeded in binding together its various peoples. Unity was particularly lacking under the Great Askiya Muḥammad who was closer to the Arab–Berber values of Timbuktu than the traditional values of Gao and Kükya, to which he was a stranger by birth. Although Gao was the political capital, neither it nor Songhay itself was the driving force of the empire whose centre of gravity lay, paradoxically, in conquered territory, in Timbuktu and Jenne.

The setting up of the Moroccan Pashalik

In pursuit of the remains of the Songhay army, Djūdar Pasha marched on to Gao, which had already been deserted by its inhabitants. Ishâk II, although still in control of the Niger river, did not attempt any counter-offensive. Instead he began to negotiate with Djūdar the conditions of his return to Morocco. Djūdar, disappointed at Gao’s lamentable state and realizing that his own men were in poor physical shape, was prepared to

accept Ishāk’s suggestions. But al-Manṣūr was not: he recalled Djūdar immediately and replaced him with the second-highest-ranking officer in the Moroccan army, Maḥmūd b. Zarḵūn. Zarḵūn’s orders were quite simply to conquer the whole of the Sudan and destroy the various Sudanese forces which had taken advantage of the general disorder to try to fill the vacuum left by the rout of the Songhay army.\(^\text{13}\)

Maḥmūd Pasha immediately set about destroying Songhay political power. He seized the traditional capital of Kükya, drove Ishāk II from the country to his death among the Gurmanche, laid a fatal trap for Ishāk’s appointed successor, Muḥammad-Gao, and endeavoured to wipe out the last pockets of Songhay resistance in Dendi (1592–4).\(^\text{14}\)

Having thus done away with the Songhay menace, Zarḵūn returned to Timbuktu to destroy the educated classes there as a political force. Dozens of ‘ulamā’ were slain or sent into exile in Morocco. Among the latter was the celebrated Ahmad Baba whose fame was to spread ‘from the region of Sūs to the towns of Bougie and Algiers’.\(^\text{15}\)

Zarḵūn was killed in 1594 in an ambush laid by the Songhay resistance in Bandiagra,\(^\text{16}\) before he had completed the occupation of the area around Jenne. This task was now given to Djūdar, but soon proved impossible in the face of fierce opposition from Fulbe (Fulani), Bambara and Mande (Malinke), temporarily grouped around Mansa Maḥmūd. After a series of inconclusive skirmishes a modus vivendi was established between the Moroccans installed in Jenne and the people of the area who came to accept, although ‘only in words’, the Moroccan occupation.\(^\text{17}\)

Al-Manṣūr’s army was forced to limit itself to the occupation of certain river ports, where they installed kašabas (permanent garrisons). These included Jenne, Wandiaka, Kubi, Konna, Sebi, Tendirma, Issafay, Kabara, Timbuktu, Bamba, Bourem, Gao and Kükya.\(^\text{18}\) For obvious economic reasons most were on the river line from Jenne to Timbuktu. On both sides of the Niger, the spine of the Pashalik, lay vast areas scarcely touched by Moroccan influence.

The pashas did not try to change the systems of local administration left behind by the Songhay. Whenever a native chief was appointed he had to receive the endorsement of the pasha, who backed the investitures of kādīs and imāms in the big towns as well as those of their Fulbe and Tuareg equivalents, ardos and amenokals. In this, the representatives of Morocco were only doing what the Askiyas had done before them and, like them, they rarely interfered in the choice of candidates.

18. The Moroccans later built two more kašabas at Gundam and Arawän.
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FIG. 11.2 The Timbuktu region (after M. Abitbol)
The Moroccan garrisons were not closed in on themselves: they were neither isolated enclaves nor fortresses. Al-Manṣūr believed the fruits of conquest would be short-lived if pacification were not followed by the colonization of the country and the introduction of peoples from the Maghrib who might take permanent root there.

Thus the Sudan saw the arrival of Guish people from Sūs, and Haha groups and also Ma’kil and Djusham elements whom al-Manṣūr was anxious to get rid of because of the trouble they were causing in Morocco. From 1599 onwards the legionaries of Christian origin, who had come with Djūdar Pasha, were sent back home to Morocco.19

Sudanese politics to the end of the eighteenth century

The post-imperial experience of the peoples of the Niger Bend: general features

In the climate of uncertainty and insecurity resulting from the fall of the Songhay empire and the irruption of ethno-social forces – the Tuareg, the Fulbe, the Moors, and so on – that had previously been kept away from cultivated areas and urban centres, political power was within the reach of any rulers who could effectively defend and protect their peoples.

All over the Nigerian Sahel the typical political leader was first and foremost a warrior, his only legitimacy the right conferred by his arms. Such leaders rarely had great territorial ambitions. The imposing states of the past were to be replaced by a mosaic of kingdoms and princedoms usually limited to an ethnic group, a clan, a town or even just a string of large villages.20

Unlike his recent predecessors, the political leader of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was influenced by local tradition rather than the universal values transmitted by Muslim scholars, and was rarely the centre of any cosmic or religious pattern.

Islam, which in the past had made such a brilliant contribution to the building of the Sudanese empires, now temporarily ceased to play an important political rôle. But it still continued its long march along the grassland tracks, carried further and further afield by Juula (Dioula, Wangara) traders who at the same time had no objection to serving the non-Muslim kingdoms and chiefdoms scattered along the trade routes from the Sahel to the forest.

19. al-Fishtali, 1964, p. 93 and pp. 113–15. As a result of these moves the descendants of the Moroccan soldiers bore little resemblance to the stereotyped image of them as some kind of Muslim convert (because of their supposedly Christian or ‘renegade’ origins), speaking Spanish rather than Arabic.


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Timbuktu, Jenne and the Arma

From 1618 onwards, Morocco stopped appointing the chief officials of the Pashalik or sending military reinforcements, and the last survivors of al-Māniṣūr’s army and their descendants, the Arma, were left to their own fate. They made themselves the lawful masters of the Timbuktu area and remained so until the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Although its military power had dwindled, the Pasha state proved remarkably durable and lasted with its structures almost intact until the time of Shaykhū Ahmadu. And yet, before the foundation of the Fulbe empire of Macina, there were forces in the Niger Bend capable of wiping out the remains of the old Moroccan colony. First there were the Bambara of Segu, who not only refrained from extending their domination as far as Timbuktu but avoided even entering Jenne. There were also the powerful Tuareg confederations of the Kel-Awllimiden and above all the Kel-Tadmekket who, despite their overwhelming victory over the Arma in 1737, never thought of seizing political power in Timbuktu. Similarly, the influential clerical group, the Kunta, did no more than offer to mediate, through its Azawad zāmiya, between the Arma and their nomad enemies. The Kunta only entered Timbuktu on the eve of its conquest by the Fulbe in 1825-6.

At first there seem to have been no special rules governing appointment to the various offices within the Pashalik, including that of the Pasha himself. But from the middle of the seventeenth century, when the first generation of locally-born Arma came to power, rules for the transmission of authority began to emerge, based on the rotation of the chief offices between the three great Divisions to which all the Arma belonged. The Division whose turn it was to provide a Pasha chose its candidate who then had to be endorsed by the rest of the military. If this endorsement was not forthcoming it became the turn of another Division to choose a candidate and so on until a choice was made that was acceptable to all.21

Such a system was bound to produce two results. First, there were frequent interregnums and often several months would go by before all the Divisions could agree on a candidate. Secondly, ‘reigns’ themselves tended to be short, since the Pasha was obliged to resign as soon as a single ‘army leader’ withdrew his support.22 In these circumstances the same individuals were inevitably called to power more than once. This led to the emergence of a number of great families or lineages distinguished from the rest of society by their political power and economic influence built up as the result of repeated periods in office. There thus came into being a ‘ruling class’, described in local chronicles as a ‘class of chiefs’.23

22. It was not unusual for a pasha to be forced to resign on the very day of his appointment.
Between 1646 and 1825, 145 pashas were appointed in Timbuktu, most of them belonging to the three lineages of the Tazarkini, Mubarak al-Dar'i and al-Za'ri. It was the last of these three which produced Mansûr b. Mas'ûd al-Za'ri Pasha who seized power by force in 1716, exiled all who opposed him and plunged Timbuktu into a reign of terror unparalleled in all its history. In 1719 the people, losing patience with al-Za'ri's excesses, rose in rebellion, drove the Pasha and his legha (henchmen) from the city and restored the old Arma political system with its chronic instability, its domestic conflicts between the Divisions, and its long interregnums.  

In 1766 the Arma elected as Pasha Bâ-Haddû b. Abû Bakr al-Dar'i, who performed the unusual feat of remaining in office for more than eight years. After his death in 1775, Timbuktu remained without a pasha for eighteen years. But even this long interregnum did not entail the final disappearance of Arma institutions: in 1794, when the great Divisions, which had meanwhile become ethnic clans, agreed on a pasha, their choice, al-Muṣṭafâ al-Tazarkini, restored all the former offices of the Pashalik.

Under his successor, Abû Bakr b. Aḥmad al-Dar'i, the office of pasha became hereditary and on his death in 1815 his two sons, Muḥammad and ‘Uthmân, succeeded him. Ka'id 'Uthmân was the last pasha of Timbuktu.

By the end of the seventeenth century, as a result of its military decline and the chronic instability of its central government, the Pashalik began to break down into a number of more or less autonomous units grouped around each of the great kasababs of Gao, Bamba, Timbuktu and Jenne. While continuing to recognize the official but distant authority of Timbuktu, each garrison elected its own leaders quite independently. The pashas themselves seldom interfered in the garrisons' affairs, calling on them only when there was some serious external threat.

The garrison at Jenne was as independent as the rest, and was not disturbed by the Bambara of Segu throughout the eighteenth century. In 1754, shortly before the presumed death of Mamari Kulibali, the Biton (Commander), a Bambara army got as far as Gomitigo, some ten kilometres from Jenne, but did not attack Jenne itself.

The Arma administration remained intact throughout the period we are concerned with: the kā'id (commander, army chief) of Jenne continued to be chosen by his Arma peers unless there was a particularly enterprising pasha in Timbuktu. Thus in March 1767, Bâ-Haddû Pasha himself appointed a new governor of Jenne, Kā'id Alfa b. Masik, who was succeeded by Kā'id Aḥmad b. Shârif. The latter remained in office until his death in 1772.
PLATE 11.1 General view of Timbuktu from the terrace of the travellers' house
The commercial links and political relations between Timbuktu and Jenne were never interrupted: in 1773 two messengers were sent to Jenne to announce the death of Bā-Haddū Pasha.\(^{29}\) In 1785–6 two \(\text{kā'ids}\) of Timbuktu took their armies to Jenne to punish a band of robbers who had taken refuge in the town.\(^{30}\) In 1794 Timbuktu was notified of the death of the governor of Jenne, Kā'īd Abū Bakr b. Ša'īd, and the following year the \(\text{pasha}\) of Timbuktu appealed to the late \(\text{kā'īd}\)'s successor and the merchants of Jenne to replenish Timbuktu's supplies of cowries.\(^{31}\)

But in 1796 Mungo Park, the Scottish explorer, was told in Segu that Jenne officially belonged to the Bambara kingdom though in fact it was governed by the 'Moors'.\(^{32}\)

Should this be taken to indicate that the Bambara exercised a 'protectorate' over Jenne? Such local sources as are available hardly support this hypothesis. They tend rather to confirm René Caillié's view that Jenne lived 'alone and independent' until it was conquered by the Fulbe of Macina in 1818–19.\(^{33}\)

The Songhay of Dendi

After being driven out of Gao and having lost two kings and dozens of members of the imperial family within a few months, the Songhay, led by Askiya Nuh, managed to hold back the Moroccan advance in Dendi. As pitched battles had resulted in a series of defeats, they began to rely instead upon ambush and, with help from Kebbi\(^{34}\), succeeded in holding back Zarkūn's troops. But after the latter's death in Bandiagara, his successor, Mansūr b. 'Abd al-Rahmān Pasha (1595–6), made them pay dearly for their victory: Nuh, defeated and forced to leave some of his people in the hands of the Moroccans, withdrew to Dendi where he was deposed by his brothers in 1599; the Moroccans then appointed an \(\text{askiya}\) for the Songhay who remained under their control.\(^{35}\)

The Songhay of Dendi gradually reverted to 'paganism' and broke down into several kingdoms, although they did succeed in maintaining their unity until the middle of the seventeenth century.

In 1630 they signed a peace treaty with the Moroccans who subsequently began to interfere in their internal affairs and arbitrate in their quarrels over succession. In 1639, for example, Mas'ūd al-Za'ri Pasha entered Lulami, the capital of Dendi, with his army, in order to establish a new king.\(^{36}\)

30. ibid., f. 30r and v.
31. ibid., f. 32r and v.
32. M. Park, 1808, p. 301.
34. See A. Ganun, 1964, pp. 127–32, for the threatening letter from the Moroccan sultan to the Kanta of Kebbi.
35. al-Sa'di, 1964, p. 270.
36. ibid., pp. 394–5, 399–400 and 423.
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The new king was deposed almost as soon as the Moroccan troops had departed but the Songhay of Dendi did not follow up this attempt at reasserting themselves. Broken up into a number of small and insignificant political units they ceased to be a major political factor in the region. They did, however, retain their freedom until the beginning of the nineteenth century, despite strong pressure from Fulbe and Tuareg nomads from Liptako and Air.

The Bambara kingdoms of Segu and Kaarta

After the break-down of Songhay's westward advance and the defeat of the Mansa of Mali at Jenne in 1599, the Bambara peasants of Niger were dangerously exposed to Fulbe and Arma incursions.

The Bambara, who practised their own religion, were divided into several kafu whose Marka and Muslim chiefs maintained reasonably amicable relations with Jenne and Timbuktu. They appealed for protection to the traditional hunter confraternities or to clans specializing in warfare, such as the Samake, who rapidly assimilated Moroccan fighting methods.37

In the middle of the seventeenth century, in a movement much like a peasant revolt, the Bambara rebelled against their Marka chiefs. It is probably from this background that the Kulibali clan emerged, which was to found the kingdoms of Segu and Kaarta.38

In Segu, Biton Kulibali (c.1710–c.1755) imposed his authority with the help of his ton-dyon, mostly captives or former captives taken in war. But no sooner had he established his position than, in or around 1739, his kingdom was attacked by the Joola of Kong led by Famagha Wattara. The Joola remained in Segu until 1745 when they received news of the death of the Faama of Kong, Sekou Wattara.39

Biton Kulibali, now enfeebled, spent the rest of his life consolidating his kingdom and getting rid of competition from his Masa-si cousins who were installed to the north-west of Segu in the region of Murdia. In 1753–4 he carried the war into their own territory, destroyed their capital Sunsanna and captured their chief, Fulakoro, who was put to death in Segu. After this the Masa-si, led by Sebamana (1754–c.1758), moved away and imposed their rule on Kaarta.40

After Biton Kulibali's death, the Kingdom of Segu went through a long period of anarchy until about 1766 when a new dynasty rose to power, founded by Ngolo Diarra. After restoring the kingdom to unity, Ngolo Diarra engaged in large-scale military operations in Macina and Fuladugu, and even against the Mossi and Yatenga countries. His excellent relations with the Azawad Kunta and their chief, Shaykh al-Mukhtār (1729–1811),

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seem to have made Ngolo Diarra treat Timbuktu with circumspection.

He was succeeded by his son, Monzon (c.1789–1808), who was the real organizer of the Kingdom of Segu. Like Biton Kulibali before him he had to deal with rivalry from the Masa-si who, since 1754, had extended their power over a large area between the Kingui and the Beledugu. In 1792 they even seized Nyamina on the River Niger, thus cutting one of Segu’s main supply routes. Monzon’s reply to this was terrible: after liberating Nyamina he turned to Kaarta where he sacked Guemu, the capital, and forced the Masa-si king, Desekoro, to flee to Guidimakha. He then attacked the Awlād M‘ Bark Moors in the Nioro region for having refused to help him in his war against Kaarta. Back in Segu he followed his father’s example by giving his sons chiefdoms in the territories he had conquered and supplying each of them with a considerable army.41

Monzon died in 1808. Three years later Shaykh al-Mukhtar died not far from Timbuktu. The almost simultaneous disappearance of these two leaders was an important factor in the unrest which prevailed in the Niger Bend until Shaykhū Ahmadu’s time, and for which the Fulbe and Tuareg forces, which the two leaders had held in check, were largely responsible.

Fulbe and Tuareg

One of the chief consequences of the collapse of the Songhay empire was social disorganization. From the early 1600s one of the main features was the irresistible advance of the Saharan nomads towards the Niger valley and the lake area south of Timbuktu.

The Fulbe achieved complete preponderance in Macina. While preserving their independence by offering fierce resistance to Moroccan attacks from Timbuktu and Jenne, they speeded up their migration towards Futa Jallon in the west and Liptako and Hausa country in the east. But they were subject to raids by the Bambara armies of Ngolo and Monzon and, during the second half of the eighteenth century, were forced to accept Segu sovereignty. Meanwhile, among the pastoral Kunari, a slow process of sedentarization and Islamization began.

Also contemporary with the Moroccan occupation was the expansion of the Tuareg of Adrār – the Kel-Tadmekket and the Kel-Awllimiden. While the first remained in the background until the end of the seventeenth century, the Kel-Awllimiden soon brought all their weight to bear on the eastern part of the Niger valley, especially between Gao and Dendi.

They became the scourge of Timbuktu, intercepting communications between it and its outport, Kabara, interfering in the conflicts between the Arma chiefs and pillaging the agricultural villages along the river. The eighteenth century was full of confrontations and clashes between the Tuareg, who were usually victorious, and the weakened Arma who suffered defeat after defeat.

In May 1737, about twenty kilometres south-east of Timbuktu, Amenokal Oghmor ag Alad overwhelmed the Arma forces at Toya, inflicting considerable losses. Three hundred to three hundred and fifty were killed, among them the ruling pasha. Despite this, the chiefs of other Tuareg groups, including the Kel-Äwllimiden, continued to come to Timbuktu to receive their investiture at the hands of the pashas.

In 1770 the Tadmekket laid siege to Timbuktu, reducing the population to starvation after a group of Arma had murdered their Amenokal Habatït. The city was only saved by the intervention of the Shaykh of the Kunta, al-Mukhtär al-Kabïr, who managed to reconcile Bä-Haddû Pasha and Habatït’s successor, Amenokal Hammiyuk. The terms of the agreement concluded between the two parties in August 1771 provided that the Arma should pay the Tuareg a surety in horses and gold-dust.

But the Tuareg broke the pact, and the Shaykh withdrew his moral support from Hammiyuk and set up another as his rival, thus causing the Tadmekket to break up into two rival branches, the Tingirigif and the Irriganaten. At the same time he won the confidence of the Awllimiden and their chief, Amma ag Ag Shaykh, who took advantage of the disunity among the Tadmekket to try to extend his rule over the Saharan nomads of the Timbuktu region. The Awllimiden thus became the chief support of the Kunta who, as the Arma grew weaker, succeeded in filling the political vacuum they left and in limiting the effects of the resulting anarchy. But until the founding of the Fulbe empire of Macina they took care not to annex any political rights in Timbuktu nor to drive out the last vestiges of Arma power. Thus Kawa ag Amma, the powerful amenokal of the Kel-Awllimiden, followed the old custom and, in July 1796, went to Timbuktu to receive investiture at the hands of Abu Bakr Pasha.

Western Sudan and the outside world

Despite Morocco’s gradual withdrawal from Sudan after al-Manṣūr’s death, the pashas of Timbuktu were steadfastly loyal to the last sultans of the Saʿādî dynasty. The Friday khutba (sermon in a mosque) was recited every week in the name of the rulers in Marrakesh, who took the trouble to announce their accession to the throne to the pashas in Timbuktu and the heads of the garrisons in Gao and Jenne.

When the last Saʿādî monarch was assassinated in 1659 the bay’a (oath of allegiance) binding the pashas to the dynasty immediately lapsed. In 1660,

43. ibid., p. 253.
45. ibid., f.28v; see also Bibliothèque nationale, Paris, Ms 5334, the Kitab al-Tara’if, by Shaykh al-Mukhtär’s son.
46. Bibliothèque nationale, Fonds arabe, Ms 5259, f. 32r; Institut de France, Fonds Gironcourt, Ms 2406, pièce 75 (Ta’rikh Fittuga).
understandably enough, the *khutba* ceased to be recited in the name of Mawlāy Āḥmad al-Manṣūr’s descendants ‘in all Takrūr, from Kūkya to Bina’. But ten years later, after the ‘Alawite dynasty had seized power in Morocco, the Arma renewed their allegiance to the Moroccan throne, first to Mawlāy al-Rashīd and then to Mawlāy Ismā’īl.

Unlike the Saʿādīs, the ‘Alawites paid little attention to the Nigerian Sahel. Their policy was oriented towards Mauritanian rather than Sudan. While the Europeans fought over Arguin and the trade in gum arabic, Mawlāy Ismā’īl firmly established his power in Mauritanian by supporting the *ʿAmīr* (Prince) of the Trarza, and even by occasionally sending more or less regular troops to the Senegal valley. These were the Ormans, who terrorized all the riverside regions of Senegal until the 1720s. They gained control of Futa Toro where they made and unmade the *satigi* (rulers) to suit themselves and brought strong pressure to bear on the inhabitants of Upper Senegal. The captives they took there went to swell the ranks of the famous black army of the ‘*Abīd* formed by the Sultan of Morocco. The excursions of the ‘*Abīd* wrought havoc in Bondu and Bambuk and above all in Galam where, on several occasions, they threatened the French trading-post of Fort Saint-Joseph.

Despite all this the Arma continued to show a certain respect to the ‘Alawite kings and according to the English writer, J. G. Jackson, the Timbuktu Pashalik went on paying allegiance to Mawlāy Ismail’s successors.

With the coming to power of Sultan Sīdī Muḥammad (1757–90), Morocco’s policy in the Sudan made a fresh start, based on the revival of trade across the Sahara. Like the last of the Saʿādī kings, the ‘Alawite Sultan referred to himself as ‘sovereign of Gao and Guinea’ in his correspondence with European governments. This might seem boastful without the evidence of the highly trustworthy English counsul, J. Matra, who served in Morocco between 1786 and 1806.

Moreover his claim seems to correspond to the attitude taken in the Sudan towards the status of Timbuktu on the eve of the Fulbe *djīhād*. Such at least is the suggestion arising from the writings of Nuh b. al-Tahir, a scholar of Macina who was one of Shaykhū Āḥmadu’s closest collaborators. One of these texts proclaims the advent of the last Caliph of Islam, Shaykhū Āḥmadu. It was addressed to the ‘Sultan of Gharb and Marrakesh and his dependencies of Timbuktu, Arawān, Bū-Jbīḥa, Taoudéni, as of Sūs Near and Far, and of Touat’.

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48. ibid., p. 185; Bibliothèque nationale, Fonds arabe, Ms 6399, ff. 214–18.
50. J. G. Jackson, 1811, p. 296.
52. Bibliothèque nationale, Fonds arabe, Ms 5259, ff. 74–8.
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This classification may have no basis in fact. But the political evolution of Timbuktu, while reflecting the internal autonomy of the former Moroccan territory on the banks of the Niger, is also comparable in many respects to the evolution of the Berber Regencies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when Constantinople’s sovereignty, though now nominal, continued to be significant.

Economic and social development

Natural calamities and human environment

By the end of the 1700s, western Sudan was no longer the dazzling and prosperous country of which al-Manṣūr spoke in 1591.

The turn of the seventeenth century brought a series of disasters: drought, food shortages, epidemics and famines destroyed harvests and decimated populations, exacerbating tensions between nomads and sedentary people. From 1639, respite became shorter and crises longer and more acute. That same year there was a famine in the Jenne region, the granary of the Niger Bend. From the central Delta it spread for four consecutive years over all the Bend. The resulting distress was probably the origin of the social movement that preceded the rise of the Bambara kingdom of Segu. 53

There were few years without crises in the eighteenth century. There was an early seven-year food shortage from 1711 to 1718. Then, from 1738, western Sudan underwent one of its worst famines ever, which affected all the Sahel and a large part of the Maghrib. 54

In 1741 famine combined with a plague epidemic to bring about a disaster of catastrophic proportions during which 'People ate the corpses of animals and human beings'. This period was full of wars and minor conflicts which set the peoples of the Sudan one against the other. 55 After 1744 the effects of the famine began to fade but plague remained endemic erupting every few years, in 1748–9, 1762–6 and, above all, 1786–96. 56

Thus the Niger Bend suffered as much if not more from natural disasters as from the misdeeds of man, and both its people and its landscape bore the scars.

The land between Timbuktu, the Great Lakes and the River Niger, was the confluence of various ethnic groups. For a large part of each year it became a mosaic of peoples and a zone of contact between two ways of life—pastoral and rural sedentary. But because the good grazing land was also the best arable land, this contact often produced conflicts, all the more serious because there was no political force in the area strong enough to


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PLATE 11.3 Tyi-wara antelope headdress, used by the Bambara in rites re-enacting the mythical birth of the bringer of agriculture
limit the incursions of herders’ tracks onto farmers’ fields and vice-versa.

Thus the hot season became a period of trouble and insecurity throughout the region. The Kel-Tadmekket east and south of Timbuktu came into close proximity with the Berabich, the Kel-Maghsharen, the Kel-Katwan, the Ghâli-Mûsâ and other baydan (nomads) who descended from Aklé in Mauritania towards Râs al-Mâ’ and the northern edge of Macina where they and the Fulbe fought each other over the meagre seasonal pastures.

Pressure was greatest at the end of the hot season when the first rains brought the peasants out into the fields again: any delay or disorder in the withdrawal of the nomads was enough to produce a serious threat to the harvest.

Local production and regional trade

Agriculture tended to recede in the areas bordering the desert. But in some places the occupation of land for agricultural purposes was intensified – as is shown by the Bambara migrations in Bara, the beginnings of sedentarization among the Fulbe of Macina, and the permanent settlement of certain Tuareg or Tuareg-ized (Kel-Antasar) groups around Timbuktu.

Furthermore, because of the advantages of the Niger as a means of communication and the extension of traditional trade networks, inter-regional commerce helped to mitigate the consequences of natural disasters.

Local food production at Jenne was supplemented from the surrounding region of San which produced ground-nuts, flour from the baobab tree, shea (a tree from whose kernels a butter is obtained), honey, dried onions, pimentos, beans and fonio. There were also cotton, indigo, senna for making soap, wool, wax, iron from Bendugu and, of course, the two main imports from the forest area, kola nuts and gold.57

After leaving Jenne for Timbuktu, boats would land at Kubaka, near which – at Sofara in the eighteenth century – the Joola of Kong developed a centre for fattening horses.58 At the confluence of the Niger and the Bani stood Isaqa (later Mopti) with its large market for foodstuffs and handicrafts.59

After Lake Debo, navigation followed the two main branches of the river, the Issa-bar to the west and the Bara-Issa to the east. Until Saraféré was established the chief settlement on the Bara-Issa was Sâ. The largest areas of cultivation in the Timbuktu area were near Lakes Tele, Oro and Fati, and along the backwaters. Wheat-growing spread in the Sudan only after the advent of the Moroccans as the Arma and the North African merchants in the big towns were the only people who ate bread.60 Among the industrial plants produced were tobacco and gum arabic which were

60. O. Houdas, 1966, p. 117.
collected in large quantities around Gundam and Lake Faguibin.  
Underlying the commercial life of Timbuktu were numerous artisans: salt-processors, weavers, tailors, tanners, shoe-makers, goldsmiths, potters and manufacturers of agricultural implements and weapons. Each craft was the monopoly of an ethno-professional corporation: all dyers, for example, came from Sansanding while the Arma had the exclusive privilege of making shoes.

The eastern part of the Niger valley was the area which had suffered most since the days of the Songhay: following the decline of Gao, it had been isolated from trade networks and as a result of persistent drought and soil erosion most of its people had become nomadic.

Trans-Saharan trade and the Atlantic trade
Despite the political upheavals from the end of the sixteenth century, trade in the Niger Bend was established on firm geographical, economic and social foundations which survived both the Moroccan conquest and the intensification of European trade on the coast. Trans-Saharan trade overcame all political and military difficulties resulting from the weakening of the central powers bordering the Sahara Desert and remained the main economic activity of vast regions of the Maghreb and the Sahel. What suffered inexorable change from the sixteenth century was not the volume of trade but its economic significance in relation to the development possibilities of the countries and regions involved.

Routes
After 1591 the route from Dar'a to Taghaza to Timbuktu became the royal road for trade between Sa'adi Morocco and Western Sudan. It was used both by army convoys and by merchant caravans organized and supervised by the Sultan's men. This route was the first to be affected by the disturbances which followed the death of al-Manṣūr. The merchants gradually neglected Dar'a and Taghaza for Sūs and Tafilālet, where local religious leaders wielded a beneficial influence. Thus, less than fifty years after the Moroccan conquest the road network had almost reverted to what it had been in the Middle Ages. The most lasting changes were those affecting the Sahelo-Sudanese part of the network.

The Atlantic route  The Saharan part of the Atlantic route corresponded to the old Trïk Lamtûnî, and its revival in the 1620s was reinforced by the 'Alawites.
Under Mawlāy Ismā'īl, caravans from Tegdaoust and Gulimin crossed the territories of the Ma'īkil people who, for various reasons, had thrown in their lot with the Shāfī'īan dynasty. Special mention should be made of

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PLATE 11.4  Travellers approaching Timbuktu
the Tadjukant who were masters of all caravan traffic between south Morocco and Mauritanian Adrar.63

Furthermore, the dissemination in the Western Sahara of religious doctrines, such as those of the Kâdirïyya and Tidjâniyya brotherhoods, caused considerable circulation of men and ideas between the religious centres of south Morocco and those of the southern Sahara. Akka, Tinduf, Smâra, Shinguetti and Boutlimit were well-known centres of the Kâdirïyya as well as important trading posts. Caravans from Shinguetti or Waddan travelled to Fort Saint-Louis in Senegal via Trarza country, Galam via Brakna country, and Hödh by the Dhâr track leading to Tishît and Walâta. In Galam, Moorish trade enjoyed complete predominance, despite the existence of the French fort of Saint-Joseph.64 From Hödh, several tracks led south towards the Bambara kingdoms of Kaarta and Segu via posts at Diara in Kingui, Gumbu, Bassikunu and Sokolo.65

Moorish caravans travelled as far as Segu, Banamba and even Nyamina, but most Bambara trade was transacted at Sansanding. Sansanding was a trans-shipment point for canoes going up the Niger from the Sotuba rapids, and the port of trade for the Kingdom of Segu. It gradually became less dependent on Jenne for its supplies from the Sahara and by the 1790s its commercial network was as busy as that of the capital of Bani.66

Caravans from Walâta also maintained direct links with Jenne via Râs al-Mâ‘ and Timbuktu.67

**The eastern route** This group of roads started in Tafilálet in Morocco and crossed Tûwât, providing also a passage for the great caravans of Moroccan pilgrims. At Timimun the road from Tûwât to the Sudan connected with the tracks from central Maghrib: one from al-Golea to Mzâb to Lâgwât and another from al-Golea to Wargla to Tuggurt to Tozeur to Gaïsa – both controlled by the Shaamba and Ugrâmma nomads whose only occupation was to guide and protect the caravans.68

Further south, at In-Šalâh, was the junction with the track from Ghadâmès, quarrelled over throughout the eighteenth century by Tripoli and Tunis, and the channel by which Sudanese goods flowed to both capitals. The merchants there, who were among Timbuktu’s wealthiest clients, maintained permanent relations with Hausa country via Ghât and Agades, and with Borno via Murzuk and Bilma.69

64. See the correspondence of the Fort’s commanders, Archives nationales, sous-collection Colonies, C6.
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After Tidikelt the caravans skirted the western border of Ahnet and on, after the arduous crossing of Tanezruft, to Azawad and the Kunda encampments. The Kunda, who provided services, knowledge and baraka (blessings) and who acted as arbiters in most of the conflicts arising among the nomads or between the nomads and the sedentary peoples played an important role in the region. Their presence alone was enough to make them the best guarantees and the most effective protectors of the road to Timbuktu.  

From Arawän and Bū-Jbeiha some caravans went directly to Bamba or Gao, but it was Timbuktu which attracted most of the traffic along this route.  

After presenting gifts to the Arma chiefs of the town, the Maghribi merchants were taken over by diatigui, who supplied them with hospitality, means of transport and, if necessary, an armed guard. For many travellers the journey did not end at Timbuktu as goods from North Africa were carried on to Jenne by the same men. It was only upstream from Jenne that a different trade infrastructure emerged, of which the most important element was the Juula network.

The Juula network Jenne was linked by two main routes to the forest regions and the countries that produced kola nuts and gold. The first route, to the south-west, ran in the direction of Bure or Wurodugu, the outskirts of kola country. The second, to the south-east, went towards Kong and Asante.  

Kong supplied Jenne with kola nuts and gold from Lobi and the Gold Coast. Both were carried by the same Juula traders who sold slabs of salt from Taoudéni to Buna. The rest of their load would be made up of cotton goods and European products which were marketed around Kumasi.  

Parallel to this route the Yarse, a Mossi group, had established direct links between Timbuktu and Asante country, skirting Jenne and the inner Delta and proceeding via Douentza, Korientze, Aouaki and Diré or via Wahiguya (Ouahigouya), Bandiagara, Konna and Korientze.  

Apart from these Mossi side-roads, there seems to have been a small amount of traffic between Timbuktu and Hausa country along the river to Ansongo, Dallol and Mauri. This was the route followed by the pilgrims, who, after reaching Kano, went north to the Fezzān and then on to Egypt via Awdjila and Siwa.  

Moroccan exports to the western Sudan were extremely varied. They

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consisted of local products, ranging from cereals and religious books to silk garments and tobacco from Meknes, and goods from the eastern Mediterranean (spices and silk) and from Europe (textiles, sugar, coffee, tea, glassware and fire-arms).

In the central Maghreb, Sudanese trade was the chief source of activity for the provinces of Tûwât, Mzâb, Süf and Djariid. It covered a wide variety of goods, from indigo cloth and turkeđi from Kano to kola nuts from Asante; the latter were eaten throughout the southern Maghreb where there were large black populations.\textsuperscript{76}

This trade, both varied and continuous, was very lucrative.\textsuperscript{77} Its economic significance may seem small in comparison with trade as a whole at that time, but the trans-Saharan trade was transporting not only merchandise, but also the ideas and values of a whole civilization.

Trade goods

Salt played a very small part in trade between the people of the Maghrib and those of the Sahel and the Sudan. Since the beginning of the seventeenth century, and despite the presence of Moroccan kaâds both in Taghâza and in Taoudéni,\textsuperscript{78} the towns along the River Niger has had access to Saharan salt deposits by means of separate and independent routes: the Moorish and Tuareg azalai. It was therefore essential for caravans from the north to diversify the goods exported to the Sudan. In addition, Sudan itself, apart from its traditional exports of gold, slaves and ivory, also needed to dispose of certain manufactured goods, such as cloth and jewellery, the proportion of which grew as the export of gold and slaves declined or stagnated.\textsuperscript{79}

Although the amount of gold exported never again equalled the huge amounts taken out of the Sudan after the Moroccan conquest, gold formed part of the freight of all caravans returning from the Sudan. At the end of the seventeenth century there was an appreciable increase in the export of slaves after Mawlây Ismâ'il had formed his 'Abīd army and, in the second half of the eighteenth century, gum arabic played an important role in Sudanese exports to Morocco. The opening of the port at Mogador provided Sudanese caravans with a new maritime outlet where, in addition to the goods already mentioned, they also sold large quantities of ostrich feathers and ivory.

\textsuperscript{76} R. Leselle, 1957; L. Valensi, 1967.
\textsuperscript{77} See among others: G. Lemprière, 1891, p. 290; J. Gräberg, 1834, p. 146; L. Godard, 1859, pp. 117–20; Prax, 1845.
\textsuperscript{78} Moroccan kaâds are said to have been in Taoudéni until just before the French conquest. See the Pichon report on the Arawân region, Archives nationales du Sénégal, Dakar, IG 254.
\textsuperscript{79} R. Caillié, 1828, Vol. II, pp. 383–4; Prax, 1845, p. 344.
Cultural and religious development

Islam in the Sudan just before the *djihāds* of the nineteenth century

The period we have been examining is often said to be one of decadence and cultural stagnation. But if by this is meant a decline or regression of Islamic culture, the description needs to be revised. Through the continuous commerce across the Sahara, through the *zialiya* (sanctuaries), the fraternities and the *marabout* groups, and through the highly organized networks of the Juula traders, the influence of Islam continued to spread in varying degrees through all the peoples of the Niger valley.

As René Caillié observed at the beginning of the nineteenth century, all the inhabitants of Timbuktu and Jenne were able to read and write Arabic. The best proof of how widely this powerful means of communication was spread is the abundance of written sources available to the historian of the region. The *ta’rikhs*, the famous chronicles of Timbuktu, were all written between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries.

Islam was no longer a purely urban phenomenon as it had been in the Middle Ages. It was no longer transmitted exclusively by the city-dwelling *‘ulamā’*, nor organically linked to just one social group, the merchants, nor connected with one economic activity.

Islam spread into the country and affected both the Bambara peasants and the Fulbe herdsmen. Its new propagators were the Berber or Sudanese *marabout* groups who had adopted as their main business the study and dissemination of the Word of the Prophet.

The emergence of the *marabout* groups (*zuwaya* or *insilime*) is one of the most spectacular aspects of the ethno-social stratification which occurred on the southern edge of the Sahara during the second half of the seventeenth century. After demographic upheavals or armed struggles about which we still know very little, nomad society, from Senegal to Air, split into two distinct strata: the ‘warrior’ and the clerical groups, who enjoyed great religious prestige and devoted themselves entirely to the study and practice of Islamic law and mystical theology.

Their *zialiya* attracted students as well as travelling merchants seeking protection. Many of these sanctuaries, carefully placed along the trading routes, later became important caravan posts. Examples of this were Arawān and Bū-Jbeihā (north of Timbuktu), which were founded by the *marabout* group of the Kel al-Sūk, later to be supplanted in its own territory by the Kunta. Others were Mabrūk and al-Ma’mūn, also former Kel al-Sūk encampments which, in the eighteenth century, under Shaykh al-Mukhtār, were to become two of the most important centres of Kunta influence.

The *shaykhs* of the desert were to eclipse the ‘*ulamā’* of the towns and become the spiritual masters of most of the instigators of the *djihāds* of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It was with the Aīr Dayman of Shinguetti that *Amīr* ‘Abd al-Ḵādir of Futa Toro began his studies, before
the *djhād* of 1775. It was among the *insilīmen* sector of the Ait Awari of Aïr that ʿUthmān dan Fodio met his teacher Djibrīl ibn ʿUmar. The influence of the Kūnta on Shaykhū ʿĀhmadū is well-known, as is that of the Ida-u-ʿĀlī of Shinguettūn Ḥājjī ʿUmar Tall.

The Islam of the *marabouts* was to a certain extent a continuation of the Almoravid tradition, and its militancy contrasted with the tolerant syncretism which characterized the ‘Black Islam’ of the Sudanese towns and the Juula centres. Also, by quickly associating itself with brotherhoods and religious orders as universal as the Kādirīyya (of which the chief representatives in the Sudan were the Kūnta), the Islam of the *marabout* offered its followers not only a religion but also a framework which went beyond the traditional categories of identification, such as ethnic groups or clans.
Whereas traditional Islam in the Sudan was closely linked to the ruling power and the chiefs, the Islam of the marabouts before the \textit{djihads} exercised its influence from below, through the combined action of the brotherhoods and the herdsmen who in the nineteenth century were to set out to attempt the religious conquest of the whole of the Sahel. It was a rallying point, a force for social and political emancipation, and as such it attracted all the Tukuloor of Futa Toro who were struggling against the established power of the Denyanke dynasty. It also attracted the Fulbe of Macina, who were shaking off the yoke of the Bambara and the \textit{ardo}, as well as the Fulbe and the farmers of Hausa country who were struggling against the hegemony of the royal powers established at Gobir, Kano, Katsina and other places.
After the fall of the Gao empire in 1591—following the Moroccan invasion—the basic edifice of political power at the top of the Niger Bend disintegrated, thus creating a major political vacuum which other powers gradually began to fill. Over the following centuries, power became localized under the impact of centrifugal forces emanating from the heart of the fallen empire and integrative forces at work on its periphery. In the Niger Bend and the upper reaches of the Volta, four poles emerged during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the Bambara kingdoms of Segu and Kaarta, the Mossi kingdoms, the Kingdoms of Kong and Gwiriko, and the Gulmanceba kingdoms. This took place against a back-cloth of numerous ethnic groups with non-centralized authority. It has been said that power was ‘tribalized’ during this period, especially under the impact of the slave trade which, even for countries as far inland as the Niger Bend and the River Volta, formed the economic backdrop.¹ But this is inaccurate, as shown later, because the African kingdoms were established in geographical areas that were, inevitably, ethnically diverse. In other words, the traditions of Mali and Gao continued but on a smaller scale, by other means and in a context increasingly dominated by external factors and internal conflicts that shaped new political structures. In addition, certain socio-economic and religious factors, that were in no way ‘tribal’, influenced the reorganization processes and, at the end of the eighteenth century, precipitated the first cracks that heralded the upheavals of the nineteenth.

¹. The Bambara appeared in the lists of names of the slave-traders and it is quite possible that their sudden rise to prominence in the seventeenth century was also linked to the slave-raiding of the time.
FIG. 12.1 The Niger-Volta region in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries
Peoples, chieftaincies and kingdoms

The Bambara kingdoms of Segu and Kaarta from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century

Political evolution

The origins of the Bambara\textsuperscript{2} kingdoms, while not ancient, are obscured by the diversity of the oral traditions and the chronicles. The former, collected or compiled by European travellers, officers and administrators just before and after Gao's fall, as well as by African traditionalists have now become crystallized in writings that contain a variety of viewpoints. The order of succession of rulers is not always the same, nor is the length of reigns.\textsuperscript{3}

This study, however, is more concerned with the development of the societies that gave birth to and formed great men than with their actions. And here, after a brief discussion of events, we shall deal mainly with the organization and relations of the forces that moved these peoples from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century.

Another disputed issue relates to the peoples responsible for taking the historical initiative in the Bambara kingdoms. Tauxier is categorical on this point: 'In the final analysis', he writes, 'the Bambara were never capable by themselves of founding kingdoms: the kings of Segu and Kaarta were of Fulbe origin, those of Sikasso and Kong of Mande–Juula origin. As for the ordinary Bambara, he is a true Negro, rather inferior, but a reasonably good worker and farmer'.\textsuperscript{4} As Bambara is a Mande language and as peoples have been mixing together since the earliest times, our main interest today obviously lies elsewhere\textsuperscript{5} even despite the many biological and political alliances (and wars) between the Bambara and the Fulbe, for example, to repel the last emperor of Mali, Mansa Magan (1645), or the attack on Kong. Although Bambara's origins are certainly lost, contemporary movements are reflected in traditions that make it possible to assert that they have long been indigenous to the Niger Bend. The Bozo were almost certainly there before them and they also mixed with the Soninke, Soso, Malinke, Fulbe and others. Raffenel mentions a myth of origin that talks of the land of Toron, at a moon's march from Segu, which clearly cannot

2. The Bambara call themselves Bamanaw, but we shall retain here the official present-day spelling of their name.
3. From this viewpoint, the works that are most often in agreement are: on the one hand, A. Raffenel, 1846 and L. Tauxier, 1942; and, on the other hand, M. Delafosse, 1912 and 1913, and C. Monteil, 1924. In matters of chronology we prefer the first two.
5. Further on, L. Tauxier, talking of physical anthropology writes: 'Quatrefages and Hamy conclude p 359 that the Mandingo [Mande] and Bambara Negroes who live in the upper Niger valley seem to belong to both the Hausa and Sudanic races, the latter representing the inferior negroes, the true negroes, the Hausa race representing a superior negro race or one mixed with Ethiopian or Hamitic elements' (1942, p 16).
be a reference to Toron in Wasulu quite nearby to the south-west. In fact, the existence of a sanankunya (joking relationship) between the Kulibali (Kurubari) and the Keita or Ture is evidence of long-standing relations between the Bambara and the Malinke who, moreover, speak two dialects of the same language.

Whatever the case, the story of the migration of the eponymous ancestors of the Bambara dynasties contains the theme of the river crossing that is to be found in so many legends of origin in Africa. Two brothers, Bara-mangolo and Niangolo, pursued by an enemy and having no canoe, crossed the river (possibly the Baule or the Niger) thanks to an enormous m'polio (catfish) which saved them at the last minute.

The striking aspect of this story of origin is the rapid association that came about, sometimes from choice, often by force, with the Soninke (also called the Marka). The Soninke were traders who had been settled for centuries, sometimes as slave-dealers, and had little interest in soldiering although the Bambara newcomers made it almost a profession. One of the brothers, Baramangolo, sought asylum on the right bank of the Niger with the Buare of Segu. The Segu Buare, who were Soninke, gave him a district which, although separate, allowed the newly arrived Bambara to defend the entire Segu kingdom. Meanwhile, the other brother, Niangolo, crossed the river and built a tata (fort) at Baïko. After failing to take the fort by storm, the Marka eventually settled down to peaceful and complementary relations with the Bambara newcomers – until the time when captives brought from Toron by the Juula seized their freedom and provided considerable reinforcement to Niangolo’s forces. Hence the Bambara’s (no doubt gradual) movement from the status of refugees to that of protector of their hosts and then to that of masters. This process stands out clearly in most accounts of the origins of Bambara power.

Another key aspect of this history was the strategic importance of the middle Niger where the bend of the river reaches farthest into the desert and towards the routes to North Africa. By unifying the two banks, the middle Niger had polarized political power for four centuries. It was difficult for power to be shared, which is why the two sister kingdoms, Segu and Kaarta, were to attack one another continually, mobilizing for this purpose peoples from as far apart as the river Senegal and northern Upper Volta.

It is difficult to relate the two earliest legendary ancestors of the Bambara dynasties to the first leaders known historically. Regarding Segu, we are told that one of Baramangolo’s descendants was Kaladian Kulibali who is

6. See R. Pageard, 1957. Some writers explain the marginalization of these people during the time of the Mansa of Mali by their refusal to accept Malian power and the Muslim religion, whence their name Ban ma na, ‘Refusal of the Master’.

7. The fact that they crossed the river without a canoe is said to be the origin of the patronym Kulibali (Kurubari) (from kulu, canoe, and bali, privative); but there are other etymologies.
Plate 12.1 Soninke statuette of a kneeling hermaphrodite made of wood with a patina derived from sacrifices. Height: 29 cm
said by several authors to have been the great-grandfather of Mamari Kulibali through Danfassari and Soma.\(^8\) Kaladian, who does not appear in the oral traditions, is represented as having almost restored the greatness of Mali in the seventeenth century, notably by reconquering Timbuktu from the Moroccans.\(^9\)

Meanwhile in Kaarta, on the left bank of the Niger, according to Nioro legend, Sunsan (c.1635), the son of Niangolo, is said to have founded Sunsana near Mourdia. His son, Massa (c.1666), was a famous farmer and also a prolific father who systematically married off his dozens of daughters not to princes he could not win over but to poor men on condition that they come and live with him and also espouse his cause. The periodic raids he launched also attracted many adventurers who were only admitted on condition that they first proved their worth at farming.\(^10\) Massa’s son, Benefali (c.1710–45), continued the same policy and considerably extended the power of the Massasi using methods that skilfully combined the patriarchal farming life with the brutality of military raids.

Fulakoro, who succeeded his brother Benefali, was unable to avoid the first serious clash between the Massasi and the kings of Segu. The latter were more powerful because their territory comprised the valleys of the river and its main tributaries, and had a larger, more varied population of producers including Bambara peasants and warriors, Soninke and Juula traders, Fulbe and Moorish cattle-herders, and Somono and Bozo fishermen and transporters. Segu’s power was counterbalanced by the superiority complex of the Massasi who claimed a more authentic nobility, especially after the change of dynasty in Segu.

Fulakoro, however, had to confront an able ruler in Segu’s Mamari Kulibali (1712–55), great grandson of Baramangolo the true founder of the kingdom. Mamari who was endowed with extraordinary strength and whose mother brewed dolo (millet beer) and hydromel rapidly became leader of a \(\textit{ton}\) (an association of boys circumcised at the same time) whence his name, Biton or Tiguiton. Hunting, farming, and drinking and larking with his age-mates produced in Mamari a social – and later a political – leader outside the gerontocratic and religious institutions of the country.\(^11\) Conflict ensued both within the \(\textit{ton}\) and without: internal conflict arose from Mamari’s decision to monopolize the weekly Monday meetings – and the contributions of his guests – instead of sharing the privilege as formerly. But the main clash was between Mamari and the Soninke traders whose youthful champion, Kassum was eventually killed after a series of

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\(^9\) L. Tauxier, 1942, p 63.
\(^10\) It is Massa who gave his name to the dynasty. Massasi means: ‘son of Massa’, but also ‘descendants of the king’.
\(^11\) The process by which the Bambara state was formed from the social institution of the \(\textit{ton}\) will be shown in detail below.
disputes.\textsuperscript{12} As the elders showed some concern over his increasing power, Mamari broke with the gerontocracy and eliminated the elders of Donkouna and Banankoro so as to win over their young men.

When the adults in these villages asked for help, Mamari seized the chance to consolidate his domestic achievements with external successes — first against Kong, which offered the Wattara gold to secure their services, and also against the Massasi.

Mamari was only able to repel the first intervention by Kong (c.1725) through his coalition with the Macina Fulbe who were in the process of settling Fuladugu (the land of the Upper Bakoy around Kita). Sekou Wattara is even said to have attacked Malinke territory and to have thus been caught between the Segu Bambara and the Fuladugu Fulbe. The second attack, by Kong, was driven off with the aid of the Tyero Somono using swarms of bees against the Kong cavalry.\textsuperscript{13} After relieving San and driving back the Senufo, the master of Segu nevertheless reduced the heavy taxes afflicting the people of Kong.

Fulakoro was reigning in Kaarta at this time.\textsuperscript{14} He was besieging the city of Mourdia which sent an appeal for help to Mamari. Mamari, who was only waiting for such a signal to intervene, defeated Fulakoro and took him prisoner and Fulakoro later died in captivity. Once again the Massasi had to move westward. Mamari Kulibali, called Biton, also conquered the whole of Bambara territory including Beledugu. Macina and Jenne were placed under his authority and he had palaces built there by a Jenne architect. Finally, in 1751, Mamari easily conquered Niani, the capital of declining Mali whose ruler, Massa Maghan Keita, paid him tribute. The pashas of Timbuktu had to do likewise after Biton’s fleet and cavalry had cleared the Niger Bend of Tuareg exactions. Biton’s successors, however, were rulers of no great stature.

The first was his son Denkoro (1755–7), an arrogant bloodthirsty man, who had seized the golden axe – the symbol of royal power – and was soon executed by the war chiefs. The average length of reign was less than three years. Only Ngolo Diarra (1766–90) reigned long enough to develop a policy: but he had first to get rid of Nankoroba Nzangue and then persuade the military chiefs to swear on magical objects that Mamari himself had appointed him ruler. Ngolo thus put an end to the agitation by the ton-dyon chiefs who had become mercenaries, and restored a true monarchy to which he gave concrete form by abandoning Segu-Koro to settle up-river

\textsuperscript{12} Thus, for example, Kassum suggested settling fines in cattle, with the aim of drawing the association into the area of movable property where the Soninke were certain to come out on top.

\textsuperscript{13} L. Tauxier, 1942, p. 74. It should be noted that the Juula also often raised bees which might provide useful help in time of war.

\textsuperscript{14} This episode is absent from the tradition recorded by Tammoura and Monteil, but is mentioned by Robert Arnaud and Adam. Fulakoro is further said to have seduced Bassana, one of Mamari’s daughters. See L. Tauxier, 1942, p. 75.
at Segu-Si-Koro. Like Biton, he also had palaces built for him at Jenne and Timbuktu and it was he who strengthened the Bambara hold on both Timbuktu and Macina where civilian officials descended from the 'Moroccans' (Arma) were now to be watched over by Bambara war-chiefs. His campaign against the Fulbe chief Sila Makan Yero took him even into Dogon country. Many Fulbe then emigrated towards Wassalu and Ganadugu. Even when very old he went on an expedition against Yatenga which failed, and he died on the return journey, having created a new dynasty at Segu.

After Ngolo internal conflict erupted again and only Monson Diarra (1792–1808) made the power of Segu felt from San to Timbuktu and from the land of the Dogon to Kaarta.

But Kaarta was not yet finished. After Fulakoro (who died in captivity during Mamari's reign), it had recovered through raids and at the expense of Beledugu, Bambuk and Khassonke country. Then, after Deniba Bo (1758–61), a great warrior – Sira Bo Kulibali (1761–80) – had established the royal residence at Guemu. He had seized half of Bakhunu while Ngolo Diarra was occupied in the north and east. He pillaged Kita, a large Malinke town in Fuladugu and, taking advantage of a dispute between two Diawara clans, the Sagone and the Dabora, he drove the latter out. The Dabora took refuge in Bundu or Segu while the Sagone, who were considered as free, were exempted from paying tribute but were obliged to provide a contingent of warriors in the event of war.

The socio-political organization of the Bambara kingdoms

The most striking feature of the Bambara's move towards a state form, and the development of institutions suitable for the rule of far-flung communities, is the novel formula they evolved for reconciling Bambara practices with the imperatives inherent in the life of large-scale multi-ethnic kingdoms. Nothing seems to have been borrowed from outside. The most inspired aspect is that, starting from the working of an ordinary ton, they gradually forged the machinery of a state. While this procedure is not exceptional in African history it has the advantage here of showing, in striking miniature, in the space of a few decades, the passage from 'clans to empires'.

In the kingdom of Segu The starting-point was the fla-n-ton (peer association) led by Mamari Kulibali. A fla-n-ton (or ton) was an association of young men who had undergone the initiation rite of circumcision in theory, successive promotions were organized into three groups: youths, adults and elders.

15. L. Tauxier, 1942, p. 96, citing L. G. Binger, 1892.
16. C. Monteil, 1924, p. 89.
17. ibid., pp. 290 et seq.
18. In fact the fla-n-ton brought together the members of three successive promotions of those circumcised.
The ton-den (association members) elected a ton-tigui (chief) who might equally well be a house captive as a son of a notable. The prime characteristic of the fla-n-ton was the absolute egalitarianism among people of all social backgrounds, which contrasts with the prevailing clan or gerontocratic hierarchy.

The other office-holders of the association comprised someone responsible for settling disputes and ensuring respect for the rules; the convenor, who called meetings and, because he declared the decisions, was nicknamed the ton-djeli (ton’s griot); and the ton-masa (leader) who acted as spokesman for the chief. The ton’s aims were mutual assistance and the sharing of resources for participation in social life.

As shown above Mamari Kulibali strengthened his group both against the take-over bids by Kassum’s rival group of young Soninke, and against the elders who opposed his ton plan, using first their role as faaya (fathers) and then the demands of farm work. By killing the elders of Donkouna and Banankoro, Mamari at once broke with gerontocratic authority and replaced it as faa (father) of the ton-den. But, as leaders’ successes mounted many other association members had joined the original group – insolvent debtors, pardoned condemned men, prisoners who had broken parole and young adventurers. Such new recruits were admitted with the status of ton-dyon (captives of the ton). But after the massacre of the elders, Mamari convened the ton-den (association members) and brutally had their hair cut to resemble the ton-dyon.19 Tradition puts significant words into Mamari’s mouth at this moment: ‘We shall no longer eat together the ton’s ground-nuts, we shall no longer drink together the ton’s beer; I am the son of God!’ Then some are said to have called out: ‘How cruel today’s ton (bi-ton) is!’, whence the nickname Biton given to Mamari.

When the members of the association – which basically coincided with the BAMBARA state’s army – poured in, it was no longer a matter of fla-n-ton (peers) but of foroba-dyon (captives on the big common field) or furuba-dyon (captives of the Great Union), the first ton-dyon of which formed the aristocracy. This structure was further strengthened by the involvement of the ton-dyon in cults of which Mamari was the grand-master; by the assignment of contingents of ton-dyon to the control of his own relatives; by the selection of the ton-masa not from the ton-dyon but from among his personal slaves; and finally by the rule that a foroba-dyon remain so for life and that his children be born foroba-dyon and remain so.

This process – which represented the abstraction and also the personalization and accumulation of power and, more precisely, arms around the leader of this politio-military machine – resulted in the attribution of the title faama (lord holding supreme power).20 The confusion of this status

19. Three tufts of hair spaced from the forehead to the nape.
20. Mamari Kulibali was thus both faa (father of a biological community) and faama (man of power and authority). See C. Monteil, 1924, p 303. This typically Mende title later passed to the Juula dynasts, including Samori.
with that of patriarch of a family community was one of the system’s serious contradictions. Originally property – accumulated through contributions, raids and war-takings – had remained in the foroba (public treasury) and profited the whole community. However, the community fiction did not long mask the privatization of state property. Eventually the collective oath (a bilateral oath binding the ton-tigui himself at a given point in his election) was replaced by a unilateral oath imposed by Ngolo Diarra on his electors. From then on the faama had discretionary control of state property which he used in particular to reward the bravest military leaders, by giving them the wherewithal ‘to repair the tears in their clothes’. The ruler was indeed assisted by a consultative senate of forty members including warriors and holy men but these notables had sworn fidelity to him at secret rituals on an island in the River Niger and had sworn allegiance after the investiture.

Another serious contradiction was the attempt by Mamari’s successors to settle the foroba-dyon as state serfs tied to farming, a move which precipitated a serious resistance crisis among the warriors. Eventually, however, some military leaders attempted to withdraw to their lands, which brought down terrible reprisals by the central government.

Except during the reigns of strong figures such as Mamari Kulibali and Ngolo Diarra, however, the egalitarian and almost anarchical spirit of the fla-n-ton never completely disappeared. It was this spirit that impelled the assembly of ton-dyon to eliminate Denkoro, Mamari’s son and successor, ‘to change the seed’. Initially, the ton-dyon sometimes had the faama at their mercy – by refusing mobilization and marching orders, for example. However, although the ton-dyon’s Monday and Thursday general meetings continued to be held for a long time, eventually they ‘no longer had a deliberative, or even a consultative, role, except in serious circumstances’. 21

The council of military leaders gradually supplanted the general meeting, itself becoming weakened, however, as some of its members moved away from Segu as the kingdom expanded – thus accelerating the slide towards autocracy of the faama, now influenced above all by his immediate entourage. Nevertheless, to rekindle his troops’ devotion to him the faama still convened a general meeting at least once a year for the re-swearing of loyalty oaths, the performance of religious rites and the incorporation of young recruits.

Segu’s army
At the time of the election, the royal insignia comprised the bow, the quiver and the golden axe – unequivocal symbols of the main activity of the state. Oral tradition records the feats of the faama of Segu’s army, notably in the siege of towns through the use of battering rams to undermine walls or stockades, ladders to scale them and burning arrows to spread fire. The basic army unit was the sën (foot) and several sën formed a bolo (arm). When the army was arrayed in battle order, the main mass – the sofa

(grooms) corps\textsuperscript{22} was in the centre, called disi (chest). This main body of troops was flanked right and left by the kini-n-bolo (right arm) and the numa-n-bolo (left arm) which were made up of foroba-dyon officered by ton-dyon. Behind the disi was a reserve corps of experienced ton-dyon called ton-koro-bolo. The faama alone appointed the keletigui (war-leader or leader of an expedition).

In addition to this regular army, there were allied volunteer contingents also outfitted by the faama or by suppliers bound by contracts to the ruler.

Arms consisted of axes (the chiefs' were made of precious metals), arrows, lances and guns, the first of which, of blunderbuss type, seem to have come from Kong. The drums played an important role either the great tabala drum associated with each ruler who announced war, or the dunuba drum which, skilfully played, transmitted messages over considerable distances. There were also trumpets and xylophones.

The man responsible for inspiring this whole body was the griot who had to ensure the men had heart for the battle on the eve of expeditions, for example, when war-chiefs would bind themselves on oath to perform acts of valour.

The army was the main arena for people of different nationalities to rub shoulders. It contained men of every social, ethnic and geographical background: a former captive could command nobles and a Fulbe might march at the head of a contingent made up of Bambara. Young people were thus attracted, being assured – if they survived – of rapidly making their fortunes. While one-quarter of the booty went to the king, one-quarter to the religious chiefs and one-quarter to the Somono who supplied the river transport, the remaining quarter went to the troops. There was also the booty from raids by individuals for soldiers attached to 'proconsular' command.

The overall organization of the territory, as in most African kingdoms, was concentric – from the original core along the River Niger from the capital, Segu-Koro, to Kirango, to the territories annexed over the years, along the stretch of river from Kangaba to Timbuktu. This main area of state activity by the kings of Segu was given the evocative name too-daga (too pot).\textsuperscript{23} The eldest son played a special role in the running of this area's affairs, a role which increased as his father grew older so as to prepare him for his future responsibilities. As a result of the increasing confusion of state property and personal wealth, the eldest sons of kings were generously provided for and their residences dotted the course of the River Niger. In the outlying areas, it was almost a matter of delegated power, either to the indigenous chiefs or to governors appointed by Segu.

\textsuperscript{22} The sof\textsuperscript{a} were in theory grooms, but did not necessarily practise this occupation; they were part of the faama's household. Sometimes, to secure the undying devotion of the 'young men', the faama presided at their 'birth' to manhood through circumcision, making sure that some of his own sons were also involved.

\textsuperscript{23} Too: millet paste that forms the staple diet among the Bambara.
Particular use was made in the organization of the army and the kingdom of two communities – the Somono and the Fulbe. The River Niger was the kingdom’s main artery, vital for the supply of fish, for civil transport and military logistics. The Somono fishermen, backed by foroba-dyon, were thus enrolled in the service of the state, to provide transport and supply fish in the form of dues. It was understood that this group benefitted from the special protection of the king and that they were free to organize their professional work technically and ritually.

It was the same for the Fulbe through the institution of the foroba-fulaw (Fulbe public officials), only a minority of whom were ethnic Fulbe. They were freemen, also backed by foroba-dyon, and expected to raise the public herds. Their sons, like those of the Somono, retained the status of their fathers. To these two groups must be added the numerous foroba-dyon established as peasants on agricultural lands for the needs of the rulers of Segu.

In the Kingdom of Kaarta The socio-political organization of the Massasi kingdom of Kaarta was similar to that of the kingdom of Segu, but more autocratic. When the king was enthroned, certain rituals were particularly meaningful. The head of the ton-dyon took over the running of the king’s house, confiscated the dead king’s wives’ jewellery and put it in the royal treasury. It was a member of the allied family of the Kassi Konare who had the duty of seating the newly elected ruler on the sheepskin, putting the red cap on his head and putting on the gold rings and silver amulets. He then made a speech to him recalling the political programmes of his predecessor and what the royal clan was expecting of him. The head of the ton-dyon then prostrated himself before him to swear allegiance and submission in the name of the troops. The royal succession did not pose problems among the Massasi as they had firm control over the country through provincial governors and heads of army corps. Moreover, the sofa corps directly bound to the king was highly organized and could be used to discourage the heads of the ton-dyon from any idea of rebellion. The supreme leader of the ton-dyon was a creature of the ruler, and all men in authority, all the corps of troops and the allies of the clan were members of the brotherhood that venerated the guardian spirit of the clan.

In short, the Massasi clan seems to have been more homogenous than that of Segu because it was not initially locked into a pre-existing indigenous institution. It was formed and developed freely under the initiative of the Massasi family which always jealously kept its leadership for itself.  

24. C. Monteil, 1924, p. 330. The author likens this structure to that of Khasso.
On the Central Volta Plateau: Mossi\textsuperscript{25} kingdoms from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century

\textit{Origins}\textsuperscript{26}

The most important development on the Volta plateau during this period is undeniably the formation of the Mossi kingdoms, the earliest of which dates from the twelfth century. Assuming, as most authors do, that the Na Gbewa and Na Nedega of Mossi traditions are the same person, through Naaba Rawa and Naaba Zuigrana, the sons of Naaba Wedraogo (himself the son of Yennenga who was the daughter of Na Nedega), the Mossi dynasties are linked to the Mamprusi, Nanumba and Dagomba kingdoms. With Naaba Wubri — whose advent at the head of the future kingdom of Ouagadougou dates to about 1495\textsuperscript{27} — and Naaba Yadega — Naaba Wubri’s agnatic grandson who founded the Kingdom of Yatenga in about 1540 — there began a process of organizing the political structures of the Mossi kingdoms which was to develop over the following two centuries.

Of the three kingdoms (Mamprusi, Nanumba, Dagomba) founded by Na Gbewa’s descendants, only Dagomba was to play a major role, from the time of Na Nyaghse (1460–1500).\textsuperscript{28} Little is known about succeeding reigns from the early sixteenth\textsuperscript{29} to the mid-seventeenth century: internal domestic strife seems to have been the main feature. But in the second half of the sixteenth century a Mande chief (Naaba), established the kingdom of Gonja.\textsuperscript{30}

In the second half of the seventeenth century, the Gonja kings launched expeditions from their capital, Yagbum. One of these wars, led by Lata-Jakpa (1622/3–1666/7) against Dagomba, was successful. Na Dariziegu of Dagomba was killed, and the Gonja took Daboya, the centre of a salt-producing area. But in 1713 during the reign of Na Zangina, a convert to Islam, the Dagomba held off a new invasion by the Gonja who were crushed at the battle of Tunuma (Tuma). The peace that followed put an end to acts of aggression by Gonja which, under Lata-Jakpa, also harried the Nanumba kingdom.

In about 1740, however, a serious war of succession broke out in Dagomba itself between the newly designated Na Garba and a prince who had been an unsuccessful candidate for the throne. Taking advantage of Dagomba’s state of turmoil, in 1744 the Asante ruler, Opoku Ware,

\textsuperscript{25.} On the Moose or Mossi, it should be recalled that the singular is Moaga, the country is Mogho, the language is More and the proper name of Ouagadougou in More is Wogodo. But, in accordance with current spelling, we use Ouagadougou.

\textsuperscript{26.} On origins see UNESCO, \textit{General History of Africa}, Vol. IV, ch. 9.

\textsuperscript{27.} ibid.

\textsuperscript{28.} On the Mamprusi–Nanumba–Dagomba group of kingdoms, see H. A. Blair and A. Duncan-Johnstone, 1932; S. J. Eyre-Smith, 1933; and E. F. Tamakloe, 1931, p. 193.

\textsuperscript{29.} See N. Levzioni, 1964c.

\textsuperscript{30.} Cf. J. Goody, 1967a.
mounted an expedition against Yendi in support of the faction opposed to the new king. Na Garba was taken prisoner and only freed after undertaking to send to Kumasi an annual tribute of 2000 prisoners – an enormous number, even with eastern Gonja contributing its share.\textsuperscript{31} Dagomba’s future was dogged by the aftermath of this treaty which compelled it to continually find new sources of prisoners. The main role of Dagomba warriors became one of man-hunting among ethnic groups less organized politically and militarily for which purpose mercenaries were recruited. By the end of the eighteenth century, Dagomba was no more than a channel for Asante influence which reached as far as the borders of Mogho.

The Kingdom of Ouagadougou

Twenty-three successors to Naaba Wubri are known in central and southern Mogho between 1500 and 1800. The nanamse (princes) had until then consolidated their territorial hold as far as the Yako and Gursi area, thus laying claim to the legacy of Naaba Rawa whose sway had extended over a large part of the White Volta river basin.\textsuperscript{32} Naaba Kumdumye,\textsuperscript{33} the son of Naaba Nyingnemdo who had established Mossi government over the old settlement of Ouagadougou (Wogodogo), began his reign with a dynastic dispute which was to have serious consequences. Naaba Kumdumye had competed for the kingship with another candidate, Naaba Yadega, who even after being rejected still had the support of his eldest sister, Pabre,\textsuperscript{34} who had stolen Naaba Wubri’s regalia for him. With these insignia of royal legitimacy, Naaba Yadega made for Gursi and, after brutally killing his former tutor, Naaba Swida, conquered the region which subsequently bore his name, Yatenga (from Yadega-tenga: the land of Yadega).\textsuperscript{35}

Naaba Kumdumye put his sons to rule in Yako and Tema which were both later to become independent chiefdoms. Mossi organization in the territories it occupied or claimed was still loose and finding a place for princes whose loyalty was not always above suspicion, the king was killing two birds with one stone: he was occupying the ground politically and also keeping happy the potential candidates for the throne. Ironically, however, it was through this process that several peripheral chiefdoms were, in fact, transformed into kingdoms or independent principalities: initially loyal dynasties became less so as they became genealogically and territorially more distant from the royal line.

\textsuperscript{31} See below, ch. 14, p. 420.


\textsuperscript{34} The interregnum between the announcement of the king’s death and the appointment of his successor was bridged by the deceased king’s eldest daughter, who bore the title napoko. Pabre was a napoko.

\textsuperscript{35} It was perhaps from Naaba Kumdumye’s reign that the rulers descended from Naaba Wubri began to take the title Mogho-Naaba (Naaba of the Mossi country), as if to assert their sovereignty over the whole of the territory, despite Yadega’s secession.
Other sons of the king were placed at Mane, at Konkistenga (a name derived from Naaba Konkise) and at Bussuma. His successors continued this policy, the aim of which seems to have been to create between them and Yatenga a protective screen made up of these northern marches.

At the end of the sixteenth century, Naaba Kuda moved the royal residence to Sapone, which shows that the state apparatus was still poorly developed. He also placed his sons in areas such as Laale, Zorgo and Riziam.

Almost nothing is known of Ouagadougou until the reign of a Fulbe usurper, Naaba Moatiba (1729–37) in the eighteenth century. He is said to have been warlike, an essential requirement to have defended himself against the united Mossi princes. He is also said to have died by poisoning and his name, and those of his descendants, was erased from the official genealogy of the court.

The reign of Naaba Warga (1737–44) was short but full of new moves to strengthen the monarchy. Wars followed one another, perhaps to bring back under Ouagadougou’s control regional chiefdoms such as Yako and Mane and Tatenga (Riziam) – Tatenga had almost acquired its independence and its chief Naaba Manzi was even expansionist. But Naaba Warga was a great legislator. According to Yamba Tiendrebeogo, he established the ritual announcement of zabyuya at the ceremonial investiture of chiefs. On this occasion three mottoes were proclaimed: the first was an expression of thanks to the great electors; the second indicated the new chief’s programme, often with a discreet warning to his adversaries; and the third illustrated the chief’s character. Naaba Warga also organized the royal court, establishing two corps of servants, one Mossi and the other of prisoners, each comprising sorondamba (young servants) and bilbale (adult servants). In addition, some duties were assigned to eunuchs. Naaba Warga also institutionalized the royal pogsyure (napogsyure) system – a system of capitalizing and distributing women – to enable royal servants to have children. The girls received or collected were married to servants, and the firstborn children of these marriages were earmarked either for royal service, in the case of boys, or for capitalization for the napogsyure, in the case of girls.

With regards to criminal law, Naaba Warga may have instituted the punishment of castration. Regarding customary law, he is said to have codified it to the state in which it existed in the precolonial period, although the details of these moves are obscure. In short, the end of the seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth saw the final establishment of

36. This name may be a corruption of the Muslim first name Modibo. This usurpation no doubt throws some light on the darkness of the seventeenth century, suggesting that it must have been very troubled.

37. See Y. Tiendrebeogo, 1964, pp. 25–32. It may be that this king was not the instigator of all the initiatives attributed to him by this author, as he is a more controversial figure than it appears from his book.
the Mossi political system both in Yatenga and in central and southern Mogho. After Naaba Zombre’s long and peaceful reign (1744–c.84) and that of Naaba Kom (1784–c.91) who was the first to spread Muslim influence, the reign of Naaba Saaga (1791–6) was marked by internal conflicts which heralded the upheaval of the nineteenth century.38

The small kingdoms of central Mogho

The small kingdoms and chiefdoms of southern Mogho are little known despite the considerable contribution of information by Jonzo Kawada. Such is the case of the problematical Kingdom of Tankudgo (Tenkodogo).39

In the east and north-east, however, three kingdoms stand out: Bulsa, Busuma40 and Tatenga, the last of which dominated the region in the seventeenth century and the second, Busuma, in the eighteenth. The principality of Bulsa probably dates back to the beginning of the sixteenth century with the installation of Naaba Namende, son and kurita41 of Naaba Wubri.

The Kingdom of Busuma absorbed one by one the chiefdoms that were still scattered in this area at the beginning of the seventeenth century, namely Naamtenga (in the Luda region) at the beginning of the eighteenth century, then the chiefdom of Pisila, and finally Salmatenga (in the Kaya region). But Busuma’s future was decided in the second half of the eighteenth century when the neighbouring state of Tatenga, founded by one of Naaba Kuda’s sons, saw a formidable and ambitious warrior, Naaba Manzi, accede to the throne. Nonetheless, at the end of the seventeenth century, Busuma’s Naaba Ruubo, with the help of Mégé and Salogo, succeeded in eliminating the terrible Manzi in battle. His son Wema had no choice but to take refuge in the farthest parts of the Riziam massif, which was later to lose more land to Yatenga during the nineteenth century.

Yatenga42

We have already described how Naaba Yadega went into exile from Ouagadougou. His successors held sway over a limited area gradually moving their royal residences northwards from Gursi and Lago, throughout the sixteenth century. The north, however, was occupied by the kingdom of Zandoma under the sway of Naaba Rawa’s descendants. Naaba

38. L. Frobenius, 1911–13 and 1924.
39. See J. Kawada, 1979. Tankudgo means ‘the old mountain’, and so the current official spelling Tenkodogo does not come from teng kudgo, ‘the old land’, as has often been stated.
41. The king’s kurita is his representative on earth after death; kurita means ‘reigning death’. He is chosen from among the deceased king’s sons unlikely to accede to the throne; once chosen, he is excluded from the throne; he is exiled far away from the court since it is forbidden for him to meet his father’s successor.
Lambwega’s political and military activity consisted precisely in dismantling Naaba Rawa’s inheritance, while in the east he incorporated the former Kurumba chiefdoms of Lurum.43

In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Naaba Lambwega’s descendants tried to saturate the considerably enlarged area of the kingdom, by establishing Mossi chiefdoms there reserved for princes, by settling Lurum, and by containing the Macina and Jelgoji Fulbe, but also by maintaining the internal territorial status quo in Mogho.44 Thus about the middle of the eighteenth century, a series of clashes with Yako45 began which were to last until the beginning of the nineteenth century over control of the small chiefdoms of Busu-Darigma and Nyesga. Naaba Nabasere died engaged in this task.

**Naaba Kango**

On the death of his son Naaba Piiyo (1754), who was probably responsible for the introduction of the first guns into Yatenga, his younger brother Naaba Kango came to the throne. No sooner had he been appointed than he was faced with violent opposition from princes led by Naaba Wobgo and he was obliged to abdicate and go into exile with a handful of trusty followers. He reached Kong and then moved on to Segu where he won the support of the Kulibali to regain his throne. In 1757, he returned to Yatenga at the head of an army of mercenaries comprising Bambara riflemen and Bwaba and Samo archers. But after his stay in places famous for their economic importance and their political pluralism, it was no longer the same prince who was returning to his country. His policy strikingly testified to this. After beating Naaba Wobogo, who went into exile, Naaba Kango began his reign with a spectacular gesture: he refused to make the ringu (enthronement) journey, which alone gave the ruler of Yatenga—who on appointment was only a naaba (chief)—the rank of rima (king).46 This refusal to have his power legitimized marked a decisive break with the past.

He also founded the capital at Waiguoyo (Ouahigouya), in about 1780, not far from the former royal seat at Biisigi. It was a new town around a vast palace built in the Mali style and bringing together his old comrades in exile. Until then, royal seats had been ordinary villages. This was the first time the inhabitants of a capital had consisted exclusively of

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43. The Kurumba (Fulse in More) occupied a vast area from northern Gulma to Yatenga; they are said to have established the ‘kingdom’ of Lurum which covered part of present-day Jelgoji (Jibo region). The king living at Mengao, bore the title of Ayo or Lurum’ayo or Lurum’yo.

44. Thus the Naaba of Zitenga (capital: Tikare) in the south-east of Yatenga was considered a kombere of Yatenga; a kombere (pl. kombemba) was a regional chief with broad autonomy marked notably by the right to appoint local chiefs; practically, Zitenga was independent of Yatenga.


46. Rima and ringu have as shared radical the verb ri, meaning ‘to absorb or eat food that is not chewed’.
representatives of the state apparatus, the world of politics, people of the royal household, either prisoners or free. Here again, he was demonstrating a clear determination to break with custom and organize sovereignly a power that he owed to no one but himself, making it more centralized by strengthening the corps of royal servants.\textsuperscript{47} The name of the new capital, Waiguyo, is itself indicative of a whole programme: ‘come and bow down and make your submission’. This demand was addressed first and foremost to all members of the royal lineage, royal nakombse (princes of the blood) who had until then been dominant, who had supported the usurper Wobogo and who now had to be brought down through the action of the royal staff. This marked a sharp turning-point in the political relations of force within the Mossi monarchy. But, up to the time of colonization, the princes refused to acknowledge defeat and the balance of power oscillated dangerously between them and the authority of the palace. The latter was reorganized. The war-chief of Ula was made the first army commander and his office was brought into the \textit{cursus honorum} of the court, so that it stopped being hereditary and became available as a reward for the personal merits of valorous warriors.

To restore order, which had been seriously disturbed during the years of instability, Naaba Kango put down banditry mercilessly. Thieves and murderers were burnt alive; the same fate befell the Bambara mercenaries from Segu who had been used against Yako and then been accused of having become turbulent. The indiscipline of chiefs was severely punished, as also sometimes was their munificence – this being interpreted in high places as a presumptuous way of competing with the king’s lifestyle.

Did the massacre of the Bambara mercenaries precipitate an expedition by Segu against Yatenga? There is no reference to such an expedition in Mossi tradition, whereas there is in Bambara traditions.\textsuperscript{48} In any event, Naaba Kango, who intended to give royal prisoners a special place in the system of government, needed many more of them. Some were taken from among prisoners-of-war; but most were captured during raids against Dogon villages in the Gondo plain and the Kurumba villages in the east and north-east.

Naaba Kango’s war against Yako was a politico-military success but it had no follow-up; hostilities resumed at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

When Naaba Kango died in 1787, he was buried in his capital and not in the royal cemetery. His death must have come as a relief to many, for he ruled without pity. The princes’ resentment was so great that they had the only daughter of the dead king stifled to death. But the court aristocracy which had remained loyal were able to have one of his life-long companions, Naaba Saagha (1797–1803), nominated to succeed him.

\textsuperscript{47} See M. Izard, 1975.
The socio-political structures of Mogho

By the Mossi kingdoms is meant not states comprising a homogenous society — the Mossi ethnic group — but composite socio-political formations resulting from the conquest, by warriors called Mossi, of the White Volta basin. And this conquest must not be seen crudely and romantically as wave after wave of horsemen sweeping down. The process of intermarriage and infiltration by slow settlement carried out by Mossi peasants, which continues down to the present day, was certainly much more decisive. But each time that an area was taken over, it was organized on the Mossi socio-political model. Strictly speaking, the Mossi were the holders of political power in the Mossi kingdoms; they recognized each other as being all agnatic descendants of a common ancestor, Naaba Wedraogo. In the case of Yatenga, at the end of the nineteenth century the population comprised three distinct societies: Mossi society, Silmiga (Fulbe) society, and Silmi-Mossi society. The first alone was made up the population of the kingdom, in that it was subject to the authority of the king, the Yatenga-Naaba. The Fulbe or Silmiise had, as it were, the status of guests, on the basis of settlement contracts under which a broad strip of territory in the northern part of the country was reserved for them. The Fulbe had been settled in Yatenga since the seventeenth century and had established permanent villages there from which the seasonal transhumance of cattle was organized. In these permanent settlements lived the rimabe (prisoners tied to working the land). It is perhaps misleading to speak of Silmi-Mossi society, but these sedentary small stockbreeders, quite numerous in the south-east of Yatenga, certainly fall into a separate category. Their compound name, Silmi-Mossi, is a reminder that they were the offspring of mixed marriages (which anyway were forbidden) between Fulbe (Silmiise) men and Mossi women. Arriving in the eighteenth century from Tema, and settling in hamlets on the fringes of Mossi village lands, they did not come under Mossi authority, and passed under the somewhat distant protection of the Fulbe politico-religious centre at Todiam in the east of the kingdom.

But what of Mossi society itself? Its internal cleavages were linked to the distinction made by the Mossi between the naaba (chief), naabiise, sing. nabiiga (chiefs' sons) and the nakombse, sing. nakombga (sons or descendants of sons of princes who had not become chiefs). This distinction rested on one of the rules of eligibility for a chieftaincy — that only chiefs' sons could become chiefs. Because of this, a nakombga had no hope of holding naam (power). Thus, strictly speaking, except for the tiny minority of chiefs and sons of chiefs, all other Mossi who claimed to be descendants of Wedraogo could be regarded as nakombse. This led to a narrow definition of the status of nakombga which distinguished between this class and that of the talse (commoners). Thus in Yatenga, only the agnic descendants of the twelfth

49. It might be recalled that the first king of Ouagadougou, Wubri, was himself the fruit of a marriage between a Mossi prince and an indigenous girl.
Mossi statuette commemorating a female ancestor, made of wood with a natural patina. Height: 47 cm
Yatenga-Naaba are nakombse, all other Mossi – except for the chiefs and sons of chiefs – being regarded as talse. The royal nakombse (the royal lineage) were themselves divided into five branches, each normally consisting of one generation of princes. The royal lineage was apparently very early seen as having to be of constant generational depth (five generations), the appearance of a new generation entailing the exclusion of the oldest generation from the royal lineage and its transfer to the talse group. This system was linked to the need for every new king to provide his sons with village chieftaincies, when there was only a limited number of villages; thus old local dynasties in the villages were regularly replaced by new ones.

To the extent that they held village chieftaincies, the nakombse constituted a category of power-holders below the chiefs. There were two others: the tasobnamba (war-chiefs) and the king’s household staff. The war-chiefs were appointed from the oldest genealogical stocks of nakombse, the dynastic descent groups founded before the formation of Yatenga, and from the first two dynastic generations of Yatenga. The war-chiefs, who did not necessarily have any military duties, were thus local notables of ancient stock, whereas the local power of the nakombse was always of recent origin. During the reign of Naaba Kango, royal servants, of free or prisoner origin, were appointed to posts as local chiefs on an ad hominem basis. This represented a departure from the traditional idea of incompatibility between authority and service posts and stemmed from the central government’s intention to create a Mossi colonization front towards Fulbe country to the east. In the case of court offices, the structure that prevailed on top of the political hierarchy around the king was the same as that around each local chief. Three dignitaries assisted the chief: the Togo-Naaba, the chief’s spokesman who was responsible for ritual ceremonies; the Balum-Naaba, who looked after supply problems and domestic affairs; and the Weranga-Naaba, who looked after the horses. These were the chief’s nesomba (honest men). These posts were closed to non-Mossi as well as the nakombse and to members of castes such as blacksmiths.

The royal court had the same core of dignitaries, but with a fourth as well – the Bin-Naaba or Rasam-Naaba, chief of the royal prisoners. Each headed a large group of servants. Thus members of the royal lineage too deeply involved in the struggle for the throne could not serve the king. Lastly, the institutional holders of power were actually effectively divided into two sub-groups with opposing interests: those – the war-chiefs and royal servants – on whom the king relied to govern; and those – the nakombse – against whom he governed. This division went deep among the Mossi as these men of lowly origin who held the great offices of state were also involved in the struggle for the throne.

50. At the court of the king of Ouagadougou, around the Mogho-Naaba, were the Widi-Naaba, the political spokesman, the Gounga-Naaba, with military responsibilities, the Larhle-Naaba, who combined military and ritual functions, the Balum-Naaba, and the Kamsaogo-Naaba, an eunuch responsible for the harem. There was also the Tasoba, the war-chief.
at the same time the great electors who chose a new Mogho-Naaba and sometimes held territorial commands. Internal conflicts have always punctuated the history of all the Mossi kingdoms. They were almost always about the transmission of power over which the rival interests of the nobles and the political experience of the king’s ministers—men of lowly extraction but with the power to select the best among those eligible—clashed. Generally, the main rivalry was between the ruling monarch’s younger brothers and his sons.

In contrast to the world of government, to which the royal prisoners belonged, lay the world of the land. The people or sons of the land were, in theory, the descendants of the indigenous peoples, blacksmiths excepted. Deprived of all political power, they were responsible for the earth rituals, which concerned both the fertility of the soil and the harvests, law and order and the perpetuation of the local group. Thus the figure of the naaba (chief) was contrasted with that of the tengsoba (earth-priest), the holder of sacred power. This dualism was reflected cosmogenically in the divine world through Naaba Wende, the King-God, and Napaga Tenga, the Queen-Land, although the King-God Wende had no altar and no ritual cult.

But the definition of the category of people of the land changed substantially down the centuries because the true Mossi became absorbed into the category of indigenes and used this status to become earth-priests. About one-third of Yatenga’s earth-priests are of Mossi origin although some Mossi became blacksmiths and Yarse.

Alongside the earth-priest there was also the bugo (fertility priest), pl. buguba, with his own tiido (altar). This office, which was even open to nakombse and also to blacksmiths, seems to have been of Dogon origin.

The political world and the world of the land were integrated into a unitary system with the king as its hub through the medium of great yearly rituals involving the monarch and the power-holders, the earth-priests and the fertility priests. The Yatenga Mossi (like the Kurumba) had an annual solar calendar divided into lunar months, the discrepancy between the lunar year and the solar year being compensated for by an intercalary month every three years. After the new year filiga (thanksgiving festival) came the ceremonies of napusum (greeting the king) at which, in three separate ceremonies, the royal servants, the war-chiefs and the nakombse paid homage to the king and gave him presents. As the new year fell approximately at the winter solstice, the period from the second to the sixth month was taken up with a great ceremonial cycle called bega which involved the king and all the dignitaries of the land in sacrifices intended to ask for a good harvest. The feasts of the bega ended at the beginning of the rainy season. Ceremonial activity was resumed during the harvest season, with two festivals of first fruits, one for the war-chiefs and the other for the fertility priests.

This highly complex political-cum-religious system gave cohesion to a
state society which was made up of groups of varied origin, the biggest of which had usually retained several cultural features from their pre-state past, starting with their own socio-political stratification. Thus the division of society as a whole into four large functional groups – power-holders, people of the land, blacksmiths and craftsmen, and traders – turns up with certain differences among the Kurumba or Fulse. Indeed, it was probably from the Kurumba that the Mossi of Yatenga borrowed their ideas about blacksmiths who, here, unlike in the rest of Mogho, form an endogamous group.

Considering society as a whole, all the ethnic groups were divided in two ways: into descent groups and local groups.

In this composite society, patrilineal and patrilocal, the Mossi term *budu* denotes any descent group, from the broadest and the oldest to the narrowest, that operates as the exogamous reference unit. It is this latter sense that is generally understood. Society was thus made up of a certain number of *budu* – such as the group of royal *nakombse*. With a history of its own, distinguished by the name of a founder and a place of foundation, a *budu* defined its individuality by the existence of a *bud-kasma* (head), a *kiims'rogo* (ancestral shrine) and a heartland where the *bud-kasma* lived and the *kiims'rogo* was, and also by having (usually not in exclusivity) one or more *sonda* (collective names or mottoes), sing. *sondre*, a key word which was used as a patronymic.

The patrilineage only existed territorially at its first level of segmentation, the *saka* (section). The section was divided in turn into *yiiya* (households), sing. *yiiri*; production and consumption units themselves being divided into *zakse* (smaller units), sing. *zaka*. *Zakse* have nowadays become the economically meaningful family units. Work on the common fields of the household was favoured to the benefit of the *yiir-kasma* (head the *yiiri*). The reserves of the head of the family were redistributed as a last resort when the stores of heads of compounds had been exhausted.

The sections belonging to one lineage were generally scattered, and hence came under several village units. In other words, a Mossi village contained parts of several lineages, whilst a lineage was likewise dispersed over several villages, the largest local lineage unit being the section.

The Gulma and the Borgu
For a long time the Gulma (or Gurma) bank of the Niger – the right bank downstream from the Bend – was little known from the historical viewpoint. This, however, has changed recently thanks to research carried out in the

51. There has been much discussion recently about the appositeness of the term ‘village’ to denote the biggest unit of habitat among the Mossi. Even though the pairing of sections does not form village ‘communities’ as in West Volta, nevertheless they still constitute meaningful entities in terms of the logic of economic and social relationships, if only because of the intersection of administrative units incorporated in a local chief, and units of land control represented by an earth-priest.
north of Gulma territory by the Voltaic historian, Georges Madiega, so that it is now possible to give on the Gulma information still incomplete but scientifically sound at least.

The Dogon (Kumbetieba in the Gulma language) constitute one of the oldest populations of North Gulma. After them came the group today called the Tindamba (people of the earth)\(^{52}\) who were originally from the region known today as Moaga but would belong to a pre-Moaga population group, and the Woba from the south. North Gulma was also peopled by the Kurumba and it is possible that the group name, Koarima – as the Gulmanceba from the south called those from the north – is a modification of the term Kurumba. In south Gulma, for which our information is still very limited, one finds, amongst the former inhabitants, some Tindamba and Woba. The latter certainly occupied a huge area before being overwhelmed and partially assimilated by the Gulmanceba and other peoples who set up states there. Thus, Woba from Gulma and Waba from Borgu (north Benin today) would form one and the same group.

On this substructure of early populations a foreign power superimposed itself, namely the Bemba or Buricimba, sing. Buricima, who later gave rise to the Gulmanceba states. We do not yet possess a satisfactory chronological framework for early Gulmance history, but Georges Madiega’s two major hypotheses are first that the ancestors of the Mamprusi passed through Gulma before the arrival of the Buricimba, and second that the first Gulmance dynasties were contemporary with the first Mossi dynasties. This would suggest that the beginning of Gulma’s history as a state was probably during the fifteenth century or the end of the fourteenth at the earliest. The figure of a historical-mythical ancestor called Jaba is associated with the birth of the Gulmance states. That he was a guerrilla leader, like Naaba Wedraogo in Mossi history, seems unlikely; and the powers attributed to him have more to do with magic than with generalship. What seems certain is that the links suggested by the Mossi between Na Bawa’s descendants and Jaba’s (known by the Mossi as Jaba Lompo, though Jaba and Lompo were probably two separate individuals, Lompo being Jaba’s son) are nothing but late reconstructions thought up at the court of the Mogho-Naaba to justify the virtual amalgamation of Gulmance power and Mossi power during the colonial period. Alternatively the converse may be the case – that the colonial administrative organization of the old chieftaincies or states, which gave the Mogho-Naaba a kind of absolute pre-eminence, may have led some people to give it a historical basis. All the evidence suggests that, from the point of view of dynasty origins, the Mossi and Gulmanceba hegemonies must be treated separately.

Where the Buricimba came from is questionable. As in many other areas that were organized as states in central West Africa, we find references in Gulma to the effect that the conquerors came from Borno; but in fact there

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is at present no way of knowing which warlike migrations gave rise to the Gulmance empire. At least we know that the earliest Gulmance political centre was Lompotangu or Sangbantangu, south-east of Nungu (Fada N‘Gourma). From Lompotangu the Buricimba moved to Kujubongu, south of Pama. The ruins that mark this second stage of Buricima penetration suggest the remains of an old capital, that of the earliest Gulmance political structure; and this must have been the focal point from which the conquerors set out and gave rise to the present-day dynasties. It is noteworthy that the Buricima were not at the time the only founders of kingdoms in this area. The Jakpangu dynasty is of Berba origin, and the Gobnangu dynasty of Hausa origin. There are also dynasties whose founders came from Yang, an interface between the Mossi and the Gulmance, whose present-day chiefs can be connected with the descendants of Naaba Wedraogo. The Gulmance dynasties of Yang comprise the Boarigu, Komin-Yang, Sudugo, Kamseongo, Dogtenga and Yutenga.

Buricimba expansion continued throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the apogee of Gulmance power can be put at about the middle of the eighteenth century. At that time the Gulmanceba held sway over an enormous (though no doubt sparsely populated) territory, bounded to the south by the Mamprusi kingdom and Borgu, to the east by Torodi and the last vestiges of the Songhay empire, to the north by the Sahel areas inhabited by Kurumba, Songhay and Fulbe, and to the west by the Mossi chiefdoms of Tuguri, Bulsa, Kupela and Tankudgo. What were to become the Fulbe emirates of Liptako (the Dori area) and Yaga (the Seba area) were then under Gulmance rule, and it was not until the early 1800s that the Fulbe drove the Gulmanceba southwards.

In the middle of the eighteenth century two large kingdoms, Bilanga and Kuala, shared most of the territory of north Gulma between them, plus three fairly new minor states, Piala, Bongandini and Con. From the village of We, north-east of Nungu, which the Buricimba reached in about the mid-1500s, the Gulmance empire expanded northwards at a great rate. The result was a sparse scattering of regional and local chiefdoms, which shrewd chiefs were later to set about federating into kingdoms.

While, thanks to Georges Madiega, we now understand the history of north Gulma, that of central and southern Gulma remains obscure. It is, therefore, all the harder to take an overall view of the history of Gulma because in the south we have eleven kingdoms, one of which, Nungu, is especially important because of the status of its king, the Nunbado (chief of Nungu). Nungu was founded by Yendabri, a descendant of Jaba’s, in the mid-1700s. That was the time when southern Gulma was over-run by the Tyokosi, Mande mercenaries belonging to the Wattara group (who turn up at Kong and Bobo-Dioulasso). Originally in the service of the Mamprusi kings, the Tyokosi were headed by a chief from Gonja. They

53. *Bado* is the equivalent of the *More naaba.*
first settled in what is now northern Togo, then launched expeditions against the Gulmanceba kingdoms while continuing to hire themselves out as mercenaries. Thus the chief of Pama sought the support of the Tyokosi against the chief of Kujuabongu. Yendabri, ruler of Nungu, soon took on the leadership of a coalition of kingdoms and set about driving the Tyokosi out of Gulma. The kings of Pama, Macakoali, Boarigu and Botu rallied around Yendabri, as did the Mossi rulers of Bulsa, Kupela and Tankudgo. Hard-pressed by their enemies, the Tyokosi withdrew to their capital, Sansane-Mango, to which the allies laid siege.54 It is questionable whether the victorious Yendabri then took advantage of his success to strengthen his authority over the league he had formed. What is certain is that, in the eighteenth century, the Nunbado became a sort of overlord of part of Gulma, his authority outside the borders of his own kingdom also being more spiritual than political. 'The Nunbado', writes Georges Madiega, 'exerted direct authority over Nungo ... He also exerted a more remote control over the diema (regional kingdoms or chiefdoms) of the batieba (regional rulers or chiefs) who were not of Lompo descent. The dynasties that were of Lompo descent regarded him simply as the nikipelo (eldest member) of the lineage'. In the document quoted, Lompo is seen as Jaba's son.55 Thus the Nunbado gradually developed into the chief sovereign of Gulma and, in the meantime, his royal seat became the main town of the land, largely because of the economic role of the Hausa traders there. (Their name for Nungu was Rojo or Fada N'Gourma.) It is still difficult today to interpret the relationship the Nunbado had with the Gulmanceba rulers. There does not seem to have been a Gulmance confederation, and the Nunbado's real authority was no doubt just as territorially limited as that of the other kinds, several of whom indeed were more powerful than he. But the Nunbado acquired exceptional moral and ritual prestige in that he became — belatedly — regarded as the direct heir of Lompo and hence of his ‘father’ Jaba. Hausa trade did the rest: Nungu became an important centre for east-west caravan traffic.

Borgu56 extends to the south-east of Gulma. Its history, somewhat confused, comprises several state-type entities, the earliest having apparently been Busa, from which the Wasangari warriors spread. Here again, the chiefs claim that the royal dynasties originated in Borno. The Wasangari military aristocracy imposed its rule over long-established peoples, some of them pre-Gulmance, who in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries absorbed Mande groups (Busa is a south-Mande language) trading between what is northern Ghana and Hausaland. Busa reached its apogee in the sixteenth century, then declined. The other kingdoms, such as Nikki, are


55. See above, p. 350: Jaba Lompo, the single figure of (no doubt late) Mossi traditions, is replaced in Gulmance traditions by two persons, Jaba and his son Lompo.

more or less direct offshoots from Busa. In the eighteenth century Nikki was at war with the Kingdom of Nupe. Nikki gave rise to the little states of Kaiama, Paraku, Kuande and Kandi. The Borgu states, incidentally, are known as the Bariba kingdoms, after one of the main indigenous peoples of the area.

The peoples with non-centralized authority
These peoples are described in this way for lack of a better term. They were settled in the upper Volta basins and had existed from a very early date, either there or elsewhere. Although, unlike the centralized societies, these peoples did not dominate the political stage or the flow of events, their contribution must not be overlooked – particularly as they form the underlying human population onto which external contributions were biologically grafted. The conquering peoples rarely arrived in all-engulfing waves, annihilating all before them. The Mossi, for example, are the product of a mixing of various ethnic groups brought together by a group of chieftaincies, under the authority of an apparently absolute king but governed by strict custom. In this process of expansion, the steady advance of Mossi peasants was unquestionably more important than the establishment of contingents of horsemen. The slow penetration of the pre-existing human fabric was a phenomenon with a double meaning, thanks to intermarriage and cultural and economic exchanges.

The biological contributions are so important that Dim Delobsom noted that the very term Moaga (pl. Mossi) means mixed. We cannot insist too strongly in this connection on the role of the Nioniosse mentioned by several authors as existing at a very early date. There has been so much biological mixing that the people of Yatenga treat the Mossi of central Mogho as Gurunsi; while in Ouagadougou this term is used solely for the Mossi of Koudougou who are neighbours of the Gurunsi. Nor have the people of Yatenga themselves been untouched by contributions from the Mande peoples of the Niger Bend, who had a decisive military impact on the history of Yatenga with Naaba Kango’s recourse to troops from Segu. These same Mande peoples, however, had long been mixed with the population through cohabitation by their traders, the professional and even biological ancestors of the important Yarse group. It is this biological

57. The expressions ‘stateless societies’ or ‘acephalous societies’ must be rejected. But even the term ‘people with non-centralized authority’ can be criticized because it is negative, and because it refers only to political power. Moreover, a people of this type can in turn become centralized (the Bambara) and then cease to be so.
59. See A. D. Delobsom, 1929. It is true that the author adds that this rather unfavourable judgement emanated from nobles describing commoners; but tradition (see Yamba Tindrébeogo) reports that the mother of Wubri, the first king of Ouagadougou, was herself an indigenous woman.
60. ibid.; R. Pageard, 1969.
61. See below in this chapter: p. 361.
mixing that probably lies behind the rakire (joking relationship) between the Mossi and the Samo (Sana). On the cultural and economic levels, here as elsewhere – such as in the Great Lakes region – the contribution of the indigenous peoples has often been played down or even concealed. We have seen how, in the area of political and religious organization, the Dogon (particularly the earth-priest) and the Kurumba contributed to the system of dynastic rule in Yatenga. If only through the management of farming rituals and through the ministry of earth-priests, who were usually from the indigenous peoples, they continued to have a strong influence on the daily life of every single peasant. But at the highest political level, the descendant of the chief of the indigenes, who had become the Ouagadougou Naaba, had an important role to play in the enthronement of the Mogho-Naaba.

While slavery developed during this period – usually at the expense of the indigenous peoples, particularly the Gurunsi and the Fulse – it escalated above all with the rise of the slave trade on the Guinea coast and its repercussions as far as the Asante empire and its tributary countries to the north.

Moreover, the indigenous peoples, whether of Mande or Voltaic culture, were open to exchanges but refused to accept domination – a strategy that was highly successful until the colonial period. Naaba Kumdumye died on an early expedition to Boromo when he was probably trying to bring under Mossi control the area between the Red and Black Voltas. This great design failed and the Red Volta, except in a few restricted areas, became the natural western border of Mogho.

Despite the absence of a centralized state, the Gurunsi and the Bwaba who inhabit this region developed a marked individual personality. The Gurunsi, whose main centres were Po, Leo, Sapouy and Rep, spread into present-day Ghana. They lived withdrawn into family groups in remarkably designed huts and were fiercely opposed to any form of complex political hierarchy. Often the earth-priest or masquerade societies constituted a link between families. In the east, however, there did exist a more organized structure under a canton chief with a court, and a religious adviser responsible for the cult of his kwara (magical symbol).

The Bwaba appear to have emerged as a specific entity between the tenth and fifteenth centuries. They do not recognize any political authority above the village level. The religion of Do also forms a bond between the initiated in one village and those in neighbouring villages.

62. Ouagadougou (Wogodogo) is, in the narrow sense, the district where the indigenous chief lives.
63. Fulse or Kurumba; see above, p. 343.
64. In fact there is no people calling itself Gurunsi (sing. gurunga in More); but Nunuma, Lela, Sisala, Kà, Kasena, etc.
Near Yatenga were the northern Samo whose concentrated settlements are marked by enormous grain stores. Political organization consisted of reasonably stable confederations of dozens of villages around a few political centres corresponding to the kafu (Mande canton). The San system rested on both clan alliances – between the Zerbo chiefs and the blacksmiths, for example – and territorial coalitions. Before coming to the throne, Naaba Kumdumye and other princes, including Naaba Yadega, had made war against the Sana. Later, Naaba Kango attempted to draw north-eastern San country into the bosom of Yatenga but failed. The Sana, hardened warriors and peasants fiercely attached to their freedom, again resisted Yatenga pressures as they had earlier – in the time of Naaba Yadega and during the reign of Naaba Lambwega, in particular – and as they were to do again throughout the nineteenth century. During this last period, moreover, their country was to act as a fallback zone for the Yatenga princes who gathered mercenaries there to make or unmake the kings in Waiguyo. As for the Bisa, who were related to the Sana and separated from them after a clan dispute, they were based in south-eastern Mogho. They, too, would put up remarkable resistance despite mutual cultural exchanges and a tribute in captives at the end of the 1700s. But they seem to have been expanding until the colonial period.

The south-west of present-day Burkina Faso was almost uninhabited although the Bwaba went hunting as far as the River Buguriba. In about 1730, the Kulango expanded into the same area where, a decade later, the Pwa (Puguli) settled with the permission of the Bwaba. Then, within fifty years, followed the Dorobe and Gan, who settled initially at Nako, the first Dyan, Lobi and Wiile and, finally, the Birifor who occupied the area of Batie abandoned by the Lobi.

Kong and Gwiriko
Since the time of the Sudanese empires from the tenth to the fifteenth centuries, Juula traders, called Wangara, had been travelling the routes to the forest where gold and kola (whence the name Worodugu) were to be found. But, from the sixteenth century, a new factor arose along the Gulf of Guinea: the trade in slaves and fire-arms. This single event is enough to explain why groups of Juula – now traders, now soldiers, now Muslim missionaries – went further and further south into the savannah areas where the goods most demanded by the new dispensation were increasingly traded. It was Juula who helped to establish the great trading centre of Begho. The Begho route was soon linked to the one crossing present-day Côte d'Ivoire from Assinie to Bobo and Bamako through Yakasso. While the Diomande settled in the centre-west, the Wattara turned Boron and Mankono into great trading centres. At the end of the sixteenth century,

66. The term Samo comes from the Mande name Samogo. But this people calls itself Saná (sing. San).

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the Gonja kingdom came into being and, at the end of the seventeenth century, after the destruction of Begho, Juula refugees fell back into the Bron (Abron) kingdom and founded Bonduku.

A number of important circumstances gave a sharp push to the activities of the Juula from the seventeenth century onwards. First there was the fall of the Empire of Gao and, second, the creation of the Asante empire which constituted a major centre for the supply of gold, arms, salt and manufactured goods. Third, there were the Voltaic savannah societies, which were quite densely populated compared to neighbouring societies, most of which had no centralized political authority, and which therefore could supply slaves, and also the cattle and gold that the coastal areas wanted. It is thus easy to understand why the Dagomba should have organized the Kulango\textsuperscript{67} kingdom of Buna in Lorhon country on the same model as their own. It was a highly centralized kingdom based on military districts administered by princes. They exploited the gold deposits of Lobi – possibly in competition with the Bron kingdom – which gave rise to bloody clashes during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

After subduing the southern Kulango, the Bron of the Akan group disputed with Buna control of the northern route along the River Comoe. It was the consolidation of their power by two great rulers, Tan Date (in the seventeenth century) and Kousounou (in the early eighteenth century) that attracted the Juula to Bonduku. But the Baule soon decided to close the Bandama river to trade with the north. The Juula, who had been driven westwards, wanted to open up the Comoe river route down to Bassam so as to use this round-about way to reach the forts in Nzima and Fanteland.

It was in this overall context that a new diaspora of settlements that were at once commercial, political, military and religious came into being on the initiative of the Juula. In the middle of the eighteenth century, armed bands that had come down from Segu – the Diarrasouba – brushed the Senufo aside and set up a Mande (Nafana) kingdom at Odienne.

The Senufo belong to the Voltaic group of language-speakers. They were settled in clans around Korogho, Seguela, Odienne and Kong, and the fall of Mali seems to have opened up to them possibilities of territorial expansion northwards as far as Sikasso and Bougouni where, however, they adopted the Bambara language and southwards into the region of Bouaké where they would be absorbed into the Baule block. In the east they gave rise to isolated groups, such as the Nafana who became gold-diggers at Begho, before falling under Bron control. As for the Pallaka, they would fall under the domination of Kong. The Senufo were, above all, excellent peasants who worked the land around their compact villages with great efficiency. They were egalitarian and independent-minded and the fact that they only had one large-scale social institution – the Poron, which had a religious character – also helped to regulate the social hierarchy. They also

\textsuperscript{67}. Kulango: ‘Those who do not fear death’.
PLATE 12.3 General view of Kong
had consummate artists who, since an early date, had been producing some of the masterpieces of the Negro-African symbolist style. It was only in about the nineteenth century that the Senufo set themselves to building up a few centralized kingdoms – with the Traore dynasty of Kenedugu (Sikasso) for example – perhaps imitating the Mande in this respect.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century the Mande added the famous centre of Kong to the chain of Juula settlements. This region appears to have been occupied, if not organized, at an early date by the Tiefo, as is suggested by the string of Tiefo villages that still run from Noumoudara to Kong. It was there that Keita and Kulibali Mande, who had later become Wattara, subdued the indigenes. One of them, Sekou Wattara, eliminated the other Juula groups at the beginning of the eighteenth century, and reigned at Nafana and Kong thanks to a powerful army in which Senufo served under Juula officers. This military force enabled it to conquer western Upper Volta as far as Dafina (the Black Volta bend). Subsequently, the Kong forces subdued Turka country and Folona, laid waste the Sikasso region and part of Minianka and Macina, and even got as far as Sofara, opposite Jenne on the River Bani. We have seen how this expedition was finally driven back by Biton Kulibali. After Sekou Wattara’s death in 1740 the empire was profoundly disrupted – because of its enormous size, the diversity of its peoples and its lack of a firmly established system of government. Finally, there was a split: the caste of non-Muslim Joola and Senufo warriors, the Sohondji, seceded from the Salama Juula, who were traders and Muslims. Kong had indeed become a great centre of Islamic learning. But its attempt to control Jenne clearly shows that the Wattara’s grand design was above all economic: to control the trade routes linking the forest to the Niger Bend over the greatest possible distance. After the failure of this ambitious project, the Juula groups fell back on more limited undertakings. One of the boldest was the creation of the Kingdom of Gwiriko.68 There, around Sya (Bobo-Dioulasso),69 Famaghan Wattara founded a replica of the Kingdom of Kong in an area around the watershed of the River Banifin (a tributary of the Niger), the Comoe and the Black Volta. As the Comoe and the Black Volta cross gold places along their middle and lower reaches and the Comoe flows through Beni towards the Jenne region, the strategic character of Famaghan Wattara’s decision, and his refusal to pay allegiance to his young nephews, Sekou Wattara’s sons, in Kong, is clear. He seized more or less completely, and more or less permanently, Tiefo, Dafin and Bwamu (the country of the Bwaba). In Bobo, he subdued and allied with the Bobo-Juula who had arrived from Jenne after the Bobo-Jing in about the eleventh century. His successors, Kere Massa Wattara (1742–9) and Magan Oule Wattara (1749–1809), only

68. Gwiriko means ‘at the end of the long stage’ in Juula.
69. See N. Levitzion, 1971; E. Bernus, 1960; and D. Traoré, 1937. On the Gonja Chronicle, which forms the basis of a reliable chronology for the events reported in this paragraph, see J. Goody, 1967a; and N. Levitzion, 1971b.
managed to contain the revolts by peoples reduced to Juula domination by repeated repression (as in 1754 against the large Bwa town of San). This domination was above all economic, even when it was made to appear as proselytism.

Economic life from the Niger to the basin of the Voltas

It is also to the middle of the eighteenth century, with the arrival of the Bobo-Juula, that J. B. Kietegha dates the period of high gold production from the Black Volta. The newcomers practically monopolized the exploitation of the gold of Pura and introduced technological improvements in its extraction. Kietegha hypothesizes, however, that the exploiters of the earlier period (from the fifteenth to the mid-eighteenth century) were already Mande-Juula, perceived by the Gurunsi of Pura as Mossi.70

Traders and trade routes were the busiest in the western and northern half of the area between the River Niger and the basin of the Voltas. But during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – even in the Mossi kingdoms and among the people with non-centralized authority, such as the Gurunsi, above the subsistence-economy base – there gradually came into being a trading network in exotic goods, which came to involve more and more professional traders.

Mossi country is an area of near monoculture in millet on exhausted soils with irregular rainfall. In each decade there were on average two bad and two very bad years. Shortages, even famines, occurred not uncommonly in Yatenga – during the reign of Naaba Zana at the end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth century and in the 1830s for example.71 In addition to millet, the staple food, crops included maize (an off-season crop), groundnuts, cowpeas, beans, sesame and some potherbs. Cotton, the main plant used in crafts, seems to have been grown for a long time. The Muslim Yarse have been associated with weaving since the beginning of Mossi history, and strips of cotton cloth formed their cargo goods in the north-south caravan trade, of which they were the main operators. The Marase (Songhay), who specialized in dyeing, used indigo. Many wild plants were gathered, both potherbs and substitute foods used in times of shortage, the main ones being nere, whose fruit had many uses, and the shea nut, from which cooking oil was made.

In Lurum’s pre-Mossi era (up to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries) the Kurumba had among them Marase who engaged in the Saharan salt trade. The formation of the northern Mossi states, including Yatenga, had a twofold effect on the caravan trade: first, the Marase were supplanted by the Yarse and, second, the Yarse, in addition to the Saharan salt trade, took up trade in kola nuts, which they bought on the northern fringe of

70. See J. B. Kietegha, 1983, p. 158.
71. A proper listing of the famines in Mogho has still to be compiled.
PLATE 12.4  Market traders gathering under the shade of a banyan tree
the Asante world. Naaba Kango's reign gave trade a fillip; the prosperity
of the village of Yuba, near Waiguyo, for example, dates from this time.

The eighteenth century saw the formation of large settlements of traders
in which the Yarse were joined by the Marase. The latter could no longer
maintain an independent trading system because the Kurumba lost their
independence and even their identity after their country gradually came
under the sway of the Mossi (Yatenga) and the Fulbe (Jelgoji). The large
markets of the kingdom, such as Yuba and Gursi, were the termini of the
salt and kola caravans. The Yarse of Yatenga were a dynamic group of
traders found not only at Timbuktu, the starting-point for the salt caravans,
but also in the valley of the Bani and throughout Macina. Naaba Kango's
policy towards Segu may perhaps have been aimed at getting these Yarse
settled in countries bordering Yatenga. For in Mossi country these judicious
traders lived in symbiosis and compromise with the leaders. In return for
certain privileges (the right to pardon, exemption from services and armed
escorts), they undertook not to encourage any subversion, to sell to the Naaba
as a matter of priority, to give him their blessing and support through
appropriate rituals and even on occasion to act as intelligence agents.72

While the accounting unit for the traders was the cowrie, other units, in
particular the cubit of cotton strip, were used both in the caravan trade
and in everyday business. There were various systems of equivalence
between the cowrie, the cubit, the block of salt, slaves and horses.

Alongside the Yarse, who combined cotton crafts with long-distance trade,
the blacksmiths engaged in heavy metal-working, metal-refining, pottery
(made by women) and the export trade to central Mogho, which was poor
in iron ore. Yatenga was, after all, one of the great metal-working areas of
central West Africa; and the trade in manufactured goods (iron parts for
weapons and farm implements) brought the blacksmiths substantial incomes.

The Waiguyo site had certainly not been chosen without economic
ulterior motives. Frobenius73 reports a tradition to the effect that Naaba
Kango meant to make his capital a salt depot. It may also have been Naaba
Kango's reign that saw the formation of a corps of chiefs of the market,
drawn from captives, with the task of levying a royal tax on imported
goods. Naaba Zombre had earlier created a corps of chiefs of the market
in the Kingdom of Ouagadougou; they were drawn from the royal captives
and were responsible for the collection of taxes on goods displayed. The
aim was, of course, to provide the court with extra revenue; but it also
sought to reduce the taxing rights of local chiefs, who were often very
harsh on traders.

During this period, which corresponds to the height of the slave trade
on almost every part of the coast of Black Africa, the terrible logic it
introduced into the mechanism of trade flows and the content of socio-
political relations must always be present in the mind, from the moment

73. L. Frobenius, 1924, p. 281.
fire-arms, slaves and political power were made part of the same question. We have noted it in the greatest kings of the time: the Massasi, the rulers of Segu, Naaba Kango of Yatenga, the Wattara of Kong and Bobo, not to mention the Dagomba and Asante rulers. But the slaving activities of kings were augmented and fuelled by the host of local chiefs who, willy-nilly, embarked on this business to enter the political game.

We have seen how, in the Bambara system, the status of captive had been ingeniously institutionalized by turning to account the already existing institution of the ton-den (association member) to create the ton-dyon (captives of the ton). But while it was Mamadou Kulibali who had this idea, it was because it was ‘in the air’ and had been established in social praxis for centuries.

A further step was taken with the foroba-dyon (crown slaves). These were prisoners-of-war grouped into contingents each of which was defined by the faama who had formed it. Usually their fate was to be sold as trade goods produced by war, in Bambara, san’dyon (trade slaves). Purchased by a community, the woman, as soon as she produced a child, acquired the status of woloso (born in the house) and the man could acquire the same status as soon as his master had sufficient confidence in him. Later, the woloso might become a dyon goron when his children took his place and paid an annual indemnity to his master. After reaching the status of woloso, the slave became a caste member. He could no longer be put on sale, and had a right to property and to transmit his estate to his children, such that his living conditions, if not his status, were preferable to those of a free but poor man who might suddenly find himself in captivity. Many people, in the turbulent world of the eighteenth century, obviously finished up accepting the powers of a protector and a master just as they did in the European High Middle Ages. It is true that the condition of a woloso was transferred to his descendants in perpetuity, even if, as happened at royal courts, a few caste men might rise to the highest positions. Although their lofty positions made it impossible for any ordinary person to refer to their caste status, the thought persisted ineradicably in the collective mind.74

Thus, the great king Ngolo Diarra’s family was unable to eradicate the memory of the servile status of their ancestor, which provoked taunts from the Massasi of Kaarta. Ngolo’s case nevertheless shows that doors were not closed to the cleverest captives. In theory, they were subject to the discretion of their master but in practice, by making use of the good offices of people in favour, they could influence top-level decisions.75 Even in the rigid Mossi system – where everyone was born and died in his status, with no transfer or break possible76 – a eunuch, the Kamsaogo-Naaba had heavy

75. See C. Monteil, 1924, p. 301.
76. The king could not dismiss or demote a noble. The chief who the king wanted to remove received a poisoned arrow from him with which he was supposed to commit suicide; if he did not, war would follow.
responsibilities. It is true that other eunuchs destined for this purpose, were traded towards the Fezzān, North Africa and the Near East.\textsuperscript{77}

Islam and traditional African religions

It was common, both before and after the colonial conquest,\textsuperscript{78} to say that the Bambara and the Mossi had constituted strong barriers to the advance of Islam in West Africa. This is a simplistic assertion that needs revision. Islam, at work since the eighth century if not before, increased its influence in the great empires from the Empire of Ghana to the Empire of Gao. But even in these areas there were obstacles and resistance. Even as late as the eighteenth century, the Jelgoobe and Feroobe Fulbe, who had left Macina for the north-east of the Volta region, were often followers of traditional religions.\textsuperscript{79}

For a millennium, however, from the eighth to the nineteenth century, Islam continued to penetrate the whole of this region diffused through numerous channels including traders, prayer-leaders, even violence, all the while getting round obstacles and adapting to the specific circumstances presented by the multiplicity of peoples, particularly when they seemed resistant. The peoples of the interior of West Africa, however, did not look upon Islam or, later, Christianity, in the same way as the followers of these religions did when they judged the continent’s traditional religions. The Bambara initially looked upon Islam syncretistically: its presence impelled them to stress once again the Supreme God, Maa Ngala, the sovereign above the spirits honoured by particular cults. Having assimilated Islam in this way, the kings of Segu and Kaarta saw no obstacle to consulting the ministers of this great God through the persons of the marabouts while remaining faithful to their own cults – of which they were practically \textit{ex officio} the high priests – and to the magician. The latter is deemed to have invoked the universal and invisible Energy, provoking in this way a sort of materialization of his desire. The magician ‘names’ and thus creates what he calls upon with his prayers.\textsuperscript{80}

Although they practised such traditional rites, the Kulibali, including the highest chiefs, took part in Muslim religious festivals, at least by their presence and by offering lavish gifts to the Sarakolle marabouts. The festival of the \textit{tabaski} (sacrifice) coincided, moreover, according to Raffenel, with the general meeting of the Massasi clan which involved secret rites such as those of Komo and Makongoba and oaths of allegiance. But these same Bambara repeated as well as they could the gestures of the officiants at Muslim prayers and some even sacrificed a sheep. These syncretisms – which in time developed with Christianity in Afro-American worship in Brazil, Haiti and Cuba – were one of the characteristics of the Negro-

\textsuperscript{77} See Y. Tiendrebeogo, 1964.
\textsuperscript{78} C. Monteil, 1924 p. 23 \textit{et seq}.
\textsuperscript{79} See I. P. Diallo, 1981.
African religious spirit. Thus, if the appeals to the spirits failed to provide a clear and satisfactory response, the intervention of the marabout was then sought and welcomed piously by Mamari Kulibali as well as by Tonmasa, Ngolo and others. Biton moreover paid the zakāt to the marabouts of Jenne and maintained a group of forty divines, including the Kamite who, although Muslims, were also priests of a faro (spirit of the River Niger). When Denkoro the Bloodthirsty was intercepted and killed by the Tonmasa, he was at the time getting ready to perform his ablutions, followed by his faithful blacksmith who was carrying a satala (kettle).

The magician-blacksmith also had no difficulty in adopting the geomantic divination introduced by the Muslims. It is true, however, that the ‘Ali Bakary’s Islamized successor at Timbuktu, who had learned Arabic from a shaykh of the Bekkai family, was soon murdered with all his family. This murder has been attributed to the fact that he was intending to ban the consumption of dolo (millet beer) and the cult of the spirits or ancestors. In fact, this is far from certain as the ambitious Tonmasa, who carried out all these massacres, was soon to kill Dion Kolo, Mamari’s last son.

What is certain is that Islam presented itself to the Bambara with institutions such as polygamy, divorce, repudiation and slavery that did not systematically challenge their own. Moreover, the marabouts themselves did nothing that might put off Bambara neophytes. Thus at Dia, probably one of the oldest centres of Islam in the Western Sudan, teaching generally adapted itself to indigenous customs and gave plenty of attention to magic. The most numerous marabouts among the Bambara were the Marka, the Bozo and the Somono who claimed to be in the line of the great masters of Moorish or Fulbe Islam and, through them, to belong to this or that brotherhood. The fact was that some ethnic groups, such as the Soninke, the Marka, the Fulbe and the Torodbe, Islamized long before and enjoying religious toleration, acted as models and catalysts. The same was true of the Bozo and Somono fishermen whom tradition associates with the earliest days of the Kulibali clan of Segu.

In short, this mutual tolerance was of great benefit to both parties: it associated the Muslim leaders with government and it used endogenous channels to win these peoples to the faith of the Kurān (Qur’an). But it also contributed to the strengthening of the power of monarchs who, faced with the ethnic and social heterogeneity of their states, could not afford the luxury of religious discord. Thus,

the pagan, by taking advantage of Islam according to his own concepts, Sudanized it; such that between these two poles, the Islamic and pagan, there exists an infinity of intermediate states linking them to

81. One of the terms to describe the divine, the consultant is turndala (through the sand), derived from the Arabic al-tareb (the land) whereas the others are strictly Sudanese words – buguridala and kyekyedala from buguri (dust) and kyekye (sand).
82. Dia is situated on the left bank of the Niger in Macina.

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one another, and which, depending on the angle from which they are observed, appear now as the Islamization of the Sudanese and now as the Sudanization of Islam.\footnote{C. Monteil, 1924, p. 332.}

Such was the state of affairs in the Niger Bend before the dissimilar \textit{djihāds} of Sekou Ahmadu Barry and Al-Ḥādjī ‘Umar. In Mossi country the beginning of Muslim influence at the court of Ouagadougou probably dates from the reign of Naaba Kom, son of Naaba Zombre (c.1744–c.1784).

Contrary to what the historic process of the expansion of Islam across the Sahara might suggest, Islam in the Volta basin was not the result of penetration from the north. On the contrary, Yatenga remained practically closed to Islam until the colonial period, despite (or because of) the existence there of two large Muslim minorities, the Fulbe and the Yarse traders. Recent research has shown that Islam spread into the Volta basin in the wake of Juula traders and warriors along a north-south line in the west of the Volta area, along the Black Volta valley; and that the town of Bobo-Dioulasso was one of the main centres of Muslim proselytism, and that the Marka \textit{dafing} (clan) of the Sanogho was one of its most active carriers through its intellectuals and \textit{marabouts}.

The founders of Gonja were Muslim Mande. From Gonja, Islam moved into Dagomba country. Levtzion puts Muslim penetration among the Dagomba at the time when, in the mid-1600s, for reasons of security, the capital of their kingdom was moved eastwards from Yendi Dabari to the site of present-day Yendi.\footnote{See N. Levtzion, 1968, pp. 194–203.} Trading centres in these areas soon became religious centres, distinguished by the presence of \textit{malams} (Muslim scholars). The evangelists of the faith were to enter the White Volta basin behind the kola caravans. The first Dagomba king to be converted was Na Zangina, who reigned at the very beginning of the eighteenth century. It is possible that the conversion of the king of the Dagomba facilitated the conclusion of a lasting peace with Gonja.

Islam penetrated Mamprusi country at roughly the same time. Gambaga, the main market, quickly became a Muslim centre. Thus it was from the south that Islam came to Mogho at the end of the eighteenth century, during the reign of Mogho-Naaba Zombre. The ruler of Ouagadougou whose mother was Muslim and to whom Islam was therefore familiar, although he did not convert, used to say the daily prayers and showed himself generally sympathetic to Muslims, including proselytes. It was during the reign of Naaba Dulugu (c.1796–c.1825) that the decisive step was taken. The \textit{Mogho-Naaba} formally converted; he built the first mosque in Ouagadougou and made the town \textit{imām} one of the top dignitaries at court. This early Mossi Islam, like that which then prevailed in the Mamprusi and Dagomba kingdoms, was an aristocratic Islam; and for the \textit{Mogho-Naaba} and the other chiefs and dignitaries, its practice was in no
way inconsistent with observance of the traditional religion. They were, however, far from trying to impose the new religion on their subjects. Although a convinced Muslim, Naaba Dulugu seems to have been afraid that Islam might make too rapid progress in his kingdom. He moved away his eldest son, the future Naaba Sawadogo, and dismissed the chief of Kombisiri – both of whom were fervent Muslims, possibly rather too prone to engage in proselytizing among their entourages. It can thus be seen that, in the Bambara kingdom as in Mogho, although there was a decided tolerance towards Islam, the traditional religion remained, despite everything, on its guard and meanwhile sought compromise formulae. For the other two political centres of this period, the Empire of Kong and Gwiriko, on the one hand, and the Gulmance kingdoms on the other, the general attitude was decidedly different. At Kong, as among the Bobo-Juula, the Islamic religion was both a reason to live and a way of life, such that their policy, imbued with a militant faith, foreshadowed the Ḉiḥāds and the conquests of the nineteenth century, particularly by Samori. Conversely, the Gulmanceba were resolute upholders of the traditional religion.

Conclusion

For the countries of the Niger Bend and the Upper Volta basin, the period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century was unquestionably a state-building phase.

In accordance with an ancient tradition in the region, the Juula, Mossi, Gulmanceba and Bambara states were all units made up of several ethnic groups. Even if the dominant ethnic group claimed certain privileges, it was itself the outcome and source of an intermixing of such groups. Hence they were not ethnic states. The sometimes highly sophisticated political machinery devised here was nevertheless vulnerable, mainly because of the almost total lack of a written form of administration.

Moreover, the states in question were undermined with internal contradictions. In the first place, the devolution of power often gave rise to serious difficulties. When Naaba Kumdumye of Ouagadougou found positions for the unsuccessful candidates for the chieftaincy – to appease them and keep them out of the way, but also to scatter dynastic power geographically – little did he suspect that his successor, Naaba Warga, would have to wage war on the descendants of those chiefs. Likewise, some of the ‘companions’ of Biton Kulibali whom he appointed, became unruly governors. This political difficulty was compounded by a social problem, for the princes excluded from the power system turned their animosity against the peasants, who were thus exploited mercilessly.

These initial contradictions obscure another equally dangerous inconsistency, namely the opposition between the royal entourage, made up of commoners, and the king’s relatives, who were held in check by a series of measures the most striking instance of which was the policy of Naaba
Kango of Waiguyo. In the case of the Bambara, the swift transition to statehood makes more conspicuous the confrontation between the three competing forces represented by the clan, the political association (ton) and the territorial state. This conflict of interests abated only under sovereigns of exceptional stature.

The question of religion must not be played down. It is true, however, that, before the 1800s the Mossi and Bambara states succeeded in maintaining a modus vivendi with the Muslim groups (Soninke, Juula, Yarse) in a compromise based on tolerance, syncretism and an exchange of service that cemented co-operation among their ruling classes. As the case of the Yarse demonstrates in particular, the Muslims in the region were often traders indispensable to the state. But there was a noteworthy difference between the Mossi and Bambara states, on the one hand, and the Kong empire and the Gulmanceba kingdoms, on the other. In Kong, Bobo and the Kenedugu, the model of militant Islam prevailed. Among the Yarse of Mogho and the Soninke of Segu and Kaarta, however, the chosen course was to refrain from politics and even initially, in the case of the Yarse, to avoid proselytism, as the traditional religion enjoyed official status. But this may merely have been a question of a time-lag, explained because the balance of power was still far from being upset. The extreme case here is that of the Gulmanceba, who were to switch abruptly from a position of power based upon the traditional religion to submission to the Muslim Fulbe after the Liptako djihād, in the early nineteenth century.

State-building in the region, however, fitted into an overall economic context which spelt ultimate doom for such political experiments. All those countries lay between the southern edge of the Sahara and the Atlantic coast which was increasingly controlled by the Europeans. European bargaining policies reshaped commercial circuits and the structure and terms of trade to their advantage, so that established patterns of supply and demand were gradually disrupted. In the economic chain that each ruler attempted to control in his region, the relative importance of the commodities used to win and maintain power (horses, arms and captives) constantly increased. It was thus that the shadow of the slave trade began to loom behind these processes in which the peoples living under non-centralized political power systems were anything but passive onlookers.

By comparison with the African rulers along the coast - who were directly confronted with the Europeans and had no other choice but submission or war - these countries of the interior certainly enjoyed a respite and seemed to be freely going their own ways. But their destiny was, in fact, pre-ordained in a process that was increasingly dependent on the outside world. For this reason the hegmonies of the region often did not have enough time to establish a de jure state providing the stability and order mentioned by chroniclers in reference to the previous empires. The all-important fact here, however, is that in difficult circumstances people proved capable of building a state with their own African means.
Introduction

From the Casamance to the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire inclusive, there stretches an enormous area of coasts and forests, inhabited by many and various peoples. This area is far bigger than the one historians normally call Upper Guinea.¹ This chapter aims at sketching the outline of its development between 1500 and 1800.

The societies

By comparison with the big ethnic masses of the Sudan, where state-type societies predominate, the area under consideration here is characterized by many small socio-cultural units organized on the basis of lineages, clans and villages.

The people of the Guinea countries are remarkable for being fragmented into many ethnic groups. From the River Casamance to the River Tanoe, between the northern savannah and the southern coastline and the mountain ranges of Futa Jallon and the Guinea Spine and the western and south-eastern coastline, there are more than a hundred ethnic groups and sub-groups.

This multiplicity of human groups explains the many linguistic differences that characterize the cultural landscape. Each ethnic group, speaking a language distinct from those of its neighbours, is aware of its individuality. There are sometimes many dialectal variants within a single language, which oddly restricts linguistic intercomprehension within a single ethnic group. Thus each ethnic group contains striking distinctions: for example the Joola are differentiated into Flup (Felup), Bayotte, Blis-Kianara, Kassa and Fooni. In the Côte d'Ivoire, We in the north (the Facobli) and the

¹. The West Atlantic coastal area (Guinea) was divided into Upper Guinea, from the Senegal to Cape Palmas, and Lower Guinea, from Cape Palmas to the Niger delta in the Bight of Biafra. W. Rodney uses the term 'Upper Guinea Coast' for the coast between the Gambia and Cape Mount. Thus the Côte d'Ivoire was not part of Upper Guinea as defined by historians, although from a strictly anthropological point of view, the western part belongs to this region.
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centre (the Duekoue) have difficulty in understanding their Nidru relatives in the south (the Toulepleu); and the Baga are divided into the Baga-Sitemou, Baga-Fore and Baga-Kakissa.²

Despite the diversity of ethnic groups and languages due to the continual overlapping of migratory flows, there are wider linguistic entities. Three big language families, themselves subdivided into groups and sub-groups, share the area between the Casamance and Tanoe rivers. Within the family of Mande languages, the Southern Mande sub-group is predominant – Northern Mande only appearing in the form of the Mande spoken in the Gambia, Casamance, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone and Liberia. South of the Mande languages, along the coastline from the Casamance river to Liberia, the so-called West Atlantic languages are also divided into northern and southern groups: they are less homogeneous than the previous family and show internal variety reflecting the ethnic complexity described above. Lastly, to the east and south-east the so-called Kwa languages comprise the Kru-Bete and Akan languages, which show the same heterogeneity as the West Atlantic languages.³

The difficulty of producing an historical synthesis

Tracing the development of the countries of the coast of West Africa from the Casamance river to the Côte d'Ivoire between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries is one of the most difficult tasks of African historians. It deals not only with peoples and societies, most of which have recently become states whose national history is being reconstructed, but also with territories that did not all belong to the big political entities of pre-colonial Africa and whose histories pose many difficult methodological problems for the historian.

These difficulties relate first to the sources themselves. After the fifteenth century, European written sources, which grew in number and accuracy as trade intensified, provide material about the Atlantic coast of Africa. Like the mercantile interests of the European nations, they are unevenly distributed by periods and regions: they are plentiful for Senegambia, the Rivers Coast and the sector from the Gold Coast to the Niger delta, but less so for Liberia and the Côte d'Ivoire; before the fifteenth and even into the sixteenth century they are virtually non-existent for certain sectors. Although they reflect the prejudices of Europeans, in line with their nationalities and the ideas then current, they nevertheless give a good picture of the coastal area, including the geographical setting and the economic activities, systems of government and habits and customs of the peoples visited. But the coast is better depicted than the hinterland, for

². For the Joola see C. Roche, 1976, pp. 28–46; for the We and Baga see D. T. Niane and C. Wondji.
FIG. 13.1 Major population groups of West Africa (after C. Wondji)
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which no records exist before the nineteenth-century missions into the interior.

These inadequate or non-existent written sources need to be supplemented or amplified by archaeology, oral tradition and other sources. The scope, however, is unevenly distributed, although the archaeology of the dry Sudan-Sahel area is developing, that of the humid Guinea area is still in its infancy despite excavations – in Casamance, Guinea-Conakry, Sierra Leone and the Côte d'Ivoire – which show traces of human occupation going back to the third millennium. Research on oral tradition has made crucial progress in the Mande and Fulbe sectors but has not yet given full measure elsewhere because the necessary knowledge of the languages and their many dialects and the prerequisite analysis of the societies and cultures call for many painstaking surveys whose findings will appear only after lengthy efforts. Moreover, in the light of the few results already recorded it seems that oral tradition rarely goes back beyond the seventeenth century. Lastly, apart from the Mande-speaking groups (where the homogeneity of the Mande languages allows significant and fruitful cross-checking), historical linguistics in this area of amazing linguistic complexity and discontinuity is still at the planning stage.

There are also difficulties relating to the socio-political fragmentation typical of this region. Historians of the states that came into being as a result of the sharing out of colonies often give more space to the peoples of the Sudanic parts than to those of the coast, who are only mentioned in connection with developments concerning the former. Moreover, no overall historical study of these peoples of the coasts and forests is possible at present without precise knowledge of each of their histories. Thus the Soso of Guinea, a Mande group, are better known than their Baga compatriots; and the Anyi of south-eastern Côte d'Ivoire, an Akan group, are more comprehensible than their lagoon-dwelling and Kru compatriots to the west.

Whether references by European travellers of the mercantilist period, observations by modern ethnologists and recent studies by historians can enable us to overcome the difficulties of fragmentation and build up a chronologically structured historical summary is questionable. Here we come up against the problems of the general line of development and the starting-point for historical movements; and the keys to these are not to be found in accounts furnished by a fragmented and disparate oral tradition.

Our study will keep to historical reality as experienced by the peoples themselves and reconstruct the time of West Africa in its most dynamic part (the Sudan) without losing sight of the flow of world history. The West African coast acted as the link between the historical pressures of the Sudan and those of European trade; and down the centuries different parts of it became active, came to life again and settled down.
Population movements

The Mande movements

In the area between the Gambia and the rivers of Guinea and Sierra Leone signs of the first Mande (Malinke) advance towards the Atlantic stem from the twelfth century. Oral traditions collected in Gambia, Casamance and Guinea–Bissau mention Mande agricultural settlement between the end of the twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth centuries. Peasant villages are reported among the Bainuk, Balante and other indigenous peoples; within these scattered groups the Muslim Fati and the ancestor-venerating Sane clans predominated, these being the original nucleus of the reigning families of what was to be the Empire of Kaabu (Gabu).

This peaceful peasant migration was followed at the end of the fifteenth century by the conquering migration of the soldiers of Tiramaghan Traore, one of Sundiata’s retired generals. The conquest of the Atlantic Joola, Balante and Bainuk territories — facilitated by the complicity of the early settlers — gave Mali wide access to the sea and control of the area between the Gambia and Sierra Leone.

A deeper analysis of the traditions of this western expansion suggests social and economic factors inherent in Mande society as its possible causes. The practice of collateral succession — brother succeeding brother until the last male of the eldest generation died — made it difficult for sons of rulers to succeed their fathers. Many gathered willing family members, warriors and slaves and moved westward to establish their own states. Many of these migrating groups were also attracted by the desire to participate in the increasing trade in, and the growing affluence of, the western frontier region. It is therefore misleading to describe these movements purely as military conquests involving the warriors only: other members of Mande society, such as traders, hunters and farmers — intent on exploiting the western commerce and on finding areas for settlement — as well as artisans and slaves, were actively involved in the expansion. The movements also involved considerable interaction among the various ethnic and language groups which resulted in new amalgams.

The peoples of the coastal belt and the hinterland in 1500

The peopling of the coasts and forests before the European voyages of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is one of the most obscure areas in West African history. No doubt some written sources dealing with the Sudanese empires and the gold trade exist that can give us some information about the peoples of Senegambia, the Southern Rivers and the Gold Coast — that is, the north-western and south-eastern sectors of this region. For the areas


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in between we can only guess the history on the strength of hasty notes by Portuguese travellers and the sometimes baffling oral traditions of some peoples of the interior who claim 'to have always been there'.

The Southern Rivers between the Gambia and Cape Mount

Southern Senegambia – Casamance and Guinea-Bissau  Most of the peoples living in this sector were already there when the Portuguese arrived, as witnessed by Cà da Mosto and V. Fernandes. Three main groups occupied the estuaries and lower river valleys, namely the Bainuk or Banhun, a people of Mande origin who had come from the east in the fourteenth century; the Joola, who had come from the south (Rio Cacheu) before the fifteenth century; and the Balante from the east, who had imposed themselves on the Bainuk before the fifteenth century. These big groups had attached to themselves the little related peoples of the coast and the immediate hinterland: the Kasanga, Papel, Beafada and Bijago. Behind these coastal groups, in the middle and upper basins of the rivers between the Gambia and the Rio Grande, were the Mande who arrived from the east in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries driving the other peoples westward towards the sea; after the Mande in the fifteenth century, came the Fulbe from Macina.

Guinea-Conakry and Sierra Leone  Fyfe and Rodney have given accounts of the peopling of this area. Archaeological discoveries at Yengema in Kono country (Sierra Leone), confirmed by linguistic research, have prompted C. Fyfe to suggest that, contrary to widely-held opinion, the Windward Coast has long been inhabited – since the third millennium before the Christian era. The earliest inhabitants were probably the Limba of Sierra Leone, who speak a different language from others in the neighbourhood: they occupied the Scarcies. Next came the Temne and Baga, with their related languages. The Temne came from the north, moving from Senegal to Futa Jallon. Lastly came the Kisi and Bullom, two related groups, who had followed the River Niger to its source. The Kisi and the Bullom merged then later split up, the former remaining in the interior and the latter going on to the sea.

At the end of the twelfth century, movements following the fall of Ghana and Sosso brought the Soso to Futa Jallon, where the Dyallonke, Baga, Nalu, Landuma and Tyapi were already. There followed a mingling of peoples which ended in some migratory movements to the west. Small groups of these peoples headed towards the coast and its immediate neighbourhood: the Nalu settled in the sector between the Rio Tomboli

5. See, for example, A. da Cà da Mosto, 1937.
and the Rio Nuñez, the Baga between the Rio Nuñez and the Rio Componi, and the Landuma–Tyapi in the immediate hinterland of the Nalu and the Baga. The Temne remained in the interior until the beginning of the sixteenth century, reaching the sea only at the end of that century. The Bassari and Koniagui of the Tenda group, having come from middle Gambia to Futa Jallon, were to stay there until the arrival of the Fulbe in the fifteenth century. At the end of that century the pressure of the Fulbe on the Soso–Dyalonke–Baga and Temne set off new migratory movements which enabled the Baga to spread southwards along the coast, thus coming into contact with the Bullom. Behind the Baga and Nalu some isolated Soso–Dyalonke groups were already trying to reach the sea. Most of these earliest peoples belong to what is known as the West Atlantic group.

Cape Mount to the River Bandama — Liberia and western Côte d'Ivoire

This area was the home of the Kru, part of the Kwa-speaking peoples. Its coastal sub-sector was the area of the malaguetta (‘grains of paradise’, Guinea or ‘fool’s’ pepper) trade. Its hinterland was the realm of high forest in the eastern heights of the Guinea Spine, which allowed only limited links with the world of the Sudanic savannahs.

The European navigators of the late fifteenth century encountered peoples along this coast from Cape Mesurado to Cape Lahou. The descriptions given by D. Pacheco Pereira and Eustache de la Fosse suggest the Kru, Bassa and Grebo. Should we conclude from this that an early Kru population already existed on this coast in the fifteenth century? C. Fyfe observes that the sickle-cell trait is significant among the Kru, and infers from this evidence that they must have lived for a long time in isolation. Y. Person concludes from the same evidence that the Kru must have settled early in the coastal forest belt. As some authors report the presence of Kru groups on the high mountains northeast of Liberia, we must therefore suppose that the movement of these peoples from the interior to the coast began before the European voyages of the fifteenth century. Archaeology and recent research in oral tradition also show that this region has been populated for a long time. West of the Bandama river prehistoric tools have been found in the alluvial valleys of the Sassandra basin, and there are ancient caves in the area between the Bandama and the Sassandra rivers testifying to human occupation going back to the Mesolithic period. A historian of oral tradition, the Ivorian A. L. T. Gauze, has revealed the existence of an ancient people, the Magwe, who came from the north and followed the River Bandama to its mouth. These people, the ancestors of the Bete–Dida, fanned out into the western forest between the rivers

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We must therefore suppose that the savannah north of the forest in the Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Guinea-Conakry, the home of the Kru, was occupied at the same time by the Southern Mande groups, the Guerze, Manon, Toma, Dan, Guro, Toura and Gagu. In the fifteenth century they had, no doubt, already begun to thrust south into the forest regions under pressure from the Northern Mande ('Mandingo') from the Upper Niger. The momentum of this north–south drive must have brought many little groups of Kru to the seaward fringe of the forest.

Population movements from Sierra Leone to the Côte d'Ivoire

In the sixteenth century new peoples came from the interior to join those found by the Portuguese in the second half of the fifteenth century. They were mainly Mande, compelled by Mali's political and economic difficulties to move southwards on the routes to the forests and the coast. This expansion to the forest fringes was the work not only of warriors but also of merchants:

Hemmed in to the north, the warriors from the savannah drove southward in the middle of the forest galleries as far as their horses survived. They followed in the hasty footsteps of the peddlers in search of kola, who brought Mandingo language and civilization to the fringes of the great forest all the way from the borders of Sierra Leone and the sources of the Niger in the west to the banks of the Bandama.13

The first of the Mande to move were the Kongo–Vai who came from the Upper Niger at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries under the leadership of the Mande Camara clan. They came to Bopolou, in the northwest of what is now Liberia, and reached the coast along the rivers Mano and Moa which flow through Sierra Leone and Liberia. According to Holsoe et al., the Vai migrated to the coast between 1500 and 1550 in search of salt and to establish trade routes into the interior. At the beginning of the seventeenth century the Vai occupied the mouths of these rivers and their Kono relatives the immediate hinterland.14

In the mid-sixteenth century, the Mane–Sumba, a group of Mande invaders from the Upper Niger also arrived on the coasts of Sierra Leone and Liberia. The origin of this migration is still unclear but Y. Person sees it as a major part of the Mande's movement southward, and says that the Mane followed the River Niger to Kouroussa then on to Konyan and Liberia. In 1545 they finally reached the coast at Cape Mount having followed the rivers Mano and Moa. From Cape Mount they moved north-

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FIG. 13.2 Migratory movements of the peoples of West Africa, fifteenth to eighteenth centuries (after C. Wondji)
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ward along the coast, crushed the indigenous peoples of Sierra Leone and made an incursion into the Futa Jallon mountains via the Scarcies. They were driven back by the Soso, the allies of the Fulbe, and had to return to the coast, which they occupied from Liberia to the islands of Los, merging with the original inhabitants.

The exact composition of the groups that brought about this migratory flow is not yet clear. Who were the Mane? Who were the Sumba? J. D. Fage thinks that the Mane were Mande warriors who may have recruited auxiliaries or Sumba from the Kru and West Atlantic peoples. But Y. Person thinks that the Mane were a Northern Mande aristocracy who led the invasion using Southern Mande warriors, in particular the Toma who may have been the Sumba. Whatever the case, this invasion had important social and cultural consequences for all the peoples in this area - Southern Mande, Kru and West Atlantic - starting with the destruction of the famous kingdom of the Sapes and continuing with the building up of a new political society under Mande direction. The peoples of this coast were reorganized into four kingdoms, themselves sub-divided into chief-tancies or principalities: Bullom (from the islands of Los to Cape Tagrin); Loko (around Port Loko); Bure (from the Sierra Leone channel to Sherbro Island); and Sherbro. These peoples were then integrated socio-culturally. Having during their conquest used the Bullom and Temme against the Limba and the Soso, and the Fulbe and the Kru peoples of the Grain Coast against the Kisi and Bullom, the Mane embarked on a process of miscegenation which led to the implantation of Mande influence in this region. The Loko, a small Temne group, adopted the Mande language; the Temne kept their West Atlantic culture, but introduced Mande chiefs; and the Kru, who kept their Kwa language, were influenced politically. The Mane also introduced military innovations - new weapons, tactics, sieges and fortifications which developed the warlike prowess of the peoples of the coast through practice in the art of attack and defence. By the end of the sixteenth century the invaders seem to have become naturalized, and by the beginning of the seventeenth the original Mane had been completely absorbed.15

In the sixteenth century a Southern Mande group, the Mande (Malinke) of the Upper Niger Camara clan, moved into Liberia and western Côte d'Ivoire causing not only the movement of the Kono and Vai towards the coasts of Sierra Leone and Liberia but also that of the Toma, Guerze and kindred groups (the Galla and the Manon) towards the forests of what are now the republics of Guinea and Liberia. At the same time the Diomande, brothers of the Camara, were moving eastward, settling at Touba (in Côte d'Ivoire) and driving out the Dan–Toura who moved south to occupy the Man (also in Côte d'Ivoire). Advancing still further east, the Mande entered Worodugu (the Seguela–Mankono sector of Côte d'Ivoire) and displaced

the Guro who moved south and southeast as far as the forest.\textsuperscript{16}

This north-south and northwest-southeast thrust by the southern Mande brought pressure to bear on the Kru, who moved deeper into the forest in the direction of the coast. Studying the Kru peopling of Liberia, C. Behrens thinks that by the middle of the sixteenth century, the north-south movement was already completed, the Kru having left northeastern Liberia and settled on the coast. In the Côte d'Ivoire sector the movements seem to have taken place later. For example, the Nidru of Toulepleu, a We group who originally lived in the savannah, were driven into the forest in the middle of the sixteenth century.\textsuperscript{17} At the same time the Zehiri Dida had had to leave Divo for the mouth of the Bandama in what is now Avikam country (Grand Lahou).\textsuperscript{18}

Population movements in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries

Unlike those before them, the population movements of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries affected the whole coastal and sub-coastal area, and took the form of multidirectional migratory flows. These flows ran not only from north to south or from the interior to the coast but also from south to north, east to west and west to east. The sector most affected by them was that from Liberia to the River Tanoe. Warren L. d'Azevedo has suggested that these population movements were largely stimulated by the desire to control the slave trade which in turn led to conflicts and the consequent formation of inter- and intra-ethnic military and commercial alliances. These developments led to the establishment of strong cultural relations among the various ethnic groups in the region.\textsuperscript{19}

\textit{From Gambia to Sierra Leone}

\textit{Casamance and Guinea-Bissau} In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries no new peoples appeared in this sector; but with the boom in the slave trade there was a mingling of peoples due in particular to the devastating raids of the Mande backed by the expansion of Kaabu, then at its peak. The appeal of European goods stimulated slave raids which in turn aroused resistance from the groups under attack. Hence the interminable wars from which no people was immune; in the Rio Cacheu in the seventeenth century they set the Bainuk, Kasanga, Papel, Joola and Balante against one another.

Some groups showed themselves to be particularly aggressive, such as the Bijago and Beafada of the islands who attacked the mainland Nalu and Balante peoples. But the Mande and their Kasanga vassals, the prime-movers in the slave raids, continually harassed the Bijago, Joola, Balante

\textsuperscript{16} Y. Person, 1964, pp. 325–8.
\textsuperscript{17} A. Swartz, 1971.
\textsuperscript{19} W. L. d'Azevedo, 1959 and 1962.

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and Bainuk. To escape the pressure of the slave-traders many peoples sought refuge in the coastal swamps, abandoning to Mande control the rivers leading into the interior. 20

Guinea—Conakry and Sierra Leone The growing influence of the Atlantic trade on the peoples of the Sudanic zone and the expansion of Islam which the Fulbe revolution in Futa Jallon brought about in the eighteenth century, were the phenomena that formed the background to the population movements in this sector in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

In the first third of the eighteenth century, the Fulbe of the Muslim holy war set off the movement of the peoples of the Tyapi group towards the coasts of what is now the Republic of Guinea. This continued an old trend, for as early as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, as indicated above, under pressure from the Mande and Fulbe, small Baga, Nalu and Landuma groups from Futa Jallon had occupied the coastal area where the Portuguese had met them at the mouths of the rivers Nunez and Pongo. But the Fulbe Muslim revolution that started between 1720 and 1730 drove the Tyapi peoples out of their old habitat for ever. Rejecting the authority of the masters of the new religion, and having lost several hard-fought battles, such as that of Talansam (1725–30) fought by the Baga, the last groups left the Futa Jallon hills for the coast; the Landuma left Mali for the upper Nunez basin; and the Baga came from Labé to occupy the coast between the Rio Pongo and the Scarcies. 21

Another major movement was the one that brought powerful waves of Soso-Dyallonke to the coast. Driven from Futa Jallon, the Soso moved slowly towards the coast which was already occupied by the Nalu and Baga. But the big wave started in 1760 when the Soso, under the leadership of Soumba Toumane, invaded the Baga and set up the chieftaincy of Toumania in the immediate hinterland of the Kaloum peninsula. They welcomed their Dyallonke relatives, who had also been driven from the Futa mountains by the Fulbe, and by the end of the eighteenth century dominated the coast between the Rio Pongo and Sierra Leone. 22

Not all the inhabitants of Futa Jallon were driven out. The peoples of the Tenda group, for example, on the north-western spurs of the mountains, resisted the Muslim Fulbe. So did the Koniagui and the Bassari who, since the fifteenth century, had escaped domination by the invaders although some of them had taken part in Koly Tengella’s bands in the sixteenth century. Nevertheless, symbiosis did occur in some cases: the Badyaranke were a mixture of Tenda and Mande-Sarakolle and the Fulbe managed to Islamize some groups who became the Tenda-Boeni. 23

Other prime movers of this population movement into Guinea and Sierra

21. See Dr Méo, 1919.
23. A. Delacour, 1912; F. de Coutouly, 1912.
Leone were the Northern Mande ('Mandingo'), who caused the Toma, Guерze and Manon migrations into the forest zone of Guinea, those of the Mende into Sierra Leone and those of the Quoja into Sierra Leone and Liberia. We must distinguish here between movements connected with the already long-established Mande migration south to the sea, and those which stemmed from the expansion of Islam for which the Mande were as responsible as the Fulbe.

In addition, during the seventeenth century the continuous movement of the Mande from Konyan drove the Toma (Loma), Guerze (Kpelle) and Manon (Mani) from the savannahs on the forest fringe north of Beyla (in the Kerouane and Bissandougou sectors) to the forests of Guinea and Liberia which they continued to penetrate throughout that century. Other Mande from the east followed the same route as the Mane and entered Sierra Leone where they intermingled with the Kisi, Bullom, Loko and Temne to give rise in the late 1600s and early 1700s to the Mende people.24

The Mende long remained in the interior, only reaching the sea in the nineteenth century. In the 1620s other Mande from the interior, intermingled with Liberian Kru, were to give rise to the Quoja and Karou hegemony which dominated the coast from Cape Verga to Cape Mesurado.25

The Mande acted as religious proselytizers. Leaders in both trade and Islam, they set up Kur'anic schools (in particular among the Bena-Soso and the Kuranko), and until the 1700s lived as groups of scholars and traders among the coastal agricultural peoples. But with the advent of the Muslim revolution in Futa Jallon they joined with the Fulbe to convert or subjugate the Soso, Baga, Bullom and Temne. Thus they occupied the Mellacorie in the eighteenth century, organized Muslim Mande chief-taincies, and were represented all along the coast from the Island of Matacong to the Saint Paul river. At the end of the eighteenth century, however, resistance to Islamization broke out among the Soso and the West Atlantic peoples when the Almamy of Futa Jallon sought to impose his authority over the whole area through the Fulbe–Mande religious alliance. The Baga, Bullom and Temne, however, refused to recognize his authority, as did the kingdom of Falaba, northeast of Port Loko, which was led by a Soso group fiercely opposed to Islam. Nevertheless, the society of the Guinea and Sierra Leone rivers was not to escape the influence of Futa Jallon, nor the more specific political and cultural influence of the Mande trader-marabouts.26

24. K. Little, 1951; A. P. Kup, 1961b, suggests that the Mende are descendants of the Sumba and Mane warriors who entered the hinterland of Sierra Leone in the sixteenth century, sometime after the Vai migration.
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Liberia to the River Bandama
The migrations that helped establish the peoples of this sector in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were primarily a continuation of the north–south movements – from the savannah to the forest and the coast – that took place during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. They were also due to the upheavals in the Akan world during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and to the various attractions and disadvantages of life at the coast at that time. The results were migratory flows in various directions: north–south, east–west, south–north, west–east and, in the forest, sometimes even in circles.

The Mande and the We

The Quoja–Karou invasion that fell upon the coasts of Sierra Leone and Liberia shows that the Mande thrust was still pressurizing the forest and coastal peoples in the eighteenth century. The Northern Mande (Malinke) had continued their advance to the south and south-east across the Sassandra river as far as the River Bandama. Their movement intensified that of the Southern Mande: the Dan continued to move south–south-eastward through Côte d'Ivoire (to Touba-Man) and south-south-westward (to Danané in Côte d'Ivoire and the Liberia forest); and the Guro and Gagu were heading south-south-east towards the Bandama river and beyond (the Guro to Bouake and the Gagu to Tiassalé and Dabou).  

This southern Mande thrust affected the movement of the We who were continuing towards the forest, in particular the We from Toulepleu in Côte d'Ivoire (to Nidru and Bewa). They reached the Guiglo in the forest in the middle of the seventeenth century and the Cavally river in the late 1600s and early 1700s. Associated with the Akan thrust and the rearrangement of the Kru world in Liberia, there were to be other migrations in the eighteenth century from the south-west (Zibiao), the north-east (Zarabaon) and the north (Semien).

The Magwe–Kru
C. Behrens thinks that the Kru moved into Liberia along the coast from east to west during the sixteenth century. There they split up into the Bassa, the Krahn and the Grebo, etc. and, after fighting the Berkoma and the Quoja in the Cape Mount area in the mid-seventeenth century, occupied what is now Grand-Bassa County. According to Behrens the Karou hegemony reflected the Kru's determination to control the whole of the Grain Coast from Liberia to Sierra Leone. Thus the Kru of Grand-Cess, west of Cape Palmas, came from Grebo country in the late 1600s and early 1700s and an east–west movement followed the original north–south movement.

As regards the Kru settlement of Côte d’Ivoire, it seems that a west–east movement followed the north–south one. Thus the Kru of Grand-Béréby came to Côte d’Ivoire from Liberia following the fragmentation of Guerre groups (the We) from the north. Most of the Bakwe and Neyo, who probably belong to the same migratory flow, also came from the west, from the Tai–Grabo forest and the valley of the Cavally.

This great migratory wave led large groups of the Magwe (the Bete, the Godie and the Dida) from the Cavally basin in the west to the Sassandra basin and beyond to the River Bandama. It supplied population for the settlement of the area between the Sassandra and the Bandama rivers until the end of the eighteenth century.

Political mutations and socio-economic changes

The establishment of sea routes: late fifteenth to early seventeenth centuries

Once open to traffic and trade, the sea shore became a magnet to the coastal and sub-coastal peoples and the Sudanese traders from the interior. The establishment of sea routes had begun before the arrival in the fifteenth century of the Portuguese caravels when Mande expansion linked the Central Sudan to the Atlantic coast from Senegambia to the Gold Coast. When the Portuguese arrived they found the coastal fringe of the Guinea area open in two directions, towards the hinterland and towards the outside of the African continent.

Internal factors leading to the establishment of sea routes

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Mali, with its spontaneous agricultural settlement and military and political expansion westward, created the conditions for the commercial expansion of the Mande into the coastal area. From 1312 onwards, Joola corporations linked the coastal countries to the line of the River Niger between the River Casamance and Sierra Leone. The Gambia and Casamance, having become western provinces of Mali, exchanged their agricultural produce (rice and millet) and their craft products (cotton cloth) for iron and other metals from the interior. The trading cities of Kantora ran this trade which used the waterways, particularly the Gambia and Casamance rivers whose mouths were linked by a busy coasting trade. A different trade flowed south from the River Niger to the forest area where the Joola exchanged salt, copper, cotton goods and fish for kola nuts and sometimes palm oil. In the fifteenth century the economy of this north-west area was thus oriented towards the interior, and Kisi and Temne country was already affected by Mande (Malinke) influence from the Upper Niger (at Doma and Hamana).30

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Beyond Sierra Leone, between Liberia and the Gold Coast, it is hard to specify the outlets of Joola trade at this time, although the names of Monrovia and Grand Lahou are sometimes mentioned. But it is certain that the Joola brought goods from the Niger Bend to El Mina, as they are reported at Begho in the first half of the fifteenth century.

The trading sphere of the Mande thus relied on a network of routes and market staging-posts with which the forest fringes were amply supplied and which the alluvial valleys and big river outlets extended coastwards. As a Portuguese observer, V. Fernandes, remarked:

They (the Malinke) trade their goods very far into the interior, further than any other people in this region, and they even go to Mina Castle by way of the interior.31

External circumstances: the Portuguese explorations

The Portuguese were the first Europeans to explore the West African coasts in the fifteenth century, once the development of the caravel had enabled them to round Cape Bojador in 1434. They were at Arguin Island in 1443, in Senegal and Gambia between 1445 and 1456, and in Sierra Leone and Liberia in 1460–2. Between 1462 and 1480 they explored the whole of the Gulf of Guinea, touching what is now the Côte d’Ivoire in 1469–70 and the Gold Coast in 1470–1.32

From 1481 to 1560 the coasts of West Africa thus came under the influence of the Portuguese. In search of gold and spices, they joined their emergent maritime empire to the Mande trading sphere, developed by Mali expansion since the fourteenth century. They must surely have wanted to obtain the gold of Galam, Bambuk, Bure, Lobi and Asante, the legend of which had long haunted Europe and which was now needed to buy the spices and other oriental produce so valued by European markets.

Portuguese documents of the time, such as the meticulous registrations by the treasurer of the Casa de Guiné, provide us with the instructive list of goods which, apart from gold, formed the cargo of caravels returning to Lisbon from the newly discovered sites of the West African coast, and on which custom duties were levied. They include rice, copal, civet, palm mats and sacks, and carved ivory objects – mainly spoons, pedestal bowls, and oliphants. The latter group is particularly important because its surviving specimens, preserved today as precious rarities in the museums of three continents, and the finest of which are safely attributed to the Bullom of Sherbro Island, bear witness to the high level of technical skill and aesthetic taste reached by the coastal peoples before their contacts with Europeans. At the same time, they represent the very earliest class of African sculptures known to have been introduced into Europe and

Throughout the sixteenth century the Portuguese maintained maritime and commercial supremacy on the West African coast from Arguin to Angola. In Upper Guinea they travelled by river in search of Sudanese gold, particularly along the Gambia, the Casamance and the rivers of Guinea-Bissau. They traded without aiming at territorial occupation. In what was then Mali’s ocean gateway, they helped to improve the links between the Rivers Coast on the one hand and the Upper Gambia, Upper Senegal and Upper Niger on the other. The gold-bearing basins of the Rivers Bambuk and Bure were thus gradually separated from the Niger

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PLATE 13.2 Sixteenth-century carved ivory hunting-horn from Sherbro Island (Bullom), Sierra Leone. Height: 43 cm
basin and the Sahara, to the advantage of the Atlantic coastal fringe.\(^{34}\)

Thus in the sixteenth century Joola inland trade routes in the Guinea coast, from the north-west to the south-east, led to coastal positions occupied by the Portuguese. Sudanese gold therefore reached Lisbon together with malaguetta which was sold cheap on the markets of Antwerp in competition with real pepper from the islands.\(^{35}\) Thus the Mande and European trading spheres were linked and Saharan traffic began to be taken over for commercial purposes.

**European voyages and early trading**

The Portuguese, however, had to contend with French and English pirates operating on the Guinea coast from 1530 onwards. Their supremacy was also threatened by Dutch competition. Already masters of Gorée (1621), El Mina (1637) and Arguin (1638), the Dutch took the monopoly of Guinea from a Portugal already weakened by its annexation by Spain in 1580. Dutch ships began to ply to West Africa in the 1590s and a decade later the Netherlands were doing more West African trade than most European nations put together. With a total of 200 voyages between 1593 and 1607, they were later making twenty voyages a year. In 1614, for example, there were thirty-six Dutch ships lying off the El Mina coast at one time\(^{36}\) and Portuguese supremacy was doomed.

Before Dutch supremacy established itself, however, the Atlantic coast had turned into a trading front of a new type, destined – in the eighteenth century – to become the scene of a busy maritime trade. But the Portuguese, by the 1700s, had opened up the area to trade and set up the strategy that was to prevail during the following centuries.

**Early social formations and the ‘Kingdom of the Sapes’**

The West Atlantic civilization, which stretched from the Joola of Casamance to the Temne of Sierra Leone, was characterized by its adaptation to the ecological environment of the lowlands and stagnant waters. It consisted of swamp agriculture, the extraction of salt, paddy rice-growing, and the use of waterways for transport and communications in boats called almadies. Organized into village societies without slaves or castes but with age groups and work associations, the Joola had already reached iron age development when they came into contact with the Mande. Rejecting the epithet ‘primitive’ assigned to the ‘West Atlantic’ peoples, W. Rodney\(^{37}\) stresses their ingenious adaptation to the natural environment, shows the commercial relationships that existed between them, and deduces their social and cultural homogeneity from their languages, dress and customs. They had no primordial state structure but did have a unified civilization and culture.

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34. B. Barry, 1981.
35. F. Braudel, 1946.
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Paddy rice-growing and the Kingdom of the Sapes were conceivably the historical expressions of this unity. Whether paddy rice-growing was an independent invention or a borrowing from the Mande has become a subject of controversy among historians such as P. Pélissier and B. Davidson.  

Social and political organization raises fewer problems than paddy rice-growing, for all the authors apparently accept that the caste system, patrilineal succession and state structure are institutions of foreign origin. Thus, under Mande influence brought about by the westward expansion of the Mali empire, the various peoples of the coast were organized into chiefdoms and principalities subject to the suzerainty of the Mandina-Mansa, the Emperor of Mali. In the fifteenth century the Portuguese observed the existence of these 'western provinces' (the kingdoms of Fogni and Casa, etc.) but reported the presence to the south of the 'Kingdom of the Sapes'. This raises another problem. Was Sapes a big confederation comprising the Baga, Nalu, Landuma, Limba and Temne peoples, as D. T. Niane thinks? Or, was it a kingdom formed between Cape Verga and Cape Saint-Anne following the infiltration southward of the Tyapi-Landuma-Baga-Nalu under the leadership of Mande chiefs, as J. Suret-Canale supposes? In our present state of knowledge it is difficult to choose between these two hypotheses.  

Even more fundamentally, we should be cautious about accepting what appears to be a diffusionist explanation for all the social and political systems and institutions in the region, especially patrilineal succession and state structures.

**Kaabu: from emancipation to hegemony (sixteenth-eighteenth centuries)**

While the spread of Mande influence had led to the emergence of chiefdoms and proto-royalties in southern Senegambia, the establishment of the Atlantic trade in the sixteenth century was to encourage new states on the ruins of the hegemony of Mali. Mali's expansion to the Atlantic via the Gambia basin had brought about the establishment, in the fifteenth century, of politico-military structures such as the little kingdoms of (the) Gambia, Casamance and Guinea-Bissau which formed the western fringes of the Mande empire. Their rulers paid tribute to the Mansa of Mali through his faribalfarin (intermediaries). But by the sixteenth century it was the farin of Kaabu province, east of the Geba river, who were receiving tribute from the Mande chiefs throughout Gambia.

Lying between the middle Gambia, the Rio Grande and Futa Jallon, the Malian province of Kaabu controlled the trade of Kantora, which dealt in gold from the Falémé and Bambuk. In the sixteenth century Kaabu annexed the province of Sankola, south of the Upper Casamance, and

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38. For this discussion, see P. Pélissier, 1966, pp. 42-44; B. Davidson, 1965, pp. 132-5. *Oryza glaberrima* is the indigenous African rice, as opposed to *Oryza sativa* or white rice, of Asian origin.

became a powerful province, although still a dependency of Mali. But as the old Mali empire weakened under attack from Songhay most of its western provinces freed themselves from its sway with the farin setting themselves up as independent kings, and Kaabu did likewise in 1537.

After its emancipation Kaabu unified all Mande countries between the Gambia, the Upper Casamance and the Upper Geba and supplanted the Mansa of Mali in this region. It then extended its sway to the Kasanga, Balante, Joola (Flup) and Beafada peoples. Its farin 'was like an emperor among them', wielding authority over all southern Senegambia and controlling trade as far as the borders of Guinea and Sierra Leone.40

**Atlantic trade and the peoples of the Southern Rivers**

While the Portuguese traders were facing competition and opposition from the Mande they were also attracting 'West Atlantic peoples' into their stations on the coast and were in direct contact there with the Joola, Balante, Papel and Kasanga.

In Sierra Leone the Bullom, Temne and neighbouring groups played an active part in trade with the Portuguese. The Bullom, who traded sea salt for gold from Mali to the north, now sold this gold to the Portuguese on the coast for cotton goods, copper bells and various metal utensils. At the end of the sixteenth century the Temne, themselves keen to profit from the maritime trade, reached the estuary of the Sierra Leone, thus splitting the Bullom into two.

By the sixteenth century the Rivers Coast of Upper Guinea had been transformed. Not only had the Portuguese set up many trading settlements there, but they had also established numerous points of contact with the Mande in the middle and upper reaches of the rivers. Links with the hinterland were thus intensified and north–south links considerably strengthened: the Cape-Verdians traded directly with the region of the Sierra Leone rivers, selling their cotton on the way to the Bainuk and Kasanga weavers; printed cloth travelled between Cacheu and Nuíz; and handicraft articles from the coast reached the Scarcies travelling back along the old kola trade route.41

The coastal area as a new West African trading front in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries

By opening the West African coast to world trade, the great European explorations committed the countries of Guinea to an unprecedented process of historical development. The main changes in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were the expansion of trade, population movements from the interior to the coast and the emergence of new societies. These changes brought about the gradual marginalization of the Sudanic

zone which, to survive, had to join the Atlantic trade by re-activating the routes leading to the forest and the sea.

The implantation and consolidation of European trade
The development of European trade on the West African coast was characterized by three features: its definitive implantation, not to say consolidation, by the systematic organization of trade; the increasing importance of the slave trade which, in the eighteenth century, accounted for an unprecedented proportion of total transactions; and the bitter competition between European nations for the possession of bases in West Africa.

In the seventeenth century European trade implanted itself for ever with the development of the sea-power of the Dutch who perfected the organization of the world mercantilist system by creating chartered companies. Moving from small commercial ventures to an organization on a grand scale, the Dutch, in 1621, set up the West India Company. With a charter giving it a twenty-four-year monopoly over trade with America and Africa from the Tropic of Cancer to the Cape of Good Hope, it had a military and naval warranty from the state and could pursue its commercial and colonial expansion in complete security. Basing itself on its forts and factories, the former to protect supply lines and the latter to exchange produce, the company contributed to Holland’s trade boom in the first half of the seventeenth century. As maritime transporters the Dutch redistributed in Europe the produce they imported from Asia, Africa and America, in particular a great quantity of gold and ivory, and thus made huge profits. As masters of the seas they purveyed slaves to the American colonies of the other European nations (Spain, Portugal, France and England) which, in 1641, acknowledged their trading monopoly over the whole of the Guinea coast.

Between 1650 and 1672 Dutch predominance was reduced. The expansion of the American plantations had given a fillip to the sugar-based economy and called for increased supplies of slave labour. This had intensified the slave trade, which gained by the concomitant boom of manufacturing industry in Western Europe (fire-arms in particular), and had increased the desire of European nations to break away from dependence on Holland. Thus France and England embarked on a merciless struggle against the Dutch monopoly, equipping themselves with the same tools of power as their great rival. There followed the golden age of their chartered companies: the English Company of Royal Adventurers (1660) and later the Royal African Company (1672); the French Compagnie française des Indes occidentales (1664) and later the Compagnie de Guinée (1685); and also Swedish, Danish, Portuguese and Brandenburger companies.

All the European nations imitated the system of organization perfected by the Dutch because isolated merchants could not engage in West African trade unless they were members of or had support from a national company.
Only powerful companies were able to meet the expenses of building and maintaining forts. Between 1640 and 1750 many forts and trading stations were built on the coasts of Africa but changed ownership continually according to the vicissitudes of war between the slave-trading nations. There were some in Senegambia and many in the Gold Coast but none in between. War with Holland ended in 1713 with the Treaty of Utrecht which gave England the privilege of asiento.

From the shelter of these forts, and from around the trading stations, the Europeans pursued the commercial exploitation of the Atlantic coast. From Gorée to Sherbro Island, in Sierra Leone, trade flourished; but no French or English company could monopolize trade because of the many coastal islets and offshore islands that gave anchorage to any ship wanting to trade with the mulatto merchants. This part of the coast was thus a happy hunting-ground for slavers of all nations who were not associated with the big companies. In the eighteenth century there was no system of forts in this sector; it was claimed by Portugal, although her writ only ran effectively in the neighbourhood of the trading station at Cacheu. The chartered companies did not bother with the Grain Coast or Côte d'Ivoire, because malaguetta pepper was no longer prized on world markets; ivory was in decline, and anchoring difficulties kept ships away from the coast. A French fort built at Assinie, in south-east Côte d'Ivoire at the end of the seventeenth century was abandoned a few years later. But by 1700 the growing demand for slaves in America was encouraging individual traders to take an interest in this sector.42

Changes in the Sudan
Parallel with the establishment of European trade, the Sudanic hinterland underwent important changes which had a decisive effect on the development of the coastal area between the Casamance and the Bandama rivers.

In the Sudan, and particularly in the Mande world, effects of the Atlantic trade, dominated by the slave as merchandise, were various. At the socio-economic level, relations with the coast became more important and the spread of the trade was accompanied by the spread of fire-arms by Joola merchants. At the socio-cultural level, Islam having lost its sway with the fall of the great empires, the ruling class split into two rival factions, one traditional and political and the other made up of marabouts and merchants. The former, relying on cavalry and trade guns, set itself up as a military aristocracy; the latter, supporting the advance of Islam to the countries of the south, inspired politico-religious revolutions. The former led to the Bambara military monarchies and the latter to the Muslim Fulbe revolutions, both of which sought to solve the social crisis born of the break-up of the empires and the spread of the slave trade.

After the political fragmentation that followed the decline of the great empires, surrogate hegemonies tried (especially in the eighteenth century)

42. See J. D. Fage, 1969b, pp. 65–73.
to reconstruct the various parts of the hinterland. In the north and north-west, the Grand Foul empire arose in the seventeenth century on the ruins of Songhay but later, in the second half of the eighteenth century, gave way to the Empire of Kaarta. Along the Atlantic, the countries that had resulted from the dismemberment of Mali were unified by Kaabu in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and then by Futa Jallon in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Along the River Niger the recovery took place at the beginning of the eighteenth century under the aegis of the Bambara of Segu, under Biton Kulibali. But in the south, from the Upper Niger to the Bandama river and eastward into the Volta-Senufo area, the Joola increased their influence thanks to their numbers and wealth. In the eighteenth century they organized the Empire of Kong to keep traffic going on the trade routes from the middle Niger to the forest and the Gold Coast; and west of the Bandama river they founded market towns to control the tracks to the sea and the kola-growing areas of the forest. 43

Just as trans-Saharan trade had helped bring the Sudanic political hegemonies into being along the Sahel strip between the seventh and sixteenth centuries, so the intensification of European trade encouraged the emergence of political hegemonies on the coast and in the hinterland in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In line with these political mutations, socio-economic changes (which have been variously interpreted) affected the coastal peoples living at the terminus of the best trade routes into the interior.

The sub-coastal hegemonies of the north-west: from Kaabu to Futa Jallon

In the seventeenth century Kaabu established itself as the big power in the Southern Rivers sector from the Gambia to Sierra Leone. Organized into twelve confederated Mande provinces, including Fulbe enclaves and Bainuk, Balante and Joola groupings, Kaabu was led by a supreme mansa (with his seat at Kansala) supported by an aristocracy of soldier-officials and a standing cavalry corps. This kingdom, which had become an empire, controlled the trade of the Gambia valley and the Guinea rivers (the Casamance, the Rio Cacheu and the Rio Geba) on which were the European trading stations of Cacheu, Farim, Ziguinchor, Bissau, Geba, Albreda and Fort James. At the end of the seventeenth century Mansa Biram was selling 600 slaves a year, buying all kinds of merchandise and levying customs through his licensed alcali (collectors). 44

In the second half of the eighteenth century the Fulbe Muslim federation of Futa Jallon established itself. It emerged from the Muslim revolution that shook the Guinea-Sudan massif in about 1725–30, and gradually became the hub of relations between the Rivers Coast and the countries of the hinterland. Situated at the confluence of the rivers that run down to the sea from the Upper Niger area, Futa Jallon was to set

44. S. M. Cissoko, 1972, p. 10.
FIG. 13.4  The main states of West Africa in the seventeenth century (after C. Wondji)
itself up as a serious competitor to the Kaabu Mande, and fought them until they collapsed in the nineteenth century. But before that time a division of spheres of influence covering all the coastal and interior countries between the Gambia and Sierra Leone slowly grew up between these two hegemonies.45

The coastal hegemony of the Karou in Sierra Leone and Liberia
The history of the Karou has been written by O. Dapper. First there was the Quoja kingdom, around Cape Mount, which was conquered by the Karou and Folgia from the interior. The Quoja kingdom had the peoples of Sierra Leone (the Bullom, Quilliga and Carrodobe) under its protection and had appointed provincial governors who reigned over them like viceroys. It also had control over the peoples of the Rio Sestos, the eastern Galla and Cape Mesurado. When the Karou conquered Quoja they divided it into two main sectors: the Quojabercoma (country of the Quoja) and the Veybercoma (country of the Vai). The Karou leaders, who directly controlled the territory from Cape Verga in the north to Cape Mesurado in the south, were war-chiefs whose war-hardened soldiers, armed with poisoned arrows, often held sway over the other peoples of the region. Absolute monarchs, defenders and protectors of the kingdom, they succeeded one another from father to son. They put down revolts in the conquered provinces, repelled the onslaughts of neighbouring peoples, such as the Dogo, Gebbe and Manou, and continually defended the integrity of the empire. Nevertheless, they remained allied to the Folgia and Manou of the interior with whom they had relations of vassalage.

In Sierra Leone and Liberia, on the upper reaches of the Moa, Mano and Saint-Paul rivers, there was a host of peoples, probably of Mande origin, who came under the suzerainty of the Manou. The Folgia, Karou, Hondo, Galla and Quoja had the same structures and customs, obeyed the same secret societies and were linked by a rising chain of vassalage from the coast inland to the Mandi-Mani (the Lord of the Manou), the greatest suzerain in the whole region. Despite their military power the Karou were dependent on the Folgia, who were in turn dependent on the Manou. The coastal peoples were descended from the peoples of the interior but were dependent on their goodwill for trading exchanges.46

The function of Karou hegemony was to order this trade between the coast and the interior. Their main economic base was trade with the Europeans from which they made big profits as middlemen. They also retailed European goods to their vassals and those of their vassals to the Europeans. Political and military supremacy was therefore to maintain such a system, and the Karou sphere of influence seems to have been above all a commercial sphere indispensable to the operation of the mercantilist

46. O. Dapper, 1686 edn, pp. 252–74.
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slave-trading system in this region in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

European trade and the comprador peoples of the coast

The development of trade in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries brought about the formation among the coastal peoples of merchant groups acting as intermediaries between the European ships and the African societies of the interior. Such were the Mestizos (half-castes) and Creoles (people born in a locality but with origins elsewhere) of the rivers in Casamance, Guinea and Sierra Leone.

From the Portuguese Lançados to the Mestizos and Creoles of the rivers in Guinea and Sierra Leone

Whether Afro-Portuguese, descended from the Portuguese settlers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, or Anglo-Africans descended from the British merchants of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the mulatto groups made up a very special people. Their influence on the historical development of the coast between the Gambia and Sierra Leone was decisive.

Lançados and Afro-Portuguese

Portuguese influence in West Africa was due to deliberate immigration but particularly to the many expatriates who populated the Southern Rivers and the Atlantic islands (especially Cape Verde) from the fifteenth century onwards. They included merchant adventurers and agents of the trading companies and were called the lançados. W. Rodney defines the latter as people who were thrown (lançar, to throw) among the blacks to do business. Most of them were Portuguese, with a sprinkling of Greeks, Spaniards and even Indians. They recruited African grumetes (auxiliaries) and plied the valleys of the Senegal, the Gambia, the Casamance and the little rivers of Guinea. Many settled in the Cacheu and Geba sectors (partly Guinea-Bissau now), and some in Sierra Leone at Port Loko. By the late 1500s and early 1600s they had penetrated Soso country and encountered the Mande traders from the interior.

The lançados soon laid the foundations of an Afro-Portuguese community: settled in villages and living close to blacks, they took African wives or mistresses. Portuguese soon became a local lingua franca second to Mande. The Portuguese presence was thus secured during the following centuries despite the decline of the mother country.

The lançados and their descendants controlled local trade in Upper Guinea in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But the racial composition of the group changed conspicuously. In the seventeenth century the flow of migrants decreased until the number of pure Portuguese fell below that of the mulattos, and the lançados came to include more and more halfbreed children, the filhos da terra (children of the land), who dominated the Beafada and Port Loko areas in the mid-1600s. The Mestizos became
blacker and blacker until they could hardly be distinguished from Africans. By the end of the eighteenth century the Afro-Portuguese community thus comprised few whites and many blacks; but it was run by the Mestizos, who had imparted to it its main socio-cultural features.

The lançados had produced a socio-cultural group new to the coasts of Africa. Speaking Portuguese, dressing in European style and living in oblong houses with whitewashed walls and sleeping verandahs, they nevertheless adopted even such African customs as tattooing and making ethnic markings. They practised a distorted Catholicism in which the wearing of the cross went hand-in-hand with a strong belief in charms, and the celebration of the Christian saints did not inhibit ancestor veneration.

The lançados were first bound to the peoples of the coast by bonds of friendship – Bibiana Vaz of Cacheu, for example, co-operated closely with the Papel and Bainuk and owned property at Farim among the Mande. Later some were integrated into the social, political and cultural life of the African peoples by kinship ties – José Lopez de Moura, for example, grandson of a Mane king of Sierra Leone, often took part in the political life of this sector where he became the greatest kingmaker of the second half of the eighteenth century. Others were quite simply Europeanized Africans, such as Francisco Correia, a Mande from Geba who spoke fluent Portuguese, was highly educated and dressed elegantly in the European style.

This Afro-Portuguese group drew its strength from its function as a comprador class. Its members did no productive work but purveyed goods to the European ships and carried on a seasonal trade related to the agricultural activities of the indigenous Africans. They thus made big profits and so came under attack from the European trading companies which tried to by-pass them.

While most were dependent on the European ships some became rich enough to do without them. These included the great mulatto families of the time: the Vaz of the Rio Cacheu and Rio Nuñez; the Tomba Mendez and Antonio Vaz in the Gambia; Sittel Fernando of the Rio Pongo and Rio Nuñez; and José Lopez de Moura in Sierra Leone. The Bibiana Vaz family became prominent in the Cacheu sector in the seventeenth century. Bibiana lived in Cacheu in Papel country but had a house among the Bainuk and another at Farim among the Mande. She had a two-masted ferry-boat and her brother, Ambrosio, at Cacheu, and her nephew, Francisco, ran a substantial business on the Rio Nuñez. Senhora Bibiana Vaz’s counterpart in Sierra Leone was Senhor José Lopez de Moura, the richest man in this area in the first half of the eighteenth century.

There were many disagreements between the wealthy mulatto traders and the trading companies, particularly between supporters of free and unrestricted trade and supporters of regulation and monopolies. The middlemen had to resist the trading companies’ attempts to by-pass them.

47. For full details about the Afro-Portuguese see W. Rodney, 1970b, pp. 200–22.
From 1684 to 1685, for example, Bibiana Vaz quarrelled with Captain José Gonçalves Doliveira of the Cacheu Company for refusing non-Portuguese ships permission to trade in the area even if they had paid their anchorage dues. The Afro-Portuguese merchants, led by Bibiana Vaz, petitioned against the measure and won over the local Papel who finally compelled Doliveira to permit trade with the English.

The determination of the middlemen groups to control the economic and political destinies of the coast by advocating free trade as against the monopoly of the big European companies, expressed itself in Sierra Leone in the form of José Lopez de Moura’s struggle with the Royal African Company. The British company aimed in particular at breaking the alliance between the African rulers and the mulattos and put an end to the latter’s role as middlemen. Led by Lopez de Moura, the mulattos reacted against this threat to their existence and, at the height of the struggle, destroyed the company’s factory which was never able to resume its activities in Sierra Leone.

From the English merchant adventurers to the Anglo-Africans of Sierra Leone
Another mulatto group was the Anglo-Africans of Sierra Leone who came into being in the eighteenth century. By 1800 they formed a group of nearly 12,000 people among whom the Tuckers, Rogers, Corkers and Cleveland were the leading families.

The Tuckers, Rogers and Caulkers (later Corkers) came from England in the seventeenth century and were initially involved in the trade of the English companies. They took African wives and thus penetrated indigenous society within which they were associated with the ruling class. The Rogers and the Corkers, for example, married into the royal family of Sherbro Island. As with the Afro-Portuguese, a culturally hybrid social group came into being here in which a man such as James Cleveland, whose mother was a Kisi woman, could occupy a prominent position in the secret society of the Poro.

As servants of the trading company the ancestors of the Anglo-Africans initially did menial factory jobs such as store-keepers, carpenters and locksmiths. But they soon became important commercial middlemen and enriched themselves considerably. In about 1690 the Tuckers dominated Sherbro Island; and in the mid-eighteenth century Henry Tucker was its leading representative. In the second half of the eighteenth century, James Cleveland came to prominence in Sierra Leone.48

Thus in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Afro-Portuguese and Anglo-Africans constituted a social group with specific economic functions, and provided a cultural milieu in which Europeans and Africans, whites and blacks, came together. Conscious of this role, they managed to make their mark with whites and blacks alike. But conscious of their interests they exploited the Africans from whom they extracted maximum

48. ibid.
profits; and although they rebelled against the rigid monopoly of the trading companies, they were none the less agents in the service of European mercantile capitalism.

Trade and peoples from the Grain Coast to the Tooth Coast
From Cape Mesurado to Cape Lahou, the development of European trade in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not give rise to any dynamic merchant groups among the Kru peoples. Although poorly linked to the Sudanic hinterland, this coastal sector nevertheless boasted many villages built at the mouths of the rivers, and abounded in a great variety of produce. The English and Dutch ships took on supplies of malaguetta pepper at the River Sestos, Cape Palmas and Cavally and slaves at Bassa, Drewin and Saint Andrew: ivory they bought everywhere.

This sector's lack of economic dynamism, despite its wealth of ivory, was no doubt due to the malaguetta crisis and the mentality of the people who were poor and more concerned with receiving presents than organizing trading relations with the Europeans. The one exception was the Saint Andrew river area which offered the ships its gold and slaves and its 'elephants' teeth' weighing over 100 kilograms. Its 'amiable and dignified' chiefs were draped in loincloths as on the Quaquu Coast.

Conclusion
Despite the difficulties inherent in drawing up a historical synthesis of this region, it can be seen that between 1500 and 1800 these peoples and countries experienced a unified development. From relative isolation they were gradually integrated into the circuits of the world market built up by the Europeans' Atlantic voyages since the great explorations. This integration was accompanied by population movements from the interior to the coast and by sharp social and political changes wherever the people tried to take advantage of the opportunities European trade offered them.
For the peoples of the Lower Guinea coast, from modern southern Côte d'Ivoire to modern Benin, or from the Bandama to the Mono rivers in general and the Akan, the Ga and the Ewe rivers in particular, 1500–1800 was — possibly — one of the most revolutionary periods in their history. It witnessed, first and foremost, the completion of the migrations of these peoples from their various cradles into their present areas of abode and the evolution of most of the ethno-linguistic groups into which they are divided today. Secondly, it saw the intensification of the trading and cultural links between these peoples and those of western Sudan, the Sahara and the Maghreb, and the opening of a completely new channel of communication and trade across the Atlantic — first with Europe and then with the Americas. Thirdly, it saw the gradual centralization of states and the evolution of larger political entities or kingdoms and empires. Indeed, by 1800 nearly the whole area was organized into a single empire under the rule of one dynasty. Finally, the period was one of radical social and cultural transformation and the evolution of new classes and new religions. These four themes form the subject of this chapter.

The migrations and the evolution of new ethno-linguistic groups

Both oral and documentary evidence confirms that, in 1500, although some of these peoples had penetrated and occupied the areas in which they live today, most were still concentrated in their various cradles. Some of the Akan, for example, had penetrated southwards to the coast, to modern south-eastern Côte d'Ivoire and south-western Ghana. But most were still living in their cradle, in the area of modern Adansi and Amanse in the Ofin-Pra basin where they were divided into eight matrilineal Adangbe (clans) — the Ada, Osudoku, Shai, La, Ningo, Kpone, Gbugbla and Krobo clans.

The Ga—Mashi, the Nungua and the Tema had long broken away from their Adangbe kinsmen in the lower Volta basin around the Lolorvor hills.

and had founded a host of settlements in the Accra plains north of the coastal region where they now live. 2 According to the archaeologist Ozanne, Ayawaso, regarded as the last such settlement, was founded towards the end of the sixteenth century. 3

The Ewe of modern Togo and Ghana had not yet begun their migrations but were all concentrated in their third ancestral home, Nuatsie or Notsie in modern Togo, the first two being Tado and Ketu. 4

Between 1500 and 1800, particularly in the 1600s and early 1700s, the final phase occurred of the dispersions of these peoples into the areas in which they live today. Partly for economic reasons — to tap the new discovered gold- and kola-producing regions, partly for social reasons — population pressure, but mainly for political reasons, the Akan, the Ga—Adangbe and the Ewe began to move out in all directions, usually in small clan and lineage groups. The Akan, for instance, in the sixteenth century moved first north and east into the present Kumasi, Mampong and Akyem areas, and south and south-west into the present Wassu, Igwira, Sanwi and Assini areas. In the seventeenth century, more Akan moved in different matrilineal clan groups north into the present Asante, Asante-Akyem and Kwahu areas, northwest into the Kulango areas and southwest into the Wassu- Sehwi and the Lagoon areas of Côte d'Ivoire. Mainly for political reasons, 1680–1730 saw a particularly large and persistent migration of the Akan from the Kumasi, Anwianwia and Denkyira areas into the present Nzima, Aowin, Sehwi, Ahafo and northern Bono areas and the Anyi and Baule areas of Côte d'Ivoire. By the mid-1750s the Akan flow seems to have dried up.

During the Akan migration, the Ga also continued their dispersion from inland to the coast largely in response to the European presence there and the consequent greater economic opportunities. The Ga—Mashi, the Nungua and the Tema were the first to move in the sixteenth century and they were followed in the seventeenth by the Osu and Teshi peoples. Their kinsmen, the Adangbe, also began to spread out southwards and northwards into the Accra plains during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, some who moved north-eastwards into the mountainous regions becoming the Manya Krobo of today. Others, in the seventeenth century, moved to the coast to found such settlements as Ningo, Prampram and Ada.

The most dramatic migrations, however, were those involving the Ewe. In the late 1500s or early 1600s, mainly for political reasons and especially to escape the tyrannical rule of their king, Agokoli, the Ewe left Notsie in two main groups, the southern Ewe (Dagboawo or Dzieheawo) and the northern or interior Ewe (Demeawo or Numeawo). 5 The southern group

2. C. C. Reindorf, 1898, pp. 6–12.
FIG 14.1 The Akan, Ga and Ewe peoples (after A. A. Boahen)
that moved to the coast, and their splinter groups, consisted of the Anlo and the Tongu while the northern groups that occupied the central and northern parts of the present southern Volta region were made up of the Asogli, Hopke, Akpini and Awudome. Sub-groups and splinter groups soon moved off to found other settlements and this process of fission and diffusion went on throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Thus, by 1800 the Anlo people comprised Anlo, Afife, Ave, Xevi, Veta, Some, Kliko, Flawu (or Aflao), Dodze and Avenori; the Tongu comprised Agave, Bakpa, Bato, Dofo, Fievie, Fodzoku, Mofi, Mefa, Sokpoe, Tefle, Togome, Volo and Vume; and the Asogli comprised Ho, Akoefe, Hodzo, Kpenoe, Takla, Adaklu, Abutia, Agotime, Akoviefe, and so on.6

These peoples did not only disperse or migrate: they also underwent ethno-linguistic changes. The Ewe and the Ga-Adangbe, who moved into areas sparsely populated by earlier peoples, such as the so-called Togo Remnant or Central Togo groups and the Guan, were able to maintain their ethnic and linguistic purity. Indeed, the main influence of the Guan communities on the Ga was religious. Many of the Akan, however, migrated into areas apparently fairly well populated by peoples of different languages, cultures and institutions. The Portuguese records of the 1480s and 1490s show that there were seven villages on the Côte d'Ivoire east of the Bandama river and Pacheco Pereira added in the 1550s that 'we know nothing of what trade there may be in this country but only know that it is densely populated'.7 These peoples must have been the Adisi in the west, and the Ewotre, Agwa, Kompa and Mono in the east. It was the mixture of these groups and the incoming Akan that gave rise to the Mbalo, Alladian, Ebrie, Eotile, Avikam, etc., collectively known as the Lagunaires. Similarly, it was the mixture of the later Akan migrants and some of the pre-existing peoples that gave birth to the Anyi, Baule and Sehwi. The Akan, therefore, became divided into the two broad groups of today, namely, the Eastern and Western Akan between whom, as Diabate insists, 'there is not an immediate linguistic intelligibility'. Each group is now further divided, mainly along political lines, into a number of sub-groups. The Eastern Akan are divided into Asante, Akuapem, Akyem, Akwamu, Bron (Abron) or Gyaaman, Wass, Kwahu, Fante, Assin, Denkyira and Gomua, all of whom speak almost the same language, namely, Twi. The Western Akan comprise the Anyi, Baule, Nzima, Ahanta, Sanwi (Afema), Aowin and Sehwi who speak mutually intelligible Akan dialects.

By the sixteenth century the sociopolitical institutions of these groups in their new homes showed similarities as well as differences. Both the Ga-Adangbe and the Ewe lived in scattered independent settlements in minor and major patrilineages and clan groups. The Adangbe, for instance, are divided into nine clans: the Asinodze, Blaka, Kpoku, La, Lekpodze, Lenodze, Nangla, Sepote and the Shalom. In each group each lineage had

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its own senior god whose priests were its leaders. However, by 1600 the Ga-Mashi had developed the office of king, based at Ayawaso.

The Akan, conversely lived in towns ruled by kings and queens and villages ruled by chiefs. Each town or village was made up of families belonging to the eight matrilineal clans into which they are all divided. These matrilineal clans are Ekoona (Asanwule among the Nzima), Oyoko (Anona among the Fante, or Alonroba or Nvavile among the Nzima and Anyi and Dwum or Dwimina among the Fante), Asenee, Agona, Bre tuo (Twidan among the Fante), Asakyiri, Aduana or Atwea (Aberadze among the Fante and Asamangama or Ahwea among the Nzima). Each family had an abusuapanin (head, leader) and so did each clan. It appears that each family or clan had its own god or gods and so did each village or settlement whose priests wielded considerable power. Among the Ga and Ewe these priests acted not only as religious but also as political leaders. In other words, society had already become stratified, with a ruling aristocracy consisting of priests and kings, ordinary subjects and relatively small number of domestic slaves. However, this social set-up was greatly altered by the political and economic developments of the 1500–1700s.

Economic changes in Lower Guinea

Equally far-reaching economic developments, both internal and external, took place in Lower Guinea from 1500–1800. Internally, already-established economic activities were continued and greatly expanded. These included collecting, farming, livestock-raising, hunting, fishing, salt-making and gold-mining. Collecting was quite widespread, its most important feature being the collection of kola nuts from trees which grew wild in the forest areas of the Gold Coast, especially near modern Asante, Ahafo and Akyem, the home of the eastern Akan. These nuts formed the mainstay of trade between the Akan and the Gur, Mande and Hausa speakers of the savannah and western Sudan.

Farming also grew in importance, the main crops being plantain, bananas, yams and rice. To these were added, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a host of new crops, introduced into the Guinea coast by the Europeans from Asia and the Americas and including corn (maize), cassava (manioc), various types of yam, tomatoes, onions, eggplants, avocado pears, sweet potatoes, citrus fruits and groundnuts. The rapid adoption of these crops by small farmers diversified the agricultural economy of the Guinea coast and must have thereby accelerated population growth.

Livestock-raising involving poultry, sheep, goats and pigs was practised, as were fishing and hunting. Fishing was the main economic activity of the

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Ewe, and Ga and other coastal peoples such as the Fante, the Ahanta, the Nzima and the Lagunaires. Hunting was done by all, first with spears, bows and arrows and sticks and later with guns.

Two of these primary activities, salt-making and gold-mining, became increasingly important between 1500 and 1800. Nearly all salt was produced by the coastal inhabitants, while gold-mining was the exclusive preserve of the inland forest people, especially the Akan in the Wassa region and the areas referred to in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century European records as Arcany or Akanny or Arcania – that is, modern Asante, Kwahu and Akyem as well as Brong Ahafo, Bron or Gyaaman and Baule. These were the areas which also produced kola nuts, the mainstay of trade with northern and western Sudan. Gold was obtained in two ways, by panning the alluvial soils from riverbeds and dry valleys and nkoron (deep-mining). While panning had been in use since ancient times, deep-mining was probably introduced into Akan territory by the Mande in the thirteenth or fourteenth century.

Gold-mining, which in many areas was rigidly controlled by the state and formed the main source of income of the rulers, reached its peak in the late 1600s when about 2 000 000 oz of gold was produced. Throughout this period gold-mining remained the exclusive monopoly of the Akan themselves and all European efforts – particularly Dutch – to participate directly in its production were resisted.

At the same time there developed another increasingly important economic activity, namely trade, in which slaves played a prominent role as porters. Trade fell into two sectors: internal and external. The Ewe, the Ga and the Akan had long been trading among themselves: fish and salt, produced by the Ewe, the Ga and the Fante, and Adangbe pottery being exchanged for the gold, tweapea (chewing sticks), ivory and iron or metal-wear produced by the Akan of the interior. Oral traditions and European records clearly show that this internal trade, conducted in local and regional markets or fairs, increased in volume and importance. Of the salt trade between the coast and the interior Bosman says:

It is not to be imagined what vast riches the Negroes get by boiling of salt and if they (i.e., the Fante) were always, or for the most part in Peace, those who follow that Employment would in a short time amass unwieldy sums; for all the Inland Negroes are obliged to fetch their salt from the Sore, from whence it is easy to infer that it must cost them very dear ...

11. For a vivid description of the different ways in which salt was produced on the Guinea Coast, see W. Bosman, 1967, pp. 308–9.
16. ibid., p. 308.
But even more important was the development of external trade. Two branches developed, the older with the savannah and western Sudan and the other across the Atlantic with Europe and later, the Americas. Arabic sources such as the *Kano Chronicle*, Portuguese records from 1470–1500 and oral traditions clearly show that by 1500 the Ga, the Ewe and the Akan had established trading links with the Guan and Gur to their north, with the Hausa of northern Nigeria to the north-east and the Mande of the Niger Bend to the north-west in gold, kola nuts, textiles, slaves and salt. Between 1500 and 1800 these links were strengthened, the Akan in particular building up trade with the Mande and Hausa during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.\(^\text{17}\) With the rise and expansion of Songhay in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and consequent order and peace, trade between Akan and Mande boomed. It was to control this trade that the Joola established a number of trading posts or refreshment centres, such as Bobo-Dioulasso, Kong, Bonduku, Buna (Bouna) and Begho, between the Niger Bend and the gold-producing countries to the south. Jenne and Begho, the main entrepôts of the north-west trade became extremely wealthy during the sixteenth century, as is evident from both written and archaeological sources. In these north-western markets, the Akan exchanged mainly gold, kola nuts and, later, European imports for cloths, blankets, Turkish carpets, striped and blue silks, leather goods, iron-ware, brassware and salt.\(^\text{18}\)

The overthrow of Songhay in the late 1500s and the subsequent insecurity was thought to have destroyed trade along the north-west routes. Now, however, it has been convincingly shown that trade did not decline during the eighteenth century but increased in volume instead.\(^\text{19}\) It was with a view to tapping that trade that Asante expanded, conquering Bron or Gyaaman, Banda and Bono during the early 1700s. In fact this trade continued even into the nineteenth century in the new market centres that emerged, such as Atebubu and Kintampo.

Trade between the Akan and Hausaland and Borno also continued. It was already in progress and of some importance by the beginning of the sixteenth century, as substantiated by the eye-witness accounts of Leo Africanus who visited Songhay and Hausaland.\(^\text{20}\) And it grew in intensity and volume, particularly during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries following the growth of the Mole-Dagbane states of Mamprusi, Dagomba, Nanumba and Mossi and also the Hausa state. Nothing illustrates this better than the wealthy state in which the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century European explorers and travellers found such towns as Kano and Katsina in Hausaland and, above all, Salaga in northern Gold Coast which

17. For evidence, see A. A. Boahen, 1977.
was then the main southern entrepôt for the north-east trade.

Gold may have been exported by the Akan to Hausaland in the sixteenth century, but it seems that gold exports had ceased during the eighteenth century, probably because of strong European competition. Akan kola, however, continued as the mainstay of the north-east trade from 1500–1800. Kola nuts were re-exported from Hausaland and Borno into the Sahara and Barbary states: in the 1780s Lucas met a Shereef in Tripoli who told him of the trade between Tripoli and Asante.21 The nuts were conveyed in caravans of bullocks, asses, horses and slaves. In exchange, the Akan imported cotton cloths, blankets, Turkish carpets, smocks, sandals and other leather goods, natron, brassware and red glass beads. A far more important and voluminous trade, however, was also developing – the trans-Atlantic trade between the Lower Guinea coast and Europe and the Americas. It started when the Portuguese dropped anchor off the coast of modern Ghana in 1471. Then followed, in the sixteenth century, the French, English and Dutch and, in the seventeenth, the Danes, the Swedes and the Brandenburgers. The last two, however, abandoned the Guinea coast in 1661 and 1732 respectively. Direct trade with the West Indies began in 1518 when the first cargo of slaves was sent there in a Spanish ship. Trade with the North American mainland commenced in 1619 when a Dutch frigate discharged the first load of West African slaves at Jamestown in the state of Virginia.22 Thus, by the mid-1600s, the triangular trade linking the Guinea coast, Europe and the Americas was fully established.

The commodities the Lower Guinea coast sold to Europeans varied from region to region and from century to century. Until the 1690s the Akan between the Bandama and the Ankobra rivers sold mainly ivory, while the Akan and the Ga between the Ankobra and the Volta rivers sold mostly gold. Throughout the sixteenth century, there seems to have been very little trade between the Ewe and the Europeans between the Volta and the Mono rivers. Most Portuguese avoided that stretch, sailing straight from the Accra region to Whydah in Dahomey and Benin in Nigeria.23 Only from 1650 did the Dutch and the Danes operate there, slaves being the main commodity.

As a result of this specialization, European traders divided the coast of Lower Guinea into the Côte d'Ivoire, the Gold Coast and the Slave Coast. Until the end of the seventeenth century, however, gold was by far the most important commodity and of prime concern to both Europeans and Africans. Every European nation tried to gain a footing on the Gold Coast, and a huge number of forts and castles was built there between the Ankobra and the Volta rivers. According to Lawrence, as many as forty-two forts and castles were built in West Africa from Senegal to Cameroon, with

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Plate 14.1 Fort St George at El Mina, as it was in the time of the Portuguese

thirty-two on the Gold Coast alone. None were built on the Nigerian coast. 24

From 1650 to 1800, however, the export trade between the Ga and the Eastern Akan and Europe underwent a revolutionary change. The records clearly show that, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, slaves were imported into the Gold Coast from Benin, São Tomé and Whydah – obviously to be used in the gold mines. In April 1529, for example, 2060 slaves were imported into the Gold Coast from Benin, and 80 from São Tomé to El Mina in 1535. 25 But from the mid-1600s the Ga and Akan of the Gold Coast began to export slaves and did so in such increasing numbers that by 1710 trade in slaves had exceeded that in gold. In 1704, the Dutch representative at El Mina, William de la Palma, reported that ‘the Negroes … now pay more attention to the slave trade than the gold trade as they do better by it’. 26 William Smith, an Englishman who visited the Fante Coast in 1726, remarked in disgust: ‘Why this is called the Gold Coast, I do not know’. 27 The trade continued to grow throughout the first half of the eighteenth century: according to Daaku, 5–6000 slaves were being exported annually by 1700, rising to 6–7000 in the eighteenth century when, according to Curtin, a total of 474,000 slaves 28 was exported. The

accuracy of Curtin's figures has been heatedly debated and there is now a
general concensus that he underestimated the number exported from West
Africa, especially during the eighteenth century, by as much as between
7.3 and 18.4 per cent. The Ewe areas also exported large numbers,
especially after 1730 when the Akwamu invaded the region.

Why, then, did the slave trade supersede that of gold on the Gold Coast
in the eighteenth century? There are three main answers to this question.
The first is the great increase in the demand for slaves following the
introduction from the 1640s of the plantation system of sugar cultivation
into the Caribbean Islands and the mainland of America. This demand was
almost insatiable throughout the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries.
The second answer is the enormous rise in the number of war-captives
owing to a great increase in the incidence of wars and also from 1650, the
growing use of fire-arms. The war-captives could not be contained locally
and had to be exported. The period from 1670 to 1750, when the slave
trade was at its peak, coincided with the rise and expansion first of the
Denkyira and Akwamu and then of the Asante empires. Most slaves were
war- or raid-captives. The third answer, which follows from the second,
is the increase in the number of slaves collected as tribute from vassal states
especially following the rise of the three new empires. Most of their vassal
states — especially Asante's — paid tribute in the form of slaves. Like gold,
the supply of slaves to Europeans on the Gold Coast remained the exclusive
preserve of the Africans themselves.

Although the Ewe, Ga and Eastern Akan exported more slaves than gold
from the end of the seventeenth century, the western Akan of Côte d'Ivoire
continued to export primarily ivory and gold throughout the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries.

Imports into Lower Guinea also underwent revolutionary changes both
in volume and quality. In the late 1400s and the 1500s the principal imports
were clothes mostly manufactured not in Europe but in the Barbary states,
Benin and Côte d'Ivoire. Clothes from the Barbary states, referred to in
early Portuguese sources as lanbens, hallabens and aljaravais, the cloths of
Benin and the Quaqua cloth of the Ivory Coast were popular on the Gold
Coast before the arrival of the Portuguese who immediately took advantage
of the demand and started trading in cloth. The export of Benin and
Quaqua cloths to the Gold Coast certainly continued into the seventeenth
century. Other imports, according to the list provided by Pacheco Pereira
in the 1500s, were brass bracelets, handkerchiefs, corals and certain 'red

See also ch. 3 above.
32. V. Lamb, 1975, pp. 84–5.
shells which they prize as we prize precious stones, white wine and blue beads which they call coris'.

By the seventeenth century the list of imports had increased considerably. Pieter de Marees, writing in the early 1600s, has left the following account of goods brought in by the Dutch alone:

Great store of light linen cloth whereof there is very much spent in those for they apparell themselves therewith besides great store of basons of all sizes, for drinking, washing in, burials, kettles to fetch water in, red copper pots, castle pots; iron used to make assagaie, cutting knives; great store of red, blue, yellow and green Rupish cloth, used for girdles about their middles to hang their knives, purses etc. Spanish serges, Dutch knives, great store of Venice beads of all kinds, and colours which they break and grind and put them on strings made of bark of trees and sold, pins used to make fish hooks, looking glasses and small copper milk cans. But the chiefest wares that are wanted there and most used among them is Linen cloth, brass and copper things, basons, kettles, knives and corals.

This list shows that these imports, including both textiles and beads, now came mainly from Europe. There is no mention of fire-arms, probably because the import of guns and gunpowder only began in earnest in the 1640s when the English and the interlopers started selling arms on the coast. So popular did fire-arms become that in 1658 the Dutch could report that 'only musquets sell well' and that 'the natives take the field with thousands of them'. In 1660 the Dutch lifted their fire-arms export ban and started exporting in quantity. Between 1673 and 1704 the Royal African Company alone shipped almost 66 000 fire-arms and more than 9000 barrels of gunpowder to West Africa, mostly to the Gold Coast. Fire-arms exports increased throughout the eighteenth century and remained the item most in demand on the Gold Coast. According to Inikori, from 1750 to 1807 a total of 49 130 368 pounds of gunpowder was exported to West Africa from Britain alone giving an annual average of 847 075 pounds.

The value of non-slave exports from West Africa to England between 1750 and 1807 was £5 443 682 (£690 000-worth of gold) while that of slaves exported by English merchants alone totalled £53 669 184. If the English share of the trade in slaves was 45 per cent, the total value of exports from West Africa during the second half of the eighteenth century would have been £131 361 920 or £2 264 861 annually.

36. F. C. Valkenburgh's Report to the XIV, June 1658.
The effects of the economic developments

Economically the Lower Guinea coast changed dramatically from 1500 to 1800 and the effects of this change were several. One was the evolution of a complicated network of major and minor trade routes. These first linked the peoples of the area to one another, then linked them to the Mole–Dagbane and Hausa to the north-east, the Mande to the north-west and to the Barbary states across the Sahara and the Muslim world. Finally the network spread across the Atlantic, first to Europe and, from the sixteenth century, to the Americas. At the centre of this network lay the town of Kumasi.

Another effect was the emergence mainly along these routes of a number of urban centres which served as entrepôts, market centres or termini. These included Kong, Bobo–Dioulasso, Buna, Begho and Bondouku to the north-west; Salaga, Yendi and Sansanne–Mango to the north-east and Tiassalé, Sakasso, Yakasso, Krinjabo, Kumasi, Kete–Krachi and Akwa-mufie in the south.

The European presence on the coast accelerated the growth of the towns there at the expense of the former capital towns immediately inland. By 1800 these towns had broken away from those inland and developed into independent city-states. Thus Mouré had broken away from Asebu, Cape Coast from Fetu, El Mina from Aguado and Anomabo from Mankessim.

Another effect of the new network was the integration of the economy of the Lower Guinea coast into that of western Europe and America and also that of the Mande–Hausa–Muslim world. In time the latter link weakened, however, while that with Europe and the Americas grew stronger.

As a result of this integration economic and industrial developments in Lower Guinea were destroyed or stunted. Trade in slaves – the most destructive, hideous and inhuman of all trades – steadily replaced trade in natural products. Moreover, it denuded the area of its labour force and – some of its skilled artisans, craftsmen and artists. Instead of exporting goods which would have stimulated existing industries and the creativity of the Ewe, the Akan and the Ga, Europe exported only cheap mass consumer goods thereby killing existing industries or seriously retarding their growth. In short, from 1500 to 1800 there was economic growth in Lower Guinea but without economic development. Moreover, since Europe controlled both importation and exportation, she kept most of the profits. Herein lie the roots of the process of underdevelopment, aggravated in the 1900s by the abolition of the slave trade and the establishment of colonialism in Africa.
The states and cultures of the Lower Guinean Coast

Fig. 14.2 Principal trade routes of the Bandama-Folla-Momo basin (after A. A. Boeken)
Political changes on the Lower Guinea coast

Political change between 1500 and 1800 was even more radical than economic.

By 1500 the process of state formation had already begun and a number of states had emerged on the coast and in the northern savannah regions. The Portuguese arrived to find the coastal states of Ahanta, Shama Aguafo, Fetu, Asebu, Agona and Accra already in existence in addition to the Mole-Dagbane cluster of Mamprusi, Dagomba, Nanumba and Ouagadougou (Wagadugu) and the Akan state of Bono in the savannah belt. The process of state-building continued to gather momentum with the first Akan kingdom, Bono, emerging in the second half of the fifteenth century and reaching its peak through the lucrative trade with the Mande and the Akan centred around Begho.

During the sixteenth century, the Ga-Mashi, the Nungua and the Tema were joined in the Accra plains by the Labadi and the Osu, all of whom founded numerous settlements. Before 1300 the Ga had had no kings, being ruled by priests. But by 1600 secular kingship had evolved, probably inspired by their Akan or Adangbe neighbours. During the early 1600s, attracted by the European presence, some Ga moved to the coast. The Ga-Mashi, the Nungua and the Osudoku were the first to move followed by the La who founded Labadi on lands conquered from the Nungua while the Osu seized land from the Osudoku. The last Ga principality to be founded on the coast was Teshi built on land presented by the Nungua to a group that had migrated from Labadi. All these coastal towns, however, recognized the suzerainty of the Ga Mantse (king) at Ayawaso which remained the kingdom’s capital until 1680 when it was moved to the coast.

What seems to have happened among the Akan in the 1500s was the formation in the Pra-Ofin basin of a number of small communities and city-states or chiefdoms bound together not by allegiance to a common sovereign but by kinship, agnatic and clan ties and linked by trade routes. However, it appears from the oral traditions of Adansi that, from about 1550, some move towards centralization was made by the clan and city-states around Fomena and Akrokyere led by Awurade Basa, king of Fomena. This led to the formation of the Adansi confederation of states but also precipitated the migrations of some Akan northwards and southwards to found their own chiefdoms, city-states and principalities, such as Kwahu, Akyem Abuakwa, Akyem Kotoku and Akwamu; Wass Twifo, Igwira and Adom further south; and Tafo, Suntreso, Kaasa and Amakom all now part of the municipality of Kumasi.

State formation seems to have accelerated between 1580 and 1630 as

demonstrated by a most revealing map of the states of southern Gold Coast between the Tano and Volta rivers drawn by a Dutch cartographer on 25 December 1629. The map depicts about thirty-eight states and kingdoms. All except two, Great Incassa and Incassa Igwira, have been identified and still exist in the same areas.

These states were founded by the migratory Ga and Akan mentioned above. With so many states in so limited an area, they must have been small, many being mere city-states or small chiefdoms. However, though different in size, all appear to have been similarly structured, with a single ruler or chief, or a king and queen. The Adansi confederation, for example, rotated the headship among the royal families of its various states. In the single states, the king was selected (in accordance with the matrilineal principle in the case of the Akan) from its royal family – usually the first family or clan to arrive in the area. He was advised by a council of family – or clan – leaders and was more the first among equals than a dictator. Each state had its own gods – river, lake or rock gods, for example – and their priests wielded considerable influence in society.

Between 1630 and about 1670 two main political developments took place in the Ga and Akan areas. The first was the steady consolidation and growth of the states shown on the 1629 map and the second was the emergence of new states. Oral sources show that kingdoms like Akwamu, Denkyira, Accra or Ga, Fante, Wasss and Adom greatly expanded their frontiers largely through peaceful means. The Ga, for instance, extended northwards from the coastal plains to include the Guan principalities below the Akuapem Hills where they established their important market centre of Abonse – A.B.C. of the 1629 map – and westwards to include the Guan principalities of Awutu and Senya. Ga was at its biggest and most powerful peak under King Okai Akwei (c.1640–77).

At the same time the Aduana state of Akwamu also became a strong kingdom occupying present-day Asamankese, Kade, Nsawan and Akuapem. Meanwhile Denkyira broke away from the Adansi Confederation, after a series of wars in the 1650s and 1660s and firmly established itself at the confluence of the Ofin-Pra rivers. On the coast the Fante extended their territory inland and European records frequently refer to wars between Fante and Etsi peoples to the north. Wassa and Adom in the south and west also expanded.

The Denkyira–Adansi wars (1650–70) and the Bono wars had greatly accelerated migration southwards and westwards into the forest where older peoples, such as the Adisi, Ewotre, Agwa, Kompa and the Lagunaires,

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43. Great Incassa and Incassa Igwira have been identified by some scholars such as Fynn and Porter with the Sehwi states whose rise will be discussed below. This, however, is doubtful since their oral traditions do not mention the former nor claim any relationship with them. See R. Porter, 1974, p. 37; J. K. Fynn, 1971, p. 43.
MAP OF THE GOLD COAST, 1629

Map of the Regions of the G.C. in Guinea as we have enquired on various places on these coasts from the most experienced Blacks and so far as our nation visits here (this region) ordinarily and have ourselves also experienced (found)

This for the first time so gathered together in the interest of those who take speculation in her, till by somebody else a better one will be made.

Done the 25th December 1629
in Guinea at Mina

Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century

FIG 14.3 Re-drawing of a 1629 map of the Gold Coast
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lived. These new groups founded not only Aowin, near present-day Wassa Amanfi, with its capital Enyini Nsu near the village of Anwianwia, but also the three Sehwi states – Anwhiaso, Bekwai and Wiawso – in the south, states such as Assini, Abripiquem and Ankobra and a host of coastal towns. In one of the richest gold areas and on the main trade route linking the northern markets of Begho and Bonduku with the coast, by the 1670s Aowin had grown into a strong and rich kingdom.

The Denkyira-Adansi migrants who moved northwards founded the Oyoko states of Kumasi, Kokofu, Dwaben, Nsuta and later Bekwai and the Bretuo states of Mampong and Afigyaase all within a fifty-kilometre radius of Kumasi. Further north others founded the Aduana state of Gyaaman or Abron among the resident Gbin, Nkoran, Nafana, Fantara and Kulango.

The new states seem to have been organized like the old. The Sehwi and Aowin states, for instance, superimposed the sophisticated Akan clan system and the institution of matrilineally elected kingship on the existing socio-political structure based on asago (warrior) companies grouped around living-quarters.

However, between 1570 and 1600, a political revolution took place marked not by the emergence of new states but by the centralization of existing ones, apparently pioneered by Aowin and Denkyira (Fig. 14.4). In the 1670s and 1680s Aowin conquered the Sehwi states to the north and west and expanded far west to embrace such Côte d'Ivoire towns as Keteso, Yawu, Brako and Sikasso.

While Aowin was expanding so was Denkyira, from her capital of Abankieso, at the Pra-Ofin confluence, in almost every direction. In the 1670s and 1680s, in a series of brilliant campaigns, the Agona rulers of Denkyira conquered all the Adansi and the pre-Asante states near Kumasi to the north and Assin and Twifo to the south. Between 1686 and 1690, they also defeated Aowin, the Sehwi states and Wassa to the south-west and the coastal kingdoms Adom and Fetu. By 1690, Denkyira dominated the south-western Gold Coast and parts of the Côte d'Ivoire.

In the south-eastern regions, meanwhile, Akwamu was also consolidating its power, expanding outwards from the newly established capital, Nyanoase, near modern Nsawan. The Akwamu rulers first attacked the Ga kingdom which was finally conquered in 1681. Then they turned westwards to subdue the coastal kingdom, Agona, in 1689. In their final campaigns (1702–10) they conquered the Adangbe states to the east and Kwahu to

47. K. Y. Daaku, n.d.
50. ibid., pp. 156–60.
FIG 14.4  States of the Lower Guinea coast, 1700 (after A. A. Boahen)
The states and cultures of the Lower Guinean coast

the north, even crossing the River Volta and subduing the Ewe states of Peki, Ho and Kpandu.52

The Denkyira and Akwamu evolved similar machinery to administer their empires. Each was divided into two areas, metropolitan and provincial. The metropolitan centred around the capital headed by the Omanhene (king) who was also king of the whole empire. Under him was a series of officials or kings who performed certain functions at court, such as the Batahene (Minister of Trade), the Sanaahene (Finance), the Gyaasehene (Home Affairs), the Akyeamehene (Foreign Affairs and Head Linguist) and the Sumankwaahene (Religious Affairs). For politico-military purposes, each state was divided into wings, three in Denkyira and five in Akwamu. The Denkyira divisions were Akumatire (Right wing), Kyeremfem (Left wing) and Agona Adontendom (Advance Guard).53 The Akwamu wings were Benkum (Left wing), Nifa (Right wing), Adonten or Krontire (Advance guard), Kyidom (Rear guard) and Gyaase. Each wing was headed by a king of a town or state within the metropolitan area or in the capital town itself. He exercised political control over his wing during peace time and became its Osafohene (war-leader) during wars. All the wing chiefs were members of the council that advised the Omanhene. The provincial area consisted of all the conquered states now part of the empire. Each continued to be ruled by its own king but was placed directly under the control of the Omanhene or a wing chief. Each state was expected to pay annual tribute and to fight in the wing of its head during battles.

Since Denkyira was the first state to develop into an empire, and since it had three wings while Akwamu had five, three of which were the same as those of Denkyira, Akwamu obviously borrowed the new imperial politico-military system from Denkyira, merely improving upon it by adding two more wings, namely Kyidom and Gyaase.

Many historians have seen the political history of the Gold Coast in the 1700s almost exclusively in terms of the rise of the Asante empire. But it was much more complex. First, there was the rise of other new states besides Asante. Secondly, there was the revival albeit brief, of Aowin and the overthrow of Denkyira and Akwamu by Akyem and Asante respectively. Thirdly, there was the expansion of the Fante kingdom to its widest territorial extent. Then, finally, there was the rise of the Asante empire, admittedly the most brilliant event of the century.

The other new eighteenth-century states included Nzima, the Aowin or Anyi states of Sanwi, Ndenye, Diabe, Moronou and Bettie, and many Baule principalities. After being defeated by the Denkyira in the 1680s, Amo Aseman led the Aowin or Anyi from Anwianwia across the River Tano to conquer the Agwa (Sohie and Anabula) and recreate their kingdom around Enchi. They were still consolidating when, in 1715, the Asante attacked forcing some Aowin westwards to found the kingdom of Sanwi.

after conquering the Aqua, Aboisse, Abakulo and Ekuebo and then the Eotile. After establishing their capital, at Krinjabo, they soon conquered Assin thereby gaining control over trade between the interior and the Aby Lagoon.

North of Sanwi emerged the other Anyi states, Ndenye and Diabe, founded at the same time as Sanwi by the branch of Anwianwia refugees that moved north-westwards into the area formerly occupied by the Agwa, Abure and other Lagunaires. The Anyi of Ndenye owed allegiance to Aowin until about 1715 but a section that refused to accept this moved away to found the kingdom of Bettie. Some Anyi, the Monfwe, crossed the River Comoe to establish the kingdom of Moronou. The relations that existed between these latter states are not known but Ndenye was definitely brought under the control of Asante. Both Perrot and Gross thought that Ndenye served the Asantehene through the Sehwi state of Wiawso but recent research has confirmed Daaku’s view that they did so through the Bantamahene of Kumasi.

Northwest of the Anyi, between the Comoe and Bandama rivers, there also arose, during the first half of the eighteenth century, a host of Baule principalities or chiefdoms. The oral traditions of the founders clearly show that they arrived in two waves from the Gold Coast. The first, the Alanguira Baule, arrived in 1700 about the same time as the Anyi. They came from Denkyira after its defeat by Asante in 1700–1. They settled in the area of the modern Canton of Agba whence some moved west to live among the Guro and Koro. The second much larger wave, the Assabu, came from Kumasi following the disputed succession that broke out after the death of Osei Tutu in 1717. According to their oral traditions, they were led by their Queen Abla Poku who sacrificed her son to the spirit of the River Comoe before they could cross, hence their name Baule (the infant is dead). Some moved north to form the Ando and others south to Grand-Morie among the Attie and the Abe. The rest, still under Queen Abla Poku, moved south across the Bandama river and then north again to the Bouaké region. This group was divided into eight large families or clans: the Faafuwe, Nzipri, Aitu, Nanafowe, Warebo, Saafowe, Agba and Ngan. Akwa Boni, who succeeded Queen Abla Poku, was apparently able to establish his authority over the Baule, the Malinke and the Mande who occupied the Warebo region. After his death, however, the kingdom broke up into independent chiefdoms.

Both waves of invaders soon mixed with the Guro, the Malinke, the Senufo and the Goli to form the modern Baule people.

The Nzima kingdom which also emerged at this time was the creation of three brothers, Annor Blay Ackah, Bua Kpanyili and Amihere II who amalgamated under their rule the three states of Jomoro, Abripiquem and Ankobra through their wealth gained from European trade. The most famous brother, Amihere II, was to become extremely rich in the 1760s. He extended the frontiers of the new kingdom, increasing its population by deliberately encouraging outsiders to settle there. Known in European records as Apollonia, this new state dominated the south-western corner of the Gold Coast throughout the eighteenth century.

Meanwhile some of the older states, such as Bron, Sehwi Wiawso, Aowin and Fante were extending their power and influence. Aowin, for example, appeared to have regained its independence from Denkyira in the 1690s. Greatly strengthened by refugees, who poured in from the Asante-Denk­yira wars, it came to dominate the Sehwi states and from 1700-10 began the conquest of the gold- and ivory-producing regions to the north. So powerful and intrepid did it grow that, in 1718–19, under its commander Ebri Moro, it invaded the Asante, sacking the capital, Kumasi, and returning home with loot and captives including some members of the Asante royal family.

Also in the early 1700s, the state of Bron conquered the Kulango to the south and part of the Nafana to the north and extended its power as far west as the Comoe river thereby dominating the trade routes from Bonduku to Kumasi and Krinjabo. The new Bron state was unique, being made up of Akan, Kulango, Nafana and Mande elements. At the top politically were the Akan invaders who maintained their clans, their matrilineal system of inheritance, their judicial system and aspects of their traditional religion. But they adopted Kulango and Nafana folklore, songs and dances and left untouched Nafana social structures and political orders at village and rural levels. In addition some of these three groups accepted Islam, introduced by the Mande–Joola who also greatly influenced the economic system of the kingdom.

It was also between 1700 and 1710 that the Akwamu extended their empire across the River Volta to its widest territorial limits. By 1730, in response partly to Akwamu expansion and later to Asante and Akyem expansion the Fante had conquered their neighbouring coastal states, Aguafo and Fetu to the west and the Agona to the east, giving them control of the coast from the Pra river to the Ga kingdom.

The political changes that occurred in the central forest regions between the Comoe and Volta rivers between 1500 and 1800 were even more

dramatic. First was the defeat and overthrow of the Denkyira empire in a series of wars (1699–1701) by the young Asante confederation of states. This was followed by the conquest of all Denkyira’s former vassal states, such as the Sekwi states (1701–2), Twifo (1712–13) and Wassa (1713 and 1726). The Asante then conquered Aowin (1715–21), Nzima (1715) and the Anyi state of Ndenye (1715) to the south-west, and Wenchi (1711–14), Bono (1723–4), the Bron state (1731–40) and Gonja (1732) to the north-west. Thus, by 1730, from the Comoe to the Volta rivers was under Asante control.

Second was the defeat in 1731 of Akwamu by Akyem Abuakwa and her allies the Ga, Kotoku and Agona. The Akwamu rulers were driven from their traditional homelands across the Volta river where they founded their present capital town, Akwamufie, and the Birim–Densu basin was annexed by Akyem Abuakwa. Thus by 1733, from the Comoe to the Volta rivers was partitioned among the Asante, the Akyem and the Fante.

Centralization was completed between 1731 and 1750 when the Asante conquered Akyem Kotoku and Akyem Abuakwa (1742) and the Ga state (1744–5) to the south, Eastern Gonja and the Dagomba state (1744) to the north of the Volta river, and the Krake and Bassa states (1744–5) to the north-east. By the mid-1700s the Asante empire stretched from the middle reaches of the Comoe river in the west to the River Volta in the east and from beyond the Volta in the north, south to the sea except for the Fante state directly south of Kumasi. The Fante maintained their sovereign existence throughout the eighteenth century through their own diplomatic skills and strong support from the British who wanted to stop the Asante gaining control over the whole coast.

Asante’s structure and government was similar to Akwamu’s and Denkyira’s. It was divided into metropolitan Asante and provincial Asante (Greater Asante, as Arhin calls it). Metropolitan Asante – unlike Metropolitan Denkyira or Akwamu – consisted not of just one town or state but, significantly, of all the former states within a fifty-kilometre radius of Kumasi. These included Dwaben, Kokofu, Bekwai, Nsuta, Mampong, Offinso, Asumenya, Denyasi, Adansi and Kumawu all of which recognized the Ohene (king) of the Kumasi state as their Asantehene (paramount king) and Kumasi as their capital. They accepted the Golden Stool as the soul and sacred symbol of the unity and survival of the Asante nation and were represented by their own Omanhene on the Asanteman Council, the governing body of the confederation and the entire empire. For politico-military reasons, metropolitan Asante was divided, like Akwamu, into five wings with the same names as their Akwamu counterparts: Benkum, Nifa, 64. For details of these campaigns and conquests, see J. K. Fynn, 1971, pp. 40–83; K. Y. Daaku, 1970, pp. 173–81; I. G. Wilks, 1975, pp. 18–29. 65. F. Addo-Fening, 1980. 66. I. G. Wilks, 1975, pp. 18–29; J. K. Fynn, 1971, pp. 57–80. 67. For further details, see A. A. Boahen, 1965, pp. 182–5; and 1974.
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Adonten, Kyidom and Gyaase. Each component state, including Kumasi, was organized likewise.

Provincial or Greater Asante consisted of all the states conquered and reduced by the Asante to vassal or tributary status. These states had no direct representatives on the Asanteman Council nor any direct access to the Asantehene. Instead each state served the Asantehene through, or was, an adamfo (client state) of one of the kings or member-states of the confederacy or one of the wing-chiefs of the Kumasi state, usually resident in Kumasi. Thus, Krakye and Bassa served Kumasi through the Dwabenhene, Gonja through the Mamponghene, Atebubu through the Adontehene of Kumasi and Denkyira through the Akwamuhene of Kumasi. Otherwise the states were largely left alone as long as they paid their annual tribute and participated in any wars. It was to strengthen this otherwise lax adamfo system of provincial administration that, from 1760-1800, Asante representatives were stationed as district and regional commissioners in some provincial states.

Between 1670 and 1750 political revolution had taken place in the forest and coastal regions of Lower Guinea. From the thirty-eight states of the 1629 map had emerged the three large empires of Aowin, Denkyira and Akwamu which by 1750, had merged into the single empire of Asante.

The first reason for the rise of these empires and the centralization of states was that the four states in question had the motivation to expand and the money with which to buy arms and ammunition. Aowin, Denkyira, Akwamu and Asante were the leading gold-producing states and the latter two the leading kola-producers for the northern trade. Furthermore, situated between the coastal and savannah regions, all played the role of middle-men in the trade between those two regions. By expanding northwards and southwards these states would gain control of the major trade routes and also the other gold- and kola-producing regions. An even stronger motivation for expansion was the European presence on the coast. By the mid-1600s European trade had become far more lucrative than trade with the savannah. If the inland states expanded to the coast they could trade directly with the Europeans and maximize profits. The challenge proved irresistible with all sooner or later fighting their way to the coast. Aowin expanded to include Apollonia, Denkyira expanded south to Ahanta and Fetu, Akwamu conquered Agona and the Ga kingdoms on the coast, and Asante finally conquered all of them and established direct contact with the Europeans.

The states that made up metropolitan Asante were motivated economically and politically. They were eager, given good alternative leadership, to rid themselves of their tyrannical Denkyira conquerors. That Denkyira rule was oppressive is borne out by the oral traditions of the pre-Asante states and also by contemporary European sources. As the Dutch Director-

68. I. G. Wilks, 1975, pp. 39 and 151.
General at El Mina, J. Van Sevenhuysen, remarked in 1701: 'The Denkyiras, for a long time past have been very bellicose and proud over their victories and have been intolerable to their neighbours.' Bosman, a contemporary observer, also notes that: 'Denkyira elevated by its great Richness and Power, became so arrogant, that it looked on all other Negroes with a contemptible Eye, esteeming them no more than its slaves; which rendered it the object of their common hatred, each impatiently wishing its downfall.' What they needed was leadership and this was provided by Osei Tutu and Opoku Ware, the founders of the Asante empire.

The other reason behind the rise of the three great empires was that the four expansionist states were free from interference in their internal affairs. The Akyem and the coastal states, although not without money or motivation, failed to develop into empires because they were denied such freedom. Sandwiched between expanding Denkyira and, later, Asante to the west and Akwamu to the east, the Akyem states were on the defensive throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Similarly, the coastal states' internal affairs were subjected to all sorts of interference by rival European nations on the coast, at times resulting in armed conflict, such as the Komenda-Dutch wars of the 1690s. Indeed, throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, cardinal European policy was to prevent any coastal state from gaining ascendency. The inland states of Aowin, Denkyira, Akwamu and Asante, however, were initially free from direct European interference and could sufficiently consolidate their power before encountering them.

Two other factors should also be taken into account in explaining the rise of the three empires: the adoption of a new technology and the high quality of leadership. Guns and gunpowder had become the most prized European import from 1650 onwards and, with their gold and other resources, the rulers of these states, could purchase what ammunition they needed. With guns their expansionist activities were obviously greatly accelerated. In traditional warfare two enemies faced each other in dense columns using spears, swords, axes, knives, bows and arrows and even hand combat in battle. The use of guns introduced fighting in different wings. This led to the evolution of the three wings by Denkyira followed by the five wings of Akwamu and Asante. This new military formation was superimposed on the traditional political structure of king plus advisory council of clan and lineage heads. Without able rulers these states could not have adapted their traditional warfare and old political structure to the new technology.

At this stage little is known about the Aowin kings but both oral and European documentary sources acclaim the courage, tact and prowess of the rulers of Denkyira, Akwamu and Asante. The Denkyira kings included Werempe Ampem, Boadu Akafu Brempon and the most illustrious, Boa Amponsem; Akwamu's included Ansa Saskraku, Basua and Akwono and 70. W. Bosman, 1979, pp. 74-5.
Asante's Osei Tutu and Opoku Ware. These kings converted their small kingdoms into huge empires in a series of brilliant, carefully-timed and well co-ordinated campaigns.

Many historians believe that these empires were products of the slave trade. Fage, for instance, has contended that

on the whole it is probably true to say that the operation of the slave trade may have tended to integrate, strengthen and develop military, territorial authority but to weaken more segmentary societies. Whether this was good or evil may be a nice point; historically, it may be seen as purposive and perhaps as more or less inevitable.

Clerici and others also maintain that 'On peut même dire que ces royaumes (i.e. Dahomey et Achanti), qui n'existaient pas auparavant, sont nés de la traite.' This may be true of other parts of West Africa but not for this area. On the Gold Coast the slave trade only became significant economically from 1700 to 10 while expansionist activities had begun in the 1670s and 1680s. In the Gold Coast the slave trade was the consequence not the cause of the state-building process.

In the Akan areas west of the River Tano and the Ewe areas east of the Volta river, home of the Lagunaires, the Anyi and the Baule, no such dramatic political change took place at this time. Political conditions in 1800 were much as they had been fifty or a hundred years earlier with small kingdoms or chiefdoms, each made up of loosely united family groups from clans of common ancestry.

In 1800 Ewe territory was still split into many independent dukowo (territorial divisions or what Amenumey calls chiefdoms and paramountcies) of varying sizes ranging from the single town of Wodze to Anlo of thirty-six independent towns and villages scattered far and wide. By 1900 the number of Eweland dukowo had grown to 120, each ruled by a fia (king) elected patrilineally from one or two lineages of the founding families. He was assisted by a Council of Elders, consulted on every issue. Under him were the chiefs of the villages of the dukowo and, in turn, each village was made up of lineages under the lineage head. At village or town level, all able-bodied male adults participated in open discussions on all matters before a decision could be taken by the chief and his elders. There are several reasons why the Western Akan of the Tano–Bandama basin and the Ewe of the Volta–Mono basin did not consolidate themselves. First, the migrations into their lands continued throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the breakaway movements into smaller and smaller settlements even into the nineteenth. By 1800 therefore, the Ewe

72. J. D. Fage, 1969a.
and Western Akan were not sufficiently settled to embark on wars of expansion. Secondly, as these migrants were themselves escaping the centralization and tyrannical behaviour of their former rulers, they were not likely to recreate the same socio-political structures in their new homes. Thirdly, in the case of the Ewe, economic motivation for state-building was lacking. As Amenumey puts it:

Eweland lacked the economic incentive, a necessary prerequisite to the evolution of centralized political entities. It is the production of economic surpluses that provides the first incentive for centralization.  

Without gold, ivory or kola nuts, the Ewe could not participate in the long-established and lucrative north-south Atlantic trade. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, their main export was slaves, an activity which jeopardized peace, stability and orderly government — the requirements for political expansion or centralization. The Western Akan did have gold, ivory and kola but because the trade routes to the north were controlled by the Mande, the Senufo, the Kulango and the Eastern Akan, especially the Asante, they profited little from that trade. Nor did they take part in the lucrative trade with Hausaland and Borno to the north-east. They therefore had no money for large-scale expansionist activities.

The third reason for the Ewe and Western Akan’s failure to consolidate was ecological. Because they were cut off from inland areas by numerous lagoons no Europeans would settle there, thus depriving them of any real economic incentive to expand southwards to the coast.

The fourth and probably most important reason was their neighbours’ constant interference in their political affairs which kept the Ewe and Western Akan on the defensive. The Western Akan faced the threat of the Sehwi and especially the Asante throughout the eighteenth century. Likewise, from the 1680s, the Ewe faced active interference first by the kings of Grand and Little Popo, then by the Akwamu and, in the eighteenth century, by Dahomey to the east and all-conquering Asante to the west.

Social and cultural changes in Lower Guinea

The most obvious socio-cultural change in Lower Guinea between 1500 and 1800 was demographic. With so many new food crops from the Americas and Asia, especially maize and some species of yams, the populations of the Lower Guinea coast greatly increased during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries — as is borne out by contemporary European documents. During the eighteenth century, however, largely as a result of the slave trade, the population remained stagnant or even decreased. As

76. Personal communication by C. Wondji.
Inikori has shown, the population of Lower Guinea would be much higher today had it not been for the Atlantic slave trade.

Secondly, society had become more sophisticated. In 1500 it had been composed of a ruling aristocracy consisting of a religious elite of priests (who wielded most power) and a political elite of kings and queens, ordinary subjects and domestic slaves. By 1800, however, the political elite had superseded the religious, except among the Ga-Adangbe and the Ewe. Furthermore, the tremendous increase in economic activities, especially in gold-mining and long-distance trade, and the numerous wars of expansion and domination, had led to an increase in domestic slaves. Slaves in Lower Guinea at this time were allowed to own property and marry free citizens. Some held responsible jobs and could even inherit the property of their owners by whom they were regarded as part of the family. By 1800 most had become integrated into society and it had become a sacred law, especially among the Akan, not to divulge the origins of such people.

Moreover, as a result of trading activities and the European presence, three new classes emerged unknown to traditional society. They were most prominent in the coastal areas between the Tano and the Volta rivers, and included a wage-earning class, an independent class of wealthy traders and middlemen merchant princes, and a mulatto group. The first class consisted of people employed by Europeans as masons, carpenters, bricklayers, interpreters, writers or secretaries, goldbrokers, civil-servants, ambassadors and public-relations officers. European records abound in references to such people. Some were literate and acted as intermediaries between Europeans and traditional rulers and their subjects.

The second class consisted of Africans, individuals or groups, who, through their own efforts in farming or trade, became exceedingly wealthy and more powerful even than the traditional rulers. This class included, on the Gold Coast, people such as John Ahenakwa and John Claessen of Fetu, Asomani of Akwamu, John Kabes of Komenda, John Konny of Ahanta and John Currantee of Anomabo (also known in oral tradition as Eno Baisie Kurentsi). On eastern Ivory Coast there also emerged the Kosehirange and the Essouma who acted as brokers or middlemen between the Europeans and the Avikam, Eotile, Abure, Sanwi, Aowin and Sehwi of the interior. By 1800 the Kosehirange in particular had become extremely wealthy and powerful and were playing a key role in the choice of lineage heads. Trade between the coast and inland was brisk. Ordinary people as well as traditional rulers could participate in it and the forest peoples played the lucrative role of middlemen-cum-producers. If a wage-earning group did not emerge, at least a group of wealthy traditional rulers and independent merchant princes must have arisen. Unfortunately, European sources and oral traditions are both silent on this subject.

79. Based on a contribution by C. Wondji.
The *mulatto* group was the product of miscegenation between European traders and African women. Such people could be found all along the Lower Guinea coast. Although contemporaries such as Bosman have spoken of them disparagingly as a 'bastard strain ... made up of a parcel of profligate villains neither true to the Negroes nor us', some, such as Geenlendonck, Bosman, Barter, Gordon and, above all, the descendants of Richard Brew, played important roles in commercial and political life.

Another important social change was the introduction of Christianity and western education by the Europeans, and of Islam by the Mande and Hausa traders. Both Dutch and English established elementary schools in their castles at Cape Coast, El Mina and Accra and, in the 1750s, the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel sent missionaries to Cape Coast. Moreover, some *mulattos* and some traditional rulers' children were sent abroad to be educated with several, including Christian Pedersen, Svane, Capitein and Philip Quacoee, returning home as teachers and missionaries. Thus, by 1800 a small educated élite and a few Christian converts could be found in such coastal towns as Accra and Cape Coast.

Even earlier than Christianity was the spread of Islam and Muslim culture along the northern trade routes, into northern Ghana by the fourteenth century and Asante and Baule by the 1750s. By 1800 Kumasi had a thriving Muslim quarter with a Kur'ānic school and, according to Wilks, the last eighteenth-century *Asantehene*, Osei Kwame (1777–1801), was deposed because of his attachment to the Muslim religion.

By 1800, however, both Christianity and Islam had made little impact on most peoples of the Lower Guinea coast, although the art of reading and writing in both Arabic and European languages had been firmly established.

As substantiated by fast-growing archaeological evidence, the Guinea-coast societies had, by 1800, developed the arts and crafts of potting, sculpture (in wood, ivory and clay), weaving, smithing and casting (in brass, copper and gold) with some groups specializing in a particular craft. Equally developed were their music, drumming and dancing.

Potting, one of the world's oldest crafts, dating in Ghana, for example, from the Later Stone Age (after −3000), was highly developed by 1700 particularly among the Adangbe whose pots were exported as far as Bonduku in Côte d'Ivoire. According to Anquandah, pottery was raised to a fine art by the Asante who produced 'some of the best-quality polymorphic pottery with complex motifs such as the *abusua kuruwa*, clan pot and the

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84. ibid., p. 53
mogyemogye ceremonial jaw-bone pot, a wine jar used for pouring libation on the Golden Stool'.

Carving and sculpting in wood, ivory and clay was also developed during this period—particularly among the Akan. Wooden stools, drums, umbrella tops and linguist staffs were made. Wood-carving reached its zenith during the sixteenth century when the Denkyira kings, to quote Anquandah, 'developed the political and cultural ideology connected with the Adanse stool'.

Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European visitors to the Ghana coast, such as Bosman, were impressed by the beauty of the ivory-side-blown trumpets that they found. Particularly well-known are the akuaba (fertility dolls) in wood and clay and the sculptured clay portraits of deceased kings and queens.

Weaving also developed during this period. According to a recent study, weaving on narrow horizontal looms was introduced to the Akan, Ewe and the Ga from western Sudan probably via the Nile valley rather than the western Maghreb. We do not know exactly when this knowledge reached the forest and coastal regions but it must have been before the arrival of the Portuguese, becoming widespread in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Both Brun and Barbot reported that cloth of six stripes from Côte d'Ivoire was being exported to the Gold Coast. According to the 1629 map, Nsoko (now identified as Begho) was an important centre 'where cloths are woven like carpets which are worn among the Akanists'. Those weavers also produced blankets, known among the Akan as kassa, bomo and nsaa, which are still highly valued by them. But it was in the eighteenth century, as Lamb has clearly shown, that weaving among the Akan and the Ewe attained its maturity and highest sophistication. This is amply demonstrated by the now famous colourful kente cloths of the Akan and the rich adanudo cloths of the Ewe who originated them (Plate 14.2). The making of adinkra cloth, a broad cloth with Akan traditional motifs and symbols stamped on it, also became famous in the Brong region and was later copied by the Asante.

However, it was in smithing and casting, especially in gold and brass, that the greatest development occurred among the Akan in particular. Using mainly the cire-perdue (lost-wax) process, these smiths produced exquisite gold and silver regalia including sword ornaments, rings, bangles, chains and headgear. Goldsmithing was well established before the advent of the Europeans but drawing on the expertise of their Muslim craftsmen, the Brong, then the Denkyira and particularly the Asante developed the art during the 1600s and 1700s, to a degree of excellence not since superseded. The Akan smiths also produced thousands of geometric and figur-
PLATE 14.2 West African weaving: (above) Kente cloths, Asante silks (below) Adanudo cloths, Ewe silks
ative gold or brass weights, now a great attraction for European tourists and found in famous art museums worldwide (Plate 14.3). Casting, especially in brass, was also developed at this time and exquisite brass caskets for keeping gold dust in and brass vessels for storing shea butter were also made.

With the rise of the Asante empire in the eighteenth century the arts and crafts of the Lower Guinea coast reached their peak. The Asante kings expanded not only territorially and politically but did everything in their power to promote arts and crafts. Following the defeat of Denkyira, Tekyiman and Akyem, they collected their best craftsmen and goldsmiths and sent them to Kumasi, as Anquandah has pointed out: ‘with the establishment of the Asante confederation, the Asante kings centralised all Asante arts and crafts in the neighbourhood of the capital, Kumasi’. Ahwiaa was established as the centre for stool-making, Bonwire for kente-weaving, Tafo for pottery, Fumesua for iron work and Krofofrom for brass-casting. Moreover, the Asantehene established the Apagyafie—a group of goldsmiths and other craftsmen from Denkyira whose duty was to make his regalia. He also introduced the golden Asomfo stool whose first occupant, Nana Tabiri, was the son of a Denkyira chief.

By blending expertise and artistic traditions, the Asante kings of the eighteenth century brought Akan cultural development to its highest peak of excellence and so ensured that their status and power was reflected in art forms of the highest quality. They developed a golden culture and civilization symbolized by their sophisticated golden regalia, their rich, multi-coloured kente cloth, their elaborate court protocol and their complicated and artistic gold weights that amazed Europeans visiting Kumasi in the 1700s and early 1800s. Despite the impact of colonialism, and the iconoclasm of and condemnation by Christian missionaries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the goldsmiths’ art never died out and fascinating regalia in gold and silver are still being produced, particularly by the Asante.

Conclusion

1500 to 1800 was indeed a period of radical change for the states and peoples of the Lower Guinea coast. Politically the process towards centralization was completed. Economically, trade in gold and ivory was eclipsed by the slave trade; the commercial and economic centres moved from inland to the coast; strong commercial links were forged with the...

90. For a fascinating study of Akan gold weights, see T. F. Garrard, 1980, pp. 171-363.
91. ibid., p. 198.
PLATE 14.3 Akan brass weights for weighing gold-dust. Geometric forms (left) were used from the fifteenth century onwards; figurative forms (right), in use from the seventeenth century, also served to illustrate popular proverbs and maxims.
PLATE 14.4  Nana Otuo Siriboe II, Omanhene of Dwaben state, in a rich Kente cloth and wearing some of the gold state regalia
The states and cultures of the Lower Guinean coast

Americas and Europe, thereby integrating the local economy with the global. Above all, this was a period of social change: the evolution of new classes, although on a limited scale and confined mainly to the coast; the introduction of literacy, western education and Christianity; the spread of Islam; and the flowering of indigenous cultures, especially in weaving and metal-work. These were indeed dynamic centuries for the peoples of the Lower Guinea coast, all the more so because at the end they were in full control of their own destiny and sovereignty.
Introduction

This chapter covers the region extending from the valley of the River Volta in the west to the River Cameroon in the east. Most of the area is tropical forest bordered by savannah with shrub forest to the north. The western part, from the border of Nigeria to the River Volta, is also savannah. The region can also be defined as the territory contained between the coastline of the Bights of Benin and Bonny (formerly Biafra) in the Gulf of Guinea. The peoples living within this part of the Guinea forest and the surrounding savannah comprise the Fon or Aja of the modern Republic of Benin, the Yoruba, the Ijo of the Niger Delta in the centre of the area, the Igbo to the north-east of the Delta in the centre of the area, the Igbo to the north-east of the Delta, the Ibibio, and various peoples of southern Cameroon.

All the languages of the area belong to the Niger–Congo family, the vast majority of them being within the Kwa sub-family. The Efik/Ibibio and other languages of the Nigeria–Cameroon border area of Nigeria, and the languages of the Cameroon itself are, however, closely related to the Bantu languages of Central, Eastern and Southern Africa. The eastern section of the region is, therefore, in many ways, an extension of the great Bantu complex of languages and cultures into West Africa. The peoples and cultures in this border region form a unifying link between West Africa and Bantu Africa. Among the Kwa language group, the Yoruba and Igbo are the largest in terms of the numbers of speakers (8–12 million) and geographical spread. The Edo group is also large with a spread of related peoples from deep within its hinterland to the Delta and its western peripheries, including such groups as the Isoko and the Urhobo and, to the north, the Ishan (Esan) and others. Among the Kwa languages, Ijo in the Niger Delta is the most divergent from its neighbours, Igbo, Edo, and Yoruba.¹

The comparatively high degree of differentiation of Ijo from Igbo, Edo and Yoruba is, in part, the result of the long period in which it has been a separate language. Glotto-chronological estimates give the period of

separation as more than 5000 years, which indicates the stability of the language communities in the region. Separation times for dialect clusters within the Ijo group itself, between the Central and Eastern Delta, for example, have been estimated at 1–2000 years. A similar estimate of 2000 years is made for Yoruba and the related language, Igala.

The long continuities in this region’s history should be borne in mind when evaluating the changes supposedly induced by the arrival of Europeans on the Atlantic coast from the end of the fifteenth century. It may be noted that the predominant influence of developments in the savannah and the hinterland on this region was only equalled over a long period and only recently superseded by the influences of the European impact from the coast.

The sixteenth century was the beginning of European activity of any significance in the Bights of Benin and Bonny. The Portuguese reached Benin in 1486 and established relations with the Oba of Benin. They also established commercial relations at various points all along the coast. During the following centuries European activity on the coast began to change the direction of trade from north to south, and the coast gradually became the major origin of stimuli to change.

The overseas slave trade was the obvious focus of European activity from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. The region covered in this study was one of the main markets for slaves on the West African coast. Some states, such as the Kingdom of Dahomey, derived great impetus for their formation and growth from the trade. The development of others, from the Niger Delta to the Cameroon, was influenced by the profits to be derived from it. Other communities, especially those organized in non-state forms, tended to be the victims of slave-raids and to constitute supply sources. In one way or other, every community was affected by the disruptions, depopulation and changes induced by the overseas slave trade.

During this period, the main impact of the slave trade was to draw the communities into the world economy as suppliers of slaves for work in the American plantations. The increase in the local slave supply led to social and political changes within the communities. The arrival of forced African migrants in the Americas also created additional forces for change in the New World. But in the oral traditions of the communities, what emerges is the effect of the trade on the fortunes of local lineages, groups or dynasties.

The Fon kingdom of Dahomey

The political development of the Kingdom of Dahomey and of the neighbouring states of Allada, Whydah, Popo, and Jakin was largely related to the activities of the European slave-traders on the coast, and to the influence of the Yoruba kingdom of Oyo to the north-east. According to a study of
this area by Akinjogbin, developments before the early nineteenth century relate closely to the effects of the slave trade and the attempts by Yor to impose its authority.

The traditional institutions of the small communities and states of the area were weakened by the introduction of the slave trade and, by the end of the seventeenth century, a political vacuum had been created. It was at this point that the founders of the Kingdom of Dahomey re-established order by fashioning a new form of political organization out of various groups of Aja peoples comprising Egun (Gun), Fon, Arada and others from the southern part of the modern Republic of Benin. By 1700 Dahomey had become a major power in the area. Between 1724 and 1727 its ruler, Agaja, embarked on a conquest of the small but older states surrounding

Abomey. This provoked intervention by Oyo, but not to establish a system of its own. After 1730 Dahomey accepted the political authority of Oyo and agreed to live within the economy of the slave trade in co-operation with the European traders on the coast. But the study concludes that it was the very 'inadequacies of the slave trade economy' that ended the brief period of prosperity. The depression that began about 1767 culminated in the fall of the Agaja dynasty in 1818, and the rise of the new dynasty of Gezo.

The new dynasty adapted fully to the slave-trade economy and made it the basis of its strength. It thereby benefitted from the breakdown of the Oyo kingdom and the wars in Yoruba country in the nineteenth century.

These, then, were the two predominant influences on Aja country: the Yoruba (specifically, the Oyo) and the slave-trade from the coast.

The inter-relationship between the Aja communities and the Yoruba to the east and north-east was deep and long-standing. Traditions of origin relate to earlier homelands in Yoruba country even among those communities with traditions of recent migration from the west. Others have traditions of direct migration from Yoruba homelands. Such traditions need not derive from the experiences of Oyo-Yoruba political and military activity from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. There are, indeed, states of Yoruba origin and culture within the area, and the incidence of cultural affinity is high. The Aja kingdoms tend to derive their affinities from Ketu, a migrant community of Yoruba from Ile-Ife.

The states, then, were largely organized in systems similar to the Yoruba pattern. The 'father' kingdom in the area was Allada, which had been founded about 1575 and played the same role as Ile-Ife played in Yorubaland. The rise of Dahomey as a centralized state swallowing all others and organized on new lines offended against tradition and invited the intervention of Oyo. Oyo intervention at several points, then, was disruptive in the tradition of all military interventions. Such interventions served to weaken Dahomey as a military power but were not negative in every way. The peace enforced by Oyo prevented the young Dahomey state from dissipating all its energies on military adventure and enabled it instead to strengthen its internal administration. Some aspects of Oyo organization were taken over, such as the ilari system introduced by Tegbesu, the last of the founding dynasty. It was the stability of its internal system that enabled Dahomey to finally break away from Oyo in the nineteenth century.

The important factor in the effect of the European slave trade on Aja country was that at the beginning of the sixteenth century when the trade started, the states in the area were still weak. The kidnapping and seizure of the weak by the strong was disruptive in the extreme and would have removed people from productive agricultural and industrial pursuits. Normal economic activities were undermined and the rules of society destroyed. Insecurity and brutal force prevailed over respect for authority, elders and the family.

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The pattern of rivalries and competition for European trading posts also destroyed the precedencies and traditional relationships between the states. Early in the seventeenth century, the Dutch established agents at Assim, the capital of Allada, the senior state. After the French had failed to establish Christian missions in Allada, they set up a rival trading station at Whydah in 1671. Economic rivalry between the two kingdoms set in, finally destroying the already weakened traditional ties. It was in this atmosphere of cynicism concerning the normal values of society, of insecurity and political and commercial rivalries, that the Kingdom of Dahomey was created by migrants who travelled from Allada.

The dissident migrants from Allada settled in Abomey, out of reach of the Europeans, in about 1625, and tried to set up a new political system that would endure despite the disturbed times. They repudiated the traditional view of the state as a larger version of the family, likening it instead to a perforated pot, symbolized by the king. For the perforated pot to hold water, each citizen had to place a finger over a hole thus sinking his identity in an absolute state. It was the dogged development of this idea of a strong centralized state with an absolute king demanding unreserved loyalty that marked Dahomey out from other states. It was thus that it was able to survive the slave trade and the attacks from Oyo and gradually bring all other states in the neighbourhood under its control.

The predominant role attributed to the Atlantic slave trade assumed in the above account of the history of Dahomey is currently being revised by recent research. Peukert\(^3\) directly challenges the two central concepts, first, that the history of Dahomey was determined by the processes of the slave trade and, second, that its economy was archaic, its external trade being monopolized by the monarchy and domestic exchange being redistributive rather than through the open market-place. In place of these old hypotheses, it is suggested:

1. that the Dahomean state did not account for more than 20 per cent of the kingdom’s foreign trade and that small traders did most of the external trade;
2. that the Atlantic trade accounted for little more than 2.5 per cent of the Dahomean economy; and
3. that even in the external trade, slaves and guns did not form the major items – Brazilian tobacco, for example, being more important an import than guns.

These are significant points for a revision of the old ideas and form bases for future research.

The Yoruba kingdoms

The history of the Yoruba communities of south-western Nigeria may be briefly summarized.

First, there are the problems of reconciling the oral traditions of origin and the archaeological evidence. The problems here mainly concern the traditions which make Ile-Ife the centre of creation and the origin of all Yoruba kingdoms from where their rulers obtained their beaded crowns. Ife, of course, also merits attention because of the unique naturalistic art in bronzes and terracotta which have been known to the world since Frobenius proclaimed them the proof of a Greek settlement in the heart of Africa. Second, there was the rise of the military and political power of Oyo, thought by some to have co-existed with the spiritual authority of the *Oni* of Ife over the whole of Yoruba country. Oyo became the flag-bearer of Yoruba power in the northern and western areas of the region. Oyo's imperial role in the affairs of the Fon and their neighbours is well known. It also came into close direct contacts with the Nupe and Borgu, known to the Yoruba as the Tapa and the Ibariba respectively. Oyo also seems to have had relations with the Hausa and through them contact with the trans-Saharan trade. Third, there is the nature of the political, cultural and social development in other Yoruba communities and kingdoms.

The primacy of Ife in Yoruba history is based on many factors. Its founder, Oduduwa, was supposed to have come from heaven or Mecca, and his sons or grandsons to have founded all the other Yoruba states. Recent interpretations of these traditions suggest that Oduduwa, or a group of migrants, came to the area about 1000 years ago but that the land was already occupied, possibly by the Igbo of Ife traditions. Some of the place-names in the traditions also suggest the existence of a number of mini-states and the names of some of the 400 deities may represent the names of rulers of such states before their unification. In addition, the movement outwards from Ife did not take place at one time and not all the crowns were obtained directly from Ife.

The famous Ife bronzes have played a part in confirming the traditions of the relationship between Ife or Yorubaland and the Edo kingdom of Benin to the east. But the bronzes also relate Ife to Nupe and regions around the Niger. Clear similarities have been found between the large bronzes found in Nupe country and those of Ife. Accordingly, it has become clear that the ‘Mecca’ of the traditions did not refer to any place in the Middle East, to Egypt or to Meroe but to regions just across the River Niger to the north of present-day Yoruba territory. In addition, the art of Ife has been compared to the Nok terracotta art in central Nigeria, despite the time gap between the two cultures (−900−c.200 for Nok, and c.+900−1300 for the height of Ife art).

Oyo not only became pre-eminent among the Yoruba kingdoms, but

According to popular stories, the last king of the mythical dynasty of the Ogiso reigning in Benin before the arrival of the Yoruba, was dethroned following a revolt. He was replaced by a prince of Ife, named Oranmiyan, the son of the oni of Oduduwa. From that time, custom required that the oba of Benin be decapitated after his death, that his skull be sent to Ife for burial in the sacred enclosure (orun oba ado) and that, in return, a brass commemorative head be sent to Benin, to be placed on the altar of the royal ancestors. At the end of the fourteenth century, the sixth oba, Oguola, is said to have suggested that a metal-caster from Ife come to Benin to teach his art. The oni is said to have sent Ighehae. This master, who may be mythical, is venerated today as the founding patron of the igun eromwon guild of casters, and has a shrine. The masculine sex of this commemorative head is indicated by the three vertical stripes above each eye (a woman would have four). The oba comes from the so-called middle period, from the mid-sixteenth to the end of the seventeenth century. The vertical inlays of iron, characteristic of the early period have disappeared; the neck and chin are hidden beneath twenty coral necklaces; and the face no longer has any realism. The greater thickness of the metal may be due to the casting technique which had become less rigorous, but it did serve a useful purpose since the increased weight made them more suitable for use as pedestals for the carved ivory needles which were customarily inserted in the circular opening in the headdress. Height: 23 cm

also developed special features. Some of these derived from its location close to the Nupe and Borgu. For example, Qyq relied more heavily on officials of slave origin in the military and social organizations than did other Yoruba states. In the armed forces, Qyq’s supremacy was probably the result of its use of cavalry and archers, derived from its early contact
with the trans-Saharan trade and the northern states, from about the period of Songhay ascendancy in the fourteenth century. Oyo may have obtained horses, kanun (potash) and obuotoyo (rock salt) among other products from the north, while exporting kola nuts, shea butter and palm products. These external contacts as well as its location in the savannah enabled Oyo to make innovations in the Yoruba concepts it shared with the other kingdoms. One peculiar innovation made by Oyo was the supremacy of the Sango (thunder cult) in its religious system.

The foundation of Oyo is related to Ife and Benin through its legendary founder, Oranyan (Oranmiyan), who is stated to have reigned at both Ife and Benin before moving to Oyo. But other states already existed in the locality, such as Iwo, Owu and Oba in the Igbomina area; Ira in the Ibolo area; and Oyokoro, Ikoyi and others. Oyo eventually made several of them into vassal states including Owu in the south and Ede in the south-east. Oyo expansion was finally stopped by the forest-dwelling Ijesha, as the Oyo cavalry could not operate in wooded regions. The Ijebu and the hill country of the Ekiti also escaped direct Oyo control. The Benin kingdom to the east proved another barrier to Oyo expansion and one tradition says that the two powers established a tree boundary at the town of Otun. Oyo ran a trade route to the coast through the territory of the Egba and Egbado and it was through this route in south-western Yoruba country that Oyo power expanded to Dahomey.

Oyo power developed out of adversity. In the fifteenth century its rulers had been driven out of Old Oyo (Oyo Ile or Katunga) and had taken refuge in Kusu among the Borgu and later at Igboho. Undaunted, Oyo had reorganized its army and adopted a new policy of militarism. The town of Ikoji became the home of the eso warriors devoted to 'training in warfare'. By the beginning of the sixteenth century Oyo had reconquered her former territory and pushed the Nupe back. The friendship between the Oyo and the Borgu also broke down and Oyo tried to expand in their direction too.

Oyo remained outside the area of direct European influence before the nineteenth century, developing its major institutions and starting its expansion independently. The adventure into Dahomey may have been connected with participation in the coastal trade. But other traditions say that Oyo kept out of the slave trade and contact with Europeans because of an early experience of European duplicity when 800 messengers sent to greet a professed friend on the coast never returned. Whatever the case, Oyo did not use such conspicuous elements of the European trade as guns until the nineteenth century.

The areas of Yoruba country beyond Oyo expansion, to the east and north, consisted of smaller state forms in the Ekiti area and others, such as the Igala, which tended to relate developments in Yoruba country to those in the Niger–Benue valley. Other states, such as the Owo and Ijebu, also appear to have had much more to do with the Edo kingdom of Benin.
Plate 15.3  Yoruba female statuette, dedicated to the worship of the orisha of creativity, Obatala. She is usually clothed with a white cloth like the priests and devotees of that god, an iron bracelet and, here, a necklace of white pearls with a pendant. The bowl that she is holding is intended to receive an offering of the white blood of the snail, a symbol of peace and calm. It is the female element of the orisha, the male element being represented by a statuette holding a fan and a fly-whisk. This bowl-bearer should not be confused with the olumeye, or vessel for kola nuts, represented by a much larger kneeling maternal figure holding a bowl which often has a lid. Height: 49 cm
than with Oyo. Works of art recovered from excavations at Owo suggest that, by the fifteenth century, Owo sculptural forms were already related to both Ife and Benin styles and that there was a third independent style, which could possibly indicate a single prototype for the two better-known styles.

PLATE 15.4 Seventeenth-century bronze mask which was worn at the waist, from Benin, Nigeria. Height: 9.3 cm
The Niger Delta

The history of the Niger Delta is linked with the history of parts of the coastal region east to the Cameroon and west to the lagoons of Lagos and beyond. Until the nineteenth century – and until the disruption by European imports at different points of the coast – trade routes crossed the region from east to west and north to south. Cloth made in the Ijebu area of Yorubaland was sold in the Western Delta and appears to have been resold as far east as Nembe in the Eastern Delta. The Itsekiri kingdom of the Western Delta, for example, was related to the Ijebu, as shown by the similarity of language, although the Itsekiri also say that their rulers came from the Benin kingdom, and its political system is similar to that of the Edo kingdom of Benin. The Itsekiri also derived some of their cultural values from the Ijo of the Western Delta among whom they lived, and traded in pottery, salt and cloth with the states of the Eastern Delta, especially Nembe.

In the western Niger delta, Ode Itsekiri, the capital of the Itsekiri kingdom, was the focus of political power. When the Portuguese came to this area, the Itsekiri became their major delta contacts and attempts were made to establish Christianity there as well as trade. There was another trading post at the estuary of the Forcados river, but the Portuguese moved through the Western Delta to the mainland at Ughoton which they used as a base for contact with the capital of the Edo kingdom at Benin. The Itsekiri also moved out in some numbers from Ode Itsekiri in the eighteenth century to establish settlements at the estuary of the Benin river at points of vantage for the trans-Atlantic trade. It was mainly from these new centres, such as Bobi, that the Itsekiri served as the agents of the Benin kingdom and as middlemen in their own right for the export of the produce of the hinterland peoples, namely, the Urhobo, the Isoko and the western Igbo.

The Ijo of the western Niger Delta were mostly organized in loose stateless communities and tended to participate in the overseas trade by preying on it as pirates. The Gbaramatu of the Escravos estuary and the Ogulagha and Iduwini of the Forcados estuary appear to have benefited to some extent from the trade system. The bronzes found among these Ijo groups, and also among the Mein and Kabowei, may be indications of affluence derived from participation in internal and external trade, as well as contact with Benin and other hinterland centres.

The Ijo of the Central Delta formed the heartland of the group. Oral traditions suggest migrations from this area to the Eastern Delta and Western Delta, and on to the Delta peripheries. From the lexicostatistical estimates of the distance between Ijo and the mainland languages of Yoruba, Edo and Igbo, the first settlements in the Delta may have been established up to 5000 years ago. Palaeontological studies of a core taken

near Nembe in the Eastern Delta suggest that human life was possible there 3000 years ago. But according to linguistic and oral traditional estimates, the present communities in the Eastern Delta were settled in the area only 1000 years ago. And radio-carbon dating of finds from sites at Ke and Saikiripogu (Ewoama) only confirms that people were living there before +800.

The excavations in the eastern Niger delta carried out by Drs. Anozie and Nzewunwa, following Professor Alagoa's survey of oral traditions, have opened up new vistas for Niger Delta history. The excavations show that

the earliest settlers knew how to exploit the shell-fish of the salt-water delta and also kept some animals. The abundance of pottery at such sites as Onyoma suggests a complex economy which included some farming, although most agricultural products were obtained through trade with the hinterland. In the oral traditions palm fruits, peppers and bananas are indicated as local products. The excavations also revealed some iron-working on a small scale. This again suggests contacts with the hinterland for raw materials and for finished goods. Numerous brass or bronze objects have been found on the surface at various locations in the Niger Delta, but a single coiled object alone has been recovered in situ as a grave-good at Onyoma.

Current art in the Niger Delta consists almost solely of sculpture in wood depicting water spirits or ancestors as shrine furniture or masks for dancing. The excavations have recovered a small but significant number of masks in terracotta from Ke and human figures from Onyoma. These finds are unique among Nigerian terracotta but one of the human heads from Onyoma has features reminiscent of Nok and Ife terracotta in the treatment of the eyes.

The Atlantic slave trade and, prior to it, internal long-distance trade, played a large part in the formation of the states of the eastern Niger delta — namely Bonny, Elem Kalabari (New Calabar), Okrika and Nembe. From the oral traditions it would appear that their founders came from earlier homes in the fresh-water Central Delta and adapted to life in the salt-water Eastern Delta. The adaptations included changing from an economy based on fishing and farming to one based on fishing, salt-boiling and trading. Social and political adaptations were made and kingship institutions were set up from about the thirteenth century. The Atlantic slave trade tended to accelerate the pace of change and the form of state established by the eighteenth century has been named the city-state or trading state. The slave trade provided wealth as a base of power for the amanyamabo (king) and ruling élite, a system for recruiting labour and increasing the population and men for the fighting forces.

Igboland

A number of stone-age sites in the Igbo heartland suggest a longer history of human habitation than had been credited to the culture. A rock shelter at Afikpo produced stone tools and pottery 5000 years old and sites with similar evidence have been found in the Nsukka area. A stone factory has been discovered also at Nsukka and is now under study by Dr Anozie of the University of Nigeria. It seems clear that people farmed there at least 3000 years ago, with yams as their main crop. Other crops which appear to be of local origin include oil palms, okro, egusi and some varieties of kola nut. Cassava, rice, coco-yams, banana, plantain and other important crops

from the Americas were introduced through the Atlantic slave trade. Cassava was established in the Niger Delta (from the Western Delta eastwards) by the seventeenth century but only penetrated parts of Igboland two to three hundred years later.

Oral traditions in places like Nri relate the origin of agriculture to their founding fathers. Iron-working, too, was established early and the bronze art of this area has become world-famous through the excavations at Igbo-Ukwu. The bronzes are thought to derive from a different tradition from those of Ife and Benin and to equal them in beauty and high quality. They are associated with the Nri divine kingship and ritual centre. The Nri priests exercised authority over wide areas of Igboland with power to install ozo and eze title-holders and wash away abomination. The eze Nri also controlled ifejokwu (the yam force). It could have been the income brought back by travelling Nri priests which provided the wealth that sustained the bronze art.

The Nri priesthood performed a vital role in Igboland because of the small-scale organization of the communities based on the title system. But some Igbo groups west of the River Niger and on its east bank adopted kingship institutions through contact with communities that had similar institutions. Thus the Aboh, Onitsha and Oguta kingdoms apparently derived their obi from the oba kingship of Benin. These states developed from migrants from areas under Benin influence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. From the oral traditions it would seem that the movements occurred during the obaship of Esigie (c. 1517–c. 1550) in Benin. The presumption is that wars or other disturbances in eastern Benin prompted groups to migrate eastwards to establish new polities modelled on their homeland.

Other states on the River Niger, such as the Osomari, claim ancestors from the Igala kingdom of Idah to the north. But Igala influence on Igboland was probably more pronounced among northern Igbo in the Anambra valley and in the Nsukka region. There is evidence of Igala raids into the area, while the Nri claim that they and the Igala shared a distant ancestor. The Igbo states along the Niger river became the first participants in the overseas slave trade and later in the palm-oil trade of the nineteenth century in collaboration with the Niger Delta states. The northern Igbo groups traded with the Igala and other groups to the north.

The Igbo political and social systems had mechanisms for wider control than the village or town. One was religious sanction by an oracle. Various oracles have operated in Igboland at different times and places, including Kamalu of the Etche, Igwe Kala of Umunoha, Agbala of Awka and Ibini Okpube (Long Juju) of Arochukwu. The last two achieved the widest influence because other sectors of the community actively demonstrated their faith in them. Thus, the Awka blacksmiths, who worked at markets and settled all over Igboland and the Niger Delta, spread the influence of

Fon and Yoruba: the Niger Delta and the Cameroon

PLATE 15.6 Ornamental sixteenth-century bronze plaque from Benin, Nigeria, showing a chief wearing his regalia: coiffure with a high collar of coral beads, leopards'—teeth necklace, bracelets and anklets. He is not an oba, since he is wearing a protective war bell on his chest, an item not worn by the king. The leopard's head decorating the war dress is believed to frighten enemies. He is accompanied by two warriors playing a trumpet and a double bell, and a naked servant carrying his ceremonial sword. These three figures, although close, are smaller—indicating their lesser importance. The representation of the Portuguese, with their plumed helmets, long hair, beards and buttoned jackets, makes it possible to date this plaque to the time of Oba Esegie. In 1515, he received military assistance from the Portuguese in a war with the Ata of the Igala. The four-leaved motif engraved in the background is known as owen iba ede ku ('the sun does not forget a day'); it is associated with Olokun, the god of water. Hundreds of these plaques decorated the great rectangular pillars that supported the canopies of the various courtyards of the palace of the oba of Benin. Their arrangement reflected complex themes. Height: 45.7 cm

the Agbala oracle. But the Arochukwu oracle was the most successful thanks to the Aro traders, the major slave-dealers, who spread word of him far and wide. The Aro trade network probably developed in relation to the trade in slaves through the Cross river estuary at the port of Calabar but
also came to deal with the Delta states, developing rapidly from about
the seventeenth century. Aro traders established settlements and markets
throughout Igboland and used the utterances of the oracle to procure
slaves. Unlike the Nri priesthood, the Aro were willing to use violence and
enlisted the help of the warriors of Abam, Edda, Ohafia, Abiriba and others
with whom they shared the loot.

The areas of Igboland without strong centralized political government
probably suffered most from the effects of slave-raiding and kidnapping.
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the eastern Niger delta
ports were prominent in the export of slaves from West Africa most of
whom came from the Igbo hinterland. Internally, too, insecurity and the
disruption of communities and institutions was considerable.

The Cross river valley and the Cameroons

The peoples in this region show affinities of language and also of historical
origins. Most of the languages are related to Bantu languages, forming a
north-western extension of the great Bantu languages of Central, Eastern
and Southern Africa into West Africa.

The largest ethnic group in the Cross river valley, the Ibibio, have been
so long established there that they no longer remember any traditions of
migration from outside. In the northern parts of the valley, the Ogoja area
is occupied by a wide variety of peoples with traditions of migration from
the Benue valley further north, or from the Cameroon. Some communities
in the Ibibio group or closely related to them, such as the Andoni of the
eastern Niger delta fringe and the Ibeno (Ibuno), also claim ancestral
homelands in the Cameroon. Likewise, some communities in the
Cameroon, such as the Isangele, are of Ibibio origin.

Communities in this region were largely organized in non-centralized
political systems of great complexity. Age organizations as well as secret
societies provided effective social and political control. Among the Ibibio,
the Ekpo secret society among others was widespread. But the Mgbe
(leopard society) of the northern Cross river valley and the Cameroons
which became the Ekpe of the Efik state of the Cross river estuary, was the
best-known and most formally organized.

The Efik are closely related to the Ibibio, their proximate home having
been Uruan Ibibio on the west bank of the River Cross. Some traditions
state that they had previously lived at Ibom, near Arochukwu in Igboland.
They had left Ibom because of wars involving groups characterized as
Akpa who could have been related to the communities known by that name
in the Benue valley, such as the Jukun. These early contacts of the Efik
are important as their final settlement at Ikot Etunko (Creek Town),
Obutong (Old Town) and Atakpa (Duke Town) by the beginning of the
seventeenth century made them the major centres for the overseas slave
trade in the region.
The state the Efik founded on the lower Cross river – now known as Calabar – exported Igbo-hinterland slaves from the collecting centre at Arochukwu which obtained slaves through its oracle and mercenaries. But most slaves sold in Calabar were Ibibio or members of groups in the Cross river valley and the neighbouring areas of the Cameroons.

The slave trade was partly responsible for the reshaping of the Ibibio Ekpọ secret society and the Ekoi Mgbe into the Ekpe at Calabar. The Ekpe became a class-structured society uniting the free aristocratic elements and keeping in control the slave classes and the poor. It also enforced political and social rules, collected debts and imposed order. Because of the common influences of the slave trade and trans-Atlantic contacts, Calabar developed lineage-based organizations similar to the Houses of the Eastern Delta states. Calabar, however, was different in that it had mainland farms where it kept most of its slaves in isolation rather than integrate them like the open masquerade society, Ekine or Sekiapu in the Delta states.

The most important groups on the Cameroon coast were the north-west Bantu groups of the Kpe–Mboko, the Duala, the Limba and the Tanga–Yasa. There were numerous groups of fishermen, farmers and hunters. Most were organized in small village units but by the eighteenth century the Bubi, the Duala and the Isuwu had organized larger political units. These groups were either connected with the slave trade or took advantage of it. The Cameroons river thus became a minor centre of the slave trade beyond the Cross river estuary with which it retained close contact.

The secret society was also an important focus of social and political control and, among the Duala, the Isuwu and other neighbouring groups, the Jengu, based on the veneration of water spirits, became the most prestigious.

Conclusion

The major external influence in the history of this region of coastal swamp and rainforest from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century was without doubt the overseas slave trade. It is, however, hard to assess its exact role in relation to internal factors for change long present in the region.

In many oral traditions the slave trade features as an enriching activity that brought both wealth and people. This was the case for the coastal communities which took part as middlemen, not themselves engaging in hunting or fighting for slaves but buying from others to sell to the slave ships and adding some of the local population. The Niger Delta states and the Efik state of Calabar would fall into this category. For them the slave trade was mainly a factor of economic change, social change in the integration and control of slaves, and political change in the shifts in the power base through differentials in wealth and manpower.

The Fon kingdom of Dahomey exemplifies a second type of participation in the slave trade – that of active procurement of slaves. In Igboland the
Aro and their mercenary allies played a similar role hunting for slaves. These communities gained from the trade but only at the expense of the normal development of their social, political and moral systems which were disrupted by the violence involved in procuring slaves.

The third category of community affected by the trade may be seen as victims. They were those from whom most slaves were taken for sale on the coast, and included parts of Yorubaland, Igboland and Ibibioland. The economic and social systems of communities were probably disrupted mostly by raids, kidnapping, wars and the general cheapening of human life. Villages were destroyed or dispersed, farms were abandoned and people lived in terror.

Against this gloomy picture, however, it is sometimes argued that the slave trade brought these tropical regions of Africa out of isolation. Formerly remote from European centres of civilization they became the vanguard of enlightenment and contact with the rest of the world. It was the slave trade which brought these communities into the international economy. In addition, the introduction of food crops such as maize, cassava and rice could be seen as redressing the demographic balance by enabling an increase in population. These are speculative hypotheses. For the African peoples of the region, the slave-trade era is seen as a bad dream best cast into the dark recesses of memory.
The region discussed in this chapter is today readily associated with the idea of wealth. One author considers that two other factors should be added to the economic potential referred to in Volume IV: first, Hausaland’s interaction with nearby regions as a producer of grain, leather and iron and a consumer of gold and kola nuts; and second, the integrated aspect of the West African economy, with the Wangara, Hausa and Kanuri in the savannah, and the Fante, Bini, Ijaw and Arochukwu in the forest.

The documentation available on the region’s development between 1500 and 1800 is of very uneven quality. Source materials on the Hausa states are extremely varied. One category comprises eye-witness reports, surveys and reference works, although both reports and surveys are open to dispute. In addition to these easily obtainable publications of a general nature, there are a number of theses which, while of uneven academic level, are mainly written by researchers from the region. A third category comprises the proceedings of regular seminars attended by specialists from various countries and covering such fields as history and archaeology. These proceedings are almost always published. Lastly, the point of view of the people directly concerned is set out in a number of documents published in English or Hausa. With the Kano Chronicle, for instance, the

errors in the English version, which was published long ago, were corrected in the Hausa version, but this still contains errors of interpretation of the original text, as well as printing errors, and new editions of all these sources are urgently needed. However, the discussions to which they give rise underscore their exceptional quality. They are proof of the vitality and seriousness of current research and the queries that are continually being raised guarantee that the present shortcomings will gradually be made good.

Indirect references to the Nupe and Kwararafa may be found in some of the above-mentioned publications. For the moment, until the thesis by the late Müsa Idrîs\(^6\) has been published, it is difficult to provide new information on Borgu.

The nature of the documentation is such that the various political entities cannot all be treated with the same degree of thoroughness: this is a consequence of the uneven pattern of research and perhaps also of the relatively peripheral role played by Borgu, the Kwararafa and the Nupe during the period under consideration.

The Hausa states

Political development

Whenever post-1500 Central Sudan is being considered, it has become customary to point to the specific influence of Western Sudan – Mali and Songhay and the Känem–Borno empire. This is understandable as a number of doubts still exist, particularly in connection with fourteenth-century history.\(^7\) The sixteenth century opened with Askia Muḥammad's campaign in Azbin – research in progress\(^8\) is expected to explain why Azbin was so coveted at various times in its history. There was also a feeling of nostalgia for the sarakunan noma (masters of the crops) emperors,\(^9\) the Mai (King) of Känem, who experimented with sugar cane crops, and the Mansa (Emperor) of Mali, who had the robber of kafi beheaded. Indeed, the war was to take on another dimension and to become an enterprise whose fundamental aim was to consume the stocks that had been built up through

\(^6\) See J. Lombard, 1965; O. Bagodo, 1978; D. M. Debourou, 1979. We have high hopes of M. Idrîs' thesis, particularly as it has been entrusted to specialists of the highest repute; cf. M. Adamu, 1979, note 89.

\(^7\) The extension of Mali's power to include Tâdmekka or Takedda: this assertion was made by Ibn Khaldûn, but has been rejected by H. J. Fisher, 1977, p. 265. This was the place where the Mansa Sakura died on returning from a pilgrimage, cf. D. Lange, 1977, p. 73, note 19(4). Likewise, according to one of Ibn Khaldûn's informants, the name Zaghai designates the Takrûr. If it is the name of the country to which the copper from Tâdmekka was exported, as Ibn Baṭṭîṭa suggested, it may be identified with Songhay, Zaghâwa or more simply Zaghai, Birnin Katsina's original name; cf. J. M. Cuoq, 1975, pp. 319 and 343; M. Last, 1983, p. 73.

\(^8\) D. Hamani, 1975.

The Hausa states

The producers' labours. One final reason was that, since Western and Eastern Sudan were better known, little attention had been paid until that time to the changes taking place in Central Sudan. However, it was soon to be integrated into the commercial and ideological system uniting the societies of Western Sudan with the Muslim world. Its political development came to be viewed in terms of its relationships with the neighbouring states, the conflicts between Kano and Katsina, and interludes involving Kebbi, Zamfara and Gobir.

The chronological framework adopted here is based on research which provides an extremely evocative view of the overall situation, despite some difficulties and occasional differences of opinion.\(^\text{10}\) A distinction can be made between the following three periods:

1. **1500 to 1620**, when the states gained in strength but there were bitter conflicts between Kano and Katsina, and Kebbi remained the dominant power in the western part of Hausaland. As far as relations with their neighbours were concerned, Songhay was eliminated once and for all, and the Mai of Borno could do little more than vent his annoyance at the hardly aristocratic behaviour of Sarkin Kano Muḥammad Kisoki (1509–65).

2. **1620 to 1730**, when Kano was on its way to becoming a caliphate,\(^\text{11}\) at a time when Zamfara and Gobir were consolidating their positions following the decline of Kebbi and Kwararafa was further increasing its capacity for attack.

3. **1730 to 1808**, a period marked by the collapse of Zamfara and Gobir's rise to the peak of its power.

Relations with the neighbouring regions

Although Hausaland's relations with its neighbours are being studied in increasing depth, there still remains some controversy over interpretation.

With Songhay,\(^\text{12}\) undue importance has been attached to the authority of Askiya Muḥammad. The economic and political issues can be gauged from the Kano sources, according to which 'Abdullah Burja (1438–52) opened up the Gwanja–Kano–Borno route when the Sunnis were organizing the western part of their empire. Kubbel's point of view may, therefore, be readily accepted – that the Askiya 'only knew of one way' of opposing the growth in trade along the eastern route, and that was to control it by conquering the region with his army. The main outcome of his campaign in Azbin was the emergence of Kebbi as an independent state.


in 1516. Songhay was subsequently to attempt to regain control over Kebbi.\textsuperscript{13} Askiya Muḥammad II Ben Kan Kiriai (1531–7) led an expedition in about 1533: "The Kanta inflicted a shameful defeat on his adversary, who fled with his entire army. . . . The prince arrived in Kagho and since that time, none of the Askiya has led an expedition against the Kanta." In fact, another expedition was organized under the reign of Askiya Dāwūd (1549–83), the conflict being brought to an end by the conclusion of a peace treaty in 1553. Kanta Dāwūd (c.1589–1613) was to provide shelter and assistance to the Songhay resistance movement: despite the Sultan of Morocco's threats, he did not yield, confident as he was of his military strength, and perhaps also wishing to handle the Songhay with tact, as they had supported the first Kanta and were represented at his court by a high-ranking dignitary, the \textit{Gulma}.\textsuperscript{14}

\textit{Azbin}\textsuperscript{15} was to provide the pretext for the clash between Kebbi and Borno. The latter had extended its influence through the conquest of Agades in about 1532, the conclusion of treaties with various Tuareg groups, and the appointment of a delegate. As Kebbi continued its repeated forays, Borno was in 1561 called to Azbin's aid. After initially winning the day at Surame, the 100 000-man Borno army was compelled to withdraw: the Kanta defeated it at Nguru but died on the return journey in a village in Katsina.\textsuperscript{16} Then, at the end of the century, a dynastic crisis flared up in Azbin. Yusuf, after being deposed by Muḥammad ben al-Mubārak (c.1601) appealed to Kanta Dāwūd for support. The latter, who wished to maintain his influence, was forced to come to his assistance on two occasions to help him defeat his rival, who was backed by Borno. This success checked the \textit{Mai}'s designs on the Azbin,\textsuperscript{17} which was at its peak under the reign of Muḥammad al-Mubārak (c.1653–87). In 1674, taking advantage of the continual conflicts between Gobir and the eastern part of Hausaland (Kano and Katsina), and between Zamfara and Kebbi, Muhammad dispatched an expedition led by his son Agabba, who conquered Adar and thereby hastened Kebbi's decline.\textsuperscript{18} From then onwards, it was left to Zamfara and Gobir to temper the influence of Azbin in the Kwanni regions. In 1675, Zamfara's army set an ambush and massacred some 700 Kel-Ewey Tuareg. In the same year, Azbin took its revenge, and Zamfara left a thousand dead on the battlefield. Gobir, which was pillaging the same area, was attacked and defeated by Azbin in about 1689. Finally Agabba, who had become

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{13} Al-Sa'di, 1964, pp. 146–7, 168; J. O. Hunwick, 1976, p. 285. For the political context to 1590, see Z. Dramani-Issifou, 1982, pp. 186, 207, 218–19. There are reservations as to what the Kebbi Chronology has to say; M. Alkali sets the date of Kanta I's death at 1554, and al-Sa'di at 1561; the author has chosen the first date.
\bibitem{14} M. Alkali, 1969, pp. 62–3.
\bibitem{15} J. O. Hunwick, 1976, pp. 283–4; H. J. Fisher, 1977, p. 266; see ch. 17 below.
\bibitem{16} Y. B. Usman, 1981, pp. 31–2; see ch. 17 below.
\bibitem{17} M. Alkali, 1969, p. 76; J. O. Hunwick, 1976, p. 283.
\end{thebibliography}
Sultan, marched on Surame in 1721, and killed Kanta Ahmadu. In 1722, the Kebbi court withdrew towards the western areas. However, Azbin was entering a period of dynastic crises and disasters, and this left Zamfara and Gobir to occupy the leading role.

Before 1561, Borno was in a position of strength; Sarkin Kano 'Abdullāhī (1499–1509) was attacked by the Mai and adopted a subservient attitude which prompted the aggressor to depart. It is difficult to describe the political climate in Kano at the time except to say that the Queen Mother Auwa managed to contain a rebellion fomented by the Dagači, an important figure who appears to have been a court dignitary. The reasons for that move are unclear. However the Sarkin's successor, Muḥammad Kissoki (1509–65) made for the city of Nguru in Borno where he gave orders that only horses and clothing were to be seized. Caught by surprise, the Mai took the initiative the following year and attacked Kano but was again made to withdraw. Two historians have recently commented on these events. When the domestic situation in the two states is examined more closely, it can be seen that Kano had just emerged victorious from a long struggle with Katsina, while Idrīs Katakarmabi (c. 1497–1519) was having to consolidate the fruits of his victory. The humiliation inflicted by Kissoki was a sign of the might of Kano at a time when Borno was suffering from internal strife and several years of famine: the second attack against Kano, however, seems to have taken place before the time of Idrīs Alowoma (1564–96).

It was not long before Kano was subjected to repeated attacks from Kwararafa: between 1582 and 1618, its population was forced to seek refuge at Daura. The sovereign of Kano was again driven out in 1653, and its inhabitants once more sought refuge in Daura in 1671. According to Palmer, the peace treaty signed between Kano and Katsina (c. 1649–51) was inspired by fear of the Kwararafa, who were eventually to be defeated by Borno in 1680.

To be objective, due allowance has to be made for the political situation in each of the states who were involved at the different stages in their political development. Apart from the profits they generated from plunder, these conflicts point to the unstable equilibrium between powerful neighbours.

19. H. R. Palmer, 1967, pp. 112–13. There is a discrepancy between the English text and the Hausa version which suggests, provided there is no printing error, that the Dagači was about to go to Kagara (a village).


The struggle for hegemony

Leo Africanus describes Kano as a city whose ‘inhabitants consist of civilized craftsmen and rich merchants’. By contrast, Katsina was regarded as a kingdom both rural and poor. It should be recalled that the Gwanja–Kano–Borno route had been opened up between 1438 and 1452. Moreover, in the fifteenth century, Agades had replaced Takedda as a caravan centre, thereby making Katsina a terminus of the trans-Saharan caravan route, and a trading centre for all Hausaland.22

According to a recent article, the explanation that the military conflicts between the two states were due to the struggle for control of the trans-Saharan terminus, has to be reconsidered – nothing is known of the nature and scale of these wars, their political background or general context. It is therefore necessary to re-examine these conflicts indicating, if possible, their causes, the name of the aggressor and the location, as well as the internal and external political situation.

The first conflict23 broke out during the reign of Rumfa (c.1463–99). Rumfa had amassed so much wealth that he was the first to be escorted by eunuchs – in full trappings in the war against Katsina – and to entrust them with official duties. The causes of the conflicts are not known, but it is known that Korau, Ibrāhīm Sura and Aliyu Murābit reigned in succession in Katsina. With sovereigns such as these to be reckoned with, it was not surprising that the war lasted for eleven years, with no decisive outcome.

The second conflict took place at the time of Abu Bakr Kado (c.1565–73), when Ibrāhīm Badankari (c.1565–73) was reigning in Katsina. The Katsinawa advanced to the very gates of Kano and camped at Salanta, defeated Kano and then returned home.

To avenge this defeat Muḥammad Shāshīrī (c.1573–82) organized an expedition against Katsina, where Muḥammad Wari (c.1575–87) was ruler. The battle took place at Kankiya, not far from Katsina. It was said that: ‘The Katsinawa were victorious because they outnumbered the enemy’. Civil war then broke out in Kano, and although the sovereign escaped death, he was deposed.

These first three conflicts seem to have had well-founded political causes. For some reason unknown to us, the attack on Kano was unsuccessful; the Katsinawa advanced to the gates of Kano in a bid for victory, after which Kano, in its turn, advanced to a point not far from Katsina, where it was defeated. At least one Katsina source24 states that it was under the control of Kano at one time.

FIG. 16.1 North Africa and the Central Sudan in 1600
The next conflict broke out\textsuperscript{25} during the reign of Muḥammad Zakī (c.1582–1618) of Kano. In Katsina, Muḥammad Wari (c.1575–87) was succeeded by Sulaymān (c.1587–1600) and Ḫūṭmān Nayinawa (c.1600–18). There is some confusion as to what happened next. There may have been a change of dynasty, as the chronology is not precise. Katsina, however, was so powerful that Kano was afraid it might be attacked and one author stresses that one precaution, taken on the advice of the dignitaries, was to adopt Cokana and Dirki as talismans before launching an attack. Despite even this precaution, however, the Kwararafa invaded Kano, defeating it and sapping its strength. Shortly afterwards, Kano’s Muḥammad Zakī consulted the ‘ulāmā’ and obtained a talisman at a very high price. Suitably protected, Kano then attacked Katsina’s military encampments and finally emerged victorious.

As soon as he assumed power in Kano, Muḥammad Nazaki (c.1618–23) made peace proposals to Katsina which, however, rebuffed them and instead attacked. The encounter took place at Karaye, not far from Kano, and Katsina was defeated. The Wambai of Kano was posted to Karaye, from where he launched constant attacks against Katsina.\textsuperscript{26}

Under Kutumbi (c.1623–48), Kano’s Prince Bako dan Kutumbi kept up the pressure on Katsina. He pillaged a town with his ninety mail-clad horsemen and their six hundred horses. Another conflict then broke out, the pretext being the assassination in Katsina of a slave belonging to a representative of Kano on a mission there. Kutumbi set up camp at Dugazawa and subjected Katsina to a long siege. He then organized a second expedition but his army was taken by surprise and put to flight and he himself was killed at Rumarawa, on the Katsina–Kano border. Kutumbi’s successor, al-Hādjdji, was deposed after eight months and his successor, Shekarau (c.1649–51), managed to sue for peace after negotiations conducted by the ‘ulāmā’. Katsina’s power was further consolidated by Muḥammad Wari (c.1631–41), Muḥammad Ubān Yara (c.1641–71) and Muḥammad Jan Hazo (c.1671–84), without the peace treaty with Kano being broken.\textsuperscript{27}

There was accordingly a long political struggle for control of eastern Hausaland. As shown, the neighbouring states of Borno and Kwararafa had to be reckoned with, but the other factor involved was the situation in western Hausaland.

Interludes

Until the end of the sixteenth century, Kebbi feared none of its enemies, not even Morocco. Among the specific factors instrumental in consolidating Kebbi’s position, one author has suggested the mixed origins of the population, the polarization of the protests against Songhay domination, and the importance its military leaders attached to maintaining independence. However, there is no proof that Kebbi invaded the region or laid claim to Songhay.28

Indeed, it was Kebbi’s independence that altered the political map in the Rima basin: north-east Zarma was integrated into it, thus depriving Zamfara of a region to pillage.29 This was to give rise to a series of clashes under Zartai, who ruled after Taritu (c.1531) and led a number of indecisive attacks in the middle of the century, after which a peace treaty was concluded. The pressure was thus taken off Kebbi which, by defeating Borno in 1561, rose to occupy the leading place in the political life of Hausaland: ‘It rapidly became the most fearsome military power in the Hausa world’.30 The exact nature of its political relations with the states is not known. Some writers feel that most paid tribute to the Kanta, but others disagree. Zamfara, for example, was attacked by Kebbi on only one occasion and there is no evidence to show that Zamfara was ever a vassal of Kebbi. Both, however, had reason to fear Gobir.31

The capital of Gobir had been transferred from Azbin to Hausaland to Birnin Lalle, in the centre of the densely populated and well-watered region of Gulbin Tarka, probably founded in about 1450. The rulers remained there until about 1600 when the Tuareg launched an attack which degenerated into a massacre. The Gobirawa were forced to take up their wanderings again and set out in the direction of Kufan Kuturu and Hisatau in the Gulbi Maradi, further south. (The last of Hisatu’s sovereigns,32 Muhammad Mai Gici, was killed there by the ruler of Katsina, who was

31. Information regarding the sarauta system in Gobir is provided by Ibn Baṭṭūta, in J. M. Cuq, 1975, p. 323. Quoting an eyewitness, the author says that the sovereign was buried with several of his entourage, together with slaves and thirty sons and daughters of persons of note. The striking fact was the religious aspect of such a tradition, although its political significance is quite clear. Archaeological research will no doubt eventually identify a site for the capital of Gobir. The new facts and the chronology prior to 1700 are taken from Maikassoua’s research. His findings are awaited with interest, particularly as Gobir is a subject that intrigues researchers, for instance J. E. G. Sutton, 1979, pp. 192-5 and G. Nicolas, forthcoming.
32. I. Maikassoua, 1982, pp. 39-45. The findings of J. Tilho, 1911, and Y. B. Usman, 1978 and 1981, suggest that these events must have taken place between the beginning of Sulaymān’s reign (c.1587-1600) and the end of that of the sovereign of Katsina, ‘Uthmān Tsagarana (c.1600-18).
concerned at the encroachments onto his territory and anxious not to lose control of the Katsina—Tessawa—Azbìn route.) The Gobirawa then struck out towards the north-west and founded the 'new' Gwaran Rama (c.1685–90). Úban Doro launched attacks from Gwaran Rama against Kebbi, and even against Yorubaland and Gurma and his successor, Soba, attacked Adar, Kebbi and Maradi. However, he also, established friendly relations with Zamfara, which opened up Alkalawa to the farmers and traders of Gobir.

This gradual expansion of Gobir southwards brought about another change in the political context. Kebbi maintained its position and prospered until ‘The old military aristocracy ... was eclipsed by a new aristocracy based on money’.³³ It started to decline as Zamfara was clearly gaining strength. In the mid-seventeenth century, Zamfara was governed by a series of strong sovereigns who drew their support from Islam; the position it occupied can be gauged from its relations with Katsina,³⁴ which were excellent until the day when a Zamfaran prince was killed by Muhammad Úban Yara (c.1641–71). Sarkin Zamfara Zaudai planned to retaliate but encountered opposition from the dignitaries of the court, who argued that the two states were on good terms. His death, however, put an end to the plan and the electors appointed as his successor his brother, Aliyu, who became Zamfara’s first Islamic sovereign. There can be no doubt that he helped to spread Islam through Katsina, as he built mosques in the towns. Zamfara then stopped making its sporadic raids and instead concentrated its forces on Kebbi’s major towns. In 1674 Sulaymàn organized a full-scale attack and the army of Kebbi, with its 6000 troops and the support of a contingent from Adar, was put to flight and many of its troops captured. In the same year, Kebbi lost Adar, which was wrested from it by Prince Agabba, as seen above. It was a series of separate defeats rather than a concerted action by Azbin, Gobir and Zamfara.³⁵ Zamfara became the leading power in the area: its might is revealed by the victory won by the commander of its cavalry, Yakubu dan Mazuru, at Yargana against Kano’s army, during the reign of Muhammad Shārīf (c.1703–31). It was after this defeat that Muhammad Shārīf constructed ramparts around many towns.³⁶

Zamfara had thus recovered from the defeat it suffered at the hands of Azbin, but the military strength of Gobir was also growing: ‘Under his reign (Kumbari c.1731–43), there was a fierce war between Kano and Gobir. The Sarkin of Gobir’s name was Soba. Whenever the Gobirawa inflicted a defeat on the Kanawa, the latter took their revenge the following


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year, and this alternating pattern went on for a long time.\(^{37}\) Ibrāhīm Babārī (c.1741–70), Soba’s successor, sent a delegation to al-Ḥādjī Kabi (c.1743–53) to make peace, but al-Ḥāджī Kabi refused. A year later, Babārī took the initiative and attacked, and the encounter at Dumi turned into a complete rout for Kano, ‘because of Babārī’s magical power’. The massacres perpetrated on both sides only came to an end at Kabi’s death. Gobir was soon to feel the weight of various restrictions imposed upon it by Sarkin Zamfara, who was worried by his restive neighbour. At the outset, Gobir was content with harassing its enemy from time to time, but then, taking advantage of a dynastic crisis, it destroyed Birnin Zamfara in about 1762.\(^{38}\)

This development had significant repercussions on the political situation in the peripheral areas. In the east,\(^{39}\) the Sultanate of Damagaram was founded towards the beginning of the eighteenth century, while the Tsotsebaki states were consolidating their position before subsequently splitting up. This area, which marked the transition between Borno and Hausaland, was extremely sensitive to political and cultural movements.

In the north-west, the history of Adar is better known.\(^{40}\) However, it is not clear what its links were with Kurfay – which is associated with Adar in some accounts and with Borno in others – although the proximity of Arewa suggests the latter. The date of the foundation of political authority in the area is highly controversial, but the various dynasties were identified with Borno at times and with Daura at others.

According to the traditions of the Zarma and the Gobirawa,\(^{41}\) Zarma – the eastermost part of the Songhay empire – first established links with Hausaland when Gobir was part of Azbin. At this time Kebbi, Zamfara and Gobir all fought over the area. Kebbi is thought to have been eliminated in 1722. Before that, however, its political role was decisive in Zarmatarey, where its name was associated with cavalry protected by \textit{lifidi} (quilted armour) which spread terror and desolation.

Finally, in the west, on the \textit{gurma} (right) bank of the River Niger, certain Gulmanceba dynasties claimed to originate from Central Sudan, Borno or Hausaland – a claim seemingly substantiated by archaeological excavations at least for the areas along the \textit{Hausa} or left bank.\(^{42}\)

In the south, occupied by Kebbi, Yawuri, Nupe and Borgu, the growth

41. For the relations between Gobirawa and Zarma, see B. Hama, 1967(a), 1967(b) and 1968; B. Gado, 1980; and I. Maikassoua, 1982; on the influence of Kebbi in Zarmatarey, see M. Alkali, 1969, pp. 90–6.
42. See G. Y. Madiega, 1982, pp. 30–41 (Borno origins of the Bemba) and pp. 50–4 (dynasties of Gobnangu and Jabo); for the archaeological data, see B. Gado, 1980, pp. 35–119.
FIG. 16.2 Hausaland, pre-1800
and consolidation of the Zarma–Songhay people has not been clearly determined. In this area’s mythology the most powerful divinities include Manda Hausakoy, the fisherman-blacksmith from Yawuri, and Dongo, a Borgu hunter whose powers were identical to those of Shango in the Yoruba culture.\(^{43}\)

The situation, however, stabilized considerably after Zamfara’s defeat in 1762. Katsina, despite a domestic crisis, was to defeat Gobir, while in Kano,\(^{44}\) Babba Zaki (c. 1768–76) felt compelled to terrorize his collaborators.

**Political and administrative organization**

Thus, despite the military conflicts, which assumed alarming proportions, this host of states remained in existence. After their severe defeats, the sovereigns of Kebbi and Zamfara retrenched to an even smaller territory to safeguard their power. Explanations for this development are being sought in the process whereby the *sarauta* system as it evolved in Central Sudan was introduced and transformed.\(^{45}\)

*The Sarki*

At the head of the state, which was first and foremost a *kasa* (territory), there was the *Sarki*,\(^ {46}\) whose ancestor had seized political power: in Kano, Katsina and Zamfara, it has been wrested from the hands of a high priest, while in Kebbi it was a *magaji* (warrior) who rose to the rank of *Sarki*.

The appointment of the successor to the throne from among the princes was the responsibility of an electoral college. In Katsina, this consisted of four members.\(^ {47}\) It is difficult to say whether such a college existed in Kebbi at this time, but it certainly appeared there at a later stage. In Zamfara, Gobir and Kano, it bore the name *Tara* (the Nine),\(^ {48}\) followed

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\(^{45}\) A general survey has been produced by A. Mahadi (forthcoming); see also M. Alkali, 1969, pp. 43–62; G. Na-Dama, 1977, pp. 80–9; Y. B. Usman, 1981, pp. 5–19; the sociological viewpoint is expounded by N. Perchonock (forthcoming). The outline is reminiscent of the information provided by written sources on the subject of Western Sudan; see J. M. Cuoq, 1975, p. 99 (sacred forest of Ghana), p. 108 (meal of the *Kanda* in Këw-Këw), p. 122 (magic stone of the Amima), etc.

\(^{46}\) There continue to be discussions as to the significance of the term; it should be noted that the sovereign’s sister in Zamfara bore the title *Asarki*, cf. G. Na-Dama, 1977, p. 345.


\(^{48}\) In Zamfara: Danau, Basace, Sarkin Rafi, Sarkin Tudu, Sarkin Bazai, Sarkin Kaya, Magajin Gari, Ubandawaki and Galadima; see G. Na-Dama, 1977, pp. 86–7. In Gobir: Ubandawaki, Ubandoma, Sarkin Rafi Babba and Karama, Sarkin Tudu Babba and Karama,
by the name of the state. The titles and functions of the various electoral colleges differ, but some of the incumbents can be identified as follows: an elder holding an ancient, long-forgotten office, the Basace, in Zamfara; governors of cities and important regions, five in Zamfara and seven in Gobir which added two deputies to Zamfara’s list, and high-ranking public servants, three in Zamfara, two in Gobir and nine in Kano. They also included representatives of ousted dynasties, such as the Durbi in Katsina, and reigning dynasties, such as the Ubandoma in Gobir.

The successor had to be chosen unanimously by the electors. Once he had been appointed, the enthronement and installation ritual took place. The electoral college also formed the council of the Sarki, and it was not uncommon, for one reason or another, for the Council to clash with the Sarki, or for the latter to debar one of the Council members.  

The government

The Sarki exercised his authority through three groups of officials: members of the dynasty, public servants, governors of the towns and regions. The members of the dynasty were assigned important duties. As different generations were involved, the brothers and children of the sovereign usually bore titles showing that they held administrative positions. The wide range of titles and the duties they entailed does not make it easy to draw up a single list.  

The sovereignty’s sister played a leading political role, although she did so through the traditional form of worship. In Zamfara she was called the Asarki or Inna—a name which Gobir also used. The history of Kano is signposted by the names of celebrated princesses: for example, if the Madaki (the Queen Mother) Auwa had not energetically intervened, ‘Abdul-lahi (1499–1509) would most certainly have been driven out by a rebellion. His son, Kisoki governed the city with the support of the same Madaki Auwa, his grandmother, Iya Lamis, his mother and Gulli, Auwa’s brother. During the reign of Sharif (c.1703–31), a dignitary of Kano had musical

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Magajin Kukuta, Sarkin Bazai and Sarkin Kaya; see I. Maikassoua, 1982, pp. 47–8. For Kano, the Gazetteers give the following list: Galadima, Madaiki (Madowaki?) Wambai, Makama, Sarkin Dawaki Maituta, Sarkin D. Tsakanin Gida, Sarkin Bai, Giroma and Dan Iya; although they all belonged to the nobility, they held administrative and/or military offices, but such a structure appears to have been very recent, since figures as important as the Dagaci, the Barde and the Santuraki were not included.


50. For Maradi, see P. H. David, 1969, pp. 657, 665–6; for Damagaram in the nineteenth century, see A. Salifou, 1971, pp. 117–33; for Zamfara, see G. Na-Dama, 1977, p. 348.

The Hausa states

instruments from Yawuri brought to him which he kept for three months and then gave them to Madaki Maryama ‘because she had attained the limits of power and she had no equal in the seven Hausa States’.52

In what might be called the central government, there were several categories of officials:

(1) The court dignitaries managed the affairs of the palace and the city. The composition of the list and the duties varied from one state to another, but their role was above all administrative. In Katsina, the most important officials included the Galadima (who deputized for the Sarki), the Ajiya (treasurer), the Turaki and Shantali (protocol officers) and the Madawaki (officer-in-charge of the royal stables).53 They were in a position to act as middlemen between the Sarki and the regional governments. In Kebbi, internal security was the responsibility of the Magajin Gari, Galadiman Gari and the Doka; the Magajin Baberi seems to have been in charge of external affairs, and the Maishanu collected the livestock that was the state’s due.54

(2) The representatives of the guilds were appointed from among the skilled craftsmen, such as blacksmiths, weavers, dyers, tanners, masons, butchers and hunters. They were responsible for relations with the different trades and occupations and, in particular, for collecting the state dues. When necessary, the blacksmiths and hunters, for instance, provided contingents for the army.

(3) The autochthonous groups had their own representatives. The village of Sarkin Naya and the region of Sarkin Mazum, for example, kept their titles even after Gobir established its capital at Hisatau.55 The Maguzawa of Kano were disbanded by order of Bugaya (c. 1385–90), but they were to be summoned by Kukuna (c. 1652–60) who allowed them to indulge in their favourite sport for three weeks, showered them with riches, and confirmed their patriarch Zanko in his office, expecting from him a tribute in kind each year consisting of a certain number of days work.56 It has to be asked whether some of the states did not relegate certain autochthonous peoples to the status of bondsmen or tributaries.

(4) The numerous immigrants were also allowed to have their own representatives. In Gobir, Sarkin Azbin handled relations with the Tuareg living in the territory, and Sarkin Fullani did likewise for the Fulbe (in Gobir, Zamfara, Katsina and Kano), as did Sarkin Sillubawa for the Sillube (in Kano and Katsina). From this point of view, the

situation regarding the Fulbe in Kebbi is most instructive. The titles Galoji and Magajin Sangeldu, which were created under the Kanta, could only be conferred upon Fulbe in contact with the herdsmen. The title of Dikko, however, which was created in the eighteenth century, was borne for the first time by a Pullo whose mother was the sovereign’s daughter.

(5) The Islamic community was present everywhere with its mallamai (scholars). In terms of regional government or, more specifically, territorial control, a distinction also has to be made between several categories:

(a) The authority of the governors of certain cities was independent of the dynasty; this was true of Rano, Gaya, Dutse, Karaye (in Kano), Maska, Samri, Dugui (in Katsina); and Zurmi, Kiawa, Tünsafi and Bakura (in Zamfara). On occasions, their relations with the sovereign could be difficult as they were eventually reduced to the status of vassals. The vassals of Kano were quick to rebel, and the Kano ruler Dadi (c.1670–1703) was forced to execute Farin Dutse, the governor of Gaya.58

(b) The governors of other cities and regions were nobles whose ancestors had become allies of the dynasty while preserving their own authority, or they were public servants. Zamfara provides an illustration of the first case with the Danau who owed his title to the name of the town in which he resided, an important trading centre from where he kept watch over the roads leading south and west of Kebbi; the governor of Bazai resided in the north, while the governor of Kaya moved from Kavatau in the north to Maradun in the centre of the territory. In Kebbi, the Innamme kept watch over the western frontier. In Katsina, the Marisa (Destroyer) resided in Gwiwa from where he supervised the eastern border, while the Gatari (Axe) of Ruma kept an eye on the north-western frontier. Two rather curious titles were to be found in Zamfara: Sarkin Tudu (Governor of the Hills) controlled the east of the territory, and Sarkin Rafi (Governor of the Valleys) the villages at the confluence of the Bunsuru and Gagare rivers. These titles may well have been inspired by the natural relief of the regions concerned.

(c) The other governors became mere cogs in the governmental machinery. The immigrants retained a local hierarchy – known by the Fulbe as ardo, or rugga.

(d) Finally, certain titles were the outcome of historical developments. In Kebbi, for example, the Kokani was responsible for relations with the population, after the conquest of Kwanni; the office of Saburu was created in about 1650 to provide security on the roads that led to Kwanni and the Azbin which were regularly pillaged by Zamfara and Gobir.

All these dignitaries, nobles, commoners or slaves performed duties of a non-military nature except that, when the occasion demanded, they became valiant warriors and formed their own armed groups.

Military organization

The foundation of Kebbi signified the increasingly important role played by military leaders in the affairs of the state. The Kanta’s first companions were from the country’s leading families but, subsequently, the elements that had participated in the struggle for independence were granted two representatives, one of whom, the Kunduda, was to be Kebbi’s military

60. M. Alkali, 1969, p. 108; initially the title was conferred upon a dignitary who was a slave by origin.
62. M. Alkali, 1969, pp. 73–4, 108–9; it is not known where the Kokani resided.
In south-western Katsina, the proximity of Zamfara, Kebbi and Katsina inhibited the formation of a large state centred around Kwianbani, Birnin Gwari, Koriga, etc. The large number of Katsinawa immigrants meant that the area towards Katsina was included but as it was constantly coveted by its neighbours, it had to be content with being dependent on Katsina.

As we have seen, this subservient role was further emphasized by the need to seek protection against its neighbours, even distant ones such as Azbin, Borno and Kwararafa, and to provide for security on the borders and the roads. The number of military leaders increased, a ranking order was instituted and efficiency increased. The highest-ranking title varied from state to state: it was Kunduda in Kebbi, Kaura in Katsina, Ubandawaki in Zamfara and Gobir, while in Kano it appears to have been the Galadima.

As weapons improved, so strategies and tactics changed. In the event of mobilization, the services of the different trades and occupations, such as hunters and blacksmiths, were called upon. The weapons used included swords, lances, knives and arrows; shields (made of oryx skin in Zamfara) were used for protection prior to the appearance of the Nupe shields. The army consisted of two main corps - the infantry, subdivided into archers and lancers, and the cavalry. Kebbi also had river flotilla.

The horses mainly originated from Azbin and Borno and were treated with special care. The sovereign imported them and set up stables: the kanta of Kebbi, for example, had stables in three places. The role played by the horse in military affairs can also be seen from the number and rank of the titles pertaining to them, such as Ubabandawaki Madaki/Madawaki (leader of the cavalry and/or commander-in-chief of the army) and Sarkin Dawaki (general in the cavalry division). The enhanced status of horses was also due to the innovations introduced by the acquisition of sulke (coats

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64. See UNESCO, *General History of Africa*, Vol. IV, pp. 277–8. The Kanta was surrounded by the Magajin Kulalo, Magajin Leka, Galandu, Mayalo, Lelaba and Takwamba (names of persons); they were joined by the Gulma (for the Songhay element) and the Kunduda (for the Kwararafa element), cf. M. Alkali, 1969, pp. 59, 61, 72, 114.


66. M. Alkali, 1969, p. 11. It may be asked what the relationship is between the 'small canoe made of a single hollowed-out tree trunk' that Ibn Battúta took in Timbuktu, and the 'small and extremely narrow boats, made of half a hollowed-out tree trunk' observed by Leo Africanus in Jenne; there are grounds for doubting whether Sonni Ali Ber's flotilla was effective with such craft, and the Sultan of Morocco certainly did not ask the Kanta of Kebbi to send them to him. L. E. Kubbel, 1974, p. 87, rightly asks whether the ahara, the dugout canoes of Hausa (and Kebbi and Nupe), did not spread as far as the Timbuktu–Jenne area.

of mail) and the manufacture of *lifidi* (horse-trappings), whence the titles *Sarkin Lifidi* (general in the heavy cavalry division) and *Lifidi* (commander-in-chief of the heavy cavalry division) which were among the highest-ranking military officers.

Rifles had been introduced to Kano by a Borno prince under Dauda's reign (1421–38), but it was not until three centuries later – at the time of Kumbari (c.1731–43) – that they were imported from Nupe: Babba Zaki (c.1768–76) was the first sovereign to set up a corps of fusiliers to serve as his personal bodyguard. Borno took to rifles but Songhay, which had been able to gauge their deadly effectiveness at its own cost, did not bother to retrieve those abandoned by the Moroccan soldiers half a century later (1591 to 1640). Hausaland seems to have deliberately neglected a weapon that it could have procured for itself with its wealth, despite, as has been suggested, Borno's attempts to prevent it from doing so. Songhay and Hausaland could boast neither of venerating horsemanship more devoutly than Borno, nor of having used slave labour and participated in the slave trade to a greater extent than Borno and the Mande.

The war tactics used consisted of surprise attacks, ambushes, direct clashes and sieges. The stepped-up construction of fortifications around the cities was also justified by the frequent sieges and conflagrations. Campaigns were meticulously prepared and often the scholar-priests prayed for the army's victory.

In this region, in which the pace of economic development had increased, improvements in the art of war were to lead to the growth of pillaging. It is not easy to distinguish between wars waged for purposes of conquest or consolidation, the repression of rebellions, wars of intimidation, and simple raids. As a state, Gobir was continually obliged to fight for its survival. Because it lasted so long after acquiring a relatively rich and well-populated territory, it is worth continuing to investigate the meaning of its existence. The political, administrative and military aristocracy indulged in pillaging, as the *Kano Chronicle* clearly shows: it grew rich and presented gifts to the sovereigns and scholars. In Kano, in the space of two centuries – between 1573 and 1768 – the aristocracy became so powerful that it urged the state to wage war, participated in plots, flaunted its wealth and its generosity and gave the sovereign cause for concern. Kukuna obliged Madawaki Kuma to tour the city on a donkey led by young servant girls, and Babba Zaki had the idea of continually terrorizing his collaborators, and did not hesitate to humiliate them.

The total number of dignitaries varied from one state to another: Gobir


69. During an ambush, Ibnou Bentsi massacred 400 Moroccan fusiliers, but he apparently had their rifles thrown into the rivers; M. Ka’ti, 1981, pp. 294–5. Up to 1640, the Songhay people of Dendi were in a position to retrieve the rifles, but no trace of this has been found in the traditions collected so far.

70. H. R. Palmer, 1967, pp. 120, 126.
had twenty-two (thirteen noblemen and nine commoners) and Katsina forty-six (sixteen nobles and thirty commoners).  

Resources

The Hausa state developed an ingenious system for controlling the territory and levying taxes to provide the treasury with the resources needed to run it. Four major sources may be singled out:

Taxes and duties

Taxes and duties were the most regular sources. They included the following:

- **kudin kasa** (land tax) was paid by the farmers. The unit taken into account seems to have been the *gandum gida* (the family field). In Kano, Naguji (c. 1197–1247) was the first to set the tax to be paid by each farmer at one-eighth of his harvest. There were taxes both on lowland crops and on others, such as indigo and groundnuts.

- **kudin sana’a** (professional tax) and paid by craftsmen and traders. In Kebbi, every producer of salt gave the Kanta one gourd a year. With the development of crafts and trade, and as a result of the establishment of guilds, these taxes could represent a substantial source of earnings.

- **kudin hito** (customs duty) was payable on certain products entering the territory. In Kebbi, in addition to this entry duty, the caravans journeying from Dallol Fogha towards Hausaland and Nupe–Gwanja, as well as those travelling from Hausaland to Gwanja, had to pay another duty. In addition, salt shipped to Zarmatarey and Arewa was subject to tax.

- **jangali** (the livestock tax) was paid by the stock-breeders, particularly the Fulbe. In Kano, it was levied for the first time by Kutumbi (c. 1623–48): 280 head of cattle were supplied by four groups, no doubt depending on the size of their herds. It was on this occasion that the office of *Sarkin Shanu* (livestock tax-collector) was created.

In Kebbi, the nomadic Fulbe paid *kudin haki* (grazing duty) while a dignitary, called the *Nono*, collected the milk and butter intended for the sovereign.

71. J. Tilho, 1911, pp. 519–21. For Damagaram in the nineteenth century, an extremely detailed and impressively long list (of over 50 incumbents), is supplied by A. Salifou, 1971, pp. 117–36.


74. The author believes that this noun was formed from *jafa* (to take, snatch) and that it implies the idea of extortion; however, the correct form is *jab(u) ngal, janggal*. For Kano, cf. H. R. Palmer, 1967, pp. 118–20, 123–4; the first time *Sarkin Fullani* is mentioned is under Sharif, a century later, but there is nothing to suggest that the title did not exist before.
Gifts
Governors, dignitaries and other figures sent the sovereign a *gaisuwa* (gift made to a superior). This was a political act whereby the interested party paid tribute to the *Sarki*, hoping in return to enjoy his favours. The value of the gift was in proportion to the rank of the giver and, in exchange, the sovereign\textsuperscript{75} did not fail, when the occasion arose, either to manifest his satisfaction or displeasure. One common method of obtaining the wherewithal to send a *gaisuwa* was precisely by pillaging. Those who were appointed to high office also presented gifts to the *Sarki*.

Spoils
Pillaging brought in slaves, horses, cattle and a variety of goods. The latter were all rapidly consumed, while the horses and their trappings increased combat capacity. The *Kano Chronicle* stresses the value attached to horses between 1582 and 1623.\textsuperscript{76} Having conquered the Katsinawa at Garaya: ‘the Kanawa took 400 horses and 60 sets of horse trappings; nobody knew how many had been killed and made prisoner’. Shortly afterwards, the *Wambai* formed a team of 100 mail-clad horsemen, with a reserve of 1000 horses, and this was certainly to the detriment of Katsina. The slaves were sold or divided among the great royal properties of which Kano is still the most outstanding example. Kutumbi, for instance, was jealous of Sarkin Dawaki Magari and ventured out on a raid. On his return, he left 500 slaves at Indabo, a property that had been set aside for him.

Other resources
There were countless measures whereby the *Sarki* could fill the coffers of the state. In almost every instance, when the sovereign pardoned an offender the latter had to pay *kudin laifi* (forgiveness tax). Thanks to the *Kano Chronicle*, it is possible to follow the process whereby the taxes and other duties were created for the benefit of the state. Shārīf (c.1703–31) instituted seven taxes that were regarded as oppressive, including duty payable when girls were married. His successor, Kumbari (c.1731–43), increased the tax payable in the Kasuwa Kurmi market so much that the market collapsed. The following year, he made the scholars pay a duty, as a result of which the Arabs left and went to Katsina and the *talakawa* were scattered throughout the country.

\textsuperscript{75} Nazaki was very pleased with the gift that Wambai Giwa made him, while Kutumbi, his successor, did not appreciate Sarkin Dwa Dawaki Magari’s gesture, cf. H. R. Palmer, 1967, pp. 117–18.

\textsuperscript{76} H. R. Palmer, 1967, pp. 117, 123; R. M. East, 1979, p. 28.
Overview

In catering for the development and management needs of the state, the sarauta system evolved in such a way that commoners and slaves could occupy the highest offices if they were considered highly trustworthy. Thus it was that royal slaves, particularly eunuchs, came to constitute an essential cog in the state machinery throughout the region.

This resulted in opposition between the mai sarauta (the ruler) and the talaka (the ruled) which was to become so pronounced that Sarkin Kano Kumbari (c.1731–43) was said to have 'loved his advisers, and hated the people'.

To a lesser degree, the governors of the cities and regions were potential opponents. The frequent uprisings fomented by the governors of Gaya and Dutse illustrate the recurring friction between sovereign and vassals in Kano's history.

The political, administrative and military aristocracy represented a uniform group which grew rich by various methods of exploitation, ranging from levies on the income derived from pillaging to almost mandatory political gifts. This aristocracy adopted a way of life commensurate with its resources and decked itself out splendidly to show its prestige, while at the same time becoming increasingly difficult to keep under control because of the bribery and corruption in which it indulged. This combination of circumstances fathered an ideology designed to deny its aristocratic origins yet unable to conceal the system's capacity for oppression, admirably conveyed by the various meanings of the word iko (power).

Diagne has described this system as an oligarchical monarchy characterized by the close interdependence between the monarch and the oligarchs.77 Usman, however, criticizes the notion of the city-state and considers that the main feature of Hausaland was 'the existence of numerous urban centres, which formed the nuclei of a political community into which the immigrants of differing origins were integrated and became Katsinawa, Kebbawa, and Kanawa, with each centre maintaining its legal status and some degree of autonomy with respect to the capital and the other centres.'78

Economic relations

A brief review of a number of areas of production and distribution is necessary to understand the main features of social relations.

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Agriculture and stock-raising

From 1500 to 1800 Hausaland remained primarily a region of manoma (farmers) who made judicious use of the agricultural potential through a variety of techniques, including fertilizers and crop rotation and association. Their tools were as numerous as elsewhere in Africa, with a wide range of hoes adapted to the nature of the soil and the function required of them. The bulk of the labour force came from the gida (extended family) and the gayya (mutual-aid system). Mention must also be made of the tradition of the bukin duku (Feast of Thousands) whereby it had to be proved that a yield of 1000 sheaves of millet or sorghum could be obtained. Careful technical, material and psychological preparations were made for the attempt and successful candidates were awarded the title of Sarkin poma (master of the crops).^79

The farmers grew millet, sorghum, rice, maize, peanuts and beans as well as cotton, indigo, henna, tobacco and onions. Shea, tamarind and nere were also cultivated, and honey was collected. They also engaged in fishing and hunting. Jibda (musk) was removed from the civet-cat and used for making perfume.

There was a substantial amount of stock-raising for domestic purposes. Goats were sacrificed – by having their throats slit – for certain ceremonies, while donkeys were used as a means of transport, particularly by traders. However, Hausaland attracted many Fulbe,^80 Azbinawa and Shuwa Arabs, who had been pastoralists for several centuries. Kel-Geres, Itesan and Kel-Tegama Tuareg moved southwards to northern and central Zamfara to graze their herds of camels, goats and sheep during the dry season, and some took up residence there. The Fulbe, with their sheep and cattle, settled in several areas of Katsina (at the confluence of the Rivers Karaduwa and Bunsuru), Kebbi (at Gulbin Kebbi, Dalol Boso, Fogha and Mauri) and Zamfara (in the area watered by the Bunsuru, Gagare and Sokoto rivers). Agriculture and stock-raising became closely associated and pockets of economic life developed based on a combination of the two, such as in the region of Ingawa in Katsina.^81

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80. For the migration of some of the Fulbe to Borno and Hausaland, see M. Idrissou, 1979. However, B. Hama (1968, pp. 92–6) asserts that some of the Fulbe came direct from the Sahara to Central Sudan and the middle reaches of the Niger, passing through Azawad. Archaeological research carried out in the region of In Gall–Tegiddan Tesemt, has brought to light skeletons of buried cattle; the only date available is 1435 (see F. Paris, 1984, pp. 1–75). The question thus remains open.
Crafts
The diversity and high technical standards attained by craftsmen were already remarkable at the time of Leo Africanus. People worked with iron, wood and leather, and also engaged in basket-making and pottery, while there was spectacular growth in weaving and dyeing. The raw materials iron and cotton were abundant and high demand stimulated high-quality crafts. Craftsmen became highly specialized: leatherwork seems to have become distinct from shoemaking, while spinning, weaving, dyeing, sewing and embroidery became quite separate trades. A system of guilds was set up, each with a representative responsible for its interests and for its relations with the state.

A trend towards group specialization can also be observed. In Kebbi, weaving and dyeing were in the hands of the Kebbawa, while Zamfara attracted weavers and dyers from Kano. In both Kebbi and Zamfara, the Zoromawa, who arrived from Macina (Massina) in the sixteenth century, specialized in silver jewellery and pottery; in Kano, pottery was made by the Bambadawa.

There was also a wide variety of manufactured articles. Leather, sandals, harnesses and saddles were exported; jewellery, which was regarded as a luxury, was purchased by the wealthy, while clothing, such as tunics, and textile cloth were famed for their quality. Hausaland was also among the areas producing the highest quality woven and dyed goods.

Trade
The stereotype of the bahaushe (trader) became widely recognized and it is impossible to overstate his integration into the trading networks of Western Africa and the international trader class in the savannah which comprised the Wangara, Juula (Dyula), Mossi (Mosi) and Kanuri. However, the starting-point was the availability of considerable agricultural surpluses, plus a flourishing crafts sector geared to the market and offering a wide range of goods.

The area of influence of the markets differed considerably. Some were important locally and retained their social and economic character: goods were traded, but social life on market day was considerably enlivened by the exchange of information, games and so on. At a higher level, the regional market was a centre to which local products were brought and where imported articles in daily use were distributed. In some cases, such

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83. The most frequently mentioned guilds are those of the stonemasons, blacksmiths, weavers, dyers, cooperers, tanners and shoemakers. It is not easy to classify the barbers and butchers. The representative of the cooperers in Kebbi, who was appointed by the sovereign, was called the sakke, a well-known name throughout the savannah in Western Sudan.
84. These were the Jawambe (a group of the Fulbe), whom the Mande named the Jogorame; see P. J. Shea, 1983, p. 111.
PLATE 16.1 Hausa loin-cloth called Goranka da nono, literally 'there is milk in your gourd'

PLATE 16.2 Hausa robe worn by men, and showing a strong Islamic influence. Made of cotton dyed blue with indigo and embroidered with silk

markets were situated on a trade route and were thereby in privileged positions: Kebbi, for example, took care of Kwanni as Katsina did of Tessawa. In Zamfara itself, the northern and north-eastern markets of Baje, Fahai, Birnin, Zamfara and so on, supplied cotton, indigo, tobacco, onions and cattle, while their southern counterparts – Kiawa, Jata, Tsohu-
FIG. 16.4 Trade routes between Hausaland and the Volta basin
war, Barrago and others – received abundant supplies of cereals. Upper Kebbi sent yarn, fabrics and slaves to Lower Kebbi, which supplied nets, harpoons, hides and abara (large dugout canoes).\(^{86}\)

The growth in domestic trade, a consequence of Hausaland’s development and also a contributory factor, has received little attention. However, because trade prospered revenues increased – in the form of various taxes and the gaisuwa which the traders often had to provide. External trade remained in the hands of the Hausa, although some Azbinawa, Arabs, Kanuri and Wangara also took part.

External trade immediately suggests the caravans. Regardless of whether these were the azalai travelling from Kawär to Gao, the ayari linking Azbin and Hausaland, or the fatake plying the Kano–Gwanja route, their first concern was to ensure that their assignment could be successfully carried out.\(^{87}\) As already mentioned, each sovereign took security precautions to protect the caravans in his own territory as they paid taxes to the states through which they travelled.

Before presenting the overall situation, several regional variants\(^{88}\) should be mentioned. In Zamfara, the Karfi assembled everything the sarakunan rafi (grazing-tax collectors) had levied. Here, salt and natron from Nguru, gathered on the shores of Lake Chad, were marketed at an earlier date than salt from Bilma or Dallof Fogha. Similarly, the dan Bahar breed of horse, from Baḥr al-Ghazäl and highly prized throughout Hausaland, was used in the cavalry and for cross-breeding with local stock. Kebbi sent salt to Nupe, Ilorin and Gwanja, from which it received tunics and kola nuts.

There were several international markets within the region and on its periphery. In the north, Agades and Bilma continued to serve as links with northern Africa; in the centre, Katsina and Kano were staging-points in north–south and east–west relations; and in the south, Zaria, Birnin Gwari and Birnin Yawuri enabled the networks to be extended towards Yoruba, Nupe, Borgu, Gwanja (and Timbuktu for Yawuri). A considerable volume of merchandise circulated in Hausaland.

The Sahara and Azbin sent Arab and European goods to these markets, including mirrors and paper, but particularly horses (the dan Azbin breed, also called bagazam, from Azbin), camels, dates, henna, salt (balma after the city of Bilma), swords and other articles. Part of the salt and sword consignments were in transit and bound ultimately for the south. In return, Hausaland supplied them with slaves, clothes, fabrics, millet, hides, iron, gold dust and kola nuts from Gwanja.

Borno had horses (dan Bahar or Bahargazal), natron and salt to offer, and in exchange received metal articles, gold dust and kola nuts, again from Gwanja.

Hausaland exported salt, swords, condiments, hides, clothes and fabrics,

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Route a: became important after the 18th-century founding of Mabrūk which linked Fūwāt with the Niger Bend.

Route b: the 'kola route', linking Hausaland and the Volta region. This route grew up after the emergence of Salaga as a kola-trading centre in the 18th century.

Route c: linked Kankan, founded at the end of the 17th century largely for the kola trade, with Jenne in the Niger Bend.

Route d: the ancient route from Cyrenaica to Kufra, extended to Wadai by the end of the 18th century, thus linking with the Sudan Road.

Route e: the Sudan Road, an east-west route linking the Nile valley with the savanna kingdoms of Dārfūr, Wadai and Bagirmi, and on through Borno and Air to Morocco.

Route f: from Cairo through Dūnkūla in Nubia, to Dārfūr.

FIG. 16.5 Diagram showing the main trade and caravan links in the Sahara and west and central Sudan, c.1215

slaves and horses to Gwanja, Borgu, Nupe and Yoruba and received in return various European goods, local iron, antimony, slaves and eunuchs, rifles from Nupe (for Kano), and kola nuts from Gwanja for general consumption.

Social relations

Despite the large number of immigrants into Hausaland, an individual’s ethnic origin had little social significance, while religious affiliation itself was so unreliable that Muhammad Alwäl’s defeat was attributed to the profanation of the Dirki. It is for this reason that we shall distinguish between three basic groups.

Producers of material goods

Farmers formed the largest category. The more intensive exploitation of the land and the improvements in farming practices – overshadowed by the importance of agrarian rites, but highlighted in the Feast of Thousands – were to bring about far-reaching changes. Until that time, the main source of labour had been the extended family. It is clear that some population groups had been reduced to a state of bondage: the Mazumawa, for example, lost their independence as soon as Gobir reached the Birnin Lalle area. Furthermore, the dispersal of the Maguzawa on the orders of Bugaya and the fact that they were summoned by Kukuna seem to imply that they had a different status, since Zanku, their patriarch, was not an elector, whereas Sarkin Mazum had to be consulted, at least for the sake of appearances. The Maguzawa of Fankui were subordinate as a group and thus tributaries, but their relations with the state differed from those existing between the sovereign Sarkin Kano and his vassal Sarkin Gaya. The last source of labour was slave labour.

Alongside the farmers was a wide variety of craftsmen. Intense specialization had produced the high standards already described. Moreover, many slaves engaged in craft activities at their master’s behest and for his benefit – at least to begin with.

A large number of herdsmen came to adopt a sedentary life-style and to employ slaves both for cereals production and to guard their herds. This process increased the pace of their integration into the political community.

Whether the producers were free men, tributaries or slaves, they were all members of the political community and their relations with the state were codified. Distinctions based on wealth and on proximity to the machinery of the state were gradually introduced.

90. ibid., pp. 107, 121.
Traders

In the fifteenth century, Gwanja was linked to Borno through Kano. In the early 1500s the Azbinawa brought salt to Gobir, while the traders in Gwanja made trips to Katsina where Kanuri and Arabs were beginning to settle. Subsequently, the Kambarin Barebari, who originated from Borno, were to make a name for themselves in long-distance trade, but the documentation currently available does not suggest that there was specialization by ethnic groups. Despite this, traders were divided into several categories, ranging from wholesalers engaging in *fatauci* (trade over medium and long distances), to retailers who organized the *kasuwanci* (retail trade).91

A group of *attajirai* (rich traders) was formed which probably included merchants dealing in slaves, horses, kola nuts and clothing. In Zamfara,92 aristocrats and traders used their slaves to enhance the value of the *gandaye*. There is little information on the production of cereals or industrial crops, such as cotton. However, traders and scholars always seem to have been closely linked.

The main unifying factor among the traders lay in their common interests; even specialization along ethnic lines could become established only if it brought in increased profits. The traders offered the aristocracy luxury goods, and did not hesitate to emigrate when they felt they were being taxed excessively: some Arabs left Kano and settled in Katsina because Kumbari was increasing the tax burden.93

Between 1500 and 1800, the different Wangara and Hausa subgroups succeeded in uniting the trade networks throughout Western Africa and, according to Ki-Zerbo,94 constituted the middle class in the main towns. The traders continued to consolidate their position as a class, while improving their techniques and spreading the Islamic faith to their advantage.

The aristocracy

The ruling class included the *masu sarauta* (all those with any political authority). It was subdivided into several levels.

The *Sarki* was at the head of the nobility which was composed of the princely families, families governing the semi-autonomous cities and vassal provinces, and representatives of the various nationalities, particularly the Azbinawa, the Shuwa Arabs and the Fulbe. The nobility performed various duties within the machinery of the state, and tended to become a homogeneous group whose cohesion was strengthened by marriage ties: ‘Abdullah Burja (1438–52) was the first sovereign of Kano to marry one daughter of

Sarkin Dutse, one of Sarkin Shira, one of Sarkin Kano and one of the Galadima.\textsuperscript{95}

All the dignitaries appointed by the Sarki to run the state formed the second level. They were of commoner or serf origin, but their position gave them access to wealth and esteem through the gifts they received, but particularly through pillaging. In some instances, they held key military offices.\textsuperscript{96} Wambai Giwa decided to enlarge the city of Kano to please Nazaki (c.1618–25) and ‘went to the site each day with a thousand dishes of food and fifty oxen up until the time the building work was finished’, but he was stripped of his office by the subsequent Sarki. This section of the ruling class ultimately controlled the state. For example, it urged Muham­mad Nazaki to counter Katsina’s authority, and it opposed the attack against Katsina planned by Zaudai. Kebbi’s decline began when the dig­nitaries holding the military offices had grown so rich that they lost interest in the affairs of the state.

The aristocracy, primarily the princes and the royal slaves, confiscated the property of the talakawa (ruled), particularly when the sovereign showed signs of weakness.

The question of social relations appears to have been dominated by two factors. The sale of Africans by certain sovereigns and the participation of Kawâr and Zawîla in the slave trade had already been stressed by al-Ya’kûbî as early as 891. Moreover, it was said of the Mai of Känem, Arku (c.1023–67) that: ‘Reflecting one day on the large number of slaves he possessed, he installed 300 of them in Dirkou, 300 in the Saguedine mosque and a further 300 in Zaylan’. These appear to be the first indicators\textsuperscript{97} of both the export of slaves from the region and their use within it. In Kano,\textsuperscript{98} Tsamia (c.1307–43) refused 200 slaves brought to him by the followers of traditional religion, but the Kwararafa were compelled to send some to Yaji (c.1349–85) and to his son Kanajeji (c.1390–1410). As ‘Abdullâh Burja (1438–52) was about to make a return Galadima Dawuda asked him to rest and began to wage war in his stead: ‘every two months he sent Sarkin Kano a thousand slaves. Each day Sarkin Kano sent him horses, clothing and horse trappings’. By the end of the campaign, he had accumulated 21 000 slaves, distributed among twenty-one villages and all named Indabo. Contrary to the recent view of one specialist\textsuperscript{99} who regarded this development as a population movement, it was in fact a genuine slaving expedition, well organized and profitable. Proof of this can be seen from the emergence of the category of the Indabawa (Rumfa was to seize their daughters), who were distinct from the Maguzawa: it should be added that the term indabo

\textsuperscript{95} H. R. Palmer, 1967, p. 110.
\textsuperscript{96} H. R. Palmer, 1967, p. 117 (Kano); D. M. Hamani, 1975, p. 85 (Kebbi); G. Na-Dama, 1977, p. 351 (embezzlement).
\textsuperscript{97} J. M. Cuoq, 1975, p. 49; D. Lange, 1977, p. 67.
\textsuperscript{98} H. R. Palmer, 1967, pp. 103–12.
is reminiscent of the Soninke debe, the Fulfulde debeere and the Songhay dabey (a village of slaves). The Indabo engaged in production activities and crafts, and particularly in agriculture. In Katsina, the city of Tsagero was a royal property where large numbers of slaves were kept, and where even princes were sent. The towns in the Gozaki area, in the south, stepped up their relations with Kano and Zazzau (Zaria): the cotton-growing on the estates in that area eventually came to depend on slaves imported from Zazzau, and part of the crop was exported to Kano.

Whether the slave was a commodity, a servant, a high-ranking public official or a producer in a subordinate position, he had a role to play in the development of the economy and the state. However, the export of slaves has to be examined regarding the sources of supply in Europe and in the Orient, even before the Atlantic trade began to claim its share. The contribution of slavery to the prosperity of the region will become clearer when it has been singled out from all other forms of subordination. From this point of view, the transition from the status of bawa (captive) to that of bacucane (house-born slave) is found in other areas of the savannah; the terms woloso (Mande), forso (Songhay), dimaajo (Fulfulde) being the equivalents of bacucane. Research should be focused on the growth of slavery during this period, in which the development of mercantile relationships simplified the social stratification. We already have enough evidence to show that the lot of the slaves was not preferable to that of the talaka.

The masu sarauta (aristocrats) can be regarded as opposing the talakawa, who were free producers but had no political power. As the aristocracy, the cultivated members of society, and the traders grew rich, the distinction shifted to an economic level, with the masu arziki or attajirai being the wealthy, and the talakawa the poor. The bawan Sarki (royal slave) ceased to be a talaka, from both the political and economic standpoints. The situation was thereby clarified, because the ethnic and religious differences had been relegated to the background, and this left those in power and the second-class citizens confronting one another.

Culture and religion

Political and economic developments gave rise to many cultural changes. On a material level, for instance, the architecture was improved and, even today, the cities still compete with each other in their building styles. In music, some instruments became widespread (such as the kakaki and the

101. See F. Cooper, 1979. See also the bibliography in P. E. Lovejoy, 1983. Particular attention is given to the Songhay empire by L. E. Kubbel, 1974; his ideas are of great interest for the savannah as a whole. The presence of the term talaka in many of the African languages (Tamajaq, Kanuri, Hausa, Fulfulde, Songhay, Gulmancema, Moore, etc.) should be noted. It more or less corresponds to bodolo in Takrüür. However, in Takrüür and in Kebbi, two expressions emphasize the position of agriculture in the savannah's economy; samba remooru and Bakabban kumbu are farmers who have turned back to the land.
Key to the 'speaking' decoration, as explained by the Zinder master craftsman, Dandibi, and recorded by his nephew, Cheffou Malam:

1 The vestibule: Zaure
2 Corner horns: Zanko, the cock's crest, is the name of a type of plait made from women's hair.
3 The peak of the pediment: Tsoro, the wrestler's plait (to which his talisman is attached) which frightens the enemy.
4 The main strapwork decoration on the pediment: Dagui is the term used to describe the embroidery on Hausa men's robes, the lion's print, the sign indicating hopes of greatness.
5 The Agades Cross, this jewel of Hausa blacksmiths in the service of Tuareg masters, was to be interpreted as a fertility symbol by Jean Gabus.
6 The sign under every window, Kura, the hyena, equals a hook for pulling up a water-scoop.
7 The sword blade, Ashasha, on each side of the entrance, is located on the pillars called Dogari, the Prince's guards.
8 Kubi: symbols from playing cards, a personal contribution by Dandibi.
9 Embroidery design known as Sarka, which is one of the principal themes of traditional decoration (as used in the Sultan's palace at Daura, the cradle of the Hausa people). It is also known as Durgusum taguwa, or Strapwork of threads.
algaita) and orchestras were brought into the royal ceremonial. We are indebted to the literate members of society for having mentioned some of the kirari (praise-songs) dedicated to the sovereigns and other important persons in Kano. The main feature of Hausaland in this respect was its richness and cultural unity – the outcome of a homogenizing process that made the Guber of Africa’s greatest vehicular languages under the name Hausa.  

Islamization at the beginning of the sixteenth century, was confined to traders and the political élite, who used it to support the consolidation of power at the centre. However, the end of the period was to be marked by an intensification of the open struggle between the political aristocracy and the scholars. The Kano Chronicle and the Wangarawa Chronicle show the development of their relations from the inside.

Kano witnessed a massive and regular influx of scholars. Under Kisoki’s reign (1509–65), several scholars arrived. The first, Shaihu Batunase, brought with him the Ashafa book; the following year he received a student from Zazzau, who became his leading disciple. He asked the sovereign to build a mosque for the Friday sermons for the Rumawa, and this was granted. The second scholar, Dan Gwarandume, took up residence at the place where Abū Bakr Kado, Kisoki’s successor, was to read the Ashafa book. The third, Shaihu Abdussalami, introduced three books. Abū Bakr, who made the princes learn the Kurān, was to be the first to read one of them. There was also a group of three brothers from Borno: one, Shaihu Kursiki turned down the post of kadi which his brother Magume accepted, while Kabi, the third remained a simple scholar. Three others, Watasansu, Buduru and Kudu arrived later. Under the reign of Abū Bakr Kado (c.1565–73), a second group immigrated to Kano, including Tama, Malam Shārif, Getso and Wuri; they came from Bagirmi (or Lagumi according to other sources) and had first spent some time in Katsina before settling in Godiya where Tama, their leader, married. Muḥammad Zakī (c.1582–1618) married one of Tama’s daughters, and instituted the Cokana and the Dirki talismans before attacking Katsina. It was on account of the scholars that the Katsinawa did not sack Kano. However, Kano attacked in its turn one morning when the feast of Ramāḍān was being celebrated, and was victorious. In the end, the scholars negotiated peace between Kano and Katsina in the period between 1648 and 1651. Kano thus occupied a privileged position at this time and attracted many scholars, at least a third of whom came from Borno. They brought books with them and were often much travelled. One of them, Kursiki, remained remote from the centre of power but another, Tama, became the sovereign’s father-in-law.

In Birnin Katsina, a distinction could be made between several groups descending from Wâlî Abû 'Abdullâhî b. Masânih, Malam Buhârî (who had declined an invitation to settle in the capital) and from Malam 'Uthmân (who had come from Borno) and so on. Many cultivated people from differing backgrounds, ethnic groups and places of origin lived in other cities. This intelligentsia, which was scattered over a territory whose population and leaders considered themselves Islamized, did not occupy any important offices in government. They were conscious that they were a separate group and kept their distance from the ruling class.

Zamfara differed in that Islam did not take root there until a late stage probably because most of its towns were far from the major cities and the caravan routes of Central Sudan. Nevertheless, Kanuri scholars may have participated in converting the sovereign to Islam. Unlike in the other states, the Imam of Anka had a real fief; the Imam’s residence was a sanctuary and a place of refuge for all those who incurred the wrath of the rulers. Three other offices were reserved for the scholars: the Limanin Ciki was responsible for the education of the royal family, while the Dan Kodo and Dan Dubai were advisers on religious affairs, the custodians of Zamfara’s history and responsible for praying for the army’s victory. The first Muslim sovereign reigned in about 1670, and Babba (c.1715) had 100 educated members of the community pray for Zamfara’s success against Kebbi.

For their income the scholars relied on the generosity of the aristocracy who contributed to their physical welfare and most probably made them gifts of money. However, it is difficult to fault the objectivity of the educated members of the community even when their own situation is involved. For example, Shaykh 'Abd al-Rahmân Zagaitî prayed for his descendants to be founts of wisdom so that they could become advisers to the king; Rumfa gave two properties to each of the Shaykh’s two sons; while the Wambai, who resided in Karaye, presented Habîbullâhî, the third son, with a fief as a reward for his blessing. It could be concluded from this that, in Kano at least, the scholars were in a position to enjoy the benefits of large estates.

Their critical attitude was also reflected in the Kano Chronicle. Muhammad Sharîf (c.1703–31) introduced seven measures that were regarded as zalunci (injustice) and included the constant increase in the rate of taxation, the tax on the marriage of young girls and so on. His successor Kumbari (c.1731–43) was to make the scholars pay a tax; the Arabs accordingly left and went to Katsina, where peace and prosperity reigned, and the talakawa deserted the city.

107. M. A. al-Hajj, 1968, pp. 11, 14. Only Professor Hunwick has attempted to trace the Wangara (Diakhite?) whose name the chronicler wished to transcribe; cf. J. O. Hunwick, 1976, p. 278.
The regular travelling of the scholars and the introduction of books are the reasons already put forward to explain the area’s intellectual awakening. However, there can be no doubt that this must be ascribed to the existence of centres of learning and, in particular, to the use of the *ajami* script in Kano and Katsina in the sixteenth century. A madrasa had grown up in Katsina after al-Balbali\(^{109}\) had passed through it, and it is likely that the use of *ajami* had not been introduced by the beginning of the sixteenth century even though, according to some sources, it had been developed during Rumfa’s reign. The scholars wrote in Arabic, Fulfulde and Hausa. Between 1500 and 1800, the fact of being part of the same political community, the same movement towards urbanization and economic development, the same population movements and spread of education and literature, all made for increasingly simple social relations. The examples of Kano, Katsina and Zamfara show that the scholars’ place of origin is easier to identify than their ethnic origin: in Kano and Zamfara the majority came from the east (Borno), whereas scholars from the west (Malle in the broadest sense) predominated in Katsina. They prayed for victory in war, they were consulted on legal matters, they rejected appeals, and their advice was prized, so that they came to have a decisive influence on social life, particularly through the *wa’azi* (sermons). Several names deserve mention. In Zamfara\(^{110}\) among the most celebrated, mention has been made of

\(^{109}\) M. Hiskett, 1984, pp. 80–3.  
\(^{110}\) G. Na-Dama, 1977, pp. 252, 325.
Ramadān b. Aḥmadu (from Fezzān), Hashimu Bazansane (a master of Shehu 'Uthmān), Maman Tukur dan Binta and al-Mustafa Gwani, a Kanuri who confronted 'Uthmān – while he was touring Zamfara – on the issue of the simultaneous presence of men and women during the sermons.

Two outstanding names are associated with Katsina.111 One, Abū 'Abdullāh b. Masānī b. Muhammad al-Barnāwī al-Kashinawī (c.1595–1667), was born in Katsina of Borno parents. The other was Muḥammad al-Sabbāgh al-Kashinawī – better known as Dan Marina – who was extremely active in about 1650 and was considered by local traditions to be Muḥammad al-Kashinawī. These two were at the root of an authentic intellectual renaissance which was to be given expression in the poem composed by Dan Marina in praise of Mai 'Alī, who defeated the Kwararafa in about 1680. The name of Muḥammad al-Kashinawī, who died about 1741 and many of whose works have survived, should also be mentioned, as well as that of Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Mahman al-Barnāwī, who died about 1755 and whose works served as sources for 'Uthmān.

However, there can be no doubt that it was Malam Djibrīl dan ‘Umaru who stood out most strikingly from the group.112 This scholar, with his encyclopaedic knowledge, was born in Adar and died there, after having been on several pilgrimages. His main subject of preoccupation lay in the Islamic reforms in Sudan. After his failure among the Tuareg in Adar, he approached the Hausa princes, whose hostility he aroused. 'Uthmān ('Usmān) and ‘Abdullāhī dan Fodio were his disciples. Despite his criticism of some of Djibrīl's attitudes 'Uthmān regarded himself as his disciple and successor. The second half of the eighteenth century was to be marked by a wealth of intellectual activity and heated debate among scholars, by way of a simple form of opposition to the established order represented by the masu sarauta.

Conclusion

Just before the djihād, there was a marked decline in the turbulent character of the relations between the states. Kebbi and Zamfara had been defeated, but the others were faced with difficult problems. In Kano, peace and stability were punctuated by two serious disagreements between the Sarki and the dignitaries: the latter prohibited Babba Zaki (c.1768–76) from residing in Takai, and Muḥammadu Alwālī (c.1781–1807) refused to give them the forty head of cattle intended for the Dirki, and had them slaughtered with an axe instead. In Gobir, Bawa (c.1777–89) for the first time introduced a tax on a certain variety of maize, and several stockraisers in that state had to pay the jangali on several occasions during the same year. Two dynastic crises shook Katsina in 1767 and 1796. The risk

of instability was noted almost throughout the region, due to resistance on the part of the dignitaries, the increased weight of tyranny, and the latent opposition of the talakawa. The political authorities had attained a threshold of oppression which no longer spared the scholars, but they were the only ones who ventured to combat the established orders openly.  

113 The historiography of Central Sudan is gradually emerging from the stage when it was devoted almost exclusively to an apologia of the *djihad*, and is now beginning to look at the changes that took place in the course of the preceding periods.

Economically the apparent opposition to progress that seemed to characterize the years between 1600 and 1790 has been overstressed. It is true that neither the wheel nor the windmill was used, and even the rifle was scorned. However, as far back as about 1582-6 the 'Takrûr people' of Gao were having fierce discussions with the 'Sudanese', who claimed that Kano was more important and greater than Gao.  

114 Despite a host of natural calamities,  

115 the area developed in a remarkable manner that has been too readily ascribed to trade although trade did indeed increase thanks to state intervention in various forms. However, the progress achieved in respect of production and processing should not be underestimated. It earned the region sufficient renown as to soon attract many European expeditions — although the reasons they gave for going there may have been of a scientific nature, such as to investigate the courses of the Nile and Niger rivers.

Politically, despite the armed conflicts, none of the states in the area disappeared during the period under consideration. Elsewhere, Ghana, Mali and Songhay disintegrated, perhaps because they were empires, yet Kânem–Borno whose longevity was remarkable was also an empire. In between the two, Hausaland and its economic successes relegated the great stability of the state as an institution to a position of secondary importance. Its bureaucratic and oppressive nature was highlighted by the measures introduced by Shârîf in Kano. One of them was called *kwaro*. Several authors do not know what this word means. If it has been correctly spelt and read, it is an obsolete term signifying 'to exchange a coin for cowries'. Since cowries were introduced into Hausaland under Shârîf in Kano's reign, he must have ordered them to be brought into circulation. One author misinterpreted *kwaro* — possibly because of a printing error — as meaning harvest tax, which was payable in Damagaram, for instance. However *kwaro* is interpreted, the meticulous detail with which the state was managed is evident. The foresight of Muhammadu Alwâli (c.1781–1807), who stock-piled food in his palace in anticipation of disturbances


114. For the opposition to change, see H. J. Fisher, 1975, pp. 66–7; for the discussion regarding Kano and Gao, see M. Ka'ti, 1981, p. 262.

and famine, vouch for that fact – although, ultimately, even he was unable to prevent the famine.\textsuperscript{116} The machinery of the state, however, was very obviously efficient and few alterations were made to it by the regimes that followed.

In the thirteenth century the Muslim state of Kânem was one of the most extensive in the *Bilâd al-Sûdan*. The Šêfuwa mais (kings) controlled the vast area from the eastern shores of Lake Chad in the south to the Fezzân oasis in the north. Their expansion, however, had not been accompanied by appropriate political and economic development. The emergence of various groups as semi-autonomous units distinct from the main Šêfuwa ruling dynasty had prevented the development of a centralized political system. In addition, Kânem, mostly desert and semi-desert, lacked the primary resources needed to support such a large system.

There followed a serious crisis which finally led to the collapse of the Kânem state in the latter part of the fourteenth century. Mai 'Umar b. Idrîs (1382–87), leading the Magumi group (of which the royal Šêfuwa was a lineage) and its supporters, migrated to Borno to the west of Lake Chad where the necessary resources existed and where the Šêfuwa had already planted their vassals. The Šêfuwa had been preceded by a large number of individual Kânem immigrants who had already settled there, particularly in the south and west.\(^1\)

The Šêfuwa's main objective on arrival in Borno appears to have been the building of a strong regional economy to support a well-organized Šêfuwa-dominated political structure. However, during their first century there, they faced many problems which at times posed threats to their very survival. There was constant civil strife, regular dynastic crises, periodical attacks from the Bulala and the problems of overmighty title-holders.\(^2\)

**Mai ‘Alî Gaji and the foundation of the Borno califate**

*c. 1465–97*

Civil conflict terminated with the accession of ‘Alî ibn Dunâma, commonly known as ‘Alî Gaji, who was able to consolidate power in his own branch of the ruling dynasty. When in about 1471 the Bulala made one of their

* I am grateful to Dr Philip Shea and John Lavers, who read the draft of this chapter, for their useful comments and suggestions.
1. For discussions see B. M. Barkindo, 1971.
2. ibid.
predatory incursions into Borno, ‘Alī Gaji met and defeated them although he did not pursue them further.

In about 1472, ‘Alī Gaji built the fortress of Birnin Gazargamu in the fork of the Rivers Yobe and Gana. This eventually developed into the capital of the Sefuwa and remained so throughout their rule in Borno. Several other fortified settlements were probably founded at about the same time.

‘Alī Gaji is remembered as a reviver of Islam as he attempted to eliminate, at least in the ruling group, the syncretism which had become rife amongst the Sefuwa. He also tried to found a proper Islamic government. Following the traditions of his predecessors and in response to the Islamic fervour of the period, ‘Alī surrounded himself with ‘ulamāʾ (Muslim scholars) whose advice he sought on any major decision. Two of these were Ābd al-Kuwwata his Qāḍī al-Kabīr (chief judge), and Masbara ‘Umar b. ‘Uthmān, his Wazir and chief ʿImām.

Many of the overmighty title-holders had their powers reduced, especially the kaigama and yerima (governor of the northern provinces) who, during the period of crisis, made and unmade kings at will. It may have been during ‘Alī Gaji’s reign that the division of the royal harem with its four titled wives and a number of titled concubines was created. The office of the chiroma (heir-apparent) may also have had its origins in this period.

During his pilgrimage in about 1484, ‘Alī Gaji was said to have been invested as the Khalīfa of Takrūr by the Abbasid claimant ‘Ābd al-‘Azīs b. Yaʿkūb. From this time onwards Borno rulers regarded themselves as Khalīfas, a claim that came to be accepted by many scholars and rulers in the Bilād al-Sūdān.

Problems and opportunities in expanding the Borno caliphate: 1497–1564

‘Alī Gaji’s policies were continued by his son and successor Idrīs b. ‘Alī surnamed Katakarmabe (c.1497–1519) who consolidated his gains and tried to expand the state. But for the next fifty years or more Katakarmabe and his successors faced many challenges which diverted their attention from their expansionist goals.

The Sefuwa’s first problem was the resumption of the Bulala attacks after ‘Alī Gaji’s death. The Bulala appear to have been determined to

3. *Brief Diwān*.

4. ‘Alī’s praise song was ‘He of the tall towns and long spears’.


frustrate economic and political development in Borno \(^{10}\) and Katakarame had to face a Bulala attack as soon as he became Mai. Not only did he defeat them but he victoriously re-entered Ndijimi, the former Sefuwa capital which, however, was never re-occupied. After concluding a treaty with the Bulala, Idris returned to Borno. It was, however, a short-lived peace and intermittent conflict continued well into the reign of Idris Alawoma (1564–96).

Another problem for the Sefuwa kings was the emergence of many states both in the Chad basin and elsewhere in the Sudan. This forced the Sefuwa to change or modify their programmes in order to deal with individual states.

By the early 1500s numerous petty kingdoms had emerged in the Chad basin along the southern border of Borno. These included Bagirmi, Mandara, the Kotoko states, Northern Bolewa of Daniski, the Yamta and the Margi.\(^{11}\) Such a potentially dangerous development attracted the king’s attention. Some states were attacked and forced to recognize some form of Sefuwa hegemony. But more often the Sefuwa tried to enter into some form of peaceful relations with the nascent states. Those mentioned above had records of early co-operation with the Sefuwa and the king’s intention must have been to use the emerging states in the building of a regional economic system. Most were encouraged to develop their own economies and to establish regular trade with Borno. Through this association the emerging states absorbed much of the Borno culture, which may have contributed to their rapid development.\(^{12}\)

In the same period many states also emerged in Hausaland. Katsina and Kano soon developed as the termini of the trans-Saharan route as well as the entrepôts of the west–east route by which the Akan gold and kola were taken to Borno.\(^{13}\) In the Sahara, there was a slight shift of the trans-Saharan route when Agades developed and supplanted Takedda as the main entrepôt.

Borno must have reacted to these developments. The new trade route between Hausaland and Borno was soon rendered unsafe to travellers by the raids of the Ngizim and the Bedde as well as the Bulala. Much energy must have been spent in trying to safeguard the route, although it was only during the rule of Idris Alawoma that the problem was alleviated. The trade-route problem and the question of the control of the new settlements which soon developed along the route may have contributed to the conflicts between Mai Idris Katakarame and the two kings of Kano, ‘Abdullahi (c.1499–1509) and Muhammad Kisoki (c.1509–65).\(^{14}\)

\(^{10}\) B. M. Barkindo, 1971.
\(^{11}\) For details see B. M. Barkindo, 1980, pp. 204–41.
\(^{12}\) ibid.
Kanem–Borno

Borno must have also had to adjust to the shift of the trans-Saharan route. Borno had long-standing relations with Takedda but must have now wanted to control Agades, particularly in the face of increasing Songhay power. In 1501 and 1515 Songhay’s Askiya Muhammad (c.1493–1528) sent military expeditions against Agades with the intention of bringing the area under Songhay’s influence.15 The result is not clear but in about 1532 Borno is said to have sent its own military expedition which succeeded in subjugating the town.16 However, the emergence of Kebbi under Muhammadi Kanta (c.1516–54) frustrated the efforts of both Songhay and Borno. The problems of Agades continued to bedevil the Sefuwa kings almost throughout their rule.

The period from about 1480 to 1520 was a time of active Islamization in the Bilad al-Sudan. In the east, the Fundu sultanate, which was founded in about 1504, soon adopted Islam. In Hausaland many scholars from Mali, North Africa, Egypt and the Saharan oases visited the area during this period, all contributing to the proper Islamization of the area. In the far west, Songhay rose to prominence under Askiya Muhammad whose rule coincided with Islamic fervour in the area. It is of interest to note that Askiya Muhammad during his pilgrimage to Mecca (c.1496–8) asked to be – and was – invested as Khalifa of Takrur17 as Mai ‘Ali Gaji had been ten years earlier.

Islamic fervour in this period presented an opportunity to the kings of Borno. The facts that the Sefuwa mais had been Muslims since the eleventh century; that ‘Ali Gaji had been invested Khalifa some ten years before the Askiya, who alone seems to have openly contested the title; and that Borno rulers traditionally surrounded themselves with reputable scholars tended to give the mais an edge on the other rulers. The chronicle which Masbarma ‘Umar b. ‘Uthman wrote for Idris Katakarimbé and the later chronicle written by Imam Ahmad b. Fartuwa for Idris Alawoma appear to have been attempts to justify the caliphal claims of the mais. The decline and collapse of Songhay later in the century, finally established the primacy of the Borno claim.

Borno was also becoming a great centre of learning visited by scholars from the Bilad al-Sudan and other parts of the Muslim world.18 That the claim of the Borno kings was accepted by many scholars contributed greatly towards laying the foundation of the cultural influence of Borno in many states. In Hausaland, these developments must have been largely responsible for the introduction of the payment of regular gifts (gaisuwa or tsare in Hausa) to the Borno Khalifa by the Muslim rulers in Hausaland.19

16. ibid.
17. J. O. Hunwick, 1962. It must have been an attempt by the Askiya to strengthen his position at home and to offer challenge to Borno, the only other great power in the region.
From the reign of Idrīs Katakarmabe, some records exist of diplomatic and commercial relations between the Sefuwa and the authorities controlling the North African littoral. In about 1512 Katakarmabe sent a diplomatic and trade mission to the Spaniards—who had recently occupied Tripoli—to renew commercial ties. Trade relations with whoever controlled the area continued under succeeding kings. When the Ottomans were established in the Maghrib, DunĀma b. Muhammad in about 1555 sent an embassy which established with Tighūrt Pasha a treaty of 'friendship and commerce' which was continually renewed by succeeding rulers. Strong ties must have also been established with Egypt which lay on the Borno pilgrim route. There is evidence of trade relations, although information is still fragmentary.

Katakarmabe’s sons and grandsons inherited the Bulala incursion problem and that of the emerging states. There was also the Kebbi-Borno war (c.1561) over control of Agades, which Borno appears to have lost.

Establishment of a strong regional economy and a centralized political system and the emergence of the Kanuri, c.1564–77

Most scholars agree that Borno reached its apogee during the rule of Idrīs b. ‘Alī, posthumously surnamed Alawoma (1564–96). The first twelve years of his reign were described in a panegyric by his Imām, Ahmad ibn Furtūwa. At home he was seen as a military and administrative innovator and an Islamizer, and in foreign affairs as a skilled diplomat who was comparable to the major Muslim leaders of his day.

His main objective as king appears to have been the realization of the objectives of his ancestors, namely the building of a strong economic and political system. Attempts were made for the first time to bring the whole metropolitan province firmly under the control of the mais. The cavalry, which was the mainstay of the army, was reorganized. There was also a corps of Turkish gunmen which had been developing under his predecessors. Larger boats were said to have been built for easier crossing of rivers. It was with such a force that Alawoma launched his conquests.

Most of the hostile groups which refused to be persuaded or coerced into submission were continually attacked until they surrendered. These included the Ngafata, the Talata, the Dugurti, the Maya, the Ngizim and

21. Ibid.
23. A. ibn Furtūwa, 1862.
the Bedde. Some, such as the Mukhulum who submitted after a defeat, were allowed to retain their homes upon a promise of tribute in corn.\textsuperscript{24} Others, such as the Ngafata, the Talata and the Dugurti, who were considered unmalleable were ejected from the metropolitan province.\textsuperscript{25}

In place of the ejected, other groups – mostly from Kânem – were brought in and settled. One of Alawoma’s most significant contributions to Borno history was the large-scale demographic changes which he effected in the metropolitan province. This, and extensive intermarriage with female slaves caught during the conflicts or exchanged with satellite states such as Mandara and Bagirmi, contributed to the development and spread of the Kanuri group within the metropolitan province.

In southern Borno dissident groups such as the Gamergu were contained by a series of \textit{ribâts} (frontier fortresses) and formal agreements were entered into with satellite-state rulers for joint military expeditions against the dissidents.\textsuperscript{26}

The final solution to the problems of Kânem

After the pacification and integration of most of the metropolitan province, Idrïs Alawoma turned his attention to Kânem to finally solve the menace it posed for Borno. He had three lines of action: to destroy completely the military strength and power base of the Bulala; to try to destroy the economic base of the Kânem state; and to transfer as many groups as possible to Borno.

Alawoma undertook several expeditions to Kânem in which the Bulala were defeated and continually harassed.\textsuperscript{27} Other groups, such as the Kananiya who supported the Bulala, were also ruthlessly attacked until they were weakened.\textsuperscript{28} During one of the expeditions, three of the most productive valleys of Kânem were ravaged, some of the most important towns situated there, such as Ikima, Aghafi and Ago, were destroyed and the population removed and settled in Borno.\textsuperscript{29}

The Kânem groups taken to and settled in Borno included the Tubu, the Koyam, the Kulu and the Shuwa Arabs. The Kulu and the Shuwa Arabs, who were both cattle-owners, were settled along the southern shores of Lake Chad and to the west of the metropolitan province.\textsuperscript{30} The Tubu and the Koyam were encouraged to engage in commerce both within Borno and with neighbouring Hausaland and Fombina.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{24} A. ibn Futūwa, 1862, p. 238.
\textsuperscript{25} ibid., p. 219; the Dugurti migrated to Kânem.
\textsuperscript{26} B. M. Barkindo, 1980, ch. 5.
\textsuperscript{27} H. R. Palmer, 1967, p. 14 suggests the expeditions took place in c.1571-5.
\textsuperscript{28} ibid., pp. 64-6.
\textsuperscript{29} ibid., p. 49.
\textsuperscript{30} For the Kulu, ibid., p. 49; for the Shuwa, J. C. Zeltner, 1979, p. 22.
who were camel-drivers, were employed in the camelry which had been established as a transportation unit of the army. Many groups were also settled north of the lake in an area through which the Bulala used to pass to attack Borno. Others, in particular the Tubu, were settled on the desert margin, both for strategic reasons and to participate in the production and marketing of the Bilma and Muniyo salt. Other groups must also have been utilized for economic or military reasons but as yet no evidence has been found.

By the 1580s, Alawoma had achieved most of his objectives and the Kâném state, by common agreement, was partitioned between Borno and the Bulala, the latter accepting some form of loose control by Borno.

Internal reforms

Alawoma seems to have made a pilgrimage to Mecca in about 1571. On his return he tried to introduce a number of reforms to bring the country into line with other Islamic states. In government he tried to separate the functions of the judiciary from the administration – but was not, it seems, successful. He does, however, seem to have succeeded in establishing a court of appeal where ‘The learned men and Imams held disputations before the Amir ‘Alî concerning doubtful points of law and dogma.’

Mai Alawoma was said to have replaced the old mosques made of reeds with those built of mud-bricks. Numerous North African and other scholars were attracted to his court which thereby gained a cosmopolitan character.

The rise of a strong regional economy

The conquests of and demographic changes under Idrîs Alawoma, as well as his other reforms, led to the emergence of a strong regional economy based on the metropolitan province, an area of some 20,000 sq. km. Three important commercial centres seem to have arisen in the eastern and western extremities of the area as well as around Birnin Gazargamu which lay between the two.

In the eastern part there was large-scale fishing along the banks of Lake Chad by the Buduma and Kânembu, while the good grazing lands

34. H. Barth, 1965, p. 506, suggests that Idrîs performed the pilgrimage in the ninth year of his rule, i.e. in 1571. This also fits in with the date suggested for the start of the Kânem wars by H. R. Palmer (see footnote 27 on p. 497). These dates support the chronologies of D. Lange, 1977, which are being used in this study.
38. P. M. Redmond (at press).
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attracted a large number of Känembu, Shuwa and Fulbe cattle nomads.\(^{39}\) Kilbu (natron) and manda (salt) were also produced by the sedentary Känembu and Buduma.\(^{40}\) Important urban centres grew up rapidly in this area due to population increase and economic development. These included Munguno, Kauwa, Burwa and Ngurno.

In the west of the metropolitan province large natron deposits were also found. These were worked by the Manga and the Tubu.\(^{41}\) In the south was a large concentration of farming peoples including the Ngizim and the Bedde. This area, following the activities of Alawoma and his immediate successors, received more varied immigrants than the east. Many of the urban centres which developed there were therefore more cosmopolitan than their eastern counterparts. They included Nguru Ngilewa, Mashina Kabshari and Maja Kawuri.

Birnin Gazargamu and its environs formed the third economic centre. It had direct and easy access to both areas through the east–west trade route which passed through the city. The Rivers Yobe and Gana also served as waterways, particularly for the transport of fish, and along their banks cattle were transported from east to west. Birnin Gazargamu was also the terminus for the Borno–Kawär–Tripoli trade route as well as for the main route connecting the area with Hausaland. It therefore served as the nerve-centre of the economy of the state, with a large market and a nucleus of foreign merchants.\(^{42}\) In the fertile irrigated Yobe valley there was a heavy concentration of the emerging Kanuri group settled in many urban centres in addition to Birnin Gazargamu. After the rule of Idris Alawoma, the Kanuri started to spread both southwards to the banks of the River Gana and beyond, and northwards towards Garu Kime and beyond.

Attempts were also made towards tighter control over the satellite states. For example, a regular supply of iron and slaves was obtained from Mandara, and skins, ivory and slaves from the Kotoko and Bagirmi.

The development of basic industries led to the establishment of supporting ones such as pottery, weaving, leather work, dyeing and transportation.\(^{43}\)

Natron and salt were traded to the Atlantic coast, Hausaland, the Volta region and northwards to Azbin and Adrar. Dried fish was traded within the metropolitan province, with Mandara and Hausaland and with the Saharan oases. Slaves, eunuchs, animal skins, ivory, perfumes, leather goods and gold were sent across the Sahara to North Africa and Egypt. In exchange horses, horse-trappings, armoury, copper, bronze and other

40. P. E. Lovejoy (at press).
41. ibid.
42. M. S. ibn Ishâku, 1929, pp. 544-7.
FIG. 17.1  *Borno, Kānem and their immediate neighbours in the eighteenth century*

Source: adapted from map drawn by John F. Antwi, Geography Department, Bayero University, Kano, after B. M. Barkindo
From the reign of Alawoma various peoples around the Chad basin were apparently encouraged by the Sefuwa to engage in commercial activities. We have already mentioned the Tubu and the Koyam. The Kotoko and Mandara appear to have come to Kano; Komolli traders from Bagirmi settled in the Zamfara valley; while the Tubu under the Kadella settled in Zaria. Significantly, they were all referred to as Bornans and must have helped to spread the emerging Bornoan culture in Hausaland and other areas. It was through its regional economy, its control of trade and its primacy in Islam that Borno came to dominate the affairs of the Bilad al-Sudan during this period.

The mais interfered little with the trade itself, limiting their role to the provision of security by making the routes safe from marauders, such as the Ngizim and the Tuareg, and by entering into agreements with Saharan and North African governments to ensure the flow of trade both on state

45. P. E. Lovejoy, 1973b Komolli is the Kanurized Bagirmi term umboli meaning 'trader'.
It was in the organization of the market that the Sefuwa government was more involved—to encourage traders and to obtain revenue. In the capital and the other major centres, the Wasili (North African traders) were recognized as guests of the government. A wasiliram (special quarter) was assigned to them and a Zanna Arjinama (titled official) looked after their affairs. In the markets, the Mala Kasuube supervised sales and attempted to ensure justice and fair play during major commercial transactions. Each profession or craft had its own head nominated by its members and recognized by the government. These helped the Mala Kasuube in the administration of the market and in the collection of revenue.

The diplomatic relations of Idris Alawoma with the sultans of Turkey and Morocco

Alawoma’s diplomatic relations with the Ottomans and the Sa’âdî thanks to the discovery of some documents, have received the attention of several scholars. However, due to the one-sidedness of the documents— they deal mainly with replies to letters sent by Alawoma—understanding of these relations is still not complete. However, the evidence shows as incorrect the general assumption that Alawoma’s main objective was to obtain arms.

Ottoman–Borno relations started with the arrival of the former in the Maghrib. From about 1549— when the Ottomans took control of Fezzân— to about 1570, these relations appear to have been cordial. However, in about 1571 the annual tribute of Fezzân to the Ottomans was suddenly raised to 3000 from the normal 1140 mithkals of gold. This high-handed Ottoman action unfortunately coincided with a period of famine, and these two events forced many people to migrate to Hausaland and Borno. Ottoman officials in Fezzân forced those who remained, many of them old people, to pay the additional sum between them. Several marauding expeditions were sent against many fortresses in the Sahara oases ostensibly to catch those avoiding taxation. Even the pilgrims from Hausaland and Borno were stopped and forced to pay taxes and the properties of those who died during the pilgrimage were confiscated.

It must have been in 1571 that Alawoma went to Mecca, thereby obtaining first-hand information of the situation. Certainly, this was when he travelled to Kawär to receive the submission and complaints of the

50. For example, see B. G. Martin, 1972 and M. A. al-Hajj, 1983.
52. ibid.
people of Jado who were probably among the Ottoman victims.  

Borno's interest in the Fezzân, and the interests of the mais in the security of the route both for pilgrimage and for commerce, must have forced Alawoma, in about 1574 to dispatch a six-man embassy to Istanbul with three specific demands: a guarantee of security of life and property to all Borno travellers in Ottoman territory; proper management or failing that the ceding to Borno of all the recently acquired fortresses south of Fezzân, including Guran; and co-operation between the two powers in dealing with the troublesome Tuareg and any other power disturbing peace in the area. There appears to have been no mention or solicitation of arms.

Sultan Murâd III's reply, dated 5 May 1577, agreed with all the requests except the ceding of the Guran fortress - which, however, he promised would henceforth be properly managed. Letters were sent to the governors-general of Tripolitania and Egypt and to the district officer of Fezzân telling them of Alawoma's requests and ordering them to comply. From then on, cordial and beneficial commercial and diplomatic relations continued between the two powers.

Moreover, the claim that the sole purpose of the embassy sent by Alawoma to Sultan al-Manṣûr of Morocco in about 1583 was to solicit arms may not be true either. The Moroccan victory at Kašr al-Kabîr in 1578 was generally hailed as an ideological victory for Islam over Christendom. There were congratulatory delegations from Borno and all the leading Muslim powers: Algiers, the Ottomans and Songhay. In addition, Alawoma must have also feared a proposed Ottoman-Sa'âdî joint expedition which might have had the Saharan oases or even the Sudan as its target. It appears that Alawoma, a skilful diplomat, aimed at frustrating that proposed venture by suggesting instead a joint Borno-Moroccan expedition to the Saharan oases, once again in some state of insecurity. The outcome of this embassy, according to Moroccan sources, was that Alawoma accepted al-Manṣûr's claim to be Khalîf of the age as the price for his demands.

Contrary to the views of some authors, the negotiations must have greatly satisfied both parties. Morocco would have gained ideologically to have one of the leading powers in the Sudan recognize al-Manṣûr's Caliphate,
thus strengthening his demands on Songhay. For Alawoma, the price was worth paying if it forestalled joint Moroccan-Ottoman action — whether real or assumed — against Borno or any area where its interests lay.

As yet little is known about the remaining fifteen years of Idrīs Alawoma’s reign. He was probably occupied with consolidating his reforms and innovations in Borno. Towards the end of his reign a major problem must have been the fast development of the Mandara and Bagirmi states. Mandara not only abandoned its earlier agreements with Alawoma regarding joint expeditions against the Gamergu but also started to encourage buffer zones between it and Borno. Alawoma was forced to lead several expeditions against Mandara, most of them unsuccessful. In Bagirmi, ‘Abdūllāh b. Lubetko (c.1561–1602), despite having probably gained the throne with Bornoan assistance, started making trouble. It was on a campaign against ‘Abdūllāh that Alawoma was said to have been assassinated by a Gamergu.

The death of Idrīs Alawoma, contrary to the views of some writers, did not lead to the collapse of the Borno empire. It was in fact, during the rules of his four immediate successors (c.1596–1677) that the earlier conquests were consolidated and the administrative machinery finally took shape. It was also at this time that the Kanuri finally emerged as an ethnic group with a distinct culture.

The social and material culture of the Kanuri

The term Kanuri probably came into use in the early seventeenth century. It refers to the dominant ethnic group of Borno upon whom the power of the Sefuwa kings was based. It was produced by the inter-marriage of the peoples and cultures of the immigrant Magumi from Känem and the Chadic speakers of Borno — a development, as noted above, accelerated by the activities of Idrīs Alawoma. Within the Kanuri group itself there were many sub-ethnic distinctions but it is not our aim here to go into such details. It was the Kanuri culture that formed the base of the Bornoan culture which spread beyond the metropolitan province as the Kanuri travelled out or as other groups adopted the Kanuri culture through political or economic domination or association or through Islamization.

Most Kanuri lived in villages in compounds containing several round huts either of wooden frameworks or of mud walls with conical grass roofs. Many compounds were surrounded by sugedi (grass matting). In the larger towns most huts and mosques were made of mud walls and houses of men with means were usually surrounded by high mud walls.

62. Al-Manṣūr was then thinking of invading the Songhay which he finally did in 1591.
63. B. M. Barkindo, 1980, ch. 5.
64. The earliest mention of the term is in a satirical poem by Muḥammad al-Tahir b. Ibrāhīm al-Fallati (d. 1776) quoted in M. Bello, n.d.
Most Kanuri towns and villages were U-shaped. The dandal (the opening of the U) was the settlement's main street. It faced westwards and led to the palace of the governor of the town, beside which was situated the settlement's main mosque.

At Birnin Gazargamu and in some of the most important towns, such as Nguru, Mashina and Gambaru, the houses were usually rectangular with thick mud walls and flat roofs. Royal palaces at Birnin and Gambaru, their main mosques, and the palaces of important dignitaries, such as the Galadima at Nguru and the Mashinama of Mashina were surrounded by impressive walls of fired bricks, one of the distinguishing traits of Kanuri culture which seems to have flourished from the mid-sixteenth to the early eighteenth century. Such walls must have been introduced to give additional protection during the period of conquests and insecurity. Birnin Gazargamu and other important towns were surrounded by a garu (mud

wall) and belaga (ditch) for additional defence.

A typical Kanuri could have been distinguished by his language and physical appearance. Both men and women had distinguishing vertical marks on each cheek. An unmarried girl usually wore her hair in a kela yasku (a special style) while a married woman wore her hair in a jurungul (crown). All women ate kola nuts and stained their teeth with gorongo or fure (tobacco flower) dyed their hands and feet with nalle (henna) and put a coral bead or metal stud into one nostril. They usually wore gimaje (long dyed cotton dresses) and women of distinction wore a kalaram (turban).

Men wore tobe (large open cotton gowns either plain or dyed blue) while those of the upper class wore a multiplicity of gowns of expensive imported cloth. In the late-eighteenth century they wore outsize unwieldy turbans which appear to have been borrowed from seventeenth-century Ottoman practice.


69. Tobacco was introduced into Borno in the 17th century. The practice therefore may date from that time.
Marriage was one of the distinguishing traits of Kanuri culture which, if properly studied, would reveal the many elements which went into its formation: Islamic rite and both Magumi and Bornoan practices.\textsuperscript{71} The nyia (marriage contract) itself was made under Islamic rites but ceremonies both before and after the marriage contract betray other cultural traits. One such example is the kalimbo barata when the bride’s friends went into the bush to collect branches from the kalimbo thorn-tree with which the bridegroom and his best friend were supposed to be beaten. Another was the kalaba, the final ceremony of the marriage, which comprised the reading of the Kur‘an together with what appears to have been some pre-Islamic initiation ceremony.\textsuperscript{72}

Kanuri society was highly stratified. It was broadly divided into two classes, the Kontuowa (ruling class or nobility) and the tala’a (commoners) and both these had several divisions. Differences of speech, dress, household furniture, architecture and residence distinguished the classes and their sub-divisions. Status was based on ethnic membership, occupation, birth, age and residence. Upward mobility was achieved through obtaining more wealth, association with the ruling class or obtaining a highly ranked profession.\textsuperscript{73}

The emphasis on inferior–superior relations was an important aspect of Kanuri socio-political culture. A social inferior was always required to show his superior respect in public. In addition, a social inferior had to render nona (respectful visits) to the house of his social father for whom he was supposed to run any errand required of him.\textsuperscript{74} The superior reciprocated by providing his inferior with his basic needs and protecting and advancing his interests in society. A Kanuri’s most valuable socio-economic and political asset, according to Cohen, was probably to have a large number of people dependent on and subordinate to him.\textsuperscript{75}

As already indicated, Islam was one of the bases of Kanuri culture. Islam was deeply rooted in ordinary everyday life and had even penetrated the fabric of Kanuri folklore. Much of the technical vocabulary of Islam had been so ‘Kanurized’ that its original meaning had been modified. For example, the word kasalla (meaning washing of any sort even of animals) had been adopted from the Arabic word sallah (prayers).\textsuperscript{76}

Borno by this time was a centre of learning which attracted large numbers

\textsuperscript{71} R. E. Ellison, 1936, pp. 531–2; I. Imam, 1969, p. 515.
\textsuperscript{72} Both the kalimbo barate and part of kalaba ceremonies are said to have been adopted by the Magumi from the so-called Sao peoples whom they first met and intermixed with upon their arrival.
\textsuperscript{73} R. Cohen, 1970.
\textsuperscript{74} R. Cohen, 1965, p. 363.
\textsuperscript{75} ibid., p. 364.
\textsuperscript{76} S. W. Koelle, 1968, p. 114. For more information see J. E. Lavers, 1971.
of students and visiting scholars from the Bilād al-Sūdān, North Africa and the Middle East. Borno specialized in tafsīr (commentary on the Kurʾān) in the Kānembu language77 and the art of writing the Borno language in Arabic letters must have been developed by the seventeenth century.78

There were two types of scholars. The first were the bearers of Islamic offices of state – the imāms, the kādis, the mainin kinendi (Islamic and legal adviser to the mai), the Talba (head of police and magistrate), khazin (treasurer) and the wazir. These were the great 'ulamā' who helped the mai in running the Islamic government and their positions were hereditary and restricted to a few leading scholarly families. The great scholars were supposedly learned and pious but as they held institutionalized offices and were thus associated with worldly power they became increasingly alienated from the non-court scholars who criticised them for supporting bid'a (religious innovation) and ada (traditions of the country) for reasons of political expediency.79

The more austere scholars lived away from the court and the city in malamti (scholarly families) in the rural areas where they taught and spread the religion. During the time of the Sefuwa most of these scholars were supported and patronized by the kings who also gave many of them mahrams.80 It was they who helped spread Islam in the rural areas of the metropolitan province and beyond into the neighbouring states. However, it was also they who produced the first intensive criticism of Sefuwa rule.

Most of the Sefuwa kings tried to enhance their powers not only through patronizing the 'ulamā' but also through an outward show of piety and in becoming learned in their own rights. This attitude – which appears to have been partly an attempt to reinforce the pre-Islamic supernatural powers of rulers,81 since knowledge provided its holder with a reputation for having access to supernatural powers – was adopted by many neighbouring rulers who adopted their religion and political structure from Borno.82

Political organization

The mai was the head of the institutionalized royal family, the supreme head of state and the larde kangema (nominal owner of the land). He was the symbol of the unity and continuity of the state. As the Amīr al-mu‘minīn

78. ibid.
79. M. Bello, n.d.
80. Mahrams are documents of privileges and exemptions from taxation and military services granted by the mais to some scholarly families and a few trading groups. See the various mahrams in H. R. Palmer, 1936 and 1967.
81. For example, 'Ali b. 'Umar was considered to have been learned and pious and to have possessed miraculous powers. He performed the hadjāj five times, dying near Cairo while returning from the fifth.
82. For a Mandara example, see B. M. Barkindo, 1979, p. 44.
(commander of the faithful) he was head Muslim and a final court of appeal in both public and private matters of justice. Many of the sacred attributes of the pre-Islamic kings, vividly described by al-Muhallabi in the tenth century, seem to have survived into the Islamic period. The king was still largely secluded, appearing in public in a fanadir (cage), and people spoke to him only through intermediaries. Muslim scholars appear to have enhanced the sacred attributes of the king in several ways. The scholar in the Idara, for example, claims that God 'has made certain peoples kings and has perfected the characters of those chosen to be kings ...'

Ibn Furțuwa, in the sixteenth century, echoed the belief of many Muslims in other parts of the world when he said: 'A place where there is an evil Sultan is better than a place where there is none. The mai was selected from amongst the maina (eligible princes) whose fathers had been kings. Succession, however, was not always smooth. There was both internal opposition from other segments of the royal dynasty and external opposition from rebellious tributary states. To avoid rebellion during an interregnum it was essential to select a new king with minimum delay. However, the office of the heir-apparent does not appear to have functioned well. From the time of Mai Idrïs b. 'Ali (c.1677–96) or earlier, the kings seem to have resorted to eliminating rival candidates, a habit they probably learnt from the Ottomans.

Subordinate to the king were the other members of the institutionalized royal family. This consisted of the king's four titled wives, headed by the gumsu (headwife), the concubines, the princes and the mairam (princesses). It also included the magira (queen-mother) and the magram (the king's official sister). The gumsu was responsible for administering the palace, and the magira, in addition to being the holder of the largest number of fiefs in the state, had the right to grant sanctuary. The official sister usually supervised the cooking of the king's food.

The royal wives were generally drawn from the families of the leading officials of state, while the princesses were given in marriage to leading religious dignitaries and torwe (specially designated title-holders). Most princes resided outside the palace and were strictly controlled although some were given fiefs. The most important of these were the chiroma (heir-apparent) and the yerima (governor of the northern provinces) who was

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87. A. ibn Furțuwa, 1862.
88. For example, even Idrïs Alawoma was not immediately succeeded by his Chiroma (Biri).
89. See B. M. Barkindo, 1979, pp. 41–2.
PLATE 17.3  Reception of the Denham-Clapperton mission by the Mai of Borno in the 1820s
always a *maidugu* (grandson of a previous king) which meant he would never become king.

The highest council of state was the *majlis* which was normally presided over by the king and composed of military and religious notables who were said to have been twelve although the accounts vary from source to source. It normally included most of the Islamic advisers already mentioned as well as military commanders: *yerima*, *kaigama* and *galadima*. Other sources include powerful slaves of the king some of whom were eunuchs. The *noguna* (*mai’s* court), which consisted of all the notables in the capital, met daily.

All towns, villages and ethnic units were grouped into *chidi* (fiefs) and all major officials of state were *chimas* (fief-holders). These were responsible for the maintenance of order in their fiefs, for the collection of taxes and for the raising of troops for the army. All fief-holders, except the *galadima*, resided in the capital and were represented by their *chima gana* (junior fief-holders). All fiefs were held at the pleasure of the king who had the right to confiscate, reduce or re-arrange their holdings. Rural people were ruled by *mbarma* or *bulala* (local or ethnic leaders).

The Šefuwa’s income included the *zakāt* (alms), *dibalram* (road tolls), *kultingo* (tribute) and war booty. All those who participated in tax collection reserved some portion for themselves while the major title-holders reserved large portions, paying the rest as tribute to the king. Both the *mai* and fief-holders, however, were expected to redistribute the major portions of their income as gifts to their subordinates who, in turn, were required to do the same to their followers.

The golden age in Borno

The seventeenth century – not the sixteenth as popularly claimed – should be regarded as Borno’s golden age. Idrīs Alawoma’s conquests were completed and consolidated and administrative reforms were made to facilitate the management of the growing empire. It was during the rule of ‘Umar b. Idrīs (c.1619–39) that the offices of the *galadima* at Nguru and the *alifa* of Mao at Kānem were established as semi-autonomous vassals to take care of the western and eastern extremities of the state respectively.\(^\text{92}\) Buffer states were established along the desert fringe at Muniyo and Mashina (and at Gaskeru, Tunbi and Damagaram in the eighteenth century) as barriers to Tuareg attacks on the metropolitan province.\(^\text{93}\)

This was the period when ‘Abd al-Karīm b. Jame (c.1611–55), who studied in Borno, founded Wadai – no doubt with Borno’s blessing, since the emergence of Wadai checked for some time the expansionist attitude of Bagirmi, into what was considered Borno territory. As with the other


\(^{93}\) J. E. Lavers, 1980, p. 203.
neighbouring states, Wadai also fell within the political, cultural and commercial orbit of Borno.  

Diplomatic and commercial relations with the Mediterranean littoral entered one of its briskest periods. Trade became so active that in about 1636 Muhammad Sakizli (c.1633–49) of Tripoli wrote to Mai ‘Umar that the two of them, together with the Sultan of Fezzan, should monopolize it completely⁹⁵ – a venture which after some years was found to be impossible. Relations with Egypt must also have been good, through trade and because Egypt lay on the pilgrimage route. It probably was during this period that new crops such as maize, tomatoes and paw-paw were introduced into Borno from the Mediterranean littoral, particularly Egypt.⁹⁶

By the seventeenth century, particularly by the rule of ‘Ali b. ‘Umar (c.1639–77), Borno had become the dominant power in the Bilad al-Sudan. Not only was it a centre of learning and culture but also the controller of all the easily accessible sources of mineral salts – at Muniyo, Bilma and around Lake Chad. Its close trade connections with the Mediterranean coast led to its domination of the redistribution of Mediterranean imports to the central Sudanic states.⁹⁷ It was also in possession of a strong regional economy at home. The mais were recognized as the undisputed leaders of the Islamic states of the region and Borno was acknowledged throughout the area as the fourth sultanate of the Islamic world.⁹⁸ Most of the states appear to have placed themselves voluntarily under the protection of the Khalif (caliph), to benefit from his baraka (blessing) and to obtain the goods they needed. It was the general erosion of this system that led to the decline and final collapse of the Sëfuwa.

The kings of the late seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth centuries tried to maintain the system they had inherited and appear to have done their job well. Most of what the oral traditions regard as classical Borno is based on the Sëfuwa system as it existed in the eighteenth century.

Crises of the late-eighteenth century

With the reign of ‘Ali ibn Dunâma (c.1742–92) Borno entered a period of crisis which climaxied in the dijîhâd of the nineteenth century.

In western Borno, the Bedde were intensifying their raids on the trade routes to Hausaland while in the north the increasing raids of the Tuareg of Agades finally led to the loss, in about 1759, of the important Bilma salt

⁹⁴. G. Nachtigal, 1874, p. 50.
⁹⁵. D. Girard, Ms. 12219.
⁹⁶. The words for maize (Masara, i.e. 'Egyptian') and paw-paw (Bambus Massarabe, i.e. 'Melon from Egypt') in Kanuri and many other languages of people around Lake Chad and Hausaland further support the claim of Egyptian origin for these crops.
⁹⁸. M. Katî, 1913–14, p. 65. The Ta’rîḳḥ has been edited several times, this passage could have been written any time between 1591 and 1655.
mines and later the abandonment of many towns on the desert fringe.\textsuperscript{99} This precipitated the southward shift of the Manga groups into Hausaland, the Sosebalki states and the Ngazir province.

In Bagirmi, Muḥammad al-Amīn (c.1715–85) threw off Borno’s overlordship and launched a series of attacks on Borno’s eastern frontiers while Wadai under Jawdā (c.1747–95) continued its expansionist policies towards Bahr al-Ghazāl.\textsuperscript{100} These attacks set in motion the migrations of the Tubu, Kānembu and Shuwa Arabs into Kānem and the metropolitan province\textsuperscript{101} thereby causing conflicts over grazing lands among the pastoralists which were exacerbated by the long and severe famines.

In about 1781, Mandara revolted and after several engagements severely defeated the forces of Borno.\textsuperscript{102} This was followed by the revolt of the Sosebalki states\textsuperscript{103} and, in about 1785, of Gobir.\textsuperscript{104} Faced with insecurity, famines and impoverished grazing lands, many of the Fulbe nomads abandoned metropolitan Borno and drifted into Hausaland, Mandara and Fombina. Nowhere, however, did they find the peace and security they were looking for\textsuperscript{105} and this may partly explain their dominant participation in the \textit{djhād}.

The non-court scholars and the ordinary Muslims blamed the crisis on the increasing corruption of the Sēfuwa rulers and the inability of the \textit{mais} to prevent the growing syncretism among the people. The court scholars were equally blamed for their acquiescence to the increasing syncretism of the rulers. Other scholars, such as the \textit{karabiwa mallams} attempted to withdraw completely from the society which they considered corrupt. When the \textit{djhād} broke out, the client-rulers in Hausaland called upon the \textit{mai} to fulfil his obligation as \textit{khalīf} and patron and come to their aid. That he could not and that he could not even prevent his own expulsion from his capital by the same \textit{djhād}ists meant that the \textit{khalīf} had lost his primacy.

However, although the \textit{djhād} did contribute to the loss of the vassal states and to the end of the Sēfuwa rule, the system that the \textit{mais} had built, particularly in metropolitan Borno, did survive albeit with modification well into the twentieth century.

\textsuperscript{100} G. Nachtigal, 1874, pp. 100–1; J. E. Lavers, 1980, p. 208.
\textsuperscript{101} Anon., n.d.
\textsuperscript{102} B. M. Barkindo, 1980, pp. 390–1.
\textsuperscript{103} I. Landorein, 1910–11, pp. 427 and 429.
\textsuperscript{104} A. ibn Mustafā, particularly MS. 49, ff. 46 and 76.
\textsuperscript{105} For Hausaland see Y. B. Usman, 1981; for Mandara see B. M. Barkindo, 1980; for Fombina, see A. Sa'ad, 1977.
FIG. 17.3 Borno’s links with North Africa and the Nile valley in the eighteenth century
Source: adapted from map drawn by John F. Antwi, Geography Department, Bayero University, Kano, after B. M. Barkindo
In this part of Africa, historical information for the period 1500–1800 is less plentiful, coherent and reliable than for other regions. This is not only because research has been unsystematic and, in general, recent, but also because, for the period prior to the nineteenth century, the possibilities for research seem extremely limited. In areas where political organizations took the form of states, these were mostly formed very late, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Oral traditions among their peoples, who had only a limited degree of hierarchy, appear uninformative and rarely go back more than a few generations, five or six at best. Those which do exist often record the individual history of a particular lineage and raise, in addition to the usual problems of interpretation, the problem of how to relate them to one another and integrate them into an overall view. Any synthesis based on this type of source is therefore provisional – but other sources are very sparse. A few travellers’ accounts, from the sixteenth century onwards, exist for the areas in closest contact with foreigners: the Atlantic coast, for example, is relatively well covered whereas the northern borders close to Muslim areas were only really visited by Muslim travellers in the nineteenth century. Finally, archaeological research, historical linguistics and ethnolinguistics are only just beginning in the area.

There is, moreover, no single factor uniting the different parts of this region. The forest is certainly its dominant physical feature – particularly as it must have covered a larger area in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries than it does today – but many parts of the region have long been savannah. The low population density appears to be another common characteristic but then, as now, there were areas of relatively high density, notably in the savannah and along the waterways. As for the peoples, their languages, ways of life and forms of organization were extremely diverse. This diversity and the inevitable uneven distribution of information necessitate a regional approach to the area.
The northern border area

The northern part of this region, from the central Cameroon highlands in the west to the River Nile in the east, is the area for which historical information is most lacking. It is significant, for example, that the best chronologies currently available contain few facts from before 1800.1 Before the beginning of the nineteenth century the historian, to use E. M. Chilver's words, is in the domain of 'reasonable conjecture', and these conjectures can only be made within narrow geographical limits. The tendency of ethnological and historical works to restrict themselves first to the limits of ethnic groups and then, more recently, to the limits of contemporary states, makes any regional synthesis difficult and hazardous. It seems wiser, therefore, to try to define micro-regions which have some degree of cultural homogeneity or, at least, some degree of common destiny at this time.

The central Cameroon highlands

These relatively fertile grasslands were probably settled very early, certainly before the population movements whose consequences are still visible and which probably took place in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.2 There are at least two indications of this early settlement. The first is the vegetation which is today wooded savannah but was once dense forest. The savannah-ization (the chronology of which is not yet established and the mechanisms of which appear to be highly complex) might be attributed to the slow and progressive action of compact human communities, to the sudden and brutal action of a small number of immigrants, or even to climatic influences. The second indication is the presence of numerous stone tools that testify to settled human occupation prior to the diffusion of iron-working which probably occurred in this area in the second half of the first millennium. But it remains impossible to identify these ancient inhabitants. They might have been Pygmy hunters, a few of whose descendants still survive on the banks of the Mbam; or proto-Bantu language-speakers who had not discovered metal-working; or a fluid mixture of several distinct peoples.

It is only from the sixteenth century that facts begin to crystallize. The population movements recorded in the traditions involved many different sorts of people: family or kinship groups; compact, thrusting bodies of people; and also isolated individuals. All the evidence suggests that the number of migrants was small for, while they dominated the peoples they found already settled (which indicates some technological superiority), everywhere they abandoned their own language and adopted that of the country where they settled. The same process may also have applied to political institutions. The traditions also reveal the countless reasons for

these movements, which included internal disputes, the search for iron ore and wood to work it, the quest for new land, perhaps precipitated by the introduction of maize or the development of the oil palm, the salt trade, and the pressure of invaders from the north. The northern factor, particularly the Fulbe raids, which is well known for the nineteenth century, was relevant much earlier, from the mid-eighteenth century or even before. The famous book, *History and Customs of the Bamum*, prepared at the request of and under the supervision of Njoya, king of the Bamum, refers to mounted invaders at a time which corresponds to the eighteenth century. In addition the vocabulary and syntax of the Mbum language, spoken in the central Cameroon highlands, include many borrowings from Fulfulde (Adamawa variant). It thus seems that the Fulbe drove the Mbum southwards and that they in turn forced the Voute to move southwards, and that this migration led to the migration of the Fang and Beti.

This constant jostling of populations, spread over several centuries, accompanied by mixing and borrowing in every direction, is a main factor in the striking cultural homogeneity of the peoples of Central Cameroon. The peoples there all speak Bantoid or Semi–Bantu languages. There are numerous similarities in political and social institutions. Human communities, for example, are organized into chiefships, or even kingdoms, in which the chief has sacred attributes and heads a body of titleholders with the help of a princess of high status (the queen-mother or queen-sister), and males belong to countless associations – secret societies and/or military groups – with ritual or police functions. Technologies were often comparable too, especially in the working of iron and copper. The smith was believed to have magical powers and is prominent in myths and historical traditions. This homogeneity, well established by about 1800, had been formed gradually during the previous centuries.

Three of these numerous peoples deserve special attention. The first are the Tikar who are important because many other peoples in the Cameroon highlands either claim to derive from them or have been strongly influenced by them. They are said to descend from a trader from Borno who settled and left offspring among the Mbum. Their various traditions put their origin in north-east Cameroon (Tibati, Banyo, Kimi, Ndobo). *Tikar* was initially the nickname of the first group of Mbum to leave their homeland for the highlands but in time it came to be applied to all Mbum emigrants and the peoples they had conquered. The major part of this great migration probably took place in the seventeenth century under pressure from the Fulbe, internal troubles and the quest for new lands. When they reached the Bamenda region, the Tikar met the Tumu whom they first allied with and then dominated. But the price of victory was their adoption of the language of the conquered and their institutions, particularly the political titles and secret societies. Several groups among the conquered chose to

migrate to the west and north-west where they founded several states, notably the Kingdom of Nsaw. Some of its features were later transmitted to the other kingdoms in the region, such as divine kingship, the cult of dead kings, the rigid socio-political hierarchy, the reservation of certain titles or functions for princes and princesses, the existence of a large palace nobility, and male secret societies in every village.

The foundation of the Bamum kingdom was the work of a group of emigrants related to the royal dynasty of the Tikar of Nsaw. The exact chronology of these events is difficult to establish: we may simply observe that in the History and Customs of the Bamum ten kings are listed between the founder, Nchare, and Kuotu, the ruler immediately before Mbuembue, whose reign is dated to the first half of the nineteenth century. According to some traditions Nchare was driven out of Rifum, while others say he emigrated freely with several companions to the present location of the Bamum. He was a conqueror who crushed some eighteen rulers, some of whose peoples fled while others were absorbed and he also founded the capital of the Bamum, Foumban, then called Mfomben (from fom (ruins) and Mben (the conquered former inhabitants). Nchare also endowed the kingdom with political institutions mostly taken from those of the Tikar. He set up a body of numerous title-holders, including the kom ngu (counsellors of the kingdom), with whom he divided up the available lands; he formed two secret societies one of which, ngiri, was for princes only, while the other, mitngu, was open to the rest of the population irrespective of social status (descendants of conquered peoples, great state retainers, counsellors of the kingdom, and so on). However, the Bamum gave up Tikar and adopted Mben, the language of the conquered. The nine kings who followed Nchare get short shrift from the codified traditions of the Bamum which say that each ‘lived long without doing anything, living on what the hands of Nchare had done’. These rulers were not conquerors, for territorial expansion only began at the beginning of the nineteenth century during the reign of Mbuembue. Apart from internal dissension the kingdom also faced the serious threat of Chamba and Fulbe invaders from the north, particularly during the eighteenth century. However, some significant developments can be detected during this period. The growth in large-scale royal polygamy led to a vast increase in the number of princely lineages (sixty-one by the end of the eighteenth century). The palace nobility also grew substantially (twenty-seven lineages of great retainers were formed) with the king recruiting most of his retainers from twins and the sons of princesses. Material and social developments remain little known. At the end of the eighteenth century the kingdom had perhaps ten to twelve thousand inhabitants, among whom there was a small number of slaves, reduced to this state as a result of offences or debts. The economy, heavily agricultural, was open to external trade and from a very early date

5. This history has been completely revised by Claude Tardits, 1980, pp. 83–126.
the Bamum were importing salt, iron, beads, cotton goods and copper objects.

As for the Bamileke, their ancient history is closely linked to that of the two previous groups. The word itself, whose origin and meaning are still the subject of debate, has been incorrectly applied to many groups (about a hundred chiefdoms) which did indeed share a common culture but did not describe themselves as Bamileke. All came from the north, from the region today occupied by the Tikar. Their migration southwards probably began in the seventeenth century, and was related to the Tikar population movements and Fulbe pressures. It took place over a long period, in successive waves led by distinct elements of the population. These migrants occupied present Bamum country where they founded several villages before being driven out of most by the Bamum: those who remained were assimilated. Among the various Bamileke groups, the Baleng were the first to cross the River Nun, almost certainly at the beginning of the eighteenth century, soon to be followed by the Bandeng, Bapi and Bafoussam. The settlement of these groups in their present location continued into the nineteenth century. The various chiefdoms had features common to the political societies of the Cameroon highlands (the existence of a chief, the importance of councils, and the role of associations, for example). One of their distinctive traits was the high mobility of people which appears to date from early times and be linked to their fairly high population growth and the inheritance system that transferred an estate to a single heir, thus obliging the other sons to secure land from the chief or settle elsewhere.

The areas around the Uele and the Ubangi rivers

A close look at the hypotheses and conclusions currently available suggests that knowledge of the areas around the Uele and the Ubangi rivers, at least before the nineteenth century, has hardly advanced since the works of the first anthropologists, in particular those of Hutereau, Calonne-Beaufaict and Lagae. Contemporary researchers constantly use the same expressions (probabilities, conjectural knowledge, provisional conclusions) which reveal the tentative state of existing knowledge as well as the extreme complexity (confusion, patchwork of races, puzzle) of the phenomena being studied. The most vexed question is undeniably that of the settlement of these lands. Despite minor divergences, relating to the most suitable qualifiers to describe the human groups involved, all research agrees in recognizing three types of populations: neolithic, Bantu and Sudanic. The main difficulties appear in detailing the vagaries and modalities of settlement and the content and successive forms of the relations between these various peoples.

Traditionally, more as a matter of convenience than of choice, two sub-

7. A. de Calonne-Beaufaict, 1921; Hutereau, 1922; Lagae, 1926.
regions were distinguished, the Ubangi and the Uele. The Ubangi area, today inhabited mostly by Sudanic peoples—Banda, Ngbaka and Ngbandi, speaking languages belonging to the eastern Adamawa family—was probably occupied until the seventeenth century by Bantu, themselves supposed to have taken possession of the region from little-known populations whose neolithic implements have survived. These Bantu are scarcely better known, since most became acculturated to the Sudanic peoples. The Sudanic peoples probably began to move into the region from Darfur and Kordofan in the seventeenth or early eighteenth century. Those who were to form the Ngbandi group probably arrived first, then the Banda and the Ngbaka. The succession of human groups in the Uele area, today dominated by Zande, Zande-ized peoples and Mangbetu, seems to have been different. Until the sixteenth or early seventeenth century, the Uele, Mbonu and Aruwimi basins were probably occupied by neolithic populations, the present-day survivors of whom are said to be the Momvu, the Logo and the Makere. These short-statured peoples used implements of wood, bone and especially polished stone (axes, grind-stones and sling-stones). Two population groups, traditionally portrayed as invaders, grafted themselves onto this underlying population. These original migrations took place from 1500–1800. The first movement of the Sudanic peoples, from whom came the Mangbetu, Ngbandi and Zande peoples, took them in a north–south direction as far as the Ubangi and the Mbonu rivers and west–east from there. The seventeenth century also saw the arrival of the Bantu following the rivers northwards. It was during this period—the seventeenth to early eighteenth centuries—that the ethno-political groups were formed.

Other researchers have proposed a synthesis covering all Ubangi and Uele areas (see Fig. 18.1). Their argument rests on linguistic and ethno-linguistic data and distinguishes three broad stages of settlement. First, in the first millennium before the Christian era, there was a large-scale west-east movement bringing the proto-Ubangians to the River Nile, with the Gbaya-Manga settling in the west, the Band in the centre, the Ngbaka-Sere-Ngbandi in the triangle formed by the river Bahr al-Ghazal and the White Nile, and the Zande-Nzakara in the south between the Uele river and the Nile. The populations were still settled there in about 1000 when a Nilotic drive from the north occurred. The first effect of this was to break up the Ngbaka-Sere-Ngbandi group and drive southwards the Ngbandi in the region between the Rivers Ubangi and Zaire. Here they met the Pygmies and the Bantu. This Nilotic drive also drove the Zande-Nzakara populations westward into the lands watered by the Uele and Mbonu rivers. The third stage, which began in the eighteenth century, corresponds to the drive by the Bantu from the south and fleeing the effects of the slave trade.

PLATE 18.1  Head in volcanic tuff, Uele, of unknown date
FIG 18.1 Population migrations in the Uele–Ubangi regions
Source: adapted from L. Bouquiaux and L. Hyman (eds), L'expansion bantoue, 1980, Paris, SELAF, pp. 81 and 82
This synthesis is attractive, although it calls for two basic reservations. First, it seems difficult to speak of migrations as this word means movements by large numbers of people. In the best-known cases, those of the Zande and the Mangbetu, the processes at work had more to do with politics than with demography since the invaders were élites, remarkably well-organized technologically and politically, and content to regroup the local populations into chiefdoms and kingdoms. However, it would be false to suggest that the states and ethnic groups, whose history in the nineteenth century is known, had always existed. But all the traditions, particularly the genealogies of the major clans, show that it was only during the seventeenth century that ‘conglomerations of peoples’ (E. de Dampierre) came into being as a result of the various waves of migration: the Nzakara, speaking a Zande-related language, the Ngbandi-speaking Baza and the Zande-speaking Mbomu. At the same time, a few clans began to stand out: the Vou-Kpata among the Nzakara, the Bandia among the Bangbandi (sing. Mongbandi), the Bakunde and the Vungara among the Mbomu. Later developments, probably dating to the eighteenth century, enabled two clans, the Vungara and the Bandia, to assert their dominance at the expense of the others. The Vungara, initially settled on the River Shinko, one of the tributaries of the River Mbomu, obtained recognition as the sole chiefs of the Mbomu by eliminating the Bakunde. They then embarked on a long migration eastward and southward which was to last until the late 1800s and during which they were to conquer, reduce, assimilate or make allies of the most diverse populations. It was above all their skill in politically organizing these populations that cemented Zande society which then appeared, more so than today, ‘an extraordinary puzzle of uprooted clans and lineages’ (E. de Dampierre) linked by their common allegiance to the ruling Vungara aristocracy. As for the Bandia, their starting-point was the upper Ubangi above the confluence of the Mbomu and the Uele rivers. The high point of their expansion came during the eighteenth century thanks to Ngubenge who carried through the conquest of Nzakara country and helped to drive the Vungara eastward.  

Little is known of the material civilization of these peoples; the quite considerable information available for the nineteenth century can only be projected back to earlier centuries with the greatest caution. It seems likely, however, that the conquering aristocracies had long and effectively engaged in hunting. Among the Zande, hunting remained a highly valued activity: they learned their farming skills from the conquered populations and, whatever interest Zande princes may have had in agriculture, work in the fields remained the preserve of women, clients and slaves. Iron-working was held in high esteem and among some groups, such as the Ngbandi, smiths were grouped in strictly closed professional associations. The major

11. In addition to the authors cited above, see also P. Denis, 1961, pp. 7–20.
river network formed by the Ubangi, the Uele, the Mbomu, the Aruwimi and their numerous tributaries was the basis for a busy trade. Regular markets were held every five to seven days with craft products (iron knives and spears), foodstuffs and animals (fish, goats and dogs) together with slaves, being the main items traded. This trade grew rapidly as the trade carried on by Europeans on the Atlantic coast penetrated inland.

The coastal societies and the Atlantic trade

The period from 1500 to 1800 also saw the establishment and large-scale development of the coastal trade, soon to be reduced to the slave trade. The coastal fringe, which experienced all sorts of upheavals precipitated by this new trade, was only the last link of a long trading chain into the interior. By 1800 this chain reached the upper Mungo, the grasslands of Cameroon and the upper Ogoze and, through the River Congo (Zaire), the River Ubangi.

Peoples

The state in 1500 of the populations and societies in the coastal zone remains obscure and continues to fuel controversies among specialists. Just south of the original home of the Bantu-speaking peoples and half way between the two centres of Guinean Coast and Kongo where state systems flourished, this region probably underwent a complex evolution in its settlement and its political, social and cultural organization, whose major stages remain obscure. The traditions concerning origins and migrations tell little: the precise migration routes of the Duala populations and their kin can only be traced from the Sanga valley; and for the Mpongwe of Gabon, the Mitsogo and the Okande, the only identified starting-point is the upper Ivindo. The writings of European navigators and traders add little more. Written by men whose main concerns were the usefulness and profitability of the countries they were visiting, these texts name places, describe resources and indicate modes of settlement but say nothing of the identity of the human groups. But they do show that the whole region was occupied, even if they do not tell by whom. Thus, according to *Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis*, written by Pacheco Pereira in about 1505, ‘all the sea coast, from (the) Serra de Fernam do Poo to Cabo de Lopo Goncalves, is densely populated. . . . This country is very near the Equator, which the Ancients declared to be uninhabitable, but experience has shown that it is not so’.12

The *Report of the Kingdom of Congo and the surrounding countries*, published in Rome in 1591, confirms this ancient settlement: ‘The island of St. Thomas trades with the people of the mainland, who frequent the mouths of the rivers’.13

13. F. de Pigafetta, 1591.
Who were these people? For the coast itself, two additional types of source are available. Travellers' reports and, particularly, O. Dapper's *Description de l'Afrique* ..., which contains a list of the numbers used by the peoples on the coast, make it possible to assert that in about 1660 they were definitely Bantu-speaking. These same written sources make it possible to date the reigns of several rulers named in oral traditions. Thus the height of the reign of Mulobe, the third historical king of the Duala, can be put at about 1650. This precise dating makes it possible to date to the sixteenth century the exploits of his grandfather Mbedi, and to beyond the sixteenth century those of the legendary Mbongo, to whom the Duala and related peoples refer.

While it is thus possible to accept a Bantu peopling of the coast by the beginning of the sixteenth century, one is still reduced to conjecture for the neighbouring regions of the interior. Thus, for the Minlaaba region and Beti country, six levels of populations have been established with no chronological data, the oldest of which was the Pygmies, followed by hunter-gatherers, such as the Ola, then various Bantu groups such as the Maka, Muumbo, Beti and Basa, whose migrations continued into the nineteenth century. Further south, in modern Gabon, the picture is clearer. At the end of the fifteenth century, the Portuguese found Mpongwe populations in the estuary region. These had reached the coast at an unknown date and had found Pygmies there. Around the Mpongwe, the Akele and Seke were possibly already living. The lands along the lower Ogowe (Cape López and Fernán-Vaz) did not yet have any Bantu populations, whose establishment in the region occurred after the development of trade with the Europeans. The peoples there were probably predominantly Negrillo. The only organized state was in the Gabon estuary. According to the later description by Dapper in the seventeenth century, the king bore the title of *Mani Pongo*: the word *mani*, of Kongo origin, may indicate the direct or indirect influence of the political model of the kingdom of Kongo, unless European traders, familiar with Kongo, used it to refer to this monarchy simply as a matter of convenience. In the far south, the Kingdom of Loango was well established by about 1500, since all the voyagers' accounts of the early sixteenth century refer to the Mani Loango and Mbanza Loango by name. The only uncertainties, which are difficult to resolve, concern its foundation and extent. Some traditions make Loango a state derived from the Kingdom of Kongo — whose founder is said to have been related to the first king of Loango — but according to other traditions, the foundation of the Kingdom of Loango resulted from processes internal to Vili society. It is possible that Loango may have main-

14. O. Dapper, 1668.
tained close, perhaps vassalage, relations with Kongo until the late fifteenth century. Loango made its influence felt intermittently as far as Cape Sainte-Catherine and, perhaps, Cape López. As in many states in Central Africa, the king’s main functions were ritual ones. The institution of royalty, founded by a family of smiths, was linked to the fire cult. During the coronation ceremony, each Maloango lit the ntufia (sacred fire) which was to burn until his death and torches lit from this fire were ceremoniously transported to the provincial capitals and thence to the lineage homes. Another important ritual concerned rain, for which the king was responsible. Each year, at the beginning of the rainy season, a great festival was held in the capital. The people, after thanking the king for his protection, would implore him to make rain and at the end of the festivities, the king,
standing on this throne, would shoot an arrow into the sky and, reports a witness, ‘there is great rejoicing on that day, because sometimes they would have rain’. The most striking feature of this society was certainly its complex economy. A dynamic food-crop agriculture blended with diversified craft production which included the making of palmcloth for clothing and use as currency; the working of ivory, copper and redwood; and salt-making. These products were sold on the local markets, notably the one in Buali, the capital, and also reached markets outside the kingdom. A trading network, based on the alliance between the Vili chiefs of Loango and those of the neighbouring peoples, made it possible to reach the Gabon estuary, Kunyi country and Malebo Pool, dominated by the Teke. The Atlantic trade thus did not create trade in this region: it merely gave a new intensity and a new dimension to an already well-established trading system.

The Atlantic trade

The local history of the Atlantic trade in this part of Africa is still little known. The account books of European traders, many of which have not survived, are often fragmentary. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries many descriptions of Central Africa give as original and certain information which was second- or even third-hand. But some facts have been established.

At first Portugal had a monopoly of the trade and the navigators Fernão do Po and Lope Gonçalves reached respectively the island of Formosa and the Gabon in 1472 and 1473. Trade only began to increase after 1500 when the Portuguese settled on the island of São Tomé which needed slaves for its own sugar-cane plantations while also serving as an entrepôt for cargoes destined for the Americas. The islands of Princípe and Annobón, uninhabited when the Portuguese settled there, were also peopled by slaves drawn from the neighbouring coasts. The trade seems to have been small-scale. At the end of the sixteenth century, slave revolts, the most important of which took place on São Tomé in 1574 and 1586, ruined Portuguese trade in the region. The Dutch arrived after 1598 and developed the new trading centres of Douala, at the mouth of the Wouri in the Gabon estuary, and Cape López, and also eliminated the Portuguese from Loango. A new stage was reached in about 1660 when the slave trade underwent a massive expansion which continued until about 1850. France and Great Britain became the main trading powers in the region, but the activity of the Portuguese, Dutch and Danes succeeded in maintaining a competitive situation, which caused regular increases in the price of slaves and the number of points of sale on the coast.

The exact size of this trade which varied from point to point along the coast, is hard to quantify. The position of these lands, at the bottom of the

Gulf of Guinea, constituted some hindrance to the development of the trade there. The slaving vessels often followed the 'small route', which obliged them to stop at the various slaving stations along the Atlantic coast, from Senegambia to Calabar, before reaching Cameroon, the Gabon and Loango which were thus visited at the end of the journey when the boats had already placed much of their cargo. The other route, the 'great route', allowed boats to avoid these intermediate stops and, taking the best advantage of winds and sea currents, to arrive directly south of Cape López and begin trading at Loango or in the neighbouring ports. Slaving captains also preferred slaves from Loango and farther south, 'the flower of the slave trade, soft and quiet, used to servitude ... always satisfied with their lot', unlike those from the Gabon or Cameroon who reputedly had a low tolerance for the physical effects and constraints of slavery. 19

There were thus the following variations. On the Cameroon coast trade entered its busiest phase in about 1750 20 with the Wouri estuary and, more precisely, Douala, its main centres. It was mostly Dutch ships that came there, although between 1732 and 1759, of the 153 trading expeditions organized by the Middelburgsche Commercie Company to Africa, only 10 percent were destined for the Cameroon. 21 The number of Dutch ships belonging to other companies and the number of English ships remain unknown, however, and there is every indication that many came to the region. Douala was supplied from the north and north-east; there is no evidence of any trading relations at this period with the south. To the north, the River Mungo gave access to the grasslands where, from about 1750, the Chamba wars supplied numerous slaves, and to the north-east, the River Wouri led to Nun-Mbam country. As yet any estimate of the numbers involved in this trade would be risky.

This uncertainty has led some historians to play down the export of slaves in favour of other products, particularly ivory, of which the Dutch took large quantities in the eighteenth century. On the River Gabon, the main trading centre was the estuary region: Cape López only began to take an active part in the Atlantic trade in the reign of Reombi-Mpolo (c. 1790–1810). Here again, despite the sparsity of figures, the slave trade was quite extensive, to judge from the seriousness of the conflict between the Portuguese and the Dutch over possession of the Gabon at the beginning of the eighteenth century and from the number of ships sent to this region by the French port of Honfleur. In addition to slaves, there were large quantities of ivory, wax and sandalwood supplied by the Kele and Fang hunters and gatherers of the neighbouring region. The slaves came from the middle Ogowe which also supplied Cape López. The Loango trade is the best known. Its trade in slaves lasted a short time compared to that of the Slave Coast or Angola. It began on a large scale about 1670 but by

1780 was almost over. Until the mid-1600s Loango supplied mainly ivory, dyewoods and palm-cloth. The latter was widely sought after in Central Africa as a currency and two or three Portuguese ships from Luanda would come each year to take on board 6–7000 pieces of cloth which the Portuguese used to pay their soldiers. The number of slaves exported by the Loango coast (Loango, Malemba, Cabinda) – a hundred a year in about 1639 – rose to 12 500 a year in the period 1762–78 and to 13–14,000 annually between 1780 and 1790.22 Slaving captains’ account books have left valuable indications of the ethnic origins of slaves bought by Europeans at Loango. The Vili of Loango are hardly mentioned among those destined for external markets. Three groups predominated: the Mayombe, the immediate neighbours of the Vili; the Monteques (Teke from Malebo Pool); and the Quibangues (Bubangi and ‘river people’ from the Congo and Ubangi rivers). This last name shows that, at its peak, the Atlantic trade had reached the heart of the continent. About 1780, Loango lost its importance to Apomande on Cape López and Malemba and Cabinda, the respective ports of two small states, Kakongo and Ngoyo, formerly vassals of the Maloango.

Complex dynamics

Over such a small region, an analysis of the effects of this system of intense and prolonged trade must be conducted with rigour and care. One long-established trend in research stresses the destructive effects of the Atlantic trade.23 The demographic losses resulting from the exports of slaves but also from the wars to capture them and the diseases imported from Europe and the Americas, take on a crucial importance in this perspective. Walter Rodney, using the example of Loango, highlighted the technological stagnation brought about by the massive imports of European and American goods and the ruin of local metal-working and textile industries.24 Another more recent trend in research tends to play down the measurable losses suffered by African societies. Thus, for Philip Curtin, the effects of the ‘three transatlantic migrations’ (the export of slaves from Africa to the Americas and, in the opposite direction, the spread of previously unknown diseases and new food plants) may perhaps have balanced each other out.25 The debate remains open. We shall limit ourselves here to stressing, in relation to these exchanges, the dynamisms of all sorts, the long-term changes affecting social organization, political structures, peopling and mentalities.

One of the most important changes was the introduction of food crops from the Americas: maize, cassava, groundnuts, beans and tobacco.26 From

Fang mask worn by a member of the Ngil society, an association of men organized on the basis of specific initiations, whose members maintain order in the community and protect it from evil spells. Height: 70 cm
about 1600, it took two and a half centuries for these crops to replace, and sometimes eliminate, the old plants, bananas, sorghum, millet and yams. The diffusion of these crops did not take place only in the coastal region: they moved rapidly inland, sometimes along trade routes, sometimes independently of them. Cassava had the most success. Mentioned on the coast of Loango in 1608, it was already being cultivated in Teke country at the end of the seventeenth century. This success was due to several factors. Its yield was distinctly higher than that of yams. It also offered great protection against the vagaries of the climate and social disorders since its root could remain in the soil unspoiled for up to two years. It was a plant with many uses: its leaves could be eaten, while the root lent itself to several techniques of processing and conserving, one of which gave a well-known bread (chikwange among the Kongo) which would keep for up to six months. During the eighteenth century, cassava spread throughout the Congo basin following the course of the River Congo (Zaire) and its many tributaries. Doubtless more slowly and less spectacularly, maize, whose presence on the coast is recorded before 1600, replaced sorghum. The other crops were gradually incorporated into the various systems of crop rotation. The scale and speed of these changes were such that it has been described by J. Vansina as a veritable 'agricultural revolution'. They testify to a great capacity for technological innovation among the peasant communities of Central Africa. But it remains difficult to interpret their effects. Did they, as has often been stressed, contribute through a more secure and more diversified food supply, to a greater physical resistance among the populations and a higher rate of population growth? Nothing could be less certain. The nutritional value of cassava is limited and, at least in the nineteenth century, serious signs of malnutrition were reported among the peoples who used it most, the Tio and the Mbosi. More generally, the extensive clearing of land required by these crops may perhaps have facilitated the spread of mosquitoes, malaria and yellow fever. Socially, this agricultural revolution contributed, along with the trade itself, to the establishment of a new division of labour. Numerous agricultural tasks, such as land clearing, cultivation and preparation of crops were gradually abandoned by men— who preferred to devote themselves to trade, which was more lucrative—and entrusted to women and slaves. The development of domestic slavery and other forms of dependence was a direct consequence of these agricultural changes.

In the regions nearest the coast, in direct touch with overseas trade, the transformations were highly complex. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the peopling stabilized and a process of redistribution began which was to be completed in the nineteenth century. These population movements were particularly complex in Cameroon and Gabon. The seventeenth century saw the occupation of the Gabon estuary by new Mpongwe clans; and the eighteenth century saw the arrival of the Orungu
at Cape López and the Nkomi at Fernán-Vaz. The slow spread of the Fang began in the eighteenth century from somewhere on the right bank of the Sanga near the sea. As regards political structures, the coastal trade had contradictory effects. In only one case, among the Orungu of Cape López, did it lead to the formation of a strong, centralized state, whose royal clan – Abolia or Alombe – held the exclusive monopoly over trade with the Europeans. The formation or strengthening of this state occurred quite late, when the slave trade was at its height, in the reign of Reombi-Mpolo (c.1790–1810). Elsewhere on the coast the opposite mechanism was at work – a breakdown of centres of authority and a splintering of political power. In this case, organization of trade, on the African side, was not a state monopoly: competition benefited a few individuals, princes, commoners and even some ex-slaves who formed a new aristocracy jealous of its privileges and keen to secure political power. In Douala, rivalry crystallized between the Bela family (‘King Bell’) and the Ngando family (‘King Akwa’) and ended in a final break in the nineteenth century. On the River Gabon, the right bank was controlled by the two branches of the Aguekaza clan and the left bank by the Assiga and Agoulamba clans. At Loango it was the new men – brokers, traders, caravan leaders and other middlemen – who came out best as they had the means to purchase land from the king and build up an entourage of many free or servile dependents. At the end of the eighteenth century there is mention of commoners with 700 dependants who were making war or cultivating land on their own account. The Maloango was reduced to selling high state offices to these nouveaux riches. It is quite certain that in Douala, on the River Gabon or at Loango the condition of the ordinary people was deteriorating. Significantly, the old vocabulary of these societies is rich in terms describing countless forms of dependence and different degrees of servitude. Collective mentalities also underwent major modifications although, in this area still neglected by research, one must not jump to conclusions. Thus the eighteenth century saw the appearance or the development of new magical practices and new conceptions of sickness centred on the individual instead of on the family group, with the main aim being to ensure protection against attacks from all sides. This development is no doubt related to a greater degree of insecurity, as the case of Loango shows very clearly. In the traditional kingdom anybody could appeal to royal justice; he had merely to go to the capital along special roads, Nzila zi Nzambi (God’s paths) or Nzila Ivanga Nzambi (God-created paths), which ensured him total immunity. In the eighteenth century, however, numerous traditions testify to examples of flagrant violation of this immunity.

From the Cameroon grasslands to the Upper Nile

PLATE 18.4 Ngunie-style mask from Gabon. Worn by a dancer on stilts, it represents the spirit of a pretty young woman who has returned to earth to take part in funeral celebrations as a member of the community of the living even after her death. Height: 26 cm
Describing the River Congo (Zaire) as a ‘starting-line’, the geographer Gilles Sautter has strikingly emphasized the role of the majestic Central African river:

The Congo is not only, by virtue of its channels and its widely scattered islands, a world unto itself that juxtaposes the (neighbouring) areas. It also represents for these latter a factor of co-ordination and regional integration. Its influence is at once direct, as a regulating waterway, and indirect, as a great navigable highway open to human initiatives.31

Until colonization the river acted as a powerful factor bringing together the various peoples of the vast Congo basin. This role did not only involve the river itself, along its navigable portion above Malebo Pool: it also involved its many tributaries, particularly the Alima, the Likwala, the Sanga, and the Ubangi on the right bank and the Kwa, the Ruka, the Ikelemba and the Lulonga on the left bank. Since early times, a remarkable trading network had been organized, ever-growing in size and complexity and moulding most of the riverine human societies along the river and its tributaries.

An ancient exchange economy

There is much evidence of this antiquity. Given that traditions rarely go back more than fifteen generations, it obviously remains difficult to reconstruct the chronological stages and the precise lines of the settlement of this region. It is, however, possible – with the help of linguistics, archaeology and traditions – to distinguish two main movements. The first and oldest is a large-scale movement that brought these Bantu-speaking peoples into this region from their original home. This movement seems to have been in a north-west to south-east direction. Most of these peoples belong, in Guthrie’s classification, to Zone C. Today, some languages still show very strong similarities to certain Nigero–Cameroonian languages: as, for example, does Bobangi to Tunen and Jawara.32 This fact suggests a direct migration from the Nigero–Cameroonian homeland towards their present location following the waterways, particularly the Sanga, which form the most convenient routes in this marshy and heavily forested area. At the end of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth, Portuguese writings mention several peoples, notably the Bolia, the Boma

and the Tio, in their present locations. Besides this first movement, there were also smaller-scale movements which probably occurred later and were in an east–west direction and which gradually led to the stabilization and separating-out of some groups. Thus, in the ‘land of the rivers’, drained by the Likwala-Massaka and its tributaries, all the peoples place their origin to the east, on the other side of the river.

These latter movements no doubt helped to create the conditions for or to broaden the bases for an exchange economy by distributing the population over complementary ecological zones including waterfronts, floodlands, and even dry lands. Agricultural activities and fishing went on simultaneously during the dry season, which was also the period of low water in the rivers and their tributaries. People thus had to make a choice, the river people opting for fishing, whose harvest was traditionally highly valued and which they could easily trade for foodstuffs or goods produced by local industries.

Archaeology fortunately bears out these assertions. In the first place it is striking that all the known layers of Zairean-Congolese archaeology are to be found around Malebo Pool, thus bearing witness to a highly unusual degree of continuity in both the density of settlement and the variety of human activities. Two sites are particularly revealing on the subject of trade. In the first, at Kingabwa near Kinshasa, on the right bank of Malebo Pool, several types of pottery have been uncovered, one of which, with very fine decoration, has been found at other minor sites in the Kinshasa region and along the river, as far as Lake Mai-Ndombe. This pottery, dated 1450 to 1650, is the best evidence of very old commercial relations along the Congo (Zaire) and its tributaries. At the other site, at Mafamba, near the confluence of the Kwa and the Congo, many clay pipes of various styles have been discovered. Most have not been used, which suggests that Mafamba was a production centre or an entrepôt redistributing the pipes in the region.

Pottery and pipes were not the only goods traded. Two products seem to have dominated the long-distance trade: camwood, for cosmetic purposes, and copper mined from the deposits on the lower Congo. The low trade value and the high transport costs limited to local trade, within a certain radius, products whose raw materials were easy to find and whose technology was relatively simple, such as salt, cloth, mats and baskets. This trade was already flourishing before the fifteenth century and was to be given a great boost by the development of trade on the Atlantic coast.

Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century

The grafting of the Atlantic trade and its consequences

This took place in several stages. In the first, from the late fifteenth century to about 1560, the Kingdom of Kongo played the leading role. Documents of Portuguese origin dating from 1529 indicate that the Malebo-Pool region was one of the main suppliers of slaves, through the routes linking it to Mbanza Kongo (San Salvador) and Mpinda. In the mid-sixteenth century, the Anzikos (Tio, Pool Teke) made up large contingents of the slave population of Peru, Colombia and Brazil. At this time these slaves were traded along with quantities of ivory, palm-cloth and redwood: in the opposite direction, the Pool began to receive nzimbu (shells used as currency in the Kingdom of Kongo), beads and European cloth and alcohol. The second stage, 1560–1750, witnessed a decline in Kongo's trade, although it did not lead to a consequential decline in the externally-oriented trade of the Pool and its offshoots. The reason was that while Kongo was suffering from the growing competition of Angola and internal problems caused particularly by the Jaga, these same Jaga established themselves in the areas between the Pool and the coast, controlling the Kingdom of Bungu, the Kongo province of Nsundi and the copper mines at Mindouli. Consequently, the decline of the routes linking the Pool to the coast through Kongo was largely compensated for by the new dynamism of the Pool–Loango axis. During the third stage, from 1750 to about 1850, the basin of the Congo and its tributaries became the principal supplier of slaves for the Americas with a dense network of caravan routes linking it to a long chain of ports on both sides of its mouth, Loango, Cabinda, Boma, Ambrizette, Ambriz and Luanda.

Throughout these three stages, Malebo Pool – the point where loads were divided up between the land paths and tracks round the unnavigable Congo rapids and the waterways higher up – was also the meeting-point between long-distance Congolese trade and the Atlantic trade. The latter's galvanizing effect on the regional economy was based on mechanisms that are easy to understand. The export trade involved high-value goods and this made long-distance transport on the Congo and its tributaries profitable. Trade in locally used goods, therefore, even if transported over long distances, also became profitable, and this in turn stimulated regional specialization. Large-scale trade was thus not a simple superimposition, but involved the complex articulation of one trade system oriented towards the outside world and another towards the satisfaction of regional needs. Each, however, was based on specific products, rules and structures.

The geographical area encompassed by these various levels of trade grew continuously from about 1500. By about 1690, Malebo Pool was in permanent trading relations with the lower Kasai and the lands around the River Alima. A century later, the River Ubangi was fully integrated into this commercial space as were all the rivers in between, together with their

From the Cameroon grasslands to the Upper Nile

PLATE 18.5  *Kuba statuette in wrought iron, c. 1515. Height: 18.7 cm*
tributaries, the Alima, Likwala and Sanga on the right bank and the Lulonga, Ruka, Mfimi, Lake Mai-NDombe, Kasai and Kwango on the left bank. The only uncertainty relates to the depth of commercial penetration along these various waterways. Only in the nineteenth century does the trade frontier appear to reach the confluence of the Ubangi and the Uele rivers.

Numerous markets existed along these waterways, particularly at the confluences, and archaeology should be able to provide a complete count of them. The largest were naturally at the biggest junction, Malebo Pool,
where there were four markets by the eighteenth century and perhaps earlier: Ntamo and Kinshasa on the left bank and Mpila and Mfwa on the right bank. Nineteenth-century observers estimated that each of these four markets had 3000 to 5000 permanent inhabitants to whom must be added people passing through, who were especially numerous during the trading season. This was during the dry season, from April or May to September, with business heavily concentrated in August. During the rainy season, business slowed but merchandise destined for the overseas market continued to be exported and the small markets above the Pool remained open.

In the absence of statistics, it is difficult to estimate the exact volume of trade but a few indications are available. In the nineteenth century, the typical canoe – whose dimensions seem not to have changed since the middle of the previous century – was fifteen metres long by eighty to ninety centimetres wide, and could carry one-and-a-half to three tonnes of merchandise. The average capacity of a paddler was about sixty-five to ninety kilograms transported over about eighty kilometres a day downstream or fifty kilometres upstream. In the nineteenth century, when the slave trade had disappeared, it was estimated that at least a tonne of merchandise passed through the Pool daily, and up to forty tonnes during the height of the trading season.37

The trading system directed towards the outside world rested essentially on two items – slaves and ivory. Slaves, trade in whom really boomed after 1750, came mainly from four regions: the Lulonga basin; the lands around the River Alima; Boma country between the confluence of the Congo and the Kwa and Lake Mai-Ndombe; and the Ubangi basin. The slave trade in the Lulonga valley, for example, shows the extreme complexity of this trade. Around the main market, Basankusu, there were numerous villages where the slaves cultivated the fields until they could be sold. Some of the slaves sold followed the course of the river to be exported; others went up the River Ubangi to be sold to the Loi in exchange for ivory destined for the markets at the Pool and on the Atlantic coast.38 The slaves, therefore – the main export item – also had their local uses. This had come about through the changes in agriculture already discussed, but also through trade requirements and the changes in social and political structures. Thus the riverine peoples along the Kwa would buy from the Boma the slaves who were used to carry their goods to the Pool and vice versa.

Among the Tio, domestic slavery was so developed that the word *mboma* (man of the Boma ethnic group) came to mean a stupid person or anyone in a lowly occupation. With the development of the slave trade, the number of mechanisms of enslavement grew. Among the Bobangi, the main trading people in the Congo basin, a distinction was made between a *montonge* (captured slave) and a *montamba* (slave sold by his kin) which indicates how far social values had been overturned by the slave trade. Throughout

The region this trade was seen as luxurious because it benefited only a tiny minority of lineage and village heads and Bobangi middlemen, and shameful because during trade negotiations not the word ‘slave’ but the euphemism ‘dog’ was used.

The second export item, ivory, appears in sixteenth-century Portuguese texts as one of the most profitable lines. Ivory had long been used locally for bracelets and hair-pins but compared to copper, also used for jewellery and decoration, its trade value in the region seems to have remained low.

There were numerous herds of elephants in the forest zone, especially in the Sanga basin and in the valleys of the Lulonga and its two tributaries, the Lopori and the Maringa. The Pygmies almost monopolized elephant-hunting but the network of rights over slaughtered animals was so complex that the hunters themselves made little profit. Among the Likuba the chiefs had to be given both tusks, leaving the hunter with only the meat; among the Tio and Mbosi the chiefs claimed the ground tusk; in addition, among the Tio, the remainder of the ivory was divided into three parts, one each for the hunter, land chief and political chief. Until the late 1700s ivory took the same routes and went through the same hands as the slaves who, by value, provided the bulk of the trade. The relationship between the two items of trade was only reversed after 1830. The range of goods received in exchange from the coast, at first limited to salt, nzimbu (shells) from Luanda, cloth and beads, was widened in the mid-1600s by the introduction of metal objects, particularly knives, and mirrors. The eighteenth century saw a dramatic increase in muskets and gunpowder, copper and tin products, and alcoholic beverages.

How these items circulated in the Congo basin is poorly understood. It seems that the very organization of trade – the variation in the value of goods from place to place and according to different tastes – prevented an equal distribution. Until about 1750 there was a segmented trade with each ethnic group controlling a portion of the river or its tributaries. This system facilitated the monopolization of certain highly valued goods, such as mirrors and porcelain. The speed of circulation of these goods has also been the subject of speculation since Stanley estimated, in about 1880, that it took an average of five years for a European article to move from the coast to the Ubangi.

The trade in locally used goods covered the same area, perhaps slightly larger, as that in export goods. Thus the lands around the upper Ogoze produced iron objects that reached the river region through Kukuya and Tio middlemen. Individuals or groups often engaged in both trades at once. Among the Kasai and its tributaries, from the eighteenth century onwards, the Nunu and the Ntomba were producing pottery, salt and sugar-cane alcohol for the Congo river market, and also ivory and gum destined for the coast. Similarly, the Bobangi, the principal middlemen in the region, also produced various goods mainly handicrafts for the local markets.
This local trade involved two main sorts of goods. Foodstuffs had the advantage of an enormous market because, from the eighteenth century, the high and ever-rising level of external demand led many villages to specialize in trade. This was the case particularly round the Pool, in the Alima, Likwala-Massaka and Sanga valleys and in the trading centres in the forest zone that no longer managed to feed themselves. Cassava, cultivated and processed by women, was one of the most sought-after items. The oil-palm provided various useful commodities: oil for domestic use, profits from the sale of which were divided among the owner of the tree, the man who had climbed it to cut the stem and the woman who had extracted the oil from it; and palm wine, produced exclusively by men. Salt was another vitally important item, whether rock salt from Mbosi country or vegetable salt produced mostly by riverine peoples along the waterways. These peoples supplied many species of fish according to well-developed techniques. Finally, there were tobacco and local alcohols.

Handicrafts also contributed to trade. This was the work of specialists: amongst agriculturalists, the women farmed leaving handicrafts a male preserve; among fishing communities, however, catching fish was the men’s job, which left women free to make handicrafts. The most sought-after products were: mats, a speciality of the land people not the river people; red camwood powder, produced by women; palm-cloth, for which the Tio were famous; iron implements; pottery, made in most villages but using different techniques and decorations, which stimulated trade; and finally, canoes of all sizes, the larger ones for trade measuring up to twenty metres long or more, while the small three-metre ones were used for short-distance journeys between fishing villages.

There were thus considerable differences between the two types of trade. The export trade was based on an economy of destruction – the extraction of men and hunting – and was little concerned with the replacement of the riches on which it depended: it profited only a tiny minority. The trade in local goods was based on an economy of production, which grew uninterruptedly over the centuries and which contributed either to the maintenance or to the improvement of village technologies: its beneficiaries were the ordinary people, men and women, each according to how much he or she produced.

Diverse societies

This internal trade, which lasted for a very long time, promoted the progressive unification of the various peoples of the Congo basin, despite the obstacles that encouraged variety. Among these was the way trade was organized. It was a segmented trade and remained so until the mid-nineteenth century. The river and its tributaries were divided into spheres

of influence each of which was controlled by one ethnic group — for example, the Sakata and the Nunu on the Rivers Kwa and Mfimi, the

Likuba on the River Alima, and the Loi on the lower Ubangi. It was only during the eighteenth century that the Bobangi began to control all the Congo–Ubangi axis. Mistrust had long ruled relations among the various partners and pillaging was not uncommon. To protect themselves from it, trading expeditions were large involving ten big canoes or more each with between thirty and sixty paddlers. Conflicts of interest often led to full-scale wars such as that between the two groups most involved in the trade, the Bobangi and the Tio, who only reached a lasting agreement in the early 1800s. Among the many factors making for unification, most important were the trading techniques themselves. Thus, from the eighteenth century, the whole region began to adopt the same currencies for transactions — palm-cloth, nzimbu, cowries and copper rods — which seem to have been in competition locally with currencies of more limited usage. In the same way, the widespread practice of credit created long chains of solidarity throughout the trading area. The profitable conduct of trade also led to strategies of extended alliances through marriage and, above all, blood brotherhoods that created numerous obligations between partners (pro-
tection and lodging, financial help in case of debt, military assistance, moral and financial help at bereavements). The river trade thus brought different peoples into contact, spread the same customs and beliefs and facilitated the rise of hegemony of Bobangi, an excellent trade language. This shared civilization, the formation of which speeded up in the eighteenth century, reached its apogee between 1850 and 1880.

This growing unity went hand in hand with a degree of diversity, linked partly to the variety of ways in which peoples became involved in and adapted themselves to large-scale Congolese trade.

For not all engaged in trade. Where water was plentiful, fishing, one of the oldest activities of the Bantu peoples of the Congo basin, remained the basic activity of many groups. Fishing societies were characterized first by their high geographical mobility, which was determined by variations in the water level and the regular movements of fishing banks. Depending on the season, men would live in fixed villages or in fishing camps built during low water and abandoned as the level of the river rose. Socially and politically there was a distinct lack of congruence between political and economic units. The basic political unit was still the village: the chief’s authority, essentially ritual and religious, operated solely within this limited framework. Many aspects of village life, however, escaped his control, particularly the endless comings and goings of fishermen between village and fishing camps and the activities of short-lived fishing teams. The basic economic unit was a loosely structured fishing team based on the initiative of a renowned fisherman and including some of his kin and other volunteers. In this way, the family cells on which the villages were based were dislocated to meet the requirements of fishing. While this system encouraged some individualism, it also guaranteed that each family received foodstuffs regularly as one fishing kinsman or another would always have fish to send home.40

Many societies in the Congo basin which were integrated into the exchange economy also profited from the new economic situation to develop their productive activities. This economic particularism no doubt partly explains the survival of the original political structures of the numerous Mongo groups whose history remains little understood.41

Those who specialized in trading activities evolved differently as shown by the contrasting evolution of the Bobangi and the Tio. The details of the Bobangi’s long migration from the middle or lower Ubangi to Malebo Pool are hard to reconstruct. According to the earliest colonial administrators, writing in about 1885, the Bobangi had been settled on the River Congo for only three or four generations, that is, since the beginning of the nineteenth century. But other European sources mention numerous Quibangue slaves on the coast in the eighteenth century and Fra Luca da Caltanisetta’s Diaire Congolais 1690–1701 notes the arrival of unidentified

immigrants at the Pool during the seventeenth century. What is certain is that what was originally a society of fishermen rapidly switched to trade, which became the sole foundation of all social life. Henceforth, there was complete convergence between the political and the economic unit. Bobangi society was based on trading firms belonging to wealthy traders. These were not built on kinship ties as each trader preferred to acquire dependants — women and slaves — over whom his authority would be greater than over kin, and exclusive. It was an open society, with much social mobility: anyone active and successful in trade could acquire wealth which was the means to increase dependants, to power and to lay claim to political titles, the highest of which, mokondzi (chief), strengthened its holder’s position at the head of his firm, facilitated the making of alliances throughout the region and brought him into the councils responsible for settling the various problems arising from trade.

The Tio had the unique good fortune of living at the biggest crossroads and main break-of-bulk point in the Congolese trading network. Trade had not apparently upset the political structures of the kingdom. Despite a feeling of common origin and cultural identity, it was widely decentralized. The underlying structure consisted of relatively autonomous chiefdoms. The chief had major ritual prerogatives but limited political powers; he could not forbid the settlement of newcomers on his territory or oppose the final departure of his discontented subjects in the event of serious dissent. The same situation occurred at the next level. The ôkoo (deformed by the Europeans into makoko but meaning king) had above all a spiritual role. Temporal power belonged to a few high notables such as the ngaailiino, responsible for collecting tribute and heading the administration, and the muidzu, the country’s chief justice. Unlike the chiefship, the dignity of ôkoo was not hereditary: the king was elected from among the leading chiefs in the kingdom by his peers, meeting in a college of eleven electors chaired by the ngaailiino. This old structure retained its essential features until the advent of colonization. It was at the social level that the most lasting changes occurred. There was first an increasing dissociation between the riverine peoples, who monopolized trading activities, and the Tio in the interior, who specialized in agricultural production (cassava and tobacco) for the river market. This intensive agricultural work required ever more manpower and led to the increasing accumulation of women and slaves. Among the riverine peoples, those who profited most from trade were the chiefs, especially those at the Pool who exploited to the maximum their exclusive right to sell men and ivory. Conversely, the chiefs and title-holders established away from the Pool, such as the king who resided at Mbe more than one hundred kilometres to the north, participated only fitfully in trade by sending their dependants there. They held political power but their economic power was less than that of the riverine peoples.

These Bobangi and Tio trading economies did not become capitalist.

Large profits were made but these could not be invested in the productive sector. It was impossible to buy land or a labour force, except in the form of slaves. Money, accepted in some dealings, was not a universal equivalent which could purchase all goods. It was accumulated in various forms and lent out, but generally without interest. Some goods and some social and religious services, such as fines and dowry payments, never came within the money economy.

The picture thus drawn of the peoples and societies of Central Africa clearly demonstrates their diversity as well as their aptitude for innovation, even in constraining situations. It also shows, through the gaps in knowledge, the directions in which researchers should urgently move, both in large-scale research with large means, directed principally towards collecting new materials through archaeology and oral traditions, and in detailed theoretical modelling in the study of social structures, cultural evolution and the history of mentalities.
The Kongo kingdom and its neighbours

J. VANSINA

based on a contribution by
T. OBENGA

The western part of Central Africa, to the south of the equatorial forests, is inhabited by peoples who speak dialects of the Kongo language and of other closely related languages. This unity is strengthened by a profound cultural unity. This ethnolinguistic group occupies a territory stretching from southern Gabon to the Benguela plateau and from the Atlantic Ocean to well beyond the River Kwango. To the north-east this complex has always bordered upon a Teke area centred on the Bateke plateaux and, to the south, on the Ovimbundu area of the Benguela plateau.

The history of this region is well documented from 1500 onwards. The number of contemporary pages written on the period 1500–1800 is estimated at over half a million: more than for any other area of comparable size on the continent.

Over the past hundred years, texts and guidebooks have been published in many editions, and a historiographical school has been developing since the seventeenth century. Naturally this chapter can be no more than an introduction in which even recent bibliography must be kept selective.

The movement of history in these areas in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was very different from that of later times. Territories of great size were organized by man, using political structures, to form states. After about 1665, however, these territories were reorganized on an even greater scale, the states becoming far less important. The organizing principle now derived from the imperatives of an economic structure which was the product of an extensive slave trade. In our approach to the early centuries, therefore, we shall give priority to the history of the kingdoms; and then,

when the dynamics of trade have brought the kingdoms low, trade shall be the focus of attention.

The potential of these regions is determined by the relief and the rainfall. Where the dry season is short, the fertile ground is in the valleys. The dry season however varies in duration from two to six months depending on the latitude and the distance from the coast, which is drier. The generally mountainous nature of the terrain explains why a population in search of better habitats was unevenly distributed, with inhabited areas the size of small districts or provincial centres alternating with deserts. The region best favoured by this diversity of habitats lay to the north of the Zaire/Congo river, from the coast to the area called Mayombe. Here, too, there were worthwhile mineral deposits (copper, lead and iron ore). This was where the two largest states of the coast, the Kingdoms of Kongo and Loango, came into being.

Since — 400 at least farmers speaking western Bantu languages had been settled to the north and south of the lower Zaire, where they produced yams, vegetables and palm kernels. From the second to the fifth century, this population was augmented by the arrival from the east of people speaking eastern Bantu languages. These people grew grain and, where the tsetse fly allowed – especially in Angola – kept herds of cattle. Before they arrived, by + 100 or earlier, iron-working had reached the region. Lastly, perhaps during the sixth century, banana-growing was introduced to round out the production pattern.4

Thereafter the socio-political organizations became more complex, and chiefdoms formed between the ocean and the Zaire river upstream from Pool. It was in the well-endowed area north of the lower river, in the region called Mayombe, that the regional division of labour developed furthest. By about 1500 the coastal dwellers were supplying salt and fish and had transformed the coastal plain of Loango, towards the estuary of the Zaire, into a vast palm-grove producing palm-oil. The estuary-dwellers were potters. Inland, copper and lead were produced from Mboko Songho to Mindouli, and iron in the Manyanga (Nsundi) area. Further north, near the edges of the great forest, raffia palm was cultivated and large quantities of fabric produced. Lastly, in the same area and further into the forest, forest products such as red dyewood were exchanged for products of the savannah. This was the birthplace of the Kongo civilization. The Teke civilization developed on the plateaux, but on the basis of contributions from groups living on the forest fringe and in the neighbourhood of the Kongo groups, and of contributions – at least of political ideas – from the Middle Zaire/Congo. The Teke kingdom, mentioned in literature from 1507 onwards, was perhaps the oldest of all: at least during the seventeenth century it was reputed to be so.5

The Kongo kingdom began in the Vungu chiefdom north of the Zaire

5. O. Dapper, 1668, p. 219 (German translation, 1676).
FIG. 19.1 Topography and natural resources of Kongo (after J. Vansina)
The Kongo kingdom and its neighbours

PLATE 19.1 Yombe pottery. Height: 37.5 cm

river. At the time, chiefdoms and even small kingdoms and clusters of chiefdoms, covered the lands of the lower river to both north and south. Nimi Lukeni, the founder of the Kingdom of Kongo, founded the town of Mbanza Kongo where San Salvador now stands. His kingdom was constituted partly by alliance with the local chief, the Kabunga, and with a king further east who ruled the Mbata in the Inkisi valley, and partly by the conquest of other lands towards the sea and the lower Inkisi valley. The date of the kingdom's creation is unknown. Some writers emphasize the length of a process whose beginning, reasoning by analogy, they place in the ninth century. Others limit themselves to dating the founding of this kingdom, placing it around 1400 at the latest, and at least a century before that at the earliest.

Scholars generally agree, despite the absence of any evidence in firm

7. For the reasoning, see M. M. Dufeil, 1980, 1981.
support, that the Tio kingdom was probably founded earlier. The Kingdom of Loango, which developed not far from Vungu to the north of the river, is thought by some scholars to have reached its zenith in the sixteenth century, whereas others, arguing from the fact that it did not attract the attention of metropolitan Portugal before 1576, contend that it was not by then highly developed or very old. To the south of Kongo, the State of Ndongo, whose king bore the title ngola — a title deformed to Angola — was taking shape about 1500. In contrast with Kongo and Loango, which were coalitions of large provinces, Ndongo represented a merger of many small chiefdoms and thus marked the culmination of a trend towards a form of state organization far less deep-rooted than that in Kongo or Loango. Moreover around 1520 it was still partly dependent on Kongo, as were the Dembo chiefdoms which separated it from Kongo proper.

A hegemony: Kongo

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries a single state, Kongo, held sway over the entire region between the Benguela plateau and the Bateke plateaux and from the sea to beyond the River Kwango. Around 1500 the borders of the state proper followed the bank of the River Zaire from its mouth upstream to above the confluence with the Inkisi, in places — at Manyanga for example — extending northward beyond the river. It included the Inkisi basin and all the lands to the south as far as the Loje. It was expanding southwards and perhaps towards the River Kwango. It influenced, and sometimes levied tribute on, all political entities except the Tio kingdom. The kingdom proper had a large population, although we have only very rough estimates to guide us. Most authors accept the figure of two million, although one speaks of four or even eight million, whereas another scouts the idea of more than half a million. The areas in Kongo's sphere of influence at least equalled the kingdom in population. The population of the Tio kingdom must have been very sparse except around Pool.

In view of the crucial role played by Kongo in the historical evolution of the region, we here propose a table of organization for it. Its structural base was divided between a large town, the capital Mbanza Kongo, and the countryside. Three well-defined social strata co-existed: the nobility, the villagers and the slaves, who differed in legal status, occupation and life-style. The language expressed this difference by a terminology which opposed the concepts of 'civilization' and 'politeness', associated with urban life, to that of 'rusticity', associated with the countryside. The same word meant both 'slave' and 'war captive', thus indicating the source of slaves.

10. J. K. Thornton, 1983b, pp. 17, 21–2; J. Van Wing and C. Penders, 1928: kifuka (urbanity); kifuka kia ntinu (court of the king); uvata (rusticity); vata (to cultivate); evata (village). This dictionary, which dates from 1650–2, was probably compiled by Robaredo, a canon and cousin of the king. It remains one of the main sources for the studying of mentalities.
The nobility formed the structural framework of the kingdom, and the town its hub. The nobles lived in town except when required to serve as provincial governors. The upper nobility was composed of relatives of the king or one of his predecessors. It was made up of bilateral houses interconnected by marriage and by the fact that individuals belonged to more than one house simultaneously. In relation to the villages, the nobility formed a bloc. Matrilineality determined access to the land, residence and
PLATE 19.2 San Salvador, the capital of Kongo, on the site of Mbanza Kongo
succession to the headship of the village. Social cohesion was much weaker between villages than in the noble bloc. Here the king appointed his close relatives to key posts in, for example, provincial government, high public office and/or the central tax system. Royalty was elective; the royal council was made up of twelve members including four women who, according to A. Hilton, represented the clans of the king’s grandparents. This institution notwithstanding, struggles for succession were commonplace. After a struggle between the lords of the north and those of the capital and south, Nzinga Mbemba, otherwise known as Afonso I, succeeded his father Nzinga Nkuwu in 1506.

The kings, much given to polygamy, had many children, and their houses quickly reached huge proportions. After a reign of twenty-five years Afonso had 300 grandsons and great-grandsons, and no doubt as many nephews and great-nephews. The king’s principal wife had to be a daughter or sister of the governor of Mbata, a province where government was hereditary in the female line of the Nsaku Lau. The reigning prince of Mbata, in his turn, married a close relative of the king. A branch of his kin, the Nsaku Vunda, provided the kingdom’s supreme religious dignitary, the Mani (lord) Kabunga of Mbanza Kongo, who was in charge of the cult of the territorial spirit of the capital area. The two Nsaku lords enthroned the king. There is a clear trace here of how the kingdom came to be constituted.

Kongo, governed by a network of the king’s relatives, was nonetheless highly centralized. The king appointed the territorial governors except the governor of Mbata and, after 1491, the governor of Soyo where the port of the Kingdom of Mpinda was situated. He dismissed governors and other officials as he saw fit. The nobility had no hereditary functions and lived forgotten at Mbanza Kongo. At every generation its hierarchy was redefined in relation to the new kings. Another factor favouring centralization was the existence of a currency issued under the king’s control. It consisted of shells of Olivancilaria nana, called nzimbu, which came from the fishing-grounds of the Island of Luanda, part of the kingdom. There was also military centralization. In the late sixteenth century the royal guard, composed of slaves, was 16,000 to 20,000 strong and was the sole standing armed force of the kingdom. In time of war abroad, the peasants were called up in territorial units. Every noble house, centred around a great

11. A. Hilton, 1985, gives a number of indications; proof is given by J. Van Wing and C. Penders, 1982: unguri (relationship); unguri ankama (seigniory) – a title still in use among the southern Suku about 1900 – and nguri (mother). The prefix un- denotes an abstraction, and the expression translated ‘seigniory’ signifies that a territory was perceived as relationship on a large scale, unguri meaning ‘the mother principle’.


14. ibid., p. 181.

15. F. de Pigafetta, 1591, p. 120; A. Hilton, 1985, p. 196 (1595).
man, also had its people (dependants and slaves), and the royal house had in addition slaves sent by all the nobility.

The ideology of royalty, called nkisi, derived from religious conceptions in general, in which three important cults played a role. These were ancestor worship, for which the holy place was the royal cemetery grove; the worship of territory spirits, the spirit of Mbanza Kongo being served by the Mani Kabunga (the name given to the clergy assigned to the spirits, from the village level to that of the kingdom); and the worship of royal charms. The nkisi concept was fundamental, and the Christians were to adopt the term, using it to mean 'that which is sacred'. The church was 'the house of the nkisi', the Bible 'the book of the nkisi', the priest the
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nganga of the nkisi,16 nganga being the recognized term for a religious expert, especially in nkisi. Diseases and misfortunes were attributed to ndaki (sorcerers) whom nganga ngombo (diviners) were able to identify, sometimes by ordeal. The use of oracles, including the oracle of poison in the administration of justice, stemmed from this notion; so did the perpetual suspicion that the king was a sorcerer. Royalty was sacred. The king was addressed as Nzambi mpungu (Supreme Creator) and court etiquette and ceremonies expressed this sacredness, which was confirmed by the ceremony of investiture. By his tumba (blessing) the king expressed his protection of the royal officials and, in general, guaranteed fertility, principally through his control over the rainfall.17 The king himself was, in a real and profound sense, the nkisi of the country.

Structures in the neighbouring kingdoms were different but the ideology was almost identical. These kingdoms were less centralized. In Loango the noble houses had not supplanted matrilineal groupings, and this class was much less cohesive than in Kongo.18 Ndongo had no territorial structure above the petty chieftaincy level, and the military system was intended to make good the deficiency.19

Afonso I’s victory ushered in the longest reign in Kongo’s history, from 1506 to 1543. The role played by this king was crucial. He opened up the country to Portugal, thus setting in train a vast economic and political reorganization and a deliberate assimilation of features of Christianity that was to prove permanent. On becoming king, this factional chief – a Christian since 1491 and protector of the rare missionaries before 1506 – rapidly made the Catholic Church the state religion under the direction, from 1518 to 1536, of his son Henrique, who was consecrated bishop in Rome. The bishopric was later to fall under the control of Portugal. The slave trade developed from 1514 onwards. The king first tried to control it, just as the sovereign of Portugal had tried to do, by establishing royal monopolies, and then, in 1526, to abolish it. This attempt failed, and even the royal monopolies were constantly breached by the Afro-Portuguese of São Tomé, by the kingdom’s neighbours – both on the Loango coast and in Ndongo – and even in Luanda, which was an integral part of the kingdom. The king used his revenue from the slave trade, the ivory trade and the trade in raffia fabric to attract Portuguese technicians and, above all, missionaries. Before he died, social and political life had been transformed. The gulf between the nobility and the ordinary people had

16. F. Bontinck and D. Ndembe Nsasi, 1978: nzo amuquissi (269), nganga (269), muquissi mucanda ua ucua (268), unganga (271), uquissi ('holiness') (271); J. Van Wing and C. Penders, 1928: mukisi (evil-spell, witchcraft, crime of poisoning), but ukisi (holiness, divinity, divine will) and kia nkisi (holy, sacred).

17. O. Dapper, 1668, p. 583. For tumba, see personal communication from Mr. Obenga.

18. In general, see P. M. Martin, 1972, and O. Dapper, 1668, who give very long descriptions of Loango.

19. Its structure is described by B. Heintze, 1970 and 1977 (for the Kisama).
widen: the former had become literate, espoused Christianity and took part in the slave trade, while the ordinary people were harshly exploited.20 The royal house had been strengthened by the importation of slaves from Pool and beyond for the royal guard, and by the proliferation of Afonso’s descendants, to the point where the succession was affected. All the subsequent kings were descendants of Afonso through one or other of his three principal daughters. The ever-increasing number of claimants led to a scission of the royal house into enemy factions and, after 1665, to a civil war which destroyed the kingdom as it had been to that date. The presence of Portuguese in the town introduced a new political dimension. Connected by marriage to various noble houses, they were split up into Afro-Portuguese and people from the mother country, who led the opposing parties at court until 1665 and took part in all the struggles for succession.

Intercontinental trade, which had been very slight before 1506, developed after it started dealing in slaves. From 1515 until 1526, when it was placed on a regular footing, slavery was a disorderly business. From 20. L. Jadin and M. Dicorato, 1974, p. 179: ‘Be careful also lest the great ones of your kingdom subject the common people to ill-treatment’ (late 1529).
then onwards only foreigners – mainly from Pool and possibly from the Kwango valley – and criminals became slaves. The mulatto community in the capital was sending pombeiros (agents from pombo, the Kikongo name for Pool people) to Pool even before 1529. The previous origins of these slaves are still unknown. Many were Bateke, but some certainly came from other areas, whence they were shipped along the rivers to Pool. Exports totalled some 4000 to 5000 slaves yearly until about 1540, and 6000 to 7000 thereafter.\(^{21}\) Imports from Pool must have been larger, for many slaves were recruited at Mbanza Kongo for service in the royal guard or for work in the food plantations which fed the capital, and other slaves were assigned to the port of Mpinda or to the retinue of provincial nobles. In addition to this supervised trade, a clandestine slave trade carried on by the inhabitants of São Tomé developed on the northern and southern borders of the kingdom, especially after 1526 when exports from the Kingdom of Benin came to an end. This trade remained on a small scale except in Luanda, where Ndongo's wars of expansion yielded many slaves.

Portugal took a keen interest in the mineral products of the country and wanted to control them. Throughout the sixteenth century the Portuguese believed that Kongo possessed hidden gold-mines, which they wanted to take over and work. The king of Kongo, however, was determined to keep the mining of Bembe copper and the working of Mbanza Kongo iron under tight control. Successive kings never allowed mineral prospecting and even restrained the exports of copper which, before 1506, had kindled the covetousness of the Portuguese. The Portuguese sovereign permitted no sale of ships to Kongo and opposed its attempts to lay on its own transport to São Tomé or Europe. The Portuguese kept control of trade and made it an unequal exchange. The Kongo court used the resulting revenues to pay Portuguese technicians and missionaries, and also to bear its share of the expenses of Kongoese nobles studying in Portugal. From the outset, however, a substantial part of the revenue was also absorbed by imports of fabrics, wine and luxury items which the king redistributed to his nobility. Such imports quickly became an ostentatious necessity for the nobility, and by the end of Afonso I's reign they absorbed the entire revenue.

Under Afonso I's successors the trends continued, despite the attempts made by Diogo I to limit the effects of the European incursion. Kongo's relative power diminished, especially in relation to Ndongo, which was gaining strength mainly through the clandestine traffic with São Tomé. In 1561 Kongo cut itself off from Portugal almost completely, but the successive deaths of two kings during a war with the Tio of Pool in 1566 and 1567 led to a disarray which, with the invasion of warriors called Jaga from the east, turned to catastrophe.

Three states: 1575–1640

The Jaga routed the royal forces, and the court had to take refuge on an island in the lower Zaire. Numerous refugees were sold as slaves by the Jaga to the people of São Tomé. The king had to appeal to Portugal, which sent expeditionary forces that reconquered the country between 1571 and 1573, although the troops were not withdrawn before 1575 or 1576. The hegemony of Kongo over the region was destroyed for the colony of Angola was founded in 1575 and the Portuguese, in large numbers, came to Loango to trade from that year onwards.

The identity of those who invaded Kongo has never been established.\(^{22}\) The name Jaga (\textit{Yaka} in Kikongo) is used in the sources as a synonym for barbarian and applied to a whole range of more or less nomadic warrior groups. The first Jaga appeared to the east of Mbata, or to the south of Pool, and from there to the River Kwango. The invasion must be associated with the Kongo–Tio wars, and probably with the complete cessation of the slave trade in 1561. It is thought that the ranks of the invaders were swollen by a great many villagers who were weary of being exploited by the nobility. Their aim was no doubt to secure a bigger share of the wealth generated by the slave trade and, once victorious, they were to be found selling slaves on the coast. There is no evidence, direct or indirect, to support the suggestion that a drought and subsequent famine drove the Jaga to invade Kongo.

Paulo Dias de Novaes, after a stay at the court of Ndongo, worked to such purpose that he obtained a contract for conquest and colonization from the Portuguese court. The colony was to be named Angola, from the title of the king of Ndongo. Dias arrived in 1575, founded Luanda in 1576 and began trading in slaves, endeavouring to supplant a community of Afro-Portuguese from São Tomé who were plying the trade in Luanda. The community yielded the market to him and moved to the \textit{ngola}'s court. In 1579, however, pressure from the mother country forced Dias to perform his contract. When the king of Ndongo was told of this, he had all the Portuguese at his court massacred as a preventive measure, thus furnishing the pretext for a war which was to last for almost a century, until 1671. At first, the fortunes of war fluctuated, with local alliances divided between the adversaries. Nevertheless, the Portuguese did manage – with great difficulty – to erect a few fortifications inland. In 1612, however, the Portuguese entered into an alliance with some Mbangala (called Jaga). These were communities of nomadic warriors who had been in the region since before 1600 and who lived by pillage. With their aid, and especially that of the Jaga Kasanje, the Portuguese occupied a large part of the kingdom from 1617 to 1621; its king fled to the east of the country. The

\(^{22}\) The last article in a debate which brought together D. Birmingham, J. Vansina, J. C. Miller, J. K. Thornton, F. Bontinck and A. Hilton (1963–81!) was by A. Hilton, \textit{The Jaga Reconsidered}, suggesting that they were the ancestors of the Yaka of the Kwango.
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25. B. Heintze.
FIG. 19.3 Kingdoms and trade of the Kongo region in the seventeenth century, with inset map of Ndongo (after J. Vansina)
of the king of Kongo. The same year, the dominant noble house lost the election to a rival house; and the electors were so far weakened that in 1641 Garcia II, fortified by the support of his house, dispensed with their endorsement and took power.  

Loango had become a great power even before 1600. Its territory extended from the Fernán Vaz lagoon to the south of Pointe-Noire, and probably included the best part of the Ngunie valley and part of the Niari plain. Its cultural influence, spread by trade, extended even further afield. Traces of it can even be found to the north of the Gabon estuary. We know, however, almost nothing of its political development before 1700.  

Loango traded in ivory – produced by pygmies among others – and in hides, red dyewood and raffia fabrics, but exported relatively few slaves. This traffic was conducted with some Afro-Portuguese who carried on a very lucrative coasting trade between the coast of Benin, São Tomé, Loango and Luanda. Raffia fabrics from Loango became the currency in Angola, where they began competing with those from the east of the Kingdom of

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Kongo in 1600. Moreover, from 1600 onwards the Dutch frequented Loango and Soyo. Loango, not being Catholic like Mpinda, afforded them a better trading base, and the king co-operated with them from the start. Dutch ships had better goods to offer at lower prices. They bought copper and, above all, they had guns and gunpowder for sale. The upshot was that the traders on the Loango coast, the Vili, who organized the caravan traffic to the interior, extended their networks at an astonishing rate. By 1626 they were south of Dande, and by about 1650 they were trading at Mbanza Kongo and even in Matamba and Kasanje. Their principal route led to Pool via the mineral deposits of Nsundi, where the Vili mined iron ore and possibly copper. Along the coast they advanced far into Gabon, as far as the confluence of the Ngunie and the Ogowe.

At this period the Vili network was in competition with the existing networks not only for the sale of ivory or fabrics but also for the slave trade. The Kongo and Angola network was disrupted by the founding of Luanda which, from the start, exported more slaves than Mpinda; the first exports varied between 12,000 and 13,000 slaves a year, mainly prisoners of war. In 1625 the total number legally exported was 11,000. This figure decreased between 1618 and 1640 but never fell far below 10,000 a year. After the first few years, more and more slaves came from purchases made inland, either in Pool (without passing through Mbanza Kongo) or in the market of Ocanga on the River Kwango. From there a caravan route

PLATE 19.6  The port of Luanda in the seventeenth century

of war. In 1625 the total number legally exported was 11,000. This figure decreased between 1618 and 1640 but never fell far below 10,000 a year. After the first few years, more and more slaves came from purchases made inland, either in Pool (without passing through Mbanza Kongo) or in the market of Ocanga on the River Kwango. From there a caravan route

29. ibid., pp. 42-5.
30. B. Heintze; P. M. Martin, 1972, pp. 69-70.
31. B. Heintze.

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crossed the Kwango, advancing in the direction of the Kwilu. In the 1630s slaves from beyond the Kwango began arriving in Luanda from Matamba and Cassange, the capital of Kasanje.

These developments affected Kongo adversely, for its capital was no longer the mandatory repository for goods and slaves, although its slave trade continued, probably on a diminishing scale. Furthermore, its currency greatly depreciated, the Portuguese having imported other shells. By 1619, the nzimbu had lost two-thirds of its value – and the king two-thirds of his revenue. The king, however, managed to redress the situation and the currency gradually regained its former value. The revenues of the king and the nobility must have, in fact, suffered far more from the diversion of trade to Luanda and Loango.

This period saw the introduction first of maize cultivation (between 1548 and 1583) and, soon after 1600, that of manioc, tobacco and probably beans, groundnuts and other New World plants, apart from citrus fruits which were found on the coast before 1600. Pigs are mentioned from 1583 onwards, and these were probably imported livestock. They were to spread mainly in Kongo and central Angola.

The crops from the New World transformed agriculture in the seventeenth century, especially after 1650, increasing yields and providing, through manioc, a diet better suited to occasional drought and war conditions. Manioc came to be associated with all the trade routes, for it was also used to feed slaves. Nutritional standards generally improved as a result of this. As early as 1560, however, reference is made to smallpox, an epidemic introduced from Europe which was to become a recurrent scourge.

The first half of the seventeenth century thus witnessed changes in nutrition and health conditions – and the introduction of the slave trade. All this inevitably set up new population trends of which the details are unknown. In Angola in particular, however, the population must have declined.

32. With regard to Ocanga, L. Jadin and M. Dicorato, 1974, p. 175, note 9, believe that as early as 1529 the plural of pumbo referred to this market. Mentioned as a kingdom from 1584 onwards and then as the starting-point of a caravan route, Ocanga is mentioned regularly until about 1640. It is known that towards 1680 the market and the route to the Kwilu were abandoned by the traders. Kongo and various European influences probably followed this route as far as the Kuba country (J. Vansina, 1978, pp. 187–91). The well-known site of Mashita Mbanza was perhaps located on this route, not far from the Kwilu (Kodi Muzong, 1976, pp. 179–83).

36. Even J. K. Thornton, 1981b, whose model seems to us over-optimistic (p. 685, one-quarter rather than one-third women among the slaves, and omission of young children), concludes on p. 713 that there was a decline in the eighteenth century.
Towards a new order: 1641–1700

In 1641 the Dutch captured Luanda and occupied a vast part of the colony of Angola before a fleet fitted out in Brazil drove them out in 1648. From then on the Brazilians dominated Angola’s trade, totally until 1730 and partly thereafter. Also in 1641, Garcia II became king of Kongo and, like Nzinga, formed an alliance with the Dutch. The Restoration left them face-to-face with a great Portuguese army with which they had to come to terms. Kasanje, which had stayed out of the wars, signed a treaty of friendship and became an ally of Portugal for more than a century. Meanwhile, from 1645 onwards, large numbers of Italian Capuchin missionaries arrived in Kongo, and this helped Garcia II to come to terms with the Portuguese. The new missionary effort in Kongo and later in Angola was to bring in four hundred missionaries — almost all in the seventeenth century — and hasten the conversion to Christianity of many rural areas of Kongo even after the kingdom collapsed — for the disagreements over the treaty ultimately led the Angolans to invade Kongo. Antonio I of Kongo declared war, assembled all his nobles and was defeated in 1665 at the battle of Mbwila — indisputably the greatest battle of the century. António perished in the battle together with many nobles. But a second Portuguese army was so disastrously beaten at Soyo in 1670 that Angola gave up its

PLATE 19.8 Decorative tiled panel from the principal façade of the Church of Our Lady of Nazareth, Luanda, 1665

PLATE 19.9 Detail from the above, showing the head of King António I, who is buried in the church
attempts to conquer Kongo. In 1671 the last vestige of Ndongo was conquered and by about 1680 peace had been imposed on Matamba (Nzinga), Kasanje and the chiefs to the south of central Cuanza. The conquest was complete.

The Kingdom of Kongo did not recover from Mbwila. The disputed royal succession rapidly led to a civil war between noble houses, which worsened and resulted in Mbanza Kongo being destroyed in 1666 and totally abandoned in 1678. Since the town was the pivot of the political system, everything collapsed. When a single king at last returned to Mbanza Kongo in 1709, his kingdom was no longer a centralized entity but a collection of principalities often still rent by internal struggles between claimants. Everything had fallen apart except Soyo, and even Soyo had the greatest difficulty in remaining united and had to give up a few districts. The nobility, having deserted Mbanza Kongo between 1666 and 1678, had to adapt itself to life in the countryside and contended there for the posts of command. During and after this period a sizeable number of nobles crossed the river northward to found small principalities in Mayombe and between the rivers Zaire and Niari.

The upheaval was total and traumatic. It demolished the very foundations of society, calling its world outlook into question: so much so that prophetesses began to appear. In 1704 Dona Beatrice Kimpa Vita, a Joan of Arc, began preaching a refurbished Christianity called Antonianism. She rejected the missionaries and the whites, but above all she exhorted rival claimants to the throne to give up the struggle, restore a king and repopulate Mbanza Kongo. She had a large popular following (she herself belonged to the petty nobility) and persuaded a claimant to the throne to settle in Mbanza Kongo, where she crowned him with the black Antonian crown. But in 1706 she was captured by the pretender Pedro II and burnt as a heretic, despite which the movement survived for another few years. Pedro II restored the kingdom and repopulated Mbanza Kongo, but a forty-year tide of political evolution could not be turned back.

With the Kongo, the organization of a vast area disappeared. The structural framework of this area, like that of Angola, was henceforth to be economic, with a framework of trade routes articulated by places of trans-shipment. Angola, which had expanded towards 1680, was also weakened. Neither the governors nor the Cámara of Luanda could maintain their ascendancy over the quimbares and ovimbali (the Afro-Portuguese) who begin to be mentioned in the sources, or over the Brazilian traders. The control of the colony was slipping away from them. In Loango the state still appeared to be strong. But when the king died in 1701, a twenty-five-year-old ‘sister’ became regent, and her council governed. It took more than a year to elect a new king. In a kingdom which was so trade-oriented,

it was to be expected that the members of the regency council would also be the heads of trading firms and that royalty, for all its religious prestige, would begin to be redefined with regard to its authority over trade.

On the periphery of the slave-trading areas, states strengthened themselves through a growing trade which they controlled, or at least remained sound for such time as they controlled it. Kasanje had become a great power on the Kwango river because it controlled an increasing flow of slaves after 1648; by about 1680 part of this flow was coming from far-away Lunda. Building its kingdom from widely varied components from 1630 onwards, Kasanje displaced a part of the original population, the Pende, who had to emigrate beyond the Kwango.41 For fear of being raided, the Pende departed north-eastwards towards Mashita Mbanza, a population centre near the Kwilu, and then eastwards as far as central Kasai, where they established chiefdoms.42 In the north the Tio kingdom held its ground, apparently without great changes, but mention is made of other kingdoms in this area, some of which were probably founded in the seventeenth century.43

The Dutch conquest and the Restoration had substantial economic consequences. Currencies – fabrics and nzimbu – depreciated. A square of

42. ibid., pp. 170–267.
43. They include the Boma kingdom of ‘Giriboma’; cf. E. Sulzmann, 1983.
FIG. 19.4 Shipping routes to Central Africa, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (after J. Vansina)
raffia which was worth 12 reis in 1640 fell to 5 reis in 1649. Despite this fall, the government did not succeed in introducing a copper currency, and the fabric rose in value once more. In Soyo it stood at 10 reis in 1813. The nzimbu depreciated from 2000 reis a cofo (unit) in 1640 to 1600 in 1649. The civil wars accelerated its fall – to 800 reis in 1698 – after which the unit value stabilized at about 1000 reis. These changes were not due solely to political developments but began to reflect an economic transformation which was to be profound.

In Angola this transformation consisted in the reorganization of the slave trade by the Brazilians, who supplied capital, ships and European goods and who acted, through their factors in Luanda and Benguela, in concert with the organizers of caravans – the Afro-Portuguese slavers. Portuguese capital was invested in Brazil not directly in Angola and this remained true until about 1730. Since capital was lacking, the traders pressed for war as a source of captives for merchants. The big Lisbon companies calculated that their profit was made on goods and not on slaves, and tried, therefore, to possess as few slaves as possible. They imported goods for the captains and the Afro-Portuguese against bills of exchange which were converted into Brazilian sugar or local ivory. The principal market was Brazil.

The situation on the Loango coast was entirely different. With an insatiable demand for slaves making itself felt in the West Indian colonies, English and French ships began to appear in 1660–5 and entered into hard-driving competition with the Dutch, who were also beginning to buy slaves in large numbers. Here companies financed in Europe carried on the triangular trade. The slave trade, initially favoured by the troubles in Kongo, developed essentially through purchase rather than capture. The contribution made regularly by Vili caravans buying in markets as distant as Pool or Cassange was far greater than the supply of prisoners of war. These were the conditions that saw the start of the large-scale slave trade which was to reach its full development in the eighteenth century.

Social and cultural transformations: the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries

We shall deal here mainly with Kongo, about which we are best informed. The division into three social strata, those of the mtvisikongo (nobles), the babuta (sing. mubata) (rustics) and the babika (sing. mubika) (slaves), was to persist until sometime between 1666 and 1678, each stratum having different social structures. The general change was set in train first among the nobility and then in the countryside. The stratum of nobles and the terms used to designate it disappeared round about 1700.

44. J. Cuvelier, 1946, pp. 309–12.
The term *ekanda* (root: *kanda*), which is attested from this period onwards, today means ‘matriclan’ or ‘matrilineage’. At that time it meant ‘family’ — matrilineal, to be sure — but also ‘ethnic group, family, republic’: in short, any community. The people of a village made up an *ekanda* just as did a matrilineal group within that village, or the Christian community. The village was thought of as belonging to a group of people related through the female line and descended from the founder of the village, who was represented by the village leader, the *nkuluntu* (old one). In fact, since women followed their husbands and their sons did not always go to live in their uncle’s village, the village group — always small in the old Kongo — was bound together by a territorial tie, although the *nkuluntu*, in running his community, took account of the various sections of clans other than his own: in other words he took counsel. The village held the rights to the land, and the spirit that dwelt in that land was perpetuated by the village *kitomi*. Ideologically these rights belonged to the matrilineage of the founder, but in practice the village acted as a body. This can be seen in particular in the existence of associations such as *khimba*, *nzo longo* or *kimpasi*, all of which were initiation cults for boys or healing cults which differed from one area to the next. Marriage defined lineage and kinship in general. Marriages between crossed cousins were preferred, and no marriage portions were paid apart from a few gifts to the wife herself.

The great unknown is whether the local matrilineal sections were linked together from village to village to form big clans comprising noble and peasant sections. We do not believe they were. The villages were in reality sharply cut-off from one another despite the web of marriage connections.

In the course of time, the power of matrilineage and of the village diminished. The villagers were already being harshly exploited by 1525. They may have revolted with the Jaga in 1568, and rebellions took place during the reign of Garcia II. At that time the *kimpasi*, a cult whose aim was to banish *mpasi* (suffering, poverty, need, calamity or affliction) was very active coincidentally with acts of oppression or natural disasters. The villagers’ lot became more and more precarious as the nobles increasingly intervened, even at this level, to demand concubines and set the sons they bore them to keep the villages under surveillance. The status of rural women suffered most, and the distinction between wives and slaves (persons without lineage) grew more and more blurred as the wife became a person without local family connections to defend her. In the seventeenth century, even for men, matters reached a point where some took refuge as *fuku*

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46. Most authors tend to take the known social institutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and date them back to this period. There is no justification for this. Even A. Hilton is not entirely free from this shortcoming.

47. A. Hilton, 1985. The reconstruction ventured here is pieced together from a series of minor indications and arrived at by analogy with what is known of recent village organizations. It is simply a model that is not contradicted by the sources.
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(clients) in noble houses, while some villagers branded their children (not their nephews) to save them from being taken into slavery.48

The bilateral noble houses, taking the royal house as their model, grew in size and importance. They absorbed a great many slaves. Their heads had large harems of wives from other noble or rural families. They paid high bride-prices for their principal wives, thus securing for themselves the ownership of the future children; the bride-price went to the wife. In this way the noble ladies grew in economic and political importance. Such growth was also favoured by the persistence of a residual matrilineal ideology when divisions occurred in the houses of highest rank. As we have seen, the great schism in the house founded by Afonso I had to do with the issue of three of his daughters. The senior woman of a house by bilateral descent was its standard.

In practice the position of patrilineal descendants — sons — grew in importance. Movable property acquired by trade belonged to the sons who, after about 1550, no longer took their father’s name but a Portuguese surname symbolizing their house. The inheritances, however, were less substantial than might be thought. Everything acquired through the performance of public functions — tributes, fines or gifts — reverted to the king after the death or dismissal of the incumbent, and it is thought that the same custom prevailed at lower levels for functions in the gift of the great lords.

After 1666 the houses underwent two different series of changes. In Soyo the reigning house became increasingly patrilineal, continuing the tendency to neglect nephews in favour of sons, including even sons by female slaves. Eventually, in the nineteenth century, the whole of Soyo, rural and otherwise, adopted the patrilineal ideology. In Kongo, on the other hand, the nobles, having lost their town, had to make a new place for themselves in the countryside. The great houses melted away like the snow in summer, to be replaced around 1700 by the formation of large matrilineal groups, the mvila (clans). Government had been decentralized and ruralized.49

When the slaves — initially war captives — were once put to work in the fields of the capital or in the household, they did not remain a single stratum for long. A new distinction became vital: that between saleable slaves and domestic slaves who could no longer be sold. The latter were attached to noble houses, and some groups — such as the royal slaves (serving in the guard or elsewhere) and mission-station slaves — became independent locally powerful groups and so remained up to the nineteenth century. Since the saleable slaves were exported, these unfortunates never formed cohesive groups. In the seventeenth century social mobility was

48. A. Hilton, 1985, p. 203 (children). Fuku, from fuka (to cover, to shelter); mfuka (debt); mfuku (usefulness, benefit); kifuka (urbanity, politeness — i.e. the behaviour of a client).
49. The word mvila is not mentioned before the nineteenth century.
greater for domestic slaves than for villagers. They were members of a noble house – manumission was common practice – and the children of female slaves and noble fathers were equal or almost equal in rank to their father. In the villages, only the son of a minor noble’s concubine could hope to rise in the social scale. In time, Kongo’s three strata thus became compressed into two stable ones – the nobility who benefited from labour relationships, and their exploited subjects. Nevertheless, as Thornton has proved, the difference in life-style of these two stable strata should also be emphasized. The urban nobility, literate and wont to parade its Catholicism, housed, clothed, fed and amused itself in an entirely different way from rural folk.

In Angola the indigenous social structure – which comprised the same strata as in Kongo although the nobles were less united as a group – was headed by a Portuguese stratum. But here, and indeed all over Central Africa, the situation was complicated by the emergence of an Afro-Portuguese stratum: mulatto traders who, in culture and language, were as much Angolan or Kongolesse as they were Portuguese. This group first formed in São Tomé through miscegenation with Kongo nobles, then hived off to the Kongo capital and to Luanda. After 1575 a group formed in the Ndongo capital, but some remained in Luanda and from there emigrated in 1615 to Benguela and inland, near the chief towns of presidios. By about 1680 there were two large groups in existence, one around the fortress of Ambaka, the other founding Cacunda Velha in 1680. About this time the term quimbures or ovimbali made its appearance and was to be used to designate this stratum for the next two centuries. In the eighteenth century they were to spread most widely on the Benguela plateau. These groups were neither chiefs nor vassals but represented a floating population of caravaneers and traders who worked in concert with African chiefs and married into the local nobility.

The history of religions and ideologies is marked on the surface by conversion to Catholicism which, in Kongo, spread first among the urban nobility and in the chief towns of the provinces. The ecclesiastical structure remained chiefly Portuguese until 1645, when the Italian Capuchin missionaries began an intense campaign of conversion to Christianity which continued in Kongo until about 1700. A very large proportion of the population was baptized, and the Christian religion was implanted even in remote villages. In Angola the Catholicism imposed by the conquerors did not progress beyond the colony except in Matamba. This religion did not spread in Loango, despite the conversion of a king in 1663.

The evolution of religious ideas and practices in Kongo shows that the Christian doctrine influenced the old religion and coexisted with it. A. Hilton has documented the existence of belief in a group of celestial

50. With respect to the Kingdom of Kongo.
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spirits other than those associated with the sun and moon. These conceptions are completely foreign to the rest of Central Africa. On the other hand, the ways of thinking of the old religion reappear in Catholic texts, as witness the catechism of 1624. An older example is the notion of nkadi ampembə (demon). Nkadi is a dangerous ancestral spirit and mpembə (kaolin) reinforces the notion of ancestor. The Christian terminology stems from the domain of the nkisi, the ndoki and the nganga, the nkisi being 'that which is sacred' or 'grace'. The missionaries fought against the rites of the kitomi and of witchcraft, ancestors worship and healing associations (such as kimpasi or marinda), but tolerated the medicine practised by the nganga. The Capuchins used processions and the accompanying prayers to replace fertility rites, and could practise exorcism. The beliefs and practices of the old religion varied in matters of detail from region to region, and these local features, with the exception of those of Mbanza Kongo, were not reflected in Catholicism.

From the sixteenth century onwards there can be said to have been a single religion in which, at least among the nobles, features of Christianity and features of the old religion had merged. The main spread of this religion took place in the seventeenth century. This explains how Garcia II came to be the defender both of Catholicism and of the kitomi. He was even nicknamed 'the sorcerer'. This new religion was the source of Haitian voodoo.

Various religious movements have been recorded since the 1630s when a first attempt was made to establish an indigenous church. The first brotherhoods of Mbanza Kongo and the coming of the Capuchins led to a resurgence of kimpasi rites and of the influence wielded by the kitomi at court. Among the nobility, ancestor worship had been on the decline since Afonso I's time and was replaced by a ritual of burial in church which was associated with the brotherhoods. It is possible that worship of the saints, especially St Francis and St Anthony, took over part of the role formerly played by the worship of great ancestors. Lastly, the Reformation, introduced by the Dutch and opposed by the Kongo kings, nevertheless had a degree of influence which has not yet been documented.

In 1704 Dona Beatrice preached a far-reaching reform which cannot be explained solely in terms of the political situation. She called for thorough Africanization. As she claimed to be in direct contact with heaven she was regarded as a munaki (prophetess). The Holy Family was black and hailed from Mbanza Kongo, and the symbols she used were evocative local symbols associated with water, the soil and local vegetation and were similar to those used, in particular, in the healing cults led by women. Perhaps

the ideas of the Reformation also played a part. But Dona Beatrice recog­
nized the Pope, despite her desire to drive out the white missionaries who falsified revelation. In short, her views were even more syncretic than the religion practised in her time.57

It has been said that after 1700 Kongo lost its Catholicism. This is false. The simple fact is that the Christian missionaries of the late nineteenth century, steeped in the atmosphere of colonialism, failed to recognize the indigenous Catholicism which was henceforth inherent in Kongo religion. If we examine modern Kikongo vocabulary, however, we find the same religious terminology, and the continuity is striking.

The arts express culture. While nothing survives in Kongo of the performing arts, such as music, dance and oral art,58 visual art objects have survived together with many texts on the subject. These objects, created to symbolize class differences (vestiary art objects, for example),59 political concepts (emblems and ceremonial objects) and religious concepts (Christian art, objects used in divination, statues of ancestors and spirits and masks) were commissioned by the court, the Catholic Church, the leaders of villagers and of village cults and even heads of families.

Although the study of Kongo art in historical perspective is still in its infancy, what is striking is the continuity of stylistic elements, allied to a dynamism of form that assimilates the many European influences. Examples include geometrical decorations criss-crossing at acute angles on a royal emblem (an ivory horn) from before 1553; fabrics from about 1650 to 1800; and basketwork, tattoos and mats from the nineteenth and even the twentieth century. Again, a motif characteristic of nineteenth-century sculpture is already represented on the Kongo coat-of-arms of the early sixteenth century. European influence was strong and was reflected in the importation of European stone architecture (churches and palaces), symbols of authority (swords, crowns, flags and vestments) and, above all, religious objects (medals, agnus dei, statues, crucifixes and paintings – there was a Spanish painter working in Kongo before 1650). Almost all characteristics of Kongo art, especially statuary and the graphic arts, have been attributed to Christian influence. In both sculpture and graphic art, however, these assertions are baseless: the facts go to prove the opposite.

Thus the manifestations of ancient graphic art – rock drawings surviving from different periods – have hitherto been ignored. In the seventeenth century we find alongside stylized drawings a series of pictograms which are clearly derived from writing and clearly an expression of popular culture. Letters were used as symbols and transformed. This use of pictograms was to continue and merge with the production of geometrical

57. A. C. Gonçalves, 1980; L. Jadin, 1961; and J. Cuvelier, 1953, have published the known sources.
58. T. Obenga, 1981.
59. Narrative bas-reliefs and pictograms merge, for example, on ceremonial swords and on pottery lids from the country north of the river.
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plate 19.11  Ruins of the former bishop's palace. Mbanza Kongo (San Salvador), 1548, photographed in 1955

decoration. This is plainly an achievement inspired by the introduction of writing. Alongside these drawings, however, a more varied figurative tradition was still practised, as witness the narrative bas-reliefs and wall paintings of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Sculpture is represented first by many Christian objects, mainly crucifixes and walking-stick handles but also statues of saints; and it does exhibit elements of the European canon of proportions. But the stylization allied to Kongo realism was there from the beginning. In the course of time the European canon was gradually modified to one that is found in ordinary sculpture, the oldest known example of which dates from before 1694.

Artists used the most varied materials—copper, ivory, wood, stone, ceramics, fibres and fabrics—and worked on the most diverse objects, including even cooking utensils. The very first chronicles extol the merits of Kongo raffia fabrics, embroidered or worked in velvet. Even the clergy used them to make priestly robes to supplement those which they imported from Italy in particular and which gave the Kongo artists certain ideas. The sculpting of cult objects used in the old religion was forbidden and opposed and work was destroyed at various times, especially under Afonso I and Garcia II and by Kimpa Vita. However, the demand for these objects was constantly renewed—for the kimpasi, for example, during Garcia II’s time. Most of the Christian sculpture was produced before 1700 and many objects of this kind have survived. Other creative activities inspired by
Europe were the casting of dress-swords and the making of standards embroidered with coats-of-arms and symbols.

The influence of Kongo art extended north and east during the centuries under review. The spread of the so-called ‘white’ masks from Gabon derives from northern Kongo masks and probably accompanied the expansion of Loango, especially in the seventeenth century. The technique of making raffia velvet spread along the Okango route to the east and was the forerunner of the ‘velvets of Kasai’, and especially of Kuba. It also appears that some features of Kongo art were passed on to the Americas.  

The eighteenth century: the northern areas

In the eighteenth century the whole of West Central Africa was re-organized. The trading networks – not the states – became the dominant factor. As the states declined so did the old ruling classes, while a merchant class arose to replace or complement them. As we have seen, there were two slaving networks: one Portuguese, trafficking from Angola to Brazil and the other in the north, where the other European powers trafficked but where the overland trade remained firmly in African hands.

This trade in the northern areas, that of the Loango coast, was fuelled by companies which financed the entire triangular trade. The Dutch, for example, were represented by the Dutch West India Company whose capital came from all the states of the Netherlands, northern Germany and the Baltic countries. At every stage of this intercontinental trade there was fierce competition between the different nationalities and European firms and this was an even greater factor in driving up prices than the increased demand for slaves in the West Indies and North America. It caused the trade to expand and the trade routes to lengthen as slaves were exported to ever more distant countries. Demand increased steadily from about 1665 to 1755, when it grew even more sharply, attaining its peak between 1755 and about 1797 when the great European wars brought it to a temporary halt.  

The ports used were first Loango and then Malemba, Cabinda and Boma in the estuary. After 1750 Malemba replaced Loango as the main trading centre. Towards 1780 Cabinda became the busiest port, to be supplanted in its turn by Boma after 1800. The European traders rented warehouse buildings in the ports, where they exchanged their merchandise for slaves through the agency of brokers, the mercadores of 1700 who later took local titles such as Mafouk. Brokers were indispensable, for the monetary systems were not identical and it was necessary to agree on exchange values. To that end, a unit of goods – the parcel – was established,

62. R. F. D. Rinchon, 1964, for specific cases; N. Uring, 1928, pp. 26–8 (mercadores, p. 28); R. F. D. Rinchon, 1929.
PLATE 19.12  Ndongo mask from Loango
corresponding to a unit value of slaves, the standard slave being the adult male. The value and composition of the parcel were discussed first. Components were of three kinds: guns and gunpowder, fabrics and miscellaneous goods especially metal goods such as cutlery and copper basins. Once agreement had been reached on the parcel, negotiations began on the exchange of people, valued by reference to the standard slave, for actual goods, valued by reference to the standard parcel. By common consent, one type of merchandise could be replaced by another: for example, some of the fabrics could be replaced by beads or mirrors, or a fabric of a given quality by one of another. Europeans calculated in terms of the purchase price of the goods in European money; the broker calculated on the basis of the currencies in use on the coast and inland. Raffia money, which was still in use around 1700, was replaced by money made of a fabric imported during the eighteenth century, but this was not accepted everywhere inland for all types of merchandise. Beads, for example, were objects of adornment in Loango but a medium of exchange in Manyanga and a supplementary currency in Pool. In addition to the purchase prices, the European merchant had to pay trade duties and make gifts to the local king and the notable in charge of European trade. The broker, for his part, earned a large commission on the selling price of the slaves, the proceeds of which went to the slave-owner, through the leader of the caravan.

About one million slaves and small quantities of ivory, copper and wax were exported during the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{63} Imports consisted mainly of fabrics and weapons. It is estimated that 50 000 guns a year were imported during the second half of the century, with gunpowder to match, and the number of spans of fabric imported must have been even greater.\textsuperscript{64}

The caravans were led by guides who maintained institutionalized relations (as ‘mates’) with the leaders of trade centres along the routes: they were skilled in negotiating rights of passage and had an expert knowledge of the big inland markets such as that of Pool. The caravans were composed of these guides, numerous armed guards, and porters. They sometimes travelled very long distances, possibly taking many months and sometimes spending the entire rainy season cultivating food crops during the outward journey. They took with them not only European products but also salt, salted and dried fish and locally manufactured items such as jewels from Loango. On the way they were able to buy other local products which they sold elsewhere, thus carrying on a kind of land-borne coasting trade.

The principal route linked the ports to Pool, where the slaves shipped along the river and its tributaries arrived in large numbers. Specialized carriers coalesced into ethnic groups, the best known being the Bobangi

\textsuperscript{63} According to the figures given by P. D. Curtin, 1969, and P. E. Lovejoy, 1983, 982 000 slaves were put aboard ship between 1660 and 1797.

\textsuperscript{64} P. M. Martin, 1970, p. 153. Compared with Van Alstein’s calculations this estimate seems rather high, but the figures were of the order of tens of thousands per annum (see D. Rinchon, 1964).
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FIG. 19.5 The slave trade in Central Africa in the eighteenth century (after J. Vansina)
who gave up fishing for commerce and whose trade network, from the 1750s onwards, stretched from the Ubangi river to the Kwa. These waterborne carriers also conducted an extensive trade in other products, for heavy merchandise of low unit value could be carried by water at a profit. The river and its tributaries were accordingly the scene of a lively trade in pottery, fish, mats, food, beer, red dyewood and other commodities bought in one place and sold in another; this encouraged different areas to specialize in different goods. This slave-trading zone had reached the Ubangi, the lower Tshuapa and the areas around Lake Mayi Ndombe well before 1800 and continued to expand as the demand for slaves grew. We know nothing of its progress along the Lukenye, lower Kasai and Kwilu, but these rivers do not seem to have been much affected by the slave trade. We do not, however, know why. A branch of the route from Pool ran to the north of the Congo, passing through what is now Franceville, until it reached Mbeti and Mboisi country, competing with the slave trade up the Ogowe river. Other caravan routes traversed Kongo, reaching Matamba and Cassange on the upper Kwango, where the Vili had to compete with regional carriers of whom the Zombo and Soso were the best known. About 1750 the capital of the new Yaka state of the Kwango river became a slave-trading centre into which thronged the slaves taken in the constant military campaigns waged by the Yaka beyond the Kwango.

The northern slave trade was so lucrative compared with that of Angola that it pushed the latter’s field of operations towards Luanda and Cassange. This led to Portuguese military action against the port of Mosul (later Ambriz) and to the occupation of Encoge (1759) in central Kongo and subsequently in 1783 of Cabinda. The Portuguese were driven out by a French squadron supported by local forces. Briefly, military solutions were of no avail in halting the progress of the trade on the Loango coast.

We are only beginning to learn the effects of the slave trade. Its demographic effects in particular are still largely unknown. A million slaves means perhaps almost two million people torn from their homes, a third of them women. They came however from a vast area. Even so, it is

65. R. Harms, 1981; E. Sulzmann, 1983. Traces of it have come to light in the form of mugs originating from Westerwald (in what is now the Federal Republic of Germany) and manufactured in the eighteenth century, which were found between Ruki, Mayi Ndombe and Momboyo.
67. Taking into account deaths on the routes and in the barracoons. Figures given for Angola by J. C. Miller, 1979, p. 103, note 90, indicate that two-thirds of the slaves died before embarkation. These figures are exaggerated, and the slave trade was more lethal in Angola than on the northern coast, especially on the routes. Doubling the export figures is certainly not an exaggeration, and the result is probably still short of the truth.
68. See H. S. Klein, 1972, p. 914. This applies to the slave trade in general, but is also valid for Angola in the nineteenth century and the Dutch slave trade in general. The figures for children, pp. 903–5, were in the area of 5 per cent.
probable that the population actually fell in old Kongo and Mayombe, although we cannot estimate by how much. Elsewhere the main result was to slow down population growth.

We know more about the economic effects. To the north of the Zaire river a vast area organized itself into a well-knit aggregate of specialized areas. In one, raffia was produced, in another tobacco, in another cane-sugar wine, in another ivory, in another foodstuffs, ironware, pottery, boats and so on. This led to technological impoverishment in each individual area. The Tio, for example, gave up iron-smelting, boat-building and, to some extent, even weaving and pottery, finding it cheaper to import the products from neighbouring areas. The economic vitality of the aggregate, however, increased steadily, due mainly to the development of waterborne transport.

The social and political effects were far-reaching. The brokers and notables in charge of the slave trade steadily gained in importance at the courts of Loango, Ngoyo and Kakongo. They used their acquired wealth to surround themselves with large retinues and thus displaced the old nobility linked to the royal house. Royal authority suffered accordingly. In Loango the royal council witnessed the replacement of territorial nobles of the royal house by these nobles, the titles being sold by the king to the highest bidder. The system of succession deteriorated, and it was the councillors who elected a king and favoured long-lived regency councils. Then, in or before 1750, the royal line became extinct. Six factions contested for the throne, but the royal *kitomi* eventually succeeded in imposing a neutral king at the cost of gravely weakening his power. A little later the new royal line suffered a schism, and royalty grew so weak that after 1787 no more kings were appointed for almost two centuries. Moreover, distant provinces such as Mayumba began seceding from 1750 on.

The Tio kingdom was also in difficulties. The regional great lords trading on their own account had grown rich and adopted a new ideology legitimizing their secession. This power was spiritual, centred upon a talisman, the *nkobi*, and could dispense with the support of terrestrial spirits. From about 1780 onwards the Tio state was in the grip of civil war and did not recover until about 1830. The *nkobi* ideology served to justify an impressive series of new chiefs who took power in, or incorporated into their own jurisdiction, an area extending from the region of Makua, via the west of the Teke (Kukuya) plateaux, as far as Tsayi country near the route from Loango to Pool.

In the middle Zaire basin the expansion of the slave trade led to renewed population movements on a small scale and to hostilities both in the Mayi Ndombe area and further north, while large centres of population began

to take shape beside the river at points where it had to be crossed. These centres became market towns in the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{70} Between Loango and Pool, especially in the copper-mining area of Mindouli, an immigration of Kongore nobles displaced the Teke villages. Alongside small chiefdoms, however, a greater number of independent villages sprang up along the Loango–Pool axis. These villages agreed among themselves to maintain common markets by establishing a market tribunal composed of judges from the different villages. The \textit{lemba} association cemented alliances between them.

In Kongo itself Christian ideology, and especially the use of the Order of Christ to which the rulers belonged, remained the basis of the ruling ideology. Its centres were the king, who was now no more than a supreme \textit{nkisi}, and the former mission stations run by former mission slaves. Territorial units broke up again and again (the Kongo syndrome),\textsuperscript{71} sometimes down to village level. To the east of Mbanza Kongo the Zombo carriers adopted the institution of market judges or agreed to rotate between leading families the government of small chiefdoms composed of only a few villages. At the same time, however, large \textit{mvila} (clans) appeared, structured in lineages that had become anchored to the land. This network of clans became the cement that bound the independent villages together, establishing a setting in which they co-operated and competed with one another.

These transformations were accompanied by significant cultural changes. The role of the great ancestors — linked with the clans — increased. Cemeteries and churches, particularly those of Mbanza Kongo, grew bigger. The notion of \textit{zombi}, a kind of corpse-slave,\textsuperscript{72} took hold, as did the confusion of saints with great ancestors. Until about 1700\textsuperscript{73} the burial of prominent people was still a fairly simple event, but soon they were being buried with ever greater ostentation. The fabric wrapping around the corpse was now replaced by a funerary bundle so enormous that routes had to be mapped out and wagons used to take the body to the cemetery, at least in places near the coast. In the nineteenth century the bundle became a giant doll, or a small shrine came into being. The wooden heads or busts which were positioned on the bundles in the eighteenth century became wooden or stone statues or ceramic monuments to adorn the tombs on which an increasing number of broken imported objects were also laid.\textsuperscript{74} The Boma area and Mayombe were at the centre of these developments. South of the river, the funerary stelae of Ambriz\textsuperscript{75} were their counterparts.

The group-healing cults prospered everywhere. The \textit{lemba}, an already old example of these \textit{nkisi} in Loango, changed in character. It became a

\textsuperscript{70} J. Vansina, 1983b, pp. 112–13.
\textsuperscript{71} S. Broadhead, 1971, 1979 and 1983.
\textsuperscript{72} Already mentioned in 1701 by N. Uring, 1928, p. 47.
\textsuperscript{73} N. Uring, 1928, pp. 35–6.
\textsuperscript{74} R. F. Thompson and J. Cornet, 1982.
\textsuperscript{75} Museu de Angola, Luanda, 1955, Nos 137–146 (Ambrizette), pp. 86–7.
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PLATE 19.13 Lemba medicine-chest (nkobi) made of bark, with characteristic petal motif on lid, from Ngoyo. Height: 24 cm
nkisi of protection for members of the élites who could pay the high enrolment fees. When an important man fell ill, the lemba priest came to treat him. To be cured he had to become an initiate member of the association, together with his first wife. The cult ideology sanctified alliances between élite families (marriage, members of the lemba cell), legitimized initiate judges and heads of families and, indirectly, legitimized the market tribunals. Different forms of the lemba developed after 1700, including one in Haiti, where the lemba Petro was the fourth voodoo.76

Christianity held its ground and evolved. The scarcity of foreign or local priests left the initiative to the missionaries’ former helpers, their slaves and, at court, the king’s entourage. The reliefs of Ambriz show crucifixion scenes in which the spear has become a python, reminiscent of Mbumba or Bomba, associated with the slave trade and wealth, while the scene is accompanied by drummers. Christian statuary was still preserved and statues were possibly manufactured in Soyo and at Mbanza Kongo, as were the crucifixes which were emblems of authority and, in what was essentially a judicial role, the emblem of nkangi (the saviour). Other crosses developed, such as santu, or charms associated with divination by hunting and used to discover the cause of collective misfortunes. These were the two sides of the same official religion.

Angola in the eighteenth century

As already stated, the Angolan slave trade was on a significant scale long before that of the north developed. The system, which was aimed mainly at Brazil, was highly fragmented by comparison with that of the north.77 Before 1730 it had the following components: the export merchant in Portugal; brokers in Brazil; shippers; slave-dealers in Luanda or Benguela; Afro-Portuguese caravaneers; and African lords and traders offering slaves for sale at the markets. A single firm could supply several components but rarely all of them together, not even those in Brazil and Portugal. Everyone tried to avoid risks and to maximize profits. The greatest risk was o risco dos escravos: the risk that slaves would die of malnutrition, untreated diseases and ill-treatment. All these causes of death resulted from attempts to avoid spending what was necessary on food, medical care and competent custodians. Each segment tried to shift responsibility for the slaves, and hence the ownership thereof, to the weaker segments. The firms in Portugal and Brazil were in a strong position; the shippers, the dealers in Luanda and Benguela and the caravaneers were in the weakest. It was they who tried to cut costs at the expense of the slaves, with consequent high mortality. J. C. Miller quotes78 an estimate to the effect that half the slaves

78. J. C. Miller, 1979, p. 103, note 90.
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FIG. 19.6 West Central Africa in the eighteenth century (after J. Vansina)
bought died between the market of purchase and the port of embarkation and another 40 per cent at Luanda while awaiting embarkation. These figures are exaggerated; their author was the servant of a Pombalian company in competition with this system in the 1770s. But they are credible figures. Losses at sea varied according to the state of health of the slaves shipped and the degree of overcrowding on board. They worked out at 10 and 15 per cent of the total number embarked. 79

The parcel, called *hanzo* in Angola, was supplied on credit to the caravaneer, binding him to his sleeping partner, who calculated his supply of slaves accordingly. The parcel consisted mainly of fabrics from Goa or Europe, brandy from Brazil, local salt, beads and sometimes a few weapons. The caravaneers’ expenses (especially for porters, who were recruited inland by state officials, and for food) were high and their risks heavy (waiting in the African market, in particular, and the risk of slaves escaping or dying). They soon fell into debt and became completely dependent on their creditor. But from about 1760 onwards the caravaneers began selling their slaves to any trader in Luanda or Benguela, and tried to redress their situation with the goods obtained. The sleeping partner was left with a write-off. 80

After 1730 metropolitan Portuguese firms came back to Luanda to supply European goods, and the Brazilians withdrew to Benguela. Under the pressure of competition, goods arrived in large quantities, stimulating the slave trade. The ships also brought numbers of poor immigrants, common convicts and adventurers seeking to grow rich on the slave trade, especially as caravaneers. An unrelenting struggle began between the *quimbares* and the new arrivals. The latter, as traders, had the full support of the high authorities of Luanda, but the *quimbares* enjoyed the backing of the provincial authorities and, in general, of the African chiefs in the inland markets. They fought the new traders by smuggling slaves out for trade with the French, English and Dutch, and the new caravaneers by charging them exorbitant sums for their porters, provisions, ferryboats and other items until the caravaneers threw in their lot with them, usually after leaving their sleeping partners in the lurch. The Brazilians and *quimbares* not only succeeded in maintaining their position in Benguela but also increased exports of slaves to the point where, by about 1690, the volume equalled that of Benguela. But the Portuguese firms, by virtue of their capital and the administrative backing they enjoyed, succeeded in shifting the ‘slave risk’. They bought, not slaves, but ivory or bills to be collected in Brazil. 81

At the turn of the century the governors supported the Brazilians. Later, and especially after the Márques de Pombal’s reforms in Portugal, they tended to favour the big Lisbon firms. The Jesuits, the allies of the Brazilians, were expelled in 1660, and with Francisco Innocencio de Sousa

Coutinho (1664–72)\(^82\) a vigorous effort was made to re-establish the mother country’s control in Angola. De Sousa tried to regain control of the administrative posts in the interior, to lay down regulations for the slave trade in the inland markets and to diversify the country’s economy. Neither he nor his successors achieved this. The Afro-Portuguese emigrated once again, moving mainly to the Benguela plateau where massive military campaigns from 1772 onwards succeeded merely in hastening the emergence of two large kingdoms, Mbailelunzulu and Bihe, of which the latter in particular became a haven for the quimbales. A new bridgehead for trade with the interior developed here, and before 1794 the caravans reached the Upper Zambezi in Lozi country. The slaves were taken to Benguela, avoiding Luanda. Luanda continued to attract the slave trade through the Kingdom of Kasanje. The Imbangala travelled by caravan to the northeast, reaching central Kasai and the Luba who lived there before 1755. But their main axis was the route from Cassange to Mussumba, the capital of the Lunda empire.

The Lunda empire took shape during the eighteenth century. Constant military campaigns yielded large numbers of slaves, while tributes in slaves flowed into the capital from the subject regions. After 1750 the empire succeeded in founding the Kingdom of Kazembe on the Luapula river and in establishing communications with Tete and Zumbo in Mozambique. Before then, westward expansion had reached the River Kwango, where a captain founded the Yaka kingdom between 1740 and 1760, causing thousands of people to flee from Hungu to Kongo between 1761 and 1765.\(^83\) This great Yaka state occupied a large part of the Kwango valley downstream of Kasanje and extended its conquests eastward in the direction of the Kwilu. Large numbers of captives were brought back from there to be sold to the Zombo, Soso and Vili, but also to the Imbangala and to caravans passing through Nkoje. During the late eighteenth century and more so during the nineteenth, these conquests and raids caused large population movements from the Kwango river towards the Kwilu as people fled from the Yaka.

In Angola the slave trade had such an ascendancy that, despite the efforts of de Sousa Coutinho and others, the country failed to develop a diversified economy for lack of capital not tied to the slave trade. The colony remained economically dependent on Brazil; around 1800, 88 per cent of its revenues still came from the slave trade with Brazil and a little less than 5 per cent from the ivory sent to Portugal.

83. Making 1032,000 slaves, according to the figures given by D. Birmingham, 1966; P. D. Curtin, 1969; H. S. Klein, 1972; P. E. Lovejoy, 1983. See also J. C. Miller, 1975b and 1979. In this case 2 million is certainly an underestimate. The real figure might be nearer 3 million. As to demography, see J. K. Thornton, 1980; 1977a, 1977b and 1981b; he concedes, 1981b, p. 713, that there was a loss of population, but his model underestimates the number of women (according to him, one-quarter and not one-third) and children (according to him, none were put aboard ship). These figures are crucial to the population picture.
The political system of the Luba and Lunda: its emergence and expansion

NDAYWEL è NZIEM

The history of the Luba is the story of the development of a political system which first emerged in Shaba, in the present-day Republic of Zaire, and subsequently spread into a large part of the southern grasslands, over an area stretching almost from the River Kwango to the River Zambezi. Although a whole series of societies evolved along individual lines in this area, they were all closely intertwined, springing as they did from the same basic impulses. This pattern clearly demonstrates the capacity for unification which already existed among African peoples in the precolonial period.

The connection and the differences between the Luba and Lunda states are implicit in their two names which reflect not so much ethnic distinction as two political and cultural systems within which a whole range of separate ethnic referents sprang up. The history of the Luba covers matters affecting the present-day Luba of both Shaba (the Luba Shankadi) and Kasai (the Luba Lubilanji) as well as matters relating to the Songye, Kanyok, Kete, Sala Mpasu, Bindji and Lulua. The history of the Lunda deals both with the Rund groups (the Lunda in the narrow sense) and the Lozi, Ndembo, Lwena, Imbangala and other groups (the Lunda in the broad sense). The linguistic classification given to the Luba and Lunda languages are indicative of this intertwined relationship. While Guthrie classifies them all in his Zone L, the Lunda languages are put into Group 50 and the Luba languages into Group 30. This bears eloquent testimony to both the

1. This political system affected the three Central African countries of Zaire, Angola and Zambia.
similarities and differences between the two languages.\(^3\)

There is general agreement that the archaeological finds of the Upemba Depression at Sanga and elsewhere are to be attributed to the ancestors of the Luba.\(^4\) Emblems of rule, later common among the Luba, appear by the thirteenth century at the latest, along with evidence at Katota and Sanga of the formation of two chiefdoms. Yet Katota and Sanga were not the direct forerunners of the Luba kingdom. Oral chronology cannot be pushed back reliably much beyond 1700 in this case. All we know is that the main Luba kingdom came into being as one among many and began to expand before the Rund state, fountainhead of the Lunda empire, was developed. The formation of the Rund state cannot be dated by oral tradition\(^5\) but at least the state is mentioned in the traditions by 1680. How long before that date it took shape, we do not know.

The emergence of the Luba and Lunda states

Shaba and the adjoining parts of Zambia and Angola are covered by woodlands, its soils are poor and the dry season is very long. The best lands lie mostly in the river valleys and their quality decreases from north to south and east to west, being worst in eastern Angola. The further north the less the risk of drought. But the southern, half-barren country contains mineral treasure – copper, iron and salt – all in its south-eastern quadrant.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the population lived in pockets of fertile land, whether near major mineral sites or not, with vast expanses of almost uninhabited areas in between, used mainly for hunting. This population distribution was reflected in the location of the early territorial organizations: which comprised small chiefdoms each governing one settlement. Thus the Sanga charter of settlements becomes the later chiefdom of Kikondja while Katota upstream, at the other end of the Lualaba lake system, formed another chiefdom. In both these areas people were fishermen and farmers. There were many other chiefdoms, all located in major river valleys, where the inhabitants were mostly farmers: namely the Kalundwe, Kanyok, Kanincin, Nsanga, Mpimin, the early Rund and various Hemba chiefdoms.

None of these population clusters lived in isolation. They were linked by trade and, presumably, intermarriage. From the north came raffia and palm oil, from the Lualaba river fish, from the south copper and salt, from the central southern area \textit{mbafu} oil. There is no evidence for extended east-

\(^3\) M. Guthrie, 1948, p. 54. The linguists at Tervuren consider that the two groups of speakers settled in neighbouring areas at a fairly late date (A. Coupez, E. Evrard and J. Vansina, 1976).


\(^5\) Such attempts all rested on the supposed emigration of Kinguri from the Rund capital to Angola. We now know that this is a later elaboration of tradition dating at the earliest from c.1700; cf. J. K. Thornton, 1981a.
west trade at an early date and apart from copper the usual movement of products was on a north-south axis from the limits of the equatorial forest in the far north, southwards to central Zambia. The trade was important enough for currencies to develop from at least 1000. In the Upemba Depression around 1300 the copper cross became the currency. By 1500 such crosses were standardized as to weight and by 1600 they had become quite small, so that they could be used for minor as well as major purchases. But the decline in size may also have been an index of devaluation. After 1700 crosses disappeared and, by the nineteenth century, imported beads were becoming the new currency.6

In this context developed the political ideology that later would be central to the main Luba kingdom. This consisted of two interlocked bulopwe (principles), that of the sacred character of kingship and that of rule through a closed association. In the kingdom’s northernmost area, in Songye country, and in some eastern areas, rule by association became dominant, but in the kingdom’s heartland balance between the two came into being, although the sacred character of kingship clearly predominated.

According to some traditions the forerunner of the Luba kingdom was

PLATE 20.1  Hemba, Zaire: monoxylloid caryatid seat, the bottom of which is worn away. Note the prominent scarifications and the quality of the bracelets. Height: 35 cm
the small Kalundwe kingdom founded between the Luembe and Lubilash rivers by a coalition of three clans. Its capital was at Cifinda. One of its kings, Kongolo (Rainbow), moved to found a capital on the plains at Mwibele, not far from Lake Boya, in what would be the heartland of the future Luba state. Other accounts, however, have Kongolo coming from elsewhere. The epic narrative of foundations, for example, tells in vivid detail how Kongolo was defeated and slain by Kalala Ilunga — Ilunga the hunter, a foreigner from the east — who moved his capital to Munza, closer to a district rich in iron ore and not far from salt pans. As Mwine Munza (master of Munza), Kalala represents a founding-father figure that depicts what an ideal Luba king should be. Kongolo may well not be an authentic figure but at least the traditions can be accepted as to the situations of the former capitals. Unlike almost all the other chiefdoms, the Luba kingdom did not have its centre in a river valley but in the heart of the great plains north of the Upemba Depression. It dominated, perhaps from the onset, the Kalundwe to the west, Kikondja to the south and controlled the major north–south trading routes. Nonetheless, until the eve of the eighteenth century it would remain a fairly small kingdom.

Meanwhile, further west other political units were being formed. The foremost among them, Nkalany, developed in the Mbuji Mayi valley from the fusion of several small areas headed by tubung (masters of the land). Their Kete neighbours to the north had a similar organization but, to the north-west, their closest relatives in speech and material culture, the Sala Mpasu, organized themselves very differently, by age organizations and by allowing powerful men to monopolize authority. Political succession to existing positions, and hence aristocracy, was rejected by them.

Nothing really predestined the Rund lands to become an empire. The areas further north with better soil were more densely settled. Their agriculture was much more advanced and they were better placed on the north–south trading routes. Yet at one point the northern tubung were united under one of the Rund lands, although they only formed a chiefdom centred along a stretch of river. The northern tubung traditions begin with an explanation as to why a chief Nkond left his office to his daughter, Rwcej or Rueji, who married Cibinda Ilunga (Ilunga the Hunter) from the Luba court and then abandoned office in his favour. The episode of the hunter is an obvious cliche also found elsewhere in the region. According to the story, Cibinda Ilunga organized his court on the Luba model. But even in this, tradition may only be partially correct as scholars have found as many Rund influences on the Luba as the other way round.

Another element of the tales must still be mentioned. According to

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8. H. A. Dias de Carvalho, 1890; P. Pogge, 1880. The Curse by Nkond of his sons recalls the episode of Noah under the tree and is probably of late invention.

Carvalho, after the conquest stage, power went to Rweej's first son, Yav, who became the *Mwant Yav* (Lord Yav). It was his name which was to become a political title designating the aristocracy of the new court. On his death, power is thought to have been assumed by his brother Naweej, who was to become the real organizer of the empire. However, the versions that have been collected more recently claim that Rweej was sterile. In order not to jeopardize the succession, she gave her husband a second wife, Kamonga, who was first in succession. This situation accounts for the institutionalized existence of two female dignitaries at the court of the *Mwant Yav*: the *Swan Murund* or *Swana Mulunda*, the symbolic mother of the society, who symbolized the perpetuation of the role played by Rweej who, although sterile, founded the empire; and the *Rukonkesh* or *Lukonkeshia*, the queen-mother, who occupied the role played by Kamonga and all other women in the same situation.

More commonly, reference is made to the existence of the right-hand mother (*Swan Murund*), who has to be differentiated from the left-hand mother (*Rukonkesh*). It was the latter who gave birth to the successor.

This testimony explains the different institutions that evolved after the appearance of the Luba hunter: first, the two female aristocracies, one symbolizing social fertility and the other biological fertility; and second, the royal title based on the chiefly title *Mwant*, to which the name of the first king was added.

**The Luba: internal organization and development to 1800**

As with Mwine Munza, a state appeared on the plains as a result of influences from the east across the Lualaba river. It incorporated the Kikondja kingdom in the Upemba Depression south of the plains and the Kalundwe kingdom to the west. It further expanded, then or somewhat later, to the south-east to control the lower reaches of the Lovua river.

The foundation and first consolidation of the kingdom led to some disturbances in the region and a number of emigrants left the lower Lovua to found the Shila state on the western shore of Lake Mweru and along the lower Luapula.\(^{10}\) It is likely that this account deals only with the group that ruled the Shila before about 1750 and not with most of the inhabitants. These rulers may not even have come from the Luba kingdom but may have been given this area as a prestigious place of origin, although they really stemmed from Kiambi on the lower Lovua. The Kanyok to the north-west were also subjected to the kingdom by Luba immigrants who organized (or founded) a kingdom there, although in the early 1800s, they threw off their allegiance to the Luba.\(^{11}\)

The most important emigration is reported towards the north. Following the troubles when the kingdom was founded, later wars of succession and

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\(^{10}\) M. Musambachime, 1976, pp. 15–32.

\(^{11}\) J. C. Yoder, 1977; 1980, pp. 88 and 90.
famines, groups of Luba Kasai left Shaba to spread northwards along the Lubilash river fanning out into the better-watered lands. Famine is given as a major motive for movement in many traditions of kinship groups in Kasai, not only for leaving Shaba but also when explaining why they left the Lubilash in Kasai to move west towards the Lulua river. They point to a real dynamic of population shift. But all the Luba Kasai could not have left Shaba in one or two waves. Probably, whenever famine hit, some southerners moved north and continued to do so until at least the early 1800s. In this area Ciluba and related languages and dialects are spoken, all markedly different from Kiluba, spoken in Shaba. Central Kasai, therefore, must have been occupied by such speakers for many hundreds of years, just as the northern country between Lubilash and Lualaba was occupied by Songye whose speech forms another branch in the Luba family of speech.

Although to the south, in Shila and Kanyok country, a variant of the

13. Luba came into contact with Kuba c. 1750 and immigrated (the Bena Coofa) just after 1800.
The political system of the Luba and Lunda

Shaban Luba political system was set up, in Kasai this did not occur. Here the political organization was either limited to the village and its land or higher office was given for life — or even for a limited period — to the highest bidder, a system also found among some Songye. The Luba Kasai also adopted some emblems and some political practices from the Kanyok. Most Songye were, however, ruled differently. By the 1880s, and probably some centuries earlier, the Songye lived in huge farming settlements or towns, ruled by the Bukishi association — membership of which required high fees and was dominated by chiefs with a few titled notables. This, too, differed from the model of the main Luba kingdom.

The organization of the Luba state was imagined as a pyramid of pyramids. At village level, households were linked by patrilineage. Relations between villages were also thought of as relations between lineages, although each district had a titled chief of a given family whose authority was held to stem from his connection with a local vidiye (spirit). Above this the kingdom itself was ruled from the capital (imagined as a summit in expressions referring to it), the very lay-out of which reflected this structure with royal quarters and quarters for titled officials of both sexes, separated by military or civilian function. At its centre stood the bulopwe (royal office). A less careful scrutiny of the layout showed the presence of Bambudye, the closed association which helped the king to rule. The king was not supposed to have a lineage or clan although the office was normally handed down from father to brother to son. But the Luba saw this as a rotation in office of different lineages, namely those of the mother’s kings. Hence the king was at the same time above the political fray and yet linked by kinship to many of the district heads. He stood at the apex of the pyramid of pyramids of kinship. This is the meaning of the title mulopwe which signifies the indivisibility of power that could not be shared. The rituals of investiture (royal incest, for instance) and the emblems underscored the uniqueness and the supremacy of the ruler as well as his position as a mere incumbent of the office for he was but one in a line of kings. Those who came before him were now powerful ancestors with their shrines and gave voice through the medium of the women attached to their shrines.

The mulopwe was surrounded by a household and titled officials. First was his harem reflecting the real political alliances that bound the kingdom together. His officials saw to it that tribute was paid in mingilu (unpaid labour), in milambu (taxes payable in food and local produce such as salt, iron, raffia and baskets) and in gifts paid at the investiture of Kugala (dignitaries). The territorial administration was in the hands of the bilolo (singular kilolo), each responsible for a kibwindji (region), and normally chosen by the local people from amongst the ruling family of the district and confirmed by the court. Sometimes the choice of kilolo was imposed

PLATE 20.2 Kuba, central Zaire: cephalomorphic ritual cup for drinking palm wine. It is inlaid with cowries on the neck and handle, and with brass on the mouth, temple and back of the head. Height: 18 cm
The political system of the Luba and Lunda

PLATE 20.3 Luba, southern Zaire: the knob of a ceremonial cane, in the form of a human head decorated with a very tall headdress surmounted by two figures holding each other by the waist. Overall length: 16.4 cm
by the court, in which case he was usually a close relative of the king. The central administration supervised the collection of tribute, organized the military when it was necessary to coerce tribute and advised the king through the tshidie (general council) and the tshihangu (court). The main officers were the twite (who represented the king in secular contexts), the nabanza (keeper of the regalia and supervisor of rituals), the lukanga (senior judge), the mwana Mwilamba (head of the army), the mwine Lundu (keeper of tradition and particularly of the unwritten constitution), the fumwa
pamba diyumbi (the keeper and maker of charms and royal diviner) and the ndalamba (queen-mother with ritual role).16

Beyond this the same officials and probably others also acted at sessions of the Bambudye association which had numerous lodges. We do not know exactly how this functioned as the Bambudye secrets have not been revealed. But the effects of Bambudye were to exert both ritual and secular control over the country and even its king, while continually promoting the ideology of Lubahood and of the state.17

In practice, local courts were patterned after the organization of the capital and local chiefs had some sacred paraphernalia and links to local territorial spirit cults, often for their own ancestors, so that the centrifugal forces in the kingdom were always strong. The coercive power of the king's warriors was the practical force that kept the country together. But there was no standing army, so that the ideological force constituted by the Bambudye was of great importance. This meant also that heavy tribute (and many traditions speak of this) could only be enforced when central districts were willing to back the king against internal or external forces.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the kingdom did not expand rapidly. There is little information about territorial history until about 170018 and the reign of King Kadilo. At that time there were campaigns to the north against the adjacent Songye towns, 'but, in the end, Kadilo met with defeat. Alliance with some Songye towns followed and by the end of the century Songye influence was being felt in the affairs of the state during a succession crisis.'19 The real expansion of the kingdom occurred in the valley of the Lualaba, along the Lovua (Kiambi) and south of the Upemba depression. Such expansion faltered as a major succession crisis developed from about 1780 to 1810. During this crisis the Kanyok freed themselves from Luba overrule, and Songye political and cultural influence reached a high point as shown by the introduction of the Bukasandji society. After 1800 however, expansion continued towards the east, with the conquest of the lands between the River Lualaba and Lake Tanganyika and a push by military leaders invested with the sacred fire towards the north along the Lualaba river as far as Buli.20 Explanations given for this expansion21 are not entirely convincing. It is better to acknowledge that the inner rationale of this dynamic is still not understood than to try and force explanations in terms of access to trade routes or raw materials about which almost nothing is known so far.

PLATE 20.5 (Left) Luba, Zaire: the knob of a cane, in the form of a scarified woman with a pearl necklace. Overall length: 160 cm

PLATE 20.6 (Right) Luba, Zaire: the knob of a cane, in the form of a scarified woman with her hands on her shoulders. Overall length: 80 cm
The Lunda: internal organization and development to 1800

The Rund kingdom became a Lunda empire in the eighteenth century. Its earlier organization is not fully known, except for some titles at court and that its military character was much more developed than in the Luba kingdom. A little is known, however, about the principles of social and political organization.

The succession of the *tubung* had been matrilineal but succession for the royal title and at court was bilateral. The imaginary representation of society was based on positional succession and perpetual kinship. This meant that every incumbent to a position or title was supposed to almost become his predecessor. The incumbent took on the name of his predecessor, his wives, children and other relatives. Indeed the personality of his predecessor almost became his personality and as a consequence kinship was perpetual. The incumbent of a title might have been in the king’s case, a grandson, for another title-holder his nephew or, for the *mwant a ngaand* (district headman), his uncle. Five generations later this system would still stand and so the ravages of time were negated.

It was possible, therefore, to imagine the state as an organization run by a single family, headed by the *Mwant Yav* (emperor). New chiefs could be incorporated by giving them a kinship link (as son-in-law, for instance, after a marriage alliance) and providing them with a stable position in the empire. Historians have rightly pointed out that positional succession and perpetual kinship provided the mechanism by which the incorporation of far-flung territories became possible. Moreover, the provision of a family model for the empire automatically regulated relationships between officials. Division by notional generation was strict. 22 Thus all ‘sons’ and ‘nephews’ owed obedience to all ‘fathers’ and ‘uncles’; all ‘grandsons’ were allies of their ‘grandfathers’. Division by direct descent or affinal station complemented this. ‘Sons-in-law’ were clients of their fathers-in-law, and ‘sister sons’ were in ambiguous relationship to ‘mother’s brothers’ as a result.

So, to the Rund the state was a family writ large – very large indeed as the empire came to stretch from the River Kwango to beyond the River Luapula. But it was a family of warriors and a family that would thrive on slavery. By about 1700, Lunda war expeditions had subdued the populations around the empire’s core, incorporated them and then moved further afield. By 1750 to 1760 strong subsidiary kingdoms were taking shape from the Yaka on the Kwango river to Kazembe on the River Luapula, along an east–west axis that encompassed the mineral resources.

22. The model is clearly akin to that of the Sala Mpasu who were not even organized into a chiefdom. But their age organization and ‘big men’ correspond to Rund categories of age and titled positions. Cf. W. F. Pruitt, 1973.
of Shaba and access to the Portuguese emporia on the River Zambezi as well as the trading routes from the Rund to the Imbangala on the River Kwango.

The imperial administration was loose. The empire consisted of a core plus peripheral kingdoms whose rulers merely paid occasional tribute to the court. At the core the lowest level of territorial organization was the canton ruled by the district headman who still succeeded to this office by matrilineal succession. Above him was the Cilol (district ruler) appointed from the capital. At the centre the tubung and titled officials assisted the king.

To control the bilolo the king had created the tukwata, sing. kakwata, (special officials), who roamed the countryside with a military detachment to force the bilolo to surrender tribute. Apart from these forces there still existed a major military organization headed by a kazembe (general). Even before 1700 generals were appointed to head expeditionary forces to distant areas. The title itself was given to any sanguinary warrior who had killed a dangerous enemy. Such a general wielded all power in his operational terrain but once the area was incorporated, he either lost his status or became a ruler in his own right, a kilolo of the emperor.

The mussumba (capital) was laid out like an army camping overnight, with front and vanguards, wings and centre. Its hub was the royal palace with the Mwant Yav (emperor), the Swan Murund (symbolic queen-mother named Rweej), the rukonkesh (queen-mother and head of the logistics for the court) and the officials foremost among whom were military officers such as the Kalala (head of the vanguard) and the Swan Mulopwe (heir-presumptive and commander of the army). Power was vested in the emperor; his title Mwant Yav (Lord of the Viper) referred to the distance between king and mortals but also to his ambiguity as he stood for both peace and war, prosperity and destruction.

By comparison, the role of the Lunda emperor was much less ritualized and his power was more despotic. Until recently the expansion of the Lunda empire was thought to have begun with an emigration of warriors to the River Kwango. But recent research has shown that the traditions about the so-called first wave of emigration are later interpolations, resulting from trading contacts between the Imbangala and the Rund. In fact, the expansion started before 1700. The first expedition went south-east towards the salt pans of the Lualaba river, near present-day Kolwezi. Then around 1700, a breakaway group, under the leadership of Musokantanda and Kanongesha, went south into present-day Zambia and set up a state in the Ndembu area after partly assimilating the Mbwela autochtons and pushing some of them southwards. Some Lunda may have been involved earlier.

23. J. L. Vellut, 1972, p. 70.
in the formation of the Lozi kingdom. Historians accept some early influence of the Lunda on Bulozi but hard proof of such contacts is still lacking. As Lunda expansion southwards started after 1700 it is likely that the Lozi kingdom had already taken shape by the time Lunda influence reached it.27

From the salt pans of the Lualaba river a further expedition took the Lunda generals eastwards towards the copper mines and beyond to the rich Luapula valley. The Lunda army beat off a Luba attack against them and subjugated the chiefs of Shaba (one of them called Katanga) and the Shila state of Luapula. They extended this state and, by the second half of the eighteenth century, Kazembe of the Luapula was lord of a large tightly knit kingdom.28 Soon after their settlement the Lunda of Kazembe took up contacts with the Portuguese of Sena and Tete. A mission led by de Lacerda visited the new kingdom from 1798 to 1799.29 It was impressed by the military power of the Kazembe and with the severity of coercive measures still being used by the court against the local inhabitants. The Portuguese visit inaugurated a period of intense trade relationships between Kazembe and the lower Zambezi. This was to strengthen the autonomy of Kazembe towards Musumbwa, so that the regular tribute payments of the 1790s had become more an equal exchange of gifts by the 1830s.30

Towards the north and west other Lunda expansion was closely linked to the development of the slave trade in Angola. Contacts with the Angolan slave-trading system date from the 1670s at the latest31 and developed after 1630.32 The Imbangala developed a system of trading by caravans which brought European goods, such as cloth, beads and crockery, to the Lunda capital where they served as luxury goods for the aristocracy and new emblems of status and power. The Lunda rejected the offer of guns and retained their faith in the mpok (broadsword).33 In return, they exported slaves captured first in the areas north and east of the Rund core in the lands of the Sala Mpasu, Kete, Kanincin and even Kanyok. Later, Mbwela captives from northern Zambia and eastern Angola were also added to those exports. At the same time, demand for slaves grew in Lunda proper. They were settled around the capital to cultivate large fields and along the major roads of the country in deserted sites to provide cassava from plantations, as well as ferry services and, eventually, porterage assistance to caravans crossing the wastes between the Rivers Kwango and Nkalany as well as from the Nkalany to the River Lualaba.34

Also shortly after 1700 the Lunda sent expeditions westwards, so that

by about 1750 Lunda chiefs were found on the River Kwango. Eastern Angola, the land of the Lwena, was their first goal. Several small states were created, the main one under the leadership of Ciniama. The Lunda leaders superimposed themselves on fairly large-scale societies organized around matrilineal genealogies of great depth. The Lunda mwangana (chief) obtained his position first as arbitrator to settle feuds, but the local people also accepted the belief that strong supernatural powers were vested in him. By genealogical reckoning the first Lunda chiefs here date from about 1750 but the process certainly started a good generation earlier, if only because by 1750 Lunda chiefs were installed on the eastern banks of the
River Kwango. West of the River Lwena various Chokwe, Minungo and Songo chiefdoms were also created by the Lunda by superimposing themselves on existing societies. With the Shinje, however, they overran a pre-existing kingdom. Among the former the Chokwe were later to prove the most important. Even in the eighteenth century as metallurgists, skilled carvers and hunters, they were valuable to the empire. The central Lunda, who had little metallurgical or carving skills, derived both weapons and carvings from this area.

The Lunda invaders hunted slaves as they conquered. They built great fortified military camps, with ditches and extensive palissades. In the Kwango valley they found Yaka, Suku and perhaps at Okango yet other chiefdoms structured after the Kongo pattern. These they overran, while many inhabitants fled. But the structures were not destroyed. Instead the Lunda established superior or parallel kilolo (chiefs). As a result a complex, three-tiered political structure came into being in which even the ideology of the state was split between ‘autochthons’ and Lunda invaders. But the leader of the Yaka, the kiamfu (a term derived from Yav, the imperial title), could not control all his own men. In the north a semi-independent state arose, that of the Pelende, whilst a group called the Sonde–Luwa emigrated east of the Middle Kwango and founded chiefdoms of their own.

Once established, the Yaka kings started raiding the lands towards the Kwilu to gather slaves for sale to Angolan, Kongo and Vili traders. This provoked major upheavals in the region. The Suku kingdom arose as a result of successful resistance, but elsewhere people fled north-eastwards provoking, by the nineteenth century, the high densities of population observed around the fifth degree of latitude south.

The final expedition went from the west of the Kasai river northwards, probably along the valley of the Tshikapa. It founded two small states: one at the main falls of the Kasai with a capital at Mai Munene which soon became a major market for caravans from the River Kwango; and the other, called Mwaka Kumbana, on the River Loange. In both areas the Lunda

35. C. M. N. White, 1962, pp. 15–8; J. K. Thornton, 1981a, p. 5 and footnote 29 (Shinje; Malonda).
36. Evidence from Lunda tradition and from the stylistic study of art used at the Lunda court related to a later period (19th century) but may well be (certainly with regard to metal) valid for the second half of the 18th century as well. The carving activities of the Chokwe at that time are attested by stylistic borrowing from late Portuguese Renaissance and indeed from Portuguese Rococo objects.
37. M. C. Correia Leitão, 1938, p. 25. Similar fortifications were known in the heartland, among the Kanyok and in the Luba heartland. Military technology diffused throughout the region.
38. ibid.
40. The ethnic groups now called Mbala and Ngongo all moved north as a result of Yaka raids.
The political system of the Luba and Lunda mixed with the other recent immigrants – the Pende – as well as with autochthons. The resulting political systems were much less like the organization of the central Rund than other Lunda states. This was due to the political influence of the Pende in the area and the continuing existence of almost independent Pende chiefdoms.  

Conclusion

By 1800 Luba and Lunda expansion had structured all the savannah area of Central Africa east of the River Kwango. They had spread a common general culture over the whole area giving its various peoples common world views, common rituals and common emblems and symbols. Some objects, such as the Lunda horned caps, are found from the River Kwango to the Lualaba. Some institutions, such as the boys' mukanda, known from west of the Kwango valley since the 1650s, spread at first with the Pende then with the Lunda and, in the north, from the Pende to the Kuba. Such widespread movement was facilitated by the existence of the trading routes and even by raids. Population mobility especially through marriage alliances, was astonishing, as evidenced by the diffusion of names for although women went to live with their husbands, clan-names were inherited through the mother. Common names are found from the River Kwango to the Kasai and from the Kasai to the Luapula.

Lunda expansion, however, also led to devastation over huge areas. The militaristic nature of the Lunda states should not be underestimated, nor their large-scale slave-raiding. The low population densities in southern Kwango and eastern Angola were probably partly due to these raids. Certainly the bunching of populations along the fifth parallel between Kwango and Kwilu was a result of these activities. This, and the presence of a common political culture from Kwango to the Luapula river, still constitutes the contemporary heritage throughout this huge area.

The region discussed in this chapter is bounded on the south by the Zambezi, on the north by the Songwe and Ruvuma rivers, on the west by the Luangwa, and on the east by the Indian Ocean. The southern zone of this region was dominated by the Chewa speakers with their sub-groups: the Manganja of the lower Shire valley and Nyanja around the southern end of Lake Malawi. To the west of the Chewa were the Nsenga and to the east the Lolo–Makua–Lomwe speakers and the Yao. The northern zone stretched on the western side of Lake Malawi from the Chewa–Tumbuka marginal zone in the south to the Songwe river in the north. Three language families occupy this zone: the Tumbuka, the Ngonde–Nyakyusa, and the Sukwa–Lambya–Nyiha. In 1500, all the people of the southern zone and the Tumbuka of the north belonged to the ‘matrilineal cluster of Central Bantu speakers’ which stretched from southern Zaire in the west to the Indian Ocean in the east. In the centuries after 1500, however, the Tumbuka changed to patrilineal descent. The Ngonde–Nyakyusa and Sukwa–Lambya–Nyiha had always been patrilineal since the dawn of their historical tradition. The region today comprises eastern Zambia, all of Malawi, and northern Mozambique.

In the period under discussion, the southern zone was dominated in the fifteenth century by the arrival of the Maravi and the rise of their state system, and in the sixteenth and seventeenth by its expansion over the Nsenga to the west and the Lolo–Makua–Lomwe to the east. In the north, in the sixteenth century the people were organized in clusters of autonomous clans except for the Simbowe and Mbale chiefdoms in the Karonga plain and Phoka highlands respectively. Late in the same century, however, an immigrant group – the Ngulube – founded the states of Lambya, Ngonde, Chifungwe, Sukwa and a number of Nyakyusa chiefdoms. In the same period, the expansion of the Maravi into the Tumbuka–Chewa marginal zone led to the establishment of new Chewa chiefdoms such as Kanyenda, Kabunduli, Kaluluma and Chulu over Tumbuka peoples, creating in the main the Tonga people and language. In both zones the trade in ivory was a major factor in the eighteenth century. The southern zone was then characterized by the decline of the Maravi state system, the rise of successor states, and the outward spread of the Yao.
FIG. 21.1  Peoples of the Northern Zambezia region in the eighteenth century
initially as traders and latterly as state founders. Among the Tumbuka, a group of immigrants from Nyamwezi country – the Balowoka – settled and created economic spheres of influence which eventually emerged as political entities. The older established states south of the Songwe, however, remained aloof from these new commercial developments until well into the nineteenth century.

Prior to the sixteenth century, the region experienced a succession of Iron Age immigrations, including those which brought the first ancestors of the modern Bantu-speaking inhabitants. Archaeology has shed much light on this subject. It tells us, for example, that the region began to be occupied by an iron-using, food-producing and possibly Bantu-speaking population as early as +300. Until the eleventh century, the Iron Age inhabitants in question were distinguished by their use of such closely related pottery as Mwavarambo and Mwamasapa in the north, and Kapeni, Nkope and Longwe in the south.¹ By the twelfth century, however, these earlier pottery traditions had begun to give way to fresh ones such as Mawudzu and Luangwa, whose introduction has been associated with the arrival of the first ancestors of the modern Bantu-speaking populations.²

The initial settlement by modern Bantu-speakers therefore appears to have occurred in the period after +1200. The new immigrants arrived from the north in clans or agglomerations of clans, and once in the region they displaced or assimilated the earlier Bantu and pre-Bantu agriculturalists and hunter-gatherers.

In northern Malawi, the earliest of the modern Bantu settlers were a predominantly stateless or pre-dynastic population (Fig. 21.2). They included the clans of Sikwese, Chilima, Silumbu, Simwayi, Namwenes (of the Karonga plain), Chiluba, Mzembe, Luhanga, Nyanjagha, Nyirongo, Kanyinji, Mtonga and so on, whom later and stronger immigrants tried to organize into states, with varying degrees of success.

In eastern Zambia, east of the Luangwa river, the earliest of the modern Bantu-speaking inhabitants are said to have been the Katanga. Further east in central Malawi, they comprised a number of clans to whom the term 'proto-Chewa' has been loosely applied. In particular, the term is associated with the Banda, Mbewe and Zimba clans which claim to be indigenous to the area. In oral tradition, the proto-Chewa are sometimes referred to as Kalimanjira (Path-makers) who cleared the country of its earlier nomadic inhabitants, the Batwa and Kafula. In some parts of central Malawi, the proto-Chewa clans are also associated with a local creation myth according to which man and all the birds and animals of his Malawian environment were created at Kapirintiwa Hill which is located on the

boundary between Central Malawi and Western Mozambique. It is not possible, on the other hand, to be definite about the origins and early composition of the Lolo-Makua-Lomwe and Yao of northern Mozambique. None of them has clear traditions of how they occupied their present homelands. This is probably because they occupied their country many centuries ago and have therefore long since lost memory of their exact origins. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Lolo already occupied the south-western part of northern Mozambique, while the Makua and other Lomwe-speaking groups inhabited the coast opposite Mozambique Island and its hinterland as far as the highlands in the central part of the country. The Yao had their homeland to the north-west of the Makua, between the Ruvuma river in the north and the Lujenda in the south.

In the northern zone, the earliest modern Bantu-speaking inhabitants

3. The following are among the main sources on the interaction between the modern Bantu-speakers and the earlier inhabitants of this region: H. L. Vail; H. W. Langworthy, 1969b; K. M. Phiri, 1975b; and A. J. William-Myers, 1978b.
4. Field research on the oral history of northern Mozambique was not possible before 1975 because of the national liberation struggle there. The situation has probably changed now as the Centro de Estudos Africanos in Maputo is currently committed to rectifying
for whom there are records settled in the area between the Songwe and South Rukuru rivers. They included the Sikwese, Chilima, Mwenekisindile and Mwenefumbo clans of the Chitipa and Karonga plains, and the Mzembe and Chiluba clans of the mountainous Phoka area south-west of Karonga. Their traditions of origin claim that they came from the north-eastern side of Lake Malawi and may have been related to the abilema who are believed to have lived in Unyakyusa before the Lwembe lineage settled there. Not long afterwards, however, fresh and in most cases more powerful groups also began to infiltrate the area. These included the Simbowe who occupied the Karonga plain and the Mbane who invaded the Phoka area. They too came from the north, with the Mbale claiming to have migrated into the Lake Malawi region from the area south of Lake Victoria.

The Mbale migration into the Phoka highlands probably occurred in the fourteenth century. The new immigrants were noted iron-smelters and they easily established good relations with the autochthons, the Mzembe and Chiluba, on whom they came to depend for agricultural produce and some of the coal deposits which they needed for their furnaces. The Mzembe and Chiluba, on the other hand, began to depend on the Mbale for iron agricultural tools and weapons. Thus it would appear that there was a general migration of people southwards using the corridor between Lakes Tanganyika and Malawi as a main passage. Some of these people probably moved further south into central Malawi or the Chewa-speaking zone.

Between the Phoka and Chewa areas in the north and south respectively, there lived various Tumbuka-speaking clans. The Nkamanga plain, Henga and Kasitu valleys were inhabited mainly by the Luhanga, Kachali, Nyirongo, Mtika and Nyanjagha clans. Some of these groups seem to have spread as far east as the lakeshore and as far west as the Luangwa valley in modern Lundazi district of eastern Zambia. The Nsenga, the present-day inhabitants of the latter region, seem to have evolved into a 'tribe' as a result of interaction between Tumbuka groups moving in from the east and Luba/Lunda-related immigrants from the west. They speak a language that is akin to Tumbuka and share the same clan-names with the inhabitants of Tumbukaland. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the situation. The historical traditions of the Yao in Malawi, on the other hand, have been collected systematically of late, see K. Lapukeni, P. Rashid, N. Kumwembe and J. B. Webster, 1978; K. M. Phiri, M. Vaughan and D. Makuluni, 1978; and R. B. Misomali, G. Mkondiwa and H. K. Bhila, 1978; Y. B. Abdallah, 1919a; L. D. Soka, 1953; and E. A. Alpers, 1975a. The Yao, according to their traditions, originated around 'Yao Hill' in the area between the Rovuma and Luambala rivers. According to Alpers, the Makua spread to other parts of north Mozambique from the Namuli Hills in the central part of northern Mozambique.

they tended to act as a bridge between the Tumbuka in the east and the Bisa in the west.

Thus prior to about 1500, the political structure of the entire region from the Songwe river in the north to the Zambezi in the south, with the exception of a few pockets, was characterized by the prevalence of stateless or small-scale polities. The different ethnic groups were each comprised of local chieftaincies with a two-tier hierarchy of authority. This form of political organization revolved around a local chieftain as the uppermost authority. The chief presided over a group of closely related lineage-based villages of which his own was the most senior genealogically. To the community of villages surrounding him, he rendered religious, judicial and military services, and was in turn entitled to the allegiance of all his followers.

Though politically and sometimes physically divided into ethnic and clan spheres of influence, the Lake Malawi region enjoyed a certain degree of social and religious cohesion. Religious affiliation in particular provided a basis of cohesion within and across the different socio-linguistic groups. Indeed over the greater part of this region, religious action was expressed at a local as well as territorial level. At a local level, religion played the function of ensuring the moral and material well-being of the population, while at a territorial level it also fostered cultural and ecological cooperation.

Religious practice for most people in this part of Africa involved ancestor veneration, spirit possession, rain-making, and control of witchcraft. Among the Chewa-speaking peoples, for example, the Nyau Secret Society (Plate 21.1) was an important vehicle for expressing and dramatizing ethnic creation myths, the moral code, and so on. Among other things, a Nyau performance dramatized the interdependence of the natural and spirit worlds, and the Chewa creation myth according to which man, animals and spirits once lived together in harmony. The chief manifestation of a territorial religious experience, on the other hand, was the rain cults. A number of these spanned large areas were dedicated to a territorially acknowledged god or spirit, and controlled by an élite of priests and functionaries. The Chikha-ng'ombe and Chisumphe cults of the Tumbuka and Chewa respectively belonged to this category.

It has been shown that at least within the matrilineal belt extending from the Tumbuka–Chewa marginal zone in the north to the Zambezi valley in the south, there was a considerable degree of interaction and overlap between the various territorial religious cults. The deity was represented in the same way throughout. Among the Tumbuka and Chewa, for example, he took the physical form of a snake, was thought to be a male force, and had several spirit wives devoted to his service. The functionaries dedicated to the services of this deity were possessed and set apart for their

8. This view is strongly supported by T. O. Ranger, 1973, and J. M. Schoffeleers, 1979a, pp. 6–23.
PLATE 21.1 Mask used by the Nyau Secret Society, the most revered institution among the Chokwe/Maravi peoples.
special role in society. Noting these structural similarities between the different rain cults north of the Zambezi, Schoffeleers has postulated that the different cults in Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe may have belonged to the same cult-complex. Be that as it may, religion provided an important means of communication and interaction between peoples who were otherwise divided politically.

Among the Chewa and related peoples of the southern zone, the loose political structure which prevailed before 1500 was greatly transformed by the emergence of the Maravi state system at the beginning of the sixteenth century and its expansion later in the same century and in the seventeenth. The Maravi thus dominate the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century political history of the lower northern Zambezia region just as the builders of the Mutapa state dominate that of Southern Zambezia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

It is now generally agreed that the Maravi arrived in the Lake Malawi region as immigrants who originated in the Luba area of south-eastern Zaire, and that they entered central Malawi from the west after migrating through the great plateau of north-eastern Zambia. On reaching the southern end of Lake Malawi, they rapidly established themselves as rulers over the earlier proto-Chewa inhabitants, consolidated their rule, and then embarked on a campaign of territorial expansion which took them beyond central and southern Malawi into adjacent parts of Zambia and Mozambique (Fig. 21.3). By the early seventeenth century, therefore, their confederation of states encompassed the greater part of eastern Zambia, central and southern Malawi and northern Mozambique. In this way, the Maravi state system came to have a political, military and economic impact over a vast area.

However, the process which led to this political configuration is not yet clearly understood by historians. No one is yet clear how the Maravi state was created or the factors which were conducive to state growth in the region.

One view holds that the Maravi arrived in the country as a group of invaders who were fully equipped with the symbols of chiefly power with the help of which they established themselves as a ruling class over what must have been a stateless indigenous population. This theory emphasizes the external origins of Maravi kingship and political institutions and


10. The only evidence to date the arrival of the Maravi in the Lake Malawi area is archaeological. C-14 dates from Maravi occupation sites that have been excavated range from 1420–80, thus suggesting that the Maravi arrived in the fifteenth century. See K. R. Robinson, 1972, pp. 61–3, and M. J. Schoffeleers, 1973, pp. 48–53. Dr Newitt, however, is of the opinion that the Maravi did not occupy the northern banks of the Lower Zambezi until the early sixteenth century: see M. D. D. Newitt, 1982, pp. 47–8.

11. This theory was first advanced by R. A. Hamilton. After a close reading of Chewa
therefore possibly underplays the intricate interweaving of indigenous and immigrant ideologies in the formation of the state. Andrew Roberts, for example, has argued that although invasion and conquest may have been crucial steps in the creation of states in some parts of tropical Africa, historians should also think in terms of how newcomers acquired authority by virtue of importing useful techniques and ideas.\textsuperscript{12} He has a vision of what would have happened in a socially and economically differentiated society where a group possessing ideas and techniques – which could be used to exploit the natural environment or to resolve long-standing conflicts or feuds, for example – was also likely to dominate the others.

Other hypotheses have also been popular with different writers. One of these would have us take into account the role of demographic factors. Agnew, for instance, speaks of geographical momentum – soil fertility, oral traditions, he concluded that a major political change occurred in the fourteenth or fifteenth century. A group of incoming chiefly invaders known by the clan name Phiri then superimposed themselves over a long established and loosely organized indigenous population. See R. A. Hamilton, 1955a, p. 21. Since then, this view has been echoed by several writers, including M. G. Marwick, 1963, pp. 377–8; and M. J. Schoffeleers, 1972a, pp. 96–9.

\textsuperscript{12} A. D. Roberts, 1976, p. 84.
adequate rainfall and reliable food supply – which from early times has been conducive to the greater concentration of population on the western side of Lake Malawi than in the neighbouring areas to the east and west. A growing population engaged in surplus production, albeit modest, would have served as a suitable basis for the accumulation of dynastic power.13

Another hypothesis takes into account the trade factor, maintaining that the formation of a state at the southern end of Lake Malawi in the fifteenth or sixteenth century arose from the need for an authority to control the development of the trade in ivory between the southern shores of the lake and the east coast of Africa via the Shire–Zambezi water system. The argument, in other words, is that it was by exercising control over the growth of this trade that the early Kalongas (as Maravi paramounts were called) were able to accumulate power.14

Lastly, there is the conflict hypothesis which maintains that the Maravi state evolved out of the dialectics of interaction between the incoming Maravi–Phiri group and the indigenous proto-Chewa inhabitants. On this, Chewa oral traditions specifically point to how – after an initial period of conflict – an acceptable relationship was worked out, according to which the Maravi–Phiri invaders would act as rulers of the country while the indigenous proto-Chewa–Banda acted as ‘owners of the soil’.15 As to what might have prompted the indigenes to accept the leadership of the immigrants, a possible answer is to be found in the strength of the Maravi kinship organization. In later periods, it was this which served as a unifying link between the various Maravi sub-divisions as they dispersed.

Oral tradition, the main source of information on the early history of the area, on the other hand, is rather reticent on exactly how the Maravi state was founded. It simply maintains that under the leadership of Kalonga Chidzonzi, who headed the most senior Phiri royal lineage, the Maravi established their first kingdom around Mankhamba and Manthimba on the south-western side of Lake Malawi. Here, the Kalonga set up his headquarters at Manthimba or Maravi and designated the village of Mankhamba (which probably predated the Maravi advent) as the religious centre of the kingdom. It is furthermore maintained that the Kalonga surrounded himself with a bureaucracy of administrators. They included the commander of the army, khombe, the public executioner, mkomba, and a land divider, mgawi. From Portuguese written sources of the seventeenth century, on the other hand, we learn that Manthimba developed into an important commercial and political centre. According to one observer in 1624, it was a densely populated place, within three kilometres of the lake.

with whose inhabitants Portuguese traders from Tete on the Zambezi conducted a prosperous trade.\textsuperscript{16}

Oral tradition, however, provides the only indication of the institutional mechanisms through which the Kalonga’s state was held together. One of these was the \textit{mlira} cult. Once every year, about the month of September, heads of the different Phiri royal lineages were invited to Manthimba for the ritual veneration of Mlira, the spirit of the great Kalonga Chinkhole who led their ancestors into the country at the time of the migration from the north. The ritual culminated in the burning of the Marimba bush which stretched for a considerable distance along the lake, from Mankhamba in the south to the Chilua river in the north. This ritual, we believe, was a surface manifestation of a royal cult which had a significant integrative function within the Maravi state. Equally important to the integration of the kingdom was the manner in which appointive offices of state were allocated. The Kalonga is said to have appointed some heads of proto-Chewa clans to important leadership positions in his state. The Banda, an important proto-Chewa clan, were caretakers (\textit{amatsano}) of the Kalonga’s shrine at Mankhamba while the Mwale under Khombe led the Kalonga’s warriors in battle. Traditions to this effect clearly underscore the extent to which non-Phiri or non-Maravi clan leaders were involved in the making of decisions pertaining to land tenure, the distribution of wealth, and the making of war.\textsuperscript{17}

The extent to which the Kalonga was able personally to direct the affairs of his kingdom may have begun to decline towards the last quarter of the sixteenth century when the state began to expand. This expansion was affected through heads of the junior Phiri lineages. Such heads were sent out from the Manthimba–Mankhamba area into adjacent territories. Mpinganjila was sent eastwards into the land adjoining the eastern bank of the Upper Shire. Nyangu went south and occupied the country on the western bank of the Upper Shire; Changamire occupied the present Kirk Range area to the west of Manthimba; Chauma went to settle to the north-west of Mankhamba; while Chinsamba went to occupy the country north of the Manthimba–Mankhamba area. Taken together, the territories controlled by the Kalonga and these subordinate chiefs formed the heartland of the Maravi state system as it evolved in the seventeenth century.

Another dimension of the Maravi expansion involved the migration of the Kalonga’s senior kinsmen into distant lands to the south and south-west of the heartland. This may have been a calculated move on the part of the early Kalongas as they sought to distance those who would have contested for the throne at Manthimba. Kaphwiti and Lundu migrated into and colonized the Lower Shire valley. Of the two, Kaphwiti was senior

\textsuperscript{16} Luiz Marianno, a Portuguese resident of Sena in 1924. His observations on the state of the ‘Maravi empire’ are summarized in J. Batalha-Reis, 1889.

and controlled the whole valley before he lost much of his authority to Lundu. The paramountcy of Kaphwiti, however, did not last for long. It had suffered an enigmatic blow by 1572 when it was reported that Lundu ruled the greater part of the valley from the Mamvera or Murchison rapids in the north to the confluence of the Zambezi with the Shire in the south. The desire to control the Sena ivory trade with the Portuguese probably accounted for the Lundu’s expansion of his sphere of influence, just as it might have led to the decline of the Kaphwitis who later found themselves cut off from this trade.18

It was the Lundu who, after his ascendancy in the Lower Shire valley, spearheaded Maravi expansion eastwards into Lolo and Makua country. The process of Maravi expansion in this part of Northern Zambezia started in the mid-sixteenth century. According to Nurse’s historical linguistic analysis, the Maravi or Chewa in this part of northern Mozambique must have begun to interact with the Lolo and Makua not later than c. 1560.19

Maravi invasion and conquest of Lolo–Makua country first owed much to the fanaticism of the Lundu’s warriors, whom some historians of Eastern Africa have identified with the notorious Zimba marauders of the late sixteenth century.20 If they are correct, then the Lundu must have employed a mercenary army drawn from the truculent inhabitants of the area west of the Lower Shire valley.21 According to dos Santos, the Zimba originated in that area before they moved toward Sena where they routed the Portuguese and their African allies in 1592. Thereafter, they swept through northern Mozambique and sacked the towns of Kilwa and Mombasa. It was not until they reached Malindi on the northern coast of Kenya that they were defeated by an alliance between the Swahili inhabitants of the town and the Segeju, a hinterland ethnic group with which the Sultan of Malindi was on friendly terms.22

Secondly, the success of the Lundu’s warriors in the east was due to the statelessness of the Lolo and Makua societies. It has been said of the Lolo in particular that ‘they had never been and seem never to have wanted to be notable or important’. Their political system was segmentary. The functions of government were performed by village headmen assisted by councils of elders. Together, these took decisions on all the military, judicial and religious affairs of their communities. Like the Lolo, the Makua also had a segmentary political system, but among them lineages belonging to

18. For a summary of the relative positions held by the Kaphwiti and Lundu in the pre-colonial politics of the Lower Shire valley, see H. H. K. Bhila, 1977. The expansion of the Lundu’s kingdom is in J. dos Santos, 1901. See also E. A. Alpers, 1968, pp. 20–2, and M. J. Schoffeleers, 1968, pp. 143–59.
21. Schoffeleers, however, has proposed that the Zimba originated on the southern bank of the Zambezi where they were displaced by the wars of Portuguese colonial expansion between Sena and Tete: see M. J. Schoffeleers, 1980, pp. 15–19.
the same clan sometimes combined under the leadership of the one who headed the most powerful lineage. Under this kind of impetus and as a result of pressure from the Portuguese, strong chieftaincies emerged among the coastal Makua in the late sixteenth century.  

The Lundu’s warriors conquered both the Lolo and Makua and had them incorporated into a tributary state which the Portuguese residents of the Lower Zambezi termed ‘Bororo’. In this conquest state, about which more is known than any aspect of Makua–Lolo history up to 1800, the Maravi established several chieftainships to govern their subjects some of whom did become auxiliary vassals. Politically, it was expedient then for many Makua to claim a Maravi origin. Culturally, however, there was considerable synthesis of Maravi and Makua customs and traditions, particularly in the Quelimane area.

As a result, by the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Lundu controlled a vast territory north of the Zambezi, from the Lower Shire in the west almost to the Indian Ocean in the east. Not only was he recognized as ‘the second most powerful person in the empire of Maravi (the first being Kalonga)’, but his warriors periodically descended on the Makua part of the coast to raid Portuguese settlements.

The Lundu held his vast kingdom together with the help of loyal military generals and vassals drawn from junior lineages within his clan. Furthermore, his state had an economic underpinning in that the different peoples whom it encompassed depended on the salt, iron and machila cotton cloths that were produced by the Lundu’s Manganja subjects in the Lower Shire valley. Manganja religion was another unifying factor in the state. Centred on the Mbona cult whose central shrine was at Khulubvi in the Lower Shire valley, the theology of Manganja religion encompassed many elements of commoner protest against the misuse of royal power and prerogative. Consequently, the official cult of the Lundu paramountcy found many adherents over a large territory stretching from the seat of the Lundus in the Lower Shire valley to the Zambezi delta on the east coast.

The immense prestige enjoyed by the Lundu in the eastern part of the Maravi confederation did not go unchallenged. The Kalonga who himself controlled a vast territory on the western and eastern sides of Lake Malawi as well as along the Upper Shire became extremely anxious about the Lundu’s growing power. In the 1620s and 1630s, therefore, Maravi expansion eastward was stalled by the vicious internal rivalry which developed

23. The best description of the Lolo and Makua political system in the sixteenth century is that given by J. dos Santos, 1901, p. 308. Examples of emergent and powerful Makua chiefs of the time are Maviamuno and Mauruka whose relations with the Portuguese are treated at considerable length by E. A. Alpers, 1975a, pp. 14–85.


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between the Kalonga and Lundu.²⁷ Thereafter, the scene of dramatic events as far as Maravi expansion was concerned shifted from the east to the south-west. In this latter direction, Undi then established his own kingdom which he later expanded as the Lundu had done in the Lower Shire and further east.

According to one version of the traditions relating to the establishment of Undi’s kingdom, the founder was sent out by the Kalonga to occupy the sandy plains near Nsengeland. Another version, however, suggests that Undi’s departure for the south-west was occasioned by a major conflict within the ruling Phiri clan at Manthimba.²⁸ The second version seems more reliable because most traditions have it that Undi left Manthimba with many followers after quarrelling with the Kalonga over such issues as political succession and the distribution of tribute.

In the west, Undi and his followers successfully colonized the Kapoche river area, a tributary of the Zambezi. Thereafter, they extended the boundaries of their nascent kingdom from the banks of the Kapoche river westward toward the confluence of the Zambezi with the Luangwa. In that direction, Undi’s warriors came into conflict with the Tawara along the Zambezi and the Nsenga along the eastern bank of the lower Luangwa. But the extent to which the Maravi then came to dominate the Nsenga has been the subject of some debate.

Historians approaching the subject from the Malawian side maintain that the first notable event in the history of the Nsenga was this invasion of their country by Undi and his warriors in the mid-seventeenth century. This invasion, it is claimed, was directed by Chimwala, the Undi’s classificatory nephew, and initially aimed at the subjugation of Mundikula who then headed the largest and most important Nsenga clan, that of the Mwanza. According to William-Myers, one of the few researchers who have approached the debate from the Zambian side, however, about three-quarters of the Nsenga on the eastern side of the Luangwa were at one time or another in a tributary relationship with Undi. The conclusion to draw from this is that during its expansive phases, Undi’s state encompassed a number of Nsenga chieftaincies, but that this did not apply to all the Nsenga as such. The south-western Nsenga near Feira in Zambia, for example, have no traditions of having been a part of Undi’s ‘empire’.²⁹

Despite the debate, there is still the question of how Undi may have established a certain degree of political control over the Nsenga. The traditional argument is that Undi and his subordinates used force and the creation of perpetual kinship relationships according to which the conquered Nsenga chiefs were recognized as ‘sons’ or ‘nephews’ of the

Maravi chiefs. Of late, however, a stronger argument has been presented. This is that trade and famine may have played a crucial role in the expansion of Undi’s influence over neighbouring peoples. Undi, it has been shown, enjoyed immense influence with Portuguese traders at Tete, and this fact enabled him to exercise indirect control over participants from neighbouring polities. Secondly, Nsenga chiefdoms along the Luangwa valley suffered from endemic famine and their inhabitants often sought relief in Undi’s territory which was more fertile than their own. The combined control and regulation of trade and famine relief placed Undi in an extremely strong position vis-à-vis the neighbouring peoples and polities.30

There is every indication, on the other hand, that Undi and his kinsmen allowed the Nsenga chieftains who came under their influence to continue to administer the affairs of their clans and areas, as long as they sent tribute in ivory and slaves to Undi’s headquarters on the Kapoche river. Nevertheless, from the time of the conquest, the Nsenga adopted the Maravi system of chieftainship which they also adapted to suit their own customs. This explains why the Mundikula (or Kalindawalo), Chimfombo and Chifuka chiefly lines maintain that Undi installed them as chiefs in the olden days.

The Maravi and their Chewa surrogates also expanded northwards into Tumbuka country. Among the princely leaders who migrated in that direction were Chulu, Kaluluma, Kanyenda and Kabunduli. Their presence there resulted in the creation of mixed socio-linguistic groups of whom the Tonga of northern Khsota Khota and Nkhata-Bay districts are the most obvious.

Chulu and Kaluluma, for example, moved into the southern Tumbuka area known as Chimaliro and the surrounding plains. Here, they encountered a Tumbuka people who were self-sufficient economically but loosely organized politically. There was little political or military cooperation among the different Tumbuka clans: Zimba, Kanyinji, Nyirongo, Mtonga, and so on. The manner in which Chulu or Kaluluma established himself as ruler over a predominantly Tumbuka-speaking population, however, is subject to conflicting interpretations in Chewa and Tumbuka oral traditions. In the case of Kaluluma, Chewa oral traditions have it that the Tumbuka initially welcomed him and his entourage. Later, however, they decided to rebel but were crushed in the fighting which ensued. The Tumbuka version, on the other hand, is more elaborate. It maintains that Kaluluma was given permission by the Tumbuka headmen to settle in the area as a commoner. Not long afterwards, however, he began to tour the countryside to compel everyone to recognize him as chief, and to force the Tumbuka headmen to help him carry the grinding stone (mphelo) on which his favourite snuff was ground. In protest, therefore, the Tumbuka tried to expel him, but he defeated them instead.31

These traditions suggest that lacking the institution of territorial chieftainship, the Tumbuka tried to resist early Maravi attempts to impose it on them. It is also possible that the conflict had an economic origin since as immigrants who still lacked a solid economic foundation of their own, the Maravi/Chewa immigrants may have become a burden on the surplus production of their Tumbuka hosts.

Kanyenda and Kabunduli migrated into what later became Tongaland. Both originally came from the heartland of the Maravi empire near the Linthipe river in the south. Their migration northward brought them to Khota Khota mid-way along the western side of the lake where Kabunduli split from Kanyenda. Kabunduli then migrated further north into Tongaland via Chimaliro in the west. In Tongaland, Kabunduli soon earned a reputation for re-organizing the once scattered Tonga groups whom he apparently defeated and brought under his own control. As his reputation increased, he was followed by a number of Chewa commoner families from the Chewa heartland, such as the Kapunda Banda who claim to have come from Chauwa’s area in what is now eastern Lilongwe.32

This intermingling of the Maravi with the original inhabitants of Tong-

galand accounts for the peculiarities of Tonga society as we know it today. Chitonga, the language of the area, is a bridge between the Tumbuka and Chewa languages. The Tonga are also the only group in northern Malawi to have remained matrilineal in descent and inheritance customs to this day. This shows that Tonga society has acted as a bridge historically between the matrilineal Chewa complex in the south and the patrilineal Tumbuka–Phoka complex in the north.

For the Chewa–Maravi peoples, the seventeenth century was a ‘golden age’ when as a result of their territorial expansion they emerged as the most renowned power-brokers north of the Zambezi. Even the Portuguese, ensconced as they were in their settlements along the Zambezi, were forced to co-operate with them. This was because the Maravi did not confine their interest to the area north of the Zambezi. From the 1590s through to the 1630s, they actively interfered in what was the Portuguese sphere-of-influence south of the Zambezi. They were interested in the lucrative gold and silver mines of the Munhumutapa’s domains, and in exercising a certain amount of control over traffic along the Zambezi.33

For two generations at the beginning of the seventeenth century, therefore, the Portuguese, from Angoche on the east coast to Tete up the Zambezi, sought to contain the Maravi, by collaborating with them. They recruited large numbers of Maravi warriors to help them in their campaigns against the Karanga or Shona south of the Zambezi as well as against local enemies in the immediate vicinity of their Zambezi settlements. For example, in 1608 the Portuguese at Tete received 4000 warriors from the Kalonga Muzula for their campaign against rebellious subjects of their ally, Munhumutapa Gatsi Rusere. Six years later in 1614 the Portuguese at Sena sought the assistance of the Lundu in mounting an armed expedition to Chicoa north-west of Tete, to search for silver. The Kalonga was again called upon to assist the Portuguese in 1623. This time he dispatched thousands of warriors across the Zambezi to help the Portuguese suppress some Karanga chiefs who took to arms following the death of Gatsi Rusere. The campaign was a success for these Maravi warriors, for they are reported to have retreated to their side of the Zambezi laden with loot in the form of gold and cattle. Again in 1635, the Lundu aided the Portuguese in crushing an uprising of Swahili chieftains in the Angoche (Quelimane) district north of the Zambezi delta.34

There is also evidence, on the other hand, to indicate that the Portuguese co-operated with the Maravi out of necessity rather than choice. Up to the end of the seventeenth century, the Portuguese residents of Sena and Tete dreaded the Maravi whom they regarded as ‘very bad neighbours’, unlike the Lolo and Makua who gave them no trouble.35

The Maravi expansion had several effects. For example, the creation of the Lundu state east of the Lower Shire valley made it possible for the Mbona cult among the Manganja to spread its influence more widely than would otherwise have been possible. The economic and cultural effects were perhaps as significant. Within territory encompassed by the Maravi confederation in the seventeenth century, trade in ivory flourished. As a result, Northern Zambezia had considerable interaction with the world's mercantile capitalist economy. The 'Maravi empire' may also have fostered cultural uniformity between the different matrilineal peoples of the Northern Zambezia region, as can be attested by the fact that they share the same clan-names and have a common descent-system.\(^{36}\)

While the Maravi were expanding over the southern zone in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the north was being penetrated by the Ngulube immigrants from the north-east. Like the Maravi advent in the south, the coming of the Ngulube is a major event in the history of the northern zone.\(^{37}\) Their coming also enables more precise dating, since regnal lists for the major chieftaincies can be reconstructed back to the time of their founding. The only problem is that although the regnal lists seem fairly reliable, the number of reigns per dynastic generation is not always easy to determine, since informants are not always clear on the way the system of succession operated. The regnal list of the Kyungus who ruled Ungonde, for example, contains fifteen names prior to about 1940. One suggestion is that this represents a minimum of nine dynastic generations. The list of the Mwaulambyas, the rulers of Ulamba, contains sixteen names prior to 1940, representing a maximum of twelve dynastic generations.\(^{38}\) It is also worth noting that the founding rulers of Ungonde, Ulamba and Unyiha were near contemporaries, with those of Ulamba having preceded the others by perhaps a few generations.

In the vanguard of the Ngulube migration, the Mwaulambya crossed the Songwe river south of the Misuku hills into what came to be called Ulamba. There he found the Sikwese and Chilima clans. The Mwaulambya assumed political control through more peaceful means than the Kyungu who was shortly to invade the Karonga plain. This was partly because the former's migration party was probably smaller than the latter's. Consequently, the Mwaulambya was more accommodating than the Kyungu whose close advisers were chosen exclusively from those who had accompanied him for all, or part of, the migration. The major officials of the Mwaulambya on the other hand were drawn from the families found in the region, the latter sharing prestige and political power with the new

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\(^{36}\) E. A. Alpers, 1975a, pp. 56–8. Alpers also holds the view that as time passed, participation in this trade was unremunerative for most peoples of East-Central Africa. The similarity between social institutions has been noted by J. B. Webster, 1977, pp. 4–5.


Similarly, the Msukwa assumed political power over the Simwayi and Silumbu clans without the use of excessive force. Both Ulambya and Misuku were founded on compromise.

The modern language situation reflects something about the numerical strength of the various immigrant parties who founded chieftaincies as well as the means by which they assumed power and later governed the people. Cilambya and the language of Kameme are dialects of the indigenous Nyiha while Kyongo and Kinyakyusa are dialects of the Ngulube peoples' language. In other words, the Mwaulambya and Kameme and their followers were assimilated linguistically while in Ungonde and Unyakyusa the indigenous people were assimilated by the immigrants. Modern Cisukwa is a dialect of Ndali (a linguistic group north of the Songwe) understood by the Nyiha-speakers and relatively easier to learn by the Ngonde than Nyiha proper. Cisukwa thus forms a bridge between the Nyiha and Ngonde languages.

The Kyungu, Kameme and party migrated to the Karonga plain via Unyiha, Uiwa, Unamwanga and then Ulambya and Misuku in the west. Although Ngonde court traditions claim that their ancestors established political authority in Unamwanga and Uiwa, those of the latter area dispute this and point to Ubisa and ultimately the Luba country as the original home of their present line of rulers. At any rate, within a short time of their arrival in Karonga, Kameme returned and settled in the area immediately west of Ulambya. Here he established political authority over a people who were mainly of Nyiha stock although in later years many Mambwe and Namwanga migrated into the Kameme chiefdom. How the Kameme established his state is not clear. It was clearly a smaller polity than that of his brother, the Kyungu, who founded his kingdom on an already established state ruled by the Simbowe.

Simbowe is a clan name and evidence suggests that it was a title used by a long list of rulers. The Simbowe clan came from Unyiha in modern Tanzania and had established itself at Mbande hill in the west-central section of the Karonga lakeshore. The basis of Simbowe's power is not clear but it would appear that he was a trader, and part of a trading network which might have extended to the east coast. Archaeological excavations carried out by Robinson at Mbande and the surrounding area have yielded artifacts which include glass beads, porcelain and conus shells. Indeed, Robinson himself concluded that the fifteenth- to sixteenth-century artifacts probably belonged to the pre-Portuguese period on the east coast, that is, during the height of Arab power and commercial influence.

Simbowe's relations with the indigenous people do not appear to have been easy; after his arrival, the Kyungu formed an alliance with the Mwenekisindile who were the custodians of an important religious shrine associated with a snake cult. Indeed, it seems that the Mwenekisindile

40. The section that follows is based on O. J. M. Kalinga, 1979a.
assisted the Kyungu in planning and executing the attack upon Simbowe. The Kyungu assumed power at Mbande by force and gradually was able to establish a new order. Once settled, the Kyungus maintained their supremacy over their new subjects by establishing a ritual centre devoted to the cult of their royal ancestors. The Kyungu did not attend the ritual centre, but gave his blessings to Mulwa, a senior official who had accompanied him to the area and who became the centre's head. In addition, adults in the kingdom attended an annual ceremony in which all fires were extinguished and new ones lit from the central fire at the royal court, a ceremony during which the people renewed allegiance to the Kyungu. On a more frequent basis the people were expected to pay tribute to the Kyungu and work in the royal gardens. The Kyungu and his officials further established themselves in the area by marrying into the original local families.

Before the arrival of the Kyungu clan the people seem to have worshipped the high god through intermediary spirits such as the divine snake. The Kyungus employed the ancestors as mediums for the worship of their own high god, Ngulube, thus introducing and promoting royal ancestor worship. As the people slowly accepted the growth of ancestral worship they also accepted the divinity of the Kyungu. He became priest-king and communicator with the royal ancestors. To the Ngonde, the Kyungu became the living representative of god. His health determined their welfare and prosperity and to safeguard this he was restricted to his residence. Should the Kyungu show even minor signs of illness he was immediately smothered by his councillors, the makambala. As ancestral veneration gained popularity in the area, the snake cult — and with it the Kisindile clan — became much less influential.

These developments occurred during the reigns of the first four Kyungus, roughly between 1600 and 1720. Soon after the death of the third Kyungu, Mwakalosi, his son and successor renounced the throne because he feared that should he fall ill, the makambala would kill him. He also refused to have all but one of his children killed. The two practices were designed to avoid competition for the throne. The makambala were also protecting their own position by ensuring that a ruler was of their own choice. The crisis caused by the refusal of Mwakalosi to accede to the throne was averted when the makambala installed his brother Magemo as Kyungu.

The Kameme, Mwaulambya and Msukwa chiefdoms also promoted royal ancestral veneration. However, they became more Nyiha in their philosophy as in their language, and smothering the monarch, restricting his movements and killing royal children never featured in their history. However, all these chiefdoms represent the introduction into the area of a

41. More details are to be found in R. J. Mwaipape, 'History and social customs of the Ngonde of Northern Malawi' (unpublished manuscript completed in 1982 and in author's possession).
new form of political organization which brought together religion and politics under more elevated and prestigious leaders and where relations among the citizenry were based more upon political than upon kinship ties.  

An even greater crisis occurred in the Ngonde kingdom upon the death of Kyungu Magemo whose only successor, Mwangonde, was too young to succeed him. His sister’s son, Kasyombe, became Kyungu. Kasyombe’s father, a Ndali, was the ruler of a small area on the north-western corner of the Karonga plain. With Kasyombe’s accession to power in about 1750, therefore, this new region was incorporated into an enlarged Ngonde kingdom.

Another important change resulting from the accession of Kasyombe was that the *makambala* began to lose some of their powers to the Kyungu. Kasyombe had been brought up at Ngana in the northern part of the kingdom. He insisted on personally touring the kingdom and ended the practice of killing the male children of the Kyungus. The number of princes proliferated leading in turn to a further increase in the powers of the monarch, especially after some of his successors such as Mwangonde (c.1785–1839) assigned portions of land to some princes thereby ensuring that the Kyungus’ influence was felt throughout the domain. There can be no doubt, however, that by 1800, the Ngonde kingdom was confident enough to begin asserting itself in the international politics of the wider region south of the Songwe.

Thus between the mid-thirteenth and mid-eighteenth centuries the area south of the Songwe river had developed through a number of stages. From an early network of religious shrines associated with a snake cult, to a system of dominant clans and, finally, in the northern and southern sections to the foundation of a number of states; in the north Ulambya, Kameme, Misuku, Ungonde and Mwaphoka Mwambale, and in the south Kanyenda and Kabunduli, Kalulumu and Chulu. In the north Kyangonde had been introduced as a new language by the Ngonde and Nyakyusa founders while in the south Chitonga was evolving out of a fusion of the Tumbuka and Chewa peoples and languages. The central part of the region was dominated by the Tumbuka. Their original clans, the Luhanga and various branches of the Mkandawire were joined by the Munthali from the Ndali hills north of the Songwe river. Further west in the Luangwa region the Tumbuka clans included the Zolokere, Mwavintiza, Goma and others. These Tumbuka groups had no centralized government and their early history is an extremely difficult one to chart. Their genealogies are shallow and so is their conception of how they were organized prior to the eighteenth century. However, in the eighteenth century the most significant

42. O. J. M. Kalinga, forthcoming.

events of the region occurred in Tumbuka country. These will be discussed later.

The kinds of religious change which occurred in the Karonga lakeshore following the establishment of the Ngonde state were also discernible in the Maravi zone of influence. The Maravi state system encompassed a network of pre-Maravi or proto-Chewa rain-shrines centred on Msinja in what is western Lilongwe today. Each of the Maravi state-builders tried to exercise control over the shrines that fell within his jurisdiction. He was anxious to play a role in the appointment of officials and to offer assistance and protection, and he usually made annual pilgrimages to the shrines. Both the Kalonga and Undi tried to gain control of the Msinja shrine in this way, while in the Lower Shire valley the Lundu managed to establish a considerable degree of control over the Mbona shrine at Nsanje. With this level of dynastic participation in the affairs of the rain-cults, their theology gradually became syncretic. It began to accommodate the veneration of the royal ancestral spirits, while purely Chewa creation myths like those which obtained in Nyau were suppressed.\(^{44}\)

However, the most notable religious change of the period occurred where the dynasts failed to gain control over the pre-existing rain-cults. They then tended to establish their own cults which tried to rival the pre-existing ones. These were royal cults and one of their functions was to deify the royal family. For this reason, it has been suggested that their link with commoners was rather tenuous. The king or his nominee presided over the rain-making ceremonies and other rituals.

Towards the middle of the eighteenth century, while the Ngonde in the north were preoccupied with the balance of power among internal factions and between religious institutions, the Maravi state system began to decline. The most articulate expression of this decline took the form of secessions from or revolts against the Kalonga, Lundu and Undi paramountcies. There were revolts against the Kalonga by a number of chiefs in the Lilongwe area of present-day central Malawi. During the same period, Undi was also confronted with the revolts led by Biwi and his other subordinates, while out in the east the Lolo and Makua also revolted against the Lundu's overlordship.\(^{45}\)

However, the factors accounting for the decline of what had been a powerful confederation of Maravi states in the seventeenth century are not clear. In the case of Undi, the Portuguese who invaded his kingdom during the gold rush of the 1740s and 1750s did play a minor role in undermining his authority. It has also been argued that both Undi and the Kalonga were weakened by the growing reluctance of Makewana, who controlled the central Chewa religious shrine at Msinja in Lilongwe, to use her ritual power in their interest. This is because — unlike the svikiro mediums who faithfully served the interest of the Mutapa state south of the Zambezi —

\(^{44}\) M. J. Schoffeleers, 1979b, pp. 152-60; I. Linden, 1979, pp. 188-93.
Makewana and her subordinate rain-callers did not always exercise their authority in a manner that would have bolstered the institution of Maravi kingship.\footnote{A. F. Isaacman, 1972b, p. 15.} The early Makewanas, it should be noted, had been key links in the religious unity of the Kalonga and Undi kingdoms. They were entrusted with the performance of the religious rituals upon which the Kalonga and Undi depended for the well-being of their followers. The Makewanas of the eighteenth century, on the other hand, developed secular ambitions as well. They carved out their own sphere of influence between the kingdoms of Kalonga and Undi, and on one occasion even sent warriors to raid into the domains of the Kalonga. Since Makewana and her acolytes belonged to the proto-Chewa clans of the Banda and Mbewe, their resistance to the Kalonga and Undi was probably indicative of an attempt by the proto-Chewa to reassert their autonomy. In any case, the defection of Makewana meant that both the Kalonga and Undi were deprived of the mystical sanctions which they had hitherto exercised over their followers through the agency of Makewana.

Finally, a factor which proved crucial to the decline of the Lundu’s influence east of the Shire river was the emergence of Makua–Lolo ethnic consciousness or nationalism in the eighteenth century. According to Hafkin, the Makua became extremely power-conscious then, much to the surprise of contemporary observers who had previously under-rated their military capacity.\footnote{N. J. Hafkin, 1973, pp. 23–6.} Their nationalism was primarily directed against the Portuguese. The coastal Makua in particular objected to the ‘divide and rule’ policies of the Portuguese as well as to the capricious trade policies of individual Portuguese. However, it was not until they began to acquire firearms from the French and Brazilian slave-dealers that the Makua began to challenge the Portuguese with impunity. Led by powerful chiefs like Mauruka and Murimuno, they waged a bitter war of attrition against the Portuguese and their African allies from 1749 to the end of the century. The challenge which the coastal Makua posed for Portuguese imperialism on the Mozambique coast must have inspired the Makua and Lolo further inland from the coast into similar campaigns against foreign domination. In the inland areas, however, it was the Maravi rather than the Portuguese who became the object of Makua–Lolo hostility. Maravi supremacy then began to be shaken from Quelimane in the east to Mount Murambala on the Shire in the west.\footnote{A. Rita-Ferreira, 1966, p. 34; E. C. Mandala, 1977, pp. 43–4; and E. A. Alpers, 1975a, pp. 104–13.}

The people of Northern Zambezia in the period under consideration were also greatly affected by their growing economic contacts with the outside world.\footnote{This subject is ably reviewed by E. A. Alpers, 1975a, Introduction.} Such contacts are usually traced back to the period of Arab–Swahili commercial dominance on the east coast and along the
Zambezi before 1500. Their frequency, however, was rather limited until the advent of the Portuguese and particularly after their settlement along the Zambezi in the mid-sixteenth century. Thereafter, Portuguese traders regularly sailed up the Shire river from Sena to purchase iron-ware, machila cloth, salt and ivory from the Manganja, with imported cloth, beads and brass-ware. With some of these Manganja products – including iron-ware and machila cloths – the Portuguese conducted further business in the lands of the Munhumutapa south of the Zambezi river. Further up the Zambezi, the Portuguese who settled at Tete established trading connections with Undi’s kingdom and the heartland of the Maravi state system as far as the Upper Shire and the southern littoral of Lake Malawi. With the founding of a feira at Zumbo in 1716, the Portuguese gained access to the ivory market in several societies as far west as southern and central Zambia. But it was the rise and spread of the Zambezia prazos which played a decisive role in the expansion of Portuguese commercial influence north of the Zambezia.

Prazos came into existence when a number of Portuguese or Goanese colonists assumed the status of political chiefs over land that initially belonged to the indigenous African peoples. The process began around Sena at the close of the sixteenth century and gradually spread to other parts of the Lower Zambezi valley in the seventeenth. According to Axelson, the grant of prazos to prominent Portuguese settlers was seen by the Crown in Lisbon as a way of encouraging private initiative in the colonization of the Zambezi valley. In addition, it was hoped that with the prospect of acquiring land, immigrants would be attracted to the Zambezia where their presence was required in order to increase the Portuguese population.

In the eighteenth century, prazos dominated the whole Lower Zambezia region from the Luabo or Zambezi delta in the east to Chicoa midway between the towns of Tete and Zumbo in the west. They were acquired in different ways. One way was by conquest, usually after the white conqueror had exploited the divisions which existed among the original African occupants: the other was by demanding land as compensation for some special service that had been rendered to a local ruler.

The big prazos were more than private estates. They amounted to areas of jurisdiction in which the estate-owners commonly known as prazeros ‘had absolute power of justice, waged war, imposed tribute, and were often guilty of great barbarities’. Of the many issues about these prazos which are of interest to the historian, two stand out. One is that of the complex

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relationships which they maintained with neighbouring African polities. The other is that of the economic impact which they had on the rest of the Northern Zambezia region.

The prazeros were notorious for their harsh treatment of the African peoples who surrounded them as voluntary retainers or conquered subjects. In addition, most of them entered into diplomatic and military relations with the surrounding African polities with the explicit aim of exploiting their human resources. For example, the Chikunda, who served the prazeros as retainers, were recruited from different African societies both north and south of the Zambezi. In this way, the prazeros had access to labour from among the Makua, Manganja, Sena, Kalanga, Tonga, Tawara, Nsenga, Tumbuka and others.53

Through their interest in the gold and ivory trades, the prazeros played an important role in the development of commerce north of the Zambezia. Using some of their Chikunda retainers (vashambadzi) as middle-men, they established a network of trade links with different African peoples in the region: Manganja, Chewa, Nsenga, Lenje and Southern Lunda. From these inland peoples, their trade caravans obtained copper, ivory, wax and slaves in exchange for imported cloth, beads, brass-ware, alcoholic beverages and salt. From about 1740, the prazeros were also involved in the mining and exchange of gold north of the Zambezia, particularly in Undi’s kingdom. Here bare or mines were opened at Michonga, Maano (the Undi’s capital), Java and Muchinga. The Portuguese or Goanese miners from Tete insisted upon absolute ownership of the diggings and all essential means of production. In return for this privilege, they made token offers of gifts and royalties to the Undi and his subordinates. Under this system of production, approximately 100 kilograms (3500 ounces) of gold were extracted annually before the supply began to dwindle in the 1780s.54

Unfortunately for the prazeros and the Portuguese community on the Zambezi generally, this gold rush led to their loss of the ivory trade. The diggings attracted an interest that was out of proportion to their actual worth. Meanwhile, the ivory trade increasingly fell into the hands of other competitors for the northern ivory market. These were the Yao, a people who have been singularly associated with the development of long-distance trade throughout East-Central Africa.

The Yao emerged as a dominant trading nation in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries; and there are two related interpretations of how they rose to this position and status. Abdul Sheriff maintains that the Yao orientation to coast-bound trade was the result of a chain-reaction. The Yao, in other words, may have simply responded to commercial influences which first affected their Ngindo and Makua–Lomwe neighbours who were nearer to the coast than themselves. Of late, Webster has proposed that what made the Yao response to trade with the coast so spectacular,

was their occupation of hilly and marginal agricultural country in which it was not possible for them to make a success of farming or hunting. Their Nyanja or Chewa neighbours to the west and Lomwe to the east were better agriculturalists and hunters, respectively.\textsuperscript{55}

According to Yao oral tradition as recorded by Yohanna B. \textsuperscript{Abdallāh, it was the Chisi ironsmiths who pioneered trade to the coast. The Chisi are said to have depended on their iron-working skills and local trade in iron-ware for their livelihood. It is thus possible that once Yaoland was adequately supplied with iron goods, the Chisi took their merchandise further afield until they established contact with the coast. Once this had been achieved, the further development of Yao commercial enterprise was facilitated by the creation of a stable market for ivory at Kilwa between 1635 and 1698. This was a period when having conquered the East African coast as far north as Malindi, the Portuguese entered a phase of peaceful commercial interaction with the various coastal cities. Kilwa therefore attracted much trade from the interior. When the Kilwa market for ivory fell after 1698 as a result of Omani–Portuguese conflicts the Yao found an alternative market at Mossuril opposite Mozambique Island. Trade, it would seem, had by that point become indispensable to the Yao way-of-life. The Yao would carry their ivory to either Mozambique or Kilwa, as dictated by circumstances.\textsuperscript{56}

In the interior to the west of their own homeland, the Yao had a rich source of ivory in Maravi country. Furthermore, from about 1750, they began to receive more ivory from the Bisa of north-eastern Zambia for onward transmission to Kilwa. The Bisa who dealt with the Yao in this way began their commercial career as entrepreneurs in the service of Kazembe, the Lunda king, whose capital on the Luapula was a regular terminus of a route used by traders from both the east and the west coasts. By 1775 at the latest, the Bisa had acquired a reputation for being one of the most commercially minded nations in the region.\textsuperscript{57}

For the Bisa, trade probably offered compensation for their political impotence at home. Agriculturally, they occupied a country that was marginally productive, between the Luapula river and the Muchinga range. Politically, they were trapped between the expansionist forces of the Lunda and Bemba kingdoms. Thus trade and travel were important avenues to opportunities further afield. In the course of pursuing them, the Bisa opened many new routes between the Luapula region in north-eastern Zambia and the east coast. Between 1790 and 1830, they also tried to develop commerce between the Lunda kingdom and the Portuguese on the Zambezi. In both cases, they played a middle-man’s role. They procured ivory, copper and slaves from different places in the interior of Central Africa and bore them to the coast or Zambezia settlements to be exchanged

for goods such as cloth, beads, guns and gun-powder.

One consequence of their trade with the east coast was that their own settlements began to drift eastward into the Luangwa valley and beyond. The initial impetus of this migration was famine and the desire to tap the ivory trade between the Luangwa valley and Lake Malawi. In this way, several Bisa villages were established in the Luangwa valley by the 1760s and by the end of the eighteenth century there were Bisa villages in the western part of central Malawi. This eastward drift of Bisa villages was intensified in the 1820s and 1830s when the Bemba intermittently raided their settlements in the Muchinga area.58

Thus for at least four decades before the close of the eighteenth century, the Bisa had close dealings with the peoples to their east. Their presence among the Chewa in particular was a factor in the growth of the power of several chieftainships including Mwase Kasungu and Mkanda. The Bisa immigrants were enterprising and often more loyal to the ruling families than the local subjects.

For the Portuguese, the failure of the gold-diggings and the loss of the ivory trade to the Yao and Bisa were factors in their active participation in the slave trade. In turn this led to a remarkable change in the nature of long-distance trade north of the Zambezi in the late eighteenth century. Ivory began to be superseded by slaves as the main trade commodity that could be exported from the region. This change, though by no means complete, was pronounced enough to warrant the identification of the eighteenth century with the ivory trade and the nineteenth with the slave trade. Portuguese participation in the slave trade was remarkable enough in the 1780s when slaves from Northern Zambezia were exported to the French island colonies of Réunion and Bourbon in the Indian Ocean.59

As the slave trade became more lucrative than the trade in ivory, the Portuguese already in it were joined by the Yao and Bisa. According to 'Abdallāh, the Yao turned to slave-trading because of the coastal demand for slaves rather than ivory. Indeed, the Kilwa market to which the Yao took their wares from the interior began to be dominated by the slave trade from the 1770s onwards.60 The market-conscious Yao probably then began to displace ivory with slaves in their caravans from the interior.

The entire northern zone was also drawn into the long-distance trading network. Until the early eighteenth century, no part of the region had been involved in the long-distance trade although a vigorous local trade had existed all round the shores of Lake Malawi and from Tumbuka country into Nsengaland and the northern Chewa area. During the first four decades of the eighteenth century the Tumbuka region was linked to a trading network which stretched from Katanga in the north-west to Kilwa in the

east. The people responsible for this change were heads of families known as balowoka – those who crossed the lake – who arrived in the area over a period of three to four decades.

The most famous of these new men was Kakalala Musawila Gondwe,

PLATE 21.3  The remains of a Tumbuka iron-smelting kiln (ng'anjo). The fame of the Tumbuka as iron-smelters was rivalled only by that of the Phangwa on the east side of Lake Malawi

PLATE 21.4  A Tumbuka-made iron hoe. This particular example was made in the Vipya, Mzimba district, northern Malawi, in the 1940s
probably a Yao-influenced Nyamwezi who for sometime had been involved in the trade to the east coast. Searching for ivory, Gondwe crossed the lake at Chilumba and settled in the Nkamanga plain near the Luangwa valley which at that time was heavily populated with elephants. He established contact with the head of the Luhanga clan, Chilundanya Luhanga, who was pleased with the goods — beads, mphande shells and cloth — which the newcomer had brought. Later Gondwe married into the Luhanga and their other influential families thereby firmly establishing himself in Tumbuka society. To fully tap the resources of the region, he gave turbans — the type which he himself wore — to various local leaders as a symbol of authority derived from himself.61

![Ivory trade routes in East-Central Africa in the eighteenth century](image)

Other immigrant families from east of the lake established themselves in the areas adjacent to Nkamanga. In the district that is today known as Hewe, Katumbi Mulindafwa Chabinga had begun to organize a smaller yet more viable state than that of Gondwe. He too came from Nyamwezi territory and also crossed the lake at Chilumba, but unlike Gondwe, he went into the mountainous area which adjoins the Misuku hills and the

61. This section has benefited from H. L. Vail, 1972b, 1974; and H. K. Msiska, 1978a.
Nyika plateau and settled at Chigoma in Nthalire.\(^{62}\) Again like Gondwe he distributed turbans to local leaders as a symbol of his recognition of their authority. From Chigoma, Katumbi extended his trading contact westwards to Malambo in the ivory-rich Luangwa valley. Later, his descendants moved some miles south-westwards to modern Hewe -- the centre of the state when the Europeans arrived.

Another trader, Katong’ongo Mhenga whose original home was in the Ubena–Uhehe region crossed the lake shortly after Gondwe and Katumbi had settled. Katong’ongo was not a trader in the same sense as Katumbi and Gondwe. He was looking for land where he and his family could settle, and this he found in the Henga valley. Katong’ongo had many skills; he was a hunter, an artisan who made ornamental bracelets and, most important of all, he knew how to produce salt. The latter skill proved very useful in that he soon came to control the high-quality salt-pan at Kamembe. Katong’ongo also married into local families such as the Munthali, Mzumara and Mkandawire some of which were well established in the Henga valley. He gradually became influential and came to be known as Mwahenga, owner of the Henga area. He traded with Mwaphoka Mbale’s people and with Gondwe’s Nkamanga.\(^{63}\)

Although the three immigrant families, Musawila Gondwe, Katumbi Mulindafwa Chabinga and Katong’ongo Mhenga, began to dominate the trade of most of the area south of the Songwe and east to the Luangwa valley, it was difficult for them to carry on for long without clashing with each other. Gondwe felt particularly threatened because Katumbi controlled access to the region that was rich in ivory; furthermore, it was important for him to have free use of – if not control of – the Chilumba ferry in order to transport his ivory to the east coast. Thus he became involved in the succession crisis following the death of Katumbi. He succeeded in promoting a weak candidate for the chieftaincy. He then worked out an arrangement with Mwahenga whereby the latter agreed not to impede his trade and was given cloth and other valuable goods in return. Gondwe made similar arrangements with the rulers east of the Henga valley. These included Mwafusulirwa, Mwamlowe, Mwankunikila and Kachulu. Thus by 1800 Gondwe was able to claim a trade monopoly of the area between the Luangwa and the western shores of Lake Malawi. In the Nkamanga plain he had achieved political authority and was thus able to extend his trading empire in which the Chikulamayembe was assisted by the fact that families – mainly the Msiska and Nyirenda probably also from Unyamwezi and also traders – took over political control of the area ruled by the Mwaphoka, ending a long period of Mbale supremacy in the

\(^{62}\) The Nthalire state was established sometime in the eighteenth century, by the Kawonga who were from southern Tanzania. They were hunters who married into the Kyungus of Karonga and it was they who suggested that they should settle in what later came to be called Nthalire.

\(^{63}\) O. J. M. Kalinga, 1979b.
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area. The Phoka country – between Nkamanga and the Henga valley on the one hand and the Chilumba ferry on the other – had long been the nexus of local trading.

There were smaller polities established in the eighteenth century by families from the eastern side of the lake and many of their founders were, like Gondwe and Katumbi, ivory-traders. Just south of Ungonde, the Mwafulirwa family founded the Fulirwa state in the area that had been dominated by the Mkandawire clan. A relation of the Mwafulirwa, Mwendamunjila Mushani Kaira later went west and finally settled at Zibang’ombe some miles west of the Mwafulirwa mountains. They overcame the indigenous Simwaka who were Nyiha and they began to forge the Wenya state which by the end of the eighteenth century had extended northward to the southern borders of Ulambya. At about the same time the area south-west of Wenya fell under the rule of a Mlowoka family, the Mughogho. This area, Uyombe, which today forms part of the Isoka district of Zambia, was rich in elephants and in later decades became popular with many hunters. The Mughogho established good relations with the older polities of Chifungwe and Utambo near the source of the Luangwa, an area also rich in elephants.

There were other families which crossed the lake further south and settled not far from the present Nkhata-Bay boma. Amongst them were the forebears of modern Mankambira. They were hunters and left their homes sometime in the 1720s probably because they were attracted by the possibility of finding abundant ivory along the western shores of Lake Malawi. They displaced the Phiri rulers and after a generation became the dominant family in the area.64

In the eighteenth century, therefore, the Tumbuka area was dominated first by ivory-hunters, then traders whose control of wealth led to the assumption of political authority. Political decentralization gave way to the power of trader-chiefs. The hunters and traders had chosen the area because successful trade normally requires political influence of some kind. Such political influence was not possible in the northern states which remained outside the network of long-distance trade for almost a century after the Tumbuka had been drawn into it. In the eighteenth century the Maravi empire was disintegrating and the states of the Tumbuka-Chewa marginal zone in the south were being left in total control of their own affairs. However even within chiefdoms such as Kanyenda, the fissiparous tendencies which frequently accompanied the ivory trade were beginning to make themselves felt and the stage was thus set for the events which led to the creation of Mankhambira’s hegemony in the area. After 1800 all states and people would become deeply involved in the commercial age of ivory and later of slaves, with unsettling to disastrous results.

The beginning date for this volume does not coincide with historical periodization in this region. An historical age opens in the southern zone

64. This paragraph is based partly on O. Y. Kaira, 1970-1; and J. B. C. Nkhoma, 1978.
c. 1400 with the coming of the Maravi, and in the northern zone c. 1600 with the migration of the Ngulube. However, the closing date is apt because new themes dominate the historiography of the entire region in the nineteenth century. They include the change-over in trade from ivory to slaves and the involvement of all parts of the region in externally manipulated commerce, the development of a whole series of Yao chiefdoms in areas formerly under the Maravi, and the arrival of a conglomerate of new peoples – the Nguni, Swahili, Kololo and Europeans – who would ultimately seek to wield political authority, regardless of their disparate motives for coming.
Southern Zambezia

H. H. K. BHILA

The period 1500 to 1800 is characterized in Southern Zambezia by a scarcity of records. We have to rely largely on the accounts of the Portuguese travellers and traders who penetrated the region during the first decade of the sixteenth century. This chapter will therefore concentrate on three selected polities, notably the Mutapa, Rozvi and eastern Shona states. The Mutapa and Rozvi polities evolved from the Great Zimbabwe culture (1200-1450) whose origins and development are dealt with elsewhere.¹

Great Zimbabwe gradually declined from the mid-fifteenth century² onwards and its decline has been closely associated with the decrease in gold production in the Zimbabwe plateau at this time. Great Zimbabwe's decline gave rise first to an obscure state known as Torwa or 'Butwa', according to Portuguese sources.³ Its first capital was situated at Khami and the second at Danangombe.⁴ The first capital, which was probably founded in the mid-1400s, was destroyed by fire during the second half of the seventeenth century.⁵ From what is known of its architecture and pottery, the Torwa state was a replica of Great Zimbabwe. The second capital was much smaller than the first. The available archaeological evidence suggests two things, first that almost all the prestige stone buildings in the Torwa state were constructed before 1650; and secondly that the Rozvi Changamire dynasty, which annexed the Torwa state in the 1690s, undertook no prestige stone construction at all.⁶

The second important political development after the fall of Great Zimbabwe was the emergence of the Mutapa empire which, by the beginning of the sixteenth century, had brought under its control the fertile and agricultural lands of the plateau region and 'a section of the Zambezi valley dry lands which also commanded parts of the trade routes'.⁷ The empire comprised heterogeneous Karanga-speaking populations. In theory it

4. ibid.
5. D. N. Beach, 1984, pp. 26, 82, notes 60, 61.
6. ibid., p. 27.
7. ibid.
extended from the southern margins of the Zambezi to the Indian Ocean but in practice the Mutapa rulers exercised a much more limited authority outside the plateau country. There is evidence that the Kingdoms of Manyika, Uteve, Barwe and Danda hived away from the parent empire during the sixteenth century. However, they continued to perform their ritual and tributary obligations until the rise of Dombo Changamire in the late seventeenth century.8 The evidence is slender but it would seem that the ‘rebel’ kingdoms continued to pay tribute to the Mutapa rulers long after the rise of Dombo Changamire. There is a suggestion that even the Changamires occasionally paid tribute to the Mutapa emperors during the eighteenth century.9 The Rozvi tribute-bearers however, were ‘received with honours accorded the ambassadors of the kings’.10 Similar developments occurred in the Lower Zambezi where the Tonga and Sena rulers successfully resisted all efforts by the Mutapa rulers to impose their political hegemony over them. These developments reduced the empire to its core, the region spanned by the Dande and Chidima territories.

10. ibid.
The habit of prestige stone-building in the Mutapa empire probably continued until the sixteenth century. Some of the early ruins, particularly the Zvongombe complex, represented the early capitals of the Mutapa rulers. Later capitals were in the form of stockades several metres high. Antonio Bocarro painted a vivid picture of both the capital and life-styles of the Mutapa rulers during the 1620s.

According to him the capital was:

very large and is composed of many houses surrounded by a great wooden fence, within which there were three dwellings, one for the queen, and another for his servants who wait upon him within doors. There are three doors opening upon a great court-yard, one for the service of the queen, beyond which no man may pass, but only women, another for his kitchen, only entered by his cooks, who are two young men from among the principal lords of his kingdom, his relations in whom he has most confidence, and the lads who serve in the kitchen who are also nobles between fifteen and twenty years of age. These are also employed to lay food when the king wishes to eat, which they spread upon the ground, upon a carpet or mat, with muslin extended above, and many different kinds of meat are set before him, all roasted or boiled, such as hens, pigeons, partridges, capons, sheep, venison, hares, rabbits, cows, rats, and other game, of which after the king has eaten a portion is given to some of his servants who are always provided from his table.¹¹

However, in the first half of the eighteenth century the Mutapas lost direct control of the plateau and the core of the empire shifted to the southern lowlands of the Zambezi bounded by Zumbo and Tete. This loss of political control was the culmination of a long process of fragmentation which began in 1629, when the Portuguese defeated Mamvura Mutapa,¹² and ended in 1917, when the Mutapa polity finally disappeared. The weakening of the Mutapa state invited distant as well as neighbouring Shona groups to take lands for themselves. The Budya who fanned out from the Lower Zambezi are a notable example. Consequently the Mutapa rulers invited other groups to settle in the core of the empire.¹³

Administratively the empire was controlled at three levels – the capital, the province and the village. The Mutapas delegated authority to chiefs at village and provincial levels. It would seem, however, that the nature of those appointed to these positions varied according to the Mutapas’ political circumstances. In the empire’s early days, only relatives of the Mutapas were entrusted with the government of the villages and provinces. It was customary for a prince and heir-apparent to govern the Dande lands. He was known as senior nevanje. Next to him was another prince with the title

of junior nevanje who was ranked second in succession to the throne. Besides members of the royal lineage, those who though not related to the Mutapas had aided in the process of conquest, were appointed to authority.

As the Mutapas came to feel more secure and confident in the seventeenth century, they allowed the villages and provinces to elect their own leaders. In the capital the Mutapas were assisted by high-ranking officials who, in exchange for their services, were granted land. Each of the emperor’s wives was also assigned specific duties.  

Beliefs and methods of administrative control

The Mutapas manipulated several mechanisms to control the empire. A typical example was the practice whereby the territorial chiefs had to rekindle their royal fires annually from the Mutapa original royal fire. This was an act of renewal of loyalty to the central authority. Once a year the Mutapa rulers sent out orders to the territorial chiefs to extinguish their royal fires and proceed immediately to the Mutapa court to rekindle their royal fires. This ritual of fidelity was also repeated at the enthronement of a new Mutapa ruler. Following the death of a ruling Mutapa an order was sent out to the territorial chiefs to extinguish their royal fires until a successor from whom they would rekindle their fires had been selected.

Failure to perform this ritual was regarded as an act of rebellion which was accordingly severely punished. This was done through an efficient army which has been estimated variously at ‘100,000 men into the fighting line’, 30,000 regulars during the sixteenth century and 3000 men during the eighteenth century. These figures suggest that, before the decline of the empire, the Mutapa rulers were in a position to mobilize many peasants ad hoc to join the army but were much less able to do so when the empire fell into decay and disorder during the eighteenth century. The statistics provided by contemporary Portuguese observers are extremely unreliable.

The Mutapa also manipulated religion to control their subjects through the close relationship between the monarchy and the spirit mediums. It was either the spirits of the ancestors of the emperors themselves or ‘past representatives of the original owners of the soil’, who possessed a medium. In addition to his other duties, the emperor was expected to maintain a close contact with the powerful dead on behalf of the nation. It was the emperor who propitiated the national spirit and interceded on behalf of his subjects. The system of observing the cult of royal graves also enhanced the emperor’s image, prestige and, ultimately, his control over his people. He was expected to visit his ancestors’ graves before any major military expedition was undertaken.

17. Vasco Fernandes Homen to Luup de Sylivia in E. Axelson, 1940, p. 274.
PLATE 22.3  An eighteenth-century engraving of Mutapa, reflecting the richness, glory and power of the emperor
The owners of the soil, like Dzivaguru, were rain-makers and ritual officers at the Mutapa royal court. This religious system was duplicated at the various levels of administration. Religion was an important mechanism of social control, particularly in an economy dominated by agriculture. The participation of the emperor in rain-making rituals was seen as crucial to the economic prosperity of the empire. Indeed, the Mutapa emperors held ‘monthly new moon’ dances for their ancestors — great annual feasts to appease their ancestral spirits. There are also references to musicians ‘who awakened the spirits to the people’s need for rain’.

Religion, therefore, played a crucial role as a social mechanism for political control. Indeed, the spirit mediums enjoyed a higher status than the emperors. It was for this reason that they were and still are called mhondoro (lion), and it was their function to advise the emperor in all matters of state.

The most common method of political control was tribute. The Mutapa emperors levied tribute in the form of agricultural produce, lion and leopard skins, ostrich feathers, small and large stock, the brisket of every

21. ibid.
animal killed and, for an elephant, the tusk on which it fell when it died.\textsuperscript{23}

Tribute also took the form of labour rent. According to João de Barros:

All the officers and servants of his court and the captains of the soldiers, each with his men, must serve him in the cultivation of his fields or other work seven days in every thirty. And the lords to whom he gives any land which contains vassals receive the same from them. Sometimes, when he wishes for a particular service he sends to the mines where they dig gold, one or two cows, according to the number of people there to be divided among them as a sign of love, and in return for this service each of them gives a little gold, to the value of five hundred reis. In the markets also the merchants give a certain amount instead of service, not that any penalty is inflicted on those who do not pay, but they are not allowed to appear before Benomotapa which is considered a great disgrace.\textsuperscript{24}

The practice of labour rent was also adopted by vassal rulers who seem to have varied its application. Instead of sending people to cultivate the emperor’s fields, the villages and hamlets in Uteve cultivated ‘a large field of Sorghum for the king; all the inhabitants of the place were obliged to work in it certain days of the year; fixed in advance…’. The harvest, however, was done by ‘stewards maintained all over for this purpose’.\textsuperscript{25}

When opening a new mine the Mutapa rulers usually sent their trusted agents to collect the tribute. The gold-miners erected a shelter to house the tribute-collectors as well as the tribute itself. The tribute was assessed as ‘the product of one of the trips from the mine to the water that each miner accomplished daily’.\textsuperscript{26} As will be shown later, the extraction of minerals, particularly gold, involved washing it in a river or pond. The nature of the tribute system does not seem to have changed until the demise of the Mutapa polity in the early twentieth century.

It could be argued that the various mechanisms of control partially succeeded in maintaining a centralized empire at a time when vast distances rendered the close supervision of the territorial chiefs impossible. The army’s inability to deal effectively with rebellions in the far-flung parts of the empire, internal political intrigue which was exploited by Portuguese traders, and civil wars, all account for the gradual decline and fall of the Mutapa empire.


\textsuperscript{26} W. G. L. Randles, 1979, p. 66.
The Portuguese factor

Although the Portuguese arrived at Sofala in 1506 it was only from 1550 to 1630 that they made serious attempts to gain control of the Mutapa empire. Until 1540 trade between the Portuguese and the Shona was conducted on a non-official basis. However, in 1540 commercial relations between the Portuguese traders and the Mutapa rulers and their subjects were regularized. This was done through the establishment of a Portuguese diplomatic-cum-trade mission at the Mutapa royal court headed by an officer called the Captain of the Gates. He was elected for life by the Portuguese traders but his appointment had to be confirmed by the Mutapa emperors. His main duties were to transmit presents, requests or complaints from the Portuguese traders to the Mutapa emperors and vice-versa. Relations between the Portuguese community and the Mutapa rulers were essentially tributary with the Portuguese paying a tribute called *curva*. At the assumption of his office, each new captain of the Portuguese fortress of Mozambique was:

under obligation to pay to Monomotapa the value of three thousand cruzados in cloth and beads for the three years of his office, that he may during this term open his lands to all merchants, both Christians and Moors, as all of them trade with cloth obtained from the said Captain; and the greater part of the gold exported from these rivers goes into the hands of the captain of Mozambique.

In exchange for this tribute the Mutapa emperors granted freedom of passage to the traders to sell their cloth and beads throughout the empire. According to the experience of a Jesuit missionary, João dos Santos, it was an:

unheard of thing for Kaffier thieves to attack the Portuguese on the road or to rob them, unless by order of Monomutapa himself, as he has sometimes given such orders to avenge some injury he received or pretended to have received from the Portuguese especially when the captain who has newly entered office at Mozambique has not paid him or delayed until the second year the cloth which it is usual to pay him during the first.

29. ibid., p. 272.
30. P. B. de Rezende in G. M. Theal, 1899–1902, Vol. II, pp. 414, 427 and 429. The value of the *curva* is given as fifteen or sixteen thousand cruzados every three years. This sounds a little exaggerated.
In situations of this kind the emperor order the seizure without compensation of all the merchandise in his empire. This actually happened in 1610 when Gatsi Rusere declared a *mupeto* (forcible confiscation) of traders' merchandise which resulted in the raiding and killing of Portuguese traders.\(^{31}\) In addition to the tribute the Portuguese Captain paid to the Mutapa emperors, both the Portuguese emperor and the Swahili–Arab traders had to pay a tribute of one piece of cloth out of every twenty pieces brought into the empire.\(^{32}\) Besides cloth and beads, which were widely circulated, the Mutapa emperors acquired as presents from the Portuguese imported luxury items such as silks, carpets, ceramics and glassware which they used to enhance their prestige through a system of patronage.

This system of tributary relations persisted with little change until the second half of the sixteenth century when the Portuguese began to win control over the Mutapa rulers. This came about as a result of Portugal's aggressive wars in Southern Zambezia between 1569 and 1575\(^{33}\) — when it succeeded in entrenching itself in the eastern Kingdoms of Uteve and Manyika. After several battles, in 1575 the Portuguese concluded a treaty with the King of Uteve whereby the captain of Sofala and his successors were obliged to pay an annual tribute of 200 pieces of cloth to the Teve rulers.\(^{34}\) In exchange for this tribute the Portuguese traders secured freedom of passage to the Kingdom of Manyika where, as later events proved, they erroneously believed there was an abundance of gold. In addition, the inhabitants of the Portuguese fortress at Sofala were allowed freedom of passage into the interior along the Sofala river to buy provisions. As with the Mutapa emperors, each Portuguese trader who wanted to pass through Uteve to Manyika had to pay a duty to the Teve ruler of one cloth out of every twenty pieces brought into the kingdom. However, African merchants, who traded 'cloth, beads and other merchandise with the Portuguese', paid 'three in every twenty pieces to the King'.\(^{35}\) It is not clear why the African merchants were required to pay more than their Portuguese counterparts but it was probably to prevent the rise of a powerful merchant class which would ultimately challenge the king's political authority. A similar treaty was concluded with the King of Manyika in 1573.\(^{36}\)

This limited success tempted the Portuguese to make further encroachments into the Mutapa empire. The rebellions which broke out there between 1590 and 1607 provided the Portuguese with an opportunity to delve into the complexity of Mutapa politics. One Mutapa ruler, Gatsi Rusere, turned for help to the Portuguese and concluded a treaty with

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\(^{36}\) ibid., p. 218.
them for military assistance in exchange for which he promised to cede all his gold, copper, iron, lead and tin mines. The treaty bestowed upon the Portuguese the prestige of ownership although they lacked the expertise and the manpower to exploit the metals. In fact the treaty turned out to be of limited value because the Portuguese left Gatsi Rusere to his own devices while the civil wars continued to rage until he died in 1624. Gatsi Rusere was succeeded by his son Nyambu Kapararidze, the legitimacy of whose claim to the Mutapa royal throne was challenged by his uncle

Mamvura. In the war that ensued between these two pretenders Mamvura sought and, in 1629, obtained Portuguese military assistance. The Portuguese extorted promises from Mamvura, after which they made a common cause with him against Kapararidze. These promises involved a treaty of vassalage and the cession of the silver and gold mines. As with Gatsi Rusere in 1607, Mamvura succeeded to the Mutapa throne with Portuguese military assistance. The treaty which he subsequently concluded with the Portuguese required Mamvura to allow the Portuguese traders freedom of passage throughout the empire, to expel the Swahili–Arab traders from the empire, and to allow the Dominican missionaries to preach their religion. It also required Mamvura to stop the curva, which the Portuguese had been paying to the Mutapa rulers as tribute almost since the mid-1600s, and instead to pay tribute to the Portuguese thenceforth. After this treaty the number of Portuguese traders and adventurers within the Mutapa empire increased. Both Mamvura and his wife were baptized and changed their names to Domingos and Luiza respectively. The treaty of 1629 encouraged Portuguese adventurers to seize land subsequently recognized by the Portuguese crown as prazos (crown land). From being the guests of the African rulers, the Portuguese traders now almost became the controllers of land but their individualism and lawlessness led to what may be viewed as a period of chaos and anarchy. Portuguese penetration of the Mutapa empire therefore, could be said to have led to its disintegration and to have given rise to a phenomenon called the prazo system as well as the birth of a new polity, the Rozvi empire.

The prazo system

The acquisition of land by individual Portuguese adventurers proceeded almost unchecked with the result that many prazos da coroa (crown-land estates) were created. They were owned by Portuguese officials, traders, religious orders and frontiers-men.

The prazo system was a synthesis of two socio-economic systems. The first was that of the Shona which consisted of a ruling oligarchy and peasant producers; the second, which was superimposed on the Shona system, consisted of the prazeros, as a dominant class, and the achikunda (armies of slaves). In other words the prazeros maintained the socio-political system they found in existence in Zambezia. An African chief continued to perform his traditional duties but he ‘no longer had absolute authority’ as the prazer assumed the status of overlord so that the relationship resembled that of chief and sub-chief in the Mutapa empire.

The relations of production on the prazos were essentially feudal. The
African chief paid tribute to the prazero in the form of agricultural produce; butter, locally woven cloth, honey, tobacco, sugar, large and small stock, ivory and gold dust. In his position as a de facto chief, the prazero adopted African social practices in matters of religion and married into chiefly families to disguise his usurpation of African traditional authority, to enhance his image among Africans, and to overcome his major weakness – his lack of legitimacy in African traditional politics. These considerations led Professor Isaacman to postulate an Africanization theory which claims that the prazo as a Portuguese land-tenure system was so transformed and adapted to the African situation that it became completely African.

This indigenization process began at the turn of the seventeenth century. However, Isaacman’s total Africanization theory is difficult to maintain when it is realized that, throughout the prazo system was always more or less linked to mercantile capitalism. As Isaacman points out, the prazeros served as middle-men in the long-distance trade between Mozambique and India and, ultimately, Europe with the prazeros during the eighteenth century exporting mainly ivory and slaves to Brazil and the French islands of the Mauritius group. In this way, the prazo system maintained its economic connections with Europe and it can therefore be argued that the prazero society retained, even in its decadent stage, a non-African feature.

In addition the internal organization of the prazos had features which could hardly be called African, a notable example being the co-existence of the colono and the chikunda (slave army). Even at the acme of its supposed mutation into an African institution, an opposite process, that of the de-Africanization of the traditional African societies of the prazos, was taking place. As the prazo system responded to the internal demand for slaves, the prazeros enslaved and sold their African neighbours and victimized their colonos and slaves alike. Consequently, a system of aringas came into existence in which the life of the colonos was so disturbed that the previous distinction between colono and slave became blurred.

It has been argued that ‘in terms of the day to day governing of the colonos the mambo’s position remained virtually unaltered’. It is true that the mambo enjoyed prestige and obedience from his people by virtue of his connection with the founding lineages. As Isaacman points out, ‘when a mambo entered a village all work ceased; he was welcomed by a chorus of hand clapping – the traditional signal of respect and royalty’. But these were the empty trappings of royalty. Ultimately the prazero had the last word in deciding judicial cases, disputes or the appointment of an African chief himself. The tusk on which an elephant fell no longer went to the mambo nor did ‘the choicest parts of the other animals which had died on

42. A. F. Isaacman, 1972b, pp. 56-63.
43. A. F. Isaacman, 1969, p. 158.
44. ibid.
his lands'. It cannot, therefore, be argued that the 'arrival of the prazero did not lead to the destruction or modification of the traditional political system'. It may not have been destroyed but it was certainly greatly modified. The prazos represented the first phase of the Portuguese colonization of Mozambique: they were pockets of political and economic exploitation by the Portuguese merchants achieved only through a modification of African political and social institutions.

The geographical spread of the prazos

The prazos were dotted on both sides of the Zambezi river. There were, however, significant differences between the prazos to the north and those to the south of the river. Those to the south were terras da coroa (Portuguese crown property), while those to the north were not. The prazeros who held the crown lands did so under clearly specified obligations. In theory the grant of a terra da coroa was restricted to three generations, the land could only be inherited through a female, it could not be more than three leagues in size, and the holder was subject to an annual quit rent. The prazo-holders in the north were free from all these conditions and acquired land as a result of a direct arrangement with the indigenous African chief. These differences led to great disparities of value between prazos of the same size. Besides, the prazo-holders placed greater value on the northern prazos as they were near the market, the Feira of Zumbo, and also the eighteenth-century gold-workings of the bares. The prazo system was sustained by a variety of categorized slaves. The top slave was the chuanga — the 'eyes and ears' of the prazero, appointed because of his loyalty. Every prazo village had its chuanga whose primary function was to spy on the traditional leaders and to collect taxes and ivory. The prazero relied on him for information about the local Africans and for the recruitment of disaffected African chiefs in the neighbourhood. The size of the African community on a prazo was of crucial importance to the prazero as he depended on it for gold production, trade, tribute which was paid in kind, defence and, often, to wage wars for territorial aggrandisement. For the enforcement of his authority the prazero depended on a chikunda whose main function was to police the local population, ensure that the laws of the prazero were obeyed and deal also with acts of rebellion. A chikunda army usually ranged from twenty to thirty men on small prazos while on large prazos, it could comprise thousands. A chikunda was divided into nsaka (groups of ten men) under the control of a sachikunda. A sachikunda and his nsaka received orders from a mukazambo (slave chief).

45. ibid.
46. ibid.
FIG. 22.2  The prazos of the lower Zambezi valley
There could be as many as twenty or thirty slave chiefs on one *prazo* whose main functions were to resolve cases and administer *muavi* (a poison ordeal) to establish the guilt or innocence of a person accused of witchcraft.

In his report of 1766 concerning the coast of Africa, Antonio Pinto de Miranda discussed the main methods by which slaves were obtained. According to him slave-hunters stole children and sold them to Portuguese traders, Arab–Swahili traders and African agents; some people were sold or pawned as slaves in times of famine; and, convicted criminals, prisoners-of-war and credit defaulters sold as slaves.\(^49\) The picture which emerges from other Portuguese sources is one of voluntary enslavement.

There is sufficient evidence, however, that some who were sold believed that ‘they were not really slaves, but were serving in the same way as a European servant who agrees on a payment with his master but does not become his slave’.\(^50\) Children were occasionally sold to meet tributary demands on the *prazo*, in which case a man could only redeem his child by exchanging him for a slave. Clearly some chiefs and colonos found themselves with no choice but to sell their dependents.

**The decline of the *prazo* system**

The *prazo* system declined during the second half of the eighteenth century for several reasons. The first was that the *prazero*’s authority was ill-defined compared with that of the traditional African ruler.\(^51\) Often this tempted the *prazero* to abuse his authority by compelling the African peasants to sell their agricultural produce to him exclusively and at artificially low prices. He also imposed heavy taxes on the peasants, tortured them and committed ‘hundreds of bloody, ferocious atrocities and cruel killings without these ever coming to the attention of the government’.\(^52\) The colonos reacted sharply by revolting against the *prazeros* and even migrating. Miranda has drawn our attention to the abortive slave rebellions and *mussitos* (fugitive slave strongholds) in the late 1700s. These revolts and migrations led to a decline in agricultural production, drought and famine.\(^53\) The *prazero* and his slave armies relied for their food on what the peasants produced; the *chikunda* used force to get food-stuffs from the peasants and the colonos, again, reacted by migrating from the *prazos* to look for food and security elsewhere.

The slave trade was another factor that led to the decline of the *prazo* system. The overseas slave trade increased in the 1640s as a result of the Dutch occupation of Angola.\(^54\) The supply of Angolan slaves to Brazil was

\(^{49}\) A. P. de Miranda in A. A. Andrade, 1955, pp. 266–70.
\(^{50}\) ibid.
\(^{51}\) ibid.
\(^{52}\) A. F. Isaacman, 1969, p. 170.
\(^{53}\) A. P. de Miranda in A. A. Andrade, 1955, pp. 266–70.
\(^{54}\) ibid.
stopped and Lisbon had to turn to south-east Africa as a source. The establishment of a plantation economy in the French Mascarene Islands in the 1730s created additional demand for slaves. But despite all these new demands, the numbers of slaves exported from Southern Zambezia by 1752 were relatively small; 300 had been obtained from the Zambezi and 200 from Sofala. A German missionary who lived in the region from 1758–9 also observed that ‘few slaves were sent overseas, and it was considered so terrible a fact that those condemned to it would commit suicide in order to avoid it’. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, however, the slave trade gathered such momentum that the prazeros in the Zambezi valley saw it as an opportunity for wealth. Slave-raiding parties brought caravan loads of slaves from the Chewa, Nsenga and Manganja territories. The prazeros also began to sell the slaves on their estates, thus undermining the very foundation of the prazo system. However, beyond the Zambezi valley the rest of Southern Zambezia was little affected by the trade. The decline of the prazo system south of the Zambezi was accelerated instead by the rise of a new polity in the second half of the seventeenth century – the Rozvi Changamire dynasty.

The Rozvi empire

The origins of the Rozvi empire are a matter of speculation. The issue has been further complicated by the name Changamire, which is associated with the founder of the Rozvi empire in the second half of the seventeenth century but first mentioned in the fifteenth century. There are occasional references to a Changamire dynasty in the sixteenth century and ‘the last that had been heard of these earlier Changamires was their defeat in 1547–8’. However, there seems some consensus on four points: first, that the Rozvi were an integral part of the historic Karanga of the Mutapa empire until they broke away in the seventeenth century and acquired a separate identity; secondly, ‘that the designation Rozvi was first applied to a section of those historic Karanga who were associated with the rise to power between 1684 and 1695 of Changamire Dombo I’; thirdly, that the creation of the Rozvi empire was the work of Changamire Dombo I; and fourthly, that the appellation Rozvi, which was derived from the Shona verb kurozva (to destroy), was either assumed by the ‘followers of Dombo ... out of vanity’ because of the destruction they had committed during their wars of conquest or was given to them as a nickname by their victims.
Between 1684 and 1695 Dombo Changamire gradually rose to power in the north-east. How he did so is still unclear. He was a herdsman of the Mutapa emperors who rebelled taking himself and his followers first to the Torwa state in the south-west, then to the Kingdoms of Manyika and Uteve in the east. The Portuguese traders, while conquering these areas, were expelled in 1684 from the Kingdom of Maungwe, from the plateau country in 1693 and from the Kingdom of Manyika in 1695. They fled to Zumbo, where they established a new settlement in 1710, then returned to their former settlement of Masekasa in Manyika. In every case, however, there was a tacit understanding that they were under the authority of the Rozvi Changamire overlords. In this way the Rozvi rulers were able to create an empire that stretched as far as Buhera, Bocha, Duma and the south-eastern highlands in the south; to the sandveld in the north-west, to the sodic soils in the north and to the lowveld in the south-west. The core of the empire probably spanned the same area as that of the Ndebele which succeeded it in the 1840s. The early capital was situated at Danangombe but later the Rozvi emperors seem to have lived at Khami and Natetale from time to time.

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62. ibid.
63. ibid., p. 236.
PLATE 22.6 Decorative walling at Danangombe. Possibly built in the seventeenth century as one of the centres of the Torwa state, it appears to have become its capital in the 1630s or 1640s, after the burning of Khami. Its population was probably c. 2,000
Our idea of a Rozvi capital comes from a nineteenth-century description, although it had probably changed little since the 1600s and 1700s. The royal court, according to our account, consisted of three large stone houses, each with many rooms, in which the Rozvi emperor used to store his belongings. The houses were surrounded by walls of ivory tusks. The Rozvi Changamire had many rifles which he obtained from Portuguese traders at Sena. He bred 'pigs and fine dogs' and:

does not eat any fresh food, only old and he drinks his pombe by himself. On certain days he goes hunting with his courtiers, other times he sends his hunters; when he dies he is buried in his house and there is no wailing or mourning because the very next day his wives present to elders a new Changamire selected by them and the first wife crowns him with two caps...

The Rozvi maintained their identity as a foreign élite amidst people who shared the same moyo (heart) totem, their allies during the wars of conquest of the Kalanga-speaking people as well as those of the Torwa state.

Provincial administration

The Rozvi rulers used methods similar to those of the Mutapas to maintain their empire. The mechanisms involved the allocation of land, the payment of tribute, religion and the training of an efficient army.

The Rozvi rulers distributed land to newly installed chiefs and levied tribute from them. They also manipulated the priestly class in the installation of chiefs, libation practices and various spirit cults. They introduced innovations in religion and the collection of tribute. Under the Mutapa emperors, as already noted, the tributary chiefs used to send their tribute with bearers directly to the royal court. The Rozvi emperors, however, organized their tribute in a hierarchical pyramid with the village as the base and the Rozvi court, the apex. The principal officer and commander of the tumbare army supervised the collection of tribute throughout the empire, sending out teams of special tribute-collectors to the various provinces and villages. The collection of tribute was therefore a specialized function within the overall administration of the empire. Some tribute-collectors were backed by the army.

The Rozvi developed a religious system altogether different from that of the mhondoro (spirit mediums) prevalent among the northern and eastern Shona. The Rozvi 'cult of the oracular deity', Mwari, was based on a belief in a High God who expressed himself through natural phenomena such as lightning or earthquakes. The principal officers of the Mwari oracle were

the Mouth, the Ear and the Eye whose main purpose was to collect information. The Mwari cult was manipulated by the Rozvi rulers for a political end.

The proverbial efficiency of the Rozvi army calls for some clarification. Portuguese observers, during the eighteenth century, never ceased to marvel at both the discipline and efficiency of the Rozvi armies which were generally well equipped with bows and arrows, daggers, assegais, battle axes and cudgels. Its organization very much resembled that of Shaka, a nineteenth-century Zulu king. Like the Zulu, the Rozvi organized their armies into regiments and also adopted the crescent formation in battle. Under certain circumstances, however, this method could be abandoned. A typical example was the battle of Maungwe in 1684 when the ‘wily and cunning’ Dombo Changamire vanquished the Portuguese ‘with his strategems’. Like most armies in pre-colonial African societies, the Rozvi armies performed certain rituals which instilled military prowess and self-confidence before they went into battle. The Portuguese came to believe that the Rozvi emperor ‘had magic oil with which he could kill any one simply by touching the person with it’ and there is no doubt that this and other beliefs played an important role in Rozvi military victories.

The prowess of the Rozvi armies in battle can also be explained by the thorough training the soldiers underwent which involved military exercises as well as archery. The elements of training and hierarchy in the Rozvi army have tempted some historians to make comparisons with the organization and terminology of a Roman army. It is more more likely, however, that the Rozvi armies were organized and trained much after the fashion of the early nineteenth-century Zulu, Ndebele and Sotho armies, as already indicated.

Another aspect of the Rozvi army that has been mystified is its invincibility – the defeat of the Portuguese at the end of the seventeenth century is often cited as an example – but these military victories are seen in isolation from the totality of the Portuguese presence in East and Central Africa during this period. The Portuguese were fighting for their survival along the East African coast from the 1650s to 1729 when their fortress at Mombasa was destroyed by the Sultans of Oman. The Sultan of Oman established himself at Pate and mounted unsuccessful military attacks against Mombasa in 1661 and Mozambique in 1670. In March 1696, a fleet from Muscat, which was reinforced at Pate, laid seige to Fort Jesus at Mombasa. Fort Jesus collapsed and with it Portuguese control of the East African coast north of Cape Delgado. In other words, what the Rozvi

68. ibid.
69. ibid., p. 377.
71. ibid. See also G. S. P. Freeman-Grenville, 1963, pp. 141–2.
Changamires encountered in Southern Zambezia was not the totality of organized Portuguese military effort as the Portuguese were concentrating on re-establishing their control of the East African coast. The Rozvi defeat of the Portuguese during this period can, therefore, hardly be used as an index for the efficiency of the Rozvi army.

The Portuguese military effort in Southern Zambezia was based on the prazeros, themselves badly disunited by rather conflicting economic interests. The prazeros had also engendered disunity in most African societies, notably in the lands of Mutapa and the Kingdom of Uteve. If these factors are not taken into account when assessing the glory and power of the Rozvi empire, it is easy to exaggerate the efficiency of the Rozvi military machine.

The Economy

Agriculture

The dominant branches of production among the Shona societies were agriculture, animal husbandry, hunting, gathering, fishing and metal-work. Long-distance and inter-regional trade complemented the economy. The Shona cultivated three main cereals, finger-millet, drought-resistant bulrush millet and various sorghums.\(^{72}\) The unit of production was the household, and there is no solid evidence that the division of labour was rigidly based on sex as has been suggested by some writers.\(^{73}\) What evidence there is, suggests that the situation differed from society to society. In some, as Barber observed, 'adult males in the community were responsible for the construction of shelters and for the clearing and preparation of new lands',\(^{74}\) while the women sowed and cultivated the fields. The harvesting was done by both men and women. In other words, the men performed the heavier tasks within the agricultural cycle and the women the lighter, more in the spirit of co-operation than strict division of labour. In some societies, however, such as the Hlengwe of the lowveld, there was some division of labour with the adult males devoting most time to trapping and hunting game while the juveniles herded cattle and the women cultivated the fields.

The ploughing season stretched from September to November with the hoe the basic technology. The limited nature of this technology necessitated shifting agriculture whereby the old land was abandoned whenever it became exhausted and new land opened up. The opening of new land involved the ‘clearing of the bush, burning it and allowing the ash to fertilize it’.\(^{75}\) The destructive nature of the slash-and-burn techniques of

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73. W. J. Barber, 1964, p. 46.
74. ibid.
75. ibid., p. 45.
agriculture has been criticized as wasteful of land. But as Lord Hailey observed in his *African Survey*, it was 'less a device of barbarism than a concession to the character of the soil'. Shona agriculture, like most pre-colonial agrarian economies, was adapted to local conditions so that there were many practices of shifting agriculture.

The period 1500 to 1800 witnessed the piecemeal introduction into Southern Zambezia of new crops from Europe and Asia. The new crops were introduced mainly along the coast and in regions where the Portuguese had built their settlements. In Sofala and the Lower Zambezi, the region between the Tendaculo and the Luabo rivers, the African peasants cultivated rice and yams although these never became their staple diet. They also cultivated sugar-cane to eat rather than to make sugar as they lacked both the expertise and the appliances. The African peasants also planted many fruit trees from India and Portugal, such as figs, pineapples, guavas, pawpaws and oranges; they also grew melons, cucumbers, sweet potatoes and lemons. Some of these fruits grew on their own in the bush, as noted by João dos Santos in 1596:

> In two places along the Sofala river there are two unowned thickets full of orange and lemon trees of which all who choose may freely gather the fruit, and the lemons are so abundant that the Kaffirs [Africans] load vessels with them and go down the river to Sofala where they are sold almost for nothing. The inhabitants of the fortress salt and fill barrels and jars with them, which they send to India where they are greatly esteemed and are eaten with rice.

It would seem, therefore, that the cultivation of these exotic fruits was stimulated mainly by demand from foreign traders. There is also evidence that wheat was being cultivated in the Kingdom of Manyika during April and May. According to Father Gaspar Macedo, the yield was quite good with one grain of wheat producing 'fifty ears'. There is also evidence that by 1778 peanuts were being cultivated in Manyika.

In addition to the cereals and fruits, 'two grain legumes were grown everywhere, notably groundnuts, *voandzeia subterranea* and cowpeas, *vigna unguiculata*'. As already noted, none of the crops introduced from Euro-Asia ever constituted the main diet of the Shona. The case was different with maize which was introduced into Southern Zambezia during the eighteenth century. This gradually caught up with millet and sorghum to constitute one of the staple diets of the Shona in the twentieth century, particularly among urban populations.

78. Ibid., p. 190.
79. G. Macedo, 1890, p. 150.
The Nyanga and lowveld

The agrarian economy of the Nyanga and lowveld areas was in many ways different from that of the plateau. The Nyanga highlands were characterized by poor soils and steep slopes. The greater part of the landscape in northern Nyanga was terraced with dry stone walls about a metre high. These terraces were made on the hillsides and their purpose was 'simply to conserve the soil and dispose neatly of the stones'. In other words, terrace-building was a method of controlling a precarious environment that was used for three or more centuries until 1800. It is possible that the numerous terraces 'represent the accumulated evidence of small-scale cultivation in many different years'. There is also evidence that a limited amount of irrigation was practised but only in a supplementary role as the Nyanga area usually enjoys a fair amount of annual rainfall. It is more likely that the irrigation of dry-season gardens of vegetables, maize and bananas, which is still being practised in this region, is an agricultural tradition of eighteenth-century origin. Equally, evidence of this agricultural tradition can be observed in the terracing of lower slopes and contouring of valley lands in the Nyanga area. According to Roger Summers, the Tonga/Sena practised this kind of agriculture before they were absorbed into Manyika society during the eighteenth century.

The lowveld economy

The lowveld economy was different. Here a riverine people, the Hlengwe, practised mainly hunting, gathering and fishing and agriculture only to a limited extent. The lowveld has very low annual rainfall so that gathering plays an important role in the economy even at present. The fruits gathered were mainly those from which beverages were made including nkanyi (marula – *Sclerocarya caffra*), mahanga (ilala palm – *Hyphaene natalensis*) the sap of which was used to make an intoxicating wine called njemani or chemwa; the kwaka tree (monkey orange – *Strychnos madagascariensis*) and the baobab fruit. These fruits were gathered by women and children while the men hunted big game. The women and children killed mice, gathered the large silvery caterpillars from trees and collected locusts.

The Hlengwe were, as they still are today, proficient hunters. The abundance of many species of game in the lowveld, it has been said, rendered it 'a hunters' paradise'. Fishing was also an important occupation. The lowveld rivers, then as now, were rich in fish. Like hunting, fishing was essentially done by the men year-round. The most

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83. ibid.
84. ibid.
86. ibid.
effective method of catching fish in large quantities was to use nets made of reeds. These nets were skilfully laid at the confluence of streams or, alternatively, young men and sometimes women were sent to walk downstream so as to drive the fish like a flock into the nets. It should be noted, however, that the difference between the hunting and fishing activities of the Hlengwe and the rest of the people in Southern Zambezia during this period was only one of degree as both hunting and fishing were practised by people in the plateau country and the coastal kingdoms. Commenting on the subject of fishing at the end of the sixteenth century, João dos Santos noted that ‘In Winter when the river Sofala rises it frequently overflows its banks and inundates the fields, the ponds in them which become full of fish from the river.’ He then went on to describe the various kinds of fish. The Nyanga region was and still is famous for its trout. Fishing then, as now, was practised in both the large and small rivers in Southern Zambezia.

As with fishing, hunting as a way of earning a living was not the exclusive monopoly of the Hlengwe of the lowveld. In various parts of the Mutapa empire men hunted countless species of animals including lions, tigers, leopards, rhinoceros, elephant, buffalo, wild cows, eland and wildebeeste to cite only a few. There was no limit as to what could be killed for food. Guineafowl were found in their hundreds in the bush close to the fields. The traditional professional hunters used traps, spears, clubs and bows and arrows to kill animals. However, with the introduction of fire-arms by the Portuguese in the early sixteenth century, the hunters’ efficiency improved.

It would be incorrect to create the impression or rather, perpetuate the ‘myth about the Hlengwe being solely hunters’. That they were able to differentiate between various kinds of soil demonstrates that they paid as much attention to agriculture as their Shona counterparts elsewhere in Southern Zambezia. The Hlengwe differentiated soils mainly on their relative ability to retain moisture. They called the sandy soils where they built their homesteads nthlava. This type of soil was good for the cultivation of cucumbers, gourds, cowpeas, groundnuts and peanuts. They also grew millet and sorghum on nthlava. soil but in the valleys or their neighbourhoods. Since rainfall was erratic, the dew that fell in these valleys played an important role in the growth of sorghum. The Hlengwe called the basalt soils tsvoelo. This was a fertile type of soil on which they grew maize and a variety of vegetables. Its advantage over other types of soil was that it retained moisture for a long period after the heavy rains. This was important for the cultivation of maize which requires a lot of rain, in a region where the rainfalls were erratic. It would seem that there was no

89. ibid.; interview with my mother, Pertenia Kwatini Bhila (aged c. 67–8 years), 19/5/85, Borrowdale.
shortage of land and the only restriction was the erratic rainfall. In a good
year, the Hlengwe peasants produced surplus grain which ‘may not have
always carried them through all the lean years but did ameliorate the
situation’.90

Various views have been expressed concerning the efficiency of the
agrarian economies of the Shona societies between 1500 and 1800. In
1569 Father Monclaro castigated African peasants ‘because they are not
provident, but quickly waste and consume the new crops in feasts and
drinking’.91 In 1648, however, Antonio Gomes observed that the African
peasants produced a surplus that lasted until the following year; further
‘they never see the bottom of their grain bins’.92 Conversely, in 1667
Manuel Barreto maintained that the Africans ‘have not, and cannot possibly
have, any provision from one year to another’.93 In 1696 Antonio da
Conceicao observed that in the Mutapa empire people ‘do their own farms
and the king has one cultivated by his cafres which stretches where the
eyes cannot see and sometimes sees personally but in a grave manner. He
eventually collects so much food that he lives in plenty and even luxury,
not only he but also his women’.94 We also learn from Jesuit Father Julio
Cesar, who visited the Mutapa court in 1620, that this reigning Mutapa
paid much attention to agriculture. Julio Cesar reported that the Mutapa
did not despise the title of farmer; on the contrary, this priest says that he
was quickly dispatched because the Emperor wanted ‘to go and see to his
farming activities because it was time to sow the fields’.95

These contradictory statements by Portuguese observers clearly under­
score the need to heed date and location when discussing the efficiency of
pre-colonial agriculture in Southern Zambezia. The evidence cited above
referred to situations which prevailed in certain years in specific places in
Southern Zambezia and should not be used as a justification for gen­
eralization. The problem of famine and drought should be discussed in the
context of time and space. As will be shown later, Portugal’s aggressive
wars during the seventeenth century led to famines which caused the
peasants to abandon their lands. It is possible that Barreto’s report referred
to some place in the Kingdom of Maungwe where in 1667, the Portuguese
and the Swahili–Arabs were fighting for commercial supremacy. Likewise,
the anonymous eighteenth-century writer was concerned largely with the
situation in the Kingdom of Manyika— or, probably with famine in a
certain part of Manyika. It has been necessary to dwell on this theme of
frequent famine and the improvidence of African peasants because the
Portuguese accounts on this subject from 1500 to 1800 and later have led

92. A. Gomes, 1939, p. 220.
95. A. da Conceicao, p. 66.
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some historians, such as David Beach to over-generalize about famines both in pre-colonial and colonial Southern Zambezia.

Beach has characterized Shona pre-colonial agriculture as ‘useful but dangerously static’. This, according to him, was because ‘no selection of crops and soil and no expertise in predicting shangwa (famine) could ward off these disasters, whether caused by climate, locusts and other blights’.

He further argues that the grain stores could not ‘keep grain in store to feed the people throughout the really bad shangwa’. First it should be noted that the Shona societies themselves were not ‘static’. The various Shona societies had contacts among themselves as well as with other neighbouring African societies – the Swahili–Arabs from the tenth century or earlier and the Portuguese from the beginning of the sixteenth century. These contacts represented efforts to modify their material conditions through barter and exchange. The Shona peasants, as already noted, had been adopting new crops throughout the period from 1500 to 1800. These developments could hardly have been features of a static pre-colonial agrarian economy. The myths about the static nature of African agrarian economies have already been dispelled, in the case of West Africa, by A. G. Hopkins. As he aptly remarks:

the agricultural history in the pre-colonial period is a story of innovation rather than stagnation. The assumption that the economy was static, having been frozen at the very dawn of African history, is untenable, and the timeless concept of the ‘traditional’ society to be used with care or better still, not used at all. Although contact with other continents led to introduction of some weeds, such as spear grass, there is no doubt that on balance the import of seeds and plants was of great benefit to West Africa. The new crops offered the means of improving nutrition, they reduced the risk of famine and made possible the support of a larger population.

The idea that the Shona peasants were helpless victims of droughts and famines has been shown to be dated. Dr Richard Mutetwa showed that, in the case of the Duma people in the south-east, for example, ‘they had several ways of predicting droughts’. They also had several methods of fighting famine such as bartering salt, meat, fish, tusks, mats, pots, baskets, spears, arrows and jewels for grain and, sometimes, begging. The Shona also obtained grain during famine through a system called mukomondera whereby one borrowed grain on the understanding that it would be refunded without interest in the following good season. In difficult situations a man pawned his daughter. It should be remembered that the other

97. ibid.
98. ibid.
101. ibid.
branches of production, notably hunting, fishing and gathering, did not disappear after the introduction of new crops; they were adapted to the new agrarian economy and consequently constituted an important means of combating drought and famine.

In his study, Mutetwa has also convincingly argued that the problem of storage was not serious because the three Shona staple crops, millet, bulrush millet and sorghum, could store very well for more than three to four years. Beach's observation that humidity increased the moisture in the grain bin during the rainy season — which caused the grain either to rot or made it easier for stock-borers to eat into the grain bins — has not sufficiently taken into account the precautions the Shona peasants took to preserve their grain. The grain bins were carefully plastered 'on the inside and sealed off'. This rendered them airtight. The grain bins were also situated on bare rock to prevent termites reaching them. In the absence of such a rock, the grain bins were placed on reasonably high poles so that termite activity could easily be spotted before any damage was done. There has been a danger, as Mutetwa keenly observed, of 'stressing the drought years at the expense of the normal or above average years, and, it may be added, without regard to date and location'.

Parallels elsewhere in Africa concerning the efficiency of pre-colonial agriculture suggest that the 'darker picture' of the efficiency of Shona agriculture to satisfy the needs of the peasants can hardly be justified. As Walter Rodney argues, most African societies actually increased the cultivation of their lands notwithstanding the periodic famines.

In a different historical context, Miracle observed that:

We have much to learn about the tribal economies of tropical Africa, but it is increasingly clear that a number of current stereotypes about them are in need of revision.

This observation was no more true about pre-colonial peasant agriculture elsewhere than it was of the Shona.

Stock-raising

Stock-raising was an important branch of production in both the Mutapa and Rozvi empires. Stock-raising included the rearing of sheep, goats and cattle. The economic significance of cattle in African societies has attracted much interest among economic historians. Cattle provided meat, milk and manure which farming communities either consumed or sold.

102. ibid., pp. 236-7.
103. ibid.
104. ibid.
of cattle also performed a social function in that it bestowed a social status upon an individual. The more cattle a man owned in society, the more he was respected 'not for his unthinking devotion to ascribed values, but for his skill in controlling a major resource'.

In a region which sometimes experienced severe droughts, cattle had the advantage of lasting longer 'than stored grain'. This may explain why the Shona societies expressed their exchange values in terms of cattle. Portuguese documents stress the central role of cattle in the economy of both the Mutapa and Rozvi empires. Large herds of cattle flourished particularly in the highveld where they were not threatened with the tsetse fly. There is every likelihood that the Mutapa and Rozvi Changamire rulers practised transhumance or the seasonal movement of cattle. In general the practice of transhumance was determined by three factors. First, the size of the herd was important: the larger the herd the more land the cattle-owning community needed. The threat of disaster explains why, from the days of Great Zimbabwe, from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century, to the end of the eighteenth century, there was an annual trek of cattle from the highveld to the lowveld during the dry season in search of better grazing land. The herdsmen moved their cattle to the highveld at the onset of the rainy season which would spread fly-borne disease. Secondly, transhumance was determined by the degree of concentration on animal husbandry. Water and salt were scarce and pasture tended to be poor on the highveld during the dry season. Again cattle were taken to the lowveld. In other words, the natural distribution of essential foodstuffs was an important factor in the practice of transhumance. Thirdly, transhumance was undertaken for purposes of trade. The cultivators and pastoralists needed one another's products and one of the reasons behind transhumance was to exchange animal products for grain. As a result, conflicts occasionally erupted between the pastoralists and the cultivators whenever cattle destroyed the cultivators' crops. This in turn led to a shift in the orbit of transhumance and/or migrations to entirely new areas – which is how pastoralists became colonists. Beach has carefully documented most of these population movements from the late seventeenth century onward and the resultant new settlements in the north, east and south of the Shona plateau.

However, he has explained these phenomena in terms of the demographic factor. It is possible that the human population pressures he has identified were also linked to the bovine population and scarcity of grazing land. Jeffy Guy has drawn our attention to a similar situation in Zululand during the

111. For the general theory of transhumance, see A. G. Hopkins, 1983, p. 41.
112. For the practice of transhumance in Southern Zambezia see P. S. Garlake, 1978.
113. D. N. Beach, 1980a, ch. 8; J. M. Gray, 1979, ch. 1.
last decade of the eighteenth century and the importance of ecology, climate and vegetation in history.

The practice of transhumance, it may be argued, enabled the Mutapa and Rozvi populations to maintain large herds. Essentially there were two types of cattle breed: the small type which was reared in the north-east and the mountainous region of Nyanga, and the large type which was reared in the north-west. However, both archaeology and the Portuguese documents tell us little about cattle management and their distribution from the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth century. Portuguese sources continually point to the fact that Southern Zambezia was ‘rich in cattle and other animals’ and that the Africans ‘cook their meat in milk instead of water’. The latter was an overstatement but nevertheless underscores the abundance of cattle in the region. Some of these cattle were exchanged for cloth or other exotic articles. The Torwa at Khami, for example, used to export cattle to the Zambezi valley during the sixteenth century.

There are several testimonies concerning the central role of cattle in the Rozvi economy from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. In the early 1500s, Diogo de Alcacova recorded that 4000 hornless cows were paid as tribute to a reigning Mutapa by a ruler of Butwa in the south-west. In 1569, Father Monclaro likened the large size of cattle in Butwa to the large oxen of France. In the sixteenth century, Father João dos Santos attributed the small-scale production of gold to the fact that the African peasants were pre-occupied with herding cattle ‘which were in great numbers in these lands’. In 1648, Antonio Gomes exaggeratedly reported that the cows in Butwa were so big that one had to stand up to milk them.

Besides cattle the African peasants reared goats and sheep and chickens for food and exchange. As João dos Santos observed in 1595 in Uteve:

Their meat is generally hens which are innumerable. The Kaffirs breed them to sell to the Portuguese and in Sofala they give twelve for a black cotton cloth, which is there worth two testoons at most; and if the purchaser goes up the river to their dwellings to buy them, they will give sixteen or eighteen for the same piece of cloth which makes eleven or thereabouts for each hen. There are also many

121. A. Gomes, 1959, p. 197.
domesticated pigs which are bred among the houses, many goats and cows and an abundance of venison, wild pigs ...  

Mining of metals: iron and copper

A large amount of iron, copper and lead was mined throughout the Mutapa and Rozvi empires although the available literature leads one to believe that African peasants were only interested in mining gold. This, however, is a reflection of the interests of the Portuguese and Arab-Swahili traders. The African peasants extracted iron from which they made objects such as hoes, assegais and axes.  

The Njanja of Wedza acquired a reputation as hoe manufacturers, selling their hoes as far afield as Manyika, Bocha, Buhera and Ndua country. They also mined copper from which they made bangles which both men and women wore round their arms and legs. Eighteenth-century evidence suggests that copper came from Duma where it was plentiful. Admittedly the Duma people did not produce copper in large quantities but they probably exported the little they mined: a geological survey carried out in 1952 showed that four-fifths of total copper production in Zimbabwe came from Duma. A considerable quantity, however, also came from Urungwe in the north-west.  

Salt

The salt industry was very important for the Shona economy between 1500 and 1800. It was largely the preoccupation of regions that did not enjoy sufficient rainfall to grow crops and raise cattle, such as the Middle Save where the salt-workers exchanged their product for grain. The Middle Save was also rich in clay and the local inhabitants took advantage of this resource to specialize in pottery manufacture. Like salt, the pots were exchanged for grain, particularly during famine years.  

Cloth

Textile production was also an important economic activity among the Shona peasants of Southern Zambezia. Cotton-growing and weaving flourished mainly on the eastern bank of the Zambezi river. Some cotton was also grown in the north-east of the highveld. The Shona wove a cloth from this cotton and also from the bark of the baobab tree. The cotton-growing lowveld area was complemented by the highveld region which abounded in cattle and this largely determined the pattern of inter-regional trade.  

128. A. Gomes, 1959, pp. 203, 222.
Gold and silver

The existence and extraction of silver from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century was a matter of great speculation among the Portuguese authorities both in Lisbon and Southern Zambezia, but throughout the period under review and even later no silver mines were located. Silver was instead obtained as a by-product of gold-mining and there was plenty of gold on the highveld, in Butwa, in the south-west and in Manyika and Uteve in the east.

The amount of gold present in Southern Zambezia was greatly exaggerated by the Portuguese during the sixteenth century. In 1633 Gaspar Macedo was told by African peasants that until that time nobody had had to dig for gold in Torwa state but had simply collected it from the rivers and creeks and exchanged it for cloth at the feira of Masekesa in Manyika. The king’s treasure, he was told, consisted of ‘gold bars each of them weighing seven or eight arratéis’.\(^{129}\) It was also claimed that ‘the whole “Mucaranga” is a gold mine wherever you dig you find gold’.\(^{130}\) Although these were exaggerations, there was still plenty of gold in the Mutapa empire and Portuguese expectations were largely fulfilled from the early sixteenth century to the second half of the seventeenth century, despite their protestations to the contrary.

Historical references to Shona mining practices strongly suggest that mining was not a year-round activity. However, in the Kingdom of Manyika in the east the extraction of gold was carried out year-round mainly because most of the rivers were, and still are, perennial.\(^{131}\) It is possible that mining was carried out by peasants either to assuage the aristocracy’s demands for exchangeable commodities or to trade themselves.\(^{132}\)

Shona mining activities were concentrated within the months of August, September and October in order to combine them with general land clearance.\(^{133}\) Agriculture was ‘the matrix in which all other indigenous economic activity’ was set: a peasant could combine farming with other economic enterprises, such as trade or gold-mining, which remained subsidiary occupations. Often it was the sale of surplus agricultural produce that financed other projects. Another reason for mining during the dry months of August, September and October was that miners could sink shafts fairly deep as a result of a seasonal fall in the water-table. Moreover, the alluvial deposits of the previous summer could easily be found before being carried away by the floods of the next season.

Mining operations followed a pattern prevalent in much of Southern Africa. The basic tools used to break out the ore were hammerstones and

129. G. Macedo, 1890, p. 151.
130. A. Gomes, 1959, p. 186.
iron gads. A gad was used to hammer into cracks and crevices, as a wedge for prizing the rock apart. The miners also used a type of crowbar consisting of a piece of iron inserted into the end of a heavy stick, probably hafted like a hoe and used as a pick. Shovels were also used to gather together the broken rock and ensure no valuable pieces were left behind. The method for gold-reef mining was fire-setting - as can be deduced from the large quantities of charcoal which Roger Summers found in many of the ancient mines. In one he also came across troughs containing charcoal standing against the face of the reef. According to him, they formed a hearth concentrating the heat against the hard rock face. By cooling the heated rock rapidly the Shona were able to crack the rock face. They controlled the amount of cold water applied by using a specially shaped clay vessel to obtain the maximum splitting of the rock. Using a wooden container, the miners took the ore to the surface where they sorted it with small axes removing the gold-bearing quartz. The pieces thus sorted were stacked amongst piles of firewood and roasted, after which the burnt quartz was crushed and the gold washed out of it.

With alluvial gold the recovery process was village-based. During the mining season groups of 400 or more miners, including women and children, assembled in one place under the command of their respective village heads. They washed the alluvium in wooden bowls and the gold that was recovered was packed into hollow reeds or quills ready for exchange. The peasants preferred gold panning to reef mining as the workings were shallow and gold-rich levels could be easily reached; gold washing was not expensive as the miner did not need picks to crack the rock nor did he have to buy or look for firewood. Moreover, panning did not involve the crushing or roasting of rocks, nor expose miners to the hazards of tunnels through soft soils that regularly caved in.

The Mutapa and Rozvi rulers exercised great control over the production of gold within their empires. It has been estimated that almost 50 per cent of gold production within the Mutapa empire was appropriated directly by the ruling élite. If a person stumbled upon a gold deposit he was required to cover it up and report it immediately to the local chief. Commenting on this in 1648, Antonio Gomes said 'no matter what a Portuguese promises them, they will not reveal that place and very often that they have tried, up to now no one has known of any'. Failure to comply with this law was punishable by death.

135. ibid.
136. ibid.
137. M. Barreto, 1899, p. 491.
139. A. Gomes, 1959, p. 185.
140. A. Gomes, 1959.
rulers did not want the Portuguese who traded with their empires to know the location of the gold mines as this would tempt them to conquest; moreover, control of the mines enabled them to dictate better terms of trade for their subjects.

The decline of gold production during the seventeenth century.

The dangerous nature of gold mining led not only to low production but ultimately to its decline during the seventeenth century.\(^{141}\) Sometimes water burst into the shafts, flooded them and killed the miners. Moreover, by the seventeenth century the Shona miners, it has been argued, had mined deep enough to reach the water-table, and it was not possible to mine below this without the aid of a new technology capable of pumping out both the water and mud.\(^{142}\) The third reason for the decline was that the price the Portuguese traders paid for gold was too low to induce the peasants to risk their lives.

One aspect that has not been examined in detail was the impact of war on gold production. The first half of the seventeenth century witnessed the height of Portuguese aggression towards the Mutapa empire. Its intervention into internal Shona politics resulted in wars among the Mutapa rulers themselves and also between the Mutapa rulers and their tributaries. These wars resulted in temporary and permanent migrations, and famine through the disruption of agricultural production even in areas rich in resources and with favourable weather patterns. In 1683, for example, there was anarchy in Makaranga where the country was ‘depopulated ... and consequently without mines’,\(^{143}\) as a result of which ‘the Portuguese live from what they can scratch by the banks of the rivers or from the gold that appears at the surface of the earth’.\(^{144}\) The second half of the seventeenth century was characterized by the even more devastating Changamire wars which resulted in the reorganization of populations into several states.

Warfare, therefore, could be blamed for the disruption of gold production in Shonaland during the seventeenth century in the same way that a natural calamity disrupts agriculture by reducing the amount of land available for production. The impact of war on the decline of gold production has so far been ignored by historians in favour of ‘the fundamental constraints imposed by a hostile and capricious geological environment which severely limited the gold available to Shona mining operations’.\(^{145}\)

In addition, the methods adopted by the Portuguese traders alienated


\(^{144}\) ibid.

them from the peasants largely responsible for producing gold. African rulers protested against Portuguese insistence that peasants — and their rulers — trade their products exclusively with the Portuguese. According to captain Francisco Figuira de Almeida of Sena, relations started to sour when the Portuguese changed their original method of trade. In the early 1500s African peasants used to take their produce directly to the Portuguese feiras in the interior. Later in the century, however, the Portuguese sent middlemen into the interior who took merchandise ‘in small bundles wrapped in wild palm-tree mats as big a load as a man can carry on his back’ to the peasants’ doors. De Almeida further reported that usually a Portuguese trader travelled with anything between three and five hundred local peasants who ‘steal anything they come across and the natives from the villages move to other places so as not to be subjected to such humiliation’. Another Portuguese mistake was to sell merchandise on credit to the African peasants who often defaulted with the result that a Portuguese trader would have to send twenty to thirty of the peasants in his employ to recover the debt. If the defaulter failed to pay the debt he became ‘the traders’ slave and with the same ease he goes with his wife and children and started doing the same as the other do’. In this way a Portuguese trader could end up with several hundred enslaved middlemen. As one African ruler pointed out:

the Portuguese were causing great damage and if they wanted to sell cloth to the Africans they should bring it to him and he himself would sell it to those who could pay for it, otherwise some run away, the others are taken by the Portuguese and thus the population of the villages was dwindling.

By the mid-1600s the king of Uteve had ordered his people not to extract any gold but ‘to till the land and grow food in order to become rich and have more peace and quiet’. Social factors, therefore, were probably more important than climate or geological factors in the decline of gold production during the seventeenth century.

Trade

Trade records also provide historical evidence of the diversity of Shona peasant economies. The peasants’ main aim, however, was to produce use-values rather than exchange values. But the production of commodities inevitably resulted in the exchange of products among the peasants them-

146. A. Gomes, 1959, p. 192.
147. ibid.
148. ibid.
149. ibid.
150. ibid., p. 193.
selves and between peasants and craftsmen and this led to the emergence of regional trade. The important regional trade networks will be identified in the subsequent discussion.

The Swahili traders established several bazaars in the Mutapa empire. It is difficult to say exactly when they did so but one Portuguese adventurer found them in existence when he travelled inland from Sofala in 1514–15. 151 We can, however, safely assume that the first bazaars in Sofala and its immediate neighbourhood were established during the tenth century when the Arab–Swahili traders, who depended on African peasants for their food supplies, started trading with African peasants in the Mutapa empire. 152 The bazaars were operated on Mondays, 153 with the African peasants exchanging their agricultural produce and gold dust for beads, cloth and other exotic items. Little is known about the volume and organization of this trade but it is reasonable to assume that the demand for food by the Swahili–Arabs must have stimulated the production of surplus grain, large and small stock for meat, and a variety of vegetables. The demand for food supplies must have increased when the Portuguese established a fortress at Sofala in 1506 which became an entrepôt between the Portuguese traders and the African peasants who went there to sell their produce.

The establishment of this fortress must be seen in the context of Portuguese commercial activities from 1498 when Vasco da Gama made his famous voyage to India. It was at this time that the Portuguese learnt about the gold mines in Sofala and its hinterland and that King Emmanuel consequently ordered the setting up of a factory at Sofala. Portugal's main aim at this time was to occupy all strategic points along the Indian Ocean. The fortresses of Sofala and Kilwa were built in 1506 to protect the gold trade while three others - in Quilon, Angediva and the Red Sea - were built to control the pepper trade. Sofala was therefore integrated into Portugal's trade network and the stage was set for further exchange between African and Portuguese traders. On arrival at Sofala in 1506, the Portuguese as already mentioned, found the Arab–Swahili traders well established and a rivalry, characterized by several military encounters, consequently developed. 154 The Portuguese emerged victorious, however, and the Arab–Swahili fled north to various strategic points on the Zambezi river from where they continued to undermine Portuguese commercial activities along the Zambezi trade route as well as trade routes into the interior. The Portuguese reacted swiftly by ousting them from most of these places and, in 1531, establishing Sena and Tete as their main trade centres.

154. For details of this rivalry, see A. Lobato, 1954a.
trading activities accordingly shifted northwards thus decreasing the commercial importance of the Sofala region.155

The defeat of the Swahili in 1512 and the effective occupation of Sena and Tete in the 1530s – which gave the Portuguese a monopoly over the supply of goods – brought to an end the independent trade of the Swahili–Arabs. But as they had neither the skill nor the manpower, and as the Swahili–Arabs were anxious to continue as traders in the region, a natural though uneasy trading alliance developed between them. For the next century Swahili–Arabs were the main agents of Portuguese trade in the interior. African *vashambadzi* (traders) had been acting as middlemen for the Swahili–Arab traders long before the advent of the Portuguese, and their role was formally institutionalized within the Swahili–Arab/Portuguese alliance. The Swahili–Arabs continued to trade, albeit clandestinely, in the Torwa interior until the late 1600s. By the early 1700s they had lost much of their Islamic culture and had adopted Lemba and Venda culture.156

The defeat of the Swahili–Arabs left the Portuguese traders without major competition along the Zambezi trade route and in the interior. Initially the aim of the Portuguese crown was to monopolize the entire trade in Sofala and the interior. But this proved impossible as greed drove individual traders inland to make independent trade agreements with African rulers. As already noted, by 1541 there were so many Portuguese traders in the interior that it became necessary to formalize and regulate their trading activities within the Mutapa empire.

As with the Swahili–Arab traders, the African peasants exchanged their produce for a variety of exotic items. Peter Garlake's archaeological excavations of the *feiras* of Luanze, Dambarare and Rimuka indicate that beads were the most popular commodity of trade during the early sixteenth century.157 The popularity of the most common black, yellow, green and blue beads varied from region to region but red and black beads – known as Cambay beads – were preferred in all kingdoms. The Portuguese found beads in circulation when they arrived and tried in vain to control their market. The popularity of beads was determined by a set of beliefs prevalent among the Shona158 that the Portuguese plucked them from trees. The black beads, it was thought, had acquired their colour through being left on the tree long enough to petrify and turn black. The green beads had been plucked before they were ripe while the yellow ones had been plucked when ripe and before the sun burnt them black. There was also a variety of imported beads, including those 'of coral, crystal, pewter, jet, amber and blue Venetia glass',159 but these were unpopular. Consequently, a

156. D. N. Beach, 1984, p. 32.
158. A. Gomes, 1959, p. 196.
159. P. S. Garlake, 1954, p. 43.
locally-made variety known as caracoes (small stone beads), which were also exempt from royal bead-trade monopoly, captured the market between 1516 and 1518. The caracoes were rated seven times as popular as the European imported beads. Cloth was another important trade item, particularly the brightly coloured cloth which was measured by arm-lengths.

In exchange for these articles, the Shona brought to the fortress’s daily market sorghum, maize, groundnuts, cowpeas, baskets, mats, pots, chickens, eggs, honey, trapped animals and birds, and a wide range of vegetables and wild fruits. This type of trade was also carried on in the feiras and presumably continued when the feiras themselves were destroyed at the end of the seventeenth century. There was, possibly, as in the markets of West Africa, some segregation of merchants according to products sold and also to sex; that is, women traders probably sold different articles from those sold by men. Most smiths, other craftsmen and miners exchanged their goods either among themselves or with the Portuguese traders. The farmers found ready market for their cattle, goats, sheep or pigs. The Sofala fortress and the feiras in the interior struck deep roots into Shona society and became an essential part of its economic and social framework.

Feiras in Shona country

The period 1575–1684 witnessed a change in the pattern of trade between African peasants and Portuguese traders. The Portuguese traders consolidated their commercial and military victory over the Swahili–Arabs by adapting and transforming the bazaars into Portuguese feiras. The land on which the feiras were established was granted by local African chiefs. In time the feiras became the main focal points of Afro–Portuguese commercial intercourse. They were large areas enclosed by low timber-palisade walls, with a few residential pole-and-mud huts near the gold-mining areas. Each feira had a fortress, a garrison of ten to fifteen soldiers, in theory a church with a priest, and a capitão-mor. Some feiras were administered by the government of the Rivers of Sena while others were privately owned. The capitães-mores, whose role and position in Portuguese commerce in the Rivers of Sena were clearly defined during the eighteenth century, bore some resemblance to the guards of the medieval Portuguese feiras. The position of capitães-mores in Manyika, Butwa and Karanga country was comparable to that of the capitão-mor dos Banianes on the island of Mozambique, and other similar representatives of merchants who were sometimes organized into guilds. Their soldo (payment) was regarded only as a subsidy – and it was the policy of the Portuguese administrators to appoint only wealthy individuals from the Portuguese settlement of Sena to such posts. On the island of Mozambique, the capitão-mor dos Banianes was

FIG. 22.4 The main feiras in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
usually the wealthiest of the Indian merchants from Diu. This was also true of Mozambique’s less well-known *capitão-mor dos muros*, who was often a wealthy ship-owner.

The duties of the *capitães-mores* involved taxation, price control, arbitrating between Portuguese and African traders, granting of licences, protecting caravans, raising soldiers, and the enforcement of laws relating to weights and measures. These powers and duties were greatly modified as *capitães-mores* interacted with various African rulers. The *feira* as an institution was formalized and regulated by a series of instructions which the Portuguese Crown sent to Vincente Regado, *capitão-mor* of Sofala and Mozambique in 1531. These instructions provided for the circulation of merchandise, the determination of titles and excise duty, the establishment of shops and the drawing up of licences to sell merchandise and the holding of law suits.

The main *feiras*

The *feira* of Dambarare was acclaimed the best of all the *feiras* in the Rivers of Sena, where almost all the rich influential merchants of Sena traded and thence scattered to other places such as Chitomborwizi, Rimuka, Luanze and Matafuna. Dambarare was the headquarters, second only to the administrative headquarters of the Captain of the Gates at Masapa. The Dambarare *feira* was three days’ journey from that of Angwa, where there was much gold but few residents as it was so far from both Sena and Tete.

A similar situation obtained in Uteve where the Portuguese held an annual *feira* in Bandire to purchase articles from the interior. This custom lasted from the sixteenth century to the early eighteenth century when the Teve authorities stopped it. The Portuguese claimed that the right to hold the Bandire *feira* was accorded them by the Munhumutapa in 1580. This may be so in theory, but the Mutapas’ control over their feudatories, Uteve not excluded, had almost disappeared by 1580. The annual *feira*, as its subsequent history shows, was sustained and controlled by the Teve rulers. Teve methods of controlling Portuguese trade were somewhat different from those of other Shona societies. In Manyika, for example, *feira* trade was controlled personally by both the kings who with their councillors occasionally visited the *capitão-mor* and the prince or princess of the *feira* area. But in Uteve the *feira* was operated largely by an *inyamasango* (village head) under whose jurisdiction the administration

of Bandire fell. He was required to pay an annual tribute to the Sachiteve in the form of a Turkish tunic, one piece of cloth, a barret, some linen, one rola (turtle-dove) and some Bengal muslin. Apparently these articles were supposed to be yellow in colour to symbolize the abundance of gold at Bandire. A survey of the area in 1890 by Renato Baptista testified to the abundance of gold. The Portuguese do not seem to have created any feiras north of the Zambezi until the early eighteenth century when Zumbo and Michonga were established. Two reasons may account for the late development of the feiras of both Michonga and Zumbo: the discovery of bares north of the Zambezi during the eighteenth century, and the need for the Portuguese to look elsewhere for trade after their expulsion from Shona country by the Rozvi emperor, Dombo Changamire, between 1693 and 1695.

The expulsion of the Portuguese from their feiras by Changamire forced the Portuguese to adopt the trading methods they had used during the sixteenth century. When they abandoned their feiras in Makaranga they established a new one, Zumbo, at the Luangwa–Zambezi confluence between 1710 and 1788 and came to depend on the vashambadzi for their trade with the Rozvi empire. They were, however, able to revive the feira of Masekesa in Manyika in 1719 but none in Uteve. The system of having one officer to co-ordinate Portuguese relations with African rulers was no longer possible in the case of the Mutapa emperors as there was no effective central political authority among the African rulers. It is therefore necessary to briefly examine relations between the Portuguese and some important African rulers during the eighteenth century.

In the east, the King of Uteve did not allow the Portuguese to mine gold in the bares in his kingdom. His subjects, however, could buy cloth and beads from the Portuguese settlers at Sena. Even in this trade, the king and his princes were accused by Portuguese traders of causing ‘infinite damage’, ‘robbery’ and violence to Portuguese merchandise, much of whose profit was spent trying to buy safety. Teve policy during the eighteenth century was decidedly anti-Portuguese. In the Kingdom of Manyika, Portuguese traders were allowed freedom of passage throughout the land but their trading activities were strictly controlled by Manyika rulers. The capitão-mor and the Portuguese merchants paid a regular tribute.

Similarly, to keep the feira of Zumbo and the trade route to Butwa safe,

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168. The term Zumbo refers to three settlements which the Portuguese established and abandoned in succession on the Zambezi–Luangwa confluence during the eighteenth century. The first and earliest settlement was founded probably in 1710 on the island of Chitacativa on the River Zambezi; the second settlement, founded in 1715, is on the Mozambique angle of the Zambezi–Luangwa confluence; the third settlement known as Mucariva, now marked on Zambian maps merely as ‘Feira’, was founded in October 1788. For full discussion see S. I. Mudenge, 1977.
the Portuguese traders paid a regular tribute to Changamire. This involved great expense and he used to send his envoys to the feira of Zumbo asking for additional gifts – usually to the value of six pastas – over and above the usual tribute.\textsuperscript{170} The precarious nature of the trade route between Zumbo and Butwa via Dande country was illustrated by an incident in 1757 when prince Chirimba of Dande seized merchandise intended for Butwa. For the next seven years, Changamire, his soldiers and the gold producers of Butwa carried on continual raids so that the once prosperous Butwa trade was destroyed. Changamire’s famous raid of 1756–7, which confiscated property worth 1000 pastas (800 000 cruzados) was a case in point.\textsuperscript{171} The Zumbo trade was also compromised by recurring civil war and famine during the 1760s. Despite the Portuguese raids, however, the Changamires valued their trade with them. The Rozvi rulers sent expeditionary forces on three occasions – in 1743, 1772 and 1781 – to protect the feira of Zumbo from attacks by the neighbouring African rulers. In addition to beads, the articles of special interest to the Rozvi rulers included umbrellas, seashells, rosaries of fake coral, chinaware, brass bells, scissors and aguadente (firewater), a kind of brandy.\textsuperscript{172}

The nature of relations between the Mutapa and the Portuguese appears to have changed little during the eighteenth century. The Portuguese continued to maintain a garrison of twenty soldiers, a capitão-mor, a lieutenant, a captain-general and a Dominican friar at the Mutapa royal court. It would also seem that the ‘old custom of baptizing the Mutapa rulers was maintained’ even though there is nothing Christian about those kings as they generally have as they all do, a thousand or more concubines’.\textsuperscript{173} Another sixteenth-century practice which survived into the eighteenth century was that:

Every three years, this King sends a emissary to the General of Sena, who meets him at Tete always on the first year of his term of office, and they discuss the continuation of the old state alliance with the said King and some matters concerning the traders of Zumbo who necessarily have to travel across his territory and if any other business comes up outside the scope of that triennial visit, there will be more respective emissaries sent from one and the other side.\textsuperscript{174}

Despite these arrangements, trade between the Portuguese and the Mutapa rulers continued to decline during the eighteenth century. This decline has been explained in the context of three developments in Southern Zambezia during the eighteenth century. First, there was the gold rush north of the

\textsuperscript{170} H. H. K. Bhila, 1982, p. 119.
\textsuperscript{171} ibid., pp. 119–20.
\textsuperscript{172} ibid.
\textsuperscript{174} ibid.
Zambezi with individual Portuguese adventurers discovering bares and starting to mine gold themselves. Secondly, gold production had almost completely declined by the eighteenth century; and thirdly, both the African and Portuguese traders on either side of the Zambezi river took to elephant hunting for ivory.

Ivory trade played an important role in the Mutapa empire. A sixteenth-century Portuguese account tells us that elephants used to 'go about in droves almost like a herd of cows'\(^{175}\) in the Mutapa empire and that 'four or five thousand elephants die every year which is confirmed by the large quantity of ivory sent thence to India'.\(^{176}\) The advantage of elephant hunting was that it was not as amenable as gold to control by African rulers as the hunting usually took place in remote areas. However, little is known about its organization and there are suggestions that much eighteenth-century elephant hunting took place in Buhera and Rimuka.\(^{177}\)

**Conclusion**

Portuguese penetration of Southern Zambezia eroded the power of the indigenous ruling class and facilitated direct forms of peasant exploitation by Portuguese mercantile capital and, later, British industrial capital in Southern Zambezia. The convergence of regional trade networks with long-distance trade gave rise to an African merchant class called *vashambadzi*. With the arrival of the Swahili-Arab traders in the tenth century and the Portuguese at the beginning of the sixteenth century, some Africans were hired to act as middle-men between the foreign traders and the African peasant producers.

The Portuguese merchants were largely concerned with trade in gold and ivory and, consequently, the main commodities of regional trade — iron, salt and copper — were relegated to second position in terms of commercial importance. By the 1530s the Portuguese merchants had already penetrated the interior of the Mutapa empire and trade in salt, copper and iron and in gold and ivory converged. Trade in one commodity stimulated trade in another, hence the emergence of an African merchant class. For long-distance trade to flourish there had to be gold and ivory and porters, food to feed the carriers, hoes to cultivate the crops and iron to make the hoes. The *vashambadzi* transported not only ivory and gold but salt and iron hoes which they exchanged for food on the way. The African cultivators who lived near the trade routes were gradually transformed as they grew more and more surplus agricultural produce for sale to the traders and their porters. Needless to say the peasants, who were mostly ignorant of the international value of the commodities they sold, were ruthlessly exploited by the Portuguese merchants.

\(^{176}\) ibid.
\(^{177}\) D. N. Beach, 1984, p. 35.
Between 1500 and 1800 much of southern Africa was transformed. New communities established themselves in the region; many pre-existing communities changed their means of living, their location or both; and the relationships which grew up within and between communities were radically different from any before. Many of these drastic changes were because of changes in southern Africa’s external linkages. When the first European, Vasco da Gama, rounded the Cape in 1497, southern Africa had only the most tenuous links with the rest of the world, but by 1800 the region was firmly enmeshed in world-wide patterns of trade and strategy. It is worth considering the changing international context itself before trying to evaluate its effect on southern Africa.

In 1500 the great population concentrations of the world were around the Mediterranean and in Asia. Neither sub-Saharan Africa nor the Americas had been drawn into regular relationships with the rest of the world. International trade was particularly concerned with Europe and Asia, and it was conducted almost entirely over land, at very great expense. The objective of da Gama’s mission was to pioneer a sea route which would reduce the costs of international trade and curb the rapacity of the many middle-men who battened upon the land route. To the Portuguese, who first developed this trade route, and to the Dutch, English and French, who followed them round the Cape, southern Africa was merely a dangerous navigational hazard. The mapping of its coast-line, however, gradually ended its isolation but the consistent lack of interest from Arab and European traders is worth looking at.

During the late Iron Age, the temperate climates of the southern hemisphere were not very attractive. With only rudimentary tools it was difficult to produce a regular surplus of food, even in regions which permitted cultivation, and what surplus there was was difficult to store or invest in further production. Population densities in the temperate regions of the southern hemisphere – including Australasia and the southern cone of South America – were much lower than in the neighbouring tropical regions. The tropical regions nurtured relatively dense human populations, permitting surplus production and a high degree of specialization. Not

surprisingly, therefore, the temperate regions were unattractive to international traders. They did not regularly produce commodities for export, and they would not do so until very recent times when large volumes of capital, advanced technology and improved transport became available.  

The Arabs, who conducted a flourishing trade along the east coast of Africa, were not tempted further south because the gold, ivory and slaves, which bulked large in their cargoes, were much more readily available on the tropical coasts than in the temperate extremity of the continent. Similarly, Europeans travelled round the Cape for 150 years before taking much interest in the region for its own sake. The names the Portuguese gave their anchorages — Algoa and Delagoa — speak of their determination to travel to and from Goa, and their lack of interest in the trading potential of southern Africa itself.

Sea-borne influences were negligible, and land contacts not much more important. Many communities in the south had historic and linguistic ties to the north, but these had little significance in daily life. The Khoi Khoi who herded animals, caught fish and gathered food from the field along the southern coastal belt, were effectively isolated from most northern contacts and so were the San hunters and gatherers in the southern interior. The speakers of the Nguni languages, mainly east of the dividing range, had little regular contact with their northern neighbours in 1500. In the far west (in today’s Namibia) the Herero and Ovambo had close linguistic ties with each other and with their northern neighbours. The central Tswana and Sotho traded to the north from time to time, but even when trade took place, the quantity of goods was small, and the commodities traded (including copper, iron and dagga) were not essential to anyone’s survival. As late as 1500 these societies were effectively independent of the rest of the world: their external links were sporadic, ad hoc and marginal. The European fleets, which sometimes anchored off the coast and took fresh water and supplies on board, did little to dent this self-sufficiency for another century or more.

Although European interest in the region was slow to develop, when it did finally express itself it was powerful. In the mid-1600s a new community was planted at the Cape by the Dutch East India Company which continued to see southern Africa simply as a way-station to the East. As late as 1800 ‘Cape Town was a seaward-looking community, a caravanserai on the periphery of the global spice trade’, with the character of ‘a residency city, closer in spirit to Asia than to the African continent on which it stood’. The regional consequences of establishing the Cape Town settlement were, however, much more profound than the Company planners intended. The region as a whole was securely linked to Europe and Asia, although it was

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5. ibid., p. 126.
not yet resolved whether the Dutch (who held the Cape from 1652 to 1795) or the British (who seized the Cape in 1795) would be the agents. The new settlement at the Cape was, and would remain, a dependency, responding swiftly to new external pressures and incentives. As that dependency expanded into its hinterland, it would draw the whole region into durable new relationships tinged with dominance and dependence. Through the little settlement entered capitalist relations of production, together with colonialism and imperialism which would transform southern Africa more abruptly and more thoroughly than any other part of sub-Saharan Africa. These developments are the focus of this chapter.

FIG. 23.1 Southern Africa in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries

It is possible to reconstruct the conditions and events of the sixteenth century but it is difficult to strike any kind of scholarly balance in reviewing these conditions. Wherever hunting and gathering communities have come into conflict with cultivators during the past two centuries, they have been destroyed as viable societies. Cultivators have survived in sufficient numbers to force themselves upon the attention of historians: nomads have been less fortunate. The general destruction of Aboriginal, Red Indian, gaucho, Siberian and southern African nomadic societies has reinforced the set theories in which we customarily view past and present, so that
some scholars can scarcely conceal their impatience in anticipating the evolution of nomads into cultivators and, ultimately, into industrial proletarians.\(^6\) The American Indians at least left behind them sufficient evidence to form the basis of imaginative and sometimes romantic reconstructions: southern African nomads were destroyed or transformed too early, and too comprehensively, to permit such literary creation.\(^8\)

Some very interesting relationships prevailed in southern Africa in the sixteenth century that defy all notions of historical inevitability. Environmental differences permitted a degree of specialization between communities; these specialist societies interacted upon each other; and this interaction was compatible with the durability of the life-style of each one. Hunters were not evolving into herders, nor herders into cultivators, but rather co-existing despite the hostilities which sometimes marked their interaction. It is worth spending some time reconstructing this kind of interaction, if only to gain some perspective on the relationships which developed later.

The western half of southern Africa, including present-day Botswana and Namibia, enjoys less than 40 cm of rainfall each year. A few regions within this zone have better annual averages but their porous soil does not retain much of the water. The only major exception is the hinterland of the Cape peninsula which enjoys good winter rain quite regularly. Rainfall in most of the western half is not only poor but also erratic,\(^9\) and there is no reason to suppose that conditions were markedly different in the sixteenth century. Without dam-building and food-storage techniques, the inhabitants of this area could not have practised agriculture. Even twentieth-century technology has made little impact on this region, apart from damming water to facilitate pastoral production. As the inhabitants could not practise agriculture, their commitment to hunting and gathering or herding is evidence of sensible adaptation — not the backwardness of which they are often implicitly accused.

The origins and history of the San hunter-gatherer groups are surrounded in myth and misunderstanding. The great diversity of languages they spoke in the sixteenth century is evidence alone of many centuries of adaptation within the western half of southern Africa.\(^10\) Hunting and gathering were not nearly as risky then as they would be now. Travelling light, knowing their territory and the flora and fauna intimately, and rarely venturing beyond familiar terrain, a hunting band was probably quite secure as long as human population density did not outgrow environmental resources.\(^11\) Fifty to seventy was reported as the average size of a hunting

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band and while there were substantial areas free of agriculture and intensive pastoralism, there would have been ample wild game. Hunting and gathering provided a reliable livelihood independent of other societies, but the San also interacted with other people. Sometimes a group of hunters would attach themselves as clients to herding patrons, obtaining dairy products in exchange for game or advice on animal movements. Although the hunters were clients, the relationship cannot have been oppressive because the San always retained the option of returning to specialist hunting on their own. Some hunting groups also lived outside the western-central interior region and indeed, a few survived in the foothills of the Drakensberg range until well into the nineteenth century, supplementing their diet by occasional raids upon the herds of the mixed farmers of that area. This form of livelihood relied absolutely on mobility. Mobility would have been impaired by the presence of many old, young or otherwise immobile people; and, therefore, a hunting life-style itself would have imposed restraints on population growth so that the balance between population and resources was not jeopardized. The need for mobility imposed yet another constraint: the accumulation of property could only depress living standards by hampering the band's speed.

In his masterly review of the evidence for Khoi Khoi origins, Elphick proposes that the most likely explanation is that San groups acquired cattle and sheep long before 1500 and expanded with them through the riverine regions of the interior into the southern coastal belt where they were observed by European travellers in the sixteenth century. Possession of stock meant that the Khoi had to cling to well-watered areas rather than roam the arid regions; but it also permitted the gradual growth of a population and the size of individual bands. Since oxen could carry baggage, the Khoi could build tents and transport them instead of making fresh shelters whenever they moved. Similarly, the presence of immobile old and young people was no longer the handicap it had been. Private property could be accumulated on a small scale (and even on a large scale in the form of stock), and within these pastoral societies, a measure of stratification developed differentiating them from the more egalitarian and property-less San. The need for social control did not require the Khoi to develop a formal structure of political authority; but individuals did exercise some authority among their clans and, in the early days of sporadic trading with European ships, some accumulated considerable power and livestock wealth.

Herding may have offered a higher level of consumption than hunting during good times, but herds were vulnerable to drought and animal disease, as well as theft and confiscation in war. When such disasters occurred the Khoi often had to hunt for a living, at least until they could build up fresh herds of stock. The knowledge and techniques of herding

were not much different from those required in hunting, so Khoi could easily revert to San whenever necessary. Near the Cape peninsula, where hunting opportunities were limited, dispossessed herders took to the seashore living off fish and shellfish until they gained access to stock or attached themselves as clients to more fortunate stock-owners. These transitions were not difficult: neither language nor culture distinguished one group sharply from another. Life might have been unstable but it was not miserable. The rare Khoi who was taken overseas on one of the ships which watered at the Cape found nothing to induce dissatisfaction with conditions at home.

Interaction between Khoi and Nguni, on the eastern flank of Khoi territory, took place across quite sharp cultural and technical boundaries. The region in which Khoi and Xhosa interacted was good grazing country but marginal for the purposes of agriculture because the rainfall was little more than 40 cm a year. There could be no clear ecological boundary between Khoi and Xhosa, as both modes of livelihood were possible. Instead inter-penetration seems to have been common. Individual Xhosa abandoned settled farming for herding and sometimes hunting. Whenever a crisis struck the Khoi, they could become clients of established Xhosa nearby because agricultural production recovers more rapidly from famine conditions than stock-farming. There must have been two-way traffic between mixed farming and specialist herding – usually small-scale but occasionally massive. Robert Ross demonstrates this relationship with reference to the Gonaqua, Gqunukhwebe and Ntinde societies which were all – in his view – former Khoi who became mixed farmers and were incorporated en masse into Xhosa society, language and tradition. However, we are not dealing with a single transition from herding to cultivation. Physically, the Gonaqua resembled the Xhosa more than the Khoi, so they may have made more than one transition (from agriculture to herding and back again) before the eighteenth century. Most of the evidence comes from the eighteenth century when the Khoi were under enormous pressure: but we cannot assume that, in earlier centuries, the Xhosa were generally expanding, nor that Khoi territory was consistently contracting, as earlier historical orthodoxy maintains. It is only in the light of hindsight that Khoi pastoralism seems a transitional and obsolete means of livelihood. For most of the period under review, the Khoi interacted intensively with other specialists but without sacrificing the viability of their own life-style.

For years the study of the mixed-farming communities in south-eastern Africa has been confounded by historians’ obsession with one question: when was the mass migration from the tropical north? It is now clear that

15. ibid., ch. 4.
18. ibid.
PLATE 23.1 A Gonaqua (Griqua) huntsman
this question was misconceived and that it was provoked by the white settlers' need to legitimize their own land acquisitions. Stable settlement and short-range, small-scale movements were more common than great population movements at high speed.

The late Iron Age was well established among the Nguni and Sotho peoples by 1500. Iron was commonly employed and quite widely processed, although not all tools and weapons were of metal. The significance of iron in mixed-farming communities requires some elucidation. Hunting and herding societies (such as the Khoi and the San in the sixteenth century) had little need of iron and could rely entirely on stone, bone, wood and fibre for their artifacts. Iron was a convenience and Khoi demand for iron was quickly saturated during the early, casual trade with ships at the Cape. It is also possible for mixed farmers to manage without metal implements: in Melanesia mixed farmers operated complex and prosperous agricultural systems for 5000 years before steel tools were introduced, although when they were they had a marked labour-saving effect. In southern Africa mixed farmers practised both agriculture and pastoralism with very few iron tools for 1000 years. The abundance of iron in the late Iron Age did not make new processes possible but must have made existing processes much easier and more productive. Cultivation is much more efficient when iron tools are available for clearing and hoeing the ground and more time is made available for domestic crafts, such as pottery, and for more extensive pastoralism. Archaeological record suggests that domesticated animals and pottery became more numerous during the late Iron Age and that, in turn, implies a more comfortable standard of living and a heightened division of labour within each community.

The written accounts of the life of Nguni societies east of the dividing range, between 1500 and 1800, are uneven and impressionistic; and a reconstruction of those years relies heavily on the study of material remains, supplemented by such oral accounts as have survived. The material basis of life was grain and livestock. The traditional reliance upon sorghum was modified in the eighteenth century by the adoption of maize which gave higher yields although it was less adaptable to regions of low rainfall. The higher yields of maize may well have contributed to the higher numbers of stock; but stock-farming could be conducted best by the use of a combination of pastures and by seasonal transhumance to take advantage of the differing qualities of sweet and sour grazing. The pressures on mixed farming of this kind were, presumably, intensified by the climatic variations

which Hall proposes for the eastern coastal belt as a whole. In particular, a general decline in rainfall in the first half of the eighteenth century, and a serious drought at the end of the 1700s, would have intensified competition for those pastures which were usable even in dry years.

Human population densities appear to have been much lower than we are now accustomed to. Peires estimates that there were no more than 100,000 Xhosa-speaking people by 1800, despite the accumulation of ex-Khoi during the preceding century or longer. If those figures are typical of the eastern coastal belt, then there cannot have been serious population pressure on land at any time between 1500 and 1800, despite the extensive agricultural and pastoral methods then used. This is important in considering the political systems recorded for the Nguni in this era. Their essential constituent, and the irreducible unit of viability, was a household of stock-owning and land-using people. For most day-to-day purposes, the household could behave as an independent unit, trading and exchanging commodities and wives with other households, almost at will. In practice, each household was linked through patrilineal kinship to a lineage, and hence to a clan; and from the time of Tshawe the Xhosa, for instance, had been loosely bound together by allegiance to the royal clan of Tshawe's descendants. The leader of the royal clan, however, had few sanctions with which to enforce his authority over other Xhosa-speakers, except the manipulation of marriage links and gifts whereby other clans (including non-Xhosa clans such as the neighbouring Khoi) became indebted to him. The ability to bestow wives, gifts and land depended ultimately on the royal household's ability to out-produce other households and clans. The chief usually had more wives — hence more units of production — than others, but there was no particular barrier to a commoner becoming wealthy in stock and wives so that the margin favouring the chief was not always wide. And against the centralizing ambitions of the chiefs commoners also had ambitions, including the desire to live as free of chiefly demands as possible. The incessant wrangles within dominant Xhosa clans and, presumably, among other Nguni societies were undoubtedly encouraged by thoughtful commoners who sought to paralyse the central authority by turning it against itself. These constraints on the evolution of a despotic style of administration were not broken until the end of the 1700s. Until then, daily life seems to have been relaxed and usually comfortable. Certainly the occasional white castaways who found their way into Nguni households during this period, and who have left some records, evinced no great anxiety to return to their own strictly ranked, tightly controlled societies.

Even less is known about the Sotho and Tswana peoples west of the

25. ibid.
27. ibid.
PLATE 23.2  Khoi Khoi farmers threshing grain
Drakensberg where lighter rainfall encouraged a greater emphasis on stock (within a mixed-farming regime) than east of the dividing range. In the 1500s there was some risk of attack from north of the Limpopo river; towards the end of the 1700s there was a more immediate threat from new communities moving northwards into the valleys of the Orange and Caledon rivers. In between, Sotho and Tswana must have interacted with Khoi and San and Nguni and Shona as there was small-scale trade in all those directions, but in the present state of knowledge little more can be said.

Like the San and the Khoi, therefore, the southern Bantu communities interacted with other specialists but were not transformed by that interaction. Nor did they transform the societies with which they interacted. Peires cites evidence of alliances between Xhosa chiefs and Khoi groups, such as the Chainouqua in the seventeenth century, and interprets this evidence as subordination of some Khoi to leading Xhosa. In view of the difficulty with which Xhosa chiefs dominated even settled Xhosa, however, these claims should perhaps be treated with some scepticism, especially as Khoi groups seem to have looked to such alliances as long-term insurance rather than daily subordination. In any event, even if these Xhosa claims were conceded, the picture of interaction suggests the durability of each of the specialist occupations. The different African groups were, it seems, capable of long-term co-existence without entrenching the hegemony of one mode of production over another.

The historiography of southern Africa is dominated by accounts of the Dutch settlement at Cape Town, its expansion and its influence on the lives of everyone within the region. In fact, the Portuguese were not only the first navigators to round the Cape but also the first Europeans to establish a permanent settlement in the region. Something of the revolutionary quality of the Dutch settlement can be grasped if it is contrasted briefly with the earlier, longer-lasting, though less influential Portuguese settlement.

Portugal in the sixteenth century was feudal, small and poor. Its overseas expansion was organized by the monarchy as a trading monopoly to India buttressed by the Church which, in the absence of any other source of skilled manpower, had a pervasive influence on the style and substance of administration. By 1510 the centre of overseas rule was Goa and the sea route was protected by forts commanding the Mozambique channel from Delagoa Bay to present-day Tanzania. With superior ships and fire-arms, it was not difficult to conquer the Arab and Swahili ports: but military superiority offered no mechanism for day-to-day government. The security of the Portuguese along the African coast, and particularly at Mozambique which became the regional headquarters, was expressed in fortresses com-

manding the mainland but not always connected to it. This was a sea-borne empire, tentative in its territorial control. It was also an essentially feudal empire in which important and lucrative offices were sold by the Crown for an annual fee. It was populated by Portuguese criminals, non-Portuguese traders and adventurers with short-term ambitions. Profit was to be had through the gold and ivory trades, and later the slave trade, recognizing the authority of existing African rulers and provoking in them the most anti-social behaviour. By the end of the sixteenth century the Portuguese empire in the Indian Ocean had been disrupted by competition from other trading powers: the Arabs had recovered their East African possessions while the Dutch, English and French had firmly established themselves in the Indies. The Mozambique channel had been reduced in strategic significance by the development of more direct routes from Europe to Asia via Cape Town or Mauritius or even without any pause for refreshment.

The exploitation of Mozambique was inefficient. Instead of introducing new forms of production, the Portuguese and Indian traders strove to become middle-men. The land was parcelled up into prazos and leased to prazeros, which had the quality of feudal and subsistence-based manors rather than commodity-producing farms. The supply of the export staples — ivory, gold and slaves — depended on indigenous collectors. Such exploitation could only take place with the co-operation of indigenous societies. For this reason the Cape itself, with its sparse population and scant commodities, offered no opportunity to the Portuguese. Even in Mozambique the absence of an effective government to attend to the long-term interests of traders permitted the degeneration from trade to short-term raiding. Merchant capitalism without capital, and colonization without colonists, could certainly disrupt south-eastern Africa: what it could not encompass was a durable transformation of existing societies.

During the long struggle against the Portuguese trading monopoly, the Dutch East India Company was formed in 1602 by associating all the smaller Dutch trading companies interested in the Asian trade. Like the contemporary English trading companies, it was founded by merchants with royal support whose aim was a national (and, if possible, an international) monopoly of trade between specified regions. The Company was innocent of any religious enthusiasm and independent of the reformed churches as the religious organizations no longer enjoyed a monopoly of education in a reformed Europe. The Heren XVII, the governing body in the Netherlands, could afford to be single-minded in the pursuit of trading profits. Equally important, the Company could afford considerable outlays which would be recouped only over a long term. The garrison settlement at the Cape was precisely such an outlay — of a kind which only an affluent clear-thinking and long-sighted trading company could envisage.33 Like the French in Mauritius and the Portuguese in Mozambique, the Heren

Dependence and interdependence: southern Africa from 1500 to 1800

XVII considered the Cape Town garrison a strategic point premised upon continuing Asian trade. They also envisaged a therapeutic purpose, whereby the garrison would buy fresh meat from the Khoi and grow vegetables to provision the Dutch fleets sailing to and from Batavia. For this reason it was appropriate that the first commander of the settlement was Jan van Riebeeck, a surgeon: and when neither the Khoi nor company employees could produce victuals on a sufficient scale, the Company took refuge in a modified form of capitalist production whereby company employees were released as free burghers to engage in production, the Company itself retaining control over marketing. The Company's rationale and its tactics were as thoroughly capitalist as the Portuguese were feudal; and, accordingly, it reaped the profits of careful planning.

Like other European powers which expanded into temperate grasslands with scant populations, the Dutch found that the dynamics of their new settlement were quite different from those of their tropical dependencies. For over a century, until the encounter with settled mixed farmers, their experience was similar to that of the Spaniards in the grasslands of the South American pampa, and of the British in the prairies of North America and south-eastern Australia.34

Perhaps the fundamental determinant of the Cape settlement was the painfully slow evolution of agriculture. For the first forty years of its history, the settlement imported much of its staple food despite the enormous stock of agricultural knowledge they brought with them from western Europe.35 The most lucrative use of land was pastoralism, of an extensive and expansive nature. The second great determinant of the settlement was the absence of a coercible, indigenous labour force. Whereas Indonesians could be directed into commodity production in large numbers by the manipulation of existing social structures, it was impossible to turn Khoi into commodity-producers without the total destruction of Khoi society. The few Khoi who survived and remained within the boundaries of the settlement merged with other elements of a new community – the Khoi Khoi, later the nucleus of the Cape Coloured. The Company could not, and did not, rely upon the Khoi for labour. Instead, labour was introduced from other parts of Africa and from the East Indies in the form of slavery. These relations of production left no room for Khoi or San except as individual units of labour fully separated from the means of production. In the language of development studies, pastoral capitalism did not articulate with other modes of production: it obliterated them.

This characteristic of the new society might not have mattered much had it not been combined with a persistent expansionism. Neumark thought that pastoral expansion was fuelled mainly by the growth of external markets for fresh meat.36 Guelke and Ross prefer to see the mainspring of

PLATE 23.3 A Khoi Khoi family herding cattle with a view of Table Mountain and Cape Town
Dependence and interdependence: southern Africa from 1500 to 1800

A capitalist organization has to expand to survive, so the question of external versus internal impulses can perhaps be ignored. At the Cape, labour was expensive and scarce while land was cheap and plentiful, so the obvious manner of achieving the expansion of capitalism was not through the more intensive use of land but through territorial expansion. The geographical extension of the settlement had the curious consequence of replicating the sparse population levels which had characterized Khoi land usage; and, indeed, commercial pastoralism meant little more than grazing much the same cattle and sheep on the same land as before, sometimes with Khoi employed as herdsmen. It was not land usage so much as social relations which were changed by the new regime. On the frontier of commercial expansion it was particularly difficult for the Dutch settlers to control their Dutch labourers as it was easy for disgruntled workers to flee eastwards or northwards to escape an irksome working situation. In addition, only settlers (and occasionally Khoi converts) could have land registered in their own names. In these circumstances it was almost impossible to discipline a Dutch labour force, and frontier pastoralists had to rely instead on costly slaves or Khoi both of whom had considerable opportunities for escape although a series of ad hoc treaties between the company and Khoi leaders officially provided for runaway slaves to be returned to the settlement.

During the eighteenth century the imperatives of extensive commercial pastoralism expressed themselves in a series of social relationships which have more in common with those of the South American pampa and nineteenth-century Australia than with the rest of Africa. Cape Town was the entrepôt, the focus of all trading relationships and meeting point of international cultures and ideas. Company officials not only administered the settlement but also often traded on their own account—a crime which was likely to go unpunished unless it caused the Company itself to lose money. They consorted with the more prosperous local land owners, traders and innkeepers of the town, and lorded it over the large and strictly disciplined slave population. They felt superior, too, to the pastoralists who came to town occasionally to sell meat, hides and tallow. Speaking a crude form of Dutch, barely literate and wearing unfashionable but functional clothes, the pastoralists obviously lacked urban sophistication and could easily be cheated by the urban meat-merchants. They were rough, too, in their management of labour as they often lived far from the disciplining officers of the town. But while they were gauche, they were also the mainstay of the colonial economy. The slave population was constantly being increased by importation but the pastoral population increased just as fast, both by immigration and natural increase. One hundred and fifty years after foundation, the settlement comprised more

than 20,000 free burghers and more than 25,000 slaves.\textsuperscript{40}

The territorial expansion of the settlement tended to disperse the Khoi and San from the western interior. At the same time the strict hierarchy and discipline within the new society tended to extrude the more vigorous and independent-minded of the slaves and the ex-Khoi. An occasional white settler also fled to the frontier, either to escape the law, or in search of quick wealth, or for a combination of these reasons. Some of the refugees were armed, and many were accomplished horsemen so — like the gauchos generated by similar social forces on the South American pampa — they were a hardy community, specialists in violence.\textsuperscript{41} Their options were three. First, they could seek and obtain employment with the state, as frontier law-enforcers, a choice which was regularized in 1795 with the formation of the Hottentot Corps.\textsuperscript{42} Secondly, they could try to live a settled life among the white frontiersmen, either as wage-labourers (as the whites wanted them to be) or as independent pastoralists (as they themselves wished). Although this was an attractive prospect, it was difficult to realize because the consolidation of the Cape settlement and the protection of private property in land made the coloured frontiersmen vulnerable to expropriation. Only rarely could Khoi register title to land in their own names, and the extension of colonial authority made the white pastoralists bold enough to challenge Khoi \textit{de facto} landowners. It was, therefore, the third option which was the most promising: to stay one step ahead of the frontier of white pastoral expansion.

The wide, dry region to the north of the Company settlement, particularly along the Orange river and its tributaries, was a typical region for the evolution of new societies. Here evolved the Kora, Griqua and Nama societies and from 1730 to about 1780 they were seldom troubled by Company authority.\textsuperscript{43} Their title to land was not explicitly recognized by the whites, but neither was it challenged. To make a living, the new little societies captured, bred and sold cattle, relying on firearms and gunpowder acquired through the settlement. Accordingly, leadership fell on those men of the frontier who were able to converse with and understand the whites and the Company authorities — white outlaws, such as Bloem, or descendants of slaves, such as the Kok family. Many knew, and remembered, their descent from Khoi bands. The Griqua chose their name because they derived from the Chariguirica community. However, the Griqua were not merely refugees from the Company settlement but also its cutting edge. They aspired to the status of independent commercial pastoralists which whites already enjoyed, not to the culture and condition of subsistence pastoralism whose time was clearly past. Yet their personal aspirations were largely irrelevant. Dependent upon fire-power from the

\textsuperscript{40} R. Ross, 1975; W. M. Freund, 1979.
\textsuperscript{41} S. R. Duncan-Baretta and J. Markoff, 1978.
\textsuperscript{42} W. M. Freund, 1979.
\textsuperscript{43} M. Legassick, 1979; R. Ross, 1976.
settlement, and obliged to stay ahead of their white rivals, they could not in the long term become a settled community. Such precarious security as they built for themselves had to be purchased by the dispossession of others. Their lands constituted the penumbra of violence which was an essential component of the new, commercial pastoralist economy and society. When that frontier was at length ‘closed’ in the nineteenth century, by a combination of environmental conditions and reinforced colonial administration, the day of the Griqua would end. That end was implicit in the inter-group relations of the eighteenth century, and while it could be postponed, it could not be averted.

The northern frontier of the settlement was the classic environment for new racially-mixed societies and similar developments also occurred on the eastern frontier. There, however, the course of events was swifter, and the climax in the 1790s more dramatic, as it involved not only the white pastoralists, the Cape Town authorities and the refugee communities but also the southernmost Bantu. There was a penumbra of insecurity on the fringe of Xhosa territory as on the white pastoral frontier and when these two zones of insecurity overlapped life became dangerous.

A degree of control over most Xhosa-speakers may have been exercised by the ruler Phalo, but his death in 1775 unleashed the rivalry of his two most important sons, Rharhabe and Gealeka. Gealeka’s death three years later released further sub-dividing forces among his followers; and the

44. J. B. Peires, 1981.
death of Rharhabe in 1782 (in a war against the Tembu) similarly split his followers between the regent Ndlamba and the young heir Ngqika. Each of these factions aspired to dominance over the entire Xhosa-speaking community and the neighbouring Khoi who were enlisted as allies. From the perspectives of both factions, the white pastoralists seemed much like the brown pastoralists — potential allies and eventual clients of wealthy Xhosa. The practice of transhumance, whereby herds of cattle were driven considerable distances for seasonal grazing, meant that white, Khoi and Xhosa were intermingled from the start, meeting each other in small numbers. It took a generation for the Xhosa to grasp the unique quality of commercial pastoralism, with its limitless and constantly-increasing appetite for grazing land. Meanwhile they behaved as if the pastoralist threat was marginal.

The Company’s reluctance to spend shareholders’ money, and the difficulty of administering a remote and sparsely populated region propelled the white pastoralists into providing for their own protection and expansion. The Company paid for a resident magistrate — a landdrost — at major centres, but the landdrost alone could not maintain control. In his judicial functions he was assisted by burghers — heemraden — who, in military affairs, took matters more and more into their own hands. Every adult male of fighting age was potentially a landowner and they all recognized a rough equality among themselves despite the growing inequalities of wealth. Each adult male was, at least potentially, the patriarch of a small community comprising his family, his slaves and his employees; and each patriarch conducted its affairs largely outside the formal judicial framework. When fighting was imminent, therefore, the patriarchs would elect an ad hoc leader and form a commando unit which would be disbanded once the spoils had been divided. It was as difficult for this loosely structured society to commit itself to a long-term strategy as it was for the Xhosa in their divided state. As white numbers increased late in the eighteenth century, so the burghers became impatient with the Company. In 1795, during the last days of Company rule, the burghers on the frontier formally denounced the Company, and declared themselves for two independent republics of white patriarchs, the short-lived republics of Swellendam and Graaf Reinet. 45

Meanwhile, a much more serious rebellion was brewing. A necessary consequence of white pastoral expansion had been the dispossession of Khoi communities and of individual Khoi commercial pastoralists such as Klaas Stuurman. 46 To the whites it seemed appropriate that the Khoi should be content to be farm labourers rather than independent farmers. To the Xhosa faction-leaders it seemed appropriate that the Khoi should be content to become clients of wealthy Xhosa. The Khoi themselves were, of course, disgruntled with the status of ‘Hottentot’ which the Company

46. Ibid.
allowed and with the status of client which the Xhosa offered. In 1799 many of them rebelled, drawing in reinforcements from the armed Khoi in the service of the new British administration. Unlike the burgher republicans, who wished to preserve the status quo but throw off the Company yoke, the Khoi farm servants, soldiers and farmers sought to overthrow the status quo on the frontier. The former was a revolt, the latter an incipient revolution.

During the French revolutionary wars, the British navy seized a number of garrisons around the world to consolidate their naval supremacy on a global scale. One of these was the garrison at Cape Town, captured after a short tussle in 1795. There is no reason to suppose that the British naval and military officers who took charge at Cape Town had much interest in the hinterland, except to maintain order. As usual in such a conquest, the simplest method of maintaining order was to acknowledge the local hierarchy of power-holders; and accordingly the burgher republics were quickly suppressed but the burghers' control over their land was confirmed. The Khoi revolt, however, could not be put down so easily. With insufficient troops for a protracted frontier campaign, General Dundas was content to calm matters. Some land was granted to individual Khoi, including Stuurman and his brothers; others were encouraged (but not forced) to return to their employment or to the Hottentot Corps; and the troubles were left to simmer for a few years until they broke out again early in the nineteenth century.

The Cape which the British acquired at the end of the 1700s already had many of the characteristics which would distinguish it in the nineteenth century. Cape Town, with a mere 15,000 inhabitants, was still mainly a garrison and an entrepôt for Asian and European trade; but it had also acquired its role as outlet for an export economy based on the hinterland, and the abandonment of old monopoly trading arrangements would provoke a massive increase in export production in the new century. In the colony as a whole there were some 22,000 'Christians', most of whom were white with a few liberated blacks. The Khoi and San were enumerated at about 14,000 and slaves at 25,000. As the terms of the census imply, the Cape had a strictly defined series of castes, each distinguished by different access to the means of production. Only 'Christians' could hold land, although the Khoi had not been entirely squeezed out; and only slaves were entirely without civil rights although, again, the Khoi were in an ambiguous position which varied with local conditions and numbers.

Increasingly, the Khoi were cast in an intermediate situation between the settlement on one side and the Xhosa, Sotho and Tswana on the other. By the end of the 1700s that intermediary role had been exhausted on the eastern frontier — hence the explosion of revolt — but it had another two or three generations to run on the more open northern frontier. Because it

was Khoi – as Khoi Khoi, Griquas, Nama and Kora – who bore the brunt of the pastoral expansion from the western Cape, most of the mixed-farming communities of the whole region were at this point only marginally affected. We have seen that the Xhosa could treat the white pastoralists as if they were merely pale Khoi: further north, among the northern Nguni, the emergence of the strong confederacies, which led ultimately to the formation of the Zulu state, was entirely independent of events at the Cape. Nevertheless, in the long run it was the transforming force of commercial pastoralism, itself provoked by the capitalist transformation of Europe and Asia, which would prove the most durable social force of the nineteenth century.
The Horn of Africa

E. HABERLAND

Introduction

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are the most dramatic in the history of north-east Africa. The mighty political and military power and the outstanding cultural development of the Christian Ethiopian empire disintegrated and collapsed. Enemy invasions not only decimated large sections of the Christian population, but also tore whole provinces away from the empire for long periods. For a time the mangešt egzi 'abheräwit (Holy Empire), hardpressed on all sides, was but a shadow of its former self. Only where the emperor actually faced the enemy at the head of his troops could the authority of the state, otherwise non-existent, be said to have any reality; and these external, political tribulations were aggravated by equally destructive spiritual disorders which constantly marred the unity of empire, the Christians and the Orthodox Church. The remarkable influence of a handful of Portuguese missionaries won an increasing number of converts to the Catholic faith, including even Emperor Susenyos who, in 1630, embraced the new faith and raised it to the status of the official religion of the state. Civil wars of unprecedented violence swept over the enfeebled empire until eventually the foreign faith and its supporters were driven out by force.

Until the end of the seventeenth century there now followed a period of consolidation of empire and restoration of the Christian Ethiopian faith and culture that once again bore fruit, though less exuberantly than in former times. Then, from 1700, a period of fragmentation of empire began which, by analogy with Old Testament precedents, has been called the ‘Age of Princes/Judges’. The steadily increasing anarchy during this period only came to an end in 1855, when Theodore II ushered in the age of the great emperors whom the Ethiopian empire had to thank for its restoration and its survival through the colonial era.

North-east Africa, however, does not only comprise the Christian Ethiopian empire. Around 1500, Islamic culture, too, reached its peak in the east and centre of the subcontinent, and warlike Islam was soon to achieve its greatest triumphs. Fired by the concept of djihād (Holy War), Aḥmad ibn Ibrāhīm al-Ghazi, a brilliant military leader and champion of the faith,
recorded in the Christian Ethiopian chronicles under the nickname Grañ (the lefthander), won victory after victory. Year after year, in the dry season, his hosts overran the land of the Amhara and the Tigrai, destroying and subjugating and forcing whole provinces to embrace Islam, even if only temporarily. But eventually the forces supporting these political and civilizing activities proved too weak. They exhausted themselves and, after the death of their leader, collapsed. The Christian empire started to counter-attack. Finally the migrations of the great Oromo (Galla) people, with inexhaustible forces at their disposal, destroyed the once flourishing communities and cultures of the Islamic peoples in central Ethiopia, leaving hardly a vestige.

Two important peoples now came on the scene, the Oromo and the Somali, who were to play a decisive role in the history of north-eastern Africa. Their evolution followed completely different paths. The Oromo spread out in all directions, in a series of individual migrations, completely separate from one another, in western, central, eastern and even northern Ethiopia. They advanced into areas depopulated through the religious wars; they subjugated and assimilated other peoples; yet, at the same time, the conquerors adapted themselves voluntarily to the superior cultures of other peoples. As a result, they failed to develop a true national culture of their own.

Not so the Somali. The participation of large groups in Grañ’s Holy War, and the steadily increasing influence of Islam which set them apart from most other peoples of north-east Africa, were powerful factors in the development of a strong national consciousness. Regardless of their division into many genealogically determined ethnic groups, at least from this time on, the Somali considered themselves one people with one culture and one religion. Their expansion between 1500 and 1700 in a south-westerly direction at least as far as the River Juba was due not only to their military strength and growing numbers but also to their ability to assimilate.

The political and cultural events in northern, central and eastern north-east Africa are historically fairly well substantiated; but the history of the west and south-west was little known until recently. We know today that this period saw the beginnings of a cultural development which, in its creativity and dynamism, is one of the most significant events in African history. Direct influence from the Christian empire to the north which, since 1300 or before, had been trying to influence southern Ethiopia, led to the growth of large states and sophisticated cultures extending south to the natural highland boundary. Of particular importance were the foundations of the states of Inariya: Boša, Kaffa and Sekko, as well as Wolayta, Dauro and the small states of the Gamo highlands.
The Christian Ethiopian empire around 1500

By about 1500 the Christian Ethiopian empire had politically, culturally and, indeed, in every respect reached heights that it was not to approach again for centuries.¹

In respect of foreign policy and military power, it enjoyed undisputed hegemony in north-east Africa. Sudan was not yet Islamic. Christian groups — all that was left of the state of Sōba — still subsisted around the confluence of the White Nile and the Blue Nile, soon to be overrun by the Fundj. The Islamic towns on the shores of the Red Sea — in what is now Eritrea — were politically insignificant. Even the coast around Massawa — the island and the city itself was Islamic-Arabic — was indisputably part of the Ethiopian empire, under the control of the governor of the provinces to the north of the Bahr Nagaš (River Mareb), inhabited by the Tigrai.²

The power of the many small Islamic dominions and states in eastern and central Ethiopia had been cut back by the crushing blows of the Ethiopian emperors of the preceding century, in particular Emperor Zera-Yakob (1434–68). Most of these states paid tribute, however unwillingly, to the Christian empire. Christian military colonists had settled there. Relationship by marriage between the ruling classes of the Christian empire and the Islamic border areas strengthened these contacts. (Empress Helena, for example, daughter of an Islamic Hadiyya chief, was one of the most influential figures at the Ethiopian court for two generations.)³

The influence and the military and cultural expansion of the Christian state were even stronger towards the south and south-west. New states with a Christian ruling class emerged; formerly independent peoples and states were made to recognize the political and cultural supremacy of the Northern Empire by force, diplomacy and purposive missionary work.⁴ The moral justification of this imperial expansion and power drive was provided by the magna carta of the Ethiopian empire, the Kebra Nagast (Glory of the Kings).⁵

This work was probably compiled about 1300, shortly after the so-called restoration of the dynasty that from then until 1974 was called the Solomonid dynasty. Folk legends, biblical, talmudic and Qur'anic traditions were brought together here and harmonized with a divine mission of salvation. The Kebra Nagast thus took on a significance for the development of Ethiopia comparable only to that of the Aeneid where, in similar pro-

1. This is a generally accepted historical fact which can be deduced too, from all known evidence. Cf. T. Tamrat, 1972, pp. 206 et passim; F. Alvares, 1961, passim. For the paintings, see J. Leroy, 1967 and J. Leroy, St. Wright and O. A. Jäger, 1961. For the literature, see E. Cerulli, 1968, pp. 81f.
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Phatic fashion, the Roman mission was established. It explains how the Queen of Sheba – here equated with Ethiopia – undertook a journey to Jerusalem to learn the wisdom of Solomon. By him she had a son, Menelik, who was born after her return to Ethiopia and was later to become the first Ethiopian king. Later, on a visit to his father in Jerusalem, Menelik carried off the Ark of the Covenant, the most important sacred symbol in the world, and brought it back to Ethiopia. It was preserved thereafter in the famous cathedral of Axum where the Ethiopian emperors were enthroned. The book ends with the announcement of the spiritual division of the world between the two great Holy Empires of Rome and Ethiopia which are to establish the Kingdom of Christ. Everything that could serve to elevate the Christian Ethiopian people and its dynasty is woven together here in most artistic fashion: the lineage of the emperors, descended from Solomon and David, the Prophet and Psalmist and the relationship with Jesus Christ thus implied and, finally, the transfer to Ethiopia of the Ark of the Covenant, the symbol of the True Presence of God among mankind. The story makes Christian Ethiopians the chosen people of both the Old and New Testaments for, unlike the Jews, they have accepted the Gospel:

The chosen of the Lord are the people of Ethiopia. For that is the abode of God, the heavenly Zion. ... I have made a covenant with my chosen people; I have sworn to my servant David: I will preserve thy seed for all eternity and maintain thy throne for ever and ever.

The fact that Ethiopia – the ‘Christian island in a heathen sea’ – was able to withstand so many storms, not least those of the sixteenth century, is due above all to the geographical position of this mountainous land. But the feeling of being the new chosen people must have given spiritual conviction to the empire’s determination to extend dominion over most of north-east Africa.

Internally, the empire enjoyed the utmost tranquillity at that time. This is evident in particular from the reports of Francesco Alvares who, from 1520 to 1526, accompanied the Portuguese mission from Massawa to Shoa as chaplain and travelled extensively throughout the country. Order and security reigned; the Governor’s instructions were obeyed and the emperor’s word carried absolute authority throughout an empire that measured at least a thousand kilometres from north to south. Although the individual provinces and districts possessed some regional autonomy, and although communication within the Ethiopian Highlands was severely limited especially during the rainy season, the unity of this state was strongly established. The concept of the Holy Christian Empire, the undisputed claim to power of the House of Solomon and, finally, the Christian faith and common culture of the two peoples who formed the state, the Amhara and the Tigrai, constituted strong and effective bonds. The culture and language of these two peoples exerted a powerful assimilating effect on

other ethnic groups which came into contact with them. The history of this period is, therefore, also the history of the rise of other ethnic groups in association with the two largest populations. This is particularly true of the different groups of the Agaw, the indigenous inhabitants of central and northern Ethiopia, who were almost completely assimilated by the Amhara and Tigrai. The assimilation process gathered strength during the sixteenth century and reached its zenith in the extirpation of the groups in northern Ethiopia who linguistically and culturally belonged to the Agaw but practised the Jewish faith, especially in the provinces of Samen, Dambiya and Waggara. Their survivors have been living ever since as a sort of pariah caste called the Falasha scattered over all northern and central Ethiopia.\(^7\)

In the south, too, in the parts of Shoa province now inhabited mainly by Oromo, not only Christianity but also the Amharic language and culture must have spread at the expense of other ethnic groups living there, in particular members of the Hadiyya.

The attempt by Emperor Zera-Yakob (1434–68) to centralize the empire’s political organization and replace the constantly changing provincial and district chiefs (recruited from among the influential families of the regions by people of his own choosing, with unlimited tenure of office) failed,\(^8\) but the word of the emperor still carried absolute authority, even after 1500. From the chronicles, which are not always forthcoming on this point, we can infer that, as regards the autonomy of individual provinces and the question of land law closely bound up with it, conditions were very similar to those still obtaining in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.\(^9\) Most land was the residual property of ethnic and family groups who decided how it should be divided among their members. The Church was also an important landowner, although its share is usually overestimated. It served to provide the livelihood of a caste made up of peasant secular priests who, in return, had to conduct divine service. Finally there were the imperial lands, granted by the emperor on a short- or long-term basis to deserving people or for specific purposes. This feudal land – to adapt the European expression to African conditions – was known as *gult*. The same word is also used to denote the right conferred by the emperor – in connection with the grant of an office – to levy tribute and services. The ownership of the land by the inhabitants was not affected by this dependency status.

The extraordinary dynamism of Ethiopian society, with its ideal of the *tellek saw* (great man) who had constantly to prove himself anew and in whom qualities and achievements alone counted, was not conducive to the rise of a nobility. In theory, the way to office was open to any free man belonging to a respectable family. In his district peoples’ assembly he could

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FIG. 24.1 The Ethiopian empire and its dependencies, c. 1550 (after E. Haberland)
be elected to office or demoted. The emperor participated in this democratic process in as much as confirmation of election or dismissal fell to him as supreme authority. Thus monarchical power and democratic election complemented one another, preventing the formation of a hereditary nobility with political privileges which could have disturbed the unity of the empire. This only happened with the increasing enfeeblement of imperial power after 1700 and later led people to talk of feudalism, a term originally characteristic of Ethiopia.

Roads were safe and travellers faced no problems. Imperial rest-houses abounded and also great weekly markets. General well-being— not just of a ruling class— surpassed anything later known. Taxes in kind flowed from the provinces and the tributary states to the emperor’s court where they were distributed. (Until 1636, when Gondar became the court’s permanent residence, the emperors knew only mobile courts consisting of large tent encampments.) Although neither minted coins nor commercial correspondence were known, there was nevertheless extensive trade over long distances in which important consumer goods were imported from India and the Near East. (Salt was carried from one end of Ethiopia to the other, and luxury goods such as jewellery and costly fabrics).

Ethiopia was closely linked with distant lands as far away as Europe, not only economically but also culturally, in contrast with its later isolation. Edward Gibbon’s famous and often quoted words: ‘Encompassed on all sides by the enemies of their religion, the Ethiopians slept near a thousand years, forgetful of the world, by whom they were forgotten,’

do not hold true for this period. Ethiopian monasteries in Jerusalem and Cyprus had active contacts with Europe. Ethiopian monks—the main purveyors of education, art and science— received their training in Egypt and took part in both Coptic and Islamic cultural life. Although literary production was limited to two fields— religious and historical— it flourished until at least 1650. In addition the graphic arts— of which, above all, book illuminations have survived— were also stimulated by contact with the Christian east and with Europe. Important themes depicted in religious painting were taken over and further developed. Evidence of these contacts are the casual mentions in the chronicles of the presence of Italian and Spanish artisans and artists. The existence of hitherto little-known ruins of churches and palaces is further proof of the richness and artistic creativity of this period.

11. The description by Alvarés of his journey from Massawa to Shoa is very instructive.
14. The chronicles of Galawdewos and Sartsa Dengel and also the History of the Galla were apparently written by monks who got part of their instruction in Egypt or elsewhere in the Orient. See J. Perruchon, 1894 and 1896; C. Conti Rossini, 1907; A. W. Schleicher, 1893.
Islamic states and cultures: the *djihād*, the Somali and the Hadiyya

By 1300, if not before, Christianity had developed a vigorous missionary activity carried on by monks and secular priests in central and southern Ethiopia. As the official religion of the Ethiopian empire, Christianity could always rely on state support — if necessary backed by fire and sword. The spread of Islam in north-east Africa, however, was not the result of missionary purpose and state help but depended on the spread of Arab culture and — at least in this area — on trade and communications. Arab and Islamic influences on the north-east African coast are age-old. Trade between the Arabian peninsula, the Ethiopian coast opposite and the Somali coast dates to pre-Islamic, even pre-Christian times. These trading relationships led to the foundation of a number of towns with mixed populations but with the Arab element predominating. The most important centres, starting from the north, were: Massawa, the off-shore Dahlak Islands, Assab, Oboek, Tadjūra, Djbouti, Zaylāʿ, Berberā, Obbia, Mogadishu, Merka and Brava (here the East African coast proper begins, with strong Swahili influence). The strength and direction of the spread of Arab—Islamic culture from these centres shows clearly just how dependent it was upon trading relationships with the hinterland and, likewise, on the fertility of the hinterland, the goods it produced and its population density. The map of the spread of Islam during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries clearly shows that it was concentrated on both sides of the Rift Valley — along the great trade route into central Ethiopia. On the southern edge of the highlands lay a number of Islamic cities of which imposing ruins remain, and states that stretched south towards Lake Zway as far as the Shebele river.16 Harar is the only city remaining. From the coast inland, there were a number of states: Adal, the largest, extending from Zaylāʿ on the Indian Ocean west to Harar and north to the Aussa Oasis in Afar territory, Dara, Dawāro, Bālī, Arababnī (or Ar’en), Šarha and Hadiyya.17 Islamic influence probably extended westwards across the Rift Valley. This is suggested by traditions that explain the name of the former Kingdom of Yamgor (commonly called Ġanģero) on the middle Gibe as meaning Yemen Land, as well as by records that tell of the Arab origin of the *nagado* (merchant) caste in Kaffa.18 To the north of the Rift Valley on the southern slopes of the Shoa highlands lay the twin Islamic states of Ifāt and Fatagar (Fatadjar) with a population still known today as Argobba. Many people in these states must have spoken Semitic languages which spread alongside and overlay the Cushitic languages originally spoken there, particularly the dialects of the Hadiyya—Sidama linguistic family. The only ones remain-

These states were all marked by the influence of Arab–Islamic culture from the coast. The cultural elements that still persist today – long after the destruction of the states – are also Arab–Islamic. The most striking example of the town settlements that once dominated the area is Harar, the only genuinely ancient city on Ethiopian soil. The city-like fortified

villages of the Argobba to the south-east of Harar and the Argobba on the eastern edge of Shoa must also be mentioned here, as must the stone-built single-storey or two-storey town dwellings with flat roofs and beautiful interior furnishings, betraying Arab influences, and the large number of walled holy sepulchres. Whenever Arab influence was felt, it left its traces in intensive horticulture (with terracing and irrigation systems), still practised today, and a multitude of food crops not normally cultivated in Ethiopia such as oranges, lemons, peaches, vines, bananas and sugar-cane. Also traceable to Arab influence is cotton-growing and the consumption of coffee and khat or cat (celastrus) which were not used until recently in non-Islamic Ethiopia. Widespread in central Ethiopia are numerous religious concepts, rites and words that stem from the Arabic, even though the original Muslims there later renounced Islam.

The spread of Islam and its culture from east to west brought it into conflict with the Christian Empire wherever it crossed the north–south course of the empire’s political and religious drive. This happened mainly in central Ethiopia, in what is now the province of Shoa, and to the east of it. This was also the scene of repeated bloody conflicts between the two powers that went on for several centuries and remained indecisive until well into the fifteenth. Although the Christian Empire remained the undisputed dominant power in north-east Africa, forcing most of the Islamic states to pay tribute, it was nevertheless unable – mainly for geographical reasons – to eliminate or destroy the Islamic states although they were insignificant in relation to its own size and population.

We are still not certain what brought an end to this stalemate and changed the hitherto mainly politically motivated war between the Islamic trading states and the Christian Empire into a religious ‘Holy War’ or dhığād, and why the political leadership of the Sultans of Adal, the Walasma, was transferred to the religious leaders (imām). Nor do we know what gave the Islamic armies – a motley collection of ethnic groups – the cohesion and fanaticism to bring the mighty Christian Empire to the brink of defeat. One explanation no doubt lies in the brilliant Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi (Ahmad Grañ) who emerged from obscurity to become the charismatic leader of the dhığād. With his death in 1543 the Islamic impetus soon collapsed, although his talented and bold successor, Amīr Nūr, tried with some initial success to continue the fight. There is also no doubt that the rest of the Islamic world, which at that time held the northern Somali tightly in its grip, provided its armies in Ethiopia with a recruiting potential of his power.

21. I would like to mention words like šaykh (religious chief), djinn (spirit), al-hayr (welfare, form of greeting), iblis (devil), awliya (saint), ṣaum (fasting) and halika (creation) which are found, often in corrupted forms, in many languages in Southern Central Ethiopia.
23. The best source is the history of the wars of Aḥmad ibn Ibrahīm by his lieutenant Sihāb al-Dīn; see R. Basset, 1897.
several times the size of the comparatively small populations of the Islamic states.

A war with the state of Adal, provoked by the Christians, and initially successful wars in the Chercher area during the reign of the weak Emperor Lebna Dengel (1508–40), who appears to have lacked all leadership qualities, seemed to herald no more than another indecisive conflict between the two adversaries. But the fortunes of war suddenly changed. In the decisive battle of Ţemǝrĕra Kure (1529) on the western edge of the Chercher Mountains, the Ethiopian empire lost not only a whole army but also a considerable part of its ruling élite. ‘Until this time the (Christian) country had never been laid waste or overrun by the enemy’, writes the Ethiopian chronicler, in great pride and great distress in the imperial annals.24 The consequences were to be fearful. Until 1543, Islamic armies swept over the Ethiopian Highlands, in the south and the north, each dry season, systematically defeating and subjugating one province after another. In southern and eastern Ethiopia, in Hadiyya and Bālī, the population went over to the Muslims, for they often shared their religion and greeted them as liberators from the yoke of Christian rule. In the old Christian provinces, especially the regions inhabited by the Amhara and Tigrai, the population was given the choice of accepting Islam or being put to the sword so that often whole districts converted – if only nominally – to Islam. Churches and monasteries were ruthlessly plundered and sacked and their treasures destroyed or given to the Islamic army if they consisted of sacred gold or silver objects or costly fabrics. Many of the treasures of Ethiopian literature and painting, miniatures in books or murals on church walls, were destroyed and such relics which by chance escaped destruction can today give only a rough idea of the achievements of those creative and productive centuries. Each dry season another province was conquered and destroyed. In 1531 Dawārō and Shoa, two large, densely populated provinces in the southeast and in the heart of the Ethiopian Highlands, were subjugated. Amhara and Lasta, two of the empire’s central provinces, followed in 1533. The same year Ethiopia’s most important holy place, Axum, with the Maria Zion cathedral where the emperors were enthroned and the Tablets of the Law from Mount Sinai preserved, was razed to the ground. (The Tablets were saved and later brought back to Axum where they are still to be found today.)

But even in the most desperate times, the steadfastness of the Christian people and the strength of the concept of the Holy Ethiopian Empire were apparent. Those forcibly converted to Islam abandoned their new faith the moment the Islamic armies withdrew. (The Ethiopian Church later organized a penitential and reinstatement ceremony for these temporary apostates.) Similarly, the conquered provinces soon rose against their new masters. Even the weak Emperor Lebna Dengel, continually on the run,

24. R. Basset, 1882, pp. 103f.
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did not submit when forced by the victorious Islamic general to take a grave decision:

Maḥammad Grañ sent a messenger to the Emperor to say to him: Give me your daughter to wife and let us make a pledge of friendship. If you do not follow me, there will soon be nobody to whom you can flee. The Emperor answered him: I will not give you my daughter, for you are an unbeliever. It is better to trust in the might of the Lord than in you, for His power is as great as His mercy. He gives the weak strength and the strong He makes weak. Thereupon the Emperor was hunted and pursued by hunger and sword. He was plagued by misfortunes such as cannot be imagined.

Lebna Dengel died a hounded fugitive, in 1540, in the impregnable monastery-citadel of Dabra Damo in Tigré. But within a few years an unforeseeable change had occurred in the political situation. The accession to the throne of the young Emperor Galawdewos (Claudius), one of the most outstanding figures in Ethiopian history, was followed in quick succession by the extraordinarily rapid restoration of the Ethiopian empire, the arrival of the Portuguese expeditionary corps (and with it the Portuguese mission) and, finally, the decisive defeat of the Muslims.

By the sixteenth century, Portugal had reached the peak of its imperialist expansion. The Indian Ocean and its inlets had become a Portuguese sea. Portuguese fortresses, which were never completely subjugated, sprang up on the coasts at Hormuz, Oman, Socotra, Mombasa, and so on. Like Spain, its rival for world conquest, Portugal was enjoying its golden age, albeit brief, and the zenith of its cultural development. Certainly the riches of three continents were flowing into Portugal, but they were bought at the cost of the enslavement of countless people, the destruction of whole cultures and appalling bloodshed from which it took the Portuguese people generations to recover. They had overestimated their own strength.25

It was an historical accident, but one that was to have far-reaching and long-lasting effects, that, in 1541, brought a Portuguese fleet into Massawa which, at that time, still belonged to the Ethiopian empire, and that Portuguese soldiers joined battle on the Ethiopian side. Ethiopia was no unknown quantity for Europe. Since the fourteenth century it had been identified with the empire of the legendary Prester John, a Christian ruler in the ‘third India’, whose existence remains a myth to this day. For centuries attempts were made to find him and win him as an ally against the oriental enemies of Christendom, whether Mongols, Arabs or Turks.26 Official Portuguese missions had already twice visited Ethiopia to form an alliance between the emperor, whom they quite gratuitously called Prester John, and the Portuguese crown. The first mission (1487) was not allowed to return to its homeland, but Francesco Alvares, chaplain to the second

(1520–6), left a remarkable account soon afterwards translated into many European languages so that Europe was well-informed about the Christian Empire.27

In 1540 a Portuguese fleet was sent from Goa in India to the Red Sea to combat the growing expansion of the Turks who, after the conquest of Egypt, were gaining ground in Arabia and even in Sudan. Part of the fleet anchored at Massawa in the spring of 1541. Soon after, the Bāhār nagāṣ (sea-king), governor of the northernmost province of the Ethiopian empire, appeared bearing letters and requesting support for the Christian state in its fight for survival. By July 1541 a volunteer corps of 400 Portuguese, under the leadership of Cristóvão da Gama, one of the younger sons of the famous Vasco da Gama, had marched into the Ethiopian Highlands. Their modern combat tactics and, above all, their superior firearms, made them formidable opponents for the Muslim occupation troops in northern Ethiopia. A growing number of Ethiopian volunteers accompanied the Portuguese who inflicted severe defeats on the hitherto invincible army of Imām Āḥmad Grañ in two battles. By invoking the djīhād and the common cause of Islam, the imām nevertheless succeeded in obtaining decisive assistance in the form of new types of artillery and sharpshooters from the Turkish commanders in the Yemen. Before the Portuguese could link up with the emperor's army they were forced to engage in a third battle and were defeated. The Portuguese commander was captured and, when he refused to adopt Islam, executed. Fortune nonetheless favoured the Christians. The imperial army and the remaining Portuguese joined forces and, in February 1543, the Muslim army was destroyed on the plateau to the east of Lake Tana. The imām was killed by a Portuguese bullet and his troops went to pieces. Whether it was Portuguese assistance that tipped the balance in this long-drawn-out war is uncertain. From a purely military point of view this may well have been the case in the final battles as their tactics and their guns had restored a certain strategic equilibrium. What was to be of greater consequence for Ethiopia, however, was the Catholic mission that followed the Portuguese soldiers (see below). The Muslim forces were no doubt strong enough to conquer Ethiopia militarily but too weak to keep the two great peoples, the Tigrai and the Amhara, under control permanently – particularly as they did not succeed in forcing Islam on the Christians. After 1543 the Christians emerged victorious from the struggle and, during the next few decades, the empire succeeded in winning back lost territory. The might of Islam had been broken for centuries to come.28

28. After the terrible last wars between Christians and Muslims during the reign of Galawdewos (1550–9) the Muslim states are not mentioned again in the imperial chronicles.
The Oromo (Galla)

‘But’, as the Ethiopian chronicler laments, like the prophet Joel, ‘that which the palmerworm hath left hath the locust eaten, and that which the Muslim has spared have the Galla laid waste’. Since the middle of the sixteenth century, members of the great Oromo people – hitherto usually known as the Galla, the name bestowed on them by their neighbours – had been penetrating central, eastern and western Ethiopia in ever increasing numbers amounting to a migration. Their arrival, their settlement and their quarrels with other groups already there had far-reaching effects, both political and cultural, and brought about fundamental changes for all north-east Africa. The Ethiopian empire suffered more and longer through the Oromo than the Muslims, and lost many provinces for ever. It was not until about 1700 that some imperial consolidation again took place, and even this did not halt the momentum of the Oromo culture. The Oromo became the largest ethnic group in north-east Africa but, unlike the Amhara or the Somali, they only recently developed a unifying national consciousness. Furthermore, individual Oromo groups were exposed to a variety of cultural and political influences.

There are few ethnic groups in Africa about whose origins and culture so much that is untrue has been written. Although it is still not possible to specify the reasons for the great Oromo migrations, they were not undertaken – as is sometimes stated – to escape the pressure of other peoples. Their own traditions say nothing about the matter except that they started out to seek new grazing-lands for a growing population. The Somali, who are said to have exerted pressure on them, had little contact with them at the time. It is also unlikely that the Somali – split into numerous autonomous groups – would have been a military threat to the Oromo who, at that time, were still united, and drove the well-organized armies and conscripts of the Amhara before them and completely wiped out the Islamic states of south-east Ethiopia.

Notwithstanding the fanciful accounts of Amharic and European authors, who pinpoint their original home as Madagascar, Mombasa or northern Somalia, the Oromo are a true Ethiopian people. This is proven by their whole culture and their traditions. The cool highlands surrounding what is today the province of Bâlî were their home, whence they set out on their great migrations into the heart of the Ethiopian Highlands and south, to present-day Kenya and the Indian Ocean.

Equally erroneous are the descriptions of the Oromo as barbariores barbari (savages) or primitive cattle-raisers. These originated from proud Amharic historians, and the Amhara generally, who described the Oromo as barbarians, non-Christians (and also non-Muslims), with no sophisticated social strata, no script and no monarchy. The false estimation of the Oromo as primitive cattle-raisers with no farming skills derives from their cattle-

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complex: they had a close emotional relationship with their cattle unknown elsewhere in Ethiopia, that went far beyond economic interest. On their great migrations they were obviously unable to practise any agriculture but wherever they settled they unfolded the full splendour of their culture. They also readily adopted many local cultural elements entering into a close symbiosis with the populations they conquered.

The Oromo were and are a people with a highly developed, sophisticated culture admired by their neighbours. It would be impossible otherwise to explain their political successes, their massive expansion and their capacity to assimilate. How strongly developed this capacity was is evident from the fact that today most Oromo do not stem from true Oromo stock but belong to Oromo-assimilated groups. Their spread was partly the result of a chain reaction in the face of their military superiority, and because of their much-admired social organization other ethnic groups voluntarily joined them. It was particularly true of members of the great ethnic group between Harar and Gurage, the Hadiyya, almost all of whom went over to the Oromo. Only the names of their ethnic groups and a few traditions bear witness to their identity. Many of the Hadiyya who became Oromo are settled in the province of Wallaga.

Oromo culture is marked by several distinctive features. There is the close relationship with their cattle already mentioned. Cattle were not only the basis of their livelihood but the object of emotional and ritual concern. This cattle-complex, with its moral overtones, permeated the whole culture, and the emotional significance of agriculture was by comparison quite secondary. Its roots lay in the Oromo myth of creation which maintains that when God created man, he cried, ‘Eh, Kota, abba loni!’ (‘Hey, come forth, ye owners of cattle!’).

Like the Somali, the Oromo consisted of numerous genealogically connected groups and clans which, as the population increased, tended to break away and form new, politically independent groups. Borana and Barentu (or Baraytu) were the mythical ancestors and founders of the two halves of the original stock that bore their names. After the migrations began, these became large genealogically kindred units embracing many sub-groups. The Barentu made their home mainly in the east, while the Borana (not to be confused with the Boran on the Kenya border) settled in the south, centre and west. Towards the end of the last century, when the Oromo were defeated by Emperor Menelik and incorporated into the Ethiopian empire, they split into more than eighty politically independent groups of various sizes.

Of still greater importance for the social and political organization of the Oromo was the gada system, classification by age groups based on an abstract numerical principle. The gada was a central institution that ruled

32. Cf. the map at the end of E. Haberland, 1963.
the life of the Oromo with an exclusivity unknown among any other people. Nothing was not subject to its rules: birth, baptism, marriage, circumcision, emancipation from paternal authority, permission to beget and bring up children, conscription for war and for hunting, obligation to kill and to sacrifice, civil death by exclusion from the system, burial, the style of adornments, hairstyles, clothing, furniture and ceremonial trappings, the installation of house and kraal and more. It represented the sum total of the laws by which life was governed. Forty years after his father had done so, each Oromo, regardless of his actual age, had to enter the children’s class. Ideally he had to pass through ten classes, each of eight years, during his lifetime. All those entering a class together formed a gada group, which remained an insoluble warrior fraternity for life. Specific rights and duties were associated with membership of a certain class, and the activities of each class - apart from social and religious regulations - were in keeping with the corresponding age-group. The fifth and sixth classes constituted the leadership and warrior class. As it was a community of free men with equal rights, there was no hereditary hierarchy. The leader of the ethnic group, who usually took the name of abba gada, was elected from among the members of the fifth class (gada or luba). He was supported by the hayu (judges), also elected from his class, and by other dignitaries. Of decisive significance for the military aggressiveness of the Oromo was the gada rule that at least once during the eight years of the ruling gada class a fighting and killing expedition had to be undertaken. The ideal of the hero as successful killer and hunter was common to all the peoples of north-east Africa. Only one who had distinguished himself as a brave warrior and hunter and had killed enemy warriors or dangerous big game, such as lion, elephant, buffalo or rhinoceros, could occupy a position of eminence in the community. To achieve this, the Oromo was prepared to make sacrifices and risk his life in the wild to win the coveted trophies. The warrior had the right to wear the killer’s adornments which included ear-rings, feathers and butter for his hair and phallic forehead ornaments. Nowhere in north-east Africa was the killer-complex so integrated into the system of society as among the Oromo. As the rules demanded of each ruling gada class a fighting and killing expedition, every eight years the Oromo warriors burst upon their neighbours who, until they came to understand the gada system, remained perplexed and helpless in the face of these cyclical episodes. Many of the Oromo’s neighbours - the Sidama, Darasse, Burgi, and all members of the Konso group33 - saw the gada system as a strengthening of military might and adopted it in somewhat modified form.

The Oromo religion was one of remarkable solemnity. Belief in a god who was creator and heavenly father took Old Testament forms. The Oromo possessed a rich treasure of oral literature, both sacred and profane,

including prayers and invocations to the deity but also lyrical love poetry.

In their early migrations at least, the Oromo had one advantage other than their military prowess: they were advancing into regions virtually depopulated or only thinly settled after fifteen or so years of fierce warfare between Muslims and Christians. This was particularly true of central Ethiopia, today the province of Shoa, through which the Islamic armies had marched every year on their way north. Once densely populated, central Shoa had become an uninhabited wilderness, which as late as 1800 was still scarcely settled. After 1530 the warriors of the Mudana gada group crossed the Wabi river; after 1538 the Kilole group devastated the adjacent area to the north, the predominantly Muslim-populated country of Dawäro and, still further north, the lowlands of the Hawaş river; after 1546 the Bifole invaded the province of Fatagar; and after 1554 the Mesale destroyed the greater part of the Islamic state of Adal. At this time the Oromo became acquainted with the horse and soon became renowned horsemen.34

Meanwhile the wars between Christians and Muslims continued. Amîr Nûr, the brave and gifted successor of Imam Ahmad Grañ, made a last heroic but fruitless attempt to revive the djihâd against the Christians; and even though Emperor Galawdewos fell in a battle for which the Christians were ill-prepared, Muslim might rapidly declined.

Catastrophic for Christian and Muslim alike were the attacks of the Harmufa group of Oromo (1560–70). They invaded the provinces at the heart of the Ethiopian empire which were just beginning to recover from the devastation of the djihâd: Angot, Amhara and Bagemder, where the armies of the new Emperor, Minas, confronted them. At the same time other Oromo groups again attacked Adal, where there was famine and plague, Amîr Nûr himself falling victim to it. Except for a few small groups who fled to the Awâs Oasis in the Afar desert, and the inhabitants of the city of Harar, which was protected by its high walls, the Muslims disappeared from this part of Africa for several centuries. When Emperor Minas died, a third of the Ethiopian empire was already permanently settled by the Oromo.35

But this was not the end of Oromo expansion. Even before 1500, other groups had already moved out from the highlands around Bâlî into the endless savannahs to the south and, in their constant search for new and more extensive grazing-lands for their cattle, had finally reached the Indian Ocean at the mouth of the River Tana. These were the Guği, Boran and Orma. In the centre the Arusi established themselves in the vicinity of the former state of Bâlî; and pushed their borders westwards until they reached the Bilate river in 1880. The Barentu spread over the area of the earliest Islamic states of Fatagar, Dawäro and Adal. The fortified city of Harar and — thanks to the Oromo’s religious tolerance — the famous pilgrimage centre of Sek Hussen survived as Islamic islands. Numerous small groups

34. A. W. Schleicher, 1893, p. 20.
35. See Fig. 24.3; cf. V. Stitz, 1974, p. 80.
of the so-called Tulama Oromo settled in Shoa. Only in the hot, easily defended lowlands, in the gorges of the great rivers and on a few tablelands did pockets of Amhara hold out: in Moret, Marhabete, Tagulat, Wagda, Manz, Geše, Efrata and Gedem. From these places they gradually climbed onto the tablelands again, and it was from here, around 1700, that the reconquest of the former Christian areas began under Nagasi, a descendant of a collateral branch of the Solomonid dynasty. The Wollo and Yeğgu
Oromo spread over the fertile provinces of Angot and Amhara, once inhabited by Christians now confined to Amhara Saynt. Although they soon adopted the local Amharic language, because of their conversion to Islam the Oromo remained sworn enemies of the Christians. Other Oromo occupied the fertile lowlands to the east of the Ethiopian Highlands as cattle-raisers. These were the Karayu, Gile, Artuma, Rike, Raya and Azebo.\textsuperscript{36}

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, a last wave of Oromo, consisting of several groups mainly belonging to the large Maçça family, pushed westwards into what are today the provinces of Wallaga and Ilubabor, stopping only when they reached the western slopes of the Ethiopian Highlands. We know little about the early history of the western part of this region. It was probably only sparsely settled, by small groups of Sudanese farmers whose survivors are the Gunza–Gumuz still living there today, and by members of the Gongga group (see below) of whom the Mao–Afillo and the Sinaṣa have survived. The situation was quite different in the east and south of this region. Here the Oromo came upon well-organized, densely populated kingdoms in close contact with the Ethiopian empire to the north and whose populations were partly Christianized. Supported to some extent by the Ethiopian empire, they put up a stubborn resistance. But because of the vigorous Oromo expansion, communications between the empire to the north and its dependencies in the south-west weakened parallel with the decline in the strength of the empire. Thus Boṣa and Guman disappeared from the political map and became the Oromo dominions of Gimma and Gumma. The indigenous substratum remained so strong here that the Oromo took over much of their culture, in particular the state constitution and the monarchy, while the gada system gradually disappeared. Inariya, famous for its gold treasures, was the last of these states to fall, defeated by the Limmu Oromo. After 1700 its king fled to the south, where the other Gongga kingdoms of Kaffa and Šekko and the many Ometo kingdoms held their ground against the Oromo, thanks to the natural strongholds provided by their terrain, and even expanded to some extent\textsuperscript{37} (see below).

The Somali

The penetration and expansion of the Oromo in central, eastern and western Ethiopia was reflected in both Christian Ethiopian and European writings. During the same period, if not earlier, another great people—the Somali—began an expansion which had comparable significance for large sectors of the eastern part of the Horn of Africa. Written sources say little about the rise of the Somali who, stimulated by the djihād of Imām Ahmad

\textsuperscript{36} See the map at the end of E. Haberland, 1963.

Africa from the Sixteenth to theEighteenth Century

Gran, now began to play an active role in the history of north-east Africa.  

The Somali country of origin is generally taken as the area north of where they live today. From there they spread – probably from the eleventh century onwards – south and west. As early as the thirteenth century, Arab geographers tell of Somali settlements in the area of Merka, to the south of the city known today as Mogadishu. As cattle-rearing nomads, the Somali were driven by the pressure of increasing population to seek new grazing-lands in the direction of the Ethiopian Highlands, and they probably reached the eastern edge of the Harar plateau about 1500, coming into contact with the Islamic states there. Names and genealogical data left by the chronicler Shâb al-Dîn suggest that they played an important role as supporters of Imam Ahmad Gran’s *djihâd*.

To date, the stimulating and unifying effect of the Arab-Islamic influence exerted by the towns on the northern and eastern coasts of Somali country and the Islamic states in south-east Ethiopia (Adal, Dawâro, and so on) has been greater on the Somali than any other north-east African people. Islam became an integrating element in Somali culture, in sharp contrast with its effect on other culturally related Kushitic peoples, such as the Oromo and the Hadiyya. The intensity of the Somali’s faith was constantly strengthened by the missionaries who drifted in from Arabia. These became the holy men and founding fathers of the Somali people, such as the famous Ismâ’il Gabarti from whom many Somali are descended.

This Arab-Islamic cultural influence also gave the Somali a sense of cultural superiority and strengthened their assimilation capacity in relation to the other mainly kindred groups in the huge area between Ogaden and Lake Turkana. Here a whole series of different ethnic groups, mainly of Kushitic language and culture and all dependent on cattle-rearing activities, had formed before the advent of Islam. As the existence of the Rendille proves, the Somali had taken part in this process before their great north-east–south-west migrations. Whether this area had once been populated by a negroid, possibly Bantu people is doubtful. It is more likely that groups racially different from the Somali, such as the Adone on the upper Shebele river, the Shebeli and Makanna on the middle Shebele and the Gobawoin on the upper Juba, owe their existence to isolated historical processes. We know for certain, for example, that the Gosa on the lower Juba are the descendants of former slaves from East Africa who banded together there to form free communities.

It is extraordinarily difficult to pinpoint individual stages in the expansion of the Somali and their assimilation of other groups because many

38. Unfortunately we still know very little about the history of this important people at that time, especially in the interior of the Horn of Africa. Certainly a better knowledge of the oral traditions and the historical events connected with the genealogies is needed. Historical research should be an urgent matter for Somalia. Still the best works are E. Cerulli, 1957–64 and I. M. Lewis, 1955, pp. 11–55; 1961, pp. 1–30.

39. V. Grottanelli, 1953.
groups which attached themselves to the Somali nation deliberately sup­pressed all reference to their former ethnic differences and assumed a Somali genealogy. The most important groups that merged into the Somali in this way were the Sab (Digil, Rahanwein, and so on) and possibly some of the Hawiyya. There is still a whole series of ethnic groups in the Somali–Oromo border area who now describe themselves as Somali but were formerly considered to belong to the Oromo (the Gurra, Garri, Gabra and Sakuya) and who provide an instructive example of cultural transfer and assimilation. Today a single family tree unites all Somali with each group having its place within the common genealogy.40

Under the influence of Islam the Somali culture changed, especially in the south. (The northern Somali, the Issa for example, still preserve many elements of the common East Kushitic culture.) The Somali thus differentiated themselves more than any other group from the large family of north-east African peoples, linked by many common historical, cultural and – not least – geographical factors. The influence exerted by the geographical environment is by no means to be underestimated. Apart from the Afar who, in the desolate wastes of their homeland, had little opportunity for cultural development, the Somali are the only inhabitants of north-east Africa whose territory consists exclusively of dry savannah and semi-desert. This ecological environment caused them to develop a completely different type of culture from that of other north-east African peoples, who are mostly highland-dwellers. Thus the gada system, so important to most East Kushites, either never gained a foothold with the Somali or was given up under the influence of Islam.

The Ethiopian empire's struggle for survival, 1529–1632: the Portuguese episode and the restoration of Empire after 1632

Between 1529 (the start of the *djīḥād*) and 1632 (the beginning of the Restoration) the Ethiopian empire was struggling for survival. It was a dramatic period not only in political and military events. It was also a time of intense intellectual and cultural conflict, an age in which ideas from another continent stirred up revolt and civil war but also stimulated both the culture and the Ethiopian Church. Compared with the 100 years of intellectual and political stagnation between 1755 and 1855, this period appears extraordinarily active and lively.

The Christian Empire – or its two great peoples, the Amhara and the Tigrai – showed astonishing strength and capacity for survival in the face of pressure from external and internal enemies. It was during the time of Emperor Sārtsa Dengel (1563–97) when – as in the last years of the reign of Lebna Dengel – the empire was more a fiction than a political reality,

that the spiritual strength of the concept of the Holy Empire was forcefully
demonstrated. The Turks were consolidating their power on the shores of
the Red Sea, seizing all Ethiopian ports and penetrating deep into the
Highlands to Tigré; in the central provinces of Bagemder and Samen a
bitter civil war was being waged against the Ethiopians of Jewish faith; and
the Oromo had not only overrun and destroyed the south-eastern tributary
states and cut the empire off from its western and south-western depen­
dencies, but also periodically invaded Bagemder and Gojjam (Godjam,
Gojam) and settled permanently in originally Christian heartlands such as
Angot, Wallaka, Amhara and Shoa. Real state power may have been reduced
to the area the emperor occupied with his troops, but the immortality of
the 'evangelical Empire' was apparently never in doubt. This at least is
how it appears in the imperial chronicles, our main source of information.
It was also this ideology that prevented the empire from disintegrating
altogether towards the end of the 100 years' anarchy between 1755 and
1855.

Moreover, the importance for the empire's political survival of the
disappearance of the Islamic states and culture from eastern and central
Ethiopia as a result of the fearful upheavals of the *djihād* and, above all,
through the Oromo migration, can scarcely be overestimated. In the
centuries to come Islam was to pose no serious threat.

The empire did, of course, suffer considerable territorial and ethnic
losses in this struggle for survival. Finally, at least as from the Restoration
of 1632, the great southward thrust of the empire — indeed the whole
imperial policy of the preceding centuries — while not officially renounced,
was scarcely pursued. As the imperial power steadily declined, efforts were
concentrated on maintaining stability at the centre, and no particularly
noteworthy or successful political or military action was undertaken. The
transfer of the emperor's residence to Gondar in 1636 is a sign of this
withdrawal. Before this the emperors — in a country where towns were
unknown — had moved their encampments of tents to a different place
every year or half year. This had been a hard-and-fast rule, followed even
when there was no political or military necessity for undertaking a journey
or change of residence. Although the Ethiopian chronicler says that 'the
Emperors moved from province to province until the hour of their last
sleep' they were not permanently on the move from one end of the empire
to the other. Often the residence remained in one region, at the hub of
the empire, for long periods apart from short moves. Thus the rulers of
the Zagwe dynasty (twelfth and thirteenth centuries), who followed the
Aksumite kings, established their residences in Wağ and Lasta. The first
Emperor of the Solomonid dynasty, Yekuno Amlāk (1270–85), resided
mainly in the province of Amhara; Emperor Zera-Yakob (1434–40) pre­
ferred north-eastern Shoa (Dabra Birhan); Emperor Lebna Dengel (1508–
40) had pitched his camp in south-eastern Shoa when the Portuguese

41. J. Perruchon, 1893, p. 149.
mission arrived; and Emperor Galawdewos (1540–59) finally had an important residence in Munesa in the Wağ district of what is known today as Arusi. It was therefore not just a break with this tradition but also a symbolic renunciation of former dynamic imperial policy, when Fasiladas built a fixed residence in Gondar in 1636 after the last great civil wars of religion had ended. Gondar was to remain the centre of what was left of Christian Ethiopia until 1855.42

Thus between 1529, the start of the ājīhād, and 1597, the death of Emperor Sartsa Dengel and the beginning of the civil wars, Imperial policy was concentrated on defence against external and internal enemies. Emperor Galawdewos carried on the struggle against the Muslims, in particular those in the state of Adal–Harar, with great success. Broad areas of the south, Dawāro and Wağ, were reunited with the empire, although they were shortly to fall into Oromo hands. Former contacts with the south-west were renewed, the influence of Christian–Amharic culture was restored there and the Oromo driven back, at least temporarily. Under the leadership of Amīr Nūr ibn Muğahid, the brave and politically gifted successor to Ibrāhīm Grañ, the Adal–Harar Muslims, despite fearful famine

42. Monti della Corte, 1945.
and epidemics which ravaged large sections of an already decimated population, once more attempted to confront the Christian Empire. Although the poorly prepared Ethiopian army was beaten back in an attack on Adal in 1559 and Emperor Galawdewos fell on the field of battle, this marked the end of Islamic power. Within a few decades the Islamic states and Islamic culture had disappeared from this region. There remained only the fortified town of Harar and the small sultanate of Awa, in the Hawash river-delta oasis, protected by the surrounding wastelands. Galawdewos’ successor, Emperor Minas (1559—63), had mostly to fight the Turks who, from their bases in the Red Sea ports at Massawa and Suakin, tried repeatedly to establish a foothold in the Ethiopian Highlands. Sartsa Dengel (1563—97), Minas’s son who acceded to the throne while still a child, spent his short life and his relatively long reign in uninterrupted campaigns heading in all directions. Although the Oromo, constantly growing in numbers and strength, never presented so serious a threat as the armies of the djihād, they allowed the empire no peace.

Wars of frightful violence were waged to annihilate the Ethiopians of Jewish faith in the northern Highlands, mainly in Samen, Waggara, Dambiya, Belasa, Sallam and Sagade, where formerly they had had their own chiefs and enjoyed a certain autonomy. Their forefathers had probably been converted to Judaism by Jewish missionaries as early as pre-Christian times. Unlike Jews in other parts of the world, they were completely integrated into the culture in which they lived, so much so that their holy books (the Old Testament, for example) were not written in Hebrew but in Ge‘ez, the Ethiopian literary and liturgical language.

It is not known why this religious war broke out at the very time when the empire was already hard-pressed by external enemies. The Jews were faced with the choice of embracing Christianity or being exterminated. The description of these wars, like that of the extirpation of the Christians by the Muslim armies of the djihād a generation earlier, is one of the darkest chapters in Ethiopian history. Despite their heroic courage, which went as far as self-destruction, the Jewish population was practically wiped out as the majority refused to be converted. The few survivors were stripped of their civic rights and their land expropriated. They were therefore forced to become artisans and the word Falasha came to be synonymous with smith, potter, carpenter or weaver, indeed with any type of skilled labourer. Despite the importance of these occupations, a stigma was attached to them in a society whose ideal was the free and independent man who never worked for a wage. Thus social degradation went hand-in-hand with religious persecution.

44. The chronicle of the Emperor Sartsa Dengel relates only wars. C. Conti Rossini, 1907.
It is astonishing how the Ethiopian empire found the strength, despite three generations of furious and unrelenting struggle, to confront not only the Turks in the north, the Adal Muslims in the east and the Oromo in the south and centre but also, in massive campaigns in the south-west, to force the large states of Inariya, Boṣa and Kaffa (Gomar) to become once more closely linked to the Ethiopian Church and northern Ethiopian culture. The compiler of the History of the Galla (probably the Court Chaplain to Emperor Sartsa Dengel) when chronicling this important campaign merely reports laconically that, during a campaign in the south-west, the Emperor was unable to bring the Dawe Oromo to battle because they had withdrawn.

As he was unable to fight against flesh and blood, he decided to fight against the Devil and captured the souls of the peoples that men call Inariya, Boṣa and Gomar. They were told: 'Become Christians!' and they did so, and were baptized with the Christians' baptism. The writer of the imperial chronicle, however, devotes many pages to the mass baptism. His eye-witness account vividly shows the Amhara's conviction of their mission and their superiority as purveyors of the Christian faith and the imperial concept. Sartsa Dengel offered to halve the Inariya tribute on condition that all became Christians. Under the pressure of the Most-Christian Emperor, but also mindful of the support to be expected against the Oromo, whose strength was constantly increasing, King Badanco of Inariya decided to be baptized. The ceremony was performed with great solemnity for the king and all his people together. The Emperor of Ethiopia himself, 'the new Apostle, the new Constantine, who closes the temples of the idolaters and opens churches', became the King of Inariya's godfather and his elders the godfathers of the Inariya nobles. The baptism ceremony was performed by the highest church dignitaries of the Ethiopian court. It is no mere panegyrizing when the chronicler, himself a monk, cries,

Oh, how great was the joy of the Christian Emperor this day for the souls of the believers who received baptism on the same day. Come, let us gladly take our Emperor Sartsa Dengel and praise him: Teacher of peoples, you who obey the Christian Law, not through fear of the sword, but in the hope of attaining the Kingdom in Heaven.

Following the ceremony and the presentation of robes of honour and finery to the Inariya, the Emperor proclaimed the Church rules and gave the country 'orthodox teachers', priests and deacons who entered the Church founded by King Badanço, now christened Zamaryam (belonging to Mary).

47. C. Conti Rossini, 1907, p. 144.
Shortly thereafter the king of the neighbouring Boşa was christened George. These events, which took place shortly before 1600, represent the swansong of imperial expansion, never to be repeated in this form. (Despite brave resistance, Inariya was conquered by the Oromo in 1710, the king fleeing with some of his people to Kaffa in the south). We can conclude from oral traditions still surviving among south-west Ethiopian peoples that the contacts thus made during the time of Sartsa Dengel had a particularly lasting and stimulating effect on southern Ethiopia and its cultural development.

Of far greater consequence for the existence of empire, however, was the almost century-long ideological conflict with the Catholic Church from 1542 to 1632.

With the creation of the Society of Jesus (the Jesuits) in 1540 the Catholic Church acquired an extremely effective instrument not only for carrying on the fight against the Reformation in Europe, but also for converting the ‘heathen’ and recovering the ‘heretical’ Christian churches not subject to the dogma and authority of Rome. Apart from the mission to India, China and Japan, led by no less a figure than Saint Francis Xavier, the recovery of the Church of Prester John was also considered important. Even before 1540 letters had been exchanged between the Portuguese kings and the Ethiopian emperors and these contacts were now seized upon. The decisive factor was, of course, the presence in Ethiopia of members of the Portuguese expeditionary force who had remained behind, and their families. Following the extraordinary episode of one João Bermudez (who had accompanied the second Portuguese mission (1520–6), some say as a barber, and later returned to Ethiopia claiming to be the Roman Patriarch for Ethiopia, ordained by the Pope), in 1557 Andrea da Oviedo was consecrated bishop and sent to Ethiopia with some other Portuguese Jesuits to prepare the work of reinstatement – that is, the union of the Orthodox Church with Rome. His discussions with Ethiopian clerics and, more particularly, with Emperor Galawdewos, brought no advantage to the Catholic faith in Ethiopia but did provoke a brilliant exposé of the Ethiopian Christian faith through the mouth of the Emperor, which has gone down in history as haymanota Galawdewos (Galawdewos’ profession of faith).

Here a voice is raised for the first time in Africa pointing out that Christianity is a religion without limitations of time or place, about which no people and no continent can claim that its own interpretation is the only true path. At once self-assured and tolerant, the African Christian here confronts the European. He puts him in his place when, for example, he shows that certain customs and practices of the Ethiopian Church are neither ‘heathen’ nor ‘Jewish’, but have their origins in Ethiopian folk culture, just as European culture has found expression in European Christendom. He says
With regard to circumcision we Ethiopians do not have ourselves circumcised like the Jews, for we know what Paul, the fountain-head of wisdom, said of it ... Circumcision is practised among us simply as a custom of our country, just as the Nubian people score their faces or the Indians pierce their ears. Thus we do it, not in order to follow the law of Moses, but out of human habit. ... And as regards eating [i.e. the ban on eating] pork, this occurs so that we can observe the law of Moses like the Jews. We do not abominate anyone who eats pork; we do not consider him unclean, but if someone does not eat it, we do not force him to do so. ... Some prefer to eat fish, others fowl, and others eat no mutton. Let each follow where his heart is inclined, even as men's inclinations and wishes are different. ... To the pure all things are pure, and as Paul says: he who really believes may truly eat all things.

This document also discusses the Ethiopian Christians' practice of keeping Saturday holy by celebrating Holy Communion and mahabbar (agape - a 'love-feast' connected with the Lord's supper) on that day. 48

Under Emperor Sartsa Dengel the Jesuits were given Fremona, near Adwa in Tigré, as their centre. There they were allowed to live in complete freedom and - not without success - to engage in missionary work. Oviedo died in 1577 and it was many years before there was a successor to lead the mission, for the Turks controlled the Red Sea ports and seized all Portuguese who came there. It was not until 1603 that Pedro Paez, a Spaniard, took over the mission after a dangerous journey lasting several years. Of all the European missionaries of the time he was undoubtedly the most important and also an outstanding and tolerant human being. Hence during his time the Ethiopians carried on the most stimulating theological discussions. The challenge forced the Ethiopian Church out of its customary lethargy into a period of debate and active struggle among the most lively in Ethiopian Church history. To reach the people, the Church carried on and recorded the religious discussions in Amharic. This ceased after the Restoration of 1632 with the reintroduction of the official Church language, Ge'ez, which was as little understood by the mass of the population as was Latin by the European peasants of the time. The fruitful effect of this contact, however, was short-lived and the constructive debate soon turned into open enmity between Orthodox and Catholic factions. 49

Literary production experienced a remarkable upsurge and the works written at this time, mainly theological and historical, are among the most important in Ethiopian literature. Theological works that may be mentioned are the Fekkare Malakot (Explanation of the Divinity) which


49. The abbreviated chronicle remarks laconically that during the reign of Susenyos: 'he had revolted for the sake of the Francs' (i.e. the Catholic faith); 'the people perished in Wag by reason of the Francs'; 'he perished by reason of the Francs', etc. See R. Basset, 1882, pp. 129f.
discusses the problem of the knowledge of God; the Mazgaba Haymanots (Treasury of Faith) which, like the Sawana Nafs (Refuge of the Soul), summarizes the arguments of the Orthodox clergy in favour of the Monophysite belief, or the all-embracing Haymanota Abaw (Faith of the Fathers), translated from Coptic Arabic and serving the same purpose. Walatta Petros was a nun who died in 1644 after spending most of her life struggling against Catholic dogma. The vivid story of her life and suffering is an important record of this turbulent period. For the reinstatement of those Christians who had temporarily embraced Islam, the Mashafa Keder (Book of Impurity) was written in connection with the atonement rites and the Mashafa Nesseha (Book of Penance) was translated from the Arabic.\(^{50}\)

An author who occupied a special position was Enbakom (Habakuk), an Arab Muslim converted to Christianity who rose in the Ethiopian Church hierarchy to the rank of abbot of the famous Dabra Libanos monastery and became cãte, leader of the Ethiopian clergy. The remarkable book Ankasa Amin (Gates of the Faith), a defence of Christianity against Islam, in which quotations from the Qur'ãan are constantly used as evidence for the truth of the Christian faith, is from his pen. Furthermore, with the translation of Barla'am and Josaphat, Enbakom made an important work of Eastern literature accessible to the Ethiopian people. It was also perhaps he who translated and adapted the Song of Alexander (Zena Eskender) the effect of which on the whole of Ethiopia was much more important than is generally supposed.\(^{51}\)

The three works or Annals concerning the reigns of the Emperors Galawdewos, Sartsa Dengel and Susenyos and the short History of the Galla by the monk Bahrey are also to be numbered among the important literary productions of this period. (Bahrey may also be the compiler of the Chronicle of Sartsa Dengel.) These works are characterized by their lively presentation, individual style and strong personal involvement, and also by their authors' awareness that they are writing as representatives of the empire.\(^{52}\)

Emperor Sartsa Dengel had appointed his brother's grown-up son, Za Dengel, as his successor, as his own son, Ya‘ekob, was still a child; but his widow together with some influential dignitaries, managed to set Ya‘ekob on the throne. Revolt and civil war followed. Za Dengel finally won but he was rash enough to make an over-hasty alliance with the Catholic mission and the Portuguese in the country, who were still to be reckoned with, and to announce his devotion to the Pope. Thereupon the abuna (the metropolitan of the Ethiopian Church) released the subjects from their oath of allegiance and excommunicated the emperor. Civil war broke out again, Za Dengel fell in the battle, and Ya‘ekob was reinstated until finally a great-grand-nephew of Sartsa Dengel, Susenyos, succeeded in becoming

52. J. Perruchon, 1893; C. Conti Rossini, 1907; A. W. Schleicher, 1893.
The accession of Susenyos (1607) marks the beginning of the final decisive phase of the confrontation between the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the Catholic Missionary Church. In the first five years of his reign Susenyos overthrew the most dangerous enemies, both outside the empire and within, in a series of successful campaigns: the few remaining Falasha were extirpated, the Agaw (the indigenous population of central and western Ethiopia, who had hitherto enjoyed a certain autonomy) were definitively subjugated and, finally, the Oromo were dealt such blows that they remained quiet for a considerable time. The exceptional talents of the head of the Jesuit Mission, Pedro Paez, as theologian, preacher, teacher and architect, had gained him access to the imperial court and, under the influence of his strong personality, the emperor began to incline increasingly towards Catholicism. This inclination was strengthened when the emperor's influential brother, Ras Se'ela Krestos, officially turned Catholic in 1612 and set up a Catholic mission in his province of Gojjam. Despite the remonstrances of the abuna, who threatened him with excommunication, in 1622 the emperor himself also embraced the Catholic faith. Pedro Paez died shortly afterwards.

The confrontation between the two doctrines and civilizations, hitherto carried on with intellectual weapons and mutual respect, now turned into open war. Alphonso Mendez, the new Spanish bishop sent by the Pope, was the opposite of his tolerant and understanding predecessor. His bigotry and arrogant manner inevitably led to a hostile reaction in a freedom-loving nation which had had close links with its own national Church for centuries. Under the emperor's protection, and with all the relentless logic and intolerance of a Jesuit of his time, Mendez began to set the Ethiopian Church on what he saw as the right path. All Ethiopian priests had to be re-ordained, all churches re-consecrated and their interior decorations altered to fit the European pattern. The calendar was Europeanized; circumcision was forbidden; and all Ethiopians even had to be re-baptized. 'Everything was done in fact that could antagonize not only the clergy but the simple worshipper.'

Two incidents aroused particular hostility: the remains of a highly respected abbot were removed from his grave in the monastery church of Dabra Libanos because Mendez felt the body of a schismatic meant desecration; and a woman was indicted for witchcraft after the European pattern. (Until then Ethiopia had remained free of witch trials, the scourge of the early modern age in Europe.)

Revolt after revolt broke out, uprising against the hated new church being particularly fierce in the central provinces of Bagemder, Lasta and Wag. The emperor, once so loved, who had brought peace to the land,

now had to subdue his subjects in bloody wars during which the fanatical zealotry of the Jesuits increased tension still further. In 1632 there was another great battle from which the emperor emerged victorious despite fearful losses on both sides. As Crown Prince Fasiladas was riding across the field of battle at his father’s side, he pointed at the bodies of the rebels, saying: ‘These were once your loyal subjects!’ At this the emperor, whose doubts had been increasing, broke down and abdicated. As he did so he issued the following proclamation:

Hear ye, hear ye! We first gave you this faith believing it was good. But innumerable people have been slain ... and now these peasants. For which reason we restore to you the faith of your forefathers. Let the former clergy return to the churches, let them put in their altars, let them say their own liturgy. And do ye rejoice.\(^{55}\)

Susenyos died shortly afterwards, a broken man and the Catholic mission came to an end. The people, insofar as they had adopted the new religion, returned in a body to the traditional faith. The new emperor, Fasiladas, had the Jesuits deported and any who remained in defiance of the imperial decree were put to death. The gradually dwindling number of Ethiopians who persisted in the Catholic faith were persecuted and their most prominent leaders, amongst them Ras Se’ela Krestos, were executed. In his endeavour to reconsolidate the empire and eliminate all foreign influence, Fasiladas went so far as to conclude an agreement with the Turkish governor of Massawa in which the governor undertook to kill any European missionaries landing at Massawa in exchange for head money. Thus ended, through the fault of the Europeans, a contact between Africa and Europe that had lasted almost a hundred years, at first enriching and significant, later only negative. The Christian brothers from overseas, originally greeted as friends and helpers, now lived on in Ethiopian memories as ‘the wolves from the west’.\(^{56}\)

The Ethiopian empire now began a period of deliberate isolation from the rest of the world and deliberate stabilization that, by the end of century, turned into stagnation. The establishment of a permanent imperial residence at Gondar, in the militarily secure centre of the empire, was part of this process. Although the great campaigns and migrations of the Oromo gradually died down and many Oromo were assimilated into the Christian Ethiopian civilization, it was no longer possible to pursue an aggressive and dynamic policy from Gondar. There is therefore little political activity to report in Christian Ethiopia during the second half of the seventeenth century. Under Emperor Yohannes (1667–82) the few remaining Catholic Ethiopians were given the choice of accepting the Orthodox faith or leaving the country. There was a certain accommodation with the Muslims still in Christian Ethiopia – mainly gabari (merchants) – who were allowed to

practise their religion freely but made to live in separate settlements.

Iyasu I (1682–1706) was the last of the great emperors who fully exercised their power. He undertook the last and unsuccessful attempt to re-establish contact with south-western Ethiopia and even visited Inariya. During his reign there were no internal or external enemies to endanger the empire. The important port of Massawa, although nominally belonging to the Turkish empire and under the control of a Bëdja governor (na‘ib of Arkiko), remained open for trade with Ethiopia. Shortly after Iyasu’s death, however, internal weaknesses began a disintegration of the empire that degenerated into complete anarchy after about 1755.57

During this period intellectual and cultural life flourished for the last time. It was mainly the patronage of the imperial court at Gondar that stimulated the arts and sciences (so that we now speak of the Gondar Period in Ethiopian art). To a greater extent than ever, art and science proved to be the sphere of a small élite, a superstructure rising above the peasant folk culture. It is not possible here to give a complete account of the different aspects of the intellectual life of the period – particularly as the extraordinary richness of cultural achievements has not yet been sufficiently recognized. We shall therefore restrict our remarks to literature, architecture and painting.

In contrast to the previous great century, literature took on a stereotyped, edifying and courtly character, with translations from Coptic Arabic predominating. Worthy of mention are Faws Manfasawi (Spiritual Medicine), a devotional book of penance, and the Fetha Nagast (Jurisdiction of the Monarchs), a collection of laws and instructions taken from ecclesiastical, civil and constitutional law intended for the use of Coptic communities in Egypt. Despite often being cited by later European writers, this work never achieved any practical significance in Ethiopia. Not only was the translation unusually full of errors and misleading, but the instructions contained in this codex had little relevance to the Ethiopian situation. Finally, this period saw the creation of a great many sacred hymns in praise of the Holy Trinity, Jesus Christ, the Virgin Mary, saints or angels. They had different names according to their metre or the tradition of their origin: deggwa, kene, malke’e or salam.58

The graphic arts, too, are marked by this relationship with court life. The famous rock churches, which are among the most important and original creations of Christian Ethiopian civilization, were still being hewn in the rock at the end of the fifteenth century, not only in the main centres of Wağ, Lasta and Geralta but also in many of the provinces further south. Their exact number is still not known – nor have they been accurately described. This type of construction ceased completely after 1500, pre-

57. The following period until 1855, when Tewodros was crowned is therefore called, in allusion to the Biblical Book of the Judges, (the era of the princes/judges) Zamana Masâfent.

sumably because of the religious wars, and was never taken up again.\textsuperscript{59} What appeared later, after 1632 in Gondar and a few other places, was something completely different — huge castles, libraries, court chapels and annexes to the palaces of the emperors and members of the imperial family. The forms of these structures often indicate foreign models. Most were probably erected by Indo-Portuguese master-builders who came to Ethiopia in connection with the Portuguese mission from the areas under Portuguese influence around Goa. This also happened in the wake of the expulsion of the Portuguese missionaries after 1632. The gradual decline of the empire, the destruction of the city of Gondar by Tewodros and the dervishes, and centuries of neglect have since completely robbed these buildings of their architectonic finery and their costly interior decoration.

\textsuperscript{59} R. Sauter, 1963.
All that remains today is bare walls or ruins which give little idea of the level of civilization at the time. In this Restoration period there must also have been active cultural contacts with India although little is known about them. Thus, for example, the Ethiopian emperor appears in religious pictures in the court dress of the Great Moguls of Delhi.

Ethiopian painting expressed itself mainly in two media: church wall paintings and book illuminations in religious works. (In comparison with these, the relatively few folding wooden altars, despite their high quality, play only a subsidiary role in quantitative terms.) While only little remains

61. For example, on several icons of the Institute of Ethiopian Studies, University of Addis Ababa.
of the church murals (paintings on stone or on cotton fabrics stuck onto the walls) before the seventeenth century, many manuscripts date back to the fourteenth and clearly show the development of this type of painting. Ethiopian painting has always been distinguished by two characteristics: its readiness to take up foreign models and stimuli, and its ability to rework these forms into typically Ethiopian creations. Each of the great epochs of Ethiopian history gave rise to quite specific developments in style.62

About 1500, book illumination reached a peak that corresponded to the peak of Christian Ethiopian civilization at that time and also to the imperial greatness of the Ethiopian empire. The highly stylized figures show a majestic dignity but also a remarkable depth of feeling. Independently of the text they illustrated, the paintings were intended to move the onlooker

The paintings of the second half of the sixteenth century and the early seventeenth are quite different in character. They reflect the multiplicity of foreign influences now penetrating Ethiopia and are witnesses to the intense intellectual conflict. An illuminating example is provided by the form of the crucifixion adopted by several Ethiopian painters — a copy of the famous woodcut, from the *Small Passion*, by the German painter and illustrator Albrecht Dürer. In 1591 Propaganda Fide in Rome had printed

63. I would like to refer to the unpublished miniatures in the manuscripts of Birbir Maryam (Gamu), or to the paintings reproduced in J. Leroy, 1967, pl. VI–XV.
an *Evangelium Arabicum* to support Catholic missionary work in the East and had illustrated it with many copper engravings, in which they also had recourse to older models, including Dürer. Copies of this work reached Ethiopia in the wake of the Portuguese mission and became favourite models for miniatures. All these pictures bear witness to the remarkable capacity of the Ethiopians for integrating foreign models into their own culture. They are also a lively expression of a turbulent age, characterized by conflict with foreign forms that did not easily fit the style of traditional Ethiopian art.

The pictures of the Restoration, the Gondar Period, finally stand out above all for their courtly elegance and graceful form. (Many of these too are inspired by European models.) They reflect the slowly vanishing splendour of the empire and are painted for a society of courtiers who found delight in their elegant and increasingly conventional forms. They are painted by artists who were integrated into court society. Pictures such as *Christ on the Mount of Olives* represent a peak in the painting of this period with its artistic arrangement of the figures, carefully balanced colours and love of detail. In the so-called Second Gondar Period of paintings, from about 1700, the force of the artistic creation steadily diminishes and finally degenerates into a canon of repetitive forms.

### South-western Ethiopia: the emergence of a new culture and new states

We are reasonably well informed about contacts between south-east Ethiopia and the Christian Empire to the north between 1500 and 1700 (and even earlier) from Christian-Ethiopian and Islamic written sources (see above). As early as the first half of the fourteenth century, the Hadiyya, who at that time still inhabited the Chercher Mountains and the area to the south thereof, were named in the Ethiopian imperial legend, the *Kebra Nagast*. The Chronicles of the Emperors Amda Seyon (1314-44) and Zera-Yakob (1434-68) are full of accounts of conflicts with the Islamic states in the east and south-east. The situation is quite different, as regards written sources, with the west and south-west – the area now occupied by the provinces of Wallaga, Ilubabor, Kaffa, Gamo-Gofa and the western and south-western parts of Shoa and Sidamo-Borana. It is true that the famous songs in praise of particular fifteenth-century emperors mention the names of peoples and states that then paid tribute to the Ethiopian empire. But we cannot be certain that they are identical with the peoples and states of the same name in the nineteenth century as names changed and migrations brought names to very distant regions. The most important names men-

64. H. Buchthal, 1960.
tioned were: Inariya, Boš(a) Zenğaro, Kambat(a) Ennamor, Kuçça, Zergo, Walamo, Gamo, Halaba, Gudela, Wağ and finally Damot and its king Motolomi (or Motilami).  

How much influence Christian Ethiopia actually had beyond political domination and exaction of tribute cannot be determined from these texts. More significant is the semi-mythical life story of St Takla Haymanot (early fourteenth century) in which it is described in detail how she went to Damot to baptize ‘King Motolomi’. It is possible that the ‘King’ element was not actually a title. Also, it has not yet been established where Damot was – it might have been Wolamo (Wolayta), as oral tradition has it. As a name given to districts and mountains, Damot occurs frequently in southern Ethiopia. Although Emperor Zera-Yakob (1434–68) led or sent military and missionary expeditions to southern Ethiopia, the surviving texts of his Annals say almost nothing about them. His name, however, lives on today in the oral traditions of the Ethiopian south and, sometimes in the garbled form ‘Zerako’, has become a synonym for ‘Emperor’. The Chronicle of Emperor Galawdewos only briefly mentions activities in the south. The final note is sounded by the remarkable description of Sartsa Dengel’s expedition to Inariya (see p. 727).

But what were the real consequences of these military, religious and cultural contacts between north and south? The oral traditions surviving in the Ethiopian south today provide a wealth of historical information which has unfortunately still not been fully recorded. Family trees, analyses of cultures as a whole and archaeological findings also give valuable clues to these events and their consequences. They prove that northern influence on the south was so far-reaching as to cause the emergence of a new culture.

The cultural situation in southern Ethiopia before the fifteenth century, when influence began to be exerted by the north, can only be deduced today, for want of other possibilities, from the picture of cultural conditions of ethnic groups in the outer fringes of the Ethiopian oecumene, who remained untouched by this influence until recently. Among these are the different groups of the Gimirra, Ari or Dizi peoples. States and sophisticated political institutions are still lacking here today. Only the steadily growing stimulus provided by the Christian Empire to the north was able to bring about decisive changes. Before this a great number of small and very small clan groups must have lived side-by-side in the south, held together by nothing more than the sharing of a common language and culture, recognition of a common lineage and, finally, perhaps veneration of a high priest or elder, who embodied the sum total of the religious affinities of the group. He was surrounded by a certain religious aura by virtue of his descent from the first man and founder of the group whose birth was surrounded by propitious omens. He was credited with supernatural powers, mainly expressed in those functions that were most important to

68. West of Gojjam in Wolayta, in Čanğerö, in Basketto, in Koyşa (Kaffa).
the peasant community, namely power over rain and food-plant growth, successful crops and rich harvests. Compared with their overriding religious significance, the political functions of these dignitaries seem to have been unimportant and often almost non-existent. Many would have had difficulty in enforcing their will and imposing sanctions. (Significantly, words for 'command', 'punish' and 'decree' are still lacking in the linguistic usage of many groups in southern Ethiopia.) These dignitaries were, of course, the undisputed symbol of their community but the real holders of political power were the clans and their leaders as autonomous, originally self-contained units. It was here that the real decisions over war and peace, right and wrong, were made.  

The conquerors from the north with their rigid concepts of state and kingship swooped down upon this unsophisticated world of simple peasants. Conquest and assimilation often proceeded comparatively peacefully, the people of the south recognizing the cultural superiority of the north. Thus the conquest of what was later to become the important state of Wolayta is supposed to have happened as follows: in the year 1600, a Tigray noble, Mika‘el, came south in the wake of one of the last great campaigns of the Ethiopian Emperor Sartsa Dengel. He was accompanied by armed horsemen and Christian priests. According to the legend he crossed a raging torrent by dividing the waters with his staff, like Moses, and arrived in the as yet small land of Wolayta, where he married the daughter of the chief. Upon the death of the chief, which followed shortly and of which his descendants have unpleasant tales to tell, Mika‘el usurped the throne. The Wolayta rose against him and he would soon have been defeated, despite his bravery and his use of cavalry hitherto unknown to the Wolayta, had he not resorted to a ruse. This ruse is a perfect illustration of the intellectual superiority and political shrewdness of the invaders. In the battles, which took the form of individual actions involving small groups, instead of throwing spears at their opponents the northerners threw fabrics (weaving was then unknown to the Wolayta), strings of beads or pieces of meat. 'If you are so rich and powerful that you can throw away such treasures', the Wolayta cried, 'then shall you also rule over us!' Thus the invaders took possession of Wolayta which under their influence, soon changed its character completely and from a land of insignificant peasant folk became a dynamic, aggressive state.

It was often accepted without question that monarchical-led states, whose warriors were better armed and possessed cavalry, originally unknown in the south, were superior to the democratically organized communities. There are therefore reports of groups voluntarily surrendering to the northern invaders and accepting the leaders as their new rulers. There are even reports of people expressly praying for a prince who

would establish a new dynasty and found a new state.\textsuperscript{71}

In this way a whole series of new states of various sizes came into being, states that were never to forget their links with the north, whose ruling classes faithfully preserved and developed the traditions and institutions of the north, and whose kingdoms and general structure have reflected the great model of the north to the present day.

In addition to the purely external, formal structure of state organization and court life, the state myth of the Ethiopian empire also made its mark. This involved the claim that they were the chosen people and theirs the true kingdom, and the associated claim that they were able to subjugate and assimilate all neighbouring peoples. The history of southern Ethiopia, as it is known from 400 years of oral tradition, is the story of the great expansion of these newly created states which widened their spheres of domination at the expense of independent democratically organized smaller groups and often contributed to the founding of new dynasties among their neighbours. This process worked in a chain reaction. Thus, according to oral tradition the first Gonga state, Inariya (or Hinnaro), was founded before 1500 by an immigrant from Tigré (Kaba Seyon). The conversion to Christianity of Inariya by the Ethiopian Emperor Sartsa Dengel has already been mentioned (see pp. 727–8), but the founders of Inariya had presumably already been Christians and their followers had only temporarily accepted the faith of their rulers. Inariya maintained its contacts with the Christian Empire as long as possible, remaining Christian until it collapsed under constantly growing Oromo pressure. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, members of the Busaso dynasty of Inariya founded further dominions: Boša, which was absorbed into the Oromo kingdom of Gimma in the nineteenth century; Kaffa, which is reputed to have been the most important and powerful state in all south-eastern Ethiopia for generations, and finally Šekko (Močča) in the virgin forest on the western edge of the Ethiopian Highlands. Further groups of Gonga, or their ruling élite, pushed northwards where they probably founded Bizamo now vanished in Wallaga. Traces of them remain in the Afillo-Busase to the north of Dembidollo and the Šinaša settled along the Abbay.\textsuperscript{72}

Oral tradition has it that the Kingdom of Gangero was originally founded by Islamic migrants from Arabia, hence its name \textit{Yam gor} (Yemen land). Later an originally Christian dynasty from Gondar assumed rule. Similar accounts survive concerning the area occupied by the Ometo peoples: in Dawāro another group of migrants priding themselves on their Gondar origin succeeded, after years of struggle, in uniting many small groups of indigenous inhabitants into a powerful state.

About 1600 Wolayta was conquered by the descendants of one šum Tamben from Tigré. Other states, both large and small, such as Kučča, Uba, Zala, Dorze, Amarro and Eli, have similar traditions. Members of

\textsuperscript{71} E. Haberland, 1959, p. 197.
\textsuperscript{72} W. Lange, 1980; V. L. Grottanelli, 1940 and 1941.
the Gošanaa dynasty, probably also of northern Ethiopian origin, founded a total of ten dominions (Gofa, Doko, Balta, Basketto, Oyda, Gozza, Gayla, Abba Malo, Konto and Koyša). As late as 1800 or so, a member of this dynamic family, Gobe, succeeded in founding the Kingdom of Konta in the no-man’s-land between Kaffa and Dawărō. Some of the former ruling families of the Dizi (Maği) in the far south-west can also trace their origins back to immigrants from Tigré.

In southern Ethiopia the social structure was originally characterized by the coexistence and mutual acceptance of free and equal people. Only religious leaders, such as clan elders or rain priests and warrior heroes, occupied a certain but not unduly privileged position. But in the newly-created states under the influence of the hierarchical concepts of the Christian north things were quite different. Equality was replaced by a complicated hierarchical system of ranks. At the summit stood the revered king, inaccessible and often invisible to his subjects and surrounded by special ceremonial laws. His hallowed family enjoyed special privileges, as in High Ethiopia, often occupying the most important state offices, such as district governor or chief justice. The exaggerated pomp and ceremony of the royal households, often in flagrant disproportion to the small size of the country and population, is reminiscent of the megalomania of the European baroque princes who tried to reproduce Versailles in miniature. In Amarro (Amhara), one of the southernmost of these kingdoms whose total population never exceeded a few thousands, there were hundreds of different state and court offices representing nothing more than honorary titles. These titles, such as abeto (highness), mikireččo (royal counsellor), gabireččo (page), are without exception borrowings from the Amharic. As the kingdoms expanded, so did the royal households, developing into independent, powerful institutions with hundreds of members. They were in sharp contrast to the former high priests or clan leaders who had lived by their own labour and that of their families and voluntary gifts from others.

The dimensions a royal court could attain is illustrated by Wolayta to the north of Lake Abbaya. Here the royal court was not only the centre of political life but also a sacral district, protected by a multitude of ritual and ceremonial laws. If the king appeared in public, it was only at a proper distance from the crowd or surrounded by his followers. The protection of the royal court with its three ramparts and three gates, each one triply secured (this too was the classical High Ethiopian pattern), was entrusted to the members of specific castes (hunters, potters, tanners and smiths) who watched the entrances, fetched water and firewood, guarded prisons and treasuries, and each morning and evening played the large instruments (drums and trumpets) reserved for the king, to announce that sun and ruler had risen or retired. While entry was more or less unrestricted by day, by evening all except the king, his wives and his pages had to leave the

73. E. Haberland, 1980.
PLATE 24.6 Fourteenth-century (?) former church bell from Tigré (?) used as a sacral ox-bell by a Dizi chief in south-western Ethiopia
hallowed district. The dignitaries and court servants withdrew to their houses against the ramparts of the royal enclosure. Only the king could slaughter animals on the soil of his hallowed residence or indeed exercise the second most important right for all Ethiopians: any kind of sexual activity. Therefore the pages who took direct care of the king's person, washed his clothes, cooked his food and served him, were sexually innocent, forbidden just as strictly as the pages of the Christian Ethiopian emperor to leave the royal court and come into contact with other people. They were pseudo-children, from respectable families, who were replaced when they reached an age at which their sexual purity became questionable. The ground covered by the royal court was so hallowed that sexual intercourse between a man — other than the king as master of the house — and a woman would have resulted in the death of the offenders and the transfer of the palace to a new site.

It was not only the palace precincts, the officers, ranks and ceremonial that were given a completely new content and dimension under northern influence: even the most revered royal insignia with whose possession royal dignity was associated, were transformed. These had formerly been symbolic objects, simple in material and form, such as sacred spears, two-pronged forks, grass rope, and so on. Their place was now taken by rings, mostly finger or arm rings, fashioned in the two precious metals, gold and silver, which were the mark of royalty in High Ethiopia. They were known
everywhere by the Amharic words *wark* (gold) and *bIRR* (silver).

This High Ethiopian influence was not confined to the introduction of new offices and institutions but had far-reaching effects on the whole social structure. Although most southern Ethiopians were members of a single homogeneous class, which we might call freemen, a sophisticated system of ranks developed after the High Ethiopian pattern which found its most marked expression in the worth-complex that extended over all Ethiopia. Worth was not inheritable like riches or a respected name (although this was not without significance), but had to be earned anew by every man, so that he could find his publicly recognized place in society. The central concepts were success in war and big-game hunting, and the warrior's obligation to kill. Political ability as judge or leader, or self-made riches were only secondary considerations. Only a person who earned worth could aspire to one of the innumerable elected offices, the holding of which was the decisive criterion for a man's status. Name and rank were often designated by the same word, and to lack a name was synonymous with social failure. It must have been the endeavour of every man to hold office at least once, even for a short period (office-bearers were elected yearly). The official kept the name — or title — of his rank even after the office had changed hands.74 Here again the influence of the north is obvious, for the names of the ranks are borrowings from the Amharic or Tigrai languages, such as *dana* or *dayna* (judge from the Amharic danya); *guda* or *goda* (master from the Amharic *geta* or the Tigrai *goyta*); and *rasa* or *erasa* (head or chief from the Amharic *ras*). The further from the north, the weaker the recognizable forms of the worth-complex until, among the southernmost of the vestigial groups still living in the Ethiopian Highlands, they disappear altogether.75

The free peasants were followed in the hierarchy by the artisans, who were members of specific castes and who occupied a comparatively low position. Despite their great economic importance — they wove garments, produced ceramics, forged tools, weapons and ornaments and tanned hides — they were nevertheless looked down upon. They could own no land, and were subjected to defamatory regulations, and physical contact with them was considered to be defiling for people of higher birth.76

In the lowest position came the slaves who, in many countries, made up more than a third of the total population. Most lived as serf-like peasantry on their masters' fields, with farms and property of their own. It was their labour and their productivity that made possible the formation of a rich dominant class which, in Wolayta for example, was the driving force in the great wars of conquest.

All these states had well educated administrators, elected by the people and confirmed in their positions by the king. The states were divided into

76. E. Haberland, 1964b.
communities, districts and provinces. They had public markets, supervised by the state, and were criss-crossed by a network of well-built roads. They were protected against external enemies by great ramparts and walls with carefully guarded gates.

The material advances brought from the north to the south since the fourteenth century are many. Curiously enough the plough, the most important agricultural implement in the north, has for some reason never gained acceptance in the south. Although its principle was known to many peoples, it was not used. Agriculture is, however, indebted to the north for a considerable number of crops. It was probably not until after the fourteenth century that peas (*Pisum sativum*), broad beans (*Vicia faba*), chickpeas (*Cicer arietinum*), onions (*Allium cepa*) and garlic (*Allium sativum*) reached the south. Later came lentils (*Ervum lens*) and various oilseeds including linseed (*Linum humile*), sesame (*Sesamum indicum*), safflower (*Carthamus tinctorius*) and nogo (*Guizotia abyssinica*) all from the Near East. These, however, played as unimportant a role in the diet of the population in general as the fruits from the East, brought into the country from Arabia via Harar and limited to specifically Islamic centres: lemon (*Citrus limonium*), banana (*Musa paradisiaca*) and peach (*Prunus persica vulgaris*). Of great importance later were the plants of the New World brought from America to Africa in post-Columbian times, probably by the Portuguese. Of these, red pepper (*Capsicum conicum*), maize (*Zea mays*) and tobacco (*Nicotiana tabacum*) are of such significance today that it is hard to imagine life in southern Ethiopia without them. The pumpkin (*Cucurbita maxima*), sweet potato (*Ipomoea batatas*), potato (*Solanum tuberosum*) and tomato (*Solanum lycopersicum*) spread to a lesser extent.77

Even today the techniques used by the descendants of the artisans from the north still bear witness to the impetus they gave this sector: treadle-loom weaving (associated with the cultivation of cotton), goldsmithing and silversmithing with sophisticated tools (blacksmithing was and still is practised using stones), leather-work with needles and fine woodwork for the production of door panels, wooden platters and large bowls. (Wood-turning or indeed, the use of rotary operations of any kind in handicrafts, including the potter’s wheel, was unknown in both north and south Ethiopia until recently.) Finally, the introduction to the south of the horse should be mentioned, although it was without economic significance, being used only in battle and as a prestige symbol.

Let us now turn to the influence of Christianity: was it strong enough to have a permanent effect on the south and provide a long-term, lasting drive, or did it disappear after emperor and troops, bishop and missionaries had withdrawn? Even today it is clear that the cultural influence was very strong, its vestiges still being visible as far as the borders of Kenya and Sudan and perhaps even beyond. Apart from external tangible manifestations, Christianity had a great impact on the moral system of the

individual folk cultures, on customs and usage and spiritual life in general. This type of transformation can often only be recognized with great difficulty.

The most striking Christian monuments in this area, by no means rich in durable man-made works, are the many sacred groves, mainly on hills and mountain tops, marking the sites of former Christian churches as their names indicate: *Kitosa* (Christ), *Mairamo* (Mary), or *Gergisa* (George). A survey carried out by the author proves that south-west Ethiopia was once dotted with a multitude of Christian churches. The materials used to build them were perishable and all have disappeared. However, their sites are still regarded as sacred and the descendants of the former Christian priests, who have become members of non-Christian clans, still perform sacrifices to the god in heaven and the god of creation and other ceremonies that are variants on the sacrifice of the Mass. In the turbulent centuries that followed the Christian mission to southern Ethiopia, the new generations of priests could not go to northern Ethiopia to be ordained by the *abuna*—the only Ethiopian bishop. The expansion of the Oromo set up a broad barrier between the empire to the north and the colonial territories in the south-west, so that the south was gradually cut off.

How strongly Christianity as a religious entity, not just as a collection of rites, influenced the essence of the southern Ethiopian religious ethics has not yet been thoroughly investigated. Neither has there been a satisfactory analysis of Ethiopian Christianity's understanding of itself. Enough has been written about official dogma but little on the views of peasants and peasant priests on their faith. Such an investigation should also consider the problem of the exceptionally important role of Mary in Ethiopian Christianity, a role that relegates Jesus Christ to the background. The function of Mary as a helpful and forgiving deity, particularly well-disposed towards women, can be seen in both north and south Ethiopia.

As regards external forms, an astonishing number of vestiges of Christian laws and ceremonies survived in the south until recently, when the Ethiopian Orthodox Church began another mission. Fasting on specific days (even if not every Wednesday and Friday as in northern Ethiopia) survived, with people abstaining from food until midday and then from animal food, including milk, butter and eggs, until midnight. The Sabbath was also observed with all work in the fields prohibited at least for the successors of former Christian priests. The seven-day Christian week, regulating the frequency of markets, continued to be observed instead of southern Ethiopia's original four-day week. Christian Sundays have now become public holidays on which the *kesiga* (successors of the Christian priests) gather their congregations together and in mutilated ritual invoke God, Christ and Mary, make the sign of the cross, burn grain instead of incense and use any other available vestiges of Christian paraphernalia. Neither were the great Christian holidays forgotten, especially the Feast of the Holy Cross (27 September) which became the New Year feast, with the exorcising
FIG. 24.4 Christianity in north-eastern Africa, c. 1700 (after E. Haberland)
of devils and a great, exuberant folk festival where everyone received gifts of meat and new clothes. Christmas and Epiphany, of such importance in the north, were celebrated only by a few groups in the south, while Easter, remarkably, became the day of the great ritual hunt.
The sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries opened with the advent of the Portuguese to East African waters and closed with the attempts by the Omani Arabs to establish some kind of overlordship on the littoral. In between these two prominent milestones, the coastal towns and peoples experienced important – at times revolutionary – economic, social and political changes. Some towns fell from great heights; others rose from obscurity to prominence; many disappeared for ever; and only a few maintained significance throughout the three centuries. The ebb and flow in their fortunes can be attributed to many factors, of which Portuguese intervention is but one, albeit important.

The coast at the beginning of the sixteenth century

In 1500, the coast was still enjoying its 'Golden Age' as shown by the surviving ruins and material culture of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Prosperity was reflected in the stone buildings and increased population in the thriving 'stone-cities', 'with their elaborate sanitation and their narrow courts ... the taste for many beads, the common use of porcelain'.

This is the overall picture: a closer look reveals differing degrees of economic and material well-being. The prosperity of the island state of Kilwa, which was growing in the fifteenth century, was levelling off if not declining, on the eve of Portuguese intervention. Kilwa had owed much of its efflorescence to the control of the Sofalan gold trade which it had wrested from Mogadishu in the late 1200s or early 1300s. Its trade, until the advent of the Portuguese, had been sea- rather than land-oriented. There is no documentary or archaeological evidence for any overland trade routes linking Kilwa Kisiwani and the gold-producing region of southern Zambezia. The only trade the island state seems to have had with the mainland, prior

3. ibid., p. 124.
to the arrival of the Portuguese, was in foodstuffs. By the end of the fifteenth century, however, Kilwa had lost control over Sofala. Politically too, its influence was declining on the coast to the north, an area important for it commercially. Internally, the rapid succession of rulers – thirteen in the fifty-six years between 1442 and 1498 – was symptomatic of a malaise that sapped its strength and vitality, whilst its hostile relations with Zanzibar reflected a recurrent weakness of Swahili towns – internal factionalism and dissension encouraging intervention by outside forces. This phenomenon was often found in later years in other coastal towns and facilitated Portuguese and, later, Omani Arab intervention and overlordship.

By 1454, Zanzibar was attempting to impose its nominee on Kilwa. At this time, Zanzibar was not, however, a leading coastal town politically or economically. It was itself divided into at least five settlements each with its own ruler. Mombasa, however, ranked with Kilwa and Malindi as a leading city state. By 1500 it had grown enormously. Ibn Battûta had described it in 1331 as having no mainland extension and no native-grown grain, even if it had banana and citrus trees. But by the time Vasco da Gama visited it in 1498, it had become a ‘great city of trade with many shops’. Its merchants played an important rôle in the commerce of the southern coast as far south as Angoche. By then, the island town had also established trade links with its hinterland in honey, wax and ivory which may have explained its remarkable and sudden rise until, by the time the Portuguese came, it had become ‘the most powerful city-state on the coast’.

Malindi, Mombasa’s arch-rival, was also prosperous by 1500. Its trade was based largely on the export of ivory and, secondarily, on the sale of such goods as gold from Sofala, beeswax, ambergris and gum copal. Unlike most other settlements, Malindi, even in the sixteenth century, had large plantations of millet and rice worked by slaves. The earliest Portuguese visitors were impressed by the great variety and quality of its fruits, vegetables and meats and by its attractive lay-out. The fact that Portuguese ships would have been assured of a regular supply of water and provisions may have been behind the establishment of cordial relations with the town.

Further north, petty sultanates were to be found in the Lamu archipelago with three on one island alone, namely Pate, Siyu and Faza. These quarreled so much among themselves that they found it impossible to present a united front against the Portuguese intruders. By 1500 Lamu had not yet seen its most prosperous times. These came long after neighbouring Manda’s days of efflorescence at the end of the ninth century. Lamu town existed on its present site by the mid-1300s, but it was to flourish only

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7. E. B. Martin, 1973, p. 30. Portuguese sources do not mention the existence of any appreciable slave trade south of the Somali coast during their presence. Vespucci, on whom Martin relies as a source for the presence of slaves in Malindi, states that they were from Guinea.
FIG. 25.1 The western Indian Ocean basin (after A. I. Salim)
after 1650. Like Kilwa, it was probably founded by immigrants from the Middle Eastern region of the Muslim empire.\(^8\)

In between these largest, most commercially prominent settlements were numerous smaller ones, interspersed among them and often falling within their spheres of influence. Thus Kilwa had some control over the Mafia islands and Mombasa enjoyed a similar rôle regarding Mtangata and Vumba. The larger towns looked more towards international maritime trade than the smaller which depended on agriculture and fishing. The number of East African coastal settlements between the Benadir coast and the mouth of the Zambezi river from the ninth to the twentieth centuries has been estimated at 173.\(^9\) While this estimate is not definite or exact it gives a picture of general trends and development, confirming that the greatest proliferation of settlements (over 100) was between 1200 and 1500, the coast’s Golden Age.

It is harder to estimate the size of these settlements in terms of area and population, although, some data are available with which to estimate figures for a few towns. Malindi, for example, is said to have covered a smaller area than it does today and the walled town could not have extended more than 600 metres north–south along the sea front and 240 metres inland.\(^10\) The walled town is dated to 1498, with a population of approximately 3500 based on the occupation of some 1000 stone houses.\(^11\) This obviously does not include the plantation labourers or the poor who probably lived in mud-and-thatch huts. Thus figures can only be rough estimates if not speculative. Mombasa and Lamu enjoyed longer continuous ‘stone-town’ existences than the other settlements which all suffered temporary or permanent eclipse.\(^12\)

The political fragmentation of the coast was much compensated for by religious and cultural homegeneity well-established since 1500. Ethnically the population was mixed — African, Arab and so-called Shīrāzī blood, intermingled in various degrees to form a new cultural group known later as the Swahili (people of the coast). Swahili is a generic term the coastal people did not apply to themselves until recently. In the 1500s, they merely formed urban groups whose élite and ruling families, for prestigious purposes, often claimed dubious, Arabian or Shīrāzī origins even if they were ethnically mixed. Others chose names that reflected their areas of origin on the coast itself, such as Wachangamwe, Wafaza, Wapate, etc.\(^13\)

While the coast was politically fragmented and its people came from different groups with loyalty to individual settlements, certain factors in its development helped to forge a fairly homogenous culture. The most

\(^9\) ibid., pp. 320–1.
\(^11\) ibid., p. 28. Kilwa’s population was estimated by Vasco da Gama in 1502 at 12,000.
\(^12\) J. de V. Allen, 1974.
\(^13\) See, for example, F. J. Berg, 1971 and 1968, pp. 35–6.
important was the common African denominator and the Kiswahili language that was soon to evolve into a *lingua franca* for the entire coast. Other important influences were the Islamic and, to a lesser degree, the Arab factors, although the latter only became dominant in the nineteenth century. The infusion of Arab and Shirâzî blood into a predominantly African, probably Bantu society must have contributed to ethnic and, with the rise of Islam, cultural differentiation on the littoral.

There is no denying the profound impact Islamic culture had on the coast. In J. de V. Allen’s words:

> The advent of Islam had a profound and long-lasting effect upon Swahili culture. It must have introduced a whole new set of cultural and religious dimensions to the concept of urbanisation: henceforth townspeople, or at least some of them, were to be marked off by religion as well as other factors. ... Nor was it only in religious learning that Islam would have an impact. The Muslim World between the tenth and fifteenth or early sixteenth centuries, enjoyed a more advanced knowledge of science and philosophy, a more sophisticated technology and better building techniques, and a higher standard of civilisation generally than any other part of the world. The Swahili coast was now, so to speak, plugged into this source of boundless intellectual creativity – albeit by wires that were somewhat tenuous and occasionally faulty – and received periodic visits from scholars like Ibn Battûta, craftsmen, artists and many others who had contributions to make to the development of Swahili culture.  

In fact, Swahili culture and civilization is a regional example of Islamic culture. It is regional because it was influenced by the indigenous East African culture which, to a significant degree, was incorporated into and became an integral part of it. The Swahili language which developed into the *lingua franca* of the coastal people, although it adopted a large number of Arabic words over the years, is the most important single manifestation of that African contribution to Swahili culture. Others include rituals related to birth and marriage, funerary and investiture ceremonies, a belief in spirits and traditional dances. Swahili culture represented ‘a fusion, in an urban “melting pot” context, of the values and customs of many people, both from the African continent and from other lands bordering the Indian Ocean’.

The material prosperity of some coastal towns in 1500 was very impressive. The rulers lived in palaces and the élite in stone dwellings, many of which were multi-storied and built around central courtyards. ‘The rich houses were embellished with those elaborately carved wooden doors which

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15. ibid.
were such a striking feature of the old Swahili culture. The townsmen's high standard of living is reflected in the importation and use of such luxury items as damasks, silks, satins, copper objects, Chinese porcelain, Middle Eastern glass vessels and glass beads. Men from Kilwa, Malindi and Mombasa were seen as far east as Malacca selling East African goods such as gold, ivory, copal and ambergris, and bringing back the cottons, silks and satins which found their way into the various coastal towns through the commercial traffic that linked them. Not all could have lived in luxury, however. The life of the tiny but wealthy minority in the multi-storied stone houses contrasted with that of the poor and servile majority in the mud-and-thatch quarters which were probably in and outside every settlement.

The populations of these settlements were predominantly African, with

initially a tiny minority of Arabs whose numbers increased substantially in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. There was also a steadily growing number of people of mixed origin. Rulers may have carried legitimate Arab dynastic names, such as al-Nabāhīnī, al-Mahdālī, al-Bā‘-Alawī, but they were invariably of mixed descent and often black. Colour was of no social or political consequence: it was the ukū o (lineage, descent) that distinguished someone and indicated his place in society and his degree of belonging.

The Portuguese intrusion

The Portuguese, like their Spanish neighbours in the Iberian peninsula, embarked upon their voyages of exploration with the din of battle against the Muslims still ringing in their ears. The Spaniards did not oust the last Muslims from their land until 1492, only five years before Vasco da Gama reached the East African coast. The motives behind the Portuguese expeditions were to outflank Islam commercially, politically, militarily and religiously – to break Mamluk (later Ottoman) monopoly of the trade routes to Asia and China, to link up with other Christians to eradicate Muslim rule wherever it was found, and, indeed, in the belief that non-Christians possessed no rights to property, to take over all Muslim territories. Pope Martin (1417–31) and Pope Nicholas (1452) had issued their papal bulls to Spanish and Portuguese rulers on the assumption that their expeditions would also serve Christendom.

The man behind Portuguese plans to outflank the Muslims, Prince Henry, was also the Grand Master of the Order of Christ under whose banner he had fought the Muslims in Morocco in the early fifteenth century. Also, in the Maghrib the Portuguese had learnt that Arab Muslims had travelled by sea to Eastern Africa and that Africa could therefore be circumvented, the Muslims there checkmated and their commerce taken over.

A series of expeditions was embarked upon to put into effect this grand plan. In January 1498, Vasco da Gama’s fleet reached the southernmost fringes of the Swahili coast at the mouth of the Quelimane river where they found an Afro-Arab settlement that was in touch with the sought-after lands of the East, namely, the island and town of Mozambique which, the Portuguese learnt, fell under the influence of Kilwa. The richly clad shaykh there welcomed his visitors until he discovered they were not Muslims after which mutual suspicion led to the first skirmishes between coastal Muslims and Portuguese. Da Gama did not visit Kilwa on this trip because of unfavourable winds. His reception in Mombasa was hostile because news of the Mozambique skirmishes had preceded him. In contrast, the Shaykh of Malindi greeted them warmly, either because of a shrewd

and far-sighted design to acquire a powerful ally against Mombasa or by an equally shrewd sense of real-politik or self-preservation. In any event, both sides remained faithful to the alliance they set up until after Malindi’s shaykh had acquired Mombasa with Portuguese assistance at the close of the sixteenth century. On da Gama’s return journey from India, the Shaykh of Malindi sent one of his subjects on board one of the Portuguese vessels as ambassador to Portugal.19

Da Gama’s first voyage was successful in its objective to reach India. It had also yielded valuable intelligence concerning Muslim trade on the Swahili coast and towns like Mozambique, Mombasa and Malindi had impressed the Portuguese with their material culture. This largely exploratory voyage was followed by others. One, in 1501, gave the Portuguese a glimpse of Kilwa’s size and trade but its shaykh, Ibrahim, would not be persuaded to co-operate with them in establishing a trading agency in Sofala. Only force, the Portuguese realized, could make him change his mind.

The following year, ‘to the accompaniment of incessant salvoes, which were intended to spread alarm and despondency,’20 Vasco da Gama’s vessels sailed into Kilwa harbour and, under the threat of the destruction of his town, Ibrahim agreed to the payment of an annual tribute and to become a vassal of the Portuguese king.21 In 1503, Ruy Lourenço Ravasco indulged in plunder and piracy in and around Zanzibar, capturing considerable booty in the form of grain, ivory and silver from ships before landing in Zanzibar and using force to impose tribute. In 1505, on the pretext that it was behind in the payment of tribute and that the ruler had not hoisted the Portuguese flag as a sign of subservience, Kilwa was attacked by Dom Francesco de Almeida, later viceroy of India. Exploiting the factional rivalries and intrigues in Kilwa, de Almeida installed a pro-Portuguese elder, Muhammad Ankoni, as ruler and, at Kilwa’s expense, work was started to build Portugal’s first fort on the Swahili coast.

Mombasa had shown hostility towards da Gama in 1498 so it was not surprising that, when de Almeida’s fleet sailed into Mombasa harbour on 13 August 1505, it was met by fire from a canon recovered earlier from a sunken Portuguese ship. This canon was destroyed by a lucky hit from one of de Almeida’s ships but the King of Mombasa and his people continued their determined resistance. Using rocks and arrows against the Portuguese muskets and cross-bows, the Mombasans, supported by hundreds of mainland African allies, fought the Portuguese in the narrow alleys of the town all the way to the king’s palace. Eventually, the two-pronged Portuguese assault on the palace forced the king to surrender. The town was looted and burnt before de Almeida’s fleet departed and no garrison was left behind to occupy it. It seems, as Strandes notes,22 that the Portuguese aim

19. ibid., p. 28.
21. ibid., p. 43.
22. ibid., p. 64.
was to break the power and prosperity of Mombasa in order to enhance that of Kilwa which was to be their stronghold.

The following year Hoja (or Oja, and thought to be Ungwana), then enjoying relations with Mamluk Egypt, decided to submit to the Portuguese rather than meet a similar fate. But Brava (Barâwa) put up resistance before being overpowered and completely looted by a force some 1000-strong. The casualties of both sides were estimated to be higher than those of any other battle then fought by the Portuguese on the Swahili coast.

Portuguese actions on the East African coast were blatantly punitive and destructive. In 1528 Mombasa was attacked again and occupied for some four months. With no long-term policy or plans for the island (the King of Malindi was not keen to take it over), the Portuguese razed the town once again before withdrawing. During that short occupation the Portuguese had destroyed Mombasa and lost many lives through fighting and disease. 23

Sixteen years earlier, in 1512, the Portuguese had been compelled to vacate their fort in Kilwa after becoming embroiled in the internal struggle for succession following the death of Ankoni. By then the Portuguese had been made to realize that the town could not produce the tribute they had so rapaciously demanded. The sum that could be extracted barely covered the cost of maintaining a garrison. They had hoped to monopolize the Sofalan gold trade, on which the town and other parts of the coast had thrived, but had only succeeded in disrupting it with their ill-considered behaviour and commercial controls. By 1506, the garrison in Sofala, stricken by disease and death, was no longer functioning and in 1512, the Kilwa garrison was withdrawn and transferred to India.

With the departure of the Portuguese, Kilwa’s trade improved significantly although the ruler remained nominally a vassal of the Portuguese crown. The town’s commercial pattern underwent an interesting change. Its traders avoided Portuguese-controlled Sofala and, together with traders from Mombasa and Malindi, sought greater contacts with the Angoche coast south of Mozambique which had long-established commercial ties with the Zambezi hinterland. Their aim was to undermine Portuguese control of Sofala; and it was to forestall this that the Portuguese ventured inland to establish themselves at Sena and Tete.

Kilwa had been heavily dependent on the carrying trade of gold and ivory from Zimbabwe as it had little to export itself. Much of the ivory, as well as the gold, had come from Sofala 24 and once Sofala was lost, Kilwa had to develop new trade links with the interior. Ivory became its most important export: ‘Effectively cut off by the Portuguese from the gold of Zimbabwe after 1530, it was the Muslim traders of Kilwa who sought to develop the previously insignificant ivory trade with the hinterland of their own town.’ 25 This re-orientation of Kilwa trade coincided with the

24. E. A. Alpers, 1975a, p. 46.
25. ibid.
FIG. 25.2 The East African coast (after A. I. Salim)
expansion of the Maravi and the Yao. It was the struggle between two Maravi chiefs, Kalonga and his nominal subordinate, Lundu, which was eventually to unleash the Zimba who were to deal Kilwa a crippling blow in the 1590s.

In conclusion, then, the Portuguese failed to devise a clear-cut policy of occupation or administration on the Swahili coast. They had only a mercenary desire to control, if not monopolize, all commercial traffic. Even in this they were only partially successful. Because Portuguese occupation was so brief (they left Mozambique and Malindi only twenty-five years after leaving Kilwa) the Swahili towns managed to continue their commercial activities. Ships from Cambay, for example, brought goods such as cotton and beads, and ships from nearby Mogadishu, Brava, Pate, Lamu and Mombasa would then carry on an exchange trade with the southern coast, including the Sofala area. Measures to stamp out this trade were neither assiduously nor successfully implemented.

Many say that, from the onset, Portuguese interests really lay beyond the East African coast in the East. This contention is sometimes used to explain the failure of the Portuguese to establish themselves effectively on the east coast, maintaining that it was only considered a minor part of the Estado da India (state of India), headquartered at Goa where the Portuguese viceroy resided. However, a 'Captain-major of the Sea of Malindi' was appointed with a few small ships at his disposal to patrol the East African coast, in the absence of effective occupation. It was also his job to issue carataze (passes) to vessels and run the Portuguese trading factory at Malindi. The establishment of this factory is proof enough of Portuguese interest in the African trade on the coast and inland. It imported goods such as cotton and beads from India which it exchanged for local goods such as gum-copal, ambergris, ivory and coir. The Captain at Malindi also played an important role in Kilwa's trade and a factor of his was placed on Mafia island, still under the political influence of Kilwa, to acquire coir and pitch.

Until the advent of the Turkish expeditions in the later 1500s, sources give only the scantiest information about the Swahili coast. In general it seems that a politico-economic compromise had been enforced by circumstances: Swahili towns remained independent so long as no conflict of interest arose with the Portuguese, in which case, commerce would be curtailed but not altogether suppressed. Some towns suffered more than others. Mombasa despite destructive punishment recovered well and in 1569 was described by Father Monclaro as 'large and populous'. He found Kilwa almost deserted but still trading in ivory with the Comoros

28. R. Oliver and G. Mathew, 1963, p. 136. It has been suggested that its trade with the hinterland helps to explain Mombasa's recovery and resilience: E. A. Alpers, 1975a, p. 45.
and the interior. By this time a factor whose impact is even harder to gauge than that of the Portuguese, had entered the picture: population movements on the mainland and their effect on the Swahili towns. Zanzibar was said to be in conflict with invaders from the mainland; Malindi was partly in ruins as a result of pressure from the Segeju; and, according to J. Kirkman, Gedi was declining prior to the advent of the Turkish commander, Mir 'Ali Bey, and his threat to the Portuguese presence.

From the moment they had entered the Indian Ocean, the Portuguese had aroused the hostility of not only the local Muslim rulers but also the rulers of the Muslim superpower, the Mamluks of Egypt. With the defeat of the Mamluks by the Ottomans in 1517 leadership in the struggle against the Portuguese intruder passed to the Turkish sultan in Constantinople. Several naval battles took place between Portuguese and Turks on the west coast of India and in the Persian Gulf. Then, in 1570–1, an insurrection broke out in the Portuguese stronghold of Hormuz, whose inhabitants had called for Ottoman help.

The uprising was suppressed, but its example was followed as the Turkish fleets periodically harassed the Portuguese. The first Turkish raids had occurred in the neighbourhood of Malindi even before the appearance of Mir 'Ali Bey. Although they had little impact, the Portuguese had been concerned and the Crown had advised the Viceroy at Goa to put an end to the misconduct of Portuguese officials on the Swahili coast about which the Swahili shaykhs had sent complaints. The Portuguese king had feared that these leaders would be encouraged or forced to seek Turkish help to free themselves from the Portuguese yoke.

Lisbon's fears were well-founded. When Mir 'Ali Bey appeared in 1585, his single galley and his message of liberation were warmly welcomed by all Swahili towns between Mogadishu and Kilwa except Malindi. He left with a promise to return with a stronger force, after collecting booty and taking prisoner some fifty Portuguese soldiers in Lamu. The Portuguese responded with a punitive expedition directed particularly at Faza and Mombasa. The former put up stiff resistance, its inhabitants inflicting heavy casualties on the Portuguese before being overpowered, having their town razed and their shaykh's head taken to Goa for display. Mombasa's inhabitants made a tactical withdrawal until the Portuguese left, but the town was sacked.

True to his promise, in 1588 Mir 'Ali Bey returned with five ships and, once again, won the support of most towns, except Malindi which only put up token resistance. When the Turkish commander began to implement his plan to make Mombasa a Turkish base, the Portuguese responded by setting sail for East Africa with a bigger fleet in January 1589.

The threat of Portuguese retribution coincided with the arrival of the

29. ibid. The presence of the Segeju in the area, however, proved fortuitous because they helped Malindi survive the Zimba attack.
cannibalistic Zimba who threatened Mombasa from the mainland as they had Kilwa before. Thus the townspeople and their Turkish deliverers found themselves caught between two unrelated enemies. The destruction of the Turkish fleet by the Portuguese allowed the Zimba access to the island where they went on a rampage of destruction. Some 200 inhabitants and Turks sought safety aboard Portuguese ships. The Zimba menace proceeded northwards and it was only the Segeju who stemmed their trail of destruction and saved Malindi from a similar fate. Meanwhile, the Portuguese expedition sailed north and wreaked vengeance on Lamu for supporting the Turks. The _shaykh_ and several other notables were taken to Pate and beheaded in the presence of the Sultans of Pate, Faza and Siyu, as an object lesson to them. Neighbouring Manda island was attacked and its capital, Takwa, sacked.

To what extent the Zimba menace, like that of the Oromo later, contributed to the depopulation and decline of some Swahili towns is difficult to gauge. Kilwa was at first eclipsed but it slowly recovered thanks to the will of its people, the presence of the commercial agent of the Portuguese Captain of Mombasa and the emergence of Yao trade towards the end of the sixteenth century. Mombasa was sufficiently weakened for her erstwhile enemy, Malindi, to take the town with the help of the Segeju. Thus ended the reign of the Mombasa Shīrāzī dynasty that had put up continued resistance to Portuguese overlördship. It was replaced by the dynasty of her arch-rival, Malindi whose ruler, Sultan Aḥmad, was thus rewarded for his consistent loyalty to the Portuguese. But the long-term effect of the transfer to Mombasa of the Portuguese Captain and his garrison, together with Malindi’s royal house, was the gradual decline of Malindi itself from which it was not to recover until the second half of the nineteenth century.

The role played at this time by Kilifi between Mombasa and Malindi is an interesting one, although sources tend to disregard its rivalry with Malindi. The rulers of Mombasa and Kilifi are said to have been related. Soon after the Zimba onslaught, Kilifi seems to have fought Malindi for the seat of Mombasa. She did so possibly on the basis of her dynastic relations or through mere ambition. Whatever the case, relations between Kilifi and Malindi on the eve of the latter’s take-over of Mombasa were hostile, with Malindi complaining of Kilifi’s encroachments and raids. The battles between the two gave Malindi an opportunity to kill two birds with one stone: to end Kilifi’s provocations and also her claims to Mombasa. After this defeat Kilifi seems to have suffered an irreversible decline. Ruins

31. As noted above, the Zimba were originally the warriors of the Lundu. In the 1580s, one of their chiefs led his men on a rampage against the people to their east. About 1588 his growing army reached Kilwa, slaughtered most of its inhabitants and left it a ghost-town before marching north to Mombasa. See also J. dos Santos, 1609, Vol. I, pp. 65–71 and R. Avelot, 1912.
testify today to the existence of a town which once had a palace and houses on top of a hill and a mosque, with beautifully carved verses of the Qur’an around the recess of the mihrab, and the rest of the town laid out below.

The two Turkish expeditions had revealed the fragility of the Portuguese hold on the Swahili coast. To strengthen it and thereby cope with future challenges, the Portuguese decided to erect a fortress in Mombasa and place a garrison there. Fort Jesus was built in 1593-4 by masons from India and labourers from Malindi working under the direction of an Italian architect.34 A garrison of 100 men was placed there under a captain whose jurisdiction stretched from Brava in the north to Cape Delgado in the south.

But despite their relatively strong presence in Mombasa, Portuguese administration of the rest of the Swahili coast did not undergo any significant change. Elsewhere, their presence remained minimal and payment of tribute was all they expected from the town rulers. The Mombasa garrison made it easier for the Portuguese to react quickly to resistance and revolts which might break out. But their proximity did not intimidate all.

34. For details of the building, see C. R. Boxer and C. de Azevedo, 1960, pp. 87–117.
In 1603, for example, the ruler of Pate rose up in arms thereby inviting condemnation and execution. But this ruthless punishment did not prevent subsequent defiance and uprisings by Pate and other towns.

Human dispersal and resettlement along the coast

Several important developments took place during the seventeenth century. One was the entry of the Dutch and British into the Indian Ocean to challenge the Portuguese. Another was the deterioration of relations between the Portuguese and the new rulers of Mombasa, their traditional allies. A third was the human dispersal and resettlement along the coast which led to the emergence of new populations and groups.

Increased insecurity, arising largely from the pressure of the Oromo and to some extent, probably, from environmental changes, led to the movement of Swahili groups from the more northerly to the southern towns. Pemba island and Mombasa both acquired immigrants from northern centres and it was during this period that most of the ancestors of the nine nations (Miji–Kenda) of Mombasa settled on the island. While some northern settlements declined or were abandoned others, to the south, were strengthened and further north – on the Tanzanian coast known as Mrima, for example – new ones appeared. Vumba Kuu developed further during the seventeenth century to acquire a distinctive identity.

Equally important was the dispersal south from Shungwaya (or Singwaya) of groups which later developed into the Miji-Kenda peoples and the Pokomo. Shungwaya cannot be discussed as a mythical state. Evidence is weighted more in favour of its existence – whether settlement or state. The Miji-Kenda oral traditions and those of Swahili-speaking groups such as the Bajuni, for example, furnish substantial evidence for its existence. The evolution of the Miji–Kenda has only been studied recently, filling thereby an important gap in coastal history. Briefly, the story is one of movement southwards from Shungwaya and settlement by different groups in fortified villages (makaya; sing.: kaya) on the hills overlooking the Swahili towns between Malindi and just south of Mombasa. Fortification probably contributed towards the development of group identity and solidarity. In time, the makaya became more than mere havens of security from Oromo and later, Maasai threats. They came to occupy a central place in the socio-religious life of the Miji–Kenda which outlasted the days when people lived within the fortified villagers. The Miji-Kenda groups developed commercial and cultural relations with the neighbouring Swahili

37. J. de V. Allen, 1977b. Also, see V. L. Grotanelli, 1955 and 1975, who identified the archaeological site near modern Bur Kavo (Port Durnford) with historical Shungwaya.
trends. The Digo and Segeju, for example, entered into socio-cultural and economic relations with Vumba Kuu. Each Miji-Kenda kaya established a special economic and political association with one of the Twelve Nations of Mombasa whose settlement in the town had been completed by the eighteenth century.

The Portuguese–Mombasans’ Conflict

The amicable relations between the Portuguese and Sultan Aḥmad lasted only three or so years after the transfer of the sultan’s seat of government to Mombasa. It soon became clear that the Captain of Mombasa was ignoring orders from Goa to keep on good terms with their ageing ally and was not honouring the administrative and fiscal agreements made with him. The sultan complained of obstacles placed on Mombasa’s commerce and shipping and, significantly, appealed to Lisbon to relieve other towns of the tribute imposed after the Turkish expeditions. He also asked for recognition as ruler of Pemba which he seems to have conquered with his own forces but which the Portuguese wished to be controlled by a puppet of their own choosing. Finally, Sultan Aḥmad was given Pemba but only on lease, his annual payment being 300–500 sacks of rice.

After Sultan Aḥmad died in 1609, his son, al-Ḥasan, found himself at loggerheads with the new Portuguese Captain, Manuel de Mello Percira, over his rights and privileges in Mombasa and over Pemba. The poisoned atmosphere between the two, worsened by the intrigues of al-Ḥasan’s uncle, drove the sultan to seek refuge in Arabaja (probably Rabai), rather than submit to a decision from Goa to be tried there. At first the Musungulos gave him refuge but later betrayed him killing him in return for a Portuguese bribe of pieces of cloth.

Lisbon was not party to this treachery and, to make amends, insisted that al-Ḥasan’s son Yūsuf be made ruler after a period of education in Goa. On arrival in Goa, Yūsuf was converted to Christianity and given a Portuguese-Asian wife. He also served in the Portuguese armed forces in the Persian Gulf and acquired distinction as a soldier and gunner. But in 1630, when he was sent back to Mombasa as ruler (under the Christian name Dom Jerónimo Chingulia) he faced severe problems for neither Mombasans nor Portuguese would accept him. His relatives resented his change of faith and he found himself socially ostracized by the whole community. At the same time, the Portuguese officials did not treat him with the respect he deserved or show appreciation of his services to the Portuguese crown.

40. This group is mentioned by the Portuguese sources but they appear not to have outlasted the Portuguese period. They were probably absorbed by subsequent groups of settlers from Shungwaya, perhaps those whose descendants became the Rabai, one of the Miji–Kenda groups.
In August 1631, the Portuguese Captain, Pedro Leitäo de Gamboa, decided that Yusuf's habit of praying at his murdered father's tomb in the Muslim fashion amounted to renunciation of the Christian faith verging on treason and planned to ship him back to Goa for trial. Like his father, Yusuf decided not to submit to trial but, unlike al-Hasan, he decided instead to fight.

The story of Yusuf's surprise entry into Fort Jesus on 15 August 1631 during the Portuguese celebration of the Feast of Our Lady of the Assumption and the massacre of all but a handful has often been told. Yusuf saw his dramatic return to Islam as the beginning of a *djihād* to oust the Portuguese from the whole coast. But his call was not heeded so well as Amir 'All Bey's had been some decades earlier and no other town would support his revolt. Nevertheless, when the first punitive expedition was sent against them in January 1632, he and his several hundred Swahili and African followers forced it to withdraw after suffering heavy casualties. But he would not wait for another expedition. Disheartened by the lack of military support from other towns, he left for Arabia – probably to enlist Turkish help.

When this was not forthcoming, Yusuf returned to East Africa where he provoked minor coastal uprisings until his death in 1637. The most rebellious was the Lamu archipelago and a lengthy punitive expedition had to be undertaken in 1636–7 to subdue Faza, Lamu, Manda and Pate. A 1635 inscription over the gate of Fort Jesus boasts of the victory which reduced the coast to subjection to the Portuguese crown.

**Anglo-Dutch intruders**

By then, however, the tide had already turned against the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean. The appearance of the Dutch and English in the area had already contributed to the decline of Portuguese supremacy by the time of Yusuf's revolt. The Dutch had long been involved in the Eastern trade as agents, shipping to other parts of Europe colonial goods brought to Lisbon. But when Spain and Portugal were united in 1580, the Spanish king sought to cut out the Dutch who had been fighting since 1566 to liberate themselves from Spanish overlordship. This determined the Dutch to reach the East independently of Spain and Portugal and, by the end of the sixteenth century, Dutch ships were challenging Portuguese in the Indian Ocean. In 1607, Dutch ships blockaded Mozambique town for several months before sickness forced them to withdraw. But they had entered the Indian Ocean determined to stay.

The English, meanwhile, had embarked upon piratical raids on Spanish ships since 1580 when unity between the two Iberian powers made Portuguese interests in the Indian Ocean legitimate targets. Before the turn of the century, English ships had rounded the Cape of Good Hope. In 1591

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41. For a study of this event, see G. S. P. Freeman-Grenville, 1980.
one landed in Zanzibar before proceeding to India, and in 1608 another landed at Pemba. Thenceforth, the Portuguese fought a futile battle to keep out these European intruders. The area of conflict was largely the Persian Gulf, along the Malabar coast of India, Sri Lanka and the Malay archipelago. Neither the Dutch nor the English sought to replace the Portuguese by permanently occupying any East African town. Stop-overs in Zanzibar and Pemba were for provisions and water supplies only.

Nevertheless, Anglo-Dutch raids and harassment stretched Portuguese resources. English involvement in fighting between local inhabitants and their Portuguese overlords turned the tide decidedly against the latter. Eventually, the shockwaves of setbacks in the Persian Gulf began to reach the East African coast.

Although officially at peace with Spain and Portugal, in 1622 England helped the Shah of Persia drive the Portuguese from their strategic entrepôt of Hormuz$^{42}$ thus depriving the Portuguese Indian state of its main source of revenue. To compensate for this loss, the Portuguese fell back on Muscat, one of the Omani coastal towns they had dominated since the early sixteenth century, plundering it as they had many Swahili towns. Muscat was the Omani equivalent of Mombasa. In 1588, soon after the Turkish raids, the Portuguese had built a fort there as a base from which to reconquer Hormuz and also as an entrepôt for the Indian–Persian Gulf trade.

The end of Portuguese rule in East Africa

Soon after the fall of Hormuz to the Persians, a new dynamic dynasty came to power in the Omani interior, determined to liberate the country from the Portuguese yoke. This was the Ya'rubí dynasty whose founder and first Imam was ṇāṣir bin Murshid. Between 1640 and 1650, the Portuguese were forced by military defeats to demolish their fortresses and evacuate Muscat. With control over their own coastline, the rulers of Oman used their seasoned seafaring inhabitants to build a strong naval force that started challenging the Portuguese beyond the Gulf. It was inevitable that historical, social, cultural and commercial ties should turn the attention of the Ya'rubí rulers to East Africa.

With the recapture of Mombasa after Yūsuf’s revolt, the Portuguese decided to rule the town directly. As noted above, revolts broke out periodically, especially in Pate which seems to have assumed leadership in the struggle for liberation. The town seems to have entered a period of prosperity during this time which led the Portuguese to establish a custom-house there in 1633. But Portuguese interference with the town’s trade, which, in their estimation, was making Pate too wealthy and powerful, led to the deterioration of relations between the two. Meanwhile, complaints of ill-treatment from other towns, such as Siyu, Pemba, and Otondo,

$^{42}$ S. B. Miles, 1919.
reached not only Lisbon but also the new rulers of Oman of whom help against the Portuguese was requested.

What followed was a prolonged period of struggle during the second half of the seventeenth century between the Portuguese and the Omani Arabs in East African waters. In 1652, an Omani expedition encouraged by the local rulers, attacked the Portuguese position in Zanzibar, killing a number of Portuguese. The Portuguese retaliated by raiding the island and driving away the queen and her son, the ruler of Otondo, for refusing to pay tribute and encouraging the Omani Arabs. In 1660 a combined fleet from Oman and Pate landed in Mombasa and sacked the Portuguese quarter seemingly without any serious opposition. Other Omani raids were made as far south as Mozambique in 1669. In August 1678, the Portuguese viceroy himself led a major expedition against ‘Pate the swaggering’. He was joined by the ruler of neighbouring Faza which at the time was involved in its perennial squabbles with Pate. The expedition was of limited success as it was forced to withdraw on the appearance of Omani ships in January 1679 – but not before having seized the rulers of Pate, Siyu, Lamu and Manda who were then beheaded together with several other notables. But the loss of her ruler did not quell Pate and in 1687 yet another move was made against it. It was invaded and looted and its new ruler seized and sent to Goa together with twelve councillors.

An attempt was made to reach a compromise agreement whereby the Shaykh of Pate would retain his throne – instead of being replaced by his enemy, the ruler of Faza – in return for accepting Portuguese overlordship. But this provisional agreement reached in Goa was repudiated by Lisbon as the Portuguese king wished to end Pate’s independence and reward Faza for its ‘conspicuous loyalty’. But by then, Pate had been lost to an Omani force and, on Christmas Day 1688, the captive ruler and his councillors were killed in an attempt to escape from captivity in Panjim.

For some years, civil strife at home interrupted the Omani raids on Portuguese positions in East Africa. When they were resumed, their target was Pemba upon whom Mombasa depended for food and where a revolt had broken out against the Portuguese. In 1694, however, the Portuguese managed to suppress the revolt and expel the Omani Arabs.

But the following year came the greatest challenge from Oman. In March 1696, seven Omani ships, carrying 3000 men and the ruler of Lamu, landed in Mombasa. They easily occupied the town and the island before laying siege to Fort Jesus. The siege lasted for more than two and half years, until December 1698 when the fortress finally surrendered. It demonstrated not only the heroism of the defenders, who were supported by allies from Malindi and Faza, but also the remarkable ineptitude and cowardice of the Portuguese commanders sent from time to time to relieve those in the fort. Invariably they limited themselves to sending supplies to the beleaguered fortress without attempting to attack the besiegers. When the Omanis

persuaded the neighbouring Miji–Kenda to cut off supplies to the defenders, disease and malnutrition took their toll. When the expedition from Goa arrived in November 1698, with orders to engage the enemy, the red flag of Oman was already flying over the fort.

From 1728–9 the Portuguese managed a brief return to Mombasa, taking advantage of the scanty Omani presence after the fall of Mombasa and Swahili disillusionment in some towns with the Arabs who were reportedly ill-treating the wealthy and interfering with local trade. Such reports may well have been exaggerated in Goa by dispossessed Swahili notables such as the Prince of Faza. But there is no doubt that the ruler of Pate was at odds with the Arab garrison in his town. When a faction rose against him, supported by the Omanis, he finally sought support from Goa late in 1727. From Pate the Portuguese expedition moved against Mombasa where the Omani garrison in the fort had rebelled during the absence of its commander, calling for help from the King of Pate against other Arab garrisons guarding smaller forts on the island. The fort and town surrendered to the joint Portuguese–Patean forces and rulers from Wasini(?), Vumba, Pangani, Mtangata, Tanga, Zanzibar and Pemba were summoned to Mombasa to renew pledges of loyalty.

But the return of the Portuguese and the Portuguese–Patean alliance was shortlived. The ruler of Pate had been so anxious for help against the local rival faction and its Arab supporters that he had made reckless promises to Portugal, such as the payment of tribute and the monopoly of the ivory trade. Within six months the King of Pate was accusing the Portuguese of oppression with regard to the ivory monopoly and complaining about other trade restrictions. In June 1729 an armed clash finally convinced the Portuguese that they should withdraw.

By then, trouble was brewing for them in Mombasa. A combined force of Mombasans and Musungulos (mainland Africans), under the leadership of a Mombasa notable who had earlier gone to Goa to urge the Portuguese return, attacked Portuguese positions in the town before besieging the small garrison in the fort. In November 1729, the half-starved garrison surrendered and was allowed to sail to Mozambique. Other towns, including Zanzibar, Pemba and Mafia, had followed Mombasa’s lead, murdering or driving out the Portuguese.

The Swahili towns, therefore, were responsible for the final expulsion of the Portuguese. But soon Pate and Mombasa were once again occupied by the Omanis, and the Swahili coast entered a new era in its history.

The Portuguese defeat has been credited to a variety of factors: their weak, incompetent and confused colonial system; the personal irresolution, caprice, ineptitude and greed of officials interested primarily in lining their own pockets, who often alienated the local Swahili population; the harsh vagaries of climate and disease that took many lives among an already small Portuguese population; and the local factional struggles, often a double-edged sword, now working for the Portuguese now against them. Towards
the end, Portuguese resources were overstretched and an expeditionary force hard to muster. Goa itself, for example, was denuded of defence forces in a last, desperate and abortive effort to regain an East African foothold in January 1730.

These military activities took place amidst significant political, economic and cultural development on the littoral. In the southern part of the coast there developed an important trade between the Yao and Kilwa, initially in hides, iron-ware and agricultural products but, by the end of the seventeenth century, including ‘a thriving, well-organized trade in ivory’.44 This trade suffered a temporary setback in the early 1700s when the Portuguese lost Mombasa whose captain had purchased a large part of Kilwa’s exports. Their Omani successors failed to provide sufficient demand for these goods or for the exchange goods of cloth and beads with which Kilwa obtained ivory and other goods from the interior. As a result, Yao ivory was diverted from Kilwa to Mozambique. But the advent of the Büsa’idi dynasty in Oman, in the mid-1700s, ushered in another period of revival for Kilwa.

Further north, Vumba Kuu had undergone consolidation and its Shārifite ruling family, the Bā-‘Alawī, had become indigenized. Each ḏīwān (ruler) adopted a Bantu nickname and his investiture ceremonies combined both Bantu and Islamic rites. The Segeju had settled around the Diwanate, as had the Digo, one of the Miji-Kenda groups. Both had entered into an intimate relationship with Vumba Kuu, providing the foundation of its economy and participating in the installation of its rulers and succession disputes during the eighteenth century and later. The influence of the Shārifite families’ religions proved decisive in the conversion to Islam of the coastal Digo and Segeju who, however, retained certain aspects of their religious beliefs including rain-making ceremonies.

In the Lamu archipelago, Pate witnessed its most glorious decades during the seventeenth century and into the eighteenth, enjoying great wealth and influence over parts of the coast to the south and playing a leading rôle in the liberation of the coast. Its prosperity was based on maritime trade which it exploited at a time when other towns such as Malindi, Mombasa and Kilwa were recovering from attacks by inland peoples such as the Zimba. Pate even established profitable relations with the marauding Oromo, who provided the town with hides for export, and traded in ivory from the mainland.45 Material culture collected and preserved reflects the great heights of prosperity and civilized living enjoyed by Pate during this period. Sources do not adequately explain its seemingly rapid decline sometime during the second half of the eighteenth century.

44. E. A. Alpers, 1975a, p. 63.
The Omani factor in East Africa

It is this fall from great heights that forms the subject of one of the greatest tenzi (epic poems) in Kiswahili, Al-Inkishafi. Its author, Sayyid ‘Abdallâh bin ‘Ali bin Näzir, was a member of the Shârifite élite of Pate. His ancestor, Shaykh Abû Bakr bin Sâlim was the celebrated Saint of Inät in the Hadramaut and had been asked by a sixteenth-century ruler of Pate to pray for the town to be freed from her enemies – whether Portuguese or Oromo it is not clear. The shârifûs settled and multiplied, became indigenized and with the shârifûs of Lamu, came to play a leading role in the development of Swahilî literary and religious traditions. It was Shârifian immigrants from South Arabia who, even before the arrival of the Portuguese, came to determine the Shâfi’î madhhab (school of thought) of the vast majority of the coast’s Muslim population.

The methods of teaching Islam, the manuals used, the cult of the saints, the veneration of shârifûs and the form and content of poetic verse constitute the cultural legacy of these descendants of the Prophet Muhammad who settled not only in the Lamu archipelago but also elsewhere on the coast and formed the main part of its religious intelligentsia. By the nineteenth century a

cultural traffic linked South Arabia to the Banadir, to the coast southwards to Mozambique and to the offshore islands: the Lamu archipelago, Zanzibar, Pemba, Mafia and the Comoro islands. Hadrami towns like ‘Inät and Tarîm, Mecca and Medina, sometimes
Cairo, and occasionally Istanbul helped to mould the scholastic minds of the East African Muslim scholars. Students from the East African towns travelled to the Hidjaz, Hadramaut, and sometimes Egypt to study under renowned scholars. The acquisition of an _Idjâza_ (certificate) from one of these scholars established its recipient as a teacher in a mosque or in his own home of the Arabic language, Kurânic exegesis, _hadith_, Sharia, etc. From this educational system there developed a strong body of _ulama_ from among whom the Busaidi rulers appointed their Kadis.46

The Omani factor contributed significantly towards the economic resurgence of Kilwa as did the slave trade. Together with the ivory trade, the slave trade was to dominate the economic history of the east coast for much of the nineteenth century. The first major catalyst for the trade was France whose acquisition of the Mascarene Islands – Ile-de-France (Mauritius) and Ile Bourbon (Réunion) – and their development after 1735 as plantation colonies, acted as strong incentives to both Kilwa and Zanzibar to provide slaves. Initially, the French turned to Portuguese Mozambique and the Kerimba Islands for their slaves as the Portuguese were anxious to prevent the French trading directly in slaves or ivory with the Makua, Yao and the Swahili merchants on the mainland.

But Mozambique’s domination began to decline in the mid-1700s, partly because of Portuguese conflicts inland with the Makua, which disturbed the Mozambique route, and partly because of the challenge from Swahili and also Arab merchants who had increased their activities along the coast after the Bûsa’idi dynasty had strengthened its dynastic grip on Oman. Parallel to this was the growth of Indian merchant capital at Zanzibar, deliberately encouraged by the new Omani rulers, who had made Zanzibar their major stronghold on the coast. Kilwa once again became a major trading centre to which mainland African slave and ivory traders were drawn, to the consternation of the Portuguese. All measures, military and otherwise, to stamp out Arab and Swahili commercial rivalry, which was seen as a deadly threat to the economic backbone of Mozambique, failed to stem the tide of Arab and Swahili competition.

By 1785, Mozambique’s domination of the ivory trade in East and Central Africa had almost ended although it continued to thrive on the slave trade, owing to the increased demand of the French Indian Ocean colonies.47 In this it faced competition from Swahili mainland coastal settlements, such as Ibo, to which the French turned more and more for slaves. Yao slave-traders turned increasingly to Kilwa as a destination for their ivory and slaves, as Kilwa became a greater emporium for desired Indian–Omani imported goods, such as Surat cloth. It is this growing resurgence of Kilwa that led the French trader-adventurer, Jean-Vincent

Morice, to sign a treaty with the town in 1776 for 1000 slaves a year to be sold to the French colonists on the Mascarene Islands.\textsuperscript{48} By the 1780s there is already evidence of the pioneering trading ventures of the Swahili and Swahilized traders into the interior and across Lake Malawi. Two of the three newly established routes reached Kilwa and the Swahili coast around Bagomoyo, testifying to the ‘revitalization of the trading economy of the Swahili coast during the second half of the eighteenth century’.\textsuperscript{49} New trade routes were opened to link with the coast peoples such as the Bolowoka, the Bisa and the Ngonde.

\textsuperscript{48} For the French trade at Kilwa, see G. S. P. Freeman-Grenville, 1965.
\textsuperscript{49} E. A. Alpers, 1975a, p. 161.
Proof that trade and profit were often divorced from politics is provided by the Omani Arabs who traded with Kilwa although its sultan jealously guarded his independence from Oman. From 1784, however, the newly installed Ḥālīm of Oman, Ṣaʿīd bin Ḍāḥmad, embarked upon a military campaign to impose his will on a number of coastal towns, including Kilwa which had been used as a base by a rebel uncle of his, Saʿīf bin Ṣaʿīd. Kilwa’s ageing Sultan, Ḥasan Ibrāhīm, could only put up token resistance. He was forced to relinquish his sovereignty and over half of his custom dues to the Omani overlord and accept the presence of an Omani governor and garrison. But these political developments only helped to increase commerce on the Kilwa coast since they created greater stability and introduced more Indian capital investment. No doubt Muscat gained from this arrangement. By 1804, the Omani Governor of Kilwa was sending to his Ḥālīm 6000 piastres a year which sum was at least doubled by 1811. Zanzibar, already the Būsaʿīdī’s most stable, loyal and lucrative base in East Africa added no less than 40,000 piastres to the Omani coffers in 1796 and nearly 60,000 piastres in 1811.

By the turn of the century the economic value of the few points at which they were represented was becoming evident to the Omani Būsaʿīdī. This and other political and strategic considerations, contributed to the policy adopted by Sayyid Ṣaʿīd bin Sultan (1804–56) of extending his dynastic authority on the coast and, eventually, establishing his capital in Zanzibar.

Conclusion

Between 1500 and 1800 there were important changes on the coast. Hitherto independent Swahili towns endured Portuguese intrusion. Their internal rivalries and intrigues sometimes facilitated Portuguese intervention, although the Portuguese occasionally found involvement more a liability than an asset.

The Portuguese occupation was violent and ruthless, determined to strike at Muslims everywhere, to take over their lands and trade and even convert them and the so-called heathens of the area to Christianity. In effect, the religious impact was negligible. Barring a few exceptions, such as Yūsuf bin Ḥasan, or some female companions, most Muslims were impervious to Christianity. Certainly, by the end of the Portuguese occupation no trace of Christianity remained.

As for the control of trade and commercial traffic in the Indian Ocean, Portuguese efforts were to prove of limited success. The Swahili towns were able to continue with a significant degree of commercial activity although Portuguese controls, such as monopolies and carataze licences depressed trade to some extent. Greed and incompetence amongst local...

50. E. A. Alpers, 1975a, p. 166.
officials were responsible for such developments as the decline of the Sofalan gold trade. While the coast was initially regarded as of secondary importance to the Asian trade, it enriched Portuguese officials, if not the Portuguese crown.

Swahili towns during this period experienced vacillating fortunes. Mombasa’s resilience enabled it to recover several times from serious Portuguese punishment. Kilwa took the blows less well. Towards the end of the eighteenth century it recovered, thanks to the slave trade with the Ile-de-France. But recovery was short-lived since it was to be overshadowed by mainland Kilwa Kivinje early in the nineteenth century. Other coastal towns disappeared for ever or reverted to villages. To ascribe this decline to Portuguese action is erroneous. Human pressures, such as those of the Oromo and the Zimba, plus environmental changes, are probably more plausible explanations. A notable exception to this general decline is Pate, which enjoyed its greatest prosperity during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – a fact which probably explains the Portuguese obsession with the island. But by the end of the eighteenth century, Pate was on the decline again, as her great poet, Sayyid ‘Abdallāh, author of Al-Inkīshāfī, records. More research, however, is needed to answer many questions concerning these Swahili towns, their sizes, the factors leading to their growth and development and their eventual decline.
This period can be divided into three: 1500 to about 1580, the droughts and famines of 1580 to 1680, and the era of state formation and expansion from about 1680 to 1800. Before 1580 the major concern of the southern and central sections of the region was the consolidation of the successor states to the Bachwezi empire while, in the north, it was the interaction among the linguistic families consequent upon the first intrusion into the Great Lakes region of Eastern Nilotic-speaking peoples.

The second period (c.1580–1680) was dominated by droughts and famines. It also witnessed the region’s most massive movement of peoples for the last thousand years. There were large-scale migrations out of Baar, the scattering of the Luo associated with Pubungu, and massive Banyoro invasions to the south with ramifications as far as Rwanda and Usukuma. In the east the drought was associated with the appearance of the Central Eastern Nilotes, their interaction with earlier peoples including Luo and a substantial southern drift of population.

The third period (c.1680–1800) was primarily concerned with the proliferation and expansion of state structures. It began with a dynastic crisis in Bunyoro which signalled the decline of that empire and, through the Paluo, was responsible for the creation of states from the Alur Highlands to the mountains on the Acholi–Karamoja border and, through the Banyoro princes, for a string of states along the southern borderlands. Nyanza Luo, Basoga, Bakonzo, Kakwa, Banyangoma and Babinza states were all multiplying. The Mpororo state was founded and fragmented. The period ends with the rise and expansion of Buganda in the central area and Rwanda in the south as the ‘super-powers’ of the Great Lakes region and, in the north, with the broad outlines of the modern configurations of Central Eastern Nilotic ethnic entities such as the Iteso, the Jie, the Eastern Luo, the Lango Omiro and the Kumam.
The Great Lakes region, 1500–1800

The Northern and Central areas

The formation of new groups and societies

Before +1000 the Central Sudanic were probably the predominant peoples over the entire Great Lakes region. They were divided into many groups, including the ancestors of such ethnic groups as the Lendu, Kebu and Moro. 'Muru' was the Luo term for all these indigenous peoples and will be used when the ethnic identity of a Central Sudanic people is not known and especially to distinguish the early peoples of the region from the later Madi immigrants who were also Central Sudanic and probably the earliest-known inhabitants of Baar. Most of the Central Sudanic peoples were organized on segmentary and gerontocratic lines. They were agricultural, revered an earth god and used rain stones or mixed oil and water to call rain. They had a complex totemic system and buried their dead in recessed graves. Mostly they were known by later migrants as expert iron-miners, smelters and blacksmiths. By 1500 they had been assimilated into Bantu culture south of the Nile-Kyoga divide but still dominated the north from the Alur Highlands to the mountains of Karamoja.

About +1000 the Nilotic Luo cradleland of Dog Nam broke up. One group moved to Tekidi and a secessionist group from Tekidi migrated to and settled in Pakwac-Pawir. Out of this section came the major linguistic element of the Alur, Abwor, Padhola, Nyanza Luo and possibly the Babito of Bunyoro. From Dog Nam another section settled in Wipac (Rumbek) out of which emerged the Shilluk, Western Acholi and possibly the Paluo dialects. By 1500 there must have been a substantial dialectical difference between the two groups. In all three Luo enclaves a form of hereditary leadership associated with the bushbuck totem had been established well before 1400.

The period from about 1400 to 1580 was given over to the internal consolidation of the successor states and the diplomatic manoeuvring of the great power blocs, the Bahinda and Babito. The new rulers rewarded collaborators with offices and recognized certain indigenous rulers, notably those of Bwera and Buyaga. There were few succession disputes. A cult developed among the Babito to revere the fallen Cwezi which was a potential threat to the new rulers.


The Babito and Bahinda were the major contenders for overall hegemonic power. Tradition claims that Kitara came to the military support of the indigenous ruler of Kiziba when a Muhima from the court in Buganda sought to overthrow him. The Banyoro armies invaded Buganda, killed the Muhima king, Nakabinge and may have been instrumental in replacing him with a ruler from the Sesse Islands, a man of the lion-leopard totem of the earlier Kintu dynasty. A disaffected section of the new dynasty in Buganda crossed Nyanza to the south-west where the Batundu population, fearful of Bahinda expansion, accepted them as rulers. This was the foundation of the Babinza clan, also of the lion-leopard totem. The Banyoro killed the Muhima aspirant to the Kiziba throne and dispatched Kibi who seized power in Kiziba. In addition, according to traditions, the Banyoro encouraged the Balisa clan to found Buhweju and Buzimba (c.1523-50) as buffer states on their southern border against threats from the Bahima states. The Banyoro also roundly defeated Nkore but their further plans were cut short when their army fled in disarray during an eclipse of the sun in 1520.

North of the Nile–Kyoga divide, the year 1500 is important because it possibly coincides with the first major appearance of the Northern section of Eastern Nilotes or Bari cluster of the Eastern Nilotes. It has been argued that this northern section of Eastern Nilotes moved out of their homeland in the Ethiopian borderlands in three waves, the first of which (c.1490-1517) possibly contained some ancestors of the Pajulu, the second (c.1517-44) of the Bari-Kakwa-Kuku and the third (c.1544-71) of the Lotuho. These migrations were certainly not distinct and people from the second and third waves did find their homes among the Pajulu. The waves have been tentatively dated by the generations in which Eastern Nilotes from the north-east attacked Tekidi. There are, of course, widespread doubts about the accuracy of the Tekidi regnal list from which the dates are calculated and, except for the third, the Lotuho invasion, no firm identification of the migrants in the Tekidi tradition. This division, however, finds some support in the published genealogies of the northern group of Eastern Nilotes. Each group in turn attacked Tekidi until this Luo settlement was broken up by the Lotuho.

Given the undeveloped state of the Northern group of Eastern Nilotic historiography the following outline must be considered tentative in the extreme. Between the Turkana escarpment and the Agoro mountains the

5. No major research has been done in this northern group of Eastern Nilotes, but see M. Loro, 1971 and J. B. Baba, 1972. L. F. Nalder, 1937, is a useful source; J. P. Crazzolara, 1950-4, pp. 337 and 342-3 and J. M. Onyango-ka-Odongo and J. B. Webster, 1976, are helpful, the latter especially for dating. There are, however, several works on the Central groups of the Eastern Nilotes: J. E. Lamphear, 1976 and unpublished; R. S. Herring, unpublished.
group seems to have split in two directions, one westward through Central Sudanic country (Muru and Lukoya) to the Nile in Baar, the homeland of Madi, and the other south through Karamoja where they were responsible for the withdrawal of the Kalenjin-type peoples from the northern part of that region. The evidence seems to suggest that they introduced to the Central Sudanic peoples their age organization, the fire-making ceremony, a sky god, the spear and shield, the sacred spear for inducing rain, the long straight hoe and elaborate head-dresses. In many areas their interaction with the Central Sudanic peoples probably promoted chieftaincy and their language spread as a new *lingua franca*.

The second Eastern Nilotic invasions may have been affected by the Oromo who spread out from their cradleland north of Lake Turkana about 1517–44 and attacked Tekidi about the same time as they began their invasions of Southern Ethiopia. Ancestors of the modern Kakwa were possibly moving within this migration. Kakwa tradition goes back to Meme living at Kapoeta (now in Toposa country). The same tradition provides a genealogy to Jaki who lived at Korobe Hill far to the west, a dispersal point for many ruling clans among the Pajulu and Kakwa. Jaki became a hero-ancestor to the Kakwa. The Kakwa also recognize their connection with a sub-stratum of the Iteso, and an early northern group of the Eastern Nilotic presence in eastern Uganda may be indicated by, along with other evidence, variations of the word 'Kakwa' from Eastern Acholi to Western Kenya among the Luo.

The land of Baar became an area of extensive mixing of Eastern Nilotes and Madi. A variety of types of hereditary leadership probably developed but for those who went to the west of the Nile – the Pajulu, Kakwa and Kuku – it was usually Eastern Nilotic leaders and Madi followers; those who went south-east towards Agoro were possibly Eastern Nilotes under either Madi or Luo leadership; those who remained in Baar created a hereditary rain-maker leadership of supposedly Madi origin but speaking an Eastern Nilotic dialect. Among the Pajulu, Kakwa and Kuku the new societies seemingly adopted an Eastern Nilotic language and combined the Eastern Nilotic sky god and spear with the Sudanic earth god and bow and arrow. They apparently abandoned the Eastern Nilotic age organization and adopted Madi dress, burial practices and rain stones. The secular leadership was usually Eastern Nilotic, while the ritual experts were Madi. The Pajulu, Kakwa and Kuku were culturally Sudanic and linguistically Eastern Nilotic.

The Bari fusion was similar with somewhat stronger Eastern Nilotic influence. A prominent feature of Bari and Kuku society was that the *dupi*


7. H. S. Lewis, 1966, fixes the beginning of the Oromo movement to 1530–8 by documentary evidence. The 1517–44 date is calculated from the genealogy in J. M. Onyango-ka-Odongo et al., 1976.
(servile class) were occasionally physically distinct from the freeborn. In Kakwa and Pajulu society the *dupi* were clients rather than serfs. Since the *dupi* were often assistants in the rain-making ritual and notable miners and smiths, they could have been of Muru rather than Madi origin on the assumption that modern Madi, who first appear later in Luo traditions, were themselves mixtures of at least different Sudanic peoples, including Moro and possibly Muru. To the Luo, all Sudanic peoples came to be called Madi and were renowned iron-workers. The Madi, however, deny this, saying that the iron-workers were the indigenous people among whom they settled, here assumed to be Muru, Moro, Lendu or Okebu. The latter three peoples still exist and claim to have been iron-workers who were accorded special status in Madi society.\(^8\)

The final invasion of the northern group of Eastern Nilotes was associated in Luo Tekidi tradition with the Lotuho. The Lotuho overran the Luo settlement of Tekidi and the king, Owiny Rac Koma (c.1544–71), fled with the majority of his subjects to the sister Luo settlement in Pakwac-Pawir. It would seem that the Didinga and Dongotoono-Murle survived the invasions by defending their highland strongholds. Probably a Central Sudanic group, the Okarowok, became Eastern Nilotic-speakers through the influence of the Lotuho. One section of the Okarowok, the Koriuk, was brought under Lotuho linguistic, cultural and finally political influence; a second, the Ilogir, came under linguistic and cultural but not political influence; while a third, the Lokoya or Oxoriuk, remained separate while adopting Eastern Nilotic speech. Slim as the evidence is that the Oxoriuk became the Okarowok (a major Eastern Nilotic clan in Uganda), this is the direction in which the evidence points.

Apparently the Lotuho assimilated the small Okarowok clans into the four large Lotuho clans and introduced Okarowok totemic prohibitions. They also introduced the fire-making ceremony and age organization and – probably because of the insecure situation – built populous closely packed villages in an area formerly characterized by a dispersed settlement pattern. This was the furthest eastward spread of totemic clans and rain stones – possibly indicating the eastward limit of Central Sudanic settlement.

While a group of the proto-Luo was forced by the incursions of the Eastern Nilotes to move to the Tekidi area, another group moved northward to Wipaco Dwong’ in Rumbek. This settlement later broke up, between 1382 and 1418, and the group moved west to the Nile to found a riverain settlement. This cluster later divided, with one group – the proto-Shilluk and its allies – going north and establishing their settlement (c.1490 and 1517) after defeating the Fung, while the Patiko and Padibe moved southwards from Baar into Pakwac-Pawir. The Luo intrusions into Baar

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8. No Madi traditions have been collected in their homeland in Baar. The only Madi traditions we have come from the Uganda region. Everywhere in the Eastern and Western Nilotic areas of Northern Uganda, hoes which were associated with Central Sudanic speakers are called Madi hoes.
apparently induced the Madi-led Panyimur, Atyak and Koc-Pagak to migrate south to the Mount Kilak area. A Madi-Luo struggle for power ensued in Pakwac-Pawir. In the chieftdom of Atyak it was prophesied that a child of the princess, Nyilak (c.1517–62), would assassinate her father the king and seize the throne. Consequently the king locked up his daughter but a wandering Luo (said in one tradition to have been Keeno, King of Patiko) impregnated Nyilak and her son, as predicted, killed the Madi king. Possibly out of this two states emerged: Attyak (later Okoro), Luo-led and from whose royal line Nyipir was born, and Atyak (Acholi), Madi-led. The plot of the Nyilak story is a stereotype, the characters varying in each incident, to explain the overthrow of Sudanic leadership by either Luo in the north or Bantu in the south.\(^9\)

The Madi-Luo struggle for hegemony in Pakwac-Pawir intensified when the large Luo migration entered Owiny of Tekidi's kingdom. Under Owiny's predecessor, Owiny Rac Koma, the Payera ruling house had been founded by Ayera, a Luo-speaking common girl whose mother was East Nilotic and whose father was a Muru trader, an apt origin for the ethnic mixture which later characterized the Payera state. The children of Ayera, who moved west to the Nile, were raised primarily as Muru and attached many Madi to themselves. In about 1560 the Lotuho overwhelmed Tekidi most of whose citizens fled with their king to Pakwac-Pawir. Others fled into the hills, returning temporarily after the Lotuho had withdrawn. The main chiefdom to emerge from the Lotuho was Puranga.\(^10\) This Luo group, infiltrated over the centuries by new migrants from Anywa and elsewhere and much influenced by Eastern Nilotes, may be called the Eastern Luo. They formed a predominant element of the population in East Acholi, Labwor, Nyakwai and Lango and they and the Eastern Nilotes had a significant impact on the dialects spoken in these areas.

The period of droughts and famines

No major area of the Great Lakes region, nor indeed of east-central Africa, was unaffected by the climatic disaster of droughts and the resulting famines which occurred in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. During this period, rainfall in the northern and central areas was only normal in two years. The four worst periods of drought were probably: 1588–90, 1601–2, 1613 and 1617–21. In 1621 the summer Nile reached its lowest level since 622 when records were first kept. The records suggest that


\(^10\) We here follow the Luo tradition as given by J. M. Onyango-ka-Odongo et al., 1976. This important tradition, which deals largely with the early history of the Luo, deserves much more critical attention than it has received so far. It provides a useful corrective to Luo oral traditions, most of which have up to recently, dealt largely with the Western Luo.
during the whole period crops could have been normal only twice, failed totally in eleven years, and were marginal or failures in twenty-four. What was the toll in human lives, in civilized norms of behaviour and human dignity during these periods of drought?

In Northern Uganda, the entire period is called Nyarubanga (Luo word for 'sent by god') because it was the worst natural disaster in their remembered history. It ended with the Great Famine of 1617–21, accompanied by a disease which wiped out the cattle herds.

The stark spectre of mass starvation leaps from the traditions. The stories from Egypt are horrendous. Cannibalism became commonplace and an estimated half of the population died of starvation. What was true of Egypt was probably also true of most parts of the Great Lakes region, especially the northern section.

If half the people died, most others were forced to migrate or flee towards regions of refuge, clustering around rivers and lakes, along the Nile, Lake Victoria and the chain of lakes stretching southward into central Africa. Twelve major traditions of migration have been collected from this period, most recalling swift movements towards large rivers and lakes. Some migrations were organized on military lines, such as the Nkanda invasion of Sukuma country, the ‘Lomukudit’ movement through Baar, or the Banyoro invasion southward at least as far as Buziga. Traditions also report the drying up of the Albert and Victoria Niles and also of Smith Sound which must have represented a massive shrinkage of Nyanza.

The Nyarubanga re-structured the ethno and political geography of much of the Great Lakes region and possibly a much wider area. It probably dealt a massive and destructive blow to leadership built on the principles of control over supernatural forces, particularly to those who claimed rain-making powers. It led to the rise of a new leadership based often on migration leaders whose skills as commanders, warriors and hunters had been responsible for a sizeable group of survivors. When the trauma was over, the leaders of the survivors set up new political entities in new regions—probably uninhabited or sparsely populated, or at best with no political leadership of their own. It is not just because the newcomers’ descendants wanted to claim ownership of the soil that traditions argue that the land was empty. In some areas it probably was or was nearly so.

Nor is it surprising that when the immigrants found people they are recalled as hunters, nor that the leader of the newcomers was himself a hunter. The animals also migrated to the regions of refuge and were clustered around the permanent water holes. Finally, it is not surprising that traditions give the impression that around 1600 there was a new beginning. Most groups experienced a new ethnic mix, a new location and new leadership. Just because pre-1600 traditions are skeletal and vague, historians should not assume that they are an accurate reflection of conditions, because the Nyarubanga wiped out traditions and destroyed their mechanisms of transmission and probably most of the older people
who were their carriers. As the worst climatic disaster in the remembered history of the Great Lakes region, it set rapidly moving waves of migration in motion, broke up states, overthrew dynasties and even shook the foundation of pastoralist societies normally adapted to cope with prolonged dry weather.\footnote{For evidence of this drought, see J. B. Webster, 1979b.}

The migration out of Baar greatly accelerated during the Nyarubanga. Madi Opei, Palabek and Padibe moved to Agoro; Attyak, Koc-Pagak, Aliba, Laropi, Parabongo, Alero and Palaru were among those Madi who poured into Pakwac-Pawir. Eastern Nilotic-speakers moved south to Korobe Hill and Mount Liru where a number of ruling families claim to descend from Jaki, his sons and following. These include the chiefly families of Nyangilia, Obule and Midia (all Kakwa-speaking), Yemele and Paranga (Madi-speaking). One group moved east to the Nile creating a belt of Eastern Nilotic speakers which divided the Madi Moyo and Meta from the southern Madi later known as Lugbara.

It was also in this period that Pakwac-Pawir gained its renown as a major Luo dispersal centre. Because Luo-speakers had lived in this area since before the Babito takeover in Bunyoro-Kitara, and because they remained firm Babito supporters, the Babito naturally took an interest in what happened there. This was important, since the area also attracted non-Luo migrants from the north, whom the Babito wished to control. Their interest in this area is perhaps best epitomized by the story of Omukama Cwa Nyabongo and Daca.

At some point near the beginning of the Nyarubanga, Cwa gathered his army, crossed the Victoria Nile (probably using a sudd bridge, a possible sign of low water) and fought and killed the Madi King of Koc-Pagak, an important non-Luo polity in the area. It then seems that he appointed another Madi, Abok, who had lived in Kitara, to rule Koc-Pagak under the supervision of one of his Paluo queens named Daca. In so doing he was apparently trying to more than merely subdue a troublesome neighbour, for using royal females as agents in a form of indirect administration was apparently typical of the first Babito dynasty's administration of outlying territories. While this policy was normally successful, in this instance he failed, to the extent at least that three sons of the original Madi leader successfully broke away to form the Pagak, Paboo and Pawoor polities. Its impact was still important, however, because it ensured that Cwa and his agents would play a rôle in the history of this area during the Nyarubanga.

It seems clear that the drought turned Pakwac-Pawir into a region of refuge for a mixture of starving and desperate people of various languages and cultures – including the Owiny Luo from Tekidi, the Omolo and Paluo indigenes, and Luo-Madi, Madi-Eastern Nilotic, and Luo-Eastern Nilotic mixtures from Baar. The influx of these people apparently destroyed the position of the Paluo north of the Nile, and made the question of who would control the Luo and other groups there even more pressing. This,
FIG. 26.1 The Nyarubanga and the fragmentation of the Luo, c. 1570–1720 (after J. B. Webster)
in turn, eventually led to a quarrel between Cwa Nyabongo (and his agents) and Nyipir. This dispute is recounted within the spear-and-bead tradition. If the elephants are seen as Madi (Abok being of the elephant totem) and the Min Lyec as Daca, then this tradition demonstrates how the latter facilitated the ambitions of Nyipir. Nyipir and Tifool (of possible Baar Luo origin), whose followers were largely Owiny and Omolo Luo, moved west of the Nile away from the jurisdiction of Cwa, Nyipir according to tradition driving an axe into the dry bed of the Nile as a symbol of eternal separation. Nyipir, leader of Attyak, founded the Alur kingdom of Okoro Tifool, a state which fragmented into Nyiganda and Angal. The main body of the Owiny apparently moved south-east passing north of Lake Kyoga into the Budola camps in eastern Busoga. The Omolo, whose movements are more debatable, may have left for Agoro and thence via Karamoja to the same area.

According to Jonam traditions, the remaining Luo, led by Daca, deposed Abok and the Koc state split into three. The first, Koc Ragem under Cua, son of Daca by Cwa Nyabongo, became the largest of the Jonam states west of the Nile. The second, Koc Labongo, east of the Nile, was founded by Kaladua, son of Daca by Abok. The third was Koc Paluo under Madi leadership in the sphere of influence of Pawir and under a Munyoro royal female supervisor. It may have been out of this fragmentation of Koc that Kakaire emerged to lead the Pakoyo migration south of Lake Kyoga into northern Busoga in the latter part of the seventeenth century.

The Luo founder of the Terego chiefdom of the Lugbara may have also emerged out of the dispersal from Pakwac-Pawir. Banale and his nephew Raoule arrived east of the Nile in Madi country completely destitute. Banale had been expelled from his home because the famine had driven him, like so many others of this period, to cannibalism. He had been assisted by a leprous Madi woman and when their secret relationship was discovered, a council of Madi elders decided surprisingly to accept him as leader and thereby founded Terego, the largest chiefdom among the Lugbara or southern Madi. Jaki and his ambitious sons were at this time extending their rule over neighbouring Madi, and it is possible that the Madi elders preferred Banale to absorption into the Eastern-Nilotic-speaking Jaki group. By their decision they preserved their language and remained essentially Madi in culture.

The Nyarubanga and the spear-and-bead dispersal at Pubungu set three migrations of Luo in motion towards the south-eastern littoral of Nyanza,

12. Min Lyec means ‘queen of the elephants’. This section follows R. A. Sargent, 1979. Also see A. Apecu, 1972. Since the details of the spear-and-bead tradition have been published so often and are widely known, they have been omitted here.

13. Sargent’s interpretation is adopted here. It is stimulating, though controversial, and relates a number of events which hitherto have been treated separately and distinctly in the traditions of the Madi, Banyoro and Luo.

14. See O. J. E. Shiroya, unpublished (a) and (b).
an area that had already been pioneered by such Luo-speaking groups as the Joka Jok of Western Kenya. Many of the Adhola clans left Pakwac-Pawir and caught up with the Owiny in Kaberamaido. One of their leaders was Amor and the Amor clan later emerged in Padhola with a royal drum, sacred spear and bushbuck totem. Other well-known clans within the Adhola complex were the Ramogi (probably part of the early Joka Jok complex), the Bwobo and their relations, the Koi. The latter was related to Olum Panya, the second king of Bwobo (of Acholi), who led them to Ngeta rock where the Koi separated from the main Bwobo group and joined the Adhola on their march to the south-east. The Adhola and Owiny groups rapidly moved south to settle in camps at Budola in eastern Busoga.

Another group of clans – the Gem, Ragem and Kochia, who were part of the Omolo cluster and ultimately of Luo–Sudanic origin – were led out of Pakwac-Pawir north along the Nile east to Tekidi and south through Otuke towards Mount Elgon. Possibly the Kaket, Lakwar and Biranga joined the Omolo complex in the east. The Biranga may have been an off-shoot of the royal clan of Puranga since both included important ritual experts ministering the oracles of an earth goddess. There was thus a gradual build-up of Luo settlers in eastern Uganda who then coalesced, probably with the arrival of Nyarubanga refugees, to form two separate clusters.

By 1600, the early settling and migrant clans had joined together to form at least four clusters: the Omolo cluster in the Banda camps; an Owiny–Adhola cluster in the Budola camps; a couple of future Adhola clans (the Ramogi and Lakwar) in the forests of West Budama; and a group of future Basoga clans on the northern Mpologoma river. Between about 1598 and 1650 both the Budola and Banda camps broke up, presumably under the severe drought of the 1620s near the end of the Nyarubanga. The Owiny moved through Samia-Bugwe and into the Alego region in Siaya District in Western Kenya. One section of the Omolo followed and the two groups came into conflict. The Adhola clans were the last to leave the Budola camps and join their brothers in West Budama.

Among those who retained their Luo speech in Western Kenya, some established chiefdoms (for example, Alego, Gem and Kadimo). They did this, it seems, partly because of their earlier political development, partly because they required some kind of political structure to mediate the process of absorption of the earlier settling Bantu, and partly because they often fought both one another and their neighbours. The majority, however, were like the Padhola, who settled in an unoccupied area and were content with an acephalous political system which preserved peace among the thirty-one clans. Ethnic unity was fostered by the myth that all the clans were descended from the sons and descendants of Adhola, their great migration leader from Kaberamaido to West Budama. Thus, although

they included such groups as the Amor, who owned royal regalia and could claim royal ancestry, the Padhola could choose to do without chiefly leadership.

The Padhola gradually pioneered land to the south and east of their original settlements. They clashed with the Bagisu and thereafter concluded a lasting peace with them. After about 1650 they also fought the Maasai in the Tororo area. The Maasai withdrew to the east and Tororo remained a no-man's-land until the Iteso began to settle there in the late eighteenth century.

Eight clans of the Owiny and Omolo complexes moved out of the Budola camps into Busoga. All were of the bushbuck totem and all had pastoral and hunting traditions, although the Owiny cluster also had a farming tradition. Those of Owiny origin were the Mudola, Ngobi, Naminha and Kibiga. The Omolo were the Bandha, Wakoli, Kiruji and Kiranda. All the Owiny, and the Wakoli of the Omolo, became ruling clans in Busoga. The Mudola clan first achieved power in Bukoli. Out of the Mudola came the Mukama figure who moved westward across northern Busoga attracting a large clientage, his sons and grandsons of the Ngobi clan founding the Chiefdoms of Luuka, Buzimba, Buzaaya and Bugabula. A second stream of migrants from the northern Mpologoma settlements of the Luo founded the Chiefdoms of Busiki, Bukono and Bulamogi. The Omolo were more pastoral, reluctant settlers, and only one of their clans became dominant.

Thereafter followed the Pakoyo migrations from Pawir south of Lake Kyoga and their founding of the Chiefdoms of Bagweri and Bugaya. In seeking a sense of ethnic unity the Basoga have tried to make Mukama the leader of all these migrations, to do for him what Padhola traditions have done for Adhola. The Luo migrations gathered numerous clients through inter-marriage and by using or seizing the principal shrines which became centres of ritual and royal pilgrimage. Wherever the Luo went they readily fitted themselves into the existing ritual and religious establishments: spiritual adaptability was one of their greatest political assets.

By 1750 the nine major states noted above had been founded. By the late nineteenth century the initial nine had fragmented into nearly thirty states, the Ngobi or bushbuck clan being dominant in almost twenty. Those states which remained father-to-son in succession and made extensive use of commoner administrators such as Luuka and Bugabula experienced no secessions and few civil wars. On the other hand those which practised fraternal succession and used royal princes as office-holders suffered repeated disputes over the throne and numerous civil wars. Buzimba split into eight independent polities, Busiki and Bugweri each into four, and Bukoli into two. Both Bunyoro and Buganda had experienced both types of administration with similar consequences. Those dynasties which held to their original Luo principles were more stable than those which gave in to the principles of heredity espoused by their Bantu subjects.

The *Nyarubanga* and the associated spear-and-bead dispersal was a momentous and historic occasion for the Luo because it determined their modern geographical distribution. The *Nyarubanga* also promoted a massive Banyoro invasion of the Bahima–Batutsi-dominated south and the greatest effort of the agricultural classes to throw off pastoralist overlordship. The first phase of the invasion consisted of unorganized and ravenous hordes, eating banana leaves and sorghum stems. They were clearly not promoting an imperial policy formulated in the royal court of Kitara. Driven by starvation, the hordes swept over the whole of the southern region, some ultimately settling in Buzinza, Burundi and beyond. They in turn set in motion migrations which followed the chain of lakes into Central Africa.

As the drought persisted, a cattle disease wiped out the royal herds of Kitara. This bestirred Cwa II (not Cwa Nyabongo) to lead his armies south to replenish the royal herds and reinforce imperial authority. The pastoralists were the obvious target of the Banyoro, and the agriculturalists Cwa’s natural allies. The struggle which ensued is discussed below in the section dealing with the agro-pastoral kingdoms of the south.

The *Nyarubanga* also introduced the Central group of Eastern Nilotes to the scene of the Great Lakes history. Historically this group, whose core population was the Karimojong-Teso cluster, was divided into Isera (agriculturalists with some cattle) and Koten pastoralists (cattle-keepers who engaged in some agriculture). While Isera and pastoralist elements are contained in all peoples of the Central group of the Eastern Nilotes, the ethnic groups to emerge primarily from the former, and whose dialects are similar, are the Iteso, Toposa and Dodos and, out of the latter, the Karimojong, Jie and Turkana.

Furthermore all the modern Central group of Eastern Nilotes have Luo elements among them. One problem for the historian is to explain why, when clan names, age and ritual organizations, homelands and migration traditions are much the same for the Lango Omiro, Eastern Acholi, Kumam and Iteso, the first three had become Luo-speaking and the last Eastern-Nilotic-speaking by 1830. A second problem surrounds three small Luo-speaking groups – the JoAbwor, JoAkwa and Kumam – who resemble the Central group of Eastern Nilotes culturally and who have received more than their share of attention because their history was expected to throw some light on the enigma of the Lango Omiro and Iteso. A third complication is the Nyangiya group – the Nyangiya, Tepes (Sor), Teuso and Didinga – who inhabit mountainous areas in north-eastern Uganda. In clan origins they are almost 90 per cent Central Eastern Nilotic or Luo in origin, yet these people maintain a very distinct language and culture.

The Okarowok (Ikarebwok) is a major clan among the Central group of

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Eastern Nilotes. As noted earlier it seems to have emerged in the Agoro region when the Lotuho imposed their language and customs over a Muru population, the Lukoya. Agoro was a major centre of Isera-Omiro dispersal. The migrants carried place-name memorials of their Agoro homeland wherever they went: Magoro, Mukongoro, Itengor, Ngora, Bokora, Igoria.

The major migrations to the south-east of the Luo associated with the Owiny and Omolo were very much mixed with the Isera, especially the Omolo who traversed the Agoro–Karamoja corridor to the south. The Owiny left behind pockets of Luo-speakers in what later became Lango Omiro country, at Amac on the northern littoral of Lake Kyoga and near Karuma Falls. Many of the people who eventually identified with the Omolo may have been Eastern Nilotic in background. Those who reached Western Kenya were known to the Luo as Omia, the Lomia being one of the four great clans of the Lotuho, and Omiya Anyiima and Omia Pacua being memorials to them in East Acholi. The last wave of settlers to arrive in Siaya also included some migrants from eastern Uganda, the most notable of whom were the Owila (the dominant clan of Uyoma), the Matar (the dominant clan of Sakwa) and the Bayuma (the dominant clan of Wanga), all probably Isera-Omiro from the Bako of Ethiopian origins.

In addition to the Central Sudanic peoples and the Northern group of Eastern Nilotes the Isera contained clans of Luo and Ethiopian origin. Other than Luo left behind by the Owiny and Omolo, there were the Puranga survivors of Tekidi. These groups were reinforced by migrants who can be traced back to Anywa or Pari, to Baar, and to Pakwac-Pawir. The most important Pakwac-Pawir groups were the Patiko, Payera, and Paluo (discussed below). Moreover, some ‘Ethiopian’ emigrants may have entered this region as a result of the Oromo invasion.19

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, these migrant groups settled together and formed clusters which were defined by their territory of residence and, in some instances, some degree of self-identification. The largest of these were the Bako cluster in Central Jie, the Okii (or Miro) cluster in the Mount Moroto–Omanimani River area of Central Karamoja, the Abwor cluster in the Labwor Hills, the Kuman cluster in Western Teso, and (what we can call) the Iworopom–Iteso cluster in Central and Southern Karamoja. All of these clusters included both Luo and the Central group of Eastern Nilotes, though in quite different proportions, and bilinguality was common by the eighteenth century. The Iworopom–Iteso cluster was unique in that it seems to have had the least coherence: its people spoke a Central Eastern Nilotic and/or Kalenjin-type language, and its Iworopom elements had large herds of cattle.

19. We believe that these ‘Ethiopian’ emigrants possibly included the Bako groups in Lango (cf. Bako people in Ethiopia), the Ober people in Lango (cf. the Uober clan among the Bako people), and the Oromo, which is the proper name for the so-called Galla. There are no traditions that explicitly link these groups to Ethiopia, so our association must be seen as a very tentative hypothesis.
Pastoralists and farmers

In the Great Lakes region, it has been the practice among historians and anthropologists to divide societies into two water-tight compartments of pastoralists and agriculturalists. These were supposed to be distinct economic categories into which all societies in the region fell. Attempts have therefore been made to identify certain ethnic groups with particular economic pursuits. This is an over-simplification of what was a very complex, dynamic and fluid situation. In northern and eastern Uganda, for example, the relationship between farmers and cattlemen was evolving throughout our period. Numerous attempts were made by all groups – farmers, pastoralists, mixed farmers, fishermen, hunters and gatherers – to improve their economies, form stable communities and, when they chose or were compelled to migrate, plan their movements rationally. Such movements of population and other social dislocations threw together groups whose socio-political, religious and economic ideas and practices often varied considerably. Consequently, people were compelled to mix and compromise their cultural heritages if they wished to form stable communities. Throughout our period, different linguistic groups of farmers and pastoralists were fusing together to form new and reasonably well integrated societies. Most of these cultural syntheses formed the bases of the new ethnic groups that emerged in the area during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. We give below a few examples to illustrate the nature of this social transformation.

Although a few of the pastoralist Central–Eastern Nilotic groups may have joined the Isera at an early date, and others (the Lokorikitak) stayed in Dodoth during their emigration from the Sudan, the majority settled in the Mount Koten–Magos Hills area of north-eastern Karamoja. These Koten–Magos people (as they have been called) apparently already had a pastoralist orientation before they came south. Hence, while they entered Karamoja as cattle-poor refugees, they quickly developed a mixed pastoral, farming, and hunting and gathering economy that was better adapted to the climate of this region than the economies of the more agricultural groups. The results of this became evident between 1680 and 1830, when the Koten–Magos groups moved into their modern homelands and the agricultural groups either joined them and adopted their economy or retreated to the west.

This process started in about 1680–1750 with the expansion of the pastoralists in four directions: one group, the Ngimonia, spread along the River Tarash and formed the core of the Turkana; another, the Korwakol, moved west to the Longiro river, forced many of the Bako groups to leave Jie, and became the most important moiety of the Jie; a third, consisting of some future Karimojong and Dodos, moved south to the Apule river; and a fourth, the Ngikora, migrated north into Dodoth (where they formed

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The last stages of this process may have been influenced by a drought in the 1720s which resulted in the ‘Nyamdere’ famine, for the traditions of the agriculturalists indicate that many of them left Jie and Labwor because of famine and moved to eastern Acholi and the Ngeta Rock area of Lango. Some of the groups in eastern Acholi then retraced their steps and resettled north-central Jie where they eventually joined the Korwakol and formed the Rengen moiety of the Jie.

The situation then stabilized for a time, but a combination of land pressure in some of the pastoralist-dominated areas and droughts in the 1780s and 1830s started the movements again. Most of the Abwor and Bako groups in Labwor pushed west into Lango and, in a few cases, south into Teso (where some joined the Kuman cluster). Likewise, many of the Okii-cluster people left central Karamoja for Nyakwai, Labwor, Lango and northern Teso, while many of the agricultural groups in southern Karamoja moved through the Magoro area into central and southern Teso.21 Others from both areas joined the Sor. Most of the groups that moved into Nyakwai, Labwor, eastern Acholi, and Lango were at least bilingual in a Luo dialect and, since all of them joined or were joined by Luo-speakers from further west, these societies became Luo-speaking. The same was true of those who joined the Kuman.22 Those who went into Teso, however, included fewer Luo-speakers, and the Iteso thus became an Eastern-Nilotic-speaking people.

This western flow of agriculturalist refugees, especially in its later stages, was accelerated by the renewed expansion of the pastoralists. In the 1780s, the proto-Dodos groups on the Apule river moved north into Dodoth, where they and the Lokorikituk combined to force the Toposa community there to move north into their present homelands. Both the Dodos and Toposa pastoralists assimilated a number of Isera groups and thus adopted a somewhat more agriculturally oriented economy than their southern brethren. Then, in the 1820s, the Korwakol and Rengen Jie combined to destroy a large community of agriculturalists, the Poet, who lived on the Kapoeta river. And, finally, in the same period, the proto-Karimojong groups on the Apule river pushed south into the homelands of the remnants of the Okii and Iteso-Iworopom clusters, and either absorbed them into their society or forced them to leave. In the case of the Iworopom people, this involved a great deal of violence, probably because they had large herds of cattle and were thus the direct competitors of the Koten-Magos groups. In either case, these developments and the 1830s drought precipitated the last large-scale migrations from this area to the west.

21. According to tradition, ‘Karimojong’ means the ‘old men left behind’ who, fearing their youths were dead, said to the messengers, ‘look for their atesin (graves)’, thus originating the word ‘Teso’. While most age-sets are named after animals, ‘Kangarak’ means ‘Those who go ahead’.

The case of Bunyoro-Kitara illustrates the interrelationship between the pastoralists and the farmers even better. Edward I. Steinhart’s study emphasizes the close ‘correlation between drought/famine and pastoral expansion, agricultural dislocation, and state formation in Kitara and her southern marches’. Bunyoro lost valued grazing lands in Kooki, Bwera and the southern marches of Kitara to Buganda between about 1760 and 1783. Also, the increasing autonomy of the pastoral societies of Nkore, Buhweju and Buzimba further restricted the Bunyoro state to largely agricultural lands. Consequently, the Kitara pastoralists infiltrated both into the Bito dynasty as well as into the agricultural lands. Pastoralists settled among agriculturalists and fused with them to form new compound communities. A new class system emerged and a new state structure based on it gradually developed. Land and not cattle became the basis of political authority, and the new chiefly élite was recruited from the settled Bahuma, members of the Bito clan and the Bairu farmers. These three groups intermarried extensively and they provided both the chiefs and the landlords, who collected tribute from the subjects for the omukama (king). Thus, in the words of Steinhart, a new Nyoro state, ‘based on the development of a subordinate tribute-paying peasantry’, gradually came into being in the eighteenth century.

Social and political institutions

It was not only language and economy which distinguished the pastoralists from the Isera groups and both from the Luo-speakers. The pastoralists perfected their age organizations as instruments of gerontocratic control, and these became the key social and political institutions in their societies. Age organizations also existed among the Isera and Isera-influenced societies, but in a truncated form. The main social and political institutions in these latter societies were multi-clan ritual groupings – called etogo in Lango, othome (sing. othen) in Labwor and itemwan (sing. etem) in Teso and Kumam – which were used for settling disputes and performing religious ceremonies. The more mixed in origins the group of clans, the stronger these institutions were.

In the ethno-cultural mix north of the Nile–Kyoga–Bisina divide, hereditary chieftaincy was a Luo idea. Since the majority of the Eastern Luo either were Eastern Nilotic in origin or had been strongly influenced by Eastern Nilotic ideas, this type of hereditary leadership was rejected by many and opposed by the elders. Nevertheless, it had an impact on the political institutions of not only many of the Luo-speaking groups, but also on some of the Isera groups and, through their influence, on such

24. ibid., p. 135.
25. For the Jie age organization see J. E. Lamphear, 1979. For the etem, see D. H. Okalany, unpublished.
groups as the Jie and Dodos. Among the Luo-speakers, those that followed chiefs tended to move into eastern Acholi, where their ideas were reinforced when some Paluo groups arrived there between 1680 and 1760. Even then, however, the Eastern Acholi remained so distinct that the western Luo peoples viewed them as Lango rather than Luo until the last half of the nineteenth century. In Labwor, Lango, Nyakwai and Kumam, the people generally rejected the idea of hereditary chieftaincy in favour of gerontocratic ritual leadership.

This is not to say that these groups did not sometimes entrust individual leaders with a good deal of secular authority. Oral traditions give the impression that the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed a significant increase in warfare among the Eastern Luo and Central-Eastern Nilotes. This in turn tended to increase the influence of war leaders and their councils and also of the younger generation at the expense of the gerontocracy, youth and eldership being a potential line of division in these age-organized societies. Thus, in Lango, powerful war leaders formed extensive military confederacies which they used to conquer their homeland, attack their neighbours, and raise large mercenary armies which fought in Bunyoro, Toro and Buganda. Similar confederacies were formed in northern Teso, Sebei (Mount Elgon), Kumam and Padhola, but in these areas the leaders were emuron (seers) whose roles seem to have been adopted from the Kalenjin peoples, probably by way of the Iworopom. Because of their crucial military roles, these men also gained considerable political influence, but none was able to secure a chiefly status for his family. Thus the institution of emuron created yet another power centre and challenge to both the war council and the gerontocracy, but did not combine readily with chieftaincy.

The Iteso who settled in the ‘thigh of the cow’, an unusually fertile area in Ngora and Kumi and those areas – Serere and southern Soroti – colonized from it, most closely resembled the original Isera. They had no age organization, no ritual etem and no emuron. They depended upon three great assimilating clans – Atekok, Ikarebwok and Irarak – as the vehicles of social cohesion. The northern Iteso plus those in Bukedea possessed all the institutions noted above, being much more mixed in origin. Among them migrations were often organized by etem, western Teso having been occupied by three, with one, the Isolata, giving its name to Soroti. Many Iteso filtered into the Bantu and Luo areas to the south as seekers after land or as mercenaries being especially welcome in some Busoga states as a counterbalance to military and political pressure from Buganda. In Bugwere, for example, the first Iteso settlers led by Laki of the Irarak clan settled from 1706 to 1733, became wealthy and drew clients, Laki’s son split the kingdom and became chief of one part after the Laparanat famine.26

In Bulamogi, an Etesot ruled temporarily. Probably the greatest of the mercenaries was the Etesot, Oguti among the Padhola.

In the Central area, Buganda stood in distinct contrast to Bunyoro. Without a royal clan or cattle and with a king who could and often did appoint officials without regard to custom, tradition or heredity, Buganda had developed, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, little class institutionalization, unusual vertical mobility and a greater degree of social inequality than Bunyoro but less than Rwanda. Everyone in Buganda was involved in a dyadic relationship of super-ordination and subordination. Social and economic ties were vertical rather than horizontal.

Politically and socially, Bunyoro-Kitara sat in the middle. From a northern Nilotic perspective it was despotic and class-ridden and from Buganda it appeared loosely organized and class-conscious. The royal Babito clan had originated as mixed farmers but the dynasty increasingly acquired a pastoral orientation. However, the non-royal branches of the Bito clan who became, during our period, the largest and most dispersed clan group in Kitara, were found at all economic levels. Many possessed no wealth or power but maintained the myth of belonging to a ruling clan. These commoner Bito clans intermarried extensively with other social and kinship groups, thus helping to create a homogenous national image for the dynasty.

Furthermore, the creation of this national image was enhanced by the appointment of representatives of other social strata and kinship groups to various court and state offices. Gradually, these offices were made hereditary and, in this way, a permanent class of privileged persons, whose fortunes and aspirations were interlocked with those of the Bito dynasty, was created.

The Mukama of Bunyoro had much less power and wealth than the Kabaka of Buganda. The Kabaka retained more of the wealth he received than the Mukama who emphasized the redistribution of wealth and surplus by the royal court. In Bunyoro power was more dispersed: most positions remained hereditary with the Mukama merely confirming the chosen candidate and in consequence few peasants ever attained high office. The clans in Bunyoro did not achieve the cohesion, nor their heads the status, of those in Buganda. While in Buganda the thirty clans were theoretically equal – in practice their status rose and fell according to their political fortunes – in Bunyoro there was a clear distinction between high- and low-status clans.

Among the Nilotic Luo there were those organized in states and those who were non-centralized. State structures were less elaborate than in Bunyoro or Buganda and Luo kings exercised influence but little real power. Office-holders were almost exclusively hereditary with the king unable to interfere with the chosen candidate of the family or clan. These differences were the result of geography and economics, historical developments and cultural biases. Although some royal lines stretch back many centuries and are as old as those in the south and west, most of the Luo states came into existence late. Furthermore, repeated droughts had forced so many migrations, re-locations and re-formations of societies that
many Luo states in their present location and their present populations date to about 1680 or even later. It is true that the same droughts substantially affected the south-west but they never caused the physical removal of a state such as in northern Uganda where Padibe, one of the oldest and by the nineteenth century most sophisticated of the Luo states, ultimately came to be located over 500 miles from where it was originally founded.

Also, none of the Luo states enjoyed the fertile agricultural base of Buganda, Rwanda or the Bahima states. Neither did they possess the rich iron and salt deposits of Bunyoro or the Busongora area. Prior to the Nyarubanga it seems likely that the Luo owned substantial hards of cattle. However, by about 1800 these had been destroyed and it seems possible that the Acholi at least probably had the lowest incidence of cattle of any of the cattle-rearing peoples of the Great Lakes region. Without cattle and without rich agricultural lands or trade items it was difficult to amass and maintain surplus wealth. Consequently the Luo states did not exhibit the disparities in wealth nor the class consciousness which distinguished the states of the south-west. In all the Luo states the Eastern Nilotic population was influential and became more pronounced from west to east, until it formed a majority in the states of Eastern Acholi. The Eastern Nilotes were extremely egalitarian in their political and social philosophy. It must have been difficult to convert them to ideas of chieftaincy, superordination and subordination, class and heredity. As one moves eastwards, Luo kings appear more and more like chairmen of, and spokesmen for, Eastern Nilotic councils of elders.

In the Luo states the theory and the nineteenth-century practice regarding class differ. The theory may represent an older pre-Nyarubanga practice when the Luo were distinguished by their ownership of cattle. The theory is that Luo societies are divided into royal and commoner classes. What had become more important by about 1800 were distinctions based on origins, those of Luo and those of non-Luo ancestry. Often royal has come to be identified with Luo and non-Luo with commoner. The royal clan is normally the largest. Membership of it gives only a modicum of prestige unless one belongs to the royal lineage. In popular thought non-Luo commoners are often graded according to how long ago their ancestors entered the society and became Luo. However, a royal separated by ten generations from the chiefly line will be treated little differently and have no greater control over wealth than an alien who joined the society ten generations ago. In the Acholi states the royal clan is exogamous and aliens are rapidly assimilated.

There is a more realistic way to look at class in the Luo states. In the political compromises over the centuries, many non-Luo clans came to hold positions or perform ritual functions which gave the lineages of the office-holders more prestige (and sometimes tribute) than the royal clan. If there was an upper class it consisted of the nuclear families of the king,
his councillors, the owner of the soil, the ritual experts including the rain-caller and the jagos (territorial sub-heads).

The acephalous Luo and the Central—Eastern Nilotes had no class institutionalization. There were no chiefs and no hereditary offices. Individuals were seldom memorialized either in clan or place names as was customary among the Nilotes. People rarely recalled ancestors prior to their grandfather. Clans were huge but families almost of the nuclear variety. The gerontocracies were governed by the oldest age-set sitting in etem or etogo where their decisions were believed to be sanctioned by the ancestors. The gerontocracies were often linked in large military confederacies in which one prominent warrior leader and his subordinates were recognized and supported by an emuron (seer) and his sub-agents, who consulted the spirits about the advisability of war, presided over ritual preparations and advised on strategy. The emuron was often a rain-caller as well. The war leaders and ritual experts were usually fairly prosperous. In the gerontocracies the lines of tension and potential cleavage were between the governing elders and the younger warriors. The elders maintained tight, even oppressive, control over the younger men, monopolizing both women and cattle and delaying marriage and economic independence for the young. Younger age-sets occasionally migrated to escape their frustrations.27

Acephalous Luo and Eastern Nilotic societies often exhibited great disparities in wealth and economic inequality. In Teso, for example, the average family might possess three to five head of cattle, 10 per cent owning 500 to 1000. Prosperous elders might be heard more often and more attentively in etem but while they had more influence they had no greater power than others. Wealth brought respect and aroused expectations of lavish hospitality but it did not result in social inequality. Vertical mobility upward was achieved by raising a large family of girls for whom cattle bridewealth was secured and few boys for whom bridewealth had to be paid, achieving fame and cattle as a great warrior, or by being a skilled animal husbandman. Cattle were widely distributed through the bridewealth system. In the south-west the same bridewealth custom was so hedged about with rules and prejudice that it made inter-marriage difficult and prevented Bairu and Bahutu from becoming cattle-owners.

The change in the balance of power: the decline of Bunyoro and the rise and expansion of Buganda

After the Nyarubanga the most significant themes in the northern and central sections of the Great Lakes history were the crisis in Bunyoro which led to its decline and the internal developments in Buganda which caused its dynamic rise and expansion. These two developments led to a dramatic

27. For the discussion of social stratification, we have followed the schema of M. L. Perlman, 1970; A. W. Southall, 1970.
change in the balance of power. The Bunyoro crisis began with the death of Cwa in the Nyarubunga invasion of the south. Cwa's only son, Winyi II, was captured and lived in Ihangiro. Kitara was ruled by a regent, Cwa's sister, Mashamba. Cwa had no sons by a Luo wife (those eligible to succeed him under the rules of the royal house) and the boy later found in Ihangiro may not have been a son at all, but he was of the Babito clan. Winyi II murdered Mashamba and seized the throne. Thereafter the old tradition of the heir being of a Luo or Paluo mother became the exception rather than the rule. Candidacy for the throne was opened to all sons of the king and succession disputes became more frequent, more bitter and more prolonged.

Under the first dynasty, the chiefdom of Pawir had held a prestigious position within the imperial structure. The new turn of events at the imperial capital caused general unrest in Pawir. A succession of what the Paluo called 'Bantu kings' sought to deal with the unrest by encouraging separatist tendencies so that the unified sub-chiefdom of Pawir in 1650 had become six petty chieflets by 1750. Under Isansa all six chieflets were placed under a country chief by which Paluoland lost its semi-autonomous status and was integrated into metropolitan Bunyoro. The Paluo regularly opposed Bantu candidates to the throne while other Paluo migrated away to the north and east because of the closing of political opportunities, the loss of status and outright persecution. The frequency of succession disputes combined with Paluo dissidence undermined the central power of Kitara. King Isansa (c.1733–60) came to power against strong Paluo opposition. Once in power he carried out a severe persecution of the Paluo which in turn accelerated their outward migration.

The most immediate result of the crisis in Bunyoro was the exodus of Paluo-Pakoyo into Acholi, northern Busoga, Alur and even into Padhola and Western Kenya east of the lake. The first exodus was led by Labongo, Kakaire and Atiko, the first two claiming a relationship to the royal house of the first Babito dynasty. They were not agents of Banyoro imperialism but they did carry drums and the political ideology of Babito rule. Both were influenced in founding chieftaincies where they had not existed and in enlargement of political scale where they had. While the Paluo helped to spread their language in the north, the Pakoyo linguistically assimilated into Basoga society.

In the north the major form of political organization was gerontocracies or tiny chiefdoms. The Paluo popularized royal drums, enhanced the dignity of the chief and incorporated small units into larger states, allowing them to retain their hereditary leadership. They founded new states such as Lira Paluo and Paimol or enlarged and restructured old ones such as

28. J. B. Webster, unpublished (b).
Padibe, Patongo, Alero and Koc. Both Puranga (taken over by the Paluo) and Payera under its traditional leadership were inspired by Paluo theories and incorporated a number of subordinate units in the process of expansion. Atiko was very much influenced by Paluo political philosophy and enlarged his insignificant polity in a move to the east until it was a chiefdom of size and significance. Although he was twelfth in line from the founder, so pronounced was his contribution that his name was given to his state. Those who imitated Paluo methods were often more successful than the Paluo themselves. Of the twenty chiefdoms west of the Aswa river in 1800 only three had Paluo monarchies and of the nine major Acholi chiefdoms in 1900 only Lira Paluo and Puranga were governed by Paluo.

Luo-ization proceeded both by incorporation and political fragmentation and proliferation. Lira Paluo was an example of the former, the Alur of the latter. The Paluo entered the Lapono area and persuaded one non-Luo gerontocracy, two small Luo chieflets and the large Lira chiefdom to join them. After a later expansion they created two royal governorships. Since further expansion was blocked, Lira Paluo formed a confederacy with small neighbouring chieflets which were gradually brought into clientship. With this political expansion went a popularization of the Luo language and culture.

The Alur developments were different. Prior to 1680 there was only one Alur chiefdom, Okoro, among the Central Sudanic peoples of the highlands. Luo settlers moved out of Okoro, inter-married and popularizing the Luo language and culture and ultimately inviting an Okoro prince to rule over them. This was usually done with the support of the indigenous people and it brought many Kebu, Lendu and Madi under Alur Luo rule. Alur states proliferated; Panduru was founded about 1670–1700; Paidha, Padiya, Padel and Acer Paluo between 1700 and 1790; and Ucego about 1820–50. This became the Alur family of states.

Omukama Isansa was as crucial to the decline of Bunyoro as Kabaka Mawanda was to the rise of Buganda. Isansa’s rule was a peculiar mixture of military success and political disaster. We have noted the mistakes in his northern policy: his southern policy was even more disastrous. He swept south once again demonstrating Bunyoro’s military might. During the military campaign he encouraged royal princes to head governorships in Kooki, Kitagwenda and the Busongora states of Kisaka and Bugaya and a favourite of the Bamooli clan in Kiyanja. Predictably, all except Kitagwenda had thrown off allegiance to the empire within a generation of his death. Isansa was overturning a policy of administering outlying territories which had worked tolerably well for three centuries presumably in the interest of getting rid of the multiplicity of contenders to the throne created by the new succession policies of his dynasty.

31. J. B. Webster, unpublished (a).
Isansa’s greatest political blunder was his attack upon the palace of Wamara, head of the Cwezi cult in Bwera. The first Babito dynasty had carefully cultivated relations with the cult, being more successful in this policy than the Bahinda states. While the Babito worshipped Wamara, the Bahinda had nothing to do with the cult even though their subjects did. Presumably Wamara opposed the second Babito dynasty because it violated the traditional rules of succession. The kings in turn withheld their normal tribute to Wamara’s court. Isansa decided upon a military confrontation. It was the most momentous blunder in Kitara’s history.

So great was the sacrilege that the trees ‘bled’ and Wamara cursed Isansa, prophesying that Buganda would swallow Bunyoro. The working out of this curse became a major historical theme well into the twentieth century. Isansa’s blunder not only related to Buganda but to the whole southern borderlands where Banyoro authority partly at least rested upon the support of the Cwezi cult. A new cult headquarters was created within the imperial palace but the cult and, Banyoro authority with it, disappeared in the southern borderlands. Consequently the new princely states threw off allegiance with ease as did the ancient tributary states of Buhweju and Buzimba. The nadir of the empire’s fortunes came about 1830 with the secession of Toro and Paluoland.³³ Not only did Wamara’s curse prove accurate, in that Buganda seized much territory of Bunyoro proper, but the string of small southern states could not stand in isolation. They became ideal targets for the imperial ambitions of Buganda, Nkore and Mpororo.

The rise of Buganda

While the Banyoro kings were busy dismantling a political system which had assured their pre-eminence for three centuries, the Baganda monarchs were correcting many of the political evils which had crippled Buganda from its foundation.³⁴ Buganda was bedevilled by three inter-related problems. The first arose from the growing strength of the monarchy and its appointed bureaucracy pitted against the clan heads or Bataka chiefs where ties or supposed ties of kinship were utilized to strengthen clan loyalties and mould clans into cohesive political factions. The second surrounded the multiplicity of ambitious royal princes in or out of office looking for an opportunity to manipulate clan political factions in order to seize the throne. Where the bureaucracy was largely hereditary and therefore protected when the monarch changed, throne disputes might be less bitter and kingmakers more disinterested and amenable to compromise. But in Buganda the new monarch’s control of bureaucratic patronage meant that behind each princely candidate stood clientages of potential office-holders for whom the outcome of the succession struggle would mean either position and prestige or oblivion and even exile. Compromise was difficult

³³ J. F. M. Wilson, unpublished (a) and (b).
³⁴ M. S. M. Kiwanuka, 1971a, whose interpretation is adopted here.
because potential office-holders sought not only personal advancement but patronage for the clan they felt they represented. The third problem was the bloody succession disputes and wars which followed the death of most kings and the numerous royal assassinations. Succession disputes were more damaging in Buganda than they ever had been in Kitara. In the latter the struggle for the throne could be fierce but once a king had been chosen and crowned he was rarely assassinated or overthrown. Not so in Buganda where a monarch might be killed or overthrown at any time during his reign. A number of Buganda kings never did appear to secure control of the kingdom, their reigns being a bloody series of civil wars among brothers and sons. Furthermore, in Kitara brothers did not succeed except in unusual circumstances. In Buganda three brothers might reign in succession with all their sons struggling to succeed.

Buganda was more favourably situated climatically and geographically than the other major Great Lakes states. There is no reference to drought in its lengthy and detailed traditions. It was rather a region of refuge. Its economy had not been shaken at least twice every century nor occasionally destroyed as during the Nyarubanga. Buganda had a diverse and secure agricultural base which, unlike in the other major states, freed its male population for war and politics. Because it was located along the littoral of Nyanza it conducted a water-borne trade – probably long before the mid-to-late eighteenth century – and this factor is normally advanced to explain its expansion. It produced bark cloth, a commodity much prized by neighbouring peoples and, in its expansion, it secured control of iron-ore deposits, a resource it originally lacked. With the possible exception of the southern Basoga states, no other state in the Great Lakes region possessed such a favourable geographical and economic environment.

Unlike other Great Lakes states, Buganda had no royal clan, each prince belonging to the clan of his mother contrary to the general population which followed the rules of patriline. Any clan therefore had a chance to provide the monarch. This system gave all the people a feeling of being part of the monarchy but also encouraged each clan to give a wife to the new kabaka with the consequent rapid proliferation of potential royal heirs. The kings of Buganda were therefore forced to be more extravagantly polygamous than most other rulers. Contrast the Acholi system where upon coronation the king was given a wife by the elders, the heir to come from the sons of this queen only. In addition the Baganda king was merely the first among equals of the Bataka chiefs. Outlying districts were governed by an indirect-rule system where indigenous chiefs became new Bataka and were employed as local agents of the kings; they were hereditary and not removable by the monarch.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Buganda was merely a tiny state like many in Busoga which tolerated fraternal succession and relied upon royal administrators. It was unstable and wracked by interminable civil wars. However, Baganda nationalism (having developed in the shadow
of Banyoro imperialism) was strong enough to prevent secession and fragmentation of the state—in contrast, for example, with the Basoga state of Buzimba which disintegrated into eight independent chieflets. However, the reluctance to secede meant that the struggle for the throne was even more fierce than where secession was an option.

Kabaka Tebandeke (c.1644–74) strengthened royal power by a successful attack upon the ritual religious officers whose extortionate practices lay heavy upon the monarchy and the populace. Tebandeke greatly reduced the power of these religious officers leaving Buganda unique among Bantu peoples in its indifference to supernatural forces. That Tebandeke was successful while Isansa failed in a similar policy relates to the different organization of religion in the two kingdoms. In Kitara the Cwezi cult was a centralized institution, while in Buganda each ritual officer was apparently independent of the next.

Buganda’s territorial expansion was associated with three outstanding kings of the eighteenth century. Mawanda (c.1674–1704) seized Singo, overran Kyaggwe and took over Bulamogi from Bunyoro. Bunyoro, preoccupied with its domestic problems related to the change in the dynasty, did not rally wholeheartedly to the protection of its territory. Given this immense territorial expansion Mawanda wisely abandoned the old indirect-rule system and the king’s favourites—many of commoner origin and called the king’s men—were appointed to the expanded bureaucracy. These royal appointees became more influential than the Bataka chiefs: Mawanda even appointed and dismissed Bataka chiefs. In theory all positions became appointive. This outstanding monarch was not only a military genius but also an imaginative statesman and is rightly credited with being the father of the modern Kiganda system of government. Both Junju and Kamanya, between about 1734 and 1794, further expanded the kingdom. Junju annexed Buddu, brought Kooki into tributary relationship and demonstrated Buganda’s military might by marching into Kiziba and as far as Karagwe. Junju was reaping the fruits of Isansa’s ‘southern charter’ of the generation before. Kamanya seized Buwekula from Bunyoro. By 1800 Buganda had conclusively established her pre-eminence over Bunyoro.

Semakokiro, in the mid-eighteenth century, turned his attention to the problem of the royal princes. He began the practice of executing unsuccessful rivals, even royal sons if necessary. He purged princes from the administration to prevent them from using their positions to plot against the throne. This gave immense power to the king and paved the way for the absolute monarchy which emerged in the nineteenth century. Ironically, while Semakokiro was seeking to reduce the destructiveness of succession disputes by controlling the number of candidates and removing them from offices of authority, Isansa was opening up the contest to all sons of the king. Not surprisingly, succession disputes became something less of a problem in Buganda and far more of a problem in Bunyoro, reversing the conditions of earlier centuries. Given the turbulence of the early politics
of Buganda, it is easy to overrate the great centralizers and imperial *kabakas* of the eighteenth century as heralding a golden age. It is well to recall that despotism was achieved at the expense of lengthy rebellions, severe opposition to the *kabakas*, considerable political violence and growing numbers of exiles to neighbouring states. It might be argued that the eighteenth century was even more violent than the centuries before it.

For centuries Buganda had existed under the shadow of Banyoro imperialism, first as a pawn of that empire but by the end of the eighteenth century ready to challenge the imperial structure itself. Buganda developed an intense nationalism which permitted the kings to gather power around the throne and develop an efficient administrative and military machine where the energies of the citizenry were devoted to their personal advancement by finding favour with the *kabaka*. Every man became a politician and many became addicted to jealousy, spying and blackmail in pursuit of royal favour. Great kings directed this energy to the service of the state and nation. Despite a vague ‘establishment’ of the Manis, Lungfish and Monkey clans, by 1800 Buganda had a highly competitive society, a society more upwardly mobile and secular than any other in the Great Lakes region.

The agro-pastoral kingdoms of the South

The term ‘interlacustrine culture’ employed for almost a century by Africanist ethnologists, is usually based on observations carried out in the southern half of the region, in particular in the Rwandan monarchy which has been singled out by several authors as an ideal example thereof. The formation of this cultural complex has been dated to a relatively recent period, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, the period discussed here. The work done by historians over the last twenty years or so has helped to expose the fallacies of this image presented by European ethnologists, and to set in their true historical dimension, one which is broader, better-balanced and more rigorously defined, peoples with a past known to be rooted in an ancient iron age going back to the beginning of the Christian era, if not earlier. The sixteenth century is a turning point, an age of legends and the socio-cultural bases of its history.

A geocultural area

The region’s natural features and cultural heritage give it a physical and human landscape full of contrasts. In the west a gigantic fault scarp over 2000 metres high, the Kibira range, extended north by the Virunga volcanoes, dominates the Lake Tanganyika depression (less than 800 metres above sea level) and the Lake Kivu basin.

To the east the high hills of Burundi and Rwanda gradually slope

towards the terraced plateaux reaching down to the shores of Lake Victoria (some 1200 metres above sea level). At over 1000 kilometres from the Indian Ocean, which gives the region its climate, this varied relief gives rise to very marked differences in rainfall between the highlands of the west and the shores of Lake Victoria, which have a yearly rainfall exceeding 1500 mm, while the narrow valley of the Kagera receives less than 1000 mm. The actual figures and, above all, the period of the rainy season (roughly September–October) vary considerably from one year to the next. Climatic variations which – as we shall see – seem to have particularly influenced the period under study, have had widely varying repercussions in the different areas, all leading to changes in the region's ecology and to movements among its populations.36

The pattern of language distribution was similarly somewhat heterogeneous. The regions concerned were divided into two zones in which Bantu languages were spoken. In the west, according to Guthrie's classification, zone D encompassed the Kinyarwanda–Kirundi–Giha group and the languages of the present-day Zairean province of Kivu. In the east, zone E, represented by Kizinza, Ruhaya and Runyambo, corresponded to the Bantu-speaking area of Uganda. People were able to understand each other without much difficulty from the Virunga volcanoes south to lower Malagarazi, and from Lake Lutanzige (or Onkibonyo, formerly Lake Albert) to the south of Lake Victoria: in the former area kings were called mwami, and in the latter mukama or mugabe. These long established geographical and cultural divides were, however, to become less clear-cut from the sixteenth century onwards, as the kingdoms took shape.

Written and oral traditions

In addition to archaeological datings and linguistic hypotheses, oral sources also provide information concerning the history of the last five centuries. Unfortunately, the wealth of this original cultural heritage was wasted on the Europeans from the time of their first contacts at the end of the nineteenth century, due to their obsession with the 'Hamitic theory'. A written colonial tradition was established which set traps on all sides for those seeking to interpret history. In the interests of methodology we recall this tradition's main characteristics. The new mid-nineteenth century definition of Hamite – to denote Africans of a superior race – as opposed to negroes as such (a terminology popularized by Seligman), was applied from the earliest 'explorations' onwards to the Hima and Tutsi groups on the basis of stereotyped aesthetic impressions and political considerations. The entire civilization of the Great Lakes was attributed to a 'Hamito-Semitic' migration from the East which is assumed to have introduced the

cow, the system of royalty and even some aspects of monotheism.\textsuperscript{37}

The hypothesis put forward by Speke in 1863 of an Oromo invasion between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, which supposedly made the region a second Ethiopia, permeated the accounts of German travellers and officers from 1890 to 1914 (Emin Pasha, Franz Stuhlmann, Count Von Goetzen, Hans Meyer) and the many publications of the White Fathers combining the fruits of their local investigations with the general anthropological conclusions of British or German authors (H. H. Johnston on Uganda, Friedrich Ratzel, Jan Czekanowski, Hermann Rehse).\textsuperscript{38} The traditional sources of the history of the southern kingdoms were until recently deeply marked by this hypothesis. These include the District Books of the Territory of Tanganyika, written by Hans Cory, articles by Father Edmond Césard and Father H. Van Thiel on the Bahaya and the Bazinza respectively, works by Father Albert Pagès and Father Louis de Lacger on Rwanda, and by Father Julien Gorju on the entire region and on Burundi.\textsuperscript{39}

The oral traditions themselves were retrieved from modern mythologies in the light of the culture of their possessors and the contacts established with them. Examples are the material gathered by the first educated inhabitants of the region, catechizers, minor civil servants and local chiefs, who were long considered the only worthy repositories of tradition. Apollo Kaggwa and John Nyakatura had their emulators. For instance, the ‘Haya traditions’ quoted by historians are usually traced to the work of one man, Francisco Rwamugira (or Lwamgira). An aristocrat, close to King Mutahangarwa of Kiziba, interpreter to the German Resident, Von Stuemer, and later secretary to the council of ‘chiefs’ at Bukoba under the British, Lwamgira wrote at the beginning of the twentieth century a History of the Kiziba (Amakuru ga Kiziba) which served as a source for Rehse’s book, an article by Césard, the District Book of Bukoba, and the general History of the Bahayas by Father Otto Mors.\textsuperscript{40} We might also mention the influence of Chief Pierre Baranyanka and of Counsellor Joseph Rugomana in the historiography of Burundi, also the exceptional role of intermediary played by Alexis Kagame in the history of Rwanda. Kagame was at one

\textsuperscript{37} E. Sanders, 1969; J. P. Chrétien, 1977; J. L. Amselle and E. M'Bokolo, at press.


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and the same time a dignitary close to King Mutara Rudahigwa, a priest trained for the purpose by Canon de Lacger and a genuine investigator seeking information.41

These chronicles, summarizing traditions refined and interpreted according to the criteria of western ethnohistory, were then made available to schoolchildren, readers of newspapers written in African languages (such as Munno in Uganda, Mambo Leo in Tanganyika, Rusizira Amarembe in Burundi and Kinyamateka in Rwanda) and all those who attended missionary and administrative centres.42 Many leading personalities began to locate their clan origins in Egypt (Misri) or Ethiopia (Bisinya).43 More extensive and rigorous oral surveys were conducted from the end of the 1950s onwards. The traditions of the court were thus put into perspective, with due emphasis being given to those of more lowly families and, above all, to the diversity of regional variations and the wealth of information compiled from sources other than the small group of educated people. Knowledge of the region’s history grew with the collecting of recordings, the accurate transcription of oral texts and the establishment of reliable linguistic bases.44

The traces left by Ruhinda and the Bachwezi

The states of the south may have grown out of the disintegration of an ancient monarchy founded between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries by a conqueror called Ruhinda: this, at least, was the prevailing belief until the 1950s. The ‘Empire of Ruhinda’, comprising all the Haya and Zinza territory, except Kiziba, and at times including Burundi and even Rwanda, was considered the southern extension of the ‘Empire of the Bachwezi’, brought about by a new wave of expansion by Bahima herdsmen. The event, if it actually took place, is now believed to have occurred at an earlier period, about the fifteenth century; more importantly, different traditions have handed down widely varying versions of the ‘Ruhinda legend’. In


42. On the transmission channels of these traditions at the start of the twentieth century, see District Book of Bukoba [copies available from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London], Vol. VII, pp. 5–6, which contains translated extracts from J. Gorju, 1920 and H. Rehse, 1910 and references to F. Lwamgira; also the District Book of Biharamulo, History of Migrations, 1931. It is worth noting that the pupils of the Kome mission are better acquainted with this history than the people in the locality.


44. J. Vansina, 1961, 1971, 1972; A. Kagame, 1972; C. W. Newbury, 1976; E. Mworoza, 1977; L. Ndoricimpa, 1984; Culture et société (Bujumbura); Etudes rwandaises (Butare); I. K. Katoke, 1975; P. Schmidt, 1978. The study by S. R. Karugire, 1971, is also of use for the kingdoms of the south. An important international symposium was held in Bujumbura in 1979: see Centre de civilisation burundaise, 1981. It was followed by a similar meeting in Bukavu in December 1982.
Bunyoro and Nkore the hero Ruhinda is described as the illegitimate son of Wamara, the last Cwezi 'king' and a woman servant, Njunaki, while in Haya and Zinza country his father is generally said to have been Igaba or Bugaba, one of the local names for the supreme deity. The Hinda dynasties of Nkore, Karagwe, Kyamutwara, Ihangiro and Buzinza took as their respective founders either a brother, a son or a grandson of Ruhinda, who is said to have given each of them a country and a drum. These traditions relate primarily to two locations between which the hero’s remains are said to have been divided when he died: towards the north, the Nkore–Karagwe complex, where his memory is associated in particular with the Isingiro and Bugara regions on both sides of the Kagera, and towards the south, the Buzinza–Ihangiro complex in which he is depicted as the assistant or even the son of the blacksmith Kayango. The traditions of the different kingdoms were built up in relation to these two locations and were not always compatible; Kyamutwara, Nyarubamba, the son or grandson of Ruhinda, came from Karagwe; in Ihangiro, the founder was himself described as a son of Nyarubamba, but bore the name of Ruhinda Kayanga in keeping with Zinza tradition. As for Ruhinda's legendary odyssey from Bunyoro to the extreme south of the region, it follows two different itineraries depending on the traditions. In one version it is overland, passing through Karagwe, in another the hero sailed the lakes north to Buzinza, from which he is said to have returned north-westwards by land.45

All the evidence suggests that the reference to Ruhinda reflected the meeting of two waves of traditions, connected with two major clan groups, Bahinda and Bayango, which had adopted the same taboo, that of the monkey nkende (a grey cercopithecus).46 With regard to the founding of the Hinda dynasties, the traditions relate that this happened only one or more generations after that of the legendary conqueror. Probably the most interesting historical fact is the continued existence of the Ruhinda tradition, a source of political legitimacy, well after the sixteenth century. Ruhinda was invoked in the eighteenth century in Kyamutwara against usurpers from the Hima clan of the Bankangos; his name was associated in the nineteenth century with the remembrance of past greatness (in Karagwe), and of shattered unity (in Buzinza); it was also used in the

45. Apart from the titles already quoted, see material in the Cory Papers, for example No. 69 (Chronology of the Bahinda) and Nos 413 and 416 (notes by A. M. D. Turnbull in 1925 and 1926 on the history of Buzinza). See also the District Books of Bukoba and Biharamulo and, in the Archives of the Maison généralice des Pères Blancs, several manuscripts including J. B. Lapioche, Le Buhava et son histoire, 1938; A. D. Kakaira, Histoire d’Uzinza, 1930.

46. L. de Heusch (1966, pp. 50–1) interpreted this as an old rivalry between the two clans, basing himself on the erroneous deduction he drew between the nkende and tumbili monkeys (quoted in H. Cory and M. Hartnoll, 1945/1971), whereas in fact these are the same animal, named in Ruhaya and Kiswahili respectively.
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nineteenth century to rally the Bunyoro and Haya peoples against the petty imperialism of the Baganda.\footnote{This ideological use appears in: Emin Pasha, 1891, pp. 353–5 (in Bunyoro); F. Stuhlmann, 1894, pp. 713–15 (in Lyamutwara); the District Book of Bukoba, copy available from SOAS, pp. 42–3 (in Karagwe); A. Brard, \textit{Rapport sur les tribus insulaires du Nyanza méridional}, Archives of the White Fathers, Jan. 1897; and A. E. Kitching, \textit{Tribal history and legends of the Wazinza'}, 1925, in the District Book of Biharamulo (in Buzinza).}

The differences between the court and the popular versions reflect\footnote{See the traditions compiled in Maruku by P. Césard, 1931.} the tenacious persistence of a cycle of traditions in the form of legends. In most cases they probably represent the spread of a particular type of ruling power rather than an expedition by a single conqueror. In Gisaka the Bagesera Bazirankende dynasty (the reader is referred to the \textit{nkende} (taboo)) attributed its origins to Nyakacende (or Nyiragakende), the daughter of Ruhinda or of one of his successors in Karagwe. In Kiziba the Bito dynasty identified Kibi, its founder, with Nyakiru, the brother of Ruhinda, and held that the two brothers had fought for control over their mother; the Bahinda clan was responsible for demarcating administrative boundaries. The Bukerebe Silanga dynasty, which came from Ihangiro towards the end of the seventeenth century, claimed that it originally descended from Ruhinda. Hinda influence is manifest as far as Buha in the south, as evidenced in the royal titles (in Heru and Bushingo) and in the reference to \textit{nkende} (the taboo of the kings of Bujiji).\footnote{Cory Papers, No. 413 (Turnbull, 1925). G. W. Hartwig, 1972; \textit{The District Book of Kigoma} (copy available from SOAS), Vol. VII, p. 203; J. P. Chrétien, 1975.}

In the west, on the other hand, oral accounts brought forward other heroes. In Rwanda, Gihanga, a hero with a genuinely civilizing role was raised to the rank of father of all the neighbouring kingdoms. In Burundi, Ntare Rushatsi, a name which seems to apply to the founders of two dynasties in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, is associated with Ruhinda in European writings only.\footnote{Hinda traditions appear in Rwanda in the accounts of Ruganzu Ndori’s ‘return’ from Karagwe in the company of Muyango. In Burundi, Ntare Rushatsi opposed a king of Bushingo called Ruhinda, and J. M. Van der Burgt, 1903, attributed the founding of this kingdom to Ruhinda ‘the great’, a theory somewhat unthinkingly accepted in the general studies by Roland Oliver.}

The traditions concerning Ruhinda drew their strength from the links between this legendary figure and the heroic exploits of the Bachwezis. Whatever may have been the reality or the extent and duration of the ‘Empire of Kitara’, as a political and religious model it most obviously had its origins in the plateaux of western Uganda. In the south, however, Isimbwa, Ndahura and Mulindwa hardly exist outside accounts circulating relatively recently. Here the foremost roles are played by Wamara, Mugasha and Ryangombe. The south developed its own mythology – for example, the manner in which Wamara, accompanied by Mugasha and Irungu, brought back from the domain of the terrible Kintu not only cattle and
seeds but death as well; Wamara's conflicts with Mugasha to whom he refused his daughter and who unleashed a storm (in a Rwandan version it is Ryangombe who is involved), and with Kagoro who in the end burned down the enclosure sheltering his beautiful cow Kitare. These deities are only the most important in a pantheon of thirty or more gods, continually increased by circumstances. Each is associated with a field of activities: Wamara with the dead; Mugasha with water, rain and lakes, hence with fishing and agriculture (in particular, the banana tree); Irungu with the bush, hence with hunting and travel; Kagoro with lightning; and Ryan­gombe with cattle and hunting.

While Wamara, whose great sanctuary was in Masaka in Bwera (Uganda), is a recurrent name in the traditions of Kitara, Nkore and Karagwe, the influence of Mugasha seems to have spread out from the Sese Islands, on Lake Victoria. Accounts of Ryangombe are to be found mostly in the west, from Rwanda to Lake Tanganyika, his origin being located by some traditions in Ndorwa and by others, by identification with Kiranga, in Burundi (it is actually related that he died in an area which was then under Bugesera), or even east of present-day Zaire. Kiranga, a hunting hero, is also associated with agriculture through the spirits Nyabashi and Sserutwa. Far from being merely monarchical institutions, these religions appear to have had very ancient origins, pre-dating the founding of the modern dynasties. Popular traditions see in Wamara the protector of the old ruling clans, such as the Basita or the Bayango, and by contrast relate the conflicts between him and his ‘servant’ Ruhinda. Mugasha is said to have enacted with Kabambo, the scene mentioned above; and when the waters of Lake Victoria rose, this King of Buzinza is said to have been forced to give up his daughter to him. And Ryangombe ridiculed the King of Rwanda, Ruganzu Ndori.

This Cwezi religion (or religion of the Imandwa) was independent in matters of both worship and mythology. In the east (in Haya and Zinza country), the same families maintained hereditary functions as mediums and were responsible for temples. In the west (Rwanda, Burundi, Buha), initiation to the kubandwa was widespread. Symbolism and vocabulary seemed to associate the religion with royalty in Haya country and Nkore, while the acts of worship performed in the shade of the erythrina, the sacred tree of Ryangombe/Kiranga, seemed to be of a more popular nature. But in all cases, these were practices of initiatory divination and healing, offering protection against threats coming from near ancestors or abuses of

52. For the question as a whole, see I. Berger, 1973; F. Richter, 1899; Cory Papers, No. 79; D. W. Cohen, 1968; C. Wrigley, 1958.
power. Mechanistic and ethnic explanations of this cultural phenomenon have, with a kind of naive euhemerism, thrown an almost total veil of obscurity over the deep divide between the specific history of this religion (of which fresh developments will be studied below) and the end of an ancient reign in Kitara.

A choice between ‘clans’ and ‘castes’

Faced with a written tradition which laid emphasis on the theory of ‘caste’ and indeed ‘racial’ opposition between ‘Hima and Tutsi lords’ and ‘Iru and Hutu serfs’, recent historiography has devoted more attention to the ‘clan’ structure. The clan (umuryango in Kirundi and Giha, ubwoko in Kinyarwanda, uruganda in Runyambo and Ruhaya), despite its universal presence in oral culture (elderly people identify themselves primarily as belonging to a clan), has not the organic simplicity of a group of kinsfolk, even if it is sometimes experienced as such. Lineages, in the strict sense of the term, are classified in units characterized by collective name, by their
respect for one or two taboos (*imiziro*) and sometimes by traditions relating to their origins or by the protection of a god belonging to the Cwezi pantheon (particularly in Haya country); but they have no territorial unity.\(^59\)

Clans are sometimes sub-divided into sub-clans (*amashanga* in Rwanda, *amahiga* in Haya country), but the system is not segmentary. Some clans appear in the long history of several of the kingdoms of the Great Lakes region, examples being the Bayangos of Nkore in Buzinza, the Bakimbiri of Nkore in South Buha, and the Basita of Bunyoro in Bukerebe. Taboos sometimes concern even larger groups: the toad is respected in Rwanda by the Bega, the Bakono and the Baha (three large clans which provided the queen mothers); there are instances of the spread of the *nkende* taboo, the most surprising example being the Kiziba, which is respected both by the dynastic clan of the Babito and by the Bahinda, while the *ngabi* bushbuck taboo, usually associated with the Babito, has been taken over by the old royal clan of the Bakuma. Some clans also see themselves as being related to different clans at different times. In Rwanda, the Banyiginya have been connected at times with the Basindi and at others with the Bahondogo.

The historical background of the clans is clear in Rwanda. As in Nkore (four units), the structure in Rwanda is exceptionally limited to eighteen large clans which all comprise Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa members.\(^60\) But studies carried out recently on the people living on the banks of Lake Kivu in the west\(^61\) show that these 'clan corporations' were still in the making two centuries ago. Elsewhere, in Burundi, Buha, Karagwe and the lands bordering on Lake Victoria, there were hundreds of clans but each had different forms of association, either exogamic units (among the Bahaya) or associations based on a joking relationship or the taking of an oath (the *endahiro* of the Bakiga, in the north of present-day Rwanda). Identity was often closely linked with the exercise of political or religious duties of relatively long standing. The fact of belonging to a given clan defined the individual's social status. The oldest traditions bear witness to the large number of local functions for which one or the other of these clans was responsible, without this necessarily implying that each of these principalities comprised a homogeneous group. For example the Basita, associated with the old Cwezi rulers in Bunyoro and Nkore, are said to have reigned in Karagwe (King Nono) and chosen the heir to the Bukerebe throne. The Batundu are said to have reigned over what was Kyamutwara, themselves following on the Bahunga dynasty, that of King Kashare, and they are sometimes associated with the Baheta, who formed the clan of King Nsansama in Buzinza.

60. The Batwa represent a small minority group in Rwanda, Burundi, and Buha (where they are called Bakiko). They specialize in hunting, fishing and pottery, and are outcasts on account of numerous taboos. They have been defined as 'pygmoid' but this term is debatable.
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Ihangiro is thought to owe its name to a former king of the Bayango clan (belonging to the larger group of Barongo blacksmiths). Here the Bahutu (a very powerful Hima clan) are said to have fought first the Bayango and then the Bahinda, under the leadership of Nkumbya, or Mukumbya. The fate of the latter, sometimes presented as a king and sometimes as a rain-maker, differs with different traditions: killed by Ruhinda, exiled at the court of Kashare, fleeing with Katobaha to Bukerebe or, alternatively, the ancestor of Ntumwa, the king of the Bukuma dynasty done to death by Kibi in Kiziba. In Rwanda there are also many pre-Nyiginya political entities: the Bazigaba in Mubari and Cyingogo; the Bagesera in Gisaka, Bushiru and Busozo; the Badanda in Nduga, Bwanmwali, Buhoma and Bukonya; the Basindi in Busigi and Ruhengeri; the Bacyaba in Bugara; the Basinga in Burwi and elsewhere (old Renge dynasties); the Bongera in Bumbogo, Buriza and Bwanacyambwe; the Batsobe in Rukoma, and so on. A number of these lineages have retained ritual biru functions in modern Rwanda. In Burundi, the custody of the drums and the religious duties devolving on clans such as those of the Bajiji, the Bashubi and the Bahanza probably reflect ancient ruling powers. All of these clan principalities were gradually absorbed between the fifteenth and the seventeenth centuries (sometimes later) by the new dynasties, as will be seen below. Notwithstanding these regional changes and influences (resulting from lineage migrations or the flow of ideas and oral accounts), small subregional entities retained a living individuality until the twentieth century. Studies have yet to be carried out on the ibihugu (countries) of Rwanda and Burundi, on the Bayoza of Kyamutwara and the Bahamba of Kyanja (groups existing before the great state of Kyamutwara or Bumbwiga, split up at the end of the eighteenth century).

The distinction between pastoralists and farmers is not so clearly obvious in this context as to lend credence to the generally prevailing hypothesis of invasions and conflicts (ascribed to the grave political crises of the mid-twentieth century). It is not only in Rwanda that clans are of mixed composition: this is also the case for 20 per cent of the clans in Haya country, over 10 per cent of Bahutu, over 50 per cent of Batutsi and 90 per cent of Batwa potters. The narrative published by H. Rehse, 1910, p. 286, on the massacre which followed the death of Kashare, the ancient sovereign of Kyamutwara, also related the savagery of the Hinda King Karemera, especially towards the members of his own family; it in no way signifies a ‘pogrom of reprisals against farmers’.

62. The term Bahaya, before being applied in the colonial period to all the populations of the district of Bukoba, designated only the people living on the shores of Lake Victoria in the region of Maruku.

63. Including Karagwe.
per cent of Batwa clans in Burundi. Other clans are in an intermediate or indeterminate situation, described as bairu (ennobled) (the Bayango) or bahutu (from a good family background) (the Bajiji). The Basita are described in some cases as pastoralists (in Rwanda for example), in others as farming-blacksmiths, having relinquished their dynastic drum in exchange for cereal farming. In general the Bajiji are classified as Bahutu in Burundi and Batutsi in Bujiji (Buha). While the hypotheses concerning a meeting in the ancient past between Bantu-speaking groups and groups speaking south Kushitic or central Sudanese languages are interesting, they bear on too remote a period (the first millennium) to throw light on the situation obtaining in the sixteenth century, given the cultural fusion of these populations. As we saw above, ethnic differentiation occurred along regional, clan or political lines which reflected the Hima/Tutsi and Iru/Hutu categories, although it would be risky to attempt a precise definition of what these categories represented four centuries ago. One single fact seems to stand out – the extent of pastoral activities on the middle plateaux from Nkore to Buha, through Karagwe, Gisaka and Bugesera. The Hamitic conquest which is so often mentioned in connection with this period appears to be no more than another way of presenting the regional and politico-economic pattern of the relations between predominantly pastoral and predominantly agricultural sectors between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries.

The formation of the modern kingdoms: a geopolitical study

Problems posed by dates in general

The wealth of oral sources contributes to the complex problem of reconstructing the chronology of the region. Dynastic lists and the genealogies of princes have many variants especially before the seventeenth century. A number of chroniclers tried to substantiate the age of their kingdoms by compiling data from external sources. The average span of a generation, fixed at thirty-three years by Alexis Kagame, would seem in fact to be about twenty-seven to twenty-eight years. Two solar eclipses provide absolute references, but they cannot be identified beyond doubt.

The first was probably that of 1520, during the battle of Biharwe, between Ntare Nyabygaro (Nkore) and Olimi Rwitamahanga (Bunyoro) – an eclipse which has implications for datings in Buganda and Rwanda. The second was probably that of 1792, which coincided with the enthronement

67. Oral traditions, even when they go back as far as fifteen or more generations, do not throw light on the earlier origins of population formation as such: or else they are ‘traditions’ permeated, through the channels described above, by the ideas of Speke, Emin or Gorju, for example, the Ethiopian hypotheses on the origin of the Basita put forward in the study by C. Buchanan, 1974, pp. 98–9.
of Mibambwe Sentabyo (Rwanda). The mwami of Rwanda whose body was exhumed in 1968–9 by the team of F. Van Noten and ascribed to the first half of the seventeenth century, could, given the imprecision of the oral studies in this respect, have been either Mutara Semugeshi or Cyirima Rujugira. In spite of the scepticism of authors such as David Henige, we can thus arrive at acceptable probabilities. Using all the concordances found in the sources and adopting the syntheses suggested by David Cohen and J. B. Webster, we suggest the chronology shown in Table 26.1.69

The ‘invasions’ organized towards the south by the Bito sovereigns of Bunyoro also appear as a binding influence between the different kingdoms. But the traditions compiled in each of the kingdoms ascribe the event to different periods. In fact, the Banyoro must have mounted numerous cattle raids. Moreover, the repetition in the dynastic lists of names such as Cwa (Bunyoro), Ntare (Nkore), Ntare and Karemera (Karagwe), Magembe (Kiziba) and Nyarubamba (Ihangiro) has led to chronological confusion.70 None the less, three large expeditionary waves can be distinguished:

(1) In the first half of the sixteenth century, after their victory in 1520


70. For example in O. Mors, 1957, Ntare Ktabanyoro of Karagwe is said to have been at odds with Magembe Kitonkire and Magembe Kagaruki, two kings of Kiziba who reigned a century apart.
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<th>GISKA</th>
<th>KARAGWE</th>
<th>KIZIBA</th>
<th>KYAMUTWARA</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

N.B. Sources indicated in notes. Maximum use has been made of the most fully documented sources and has not been confined to standardized lists. The most accurate are those of Rwanda and Kiziba. Considerable uncertainty exists as regards the period before the seventeenth century.

Key:
/ sovereigns of the same generation (brothers or cousins)
== historical alliances
+ 1895 certified date of death (end of nineteenth/beginning of twentieth century)
C calamities (droughts and famines)
in Nkore, the Banyoro are said to have invaded Rwanda twice, under the leadership of Prince Cwa, the son of Nyabongo, Olimi's successor. The bami, Kigeri Mukohanya and Mibambwe Mutabazi were forced to flee, one to the west of Nyabarongo and the other as far as Bushi. The King of Bugesera, Nsoro Sangano, is also said to have been killed during this invasion. Only with the death of Cwa was the tide to turn.

(2) During the first half of the seventeenth century, the small Bito Kingdom of Kiziba seems to have been subject to raids by its protector, Bunyoro, which occurred throughout the century, for example during the reign of Magembe Kitonkire. Karagwe (under kings called Ntare and Ruhinda) was also affected during this same period.

(3) During the first half of the eighteenth century the most famous raid occurred which is attributed to a mukama called in some accounts Cwa (Cwamali) and in others Kyebambe. After having for years laid waste all the Haya lands, this sovereign is said to have been defeated and killed by King Nyarubamba Kicumbu in Ihangiro. His retreating warriors are then said to have been crushed by the mukama Ntare Kitabanyoro of Karagwe, who had returned from Buha where his mother had taken him into exile. At the same time another Banyoro group was defeated by a mugabe from Nkore, also known as Kitabanyoro ('Banyoro killer'). The kingdoms of the south were thus finally rid of the activities of the Babito. The memory left behind by the Babito was both terrible and confused but their influence was probably substantial especially with regard to the military organization of the kingdoms.\(^71\)

The Kagera plateau states

This region of grassy plateau has always represented an important geopolitical axis offering an easy route from the valley of the Katonga to that of the Malagarazi. Unfortunately its political history is the worst recorded in the region, because of the difficulties besetting its different kingdoms since the nineteenth century, resulting in some cases in their dismemberment or destruction, and bringing about the rapid erosion of their traditions. There is not a single study on either Bushubi or Bugesera, and what has been written about old Gisaka or Buha is either sketchy or superficial. Only the northern part, comprising Mpororo, Nkore and Karagwe, is relatively well known.

Despite its prestigious origins (the Sita dynasty, the principal starting-point of the Ruhinda complex), Karagwe began to assert itself chiefly from the seventeenth century onwards, taking advantage of the first ebb of Nyoro

71. D. Henige, 1974; A. R. Dunbar, 1965; S. R. Karugire, 1971; E. Césard, 1927; I. K. Katoke, 1973; O. Mors, 1957; H. Rehse, 1910; A. Kagame, 1972. These expeditions are to be distinguished from the more remote establishment of a Bito dynasty in Kiziba and in no way lend support to the hypothesis that the Hinda movement was Luo in origin, as suggested by L. de Heusch, 1966.
FIG. 26.2 The southern Great Lakes region at the end of the seventeenth century (after J. P. Chrétien)
influence (the crisis of the succession leading to the accession of Winyi, the successor of Nyabongo). Little is known about the Ntare and Ruhinda who came after, save that they were more powerful than their neighbours to the east: the attack on Kiziba ended in the death of a son of King Magembe Kitonkire. They maintained better relationships with Gisaka and Rwanda, including marriage alliances. The crisis precipitated in the eighteenth century by the Nyoro invasion led to a fresh upsurge, embodied in the person of Ntare Kitabanyoro, and later consolidated by the establishment of trade relations with Buganda and the people of Nyamwezi.

Mpororo, or Ndorma, inherited a rich tradition of government by clans. The Bakimbiri are said to have been governed by Ryangombe himself, and the Baishekatwa by Queen Kitami, the first incarnation of the spirit Nyabingi, who was held to be very active until well into the twentieth century. Overall government was taken over by a Hima dynasty from the Bashambo clan who took advantage of the vacuum created by the Banyoro defeat in Rwanda. The Bashambo contracted marriage alliances with the Bahinda of Nkore, who at that time were less powerful than the Bashambo: in the mid-seventeenth century, King Gahaya, the son of Ishemurari, attacked Gisaka and alarmed Rwanda. The culminating point was reached at the beginning of the eighteenth century; but fifty years later, when Gahaya Rutindangyezi died, Prince Ndabarasa, the son of the Rwandan mwami Cyirima Rujugira, occupied the entire south of the country; the kingdom split up into rival principalities; and the Murorwa drum was hidden near Lake Bwinyoni in the western mountains.

The Gisaka dynasty claimed to have two different clan origins, namely the Bagesera and the nkende totemic group (the Bazirankende). At the end of the fifteenth century King Kimenyi threatened to annex the tiny territory of the Rwandan mwami, Ruganzu Bwimba. In the mid-sixteenth century Kimenyi Shumbusho took advantage of the Nyoro attack to occupy the heart of old Rwanda, Buganza and Bwanacyambwe: Rwanda was only to regain this lost territory a century later. With Ndorwa and many Rwandan rebels as allies, Gisaka tried to take its revenge under Kimenyi Getura in the mid-eighteenth century, but Cyirima Rujugira's warriors defeated him also. The latter's son, Kigeri Ndabarasa, also occupied Mubari, an old kingdom ruled by the Bazigaba, with its centre in the islands of the Kagera.

Bugesera could also be seen as a precursor of the political powers which were later to establish themselves in the western mountains. The Bahondogo dynasty seems to be so closely linked with that of the Banyiginya of early Rwanda that Jan Vansina suggested that the latter descended from it. Marriages and military alliances marked the history of the two countries from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. Ruganzu Ndori took action against Burundi, and Yuhi Mazimpaka gave hospitality to King Nsoro Nyabarega who was in difficulties. Until the end of the seventeenth century Bugesera covered a very large territory extending from the Kanyaru to the Ruvubu (the entire northern third of present-day Burundi) and, with its
watering-places and rituals, was a typical pastoral habitat. Trouble came with the growth of the Baganwa dynasty in Burundi, which tended to side with Gisaka. The nineteenth century began with the country being divided up.

Farther to the south, several kingdoms were established in the Malagarazi basin. From the sixteenth century a ‘north Buha’ is said to have consisted of Buyungu, Muhambwe, Ruguru, Buyogoma (east of present-day Burundi), and even Bushubi. The Rwandan mwami Mibambwe Mutabazi is said to have found a wife there. The Bahumbi dynasty (of the kings known as Ruhaga, Nkanza and Gihumbi) remained very powerful until the eighteenth century: it gave hospitality to King Ntare of Karagwe fleeing from the Banyoro; it defeated Kakaraza, the mugabe of Buzinza; and it expanded into Sumbwa territory. Early on, however, to the south of the river, Ruguru became the centre of another state, comprising Heru and Bushingo and ruled by the Bakimbiri dynasty (that of Kings Ntare, Ruhinda, Rwasa and Kanyoni) which, with the principality of the Bajiji in Nkarinzi, took a greater interest in the mountains overlooking the eastern shore of Lake Tanganyika. It was only towards the mid-nineteenth century that Buha declined and began to break up.\textsuperscript{72}

The states on the shores of Lake Victoria

These countries, which were more thickly populated, extended over grassy highlands and fertile, humid plains and valleys with waters teeming with fish. These differing geographical features affected the characteristics of communities and states and accounted in part for the splitting up of Kyamutwara and Buzinza in the nineteenth century.

Kiziba, wedged in between Lake Victoria and the River Kagera, was torn between its traditional links with Kitara–Bunyoro (its kings were buried there until the end of the seventeenth century, and its princes brought up in this foreign court) and with the Sese Islands (the origin of a ritual fire used at enthronement). Moreover, it was constantly warring with its neighbours in the south-west, Kyamutwara and Karagwe, which turned a succession of conflicts to their advantage. The Nyoro menace was followed at the end of the eighteenth century by attacks by the Baganda. King Burungu Kakindi appealed to Kabaka Semakokiro, for help against the rebel princes who, for their part, gained the support of the pretender, Kamanya.

In Kyamutwara, permanent Hinda supremacy seems to have been established in the seventeenth century by King Karenera. His insane cruelty is said to have led him to have his son Mukanbya blinded. It is possible that, after a long regency under Kayango, it was the latter’s successor, who in fact founded a new dynasty. This was Rugomora Mahe who, following his

long and roundabout voyage from Ihangiro to the Sese Islands and Kitara, was regarded as a civilizing hero. He and his descendants exploited the weaknesses of Kiziba and Ihangiro, until at least the end of the eighteenth century when Kyamutwara was in its turn weakened by internal disension. The mukama, Karemera Mwiru, eliminated his predecessor, Bwogi Mpan-gukano, with the support of the Baziba and the Baganda. His sons, Kajurunga and Kinyoni, were to share Hinda power, thus leading to the formation of the principalities of Maruku and Kyanja in the nineteenth century. During the eighteenth century two Hima lineages of the Bankango clan, originating from Buzinza in the reign of Kahigi Kasita (who is thought to have married the sister of the two founders, Karamagi and Mutashaba), gained increasing military and political influence. At the beginning of the nineteenth century they established an independent government in Bugabo and a small-scale 'Kyamutwara', implanted on the shores of Lake Victoria where the Germans were to found Bukoba in 1890.

In Ihangiro there was a sharp division between a flat lake region called Ihaya and an inland plateau called Mugongo. Succession conflicts, especially under Muramira, gave the kings of Kyamutwara, Rugomora and Kahigi, the opportunity for intervention in the plateau region at the end of the seventeenth century. Justification could be provided by the dynastic relationship. Here again, with Buto, we find the theme of a king blinded by his father; the question also arises of a break with the reign of Nyarubamba, the conqueror of the Banyoro. At the close of the eighteenth century Nyarubamba II appealed to the Baganda to help him recover the plateau region from a rebel prince. From then on there developed along the whole western shore of Lake Victoria in the nineteenth century what could be termed Ganda imperialism.\footnote{73}

Buzinza introduces us to another cultural and ethnic region where the influences of the Baha, the Basukuma and even the Tatoga Nilotes intermingled. It was also the main home of the Barongo blacksmiths whose links with the Yango clan have been mentioned. The three main sources of the political history of this kingdom\footnote{74} provide dynastic lists which contradict one another with regard to length and order; the most accurate is that of Van Thiel. After the reigns surrounded by the legend of Ntare Muganganzara and the first Kabambo, there was, as it were, a second founding under Kabambo Kinwa, who was also born of the incest committed by a blind prince. In the eighteenth century the mugabe Kakaraza had to fight off attacks from the Baha in the west and the Tatoga in the east. His son Mwiwahabi was the last sovereign of a unified Buzinza. The war of succession led to the separation of Rusubi under Ntare Muhire, and of all the coastal regions under Ruhinda Muhangakyaro, at the start of the nineteenth century.

\footnote{74}{H. Van Thiel, 1911; O. Mors, 1957; P. Betbeder, 1971.}
The history of Bukerebe is one of complex regional influences. From the cultural standpoint, this country, made up of an island and a peninsula, forms part of the Zinza group. In the nineteenth century, however, the Silanga dynasty claimed to be of Ruhindan (even Bunyoro) origin, whereas its founder, Katobaha, is said to have come from Ihangiro in the seventeenth century, and its taboo was the enfunzi (a kind of goldcrest) which was also that of the Bahutu or the Baitira, a clan which, as we saw above, fought with the Bayango and the Bahinda (under King Nkumbya at the end of the sixteenth century). The kings (bakama) gradually gained the upper hand in the eighteenth century over the Sita and Kula clans, but the Tatoga menace forced them to establish their capital in the island. The important trade in ivory was considerably developed by this principality at the start of the nineteenth century.\footnote{G. W. Hartwig, 1972 and 1976; E. Hurel, n.d.}

The states in the western mountains
Whereas in the east the developing pattern of kingdoms led to fragmentation, in the west, the trend favoured concentration to the advantage of two powers – Rwanda and Burundi – each of which had over one million inhabitants at the end of the nineteenth century.

The tiny Rwandese principality which came into being in the fourteenth century south of Lake Mohazi (in Buganza), in the shadow of Bugesera and Gisaka, succeeded in firmly establishing itself along the River Nyabarongo, thanks to the long reign of Cyirima Rugwe who annexed the lands of the Bongera. But the serious crises of the sixteenth century were to affect this kingdom’s stability. The two Nyoro invasions, which led King Kigeri Mukobanya and King Mibambwe Mutabazi to flee westwards, culminated in the shifting of the centre of political power to Nduga, while the original territory (Buganza and Bwanacyambwe) was captured by Gisaka. After the warlike reign of Yuhi Gahima, who launched expeditions in every direction, the succession conflict between his sons, Juru and the mwami Ndahiro Cyamatara, was exploited by the Bashi, the Bahavu and the people of Bugara in the west. The king was killed and the drum of the Rwoga dynasty captured. Notwithstanding the pious tradition recounting that the rightful prince had been hidden in the home of his aunt in Karagwe and despite the claims by the Banyiginya to an unbroken line from the country’s origins (from the time of the mythical Kigwa and the legendary Gihanga), Ruganzu Ndori probably founded a new dynasty of the Kalinga drum at the beginning of the seventeenth century. He re-occupied Nduga and from there he and his successors extended the kingdom as far as Lake Kivu and the River Kanyaru, recapturing Bwanacyambwe (in the region of Kigali) in the east at the same time. The growth of a new dynasty in Burundi put a stop to expansion at the end of the century, but it recommenced in the eighteenth century as a result of the exceptional military organization set up by Cyirima
The Great Lakes region, 1500–1800

Rujugira and Kigeri Ndabarasa. Burundi and Gisaka were compelled to retreat; Ndorwa broke up; Mubari was occupied and settlements on the shores of Lake Kivu were extended up to Kinyaga. At the end of the eighteenth century, Bugesera, an old ally, was divided up between Rwanda and Burundi under Mibambwe Sentabyo. This expansion continued in the nineteenth century, especially in the north-west and south-east, but the old Hutu and Tutsi powers preserved their independence for a long time under a kind of protectorate of the Banyiginya.  

There is much less information concerning the history of Burundi during this period. At the start of the sixteenth century an initial dynasty created by Ntare Karemera seems to have become established in the mountains of the north-west, on the borders of the powerful Bugesera. Among the Bami, Mutara Semugeshi, who was the son of Ruganzu Ndori, and Mutaga Nyamubi are said to have established a kind of alliance which was consolidated by exchanges of pastoral rituals. Then at the end of the seventeenth century Ntare Rushatsi or Rufuku founded the Baganwa dynasty in Nkoma which maintained relations with South Buha. This dynasty unified the south (where the so-called Nyaburunga Burundi was weakened by the conflict with Nsoro and Jabwe), the centre and the north – the fusion of the clan powers of the old kingdom (Bahanza, to which Ntare, Bajiji, Babibe and Bashubi would seem to have belonged) – and rose up against Bugesera whose king, Nsoro Nyabarega, had to take refuge in Rwanda. Burundi then extended to the south of present-day Rwanda; it was the defeat of Mutaga Senyamwiza by Cyirima Rujugira in the mid-eighteenth century that fixed its borders along the River Kanyaru. It was only at the time of the long reign of Ntare Rugamba, during the first half of the nineteenth century, that the kingdom expanded west to reach the River Rusizi, and east as far as the Malagarazi basin (at North Buha's expense).  

Further west, around Lake Kivu, the Bashi on the one hand, and on the other, the Bafuriru of the Rusizi plain and the Bahavu dwelling on Ijwi island and the west coast, were all ascribed a common origin in the Nyindu region (in Lwindi). The political structure of the mwami could be connected with the socio-religious institution of Bwami which would seem to have formed the basis for Bembe and Rega societies. Traditions also testify to the very long history of relations between these small kingdoms and Burundi and Rwanda. They have been masked only by the spread of the Hamitic theory of the 'Ethiopian invasions' and by the carving out of colonial frontiers at the end of the nineteenth century.  

77. J. Vansina, 1961 and 1972; E. Mworoha, 1977; J. P. Chrétien, 1981 (a) and (b), and 1984. 
States, economies and societies

This history of politics and warfare should not overlook the question of population movements, the evolving pattern of landscapes and crop production, and institutional and even ideological changes.

Development of the relationship between herding and farming

At the outset, geographical factors determined the two areas which served for these activities – pastoralism on the Kagera plateaux and agriculture on the shores of Lake Victoria and in the western mountains. During the period considered here, however, the two activities were to a greater and greater extent carried out in conjunction throughout the region and in a variety of ways. In reality, they had never been in strict opposition to one another: the association of the earliest cereals, eleusine and sorghum, with cattle-raising would seem to be a very old practice, as regards both production and consumption (meal and milk).\footnote{J. P. Chrétien, 1982.} Ancient Karagwe is famous, according to tradition, not only for its cattle but also for its farming and its beer made from sorghum.\footnote{O. Mors, 1957; J. B. Lapioche, MS, op. cit., fn 51.} Cattle were not limited to a single variety, the long-horned Sanga, and their preserve in the region goes back much further than was thought. Early accounts mention the use of manure whose importance in intensive farming with two harvests a year in the wettest regions has been sadly overlooked. This complementarity was especially evident in countries such as Kiziba and Kyamutwara – the banana tree gradually assuming the same importance there as in Buganda, where the Bahima settled only in small numbers and where social hierarchies were based on land relationships and not on contracts concerning cattle. The renown of Rugomora Mahe in the seventeenth century (or that of Katobaha in Bukerebe) rested essentially on the introduction of the banana tree and the raphia palm (with which he is credited) and on his relations with Mugasha, god of water and cultivation.\footnote{A. O. Anacletti and D. K. Ndagala, 1981. For the socio-political role of the banana tree, see C. P. Kottak, 1972; concerning Rugomora Mahe, see a very fine account published by P. Schmidt, 1978.}

But towards the west in particular, factors other than those of an agricultural kind led to the increasing influence of the herders at that time. These were droughts and famines. Close analysis of the oral sources available concerning the countries in question reveals a vast number of such calamities during the first half of the seventeenth century (Rwanda, Kyamutwara, Buzinza) and the second half of the eighteenth century (Burundi, Rwanda, Kiziba, Karagwe), and this is in line with several of the hypotheses put forward by R. S. Herring and J. B. Webster based on data on the old Nile regime and the traditions of the Nilotes of Uganda already discussed above. As was very well demonstrated by E. I. Steinhart
in the case of Nkore and the principalities which emerged from Ndorwa, these ecological and subsistence crises were particularly detrimental to farmers; they were forced to seek the help of the herders who, through the practice of transhumance, were able to ensure the survival of their cattle. The shifting of the centres of political gravity from the area of the Rivers Kagera and Malagarazi towards the wooded heights of Kiriba overlooking Lakes Kivu and Tanganyika which occurred in the seventeenth century was not simply the result of expeditions or dynastic changes but was also due to the growth of a system of tribute which was favourable to pastoral groups and their values. The 'civilization of watering-places' which obtained in Bugesera is also reflected in the oldest historical traditions concerning Rwanda and Burundi. Worship by the mwami Yuhi Mazimpaka at the end of the seventeenth century, of the most beautiful cows in his herd, is an illustration of this.82

In the case of Rwanda or Burundi (and of Nkore), however, it can be said that those who benefited from the regimes established 300 years ago represented only a part of the herd-owners, the rich Batutsi and the ruling circles that had links with royalty (for example, the princes of Baganwa in Burundi). In short, they were those who had succeeded, through the actual introduction of the cow or its use as a symbol, in acquiring political control over agricultural production which provided an additional means of redistribution and statute labour. Agriculture was of little interest to ethnological accounts, and yet its importance is evident in the rituals and even the ideology of royalty. In Burundi, for example, the annual muhanuro festival – during which royal authority and the drums symbolizing it were renewed – celebrated the sowing of sorghum, and determined the most favourable date for this in a country with a long rainy season. Moreover, with regard to food crops, the introduction of plants of American origin (sweet potatoes, maize, Phaseolus vulgaris bean) which, to judge by the references to tobacco in oral traditions, could have occurred in the region in the seventeenth century, presented farmers with new ways of intensifying their activities, providing them with the possibility of two harvests a year and ensuring the supply of plant protein (present in beans).83

The relationship between herders and tillers, then, does not have the immutable and universal character that the socio-biological stereotypes would lead us to believe. Even assuming that the Barundi, Banyarwanda or Bahaya farmers were termed Bahutu or Bairu at the start of our period,

82. See 'C' indicated in Table 26.1. J. B. Webster, 1979a, chs 1, 2 and 7; E. I. Steinhart, 1981, pp. 115–56; J. P. Chrétien, 1984; P. Schumacher, 1958. Concerning the same development in Buha, see J. F. Mbwiliza, 1981.
83. J. P. Chrétien, 1979 and at press; M. Bahenduzi, 1977; L. Ndoricimpa, 1984; E. Mworoha, 1977; C. Vidal, 1974. In spite of her misuse of feudal terminology and a tendency to underestimate the impact of colonization, Claudine Vidal deserves credit for underlining the importance of the land in old Rwanda. It will also be seen that mwami refers to fructification (kwama in Kirundi) whereas mukama means 'the milker', a revealing contrast.
the economic, political and territorial changes which took place between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries brought about the development of Hima–Iru or Tutsi–Hutu relations from one of local trade to a more comprehensive hierarchical relationship, its flexibility depending on the
states involved or the particular moment in time.\textsuperscript{84}

Consolidation: monarchical rulers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
Before colonization each state had a system of tribute which varied according to the ecological situation, the relationship between the different forces of production, the clan pattern and the institutional forms that existed. Everywhere, the sovereign exercised direct control over areas close to his residences and assigned chiefs (bakungu, batware) elsewhere. They were often princes of royal blood (Balangira in Haya country, Baganwa in Burundi), and were assisted by delegates who were usually from the most influential local lineages (farmers or herders). Tribute was paid to these courts in the form of labour or in kind (cattle, baskets of provisions, special products such as salt, honey or weapons). The ruling aristocracy could thus extend its influence by redistribution, for there was little luxury (clothing was of skins or bark; local vegetation was used for the construction of residences).\textsuperscript{85} Nevertheless, royal power was consolidated, particularly from the eighteenth century onwards, in four ways:

Exploitation of clientship (the relationships which were known as ubugabire or ubuhake) were increasingly removed from their private context and used for political purposes – protection guaranteed to a family in exchange for increased obligations. In Rwanda the buhake was used more especially to subjugate influential Hutu lineages in the peripheral regions conquered by the Banyiginya, particularly in the reign of Yuhi Gahindiro at the very end of the eighteenth century. It was at this same time that the gikingi land system became established, granting exclusive grazing rights to the most important herd-owners with administrative authority over families residing in these areas. This network of privileges which has prompted a number of authors to refer to feudalism, was accompanied in Rwanda by a remarkable increase in the size of herds resulting from the conquests of the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{86}

Military organization: Employing the same model as the emitwes of Nkore, Rwanda developed – especially from the time of the reign of Cyirima Rujigira – a system of hereditary standing armies, consisting of young men of certain lineages who were stationed in camps located on borders which were under threat. This militia also looked after the herds belonging to or protected by the king. It included Bahutu as well as Batutsi, and even foreigners, some of whom were refugees from the kingdoms defeated by Rwanda (Ndorwa, Gisaka, Burundi). In the nineteenth century, the role

\textsuperscript{84} Colonization then gave this opposition an ethnic aspect, making the two categories castes in a racial substratum.


\textsuperscript{86} J. P. Chrétien, 1974; A. Ndikuriyo, 1975; C. W. Newbury, 1976; J. Rwabukumba and V. Mudandagizi, 1974; L. Meschi, 1974.
of this institution was reduced to a mainly tax-gathering function, termed umuheto ('of the bow') in the service of important chiefs who were ranked above land chiefs and grass chiefs. The importance of the military factor was also marked in the other kingdoms at the end of the period.  

Trade possibilities: Until a recent date, institutionalized exchanges and local barter played a more important commercial role than specialized trading. None the less, regional products such as salt from Katwe in Busongora, or from Uvinza, articles made of iron (hoes made by the Bazinza and the Bash) or raphia bracelets (amatega) formed the basis of the earliest pedlars' wares. Judging from the objects found in the tomb of the Rwandese mwami who died in about 1635, or the traditions concerning Yuhi Mazimpaka, articles from the Indian Ocean coast, including glass beads and ornamental shells, would appear to have spread through the region from one centre to another, in the seventeenth century. Trade in copper (from present-day Shaba?) is also thought to have existed from the eighteenth century onwards in Burundi, Karagwe and Buganda. But it was only in the nineteenth century that rulers in Rusubi, Karagwe, and Rwanda made attempts, as had been done in Buganda, to control this trade in luxury articles.  

Ideological control: The break-up of lineages, which had become an ill-assorted mixture of clan groups of a political character, was fostered by the changes brought about in society as a result of the agrarian crises, the wars of conquest of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the movement of the population in search of food, better irrigated lands, or richer pastures. The success of Cwezi religion in the seventeenth century (for example, the emergence of Ryangombe or of Kiranga in Rwanda and Burundi) is understandable for it offered a kind of refuge in the face of this instability. To a great extent the new monarchies derived their legitimacy from this religious movement, as testified by myth and ritual. Initiates were, however, also capable of sparking off subversive movements among the people or blocking royal action. The mukama Wannumi of Kiziba, was, for example, driven mad by the medium of Wamara whose cows he had seized! Ultimately the monarchies, supported by the ruling system and encouraged by their war conquests, set about controlling this double-edged religion and turning it to their advantage. In Kiziba the cult of dead kings counterbalanced the power of Cwezi spirits. In Kyamutwara, the monarchy, from the time of Rugomora Mahe onwards, was based on the cult of Mugasha. In Rwanda a 'King of the Imandwa' was installed at the court from the reign of Cyirima Rujugira. During the same period the Rwandese monarchy had an official body of panegyric poetry and historical  

narratives compiled. This oral literature was disseminated by the army. The sacred code of *ubwiru* established royal rituals and the dynastic genealogy incorporated allied Tutsi lineages (those of the queen-mothers).

The remarkable character of Rwandese oral literature reflects the exceptional nature of the country’s political centralization. In the other states, the different strata of society retained a greater degree of independence right up to the eve of colonization.89

**Conclusion**

By the end of the eighteenth century the modern ethnographic and linguistic configurations in the Great Lakes region had emerged. The major population movements in the region had mostly come to an end, and the outlines of the last ethnic groups to be formed in the region – the Bakiga, Iteso and Lango Omiro – were being defined, the process being completed by about 1830. Most people already occupied the homelands in which their modern descendants live. Also, with very few exceptions, the era of state formation had come to an end with Rwanda having emerged as the dominant state of the southern section. In the central area, Bunyoro continued to decline until the secession of Toro and Paluoland in 1830 which brought to a close a lengthy theme of Great Lakes history with ramifications from Mounts Otuke and Elgon in the east to the Alur and Kigezi highlands in the west, and from Agoro in the north to the undulating plains of Usukuma in the south. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Buganda had emerged as the pre-eminent state in the central area. Henceforth, the main concern of the historian shifts from the growth of central authority to the efforts of the chiefs to control and limit the power of the monarch. During the nineteenth century, a multiplicity of new themes was to dominate the Great Lakes history.90

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In East Africa, the year 1500 is generally considered the high watershed between archaeology and historical linguistics, on the one hand, and oral traditions, on the other, as rewarding sources for historical studies. Before 1500 historians have to rely heavily on archaeology and historical linguistics but thereafter oral traditions are the major source and, from the nineteenth century, oral traditions join hands with written sources.\(^1\)

This does not mean, however, that there are adequate sources, oral or written, on which to rely for the perception or reconstruction of the period under study. As in the period before 1500, unevenness and even the lack of documentation remain fundamental problems. For example, little historical research, if any, has been done on interior societies such as the Gorowa, Zigua, Gogo, Turkana, Maasai and most of the Kalenjin groups, to mention only a few. The gap is slowly being filled but there remains a crippling imbalance in the sources for the history of this region for this period. It follows that what can legitimately be asserted must be tempered by the knowledge that much was taking place that remains unknown. As Professors Alpers and Ehret have correctly observed, the themes yet to be recovered through research might well be of equal or greater weight than the dominant social and economic interpretations that have emerged from existing materials.\(^2\)

The period 1500 to 1800 saw the emergence of societies and social and economic systems that are still characteristic of the interiors of Kenya and Tanzania. Variety of experience is perhaps the key feature of the history of this region at this time. The centre of the stage was occupied by the Maasai, Chagga, Pare, Shambaa, Gogo and Hehe. On the eastern periphery lived the Kikuyu, Kamba, Miji-Kenda, Zigua and Zaramo. To the north-west lived the Abaluyia, Kalenjin, Luo, Abagusii and Abakuria, and to the south-west the Tanzanian communities such as the Sukuma, Iramba, Nyamwezi, Zinza and Kimbu.

All these peoples – with the exception of the coastal societies – were still

\(^1\) Most history books in East Africa on the pre-colonial period which are based largely on oral traditions open around 1500. See G. Muriuki, 1974; H. A. Mwanzi, 1977; W. R. Ochieng', 1974a.

\(^2\) E. A. Alpers and C. Ehret, 1975, p. 470.
isolated from the ocean and could still resolve their problems without confronting the economic and allied challenges that would emanate from the coast during the nineteenth century. There is no record of any penetration of the interior by Arabs or Swahili before 1700, and 'no significant collection of imported objects has yet been found at any interior site north of the Zambezi dating to the period before 1600'. From the mid-1600s, however, it is possible to begin to see clearly the rise of chieftaincies and articulate—though often decentralized—political organizations, and changes towards a general tributary mode of production. Sustained attempts were being made to effect social and political integration into larger economic and political communities in which rulers extracted tribute from their subjects by which to maintain themselves, their families and their followers. Oral traditions portray this development as one of conquest and assimilation by the stronger migrating communities. Alternatively, the process can be viewed as a gradual neutralization and stabilization by the local populations of the disruptive activities of hitherto unsettled or migrating communities.

All history is transition from one stage to another. In the centuries following 1500 the interior societies of Kenya and Tanzania were evolving into the distinct ethnic groups that exist today with their own peculiar linguistic and cultural characteristics. The overwhelmingly dominant economic activity was agriculture. In all the settled agricultural communities people observed the distinctive features of their own local environment and tried to find techniques for dealing with them in a rational manner. As John Iliffe has put it: 'The men followed the dictates of the land.' Advanced methods were used in some areas—such as terracing, crop rotation, green manuring, mixed farming and regulated swamp farming.

While most East Africans were agriculturalists, the Maasai, Pokot and Turkana were largely cattlemen who drove their livestock for pasture and water all over the plains of central Kenya and Tanzania. As is discussed later, both the agriculturalists and cattlemen at no time attempted to pursue exclusive, or specialized, economic activities. Each economic pursuit shaded imperceptibly into the next and all were subject to fluctuation and change. Often the agriculturalists such as the Luo and Abagusii, also kept large herds of livestock, while cattlemen such as the Samburu and Arusha Maasai also practised some agriculture. The Baraguyu, the Kalenjin and the Akamba (Kamba) were semi-pastoralists.

The Sanye, Okiek, Sandawe and Hadzapi remained gatherers of berries, vegetables and fruits, and hunters of wild animals and birds—but even among these hunters and gatherers, growing variety of subsistence patterns.

FIG. 27.1  Ethnic groups of Kenya and Tanzania
Source: adapted from map drawn by M. Kivuva, Moi University, Kenya, after W. R. Ochieng’
The interior of East Africa were to be observed. For example, the Okiek traded honey for agricultural products, while the Dorobo and Athi hunters were involved in the long-distance ivory trade and, by the nineteenth century, were beginning to acquire stock. Henry Mwanzi informs us that when the nineteenth-century Swahili caravan-traders came to Kipsigis country it was those of Okiek extraction who were first to secure what was required — namely ivory. They excelled in hunting techniques and in elephant tracking, and ‘they thus acted as middlemen who hunted for ivory, which they sold to the caravan traders’. During most of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries both agriculturalists and cattlemen were locked in competition over the higher, richer and better-watered grasslands and plateaux. At the same time, however, they invaded the domains of the hunters and gatherers which led to the systematic absorption, decimation or isolation of the latter.

Economic evolution

By 1500 the two major economic pursuits in the Kenya-Tanzania interior were agriculture and cattle-keeping. Famine, John Iliffe has argued, was man’s biggest challenge during this period. It resulted from East Africa’s poor soils and its unreliable rainfall which affected both crops and pasture.

Not even the most favoured regions were spared the pangs of famine. Bananas might have thrived in Usambara, but the traditions of the Shambaa record a famine at least once every fifteen years. ‘Deliver us from death by starvation’, men prayed in the fertile Unyakyusa on the shores of Lake Malawi. Many Haya, Miji-Kenda, Hehe and Kamba traditions also tell of frequent periods of starvation, and famine is the chief explanation of migration and social change in most Kenyan and Tanzanian traditions. Most of the ancient clans of southern Usambara claim to have come up into the fertile hills during famines in Zigua ‘and having moved to the mountains, they had the advantages of increased rainfall and hardy banana trees’. In 1899 a terrible famine hit Usambara: ‘people ate tree roots and banana peels, and hundreds became Christians to fill their stomachs’. When rains failed, men had two alternatives:

Some sought food in the bush. Here hunting and gathering skills were crucial, and such experts as the Sandawe were less often decimated than their neighbours. Others fell back on the reserves embodied in their cattle, not eating them but exchanging them for grain with

more fortunate groups, or exploiting the social ties created by prior
exchanges of cattle.\textsuperscript{12}

The first line of defence against famine was the cultivator's skill. From
1500 there was continued experimentation with the crops introduced much
earlier by the Bantu and Nilotes. In forested regions with heavy rainfall,
sorghum, eleusine and millet were less important than bananas and tubers.
After 1500 a number of European and American crops were introduced by
the Portuguese in East Africa. These included maize, groundnuts, sweet
potatoes and cassava, all now well-established. Although only recently
introduced to East Africa, little is known of their routes of dispersion.
They seem, however, to have varied with the habitat requirements of each
crop. Cassava, for example, is thought to have reached the Great Lakes
area of East Africa from both Zaire and Zanzibar,\textsuperscript{13} while maize may have
arrived in the same area from the east, through Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{14} Other foods,
including numerous varieties of peas, beans and nuts, were also cultivated
and are still grown today.

The East African cultivator experimented with all available crops and
sought to produce as many as possible.

Since communications and markets were relatively poorly developed,
the farmer had to sow a great variety of crops with a great variety of
characteristics, in order to survive no matter what the climatic vari­
ations, so that he would not be, in effect, wiped out. By taking a single
ecological zone, understanding its complexity with a thoroughness
incomprehensible to even a Westerner, developing a rich and subtle
language with a profusion of terms for the understanding of local
ecology, planting dozens of crops to which the environment was
peculiarly suited, the farmer sought to defeat famine, to cheat death.\textsuperscript{15}

In Western Kenya the Abagusii, on penetrating the Southern Kenya
Highlands in the mid-1700s from the plains around Winam Gulf, were
faced with instant crop failure which led to famine and many deaths. They
were forced to reduce their dependence on several varieties of sorghum
and other lowland crops and expand production of finger-millet and root
crops that flourished in their new environment.\textsuperscript{16} Only long experience
could give such skill, on which rested the authority of age.\textsuperscript{17} By the
1700s the Kenya–Tanzania interior supported many different agricultural
systems.

As already noted, all communities observed the peculiarities of their own
environment and tried to find techniques for dealing with it in a rational

\textsuperscript{12} J. Iliffe, 1979, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{14} A. C. A. Wright, 1949, p. 80. See also M. D. Gwynne, 1975, p. 253.
\textsuperscript{15} S. Feierman, 1974, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{17} R. W. July, 1974, p. 180.

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manner. One common practice was the cutting and burning of the bush to make room for cultivation. After a few seasons, when the soil was exhausted the farmer would move elsewhere to allow the soil to recover. The little available evidence suggests that all agricultural systems in the Kenya and Tanzania interiors rested on the labour of the homesteads with the same simple technology—axes, hoes, *pangas* and digging sticks.

Livestock-raising involving poultry, sheep and goats continued to be a vital economic and cultural activity, particularly in the drier and less-densely settled areas of the Kenyan Rift Valley and the open grasslands of central Tanzania. As Abdul Sheriff has observed, it was more convenient to store wealth in the form of cattle than vegetable foodstuffs. Livestock manure was also important for agricultural intensification. Livestock provided clothing and food, weapons and utensils. Among the pastoralists, such as the Maasai and Turkana, livestock governed the daily routine and kinship relations, its ownership being a measure of family prosperity and individual security. Even among settled agricultural peoples and in mixed agricultural and pastoral societies, ownership and control of cattle and other livestock had high economic and social value. In many predominantly agricultural societies, the Kikuyu and Abagusii for example, the acquisition and ownership of cattle was an important indication of wealth and prestige, 'and relationships with neighbouring peoples, the Maasai and Akamba, were made in this context.

Among the Turkana, Luo, Kalenjin and Maasai, stock changed hands through loans freely begged and granted and through bridewealth. In this way each family herd came to be widely dispersed among friends and relatives often in distant parts, and the benefit rebounded on both the individual and on society as a whole. 'Through the broad dispersal of his cattle, each man reduced the dangers of catastrophe—the destruction of his herds through disease, enemy raid and drought.' By freely loaning his stock a man increased the number of his friends, relatives and acquaintances on whose assistance he could rely in time of need.

Apart from cattle, the predominantly pastoral people were also wealthy in land. Groups such as the Somali, Maasai and Oromo expanded their pastoral activity over wide areas of East Africa. 'With their ease of mobility, their political cohesion and their general health and strength, based on high protein diet of milk, blood and meat, the nomadic pastoralists were militarily dominant over much of East Africa.' The economic geography of the Kenyan and Tanzanian interiors by the mid-1700s can rightly be described as a 'sea' of pastoralism surrounding a few 'islands' of agricultural production. In its social value, wealth, control of territory and political and

military power, pastoral production and the pastoral way of life was predominant, and envied.

Supplementary to agriculture and livestock-keeping was hunting, both as a food source and for protecting cultivated crops. Many East African traditions refer to the importance of hunting, particularly among those who were poor in livestock and, therefore, in domestic sources of protein. Oral accounts, especially those of the Luo, Shambaa, Pare and Abakuria, frequently explain the movement of people by stating that they were hunting an animal that led them to a desirable location where they decided to settle. The myth of the origin of the Shambaa kingdom tells of the appearance of Mbegha, a Ngulu hunter, who killed the wild pigs that were uprooting their crops and gave meat freely to the people. "The Shambaa, in admiration and gratitude, gave him wives and made him king of all Usambara."23 The founder of the ruling Muyinga dynasty of the Hehe is said to have come from Ikombagulu in Usagara on a hunting expedition.24 The founders of chiefdoms among the Sumbwa, Vinza, Tongwe and Bende are also said to have been "hunters from Buha, Burundi, Rusuubi or Rwanda".25 Hunting, thus, was an important and respectable economic activity.

Men hunted animals for their flesh to supplement their vegetable diet. Cultivated crops and domesticated animals had to be protected from wild animals and birds, and men had to prevent burrowing and grazing animals from destroying crops by using trenches, pit-traps, nooses, spears, arrows and dogs.

In contrast to early importance assigned by tradition to farming, livestock-raising and hunting, fishing activities are not accorded much significance, except among the groups who lived along Lakes Turkana, Victoria, Baringo, Eyasi and the Indian Ocean. Various types of fish were caught by hook and line, basket-nets and fence traps. Dried fish were, and are, traded to those far from fishing areas.

The traditions of most of the East African peoples indicate an ancient knowledge of iron-working, both smelting and forging. Archaeologists and linguists have also established that iron technology had been introduced into East Africa by the Bantu, probably six centuries before the Christian era. The earliest Iron Age sites in East Africa are around Lake Victoria – at Buhaya, Rwanda, Nyanza and Chobi – and date from the fifth or sixth century before the Christian era in Buhaya and to the third or fourth century of the Christian era in the Winam Gulf and northern Uganda.26 "These sites are characterized by tall cylindrical smelting furnaces, a distinctive style of pottery termed Urewe-ware, dense village settlements, and

24. ibid., p. 39.
25. ibid., p. 120.
Another series of early Iron Age sites is found at Kwale, Pare, Kilimanjaro and Usambare, dating from the second or third century. These have their own distinctive pottery style, termed Kwale-ware; and also show evidence for permanent settlements and agriculture. Smithing was usually the guarded occupation of a few groups and carried much prestige and, occasionally, wealth. Among the Nyiha, the iron-smelting was accompanied by great ritual, including the absolute prohibition of the presence of women near the kiln. Several Ugweno traditions indicate that by about 1500, it had lineages specializing in iron-smelting and iron-forging. The major iron-working lineage, the Washana, controlled political power in the country. They were later overthrown by the Wasuya who transformed what were hitherto clan initiation rites into an elaborate state institution with unlimited coercive powers. In western Kenya, the Abagusii claim that they had worked iron since the sixteenth century. Their smiths are said to have become rich from the sale of their manufactures. Among the Luo to the north of the Winam Gulf, the Walowa of Yimbo were the major smiths. They manufactured hoes, arrowheads, ornaments, needles, axes, spears, knives and razors. Also important were salt-mining and crafts such as drum-making, pottery and canoe-building. Traditionally, these were the guarded specialities of particular clans. Such crafts as basketry and housebuilding were not specialist activities, but were undertaken by anyone who had time for them.

It must be re-emphasized that, between 1500 and 1800, food production was a crucial factor in the survival and expansion of society, stimulating a steady increase in population. As most of East Africa was put under extensive cultivation, and grazing, and as production rose above the bare necessity, man could start to look ahead — accumulating and preserving food for future consumption, and utilizing the time thus freed for purposes other than subsistence. He could now afford to specialize, to exempt certain individuals from the task of food production to follow other pursuits such as commodity distribution, war-making, statecraft, art, religion, medicine or philosophy and the improvement of technology.

Trade

Until the late 1700s most societies in the Kenyan and Tanzanian interiors developed independently of external global forces. They were independent politically, economically and socially. As Sheriff puts it, ‘their economy

was symmetrical and internally integrated, by which we mean that they produced what they consumed and the surplus was retained within the community to support the development of non-agricultural crafts and social differentiation.\textsuperscript{33} The exchange of various forms of surplus is termed trading.

Trading, the exchange of goods for mutual benefit, is a universal human habit found even among the most simple societies. Although simple communities are commonly thought to have self-sufficient subsistence economies, trade in the sense of a regular series of acts of exchange is frequently reported even among those who live by hunting and collecting. The need to trade arises from the simple fact that at no time have all groups and

\textsuperscript{33} A. M. H. Sheriff, 1980, p. 36.
areas been endowed with similar facilities and resources. People traded because their neighbours had vital commodities which they themselves lacked but needed either for their livelihood or their pleasure.

Take, for example, the relationship between pastoralism and agriculture. There is, of course, the misconception that regards pastoralism as historically separate from, and essentially opposed to, agriculture. Indeed colonial literature has built a picture of continuous feud between pastoralists and farmers. While one can talk about contrasts between the two, there was also much that encouraged co-operation and pastoralists exchanged their products with farmers.

Much has been written about the trade connections that for centuries existed between East Africa and the Orient. Indeed even before the establishment of the long-distance trade which, in the nineteenth century, was to become the lifeline of this commercial exchange between East Africa and overseas countries, there existed trade relations between East Africa and Asiatic states. But it must be emphasized that significant trade relations in East Africa also included important internal economic ties between cultural and ecological regions.

African trade has long been stimulated by contact between distinct ecological regions and different and complementary cultures. Indeed, this trade may have been more significant to the African peoples, as it dealt in basic necessities often determined by climatic and ecological factors. Internal African trade had a different purpose and dynamic to that of Arab or European trade. In some areas, for instance, one of its dominating concerns was to overcome famine. It was therefore irregular and sporadic. It was also a means of accumulating wealth in the form of cattle and foodstuffs.

Let us look at several instances of this trade. Traditions from Kikuyuland talk of ancient trading connections between the Kikuyu and the neighbouring Akamba and Maasai. The Kikuyu economy was diverse. While they were predominantly farmers, certain sections, such as the Kikuyu of Tetu and Mathira in Nyeri, were so influenced by their Maasai neighbours as to have evolved a semi-pastoral economy, almost a Maasai way of life. Conversely, the Athi Kikuyu specialized in hunting and extracting forest products, such as beeswax and honey. To the Maasai, the Kikuyu offered a variety of manufactured, as well as agricultural products – including pots, calabash containers, spears and swords, as well as honey, tobacco, elephant-mat and ochre. For these the Maasai paid in livestock, magic, milk, skins and leather cloaks.

Kikuyuland also constituted the best markets for the Akamba after 1760. From the Kikuyu communities of Muranga and Nyeri, the Akamba traders sought the staple crops that they could not grow themselves in sufficient abundance: nzavi (a preservable bean), ikwa (a tuber yam), nduma (the arrowroot plant of the inland water-holes), njaki (a common Kikuyu bean), mwembe (traditional maize) and, sometimes ndulu (a green of which the
Akamba were particularly fond). The Akamba paid in *mbua* (animal skins) and *uki* (a type of beer, longer fermented than that of neighbouring communities). Sometimes, the Akamba traded their labour in harvesting for an equivalent share of the food crops.\(^{35}\)

Further west, on the eastern lip of Lake Victoria, there was a widespread trading network linking the various communities. The Abagusii and the Luo were the major trading partners. The Abagusii sold to the Luo agricultural products and iron items such as axes, spears, razors and arrowheads, and also soapstone and leopard and baboon skins. These were exchanged for a variety of Luo goods – chiefly livestock but also including cattle-salt, hides, ghee, milk, fish, pots and poison. Trade between the Maasai and their Nyanzan neighbours was negligible, although the broad-bladed Maasai spears and their magic were widely sought after by the Abagusii and Luo. In return the Maasai were paid in foodstuffs.\(^{36}\)

Further south, in Tanzania, traditions from Western Unyamwezi and Uvinza speak of pre-1800 immigrant groups from the north exchanging grain crops for pots with the earlier inhabitants, ‘fishermen who had lived along river banks and only cultivated crops’.\(^{37}\) Among the Nyamwezi, forest products – bark-cloth, bark-boxes, spearshafts, honey and beeswax – were also traded between villages and were in special demand in the northern countries of the Iramba, Sumbwa and Sukuma. In Unyakyusa most women made pottery, but volcanic areas lacked suitable clay and so depended on specialists such as the Kisii women of the Nyasa lakeshore, who bartered their pots from house to house in Nyakyusa villages, or the people of Ngaseni who traded their huge beer pots along the road which ran around the upper slopes of Kilimanjaro.\(^{38}\)

The two most important items in early trade in central Tanzania were probably iron and salt. The main area of iron-working was in the north, among the Ha and the Zinza. The scarcity of iron in general was a major stimulant to trade. Throughout central, western and northern Tanzania iron was needed in a variety of forms as hoe-blades for cultivation, as knife-blades and axe-heads for building and other crafts, and as spear-blades and arrowheads for hunting, fishing and fighting. Many traders from the north and the south travelled to the land of the Ha and the Zinza to buy these iron items which they sold back home at a profit. The northern Nyamwezi introduced iron hoes to the Nyatura. Andrew Roberts explains that iron hoes from the north-west were reworked to make spears, not only among the Sukuma and Wakiko fishermen of the lower Malagarasi, but also among the Western Maasai and the Baraguyu.\(^{39}\) In the north-east, the Chagga and Maasai obtained iron products from Pare smelters while, in the late 1700s,

37. A. D. Roberts, 1970c, p. 43.
the Mamba chiefdom became the iron-working centre for much of Kilimanjaro. In the south, Fipa smiths exchanged their produce for cloth woven in the Rukwa valley while the Nyakyusa climbed the Livingstone mountains to barter food for the products of Kinga furnaces. Iron was a scarce and precious commodity: only the wealthy possessed iron hoes. Those used on Kilimanjaro towards the end of the eighteenth century were only a few centimetres broad. The Sandawe used them until they were worn down to the tang.40

The other staple of regional exchange was salt, a necessity of life to men who lived chiefly on vegetable foods. Most people produced small quantities by burning grass or collecting surface deposits but high-quality sources were rare. The major salt pans were located in Ugogo and at Ivuna, Kanyenye, Lake Balangida, Singida and Lake Eyasi, and at Bukune and Bulungwa south of Kahama. The most important brine springs were in Buha and Uvinza. Salt was traded widely, ‘especially to the north and south’.41 The Uvinza springs, in particular, seem to have been exploited since +1000.42 This Vinza salt industry was later stimulated by the foundation of the original Vinza chiefdom in 1800, ‘which would have extended the range of social contacts and created a social group that would profit directly, through taxation, from increased salt production’.43

Trade among the Miji-Kenda of south-east Kenya and north-eastern Tanzania had only begun to develop appreciably by the beginning of the eighteenth century. At this time most Miji-Kenda, who had previously isolated themselves in fenced-in hill-top settlements behind the coastal plains, began to expand outwards. Later, with their population greatly expanded, they embarked on secondary migrations settling in the less fertile lower parts of their hilly country, where they frequently clashed with the Oromo and Maasai.44

The Miji-Kenda were largely cultivators of millet, rice and fruits. Throughout the eighteenth century they were staunch allies of the Mazrui, supplying the many coastal settlements with ivory, gum copal, honey, beeswax, tobacco, grain, foodstuffs and timber for building dhows. In return the Miji-Kenda traders obtained salt, beads, cloth, iron hoes and other goods. John Lamphear has suggested that by 1750 at least, the Miji-Kenda were the middlemen of Swahili–Arab trade.45

In the trade between the coast and the interior, the Miji-Kenda sent their trading caravans both north and north-west. Northwards, they travelled to the countries of the Oromo and Borana from whom they obtained mainly livestock in exchange for cloth and beads. In the north-west, they

41. A. D. Roberts, 1970c, p. 47.
43. A. D. Roberts, 1970c, p. 47.
penetrated Akamba and Chagga countries, obtaining ivory, honey and beeswax. But Miji-Kenda control of the interior trade was shortlived and by the mid-1700s, they had been replaced by the Akamba.

From the foregoing survey, we may conjecture that the trade of the interior of Kenya and Tanzania may well, by 1700 or before, have involved exchanges over considerable distances. It is, however, clear that it was only in about 1800 that the interior of East Africa began to participate in long-distance trade and thus to be linked to economies beyond it.

Social and political activity

Social and political institutions and organizations were important for the cohesion of society and the protection of property and trade. Society in the East African interior, between 1500 and 1800, was far from settled. Although the linguistic map of modern East Africa was taking final shape, there were still significant internal migrations into sparsely-settled or empty areas. These internal movements sometimes brought together peoples of different languages or dialects and with different political and economic practices. Internal conflicts multiplied as clans and clan membership expanded, necessitating more sophisticated methods of conflict resolution. When disputes arose between different clans, the parties involved sought arbitration from individuals respected for their wisdom. In some areas, such as Shambaa, Yimbo, Nandi, and Unyiha, the immigrant groups or families assumed political leadership over those whom they found already settled. In other areas the immigrants were absorbed into the local social set-ups. In both cases internal migrations set into motion processes of cultural and political integration which continued into the colonial period.

The period 1500–1800 therefore saw a movement towards political centralization and the evolution of larger and larger linguistic and social groups. A number of factors dictated in favour of the expansion of political scale. There was, for example, the need for more effective means of defence than those offered by the clan or the village and to expand areas of economic activity. But while a variety of societies emerged in the East African interior the two that contrasted most conspicuously were the pastoralists and farmers.

Pastoralists, like hunters, were parasites upon herbivores. Like hunters, too, they pursued a wandering life, travelling comparatively large distances in search of grass for their animals. They often followed a regular migrational pattern designed to discover the richest feeding and watering grounds for their herds at each season of the year. Above all, the pastoralists

47. S. Feierman, 1968, pp. 1–8.
had to protect their herds from rival carnivores, whether animals or men. Such a life required articulate leadership and clearly defined lines of authority to determine routes of march and take command in emergencies whenever rivals attempted to intrude upon the community’s traditional pastureland or steal their flocks and herds.\(^{51\text{a}}\)

The political history of the Kenya–Tanzania interior partly depended on population growth which was made possible by a farming existence and the disciplined politico-military organization required by pastoralism. The balance tipped in favour of one or other protagonist, depending on the fluctuations in social organization and cohesion, and on the development of technology. By 1800 the pastoralists were beginning to lose both economic and military power to the farmers who were rapidly perfecting their political institutions through social integration and the expansion of their farming capability. The pastoral Maasai, in particular, declined militarily and economically throughout the nineteenth century due to cattle diseases, epidemics and civil wars.\(^{52\text{a}}\)

It could thus be said that the pace of socio-political evolution throughout the Kenya–Tanzania interior was accelerated by the increased variety of societies and stimulated by migrations.

By 1700 two main types of socio-political organization existed in the Kenya–Tanzania interior. Societies such as the Kikuyu, Miji-Kenda, Kamba and Maasai lived in scattered independent settlements in minor or major patrilineages and clan groups with no form of centralized, traditional bureaucracy. Decentralization, however, as shown later, did not mean disorganization or lack of political or social cohesion. Decentralized societies had family, village and neighbourhood councils. At the highest level they had clan or district councils made up of elders, and from these elders was chosen the ruling council. Group relationships were maintained among family, clan and neighbourhood members, and these relationships defined and governed the actions of individuals and established mutual obligations and rights. Indeed, among the Kikuyu the idea of individual initiative was sharply discouraged as self-seeking, ‘whereas concepts of corporate effort and group responsibility were regarded as the cardinal virtues’.\(^{53\text{a}}\)

Conversely, the centralized (or centralizing) societies, such as the Shambaa, Pare, Sukuma, Nyamwezi and Wanga, entertained rudimentary chiefly bureaucracies that provided socio-political control. By the end of the eighteenth century some of these groups, such as the Shambaa and Pare, had strong despotic kings and paramount chiefs, assisted by various councils, ministers and district chiefs.

Let us look at specific cases of these developments. Before 1300 central Tanzania was occupied by scattered populations of settled agricultural Bantu, the cattle-herding and Kushitic-influenced Mbugu, Gorowa, Burungi, Alagwa and Aramanik, and the hunting and gathering Sandawe

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52. G. S. Were and D. A. Wilson, 1972 edn, pp. 89–96.
and Hadzapi. They lived in villages, the ruins of some of which – particularly those of the Bantu farmers – are still scattered all over Tanzania. These early villages governed themselves on family lines, authority being vested in the hands of two or three influential families. Indeed, most Tanzanian communities seem to have recognized the importance of some
kind of organization from the time they migrated and settled in their respective areas. But because the migrations were individual or small-group migrations, the organization also emphasized kinship ties. Within each kinship group there were seeds of political leadership.

Among the Pare, the first stage of articulate political leadership was accomplished when each clan established itself in its territory and accepted one ritual leader whose descendants would succeed him. Thus the religious needs of the community were at the heart of Pare political evolution. After settling in an area, each Pare group gradually established its mpungi (sacred shrine) which linked it with the ancestors who had founded the group and, periodically, all members gathered to worship. As the population increased it became necessary for people of different clans to come together. 

The formative period, when clans first came together, is enshrouded in myth, but Isaria Kimambo says that about 'sixteen generations ago' a leader from the Washana iron-smiths emerged who was recognized by many Ugweno clans as their chief. The Washana were later overthrown by the Wasuya who took over the loose political organization that had existed and established a centralized state. Angovi was the coup-maker but it was his son, Mranga, who consolidated the Ugweno state. Kimambo considers Mranga 'one of the great' political reformers of Tanzania:

He transformed what were hitherto clan initiation rites into an elaborate state institution with unlimited coercive powers. He organized a hierarchy of councils, he maintained a large group of officials wholly dependent on him and, finally, he sent his sons to rule districts and thus expanded the kingdom over the whole plateau of North Pare.

At the apogee of its power the Ugweno state had at its head a Mangi Mrwe (paramount chief) who was assisted by a council of ministers and the wamagi (district chiefs).

As already explained, population expansion aided by the emergence of ritual leaders and iron-smith experts, led to the coalescence of clans for mutual political and economic benefits in Ugweno (and later the entire Pare Highlands). North Pare, for example, formed a single geographical unit which allowed a greater concentration of population. In addition, were the resolute leaders whose wealth and claim to supernatural powers attracted followers beyond their lineages.

Bukoba was another area of Tanzania where chiefly institutions were strong by 1600. Several ruling lineages had evolved among the agricultural communities, including Karagwe, the Buhaya states, Buzinza and the Ha states. Their political system, which was more centralized than in other Tanzanian states, involved control of land and cattle in such a way that the tribute system was more exploitative. These states belonged to the

Further south, by 1600 many chiefships had sprouted all over Tanzania resembling one another in many ways. For example, each consisted of a small group of villages and neighbourhoods ruled by a single chief whom the villagers appointed from the ruling lineage. Such chiefs were known as *ntemi* or *mtemi*. The chief presided over the chiefdom’s councils and supreme court. He was the holder of special regalia or rulership symbols, such as sacred spears. He also maintained a royal fire from which all fires of his chiefdom were supposed to be kindled.

The striking similarity in the organization and regalia of these chiefdoms at one time led scholars such as Roland Oliver and J. D. Fage to propound the theory of common origin, ultimately from the Nile valley and immediately from local Ugandan, Rwandese and Burundi examples. But scholars of Tanzanian political history have repudiated such diffusionist (at times racist) theories. Kimambo, in particular, has argued that the problem of explaining similarities between African political units, at regional or continental level, has to be sought in agricultural peoples, and the differences in the scale of organization have to be understood in terms of adjustment both to local environment and to special external factors.

Andrew Roberts tells us that the origins of numerous Nyamwezi chiefdoms are probably not to be sought in any single process of migration or diffusion: they sprang from the Nyamwezi environment. ‘From an early stage – just how early, we cannot say – certain men were respected as rainmakers and magicians, as pioneers in opening up woodland and as arbitrators in dispute.’ It was from these roots that the Nyamwezi chiefships emerged. ‘A Nyamwezi (ntemi) exercised both ritual and administrative power in a manner broadly similar to that of other chiefs in eastern and central Africa.’ But unlike in Upare where development was towards centralization, in Unyamwezi the small chiefdoms tended to increase in number, ‘not only through migrations, but also as a result of chiefdoms splitting up’. Only in the nineteenth century was there rapid centralization in Unyamwezi ‘due to expansion of trade’ and the emergence of ruthless traders and organizers such as Mirambo.

Among the Fipa of south-western Tanzania, the earliest traditions of origin are tied up with the origin of the (Mlansi) Fipa kingdom. According to one version, recorded by Roy Willis, ‘the first man in the world, who was called Ntatakwa, fell from the sky when the world began and founded the Mlansi line of chiefs’. The early settlers of Ufipa were farmers who lived in compact villages. This encouraged a collective defence arrangement which culminated in the building of fortifications. The ruling lineage,
which most probably came from around Lake Mweru, seems to have derived its power from its iron-smithing skills. ‘The fact that the present chief of Milansi is an ironsmith, a hereditary occupation,’ Willis has argued, ‘supports the theory that the founders of the Milansi chiefdom were themselves smiths.’ Milansi traditions indicate that the first ruler, Ntatakwa, sent out his sons to found villages and govern other parts of the country. The Fipa kingdom seems to have been a confederation of chiefdoms ruled by related chiefs.

Later in the eighteenth century, the Fipa political style was changed due to an invasion by some pastoralists from the north who introduced political ideas resembling those of Buganda, Bunyoro and Ankole. They introduced a principle of government not based on relationships between ‘father chiefs’ and ‘son chiefs’, as formerly practised in Ufipa, but on a personal bond of loyalty between a ruler and a number of followers chosen by him. These rulers at the periphery had no kinship relation with the king. There was probably a coup which overthrew the traditional ruling Milansi lineage and ushered in the Twa dynasty. Some of the lesser chiefs, still loyal to the Milansi dynasty, apparently had to be overcome by force. The Twa, however, did not rule in peace, as Ufipa was again invaded towards the end of the eighteenth century, by the Nyiha who burnt down Milansi villages. By 1800 civil war between the two rivals for the Twa kingship was still raging.

Clearly, between 1500 and 1800 a number of ntemi chiefships, of varying sizes and centralization, sprang up in Tanzania in response to human, political and economic needs. They were shaped by the physical and human environment and, while centralization and economic expansion was the objective of most Tanzania states, the process of nation-building was often painful. Sometimes, as with the Nyamwezi, these states faced fission or secession. Sometimes, as with the Fipa, they faced coups and civil wars. In many ways they faced similar nation-building problems to those faced by modern African states.

In western Kenya, the Luo seem to have emphasized their kinship system, ancestral cults and hereditary leadership, with the result that they tended to form jural communities organized around ritually important meg-piny (land-owning clans) and their nominally hereditary leaders. When they arrived in Nyanza they tended to create polities that were more centralized and stratified than the earlier communities. And, while the Luo clans and lineages were equal in most respects, the presence of chiefly, priestly and commoner groups indicated a degree of clan inequality rarely found in Kenyan societies.

Probably the best elaboration on the Luo socio-political system in pre-colonial times is that by Peter C. Oloo Aringo in his study of the Alego Luo. He agrees with B. A. Ogot that, at the highest level of political

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62. R. G. Willis, 1968, p. 84.
organization, the Luo were divided into twelve or thirteen ogendini (sub-ethnic groups) of varying sizes. Membership of the sub-ethnic group was through gweng’ (pl. gwenge), a semi-autonomous political and territorial unit. Ideally gweng’ was occupied by clansmen but parts were often leased to jodak (stranger lineages and clans), ‘either because of the latter’s part in assisting in the conquest of the new territory, or on terms laid down by the dominant clan who claimed to possess all land in the territorial unit. Gweng’ society, thus, tended to be a plural society.’

The highest political council in any gweng’ was the buch jodong gweng’ (council of the elders). In Alego, membership of this council was open to all heads of lineages of the dominant clan, with only select and talented representation by the elders of jodak communities. (In Yimbo, another Luo chiefdom, there was no such discrimination.)

The green’ council was the custodian of clan land. It accepted or rejected new strangers and acted as the final court of appeal in cases affecting the gweng’. It also carried out ritual ceremonies and declared war or negotiated peace with other gwenge. A decision of the jodong gweng’ was binding on all subjects: those who defied its regulations and decisions could be cursed. An effective curse of jodongo was believed to inflict chira (an incurable disease supposedly imposed by the ancestors on the wrong-doers and his descendants). The gweng’ council could also expel persistent criminals and their families from the territorial unit and inflict corporal punishment and fines on wrong-doers for various crimes.

Above the gweng’ council was the buch piny (council of the sub-ethnic group). Members of this council were the heads of the various gweng’ councils, together with prominent diviners, healers, rainmakers and outstanding warriors. The buch piny was usually chaired by the ruoth or wuon piny (chief). The council dealt with major political, judicial and economic matters affecting the piny (territory of a sub-ethnic group) – such as murder, cattle-theft, boundary disputes, famine, pestilence, invasion, defence, trade and inter-clan and inter-gweng’ conflicts. In a few centralized pinje, such as Yimbo, the buch piny was an effective instrument of control and coercion. In places such as Sakwa or Asembo, where centralization was yet to be achieved, the buch piny tended to have limited powers and confined its role to arbitration in internal disputes.

The Kalenjin, who have lived for centuries in the western highlands of Kenya, formed a typically decentralized society. B. E. Kipkorir says that until the 1800s the political system was egalitarian and decentralized. The elders and influential specialists monopolized authority. Eloquence, the ability to voice acceptable views at councils, and a command of precedence and custom were considered important for political leadership. Above all, a man had first to distinguish himself as a happily married and socially
established member of a clan or neighbourhood community to be accorded the accolade of leadership. Among the Nandi, a section of the Kalenjin, there is evidence to indicate that between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries a new dimension of governance of society entered the scene in the adoption of a spiritual leader called the orkoiyot (pl. orkoik). H. A. Mwanzi asserts that while the socio-political structure of Nandi society remained largely unchanged, with the clan and neighbourhood councils as the basis of social and political life, by the end of the nineteenth century the orkoiyot had transformed the Nandi polity into a theocracy with himself as the sovereign.67

In time the orkoiyot was able to demand a share of the war booty and to impose his authority over sectional and neighbourhood councils through having his personal representatives as consultants to each council. This intervention in the political field created strong ties between the sectional warriors and the orkoik, but in many other matters the orkoik had little direct power or influence. There is evidence to suggest, however, that by 1890 the Nandi orkoik, like the Maasai laibons (ritual leaders), were beginning to pretend to a greater degree of political authority than their predecessors had envisaged. These pretensions were encouraged by the regional councils which had profited from the orkoik’s ministrations, and had consequently developed an unreasoning belief in his supernatural attributes.

Thus, a special class of officials was created among the Nandi to maintain communication between these councils and the orkoiyot. These officials accompanied the warrior leaders when the orkoiyot’s permission was sought for a projected raid. They also acted as secret-service agents for the orkoiyot, so that he could be kept informed of events and public opinion in their areas. These arrangements progressively centralized Nandi society in the second half of the nineteenth century.68

Conclusion

Scattered all over Kenya and Tanzania by 1800 was a bewildering number of differing Nilotic, Kushitic, and Bantu-speaking communities. Only in the Great Lakes areas of East Africa had there developed large states and kingdoms.69 In the Kenya-Tanzania interior, the typical polity was small and clan-oriented. Most Bantu-speakers were farmers, though wherever possible they kept and prized their livestock. Pastoralists, such as the Turkana, Oromo and Maasai, with their more aggressive societies, controlled substantial portions of territory between the agricultural Bantu.70 Along the coast were the Swahili city-states, dominated by local Arab

69. See ch. 26 above.
oligarchies. The city populations were mixed, the dominant language being Swahili, and the tempo of life considerably different from that of the interior.

The end of the eighteenth century marked the end of independent East African growth – centuries of Iron Age growth during which most inland people were isolated from outside influences. Soon after 1800 the independent people of Kenya and Tanzania were faced with events of new and often terrible meaning as great waves of Arab and European invasion intruded upon their lands. Much of their traditional civilization was seriously damaged or submerged in a rising flood of violence. Many long-established customs and beliefs were undermined and many ancient ways of keeping law and order set aside.

East Africa was badly placed to meet this harsh and sudden challenge from outside. Africa as a whole had fallen far behind the strong powers of the rest of the world in its ability to produce goods, whether for war or peace. After 1500 Europe had entered a period of far-reaching mechanical and scientific discovery and development. Inland Africa, by contrast, had not: it had continued instead with the steady but slow development of its own civilization. This Iron Age civilization had many achievements. There was much advancement and invention in the arts of community life, the adoption of new crops, the spread of metal-working skills, the growth of trade and, more important, the methods of self-rule and ways of keeping the peace. These were definitely important gains but they could not compete with the growing power of the strong industrialized nations of Europe. By 1800 the technical power of the Europeans was far greater than that of the Africans. By 1900 the power gap had become enormous. It underlay much of post-1800 African history and was part of the background to imperialism in Africa. It went far to explain the crisis which began after 1800, and although it did not make itself directly felt until after 1850, it had an indirect effect on the inland peoples long before that.


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Madagascar

The mould of modern Madagascar was cast in the course of the nineteenth century when the Merina of its heartland attained political supremacy, imposed a blend of their own and imported European features on many other populations, and became virtually the only Malagasy to be perceived by outsiders. The colonial period, which began with a military defeat of the Merina, made them even more omnipresent in the current century. Yet, beyond the impact of relatively recent events, there is a different and more inclusive past in which the three hundred years before 1800 stand as a monument in the history of Madagascar as a whole. It is almost certain that most of the inhabitants of Madagascar coalesced during these three centuries into the wider social, economic, religious, cultural and political aggregates that make up the Malagasy people today—the Antankara, Antandroy, Antambahoaka, Antanosy, Antemoro, Antesaka, Antefasy, Bara, Betsimisaraka, Betsileo, Bezanozano, Merina, Mahafaly, Sakalava, Sihanaka, Tanala and Tsimihety.¹

By the mid-sixteenth century there was an end to settlers from overseas who merged into new populations; some of the inhabitants of Madagascar had come into contact with Europeans, mostly Portuguese; and at least one of the more lasting and influential royal families, the Maroserana, had started to form. In the early 1600s Madagascar was a political honeycomb of mostly small and self-contained chiefdoms. Before the end of the century much of western Madagascar went under a Sakalava empire and several kingdoms emerged among the Highlanders like the Betsileo and Merina, among the south-eastern Antemoro, Antesaka, Antefasy and Antanosy, among the southernmost Antandroy, the south-western Mahafaly, and the

¹. As the ethnic names have never been standardized other spellings also exist. In general the prefix an- (or ant-) denotes ‘people of’ but is swallowed in everyday speech (viz. Antanosy = ‘Tanu’ as the Malagasy ‘o’ comes out as ‘oo’ or ‘ou’ in French); be- and -be reflect ‘many’ or ‘numerous’ and also ‘great’ to denote importance; and tsi- or -tsi is a negative. Excluded from the above list are some 70,000 Makua, descendants of Africans imported via Mozambique in the first half of the nineteenth century. Recent suggestions that a number of the main ethnic names were formed under Merina hegemony are incorrect.
Bara of the southern interior. In the same century contacts with Europeans became less confined and more intense at times as the Dutch, English and French East India Companies turned to the great African island; the slave trade shifted from exports mainly to Eastern Africa and Arabia via three outlets bunched up in the north-west to exports at several points of Madagascar’s vast coastal belt and toward the Cape, the Mascarenes and the New World; and fire-arms began to spread in relatively small quantities but not without instances of political impact. In the eighteenth century, the Sakalava empire and especially Iboina, its northern component, reached its apogee while a good part of the eastern littoral became politically united for the first time into the Betsimisaraka Confederation. Before 1800 the northern Sakalava and the Betsimisaraka were in a state of decline which could not be reversed because of events within and outside Madagascar. In contrast, a weak and disunited Imerina augmented its food production, increased its population, and underwent a political rebirth which gave the Merina a solid base for their future expansion.

Newcomers and coalitions

In time the Antemoro became famous in Madagascar as the only group to have a scribal tradition in Malagasy (using the Arabic script) before the 1800s and the people with special abilities in the domains of magic and religion. Full agreement is still lacking on the questions of when and where the ancestral Antemoro first landed in Madagascar, where they came from, the degree of their own Islamization, and their impact within the island. Earlier writers tended to place them in north-eastern Madagascar around the 1400s and to regard them as Arabs from Arabia. Even more recently, the extent to which Islam has been and is a real force in the past and present of the Antemoro has been questioned. Gustave Julien was the first scholar to propose an Eastern African origin, supported in the past decade on several grounds, along with the suggestion that the early Antemoro had Islamic religious training and organization but could not maintain either in the face of total isolation from the Islamic world. One aspect should remain beyond dispute: the Antemoro did not develop a society and state in Madagascar prior to the arrival of their ancestors at the Matitana river in the south-east. This is where both emerged after the ancestors intermixed

2. The prefix /- stands for ‘place of’ in toponyms; it is also found as a personal article in individual and group names; and it represents an African survival.
4. J. Faublée, 1958, p. 71. He was following A. Van Gennep, 1904, pp. 4–11, who demanded proof of Islamic origins. E. de Flacourt, 1661, p. 171, outlined the Muslim hierarchy in the south-eastern part of the island.
5. G. Julien, 1929, p. 75.
with the *tompon-tany* (master of the soil; original inhabitants). It is however possible to date rather closely the Matitana settlement because three Portuguese sea captains happened to visit the area at the right time, between 1507 and 1514. At a year apart, the first two neither found nor reported any ‘Moors’ there but did note that local residents were no strangers to trade with them.\(^7\) The third was sent directly to Matitana to establish a factory in 1514. By then Matitana had a ‘town densely inhabited by Moors’. After some six months of their opposition to a Portuguese commercial presence the *tompon-tany* forced him to abandon Matitana for good.\(^8\) As the ancestral Antemoro are the only serious candidates for the ‘Moors’ in this particular instance, the Matitana settlement must have developed between 1509 and 1513.

Written Antemoro traditions regarding both the formative period (‘when Matitana did not yet have seven villages’) and the ensuing centuries are not only documents which record events of the past but are also aspects of a self-reflective process. They tell us in general about encounters with those who inhabited the south-eastern littoral before the first Antemoro arrived; about newcomers steeped in patrilineal concepts meeting the *tompon-tany* who defined themselves in matrilineal terms; about not one but several arrivals of the ‘proto-Antemoro’ at Matitana and about the many conflicts among the newcomers themselves.\(^9\) Only the ultimate ancestor, Ramakararube, remains above all strife as he returned to ‘Maka’ (Mecca).\(^10\) In a more precise way, it was in the first three-quarters of the sixteenth century that the Antemoro prevented their own incorporation into one or more of the *tompon-tany* groups and formed a society dominated by and centred around four aristocratic and four sacerdotal clans. Indeed, most of what is known of Antemoro internal history well into the 1800s is but a reflection of conflict among the aristocratic Anteoni, Antemahazo, Anteisambo and Zafikasinambo, each clan having its own territory within the kingdom.\(^11\)

The *Andrianoni*, or ruler of all the Antemoro, could come from any of the four (sometimes collectively called Anteoni). At the same time, the sacerdotal clans vied for primacy in religious and cultural functions. The Tsimeto, Zafimbolazi, Anakara and Anterotri sought, for example, to be the guardians of sacred Antemoro manuscripts, (*sorabe*), to become the high priests of the realm, or to have the closest proximity to an *Andrianoni*

\(^7\) A. Grandidier *et al.*, 1903–20, Vol. I, pp. 18–19 and 48–9 for the visits of Ruy Pereira and Diego Lopes de Sequeira (who was much more than a sea captain) in 1507 and 1508.


\(^11\) These were reduced to three in the 1600s. The Anteoni and Antemahazo occupied the lower and middle Matitana. The Andrianoni’s capital was Ivato. The sacerdotal clans, collectively called Antalaotra, centred around Vohipeno. Cf. H. Deschamps, 1961, p. 93 and map on p. 110.
Fig. 28.1 Ethnic groups of Madagascar
Source: adapted from map of Madagascar from Early Kingdoms in Madagascar, 1500–1700 by Raymond K. Kent, © 1970 by Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. Map adapted by kind permission of the publisher.

Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century
and his clan. As could be expected, the aristocrats were not free of ambition to control the religious aspects of Antemoro society, while the Antalaotra sought temporal power as well. The divisions would blur in the 1800s as the sacerdotal Anakara gained a monopoly over both political and religious power, unchallenged until revolts by commoners began to erode it despite their suppression by foreign troops from Imerina.

When the Antemoro established themselves on the eastern littoral of Madagascar they found that it contained, besides several *tompon-tany* groups, other relative newcomers who had been there since earlier times. Concentrated among the Antambahoaka, the northern neighbours of the Antemoro, but also scattered along the central and southern sections of the eastern coast, were the descendants of Raminia, the Zafindraminia, whose great ancestors were also reputed to have been from 'Maka'. Various origins have been proposed for Raminia and his companions but there is agreement that their advent in Madagascar should antedate at least the fifteenth century. One of the few Zafindraminia traditions to survive without being incorporated into Antemoro texts suggests that - wherever Raminia ultimately came from - Eastern Africa provided an important point of transition en route to Madagascar. By the time of the Antemoro arrivals, the Zafindraminia enjoyed, on the whole, privileged positions among the *tompon-tany*, the ongoing custom (*sombili*) being that only a descendant of Raminia should slaughter domestic animals. As could be expected and as their own texts confirm the Antemoro ancestors sought to intermarry with the Zafindraminia females. There were rivalries over them but the unions were 'barren'. In the end the conflict became one between the more recent and the older newcomers creating considerable insecurity which was echoed in some oral traditions of the *tompon-tany* as a fight of two 'giants' (Darafify and Fatrapaitanana). The peak of this general conflict coincides with the emergence of the aristocratic Zafikasimamo as the new and powerful rulers at Matitana around 1550. Not without some difficulties, the Antemoro texts derive the Zafikasimamo founder (Zafikazimambobe) from Ramarohala, the immediate ancestor of the aristocratic Anteoni who represents the third indigenous generation and two of whose seventeen sons were founders of the aristocratic Antemahazo and Ante-

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14. Some thirteen *tompon-tany* are mentioned as group-names in Antemoro texts, with the Antemanampatra and Manankarunga as the more important ones. A small number of earlier newcomers called *Onjatsy* (phon. Undzatse) retained some privileges under the Antemoro rulers, some of whom married Onjatsy females.
15. *Inter alia*, Javanese, Shirâzi and Indian.
17. G. Mondain, 1910, pp. 52–5. The 'lack of progeny' is a symbolic claim.
isambo.\textsuperscript{19} While such genealogical texts show that it took several generations to become assimilated into the language and culture of the area, they also point to their own cohesive function. They require that the Zafikasimambo issue forth from the Anteoni and that they be given a proper aristocratic and local origin. Nonetheless, it is known from an independent source of the mid-1600s, well-acquainted with south-eastern Madagascar, that the Zafikasimambo were the last of overseas newcomers at Matitana and that their name came through a \textit{tompon-tany} female spouse.\textsuperscript{20} They were uniformly regarded as sacerdotal persons (\textit{ombiasa}) and scribes sent from Mecca fifteen decades from the date of writing (1658) to instruct the local inhabitants.\textsuperscript{21} The Zafikasimambo influenced the course of Antemoro society in some decisive ways after the 1550s. They took over the Zafindraminia ritualistic prerogative of \textit{sombili} and applied it with rigidity, as an economic and political tool; they reduced the freedoms of commoners; and they pushed religion into the centre of political life. They also settled the Antemoro–Zafindraminia conflicts by putting to death as many male descendants of Raminia as possible and by placing their women and children in confined areas.\textsuperscript{22} It could be said that the Zafikasimambo created the first strong Antemoro kingdom at Matitana and gave it two capable Andrianoni, namely Rabesirana (c.1580–1615) and Andriapanolaha (c.1630–60).\textsuperscript{23}

The ferment at Matitana had an impact beyond this homeland of the Antemoro. It produced, for example, expatriation which became a permanent feature of their society.\textsuperscript{24} As the sacerdotal clans sired more of the specialists than could be absorbed into the subdivisions of the Antemoro kingdom, it became a common practice to fan out among other populations and offer the special skills to those in need.\textsuperscript{25} This could be done either by itinerant \textit{ombiasa}\textsuperscript{26} or by those who took up residence, usually to serve a ruler. There are no satisfactory chronological steps through which to measure the impact of the Antemoro expatriates on other populations from the mid-1500s to the end of the eighteenth century. Yet, in a cumulative sense, there is little doubt that they came to assist (as perhaps the earliest pan-Malagasy) a major and ongoing political change – the transition from self-contained and inward-looking chiefdoms, uninterested in territorial expansion and frequently unaware of others at some distance apart, to

\textsuperscript{19} G. Mondain, 1910, pp. 56–9. The other sons were dème-founders.
\textsuperscript{20} E. de Flacourt, 1661, p. 17. It should be noted that \textit{mambo} and \textit{kazi} are titles found in south-east-central Africa.
\textsuperscript{21} E. de Flacourt, 1661, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{22} ibid., de Flacourt placed the pogrom in the 1630s.
\textsuperscript{25} See G. A. Shaw, 1893, p. 109, for one instance of Antemoro expatriation.
\textsuperscript{26} Phonetically \textit{umbias} (pl. and sing.) and often translated as ‘priest’, ‘medicine man’, ‘doctor’. \textit{Ombiasa} encompass a number of functions and have a number of categories into which they are subdivided among the Malagasy.
wider and more ambitious political unions. As is known from de Flacourt, the *ombiasa* from Matitana (the name Antemoro was not known to him) were not only the 'masters' of the *ombiasa* in other sections of the south-east; they also trained foreign religious specialists, some of whom may have been nothing less than pivotal in their own societies. Constant ferment at Matitana also led to occasional aristocratic exiles and the pogrom carried out by the Zafiksasimambo against Zafindraminia adult males must have sent not a few involuntary migrants towards the interior of Madagascar. From such exiles may have come the Zafirambo, rulers among the Tanala or Ikongo, some ancestors of nobility in future Imerina, or even the Zafindraminia among the Antanosy.

According to de Flacourt, the Zafindraminia came to Antanosy at the turn of the sixteenth century. Others have argued for a much later arrival there, around 1625. The earlier date appears to be the better one but, again, it is not improbable that the Zafindraminia newcomers among the Antanosy received an infusion of their co-descendants fleeing from Matitana. A Zafindraminia–Antanosy genealogy, which is far from being a reliable chronological document, suggests that there was a 'royal line' extending back for seventeen generations. In effect, written accounts by resident Europeans falling between 1614–80 as well as a study soon to be completed show in clear terms that the Zafindraminia were not able to create a centre of authority among the Antanosy. They introduced the *sombili* into the area; they excelled in the construction of wooden huts; they amassed cattle which was the main source of wealth even in a predominantly agricultural society; they had an idea of kinship and a 'will-to-power'; and they attained a position of privilege in the lands of Antanosy. Yet their acquisitive impulse, internal rivalries, and inability to find symbols that would transcend the needs of individual *Rohanbian* (as the highest Zafindraminia estate was called) and unite all of the Antanosy, all went against the formation of a single state ruled by the Zafindraminia kings. Instead, two parallel societies developed with the Zafindraminia copying the *tompon-tany* hierarchy. When the French established Fort Dauphin in Antanosy during 1643 the two societies were in a state of interpenetration not only as a result of exogamy but also because the upper estates on both sides

28. A somewhat suspect Antemoro text (or rather Antemoro-influenced) suggests that late in the 1800s (when the Merina were victorious in most of Madagascar) some of the early Zafindraminia had gone to Imerina.
29. E. de Flacourt, 1661, p. 5. In his preface de Flacourt placed the advent of Zafindraminia in Madagascar some 500 years before his time.
30. A. Grandidier oscillated between the two dates, for example.
32. R. K. Kent, n.d.
were shifting toward political centralization. During its three decades on local soil, from 1643 to 1674, Fort Dauphin deflected this process completely and political unity would continue to be elusive.33

The Zafindraminia were not kingdom-builders, the Antemoro represent a rare instance of newcomers who created their own society and state, but the Maroserana stand out as a pan-dynastic family, the most important one in the political history of Madagascar. Ultimately, the Maroserana would give rulers to the Mahafaly, the Sakalava of Menabe and Boina, to a part of the Antandroy and of the Bara. Once formed, like the Zafindraminia and the Antemoro, the Maroserana were no longer outsiders to Madagascar, unassimilated foreigners who maintained their own language and culture. The origin of the Maroserana and their formative period have been (as in the cases of other newcomers) matters of controversy. To begin with, the Mahafaly and Sakalava oral traditions are not in accord about the ultimate Maroserana ancestor or about where the 'proto-Maroserana' arrived from. Oral texts collected when most of the Sakalava were still independent advance two very different origins at the same time. One is assigned to Andrianalimbe from the interior of Madagascar and the other to Andrimandazoala from overseas.34 To compound the problem, a number of traditions claim that the Maroserana founder was Rabaratavokoka.35 The Mahafaly of south-western Madagascar, among whom the Maroserana were born sometime in the 1500s, have given Olembetsitoto as the founder of their royal family.36

These contradictions are in part responsible for the claims of some authors that the Maroserana originated, for example, in south-eastern Madagascar; that they were stranded Indians from India who had landed near present-day Fort Dauphin around 1300 and gone north and founded the Zarabehava, the royal family of the Antesaka; and that, from there, they had moved westward giving royal families to the southernmost Antandroy (the Zafy Manara), to the Bara of the southern interior (the Zafy Manely) and still later to the Mahafaly and the Sakalava.37 The term Maroserana has been interpreted to mean 'those who had many ports'—'nom donné surtout aux princes du sang que Radama I envoya comme gouverneurs aux divers ports de mer ou il établit des douanes'38—suggesting

33. ibid., see also below.
34. Cf. C. Guillain, 1845, pp. 10-11.
35. Inter alia, L. Thomassin, 1900, p. 397, where it is spelled Rabavavatavokoka. Still other traditions give him a father.
36. C. Poirier, 1953, pp. 34-5. In fact 'Andriamaroserana' is the generic name of the first Maroserana ruler whose skull, called Andriamaro, became the protector of all Mahafaly (see text below). The difficulty with Mahafaly genealogies stems from the political fact that there developed four states among this south-western group, complicating versions of the early royal tree.
an ancient strategy of coastal control. Several corrections have been made to all these claims in recent years, especially by reference to the primary sources.\(^{39}\) As the Antesaka royal traditions have stated, the ruling Zarabehava were a branch of the west-coast Sakalava who crossed Madagascar sometime before 1650 but not earlier than 1620.\(^{40}\) This passage is also attested by other evidence.\(^{41}\) Thus there was no dynastic Maroserana movement from east to west and there is no longer any real doubt that this family formed in south-western Madagascar. The Zafy Manely, royal family of Ibara, came from the south-west into the southern interior, not the other way around, while the would-be Indian origin is not supported by evidence, including linguistic items, as nothing Indian has ever been found in the Maroserana royal vocabularies. No less damaging to an Indian political influence is the span of some 250 years between the supposed arrival in 1300 and the birth of the Maroserana at about 1550. Finally, some 135 years ago, Charles Guillain showed in situ that a title instituted early in the 1800s by the Merina King Radama I (1810–28), with the intent of securing control over ports, did not have the same meaning at all in south-western Madagascar around 1840.\(^{42}\)

The two divergent Sakalava traditions are by no means antagonistic. Andriamandazoala and Rabaratavokoka mean respectively 'Lord-who-withered-the-forest' and 'Noble-bent-reed'. As both the Mahafaly and the Sakalava renamed their departed monarchs (this linguistic taboo is called anaratahina in Mahafaly and fitahina by the Sakalava), and since their idioms did not tolerate the use of the word 'dead' in respect to monarchs no longer living, it is likely that the idea of a 'bent' reed (reed being a concept analogous to the Zulu uthlanga)\(^{43}\) points to Rabaratavokoka as a fitahina for Andriamandazoala. Another argument in favour of this fitahina is the absence of any tomb for Rabaratavokoka and the claim that Andriamandazoala always had one (although it was found empty when opened).\(^{44}\) The tomb of Olombetsitoto is in Mahafaly.\(^{45}\) At the same time, newcomers from the interior (possibly exiled by other newcomers) – represented by


\(^{41}\) See J. Boto, 1923, pp. 252–3. In addition a number of wars were fought by the Sakalava while crossing the interior, leaving memories behind.

\(^{42}\) C. Guillain, 1845, p. 11, note 1. He was told near Tuléar that the term maroserana meant 'many paths' reflecting the custom of the first Maroserana kings in Mahafaly to place their residences in the middle of habitations with paths radiating in all directions to villages around them; but Guillain did not find the explanation satisfactory. He was also aware what meaning had been assigned to the term in Imerina.

\(^{43}\) Cf. C. Callaway, 1870, pp. 2–3 and note.

\(^{44}\) Reported by E. Birkeli, 1926, p. 32.

\(^{45}\) M. A. Marion, 1971.
Great-Lord-'Ali (Andrianalimbé) – and those from overseas – reflected in the person of Andriamandazoala – gravitated toward each other through both coalition and conflict, a pattern for newcomers in Madagascar. It is highly probable that some of the Maroserana ancestors arrived in southwestern Madagascar by a sea route. The ruling Maroserana branch among the Sakalava was known as the Zafivolamena (Sons-of-gold) while the tombs of Maroserana rulers in Mahafaly are still called volamena (red silver, i.e. gold). There certainly are traditions which claim that a large amount of gold was unloaded near present-day Tuléar by the Sakalava-Maroserana ancestors. Given that gold was neither found nor mined in the entire southern half of Madagascar (Portuguese sailors showing gold encountered indifference among the coastal inhabitants in the 1500s), traditions which record that it was imported cannot be wrong in substance. Equally, the fact that volamena became a sacred (fady, faly) metal is a reflection of its pan-dynastic agents. With the proximity of vast Rhodesian gold mines, with men capable of bringing it to Madagascar in a single crossing (the Afro-Arab traders or even self-exiled Portuguese holding on to large quantities of gold with nowhere to go) and with the presence of several words and customs in Madagascar with parallels in Rhodesia, one can hardly avoid the strong possibility of Maroserana–Mwene Mutapa connections.

Some extremely interesting traditions, collected and published by a Sakalava at the turn of the 1900s, throw light on the Maroserana beginnings. They point to initial failures of newcomers to the south-west to become politically established, with many starts which led nowhere in particular. They reveal that political successes were not forthcoming until kinship evolved with local chiefly families, grouped under the name of a nearby forest, the Analamahavelona. They also reveal that innovation was an important asset to the early Maroserana. They had a sense of territorial expansion; they began to introduce fortifications and build on elevated sites; they used irregular soldiers; they arbitrated disputes; they knew how to attract followers by redistributing food and cattle (their first capital was known as Itsororobola, a name suggesting a constant flow of abundance); and they began using pre-existing diviners for the purposes of state.

46. Andrianalimbé may have a better translation as simply ‘nobles by the tens of thousands’ (andriana = lords, nobles + ali, from alina = ten thousand, and mbelhe meaning numerous, many). Andriana should not be understood as a functional title that applied to those in office.

47. Tovonkery, 1915, p. 7.

48. R. K. Kent, 1970, passim. Nonetheless, the nature of the connections may not be direct in terms of customs and until parallels can be increased beyond the most disputable levels, by additional research on both sides of the Mozambique Channel, a Zimbabwean origin of some Maroserana ancestors will remain controversial.

49. Analavelona is a ridge in the Fiherenana valley, partly parallelling the western coast between the rivers Fiherenana and Mangoky.

analogous situation obtained among the Mahafaly where alliances with the chiefly families – the Andriantsileliky – interrupted by several years of conflict, ended in the Maroserana political supremacy. Yet the chiefly families retained many important privileges and were not dispossessed. It would appear that a combination of the high birth rate among the Maroserana and attempts to adhere to primogeniture in royal succession began to issue forth endless collaterals and princes without the right to rule. The Sakalava texts (sometimes by ‘extending’ the Maroserana genealogy back in time) refer to this bifurcation into the legitimate rulers and collaterals as the volamena and volafotsy (white silver) phase. It was probably as a response to this problem that new lands (orin-tany) came to be actively sought, assisting nonetheless an expansion of Maroserana influence, as non-ruling kin were given villages to rule over. But this problem would not go away, even as late as the 1800s, and it led from time to time to self-exile of the collaterals (longon’mpanilo or vohitsy mananila), alliances with opponents of the Maroserana and even to the formation of rival dynastic families, like the Andrevola, rulers of the Fiherenana valley who would give the Maroserana a great deal of trouble.

Outsiders and their impact

The accounts of outsiders from Europe who visited Madagascar prior to the colonial period have had one cumulative and lasting effect. They are and will continue to be of inestimable value to the study of the island’s past. Such a unilineal view cannot be advanced in respect to what the local impact of Europe had been by about 1800. In a general way, the sixteenth-century Portuguese affected negatively the Muslim-dominated trade and its outlets in the western Indian Ocean. At the turn of the 1500s Madagascar had four such outlets, one near the north-eastern town of Vohemar and three in the north-west, not far from present-day Majunga. The north-western trading posts were located on small islets in the Bays of Mahajamba, Boina and Bombetock. They were controlled and inhabited by communities of Swahili-speakers who exported mainly rice and slaves to Eastern Africa and Arabia. Their north-eastern counterpart, called Iharana, was different in several respects. The Iharanians lived on the mainland, they did not rival the north-west in exports of grains and humans, and they were in essence an original local culture of long-standing.

52. Many of the sources will be found in the COACM, Vols. I–IX (1903–20), started and inspired by Alfred and Guillaume Grandidier, the main editors. The volumes do not go beyond 1800 and there is no comparable collection for the nineteenth century as yet.
centred around the polished stone and building crafts. Moors from Malindi were reported as the founders of Iharana by the Portuguese in the early 1500s and there is little doubt that it began to decline only after Europe interfered with Muslim commerce in the Indian Ocean. By the eighteenth century Iharana was a ghost and its material culture died out without reappearing in any solid fashion elsewhere in the Great Island. In 1506 the Portuguese attacked the main Swahili trading post in the northwest, called Lulangane (on the islet of Nosy Manja in the Mahajamba Bay). They planned to destroy Boina without a clear result and they spared Bombetock altogether as its Shaykh proved to be friendly. The Portuguese also discovered a dense colony of Africans further north, in the Bay of Anorontsanga. Some two thousand strong, they massed on the beach armed with bows and arrows (weapons which have since disappeared from Madagascar) as well as spears and shields, but changed their mind before a battle could take place and disappeared inland. Their huts were burned as the ‘whole mountain seemed ablaze’. Yet this particular colony was not a part of the Muslim trade network: the Africans in question were escaped slaves from Malindi, Mombasa and Mogadishu.

After a bellicose beginning, however, the Portuguese in Mozambique changed their tune and began to send a ship annually to north-western Madagascar for cattle, ambergris, raffia cloth and slaves. According to Do Couto, his compatriots even became the most active buyers of slaves from the north-western middlemen by the mid-1500s. In adding to the demands for exports, the Portuguese were a factor in the emergence of several minor political unions on the north-western mainland, not very far from the Swahili trading posts. There were no less than five such new groupings along the littoral and partly inland between latitudes 14° S and 16° S. One of the five was growing rapidly in importance under a ruler whose title was Tingimaro, called with exaggeration the ‘most powerful rei in the island’, who was ‘continuously at war with his neighbours’. Tingimaro was visited half a century later, in June 1614, by Father Luis Mariano of the Order of Jesus in Mozambique. He travelled three times some twenty-four kilometres inland to Tingimaro’s capital of Cuala and back in the hope of securing a religious (and Portuguese secular) foothold in a state which the coastal middlemen were beginning to fear. After one of Tingimaro’s subjects underwent a poison ordeal to ascertain the

55. For an outline of previous work on Iharana, see P. Vérin, 1971, pp. 225–9. P. Gaudebout and E. Vernier, 1941, remain the starting point of description.
60. ibid.
61. ibid., war prisoners were sold to the coastal middlemen.
62. Samamo, the Swahili ruler of New Mazalagem told Paulo Rodrigues da Costa in
intentions of Father Mariano he was well-received but Tingimaro refused a treaty with the Portuguese and would not allow any missionary activity inland.  

He was a Buque (from the Swahili wa-Buque), the name the Portuguese adopted to distinguish speakers of Malagasy from the Cafres on the mainland of Madagascar who spoke Bantu idioms, but one by which the Swahili-speakers designated all the inhabitants of the island. As Tingimaro eventually came to control also the Bay of Anorontsanga, it would appear that the colony of escaped slaves from the Swahili coast of Africa had been absorbed by the Buques in close to five generations.

In the late 1580s, the Moors of Mazalagem (the names ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Mazalagem were given to the trading posts in the Bays of Mahajamba and Boina by Europeans, in a variety of spellings) refused to trade with the Portuguese and a Dominican priest seeking local converts lost his life. Only royal orders from Lisbon prevented a war but not before a show of force and some reprisals against Moors outside Madagascar. In 1590 north-western Madagascar was placed in the trading zone of the Mozambique Island. Several attempts were made between 1614 and 1620, especially by the ubiquitous Father Mariano, to establish a church in north-western Madagascar. As a recently published diary makes clear, this did not serve the Christian cause. Relatively lax local practitioners of Islam, who seldom went to the mosque, were driven to more rigorous observances and tighter ties with the Sunnite Muslims from Eastern Africa and Arabia. About half a century later, in 1667, Father Manuel Barreto was able to write that he had:

Often heard Bartholomew Lopes, a man of great judgement ... and well experienced in voyages to Madagascar, say that if the king (of Portugal) would give him six armed vessels with oars, carrying Portuguese soldiers, he would go there with his launch and several boats manned (by) Kaffirs of another race and would prevent any ships of the Moors from Mecca, Brava and Magadoxo, putting into the island to carry on the trade in Buques, of whom they make Moors, at the rate of more than three thousand and a half every year, there being sheiks in various ports for this purpose, who in the course of

1613 that his uncle and himself had been forced to abandon Old Mazalagem by Tingimaro and that he feared attempts by Tingimaro to capture New Mazalagem too.


64. Madagascar was only called Ubuque in the north-west and the distinction between Buques and Cafres in Da Costa’s Diário and Mariano’s accounts was deliberate.


66. King to de Meneses, 6/2/1589, BFUP, I, 302.


68. Placed, that is, from Goa.


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the year buy and catechise them, to the great opprobrium of the Christian name.\footnote{See supplement to M. Barreto, 1899, pp. 503–4.}

The Portuguese also signed several treaties with rulers along the western littoral of Madagascar in 1613 and a Jesuit mission was sent to the Kingdom of Sadia, on the Manambovo river in 1616 and 1617. The mission triggered a civil war which had been in the making for some time\footnote{L. Mariano, \textit{Letter}, 24 May 1617, in A. Grandidier \textit{et al.}, 1903–20, Vol. II, p. 236.} and which would have important consequences in the foundation of the Sakalava kingdom of Menabe. In 1641 the Portuguese formally annexed western Madagascar in a Luso–Dutch treaty.\footnote{G. M. Theal, 1898–1903, Vol. I, p. 407. It was ratified in Portugal and Holland in 1641 and 1642.} But, in practical terms, this meant little more than the wishful thinking of Mozambique’s main trader with Madagascar. Indeed, by 1700, north-western Madagascar was under Sakalava–Maroserana control and, just a century later, the Malagasy would come to raid not only Portuguese vessels in the Mozambique Channel but also their bases at the Querimba and Ibo islands.\footnote{See E. de Froberville, 1845.} It is certain that some stranded Portuguese had been in southern Madagascar sometime between 1510 and 1550 and stories linking them with a large quantity of gold were recorded by de Flacourt.\footnote{E. de Flacourt, 1661/1920, pp. 32–4.} One such group settled in Antanosy, where a small stone fort (\textit{trano-vato}) was found bearing inscriptions, and some of the Zafindraminia claimed inter-marriage with the Portuguese who were absorbed without leaving much of an impact behind in this part of the island.\footnote{L. Mariano, \textit{Relation}, in A. Grandidier \textit{et al.}, 1903–20, Vol. II, pp. 41–8; E. de Flacourt, 1661/1920, pp. 32–4.}

It would appear that early in the 1600s the Portuguese took fewer slaves from Madagascar than their competitors from Africa and Arabia. Moreover, the Portuguese were paying considerably more. At the same time, the Comoro Islands became the point at which slaves and material items from Madagascar were collected for trans-shipment to Malindi, Mombasa, Mogadishu and Arabia (particularly the Gulf of Aden). Traders from Domoni, for example, obtained ‘abundant numbers’ of slaves from north-western Madagascar ‘because of everlasting civil wars’ among its rulers. In 1614, slaves were bought in Madagascar for nine or ten piasters and resold to the Portuguese for 100 piasters each.\footnote{Walter Peyton’s visit to Moheli, in A. Grandidier \textit{et al.}, 1903–20, Vol. II, p. 84.} As not a few of Domoni’s merchants spoke Portuguese ‘rather well’ at the time, it would seem that the Portuguese were shifting their commerce toward the Comoros. Also in 1614, Anjouan was reported teeming with male and female slaves from Madagascar about to be taken to Arabia and exchanged for Indian cotton.
and opium.\textsuperscript{77} Some three decades later, a dhow from Boina Bay (New Mazalagem) was seen at Anjouan with 500 slaves, mostly children and youths purchased for 'two to four pieces of 8th real'. At Anjouan they had already quadrupled in price, at Malindi they went for ten times more than at Boina and even this price doubled by the time they reached the Red Sea area.\textsuperscript{78} Dhows from Shihir, in the Gulf of Aden, also made direct voyages to Madagascar to buy rice, millet, young men and women.\textsuperscript{79} Clearly, the Portuguese were losing out to traditional buyers in Madagascar and – after about 1620 – they seem to have lost interest in the island altogether.

As the seventeenth century edged toward its second half, new buyers still began to visit Madagascar and they would hardly be confined to its north-western outlets. At least eight ships are known to have supplied the Dutch at Mauritius with rice and slaves from Madagascar, especially from the Bay of Antongil, between 1639 and 1647.\textsuperscript{80} A treaty was signed with Antongil's ruler in March 1642 which bound him to supply slaves only to the Dutch East India Company and, in 1646, Mauritius' third governor planned to build and arm a fort in that bay – but orders from Batavia halted further efforts from Mauritius.\textsuperscript{81} Until they began to make journeys to Madagascar from the Cape in 1655, the Dutch had frequent (and at times quite brutal) conflicts with the eastern Malagasy. They also took part in local conflicts. Yet the eastern littoral was disunited and neither a Dutch commercial presence nor occasional participation in local wars can be said to have produced any long-lasting effects. In the 1700s, however, the Dutch would combine with other Europeans to exert considerable commercial influence in several parts of Madagascar, more strongly along its western coast than elsewhere.

English vessels came to Madagascar hundreds of times between 1600 and 1800, mostly to its western shores and especially to the Bay of Saint Augustine. Sometimes eight or more ships would be moored there at the same time. Pidgin English became the local language of trade and some of the local residents took English names and titles.\textsuperscript{82} Puritans from England were sent to Saint Augustine Bay in 1645 to establish a colony. Five years later, another colonial venture was started at the north-western islet of Nosy Be. Both attempts failed, with considerable loss of life, the potential
settlements having been misled about Madagascar as an earthly paradise.\textsuperscript{83} Unlike the Portuguese and the Dutch, the English did not develop any bases around Madagascar but they nonetheless became the most active exporters of slaves from the island to the New World, especially to Barbados and Jamaica. A census taken at Barbados at the end of the 1600s showed 32,473 slaves, half of whom were from Madagascar.\textsuperscript{84} Not a few participants in the slave trade between 1688 and 1724 were English and American pirates. They visited all the trading sections of Madagascar but also had colonies at Diego Suárez, Bay of Antongil, and the eastern islet of Sainte-Marie. Pirates took part in local wars and contributed to a state of insecurity and the constant supply of humans for export.\textsuperscript{85} It was sometime in this period of the pirates that two marked changes could be noted in terms of trade and in items of exchange. First, as a variety of Europeans started to compete for the same suppliers, the coastal rulers converted this advantage into prices which mostly fluctuated upward. The second change may have been the consequence of the first as it became more and more expedient to trade discarded and faulty fire-arms for the much-sought-after slaves. As an English medical doctor put it in 1754: the fire-arms sold to the residents of Saint Augustine were of such poor quality that they often exploded maiming and killing those who used them.\textsuperscript{86}

France was the only one of Europe’s nations seeking a long-term foothold in Madagascar to register a modest success in the form of Fort Dauphin, a fortified settlement in south-eastern Madagascar which lasted just over three decades, from 1643 to 1674. At times, the French can even be perceived as occupying an intermediate position between ‘outsiders’ and ‘newcomers’. Many of the men at Fort Dauphin married local women. Among the better-known instances were those of Pronis, Fort Dauphin’s first governor, who married into the Zafindraminia Rohandrian, and of the French soldier nicknamed ‘La Case’ who came to Fort Dauphin in 1656, married an heiress-apparent in the northern reaches of Antanosy-land, and became a local military hero.\textsuperscript{87} Frenchmen also fought on loan to various rulers, using their fire-arms to great advantage at a time when few were as yet in local hands. The best-educated and the most durable of Fort Dauphin’s governors, Etienne de Flacourt (1648–58), author of two fundamental works about Madagascar,\textsuperscript{88} became in effect a local potentate, forced to fend for himself without much support from France. Indeed, not a single ship came to Fort Dauphin during half of his tenure as governor.

The impact of Fort Dauphin has been generally underestimated. It has


\textsuperscript{85} H. Deschamps, 1972, remains the basic work on the subject.

\textsuperscript{86} Account of Dr. Edward Yves, in A. Grandidier \textit{et al.}, 1903–20, Vol. V, p. 256.

\textsuperscript{87} See E. F. Gautier and H. Froidevaux, 1907, \textit{passim}.

\textsuperscript{88} E. de Flacourt, 1658/1913 and 1661/1920. See also A. Malotet, 1898.
PLATE 28.1  Etienne de Flacourt, governor of Fort Dauphin, Madagascar, 1648–58
two dimensions: one local; one wider. The Antanosy were, for example, about to attain their elusive political union with the Zafindraminina under the leadership of Dian Ramack, a former prince of the Matikassi subdivision who had been to Goa. Fort Dauphin became an obstacle. When ships no longer came to it (1650–4), a period of intense struggle for supremacy came into the foreground, with the Rohandrian newcomers on one side and the French outsiders on the other, and with most hut-dwellers and tillers of the land fleeing into the forests from the mounting violence. By 1653 Dian Ramack and many Rohandrian were dead and a number of chiefs made their submissions (mifaly) to de Flacourt who had no interest in becoming a builder of a local state. Matters grew worse after his departure but the Second French East India Company nonetheless made another colonial effort in Madagascar. Outposts were set up in 1665 at Antongil, Matitana and Sainte-Marie. In 1667, ten ships disembarked some 2000 colons and soldiers from France at Fort Dauphin. This prompted a series of mifaly as rulers in Antanosy gave up the struggle for good. Outside Antanosy, the French presence at Fort Dauphin accelerated the founding of Menabe by the Maroserana ruler, Andriandahifotsy, who sought an alliance with Fort Dauphin. Another case in point outside the Antanosy lands consists of the campaigns of La Case at Matitana where he ended the political supremacy of the Zafikasimambo. Fort Dauphin was abandoned in 1674 and its last residents were evacuated to Mozambique, India and Bourbon (now Réunion) but its thirty-year presence came to be felt in Ibara, among the southern Betsileo, in Antandroy and Mahafaly lands, as well as throughout south-eastern Madagascar.

As nearby plantation economies, the Mascarene Islands of Bourbon and Ile-de-France (Mauritius, abandoned by the Dutch in 1710 and occupied from Bourbon from 1715–21) were destined to have a disruptive impact on Madagascar, especially on its eastern side during the 1700s. In 1744 Bourbon exported 1.14 million kilograms of coffee and its population comprised 10,338 slaves and 2,358 whites. In 1797 over 80 per cent of its total population of 56,800 were slaves. In Mauritius — whose total population in 1978 was less than 43,000 — close to 36,000 slaves were counted and in 1797 over 83 per cent were counted as slaves among a total of 59,000 residents. It is generally agreed that most of the slaves imported into the two Mascarenes between 1664 and 1766 came from Madagascar but that the royal French administration which bought both Mascarenes from the French East India Company for over 7.5 million pounds sterling gradually supplanted the Malagasy with slaves from Africa. It should not be overlooked, however, that imports of slaves doubled between 1766 and

91. The formal decision was made in 1740 but slaves were sought even earlier in Mozambique and the reason for the change came from the Malagasy Maroon colonies which could not be dismantled: cf. C. Grant, 1801, pp. 75–8.
1788, the first generation of royal government, and that Madagascar was hardly left alone by the Mascarenes after 1766. By 1784, there was a royal agent at Foulpointe, the main outlet for the Mascarenes in Madagascar. Two years later, when a Polish-Hungarian nobleman and libertine named Benyowsky tried to interfere with Mascarene commercial interests in eastern Madagascar, he was shot by soldiers from Ile-de-France. In fact, north-eastern Madagascar, between Tamatave and Foulpointe, was becoming a satellite plantation for Mascarene entrepeneurs.

The western and northern states: Mahafaly, Sakalava, Antankara, Tsimihety

After the political success of the early Maroserana in the south-west, a new society emerged between the Menarandra and the Onilahy rivers. Its name, Mahafaly (to make sacred), is connected with social differentiation and with rituals of royalty. Traditions recall that the first Maroserana went into total seclusion, advised and protected by the ruler's ombiasa. He became sacred (faly) when no longer seen and, by extension, he made the land and the people on it maha-faly.92 The principal Maroserana deity, cranium Andriamaro, could not be seen either as it inhabited a misty peak and spoke only through a medium (vaha) to express its will. In a society with long-established pastoral habits and little love of authority, Andriamaro seems to have been able to impose a moral code based on fear.93 After the Maroserana came to power, Mahafaly society consisted of the privileged (renilemy), the commoners (valohazomanga), and those who came to Mahafaly from elsewhere (folahazomanga). The descendants of the most powerful chief at the time of Marosenara's formation, Tsileliki (who-could-not-be-vanquished); his former subjects with special status; all those who came with the proto-Maroserana; and occasionally rewarded individuals or families: these became the new élite.94 Some of the numerous Mahafaly clans had special functions which brought them into proximity with the mpanjaka (king, chief, ruler), as royal smiths, for example, or collectors of honey for the court. The clans elected their own heads, who were confirmed as royal friends (rainitsy ny mpanjaka) and were assisted by their own high councillors (ondaty-bé). The Mahafaly kings had a chief priest, mpisoro, who presided over the group-altar, hazomanga-lava, where animals were sacrificed.95

Mahafaly history before 1800 is marked by conflicts with its neighbours, by the division into four separate and independent kingdoms (Sakatovo,

94. E. Mamelomana, n.d., passim; and Centre for the Study of Customs, University of Madagascar, n.d., pp. 1–3. Both were probably written in the early 1960s.
Menarandra, Linta and Onilahy), and by the annexation of lands belonging to the westernmost Antandroy (Karimbola). De Flacourt throws some light on the conflicts. He mentions an embassy of twelve Mahafales (Mahafaly) who came to Fort Dauphin in June 1649 from Dian Manhelle (not the anaratahina). They asked for French mercenaries to fight against a ruler of the Machicores (the generic name of the peoples of the southern interior, now spelt Mashicoro) who had taken many cattle from their king. De Flacourt agreed for the usual fee of half the cattle taken with the help of these men. By mid-1653, on the eve of Dian Manhelle’s own death, the people of the southern interior were in complete disarray, having lost two successive rulers in wars against him. It would appear that the Mahafaly were also parting in the 1650s – the given approximate date of the first two breakaway kingdoms, the Menarandra and the Sakatovo. Somewhat later, Menarandra would spawn two more kingdoms, the Linta (c.1670) and the Onilahy (c.1750), the northernmost of the Mahafaly states ruled by the Maroserana. It was one of the Menarandra kings who conquered the western Karimbola–Antandroy in the first half of the 1700s. An Antemoro influence can be detected in the Onilahy kingdom since its first ruler carried the Antemoro title of Andrianonina as his own name. There were six rulers in Sakatovo before 1800, seven in Linta, three in Menarandra (after the breakaway about 1750) and two in the Onilahy kingdom. The divisions reflect much strife among the Maroserana, but the internal history of the Mahafaly prior to the late 1800s is not well known as yet.

While the earliest political successes of the Maroserana took place among the tonpon-tany living south of the Onilahy, the largest waterway of the south-west, this dynastic family did not grow in political importance until some of its members crossed the river and went north into the valley of the Fiherenana, the area between the Onilahy and the Mangoky. This is where the Maroserana–Volamena were born and from where they crossed the Mangoky to become the dynasty of the Sakalava states, the Menabe and Iboina. There is no doubt that Andriandahifotsy was the founder of Menabe and most likely of the Volamena branch as well. As his fitahina states, he was the lord-who-humbled-thousands (Andrianihaninarinairo).

De Flacourt’s map indicates southern Menabe as the land of Lahe Fonti (lahe/dahe, man; fonti/fouti/fouchy/fotsy, white) before 1660. The findings of the Volamena and of Menabe have their religious and secular aspects. A royal moasy (priest), associated with crocodiles, Ndriamboay (noble crocodile), is credited with introducing the cult of the ancestors.

96. E. de Flacourt, 1661/1920, p. 263. It took fifteen Frenchmen and 2000 Mahafaly some twelve days to reach the Machicores and take 10,000 head of cattle and 500 slaves.
97. E. de Flacourt, 1661, pp. 74–5.
98. The Mahafaly–Maroserana genealogies and dates were worked out by Speyer, an Austrian, who spent thirty years among the Mahafaly and advised their last king, Tsiam-pondy (1800–1911). The dates are tentative.
99. E. Defoort, 1913, pp. 168 and 172, places the event close to 1750.
(dady) to the Maroserana so that the rulers became the Ampagnito-be (great royal ancestors; fathers of the people). In reward Ndriamboay was included in the Maroserana dady, either as the father (the idea of submission) of Andriandahifotsy or as his uncle, and given the posthumous name of Andriamisara ('ishara means to divine in Arabic). 100 Other traditions hold that it was Ndriamboay who carried out the sacrifice of Andriandahifotsy’s wife from whose blood came both the Volamena (silver which became red) and the name Menabe (Great Red). 101 Human sacrifices are known to have taken place in some Maroserana funerals but a more reliable tradition reveals that Andriandahifotsy’s spouse (a member of the numerous Sakoambe whose tombs are still near Morondava) managed to bring the first fire-arms to him during a crucial battle. 102 The ten weapons became part of the royal regalia 103 and her sons became the Volamena.

When the Maroserana came into contact with peoples of Menabe they were no longer in the lands of south-western pastoralists, and the tompon- tany of Menabe were quite different as well. The coastal belt roughly between Majunga and Morondava some 640 kilometres long, was inhabited by fishermen and farmers with few cattle. Excepting the densely inhabited Sadia (with a capital of 10 000 in 1614), most of its residents lived in small communities, had no weapons and constantly surprised Da Costa in this particular respect. 104 The 640-kilometre belt was known as Bambala. Its residents spoke not Malagasy but Bantu idioms: they were Cafres not Buques; and their language had been ‘made richer’ by the intrusion of Malagasy loan-words, without any linguistic flooding. 105 The origin of the Sakalava has been made into a greater problem than it should have been, particularly through linguistic arguments. They were from the Bambala coast, from Sadia, and they connected with the Maroserana somewhere near the Mangoky river, probably at one of its smaller affluents called the Sakalava. All traditions agree that the Sakalava were the outstanding warriors of their time and Mariano’s testimony confirms this function among the Suculamba of Sadia who had broken off in 1616 and were reported raiding far and wide by 1620. 106 Moreover, the dady cult, described by Mariano during his stay in Sadia, 107 was the model adopted by the Maroserana—Volamena. The Sakalava were the spearhead of political auth-

101. C. Betoto, 1950b, p. 3.
102. E. Birkeli, 1926, p. 33.
106. This was made clear by Mariano in his Letter of 24 August 1619; see A. Grandidier et al., 1903–20, Vol. II.
ority for the Volamena kings but the *dady* cult gave this authority a religious base which survived the formidable warriors and their direct descendants. A feature which came into Menabe from outside, probably not directly with the Maroserana,\(^{108}\) was the formula for making royal posthumous names with the prefix *andria* (lord, noble) and suffix *arivo* (thousand, thousands). While the variable infix usually depicted what a ruler had represented in local memory, the formula contained the political idea that a true king must have many subjects.

Southern Menabe (an area roughly between the Mangoky and Manambovo rivers) was under Andriandahifotsy by the early 1670s when this ruler was visited by a French cattle-trader from Fort Dauphin, who saw a disciplined army of some 12,000 men and received fifty prime bulls as a gift for the Fort's governor.\(^{109}\) By best estimates, Andriandahifotsy died around 1685. Conflicts over the succession left one of his sons, Tri-monongarivo (died c. 1718/19 as Andriamanetriarivo), at the helm of Menabe which he expanded\(^{110}\) and populated with many new subjects attracted from the south-western pastoralists.\(^{111}\) His younger brother, Tsimanatona (by *fitahina* Andriamandisoarivo), crossed the Tsiribihina river and went north with less than 1000 Sakalava warriors to found Iboina in the 1690s. As some of the royal names do not accord in oral texts and contemporary European accounts, it is difficult to tell whether Menabe had four or six rulers between 1720 and 1800.\(^{112}\) Nonetheless, it remained stable during this period apart from one case of regicide reported in the 1730s. In the ensuing decade an important alliance with the Andrevolana rulers of the Fiherenana valley was concluded through the royal blood-covenant (*fatidra*) which made the southern boundaries of Menabe safer. There was also a marriage alliance with a powerful ruler in western Imerina – an alliance which impelled his rival in central Imerina to seek the submission of Menabe toward the end of the 1700s but without success.\(^{113}\) In Iboina, protected from the south by its sister-state, Menabe, the Muslim trading posts and traders were brought forcibly under the royal Volamena protection. Analalava and Anorontsangana (once under Tingimaro) were added to the kingdom along with some new subjects. Majunga grew into the commercial capital of Iboina and its kings and their court at Marovoay attained a splendour unknown elsewhere in Madagascar. At the time of Andrianinevenarivo (known as Andrianbaga, died 1752), Iboina was at its height. Just as the influx of south-western pastoralists had

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108. The formula may have been Antemoro as some of their *sorabe* reflect it.
110. At its peak, Menabe encompassed the area between the Fiherenana and Manambao rivers, reaching unevenly inland to the massifs of Isalo, Midongy, Lava, Tsara and Bongo: cf. L. Thomassin, 1900, p. 397.
112. E. Fagering, 1971, pp. 22–4, attempts to resolve this problem.
virtually replaced the land cultivators in Menabe during the Maroserana ascent, now migrants from the north, moving south with their cattle herds, gradually absorbed most of the remaining Bambala populations.\(^{114}\) This meant not only the linguistic flooding-out of the Bantu-speaking \textit{tompon-tany} but also an adverse economic change which came at a time when the Sakalava states needed more, not fewer, inhabitants who could plant and harvest. Eventually, as it became harder to obtain agricultural labour from other parts of Madagascar, the Sakalava began to raid the Comoro Island and even south-eastern Africa.\(^{115}\)

The last three decades of Iboina, in the 1700s, evolved under a single monarch, Queen Ravahiny (c.1767–1808), who is usually credited with the stable government and economic prosperity of her lands.\(^{116}\) Nonetheless, Iboina began to decline during her rule. The Volumena had run out of dynamic kings by the 1750s while the Iboina Muslims, who had gone the Sakalava way constituted Iboina’s most dynamic element. As the Iboina–Sakalava followed the proper line of royal succession and accepted, not without periodic turbulence, three successive queens (Ravahiny was the third), the Muslims aimed at capturing the throne. Ravahiny’s son and heir-apparent was, for example, a Muslim convert and frictions between the silamos (from Islam/Islamos) and traditionalist Sakalava élites were not an asset for Iboina. Another weakness came out indirectly, by way of the eastern littoral where Count Benyowsky had persuaded a number of Betsimisaraka rulers to cease paying tribute to Iboina. Warriors sent in 1776 to punish the former tributaries and eliminate Benyowsky failed in their mission and some Sakalava even came over to his side,\(^{117}\) revealing thus to the peoples of the interior that Iboina was no longer omnipotent. Finally, Ravahiny handed Iboina a major long-range foreign policy error by deciding to support the ruler of central Imerina, Andrianampoinimerina, against other local rivals.

The Sakalava kingdoms were both despotic and regal.\(^{118}\) The rulers’ daily lives were regulated by the royal \textit{moasy} (priests) and nothing would be undertaken without sacerdotal advice. There was a Royal Council composed of six elders who resided at the court. The first minister, \textit{Manantany}, dealt directly with the many royal collaborators and his power usually expanded or shrank in inverse proportion to the king’s direct involvement in the affairs of state. An aide to the first minister, the \textit{Fahatelo}, was usually selected for his knowledge of clans and lineages as well as of Sakalava custom. Each village of any size had its own royal official (often

\(^{116}\) H. Deschamps, 1965 edn, pp. 101 and 104; M. A. de Benyowsky, 1790, Vol. II.
\(^{117}\) For the terms, see J. Vansina, 1962a.
\(^{118}\) This also shielded the Maroserana kings who could always blame their \textit{moasy} for errors of judgement when something went wrong. Several royal \textit{moasy} are known to have been put to death in Menabe under royal disgrace.
also called the *Fahatelo*) who saw that the royal rice fields were worked four days a week and that the royal cattle-pens were constantly renovated through various gifts since a regular tax did not exist and quotas were fixed according to position and ability to contribute. Officials called *Talempihitry* and *Hanimboay* acted as overseers of the *dady* cult to which all the Sakalava adhered. No monarch could rule without being in possession of the royal *dady* (ancestral Volamena relics), especially since a new king automatically became the sole intermediary with the sacred royal ancestors (*Ampagnito-be*). As custom ruled the Sakalava even more than the royal *dady*, its interpreters were highly regarded and the Royal Council of elders had its counterpart in the *sojabe* (village elders) concerned with the minutiae of social life.119 Royal relatives were often made into minor rulers (*mpanjaka*) through the *fehitra* (village fiefs, for lack of a better term) which assured their economic well-being but which gave them little political influence. This organization is a model which mutated in both Iboina and Menabe during the period from 1700 to 1800. Provincial governors often had considerable powers and sometimes declared their independence. Some of the monarchs had little regard or use for the channels of authority and royal power was often used differently at the ports which were the source of external wealth going directly to the throne.

The Tsimihety grew out of acephalous refugee groups from the eastern littoral, men and women who had fled the slave wars and settled with their cattle in the great Mandritsara plain that could be reached without scaling the high escarpment that divides much of eastern Madagascar from the interior.120 In contrast, the Antankara were the *tompon-tany* of Madagascar’s far north, people of the rocks (*ant-ankara*) which are such a visible mark of this part of the island. Neither had developed states121 on their own and both came to accept Maroserana collaterals (the Volafotsy, descendants of white silver, sons of non-Maroserana women and Maroserana royals) who could not rule among the Sakalava and who migrated into the northern interior in search of their own kingdoms. The Tsimihety, nonetheless, did not accept rule by the Volafotsy (or the Volamena) and deliberately adopted their collective name (*isi-mihety*) to indicate, by refusing to cut their hair, non-submission to Maroserana authority. Because a centralized kingdom failed to emerge among the Tsimihety their eighteenth-century history remains virtually unknown. They intermarried with the Iboina–Sakalava and the Antankara and although their numbers increased greatly before 1800 there were no serious external attempts to

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121. It would appear that a section of the Antankara coast was once controlled from the islet of Nosy Be by a powerful chief who had opposed Muslims and who was in the process of political expansion but perished in a gunpowder explosion along with his family: N. Mayeur, 1912, p. 128 and pp. 148–9.
place them under political control. This is all the more surprising as the Tsimihety had no warriors, paid no tribute and often crammed, with their herds of cattle, the high Sofia river valley, an artery of Iboina's political supremacy among the east-coast Betsimisaraka until the 1780s.

The Antankara reactions were quite different. Some came to place themselves under Iboina's founder and part of the Antankara would be under Sakalava control at one time or another well into the 1800s. Nonetheless, a royal line took among them, going back to a Volafotsy named Kazobe. A fully centralized kingdom did not evolve, however, until the time of his grand-nephew, Andriantsirotso, who ruled either from c.1697 to 1710 or between 1710 and c.1750, depending on the texts. Alternately in exile among the Betsimisaraka of Maroantsetra and a ruler forced to pay tribute to Iboina, it was Andriantsirotso who established the royal necropolis at Ambatosahana (where he had once fled from Iboina's King Andrianbaba). In the absence of a royal dady cult he introduced the unifying symbol of Antankara royalty, the saina, the flag with crescent and star brought back from Maroantsetra. He associated his power with a formidable female moasy who fashioned the royal amulets, mandrestrafy (purveyors of invincibility, sacred objects passed on from ruler to ruler), advised two of his successors and lived to be over a hundred years old. Andriantsirotso's son and successor, Lamboina (despite probable 'tele­scoping'), had one of the longest rules in Madagascar (the texts differ with 1710–1790 and c.1750–1802). He sired over thirty sons, according to tradition, and his rule had one outstanding feature in that it was without wars. With one attempted exception, he paid regular tribute to Iboina, some fifty outrigger-loads of tortoise-shell each year, and concluded a treaty with Benyowsky's envoy and interpreter, Nicolas Mayeur, in 1775. A decade later Lamboina was persuaded by Benyowsky to shift his allegiance to France and cease paying tribute to Iboina's kings, advice followed with brevity since the Count was himself killed in 1786. The Antankara political organization was borrowed from the Iboina–Sakalava without the dady cult. Officials analogous to the Fahatelo in Iboina were called Rangahy at Ambilobe (the later-day Antankara capital); the Royal Council, called Famoriana, was probably more powerful among the Antankara; and they, too, did not have a system of regular taxation and used the method of periodic collection (tatibato) to finance the state.

124. Although the royal Antankara family converted to Islam in the 1840s (in exile) the flag itself and its crescent had no connections with this religion other than visual (copy of the crescent).
126. N. Mayeur, 1912, pp. 119–24; C. Guillain, 1845, pp. 369–70.
States of the Interior: Betsileo, Merina, Sihanaka, Bezanozano, Tanala and Bara

The Betsileo derive their name from a ruler named Besilau who is known to have opposed the Menabe Sakalava expansion into the interior highlands during the 1670s, apparently with success (—silau/tsxileo, the invincible). Yet the populations that became known as the Betsileo in more recent years did not, on the whole, support internal attempts at political unity and came under one government only through external force in the 1800s. A mixture of diverse tompon-tany and newcomers, sometimes migrating in groups or as individuals in search of their own political fortunes, subdivided the Betsileo into four main states: Arindrano in the south, merging into Ibara; Isandra in the centre, facing west and the Sakalava; Lalangina in east-central Betsileo with the Tanala as neighbours; and Manandriana, the northernmost Betsileo state, closest to Imerina, the last to form and the first to accept Merina over-rule in the late 1700s. Although complex genealogical trees could be extended into the 1500s it is doubtful that kingdoms developed among the Betsileo before the 1650s. Isandra and Arindrano (a name also applied to the southern Betsileo who had sought French mercenaries at Fort Dauphin) were under a host of minor and independent chiefs as late as 1648, while Lalangina had little strength as a state even in 1667, when La Case took from it many cattle with only a small force of men. Oral traditions confirm that Lalangina had internal difficulties at the time. Its founder, Rasahamanarivo, was forced to abdicate (because of leprosy, a disease which seems to have been connected with royal persons more than once) in favour of his brother but went to Arindrano around 1680 and was accepted in turn, by the southern Betsileo as their ruler. Struggles for succession and wars with neighbours arrested the growth of Lalangina and, after a case of regicide, it broke up into four provinces, each with its own ruler. Nonetheless, the usurping branch of Lalangina’s royal family produced at least three strong rulers in the 1700s: Raonimanalina, who re-unified the kingdom with the aid of fire-arms obtained from the Sakalava (‘3,000 flintlocks for 3,000 slaves’) and introduced an internal militia to reduce dissentions; Andrianonindranarivo, who carried out a number of important economic and social reforms which resulted in much greater rice production, the growth of the population and a period of domestic tranquillity; and his son and successor, Ramaharo.

who transformed the militia into an economic adjunct of state meant to ensure a still greater harvest of rice (indeed, during the 1700s the Betsileo became the foremost rice-growers of Madagascar). The eighteenth-century rulers of Lalangina were not fortunate in external relations but Ramaharo would not submit to Merina rule toward the end of the 1700s.  

Conflicting traditions hold that the ancestor of Isandra's royal family, the Zafimanarivo, was either an Antemoro female or a Maroserana prince in exile. Geography certainly favours a Maroserana antecedent. An early Zafimanarivo is associated with the term volamena (gold). Finally, like the Maroserana of Menabe, Isandra's departed rulers were drained of their humours prior to final rest. Unlike the Menabe Sakalava, however, the western Betsileo came to believe that the royal humours transformed themselves into large snakes (fanane), the objects of a pre-existing but less elevated cult. It is also very possible that a sacerdotal person coming from south-eastern Madagascar entered the royal genealogy for services rendered, as had earlier been the case with the celebrated priest of the Maroserana in Menabe. One could not call Isandra a notable Betsileo state until the 1750s, when it came under an outstanding monarch, Andriamanalina I. Sometimes called the 'jester king' because of his ability to win political arguments through humour, Andriamanalina I was the first Betsileo to conceive of a unified, single state, and to attain this end as well. When diplomacy failed, as with parts of Lalangina and Arindrano (long eclipsed by the former in the 1700s), Andriamanalina became a military conqueror. He also expanded westward, placing his Betsileo on the Midongy massif, and south into Ibara where he obtained an important vassal, the Bara ruler Andriamanely II. Retaining the traditional structure in each area, Andriamanalina I placed his sons at the head of four new provinces which contained most of the Betsileo. Indeed, at his death in 1790, the Betsileo were at their political apex. As for Manandriana, it had a very short span as an independent state having formed after about 1750 and with its second ruler placing himself under the Merina, quite willingly, c. 1800.

In a strict sense, the Merina history begins with Ralambo, the ruler to whom an important body of oral traditions assigns not only the first use of this collective name but also the introduction of new institutions and hierarchy. Before his time, variously estimated between 1610 and 1640, Imerina did not contain a state organization. It had numerous village...
chiefdoms peopled either by the Vazimba, its *tompon-tany*, or by the Hova\textsuperscript{139} whose clans attained Imerina in two major migratory movements probably not later than about 1500.\textsuperscript{140} Intermittent conflicts appear to have been the rule in the 1500s but their resolution did not necessarily depend on warfare. Disputes were also arbitrated by local sages and astrologers, the elders of Ampandrana, who had settled among the Vazimba prior to the Hova arrivals.\textsuperscript{141} As neither the Hova nor the Vazimba of that time were ethnic groups or peoples with a centre of political authority, the Ampandrana gradually assumed a position of leadership from which came the future dynasty of Andriana, starting with Andriamanelo, Ralambo's father. It was Andriamanelo who created the first fortifications at Alosara and who started using iron for weapons as well as limited domestic use. Although his iron-tipped spears gave him absolute superiority over the clay-heads, to consolidate his power he also married into the family of the powerful Vazimba chieftain at Ambohitraby.\textsuperscript{142}

With Ralambo come the first of the twelve *sampy*, amulet-guardians of Imerina; royal circumcision and incest; the *fandroana* or annual royal-bath ceremony;\textsuperscript{143} divinization of departed monarchs; the noble (*andriana*) classes and smithing units (silversmiths and ironsmiths) to serve the state; the head tax; consumption of beef; and a small but standing army.\textsuperscript{144} His son and successor, Andrianjaka, turned decisively against the Vazima using fire-arms obtained from west-coast traders under royal protection.\textsuperscript{145} Under Andrianjaka, the Merina monarchy became more elevated and more distant from its subjects, and some of its internal measures inspired fear. Nevertheless, he founded Antananarivo and secured the marshes for considerable harvests of rice which, as Hubert Deschamps has observed, gave the Merina an economic base early enough to become the most numerous among the Malagasy.\textsuperscript{146}

The growth of population in Imerina also increased the risk of famine (*tsimiompy*) and compelled its rulers to continuously expand the irrigated areas, a practice followed without exception by Andrianjaka's three successors well into the eighteenth century. While his son and grandson distinguished themselves mainly by adding letters to their royal names (lord-above-lords and lord-above-greatest-of-lords, with thirty-three

\textsuperscript{139} Although still used for the early period of local history, the term Hova did not reflect ethnicity and, after Ralambo and to the end of Merina state, Hova (with whom the Merina were often interchanged) designated *commoners*.


\textsuperscript{143} The best work on this subject is G. Razafimino, 1924.


\textsuperscript{146} H. Deschamps, 1965 edn, p. 117.
Madagascar and the islands of the Indian Ocean

letters in Malagasy), Andrianjaka's great-grandson, Andriamasinaivalona, was another pivotal ruler. Largely with the help of his astute adviser, Andriamampiandry, he deposed an older brother who fled among the Sakalava and even sought their military help.\textsuperscript{147} Andriamasinaivalona pursued a policy of aggressive expansion and allowed little independence to the many chiefs who came under his authority. He increased the number of the noble clans from four to six and rewarded the more deserving nobility with village fiefs and the title of \textit{tompon-menakely} (masters-of-the-fief).\textsuperscript{148} His advanced age also led him to consider the problem of succession while still in office. Against the advice of Andriamampiandry, he divided Imerina into four provinces and placed a son at the head of each. In effect, he soon found himself amid four independent kingdoms: two in the north, centred around Ambohitrabiby and the necropolis of Ambohimanga (where 'no boar, dog or stranger could set foot', as tradition has it); one in the south, ruled from Antananarivo; and one in the west with its capital at Ambohidratrimo. He also suffered the humiliation of being imprisoned (for 'seven years') by Andriantomponimerina, his son and ruler of the western area (Marovatana).\textsuperscript{149} The old king died about 1750,\textsuperscript{150} and Imerina became a site of internal wars in which even outsiders took part. By the 1770s, Ambohimanga had conquered Ambohitrabiby and seemed quite strong under its ruler Andrianbelomasina. Although his son Andrianjafy inherited the throne it was his nephew Ramboasalama who became the ruler at Ambohimanga \textit{c.} 1777/8 and who came to be regarded as the most important of Imerina's kings.

Assuming the name of Andrianampoinimerina, he first managed to secure peace with his royal brothers and rivals. He then fortified his borderlands by peopling them with those pledged to defend them, and secured a considerable quantity of fire-arms through western Madagascar. Antananarivo fell in 1797,\textsuperscript{151} Ambohidratrimo shortly thereafter, and several less defined sections of Imerina also came into his hands before about 1800. He went beyond the obvious drive for unification in Imerina and began sending especially selected envoys to rulers in other parts of Madagascar with the offer to become his vassals and retain autonomy or face eventual conquest by the Merina. This form of diplomacy worked at times, as among the Manandriana Betsileo, the Andrantsay of Betafo (a mixture of Antandrano who had fled western Madagascar during the Sakalava expansion, of Betsileo and some assimilated Merina), and in western Imamo. It also failed in places as in Menabe or parts of Lalangina

\textsuperscript{147} C. Guillain, 1845, p. 42; V. Malzac, 1912, pp. 54–65.
\textsuperscript{148} This institution went back to the times of Andrianjaka and his brother Andriantompoaindrindra when twelve Menakely were created: cf. J. Rasamimanana and L. Razafindrazaka, 1909, 1957 edn., p. 37.
\textsuperscript{149} G. Grandidier, 1942, Vol. V, part I, pp. 62 and 64.
\textsuperscript{150} A. Tacchi, 1892, p. 474.
and Isandra, but there is slight doubt that Imerina under Andrianampoinimerina no longer paid tribute to the Sakalava and that it was becoming a power to be reckoned with, despite its small territorial size. Andrianampoinimerina was a tough monarch and it is said that he did away with not only theft in Imerina but also the consumption of intoxicating beverages and the smoking of tobacco. In essence, Andrianampoinimerina made himself the centre of all authority, high and low, building on the earlier ideas of Andriamasinavalona, but tempered by constant advice from reputable elders, the flow of information through the public assemblies (kabary) and the Council of Seventy which represented every collective within the kingdom. Through unification and the restructuring of Imerina, he paved the ground for its nineteenth-century empire.

Although neither the Sihanaka nor the Bezanozano developed into powerful state-structures their histories remain of considerable interest. The Sihanaka evolved around Lake Alaotra (the largest lake in Madagascar), while the Bezanozano came to inhabit an area between the tropical rain forest of the eastern littoral and its escarpment. Both were thus ideally situated - the Bezanozano on the main commercial route linking Imerina with the eastern coast and the Sihanaka on its counterpart in the direction of the north-western entrepôts. It is almost certain that the first ‘Ova’ (Hova) sold into slavery in 1614, as reported by Father Mariano, reached the entrepôts through Sihanaka intermediaries. Conversely, the Bezanozano were the main suppliers from Imerina to the Mascarene traders in eastern Madagascar. Indeed, both the Sihanaka and the Bezanozano were in possession of so many slaves that, in 1768, they even sought help from Europeans to suppress their own internal slave rebellions. In 1667, when François Martin penetrated into Sihanaka territory from the eastern side (after an eighteen-day journey), he found them inhabiting fortified hill-top villages, surrounded by high stone walls (held together by reddish mortar) and wide, deep trenches. They were excellent potters; they had the only bridge seen in Madagascar until that time by Europeans; and they were extremely well armed, using bows and arrows to rout Martin’s party of forty-four compatriots and some 3000 Betsimisaraka. Martin also confirmed the Sihanaka as one of the most important trading groups in the island, all of which would presuppose considerable political organization. Yet there is no evidence that the Sihanaka ever had central authority. There was an attempt to establish a dynasty among the tompon-tany of the Lake

152. About twenty miles in diameter: see the map based on detailed work of Savaron in H. Deschamps, 1965 edn, p. 118.
153. For an outline of changes see H. Deschamps, 1965 edn, pp. 121–7; otherwise the French texts of F. Callet, 1953 edn, Vols. II and III.
155. N. Mayeur, 1806, p. 123.
156. G. Grandidier and R. Decary, 1958, pp. 120, 121 and note 1, and p. 132.
Alaotra area by Rabenifananina who probably came from Betsileo and left behind the collective name of Antsihanaka but no political successors. In fact, the Sihanaka paid tribute to Iboina in the eighteenth century but not without at least one serious attempt to repudiate it through a major attack which ended in failure. The Bezanozano, whose group name even indicated a lack of central authority according to William Ellis, and whose land was called originally Ankay, were also ruled by village chiefs (mpisehy) and lived in fortified villages. Unlike the Sihanaka, however, they had at least one unifying institution in the form of amulets representing eleven protector-deities said to have arrived from Sakalava land. As several bear Sakalava names, their west-coast origin seems beyond dispute, although it is also likely that the Bezanozano ombiasa fashioned some of them. Toward the end of the 1700s, in contrast to the Sihanaka, the Bezanozano seem to have accepted the pre-eminence of Randrianjomoina, their first king, but this was an evolution cut short by the Merina who demanded and secured the Bezanozano ruler’s submission.

Wedged between the Betsileo highlanders and the coastal Antemoro, the Tanala took as their own a purely environmental name, ‘people of the forest’ (Antanala) which was used in other parts of Madagascar as well but not in such a lasting, ethnic sense. Indeed, the Tanala developed into a highly mixed population. As many as twenty-three of their clans have claimed Betsileo descent; and none of the Tanala ever had a state. Some of them, however, do stand out in local history, the so-called Tanala of Ikongo, a huge rock accessible only by artificial passages. While completely isolated from the Betsileo highlands, the Tanala–Ikongo area has been the natural hinterland of the coastal region (only about forty-five kilometres away), accessible (apart from the rock itself) by such waterways as the Sandrananta and the Faraony, and the Matitana river of the Antemoro. It is therefore not surprising that the Ikongo–Tanala accepted migrants from the eastern littoral and that one of them, Rambo, said to have been an Anteony–Antemoro, sired the local dynasty of the Zafirambo, first mentioned by outsiders in 1668. According to Tanala traditions, collected by Ardant Du Picq around 1900, Rambo became the king of Ikongo through his knowledge of the curative amulets (fanafody) and of the sorabe. Rambo was also remembered as the ‘law-giver’ and several of his successors also fashioned amulets to protect the Ikongo–Tanala and

159. C. Guillain, 1845, p. 24; N. Mayeur, 1912, p. 70.
164. ibid., p. 543.
were reputed to predict natural phenomena. Pre-dynastic chiefs, the Anakandriana and Andriambaventy, retained a number of privileges and although the Zafirambo practised the sombili (prerogative to slaughter domesticated animals) they applied it only to themselves. The Zafirambo were also known as Zanaka Isandrananta (children of the Sandrananta) because, after Rambo, the humours of departed rulers were thrown into this river, creating the belief that crocodiles hatched from them. Most of the 1700s were marked by conflicts between the Ikongo-Tanala and the Antemoro, leading to a devastating Tanala invasion of the lowlands late in the century. At the turn of the 1800s, one of the Zafirambo, Andriamamohotra, allied himself with Andrianampoinimerina.

The Bara, major pastoralists of Madagascar who have often been given an African origin, seem to have emerged somewhere in the southern reaches of Arindranoland, along the River Ihosy. De Flacourt mentions a site in this approximate area, called Varabei, a name duplicated in Barabe (Varabei and Beibe meaning great, or numerous) one of the three great Bara clans. The Bara-be settled on the Horombe Plateau with the Bara Ianstsantsa to their east and the Bara Imamono on the western side, toward the Sakalava. Two important bar but smaller Bara clans, the Vinda of southwestern Ibara and the Antivondro who inhabit the eastern side of the River Ionaivo, are of more recent origin, the Vinda having formed only in the early 1800s. The Bara seem to have expanded until the more or less natural boundaries were attained with the Sakalava, Mahafaly, Antandroy, Antanosy, Antesaka and Antefasy. There were two distinct dynastic periods in the southern interior (of which Ibara is by far the largest), one which coincides with the proto-Maroserana and which is likely to remain inadequately known, and the more recent one, the period of the Zafimanely, after about 1650. A total absence of succession rules and the ease with which dissenters could migrate with their cattle to even better grazing grounds undoubtedly facilitated the disintegration of political authority by the 1640s, when the Mahafaly ruler, Dian Manhelle, invaded the southern interior and began to instal his kinsmen as local rulers. After his death in 1653, Dian Manhelle's descendants, the Zafimanely, gradually assumed positions of authority in Ibara but not necessarily to its benefit. Ibara's history between about 1650 and 1800 is dominated by competition among the Zafimanely kinglets (mpanjaka-kely in distinction from mpanjaka-be, the title of a king given only to rulers of the great Bara clans) and their proliferation which added countless subgroups (tariki) to the Bara family. Their internal competition was not political so much as economic in nature.

167. ibid., p. 39.
169. E. de Flacourt, 1661/1913, p. 33.
171. ibid., pp. 123-37.
PLATE 28.2 Bara ethnic group of Ambusitra, south-eastern Madagascar: memorial statue called alualu, erected when a person dies without male issue or when the corpse does not rest in the family grave. The statue was surrounded by an enclosure of posts bearing the horns of zebu cows sacrificed at the funeral ceremonies. The rule was that it was a female figure that becomes the replacement for the dead male and symbolizes the element destined to ensure issue. Made from the hard wood of the camphor tree. Height: 107 cm

Without a system of regular tribute the Zafimanely maintained themselves as local lords by securing a part of their wealth through legal decisions\textsuperscript{172} and a much larger one through raids for cattle, the main source of wealth.

\textsuperscript{172} This may be the reason why Bara justice involved a great variety of trials-by-ordeal.
As they could not afford to raid their own subjects or embark easily upon foreign wars, the Zafimanely raided each other’s cattle-pens, more or less constantly and without any political vision. This cycle of artificial tension was broken only after 1800 by Raikitroka, an extremely interesting ruler who deserves to be studied in greater depth. The Bara kings did not, in practice, govern their clans as absolute rulers, and they could not declare war without the approval of their councils of ministers (called Tandonaka among the Imamono) and their provincial governors (Mamandranomay), appointed by the mpanjaka-be in office but also controlled by local councils of elders (the Ionaka in Imamono).

The Eastern and Southern states: Betsimisaraka, Antemoro, Antambahoaka, Antefasy, Antesaka, Antanosy and Antandroy

The Betsimisaraka, often divided into ‘Northerners’ (Antavaratra) and ‘Southerners’ (Antatsimo), and the Betanimena who separated the two, evolved along the eastern littoral of Madagascar roughly between the Bay of Antongil and Vatomandry. As is attested by a large number of sources, the tompon-tany of this area were strangers to larger political unions prior to the 1700s and remained under chiefs (filohany) seldom in control of more than one or two villages. Nevertheless, chiefs around the huge Antongil Bay seem to have been better organized and to have had office regalia, at least since the late 1500s. The Antavaratri were also favoured by nature. They had all the ports (in Antongil, at Titingue, Foulpointe, Fenerive and Tamatave) while the Betanimena coast had none. As the Mascarenes came to depend increasingly on eastern Madagascar for its rice, cattle and slave labour, the control of these ports assured not only wealth for their filohany but also firepower for protection and attack. This was also the section of Madagascar most heavily settled by European, especially English and American, pirates from the 1680s until the 1720s. Many intermarried among the Antavaratra and sired métis who became the Zana Malata, often allied to the filohany as sons of their daughters. Out of one such union, around 1694, came a Zana Malata named Ratsimilahoe whose father took him to England and India for brief periods. A political change among the Betanimena (then known as Sicoua or Tsikoa in modern

175. In the 1590s, the Dutch saw a ruler who monopolized the colour red and wore a sort of crown with two horns.
176. N. Mayeur, Ratsimilahoe, 1806, typescript copy, p. 132.
177. ibid., p. 11; G. Granddidier and R. Decary, 1958, p. 28, note 1.
Malagasy) gave Ratsimilahoe his political start. Around 1700 the Sicoua began to unite around strong chiefs. By about 1710 they elected the chief of Vatomandry as their supreme ruler, one who would lead them into the northern ports. It was in response to an invasion of these ports that Ratsimilahoe managed to unite most of the Antavaratra despite his youth.

Ratsimilahoe recaptured Fenerive in 1712 and the hasty retreat of the Sicoua, across fields of soggy red clay which stuck to their feet, led to their name Be-tani-mena (the many-of-red-earth).\[^{178}\] Ratsimilahoe coined the name Betsimisaraka (the indivisible-many) to stress the lasting nature of the political union and in distinction to the Betanimena. He also secured peace with them by leaving the port of Tamatave to their king and was elected as king (mpanjaka-be) of all the Betsimisaraka and renamed Ramaroumanompo (modern Ramaromanompo, Lord-served-by-many) at his capital of Foulpointe.\[^{179}\] The Betsimisaraka–Betanimena peace broke down within six months, however, and Ratsimilahoe took Tamatave, forcing the Betanimena king into an inaccessible area further south.\[^{180}\] He also contracted alliances with the Antatismo (Southerners) and the Bezanozano.\[^{181}\] By the 1730s Ratsimilahoe was one of the most powerful kings in Madagascar, holding together a confederation of clans and families with rather independent habits. He did this by allowing the traditional chiefs to keep their autonomy and pay as much tribute as each saw fit, in slaves, cattle and rice. He also compensated the relatives of various filohany who had fallen in battles against the Betanimena with royal gifts (vilipate) and allowed the Betanimena to buy back relatives taken during the hostilities. He took the sons of high and low filohany as hostages at his court but used them productively as the ompanghalalan, royal messengers, who took his orders to the Betsimisaraka. He also administered high justice, permitting any Betsimisaraka to by-pass his own ruler.\[^{182}\] Keenly aware of the strong centrifugal tendencies within his kingdom, Ratsimilahoe married Matave, the sole daughter of Iboina’s king Andrian Baba to be linked with the Volamena and the Sakalava empire.\[^{183}\] Ratsimilahoe died in 1754, after about forty years as the leader and unifier of the Betsimisaraka. He had three successors between 1755 and 1803. The first lost his life in slave raids. The second was speared to death by his own subjects. The middle one, Iavy, became illustrious only as the biggest slaver in Madagascar. Indeed, in the second half of the 1700s, Betsimisaraka-land came to resemble Angola in the height of its slaving tragedies early in the 1600s.

There is no longer any real doubt that both the Antesaka and the Antefasy of south-eastern Madagascar were founded by migrants from

\[^{178}\] N. Mayeur, Ratsimilahoe, 1806, typescript copy, pp. 28–36.
\[^{179}\] ibid., pp. 36–48.
\[^{180}\] ibid., pp. 64–77.
\[^{181}\] ibid., pp. 83–90.
\[^{182}\] ibid., pp. 116–24.
\[^{183}\] ibid., pp. 124–30.
the west. Differences between the ruler of Sakalava-Menabe, Andri-
andahifotsy, and his brother (or uncle), Andriamandresi, impelled the later
to leave Menabe and go into the southern interior with his own followers.
Andriamandresi crossed the Horombe Plateau and may even have reached
the Bara-Tanala gap (providing passage to the eastern littoral). It was not
until his grandson Behava, however, that Nosipandra (later Vangaindrano)
was attained and became the Antesaka capital, seat of the Zarabehava rulers
and rice-basket of their kingdom. According to Antesaka informants, the
collective name is meant to reflect Sakalava origins. De Flacourt's map
suggests that the Antesaka migration was over by the 1650s. As for the
Antefasy, their traditions hold that the ultimate ancestor, Ndretsileo, came
from the African mainland to the River Menarandra at a time when the
Maroserana were already established among the Mahafaly, in Menabe and
in parts of Ibara. With a companion named Isoro (who would later separate
to found the Zafisoro) Ndretsileo settled in Ibara. Difficulties with the
Zafimanely nonetheless became acute by the time of his grandson Ndrem-
bolanony. He went further east and sided in a local war with the ruler of
Antevatobe whose daughter became, in turn, the spouse of Ndrem-
bolanony. One of his three sons, Marofela, coined the name Antefasy (sand-
people) to suggest that his kingdom would be densely populated by the
analogy with sand.

The most important Antefasy ruler prior to the 1800s was undoubtedly
Ifara who resided at Ambaky (the old name of Farafangana). Ifara gained
a monopoly of trade with the first European vessels to visit his coast and
became so powerful at one point that he was widely regarded as the sole
owner of the Manampatra river. Another Zarabehava ruler particularly
recalled is Maseba who detached the Antefasy from a brief Antemoro
dominance. Ifara was Maseba's successor, but dates are hard to come
by. The Antefasy (who sometimes claim kinship with the Zarabehava)
undoubtedly formed after the Antesaka – possibly in the 1670s – and
Maseba might have been the last seventeenth-century ruler. From Ante-
emoro sources, conflicts between the Antemoro and the Antefasy can be
dated to the 1680s. They also continued during the 1700s but the wars
were never conclusive. The Antesaka were more inward-looking and they
had considerable difficulties over successions. Tradition recalls that one of
their Zarabehava kings, Ratongalaza, 'either killed or expelled all of his
brothers'. His grandson, Lengoabo, was the last eighteenth-century king
and he extended the Antesaka boundaries to their greatest limit. The
history of Antambahoaka and the Antemoro during the 1700s remains

187. ibid., pp. 6-7.
unknown despite the fact that Matitana is cited by European accounts as one of the main exporters of rice and slaves, especially after 1724. Another aspect of considerable interest for the 1700s, particularly after about 1750, is the general restlessness of commoners under Zafindraminia and Anteony rulers, a restlessness which would explode in the 1800s and force at least the Anteony to seek Merina support against their own subjects.

Of some 4000 settlers and soldiers sent from France to Fort Dauphin by 1674, two-thirds perished from malaria, famine and violent death. Twenty-four years later, amid the ruins of this Fort in Antanosy-land, a Dutch sea-captain found that the local ‘king’ was a pirate from Martinique named Samuel. He commanded some twenty Europeans and about 300 Antanosy, had a fleet of fifteen large outriggers, and was at constant war with the traditional ruler Diamarang Diamera. The European connection within Antanosy was not only sustained by earlier links through Fort Dauphin but also because, after the 1720s, the Mascarenes became plantation economies with an insatiable demand for slaves, rice and cattle. The Count of Modave, sent as the governor of the second French establishment at Fort Dauphin (1767–70), discovered no less than thirty-five rulers between the valley of Ambolo and the River Mandrare. They were at war with each other over slaves and cattle, causing frequent external migrations of their own subjects (especially among the Antandroy), and the most powerful of the local rulers controlled fewer than 3000 villagers. Modave, who opposed the slave trade and came to replace it with a legitimate counterpart, was abandoned by France (much like de Flacourt before him) and ended by becoming a slaver to pay for his debts and resupply his own plantations on Ile-de-France (Mauritius). It should be recalled that Fort Dauphin was built at a time when Antanosy-land had been among the most densely populated in Madagascar, when its agriculture produced considerable surpluses, and even when it had a good possibility of becoming unified into an important state. Shortly after the collapse of the Modave mission another French visitor saw Antanosy-land as the ‘poorest’ and ‘saddest’ in the island, barely populated and virtually without ‘resources’. Even slaves and cattle were few in number and had to be brought from far away.

There have been two very different sections of Antandroy, the southern-

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190. C. Grant, 1801, pp. 167–71, from a 1763 report.
193. Modave, *Journal*, 1768, quoted in G. Grandidier and R. Decary, 1958, p. 10. There was a revolt in Antanosy in the 1730s against the Zafindraminia who were dispossessed of their cattle according to Le Gentil, 1779–81, Vol. II, pp. 511–22, but it may also have taken place in the 1770s according to A. Grandidier, *Notes*, MS, folios 316, 410 and 551; G. Grandidier and R. Decary, 1958, p. 104, note 5.
most state of Malagasy. The Karimbola have been the *tompon-tany* of western Antandroy, the area between the Menarandra and the Manambovo rivers, and they have no memory of a migration. The eastern Antandroy (called by de Flacourt the land of Ampatres), extending from the Manambovo to the Mandrare, was once occupied mainly by the Mahandrovato who were submerged by an influx of migrants from Ibara and Antanosy seeking refuge in the arid south from political uncertainties at home.\(^{196}\) It would appear that the ruling dynasty of Zafimanara emerged among the Mahandrovato (who welcomed the earliest migrating groups) and that their rule was gradually accepted by the Karimbola as well. The collective name, Antandroy, was given by the Zafimanara to all the peoples between the Menarandra and the Mandrare and it reflected a sense of political unity, a ‘Zafimanara Confederation’. The Karimbola, who retained their autonomy under chiefs residing at Ambahy, accepted the Zafimanara kings through marriage alliances and because of their constant need for self-defence against Maroserana-Mahafaly expansion eastward.\(^{197}\) In the long run, the Karimbola saw little help from the Zafimanara, having stopped the Mahafaly at the Menarandra until about 1750 but not thereafter.\(^{198}\) At about the same period, repeated migrations from the interior and from Antanosy diluted the Zafimanara authority in eastern Antandroy. By the 1790s, the Zafimanara were confined to the Manombo plateau having been flooded out and unable to cope with the changing nature of their former domain. As for many other populations in Madagascar, the end of the eighteenth century did not augur well for the Antandroy.

### The Comoro Islands: Grande Comore, Anjouan, Moheli and Mayotte

The Comoro Islands are roughly half-way between Madagascar and Africa. The Grande Comore is nearest to the African mainland, Mayotte faces Madagascar, while Anjouan and Moheli are in between. Their past is, among other things, a mirror of their geographical situation. There is general agreement that the Comoros were settled by Bantu-speaking mainlanders who had no discernible ties to Islam, that this great religion was imported by the Afro-Shîrâzî, and that the lasting supremacy of Sunnite Islam among the Comoreans must also be attributed to some political successes of more recent Muslim arrivals from Africa. In the traditional

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196. E. Defoort, 1913, pp. 161–72, outlines the various migrations.

197. ibid., pp. 162 and 166.

198. ibid., p. 168.

199. The names of the four Comoros vary infinitely in older sources but their local ones were Ngazija, Anzuani, Muali (at times M’heli), and M’samburu (after Mayotte’s largest group of Bantu-speakers, M’Chambara), sometimes also M’Ayata; cf. J. Repiquet, 1902, p. 110, and A. Gevrey, 1972, p. 74. The names in this short essay are the current ones.
accounts collected by Ṣaḥḥād Ahmad Ṭālī, the pre-Islamic and Ẓīrāzī periods are associated with the ancient chiefs (bēdja) and their fāni successors whose own daughters (jumbe) would come to marry the Sunnite newcomers. Almost nothing is known of the bēdja and the two periods cannot be sharply defined, but the fāni are connected with construction in stone and the erection of the earliest mosque in the Comoros. Although the three segments tend to duplicate those often expressed for the history of East Africa, a chronology of the bēdja and fāni cannot as yet be worked out in the absence of detailed archaeological, linguistic and historical studies. Such studies are not merely overdue. They could go a long way towards new understanding of three monumental events – the migrations of the Bantu-speakers, Indonesian migrations to Africa and Madagascar, and the advent of Swahili culture itself.

The clearest innovation of the latest Muslim arrivals was political in

200. Essai sur l’Histoire d’Anjouan, 29 December 1927, typescript, pp. 1–45, Bibliothèque Grandidier, Tsimbazaza-Tananarive (Antananarivo now), Malagasy Republic; pagination of typescript is followed. Parts of the S. A. Ṭālī Essai have appeared in a local ephemeral publication, Promo Al-Camar, May 1971, most inadequately. Despite many confusing passages, the 1927 Essai must continue to be regarded as the most interesting and still quite valuable attempt to deal with local history. The Essai is dedicated to the Governor-General of Madagascar and Dependencies. The Comoros were attached to Madagascar from 1914 to 1946. Mayotte became a French Protectorate in 1843. The other Comoros were taken over by France in 1886.


202. The Bēdja appear sometimes as the earliest Ẓīrāzī chiefs. For example, M. Fontoynot and E. Raomandahy, 1937, picked up the following oral tradition: ‘Grâce à leurs connaissances botaniques, pharmaceutiques et médicales, ces Ẓīrāziens échappèrent aux maladies et ils se multiplièrent rapidement puis se dispersèrent, se choisissant des chefs auxquels ils donnèrent le nom Bedja que l’on retrouve ensuite chez plusieurs Sultans, tel Fābedja’, p. 12, (italics added). The same reservation, expressed for East Africa quite well by James Kirkman in his note on ‘Persian’ for Justus Strandes (pp. 309–10 of the English translation, edn. of 1971), applies to would-be sharp distinctions between the Ẓīrāzī and Arabs as well as fāni and Sunnite periods used as a matter of simple convenience.

203. The earliest mosque reported is on Mayotte at Chingoni but A. Gevrey, 1972, p. 207, reads the carved hijra-cûtnàir date of 944 while S. A. Ṭālī, 1927, p. 4, gives it as 844, providing the corresponding Christian dates of 1566 and 1441.


205. An early date for the presence of mainlanders on the Comoro Islands could produce considerable revisions of virtually all the many theories and hypotheses regarding the Bantu-speaking migratory impulses and stages; it is equally possible that settlers from the mainland were of intermixed Afro-Indonesian origins, especially since the Wamatsaha who represent the first Comorean settlers offer a number of physical, ethnographic and even linguistic features which point to such a conclusion. Cf. J. Repiquet, 1902, p. 51 and photo.; S. A. Ṭālī, 1927, p. 1; also James Hornell’s comparative studies of the outrigger in Madagascar, Comoros and Eastern Africa (e.g., J. Hornell, 1934). The earliest available Comorean vocabularies are already Swahili: for example, the fourteen words reported by Walter Peyton in 1613, see S. Purchas, 1613; His Pilgrims, British Library, London, Add. Mss, no. 6115, Vol. I, fos. 488–90; and A. Grandidier et al., 1903–20, Vol. I, p. 491 and note; see also L. Aujas, 1920, pp. 51–9.
concept. For the first time, the four Comoros were perceived as a single entity and attempts were made to place them under one monarch (Sultan) residing in the centrally located Anjouan. The sultanic period may have started as late as 1506 or even before about 1400, depending upon how one reads the slender evidence.206 One or more of the Comoros might well have been under the control of traders from Mozambique and Kilwa207 before ‘Muslim Arabs of the same tribe that founded Malindi’ arrived at Grande Comore,208 which could be seen from the African mainland whenever Mount Kartala erupted.

Telescopied as well as functional traditions hold that the first Comorean dynasty was born on Anjouan despite the initial migration of the ultimate ancestor into Grande Comore.209 This may not be far-fetched. Grande Comore is the largest island but it has no sweet water and its soil is generally unproductive. As late as 1727, Alexander Hamilton described it as an island endowed with the bare necessities of life and a handful of inhabitants.210 The penultimate ancestor, Hasan/Hasanî, the real founder of the dynasty, is also depicted as a prolific builder of mosques on Anjouan, first at Sima and later at Domoni. He is also seen as the main carrier of the Shâfi‘ite rite and, indeed, his ascent seems hardly separable from the general adoption of Sunnite Islam by the Anjouanaise. His sons had dual names, Bantu and Arabic, and they extended the Hassanite dynasty to the other Comoros, probably along with the new religious influence.211 Thereafter, Comorean history is dominated by internal rivalries, even to the level of tiny sultanates within each island. Thus, while Sunnite Islam took hold across the Comoros and brought about a new system of justice with its ḥādir, nä‘ib (village judges), and the Madjelisse (body of jurists), political rivalry among kinsmen and between some of the old fami and the new sultans became both an unchanging and dynamic feature of the Comorean society.

Europeans who visited the Comoros left accounts which can seldom be matched with local traditions or at least those set on paper so far. Yet both

206. Cf. A. Gevrey, 1972, pp. 78-9, 148, 184, 206-7; S. A. ‘Alî, 1927, pp. 2-5; J. Repiquet, 1902, pp. 111-12. Gevrey gives a list of Mayotte’s eighteen Sultans (the last of whom was from Madagascar) on p. 227, spanning the period 1530 to 1843. He states that some dates are accurate while others represent approximations. Unfortunately, his base date of Lancaster’s visit to the Comoros, given as 1561, is inaccurate by thirty years (1591 and it is not a simple inversion of the 9/6).


209. The fact that the earliest mosque is on Mayotte and not on Anjouan (and all the more so since its building is attributed to Haissa, the son of Hasanî) seems to confirm the functionalist aspect but judgement cannot be firm as, properly speaking, there is no real work of professional history for the Comoros before the nineteenth century.


211. S. A. ‘Alî, 1927, p. 3. Their Bantu names were Machinda and Chiwampe.
Madagascar and the islands of the Indian Ocean

Types of sources, external and internal, do reveal the constant rivalry and the fact that local history is dominated not by the larger Grande Comore and Mayotte but by Anjouan and Moheli, the pace-setters. At the turn of the 1600s, independent visitors from different parts of Europe confirmed that Anjouan did have a monarch—a queen—regarded as the supreme head of all four Comoros. One can equally deduce from the same sources that each island had a de facto ruler of its own, a ruler who held the Anjouanaise queen in esteem as a dynastic matriarch, not necessarily as a military or administrative power to fear. In 1602 Moheli was ruled, for example, by an independent and imposing Muslim monarch who stunned visitors from Europe with a dazzling knowledge of navigation and charts from the Red Sea to the East Indies, with his first-hand acquaintance with Africa and Arabia, and—not least—with his command of the Portuguese language. This extremely interesting Comorean died in 1613, just one day before the arrival of Christopher Newport who noted that only the royal death could have brought a temporary halt to the Mohelian, outrigger-riding war parties which often sailed to Anjouan and ‘other’ Comoro Islands. Other English visitors found, a year later, that Grande Comore was divided among ten ‘Lords’; that the Anjouanaise queen (the ‘old Sultaness’) had ‘delegated’ power on Moheli to her two sons, Amar-Adel, the sultan, and his brother, the vice-sultan and shârif (the main sacerdotal figure), both of whom lived in the interior, near Fombony; and that Moheli’s principal port was under Fombony’s governor, a man of very considerable influence. Also in 1614, the old fani of M’samudu proclaimed himself an independent sultan and also master of northern Anjouan as the venerable queen no longer controlled her island. Martin Pring also came across a powerful fani in 1616 at Moheli. By 1626 there were


213. Several accounts refer to the sultan’s ‘queens’ who are at times spouses and at other times mothers. The queen-mother (of a sultan) seems to have been held in great esteem, see the account of John Saris for Moheli in 1611, A. Grandidier et al., 1903–20, Vol. I, p. 497.


217. A. Gevrey, 1870, p. 185; A. Grandidier et al., 1903–20, Vol. II, pp. 90ff. Both Gevrey and Grandidier state that Magné-Fané (fani) was the name of the rebel sultan of M’samudu, and both cite Pieter van den Broecke, an astute observer and officer in the Dutch fleet under General Reynst, who visited the Comoros in 1614. However, P. van den Broecke does not mention this name.

two contenders for the Mohelian Sultanate, a descendant of the *fani* (probably deceased by then) and an ‘Arab’. Both owed their ‘fortunes’ and, apparently, most of their rivalry to their spouses, daughters of the ‘last sultan’.  

With exceptions, Comorean rulers sought good relations with the Europeans who came to their islands. It became customary for captains of European vessels to send more or less imposing swords and pistols to local rulers upon arrival. In turn, the *sultans* and their ‘port’ governors secured letters of recommendation from the captains upon departure. These documents were subsequently shown to incoming captains as proof of international friendship. Nearly all of the ‘English Shipping bound to Mocha, Persia and Surat’, wrote Hamilton, paused at ‘Johanna’ (Anjouan) for ‘Refreshments’, leading to long-lasting Anglo-Anjouanaise amity on which the local *sultans* would call from time to time. The Comorean traders had been for a long time, middlemen between Madagascar, Africa and Arabia but it does not follow (as can be read on occasion) that the four islands had nothing to export themselves. Wars within an island, such as the one reported on Grande Comore in 1620, and frequent sea-raids from one island to another went beyond purely political tensions. Many were simply glorified *razzias* for slaves to be exported at considerable profit. This duality of purpose became more pronounced by the time M’samudu had built its great mosque in 1670 and, yet was still less acute than during the pirate times in the Western Indian Ocean (1680–1720), when Comorean *sultans* used and were, in turn, abused by such major pirates as Mission and Caraccioli, when the sackings and destruction of Comorean towns became commonplace. It was precisely between 1700 and 1720 that British naval squadrons, under Captain Cornwall and Commodore Littleton, abandoned the neutrality of their flag and gave

220. For example, thirty-five sailors under the command of J. Lancaster were killed in an ambush on Grande Comore in 1591, an act which gave this island a bad reputation decades and even a century later; cf. A. Grandidier *et al.*, 1903–20, Vol. I, p. 161.
221. In 1608, when Alexander Sharpy sent some trinkets and two knives to the ruler at the landing site of Grande Comore, the gifts were ‘rejected with disdain’; A. Grandidier *et al.*, 1903–20, Vol. I, p. 419.
222. For example, in 1620 General de Beaulieu was shown letters in English and Dutch dated respectively 16 August 1616 and 8 August 1618 as ‘attestations’; cf. A. Grandidier *et al.*, 1903–20, Vol. II, p. 358. The practice of international letters of recommendation undoubtedly grew out of the local Swahili scribal culture since it is known that the heads of at least Mayotte communicated with the *sultan* at Anjouan via state letters. In 1599, for example, the Dutch were given a letter of recommendation for the queen at Anjouan by Mayotte’s ruler; cf. A. Grandidier *et al.*, 1903–20, Vol. I, p. 256; in 1646, John Smart took ‘letters’ from the ‘King of Mayotte’ to Anjouan: Smart to Kynnaston, 26 June 1646, cf. A. Grandidier *et al.*, 1903–20, Vol. V, pp. 514–17.
active help to Anjouan and its sultan of the year.225 This naval and military assistance reflected a desire to extend Anjouan’s effective control over the other Comoros and pre-empt any local shelter for the pirates in return. The pirate supremacy had ended by 1720 but not the interventions of British arms on behalf of Anjouan.

In 1736, according to Sa’did Ahmad ‘Ali, Anjouan obtained a new monarch, Sultan Ahmad, who believed – as did the early Hassanites – that all the Comoros should be under a supreme ruler. He lasted a long time, ‘over 40 years’, but his tenure was marked by a nearly successful dynastic coup in 1743, a full-scale political war with Mayotte some years later (ending in Anjouan’s humiliating defeat) and, above all, by an internal revolt of major proportions. The original inhabitants of Anjouan (the Wamatsaha), led by a charismatic commoner named Tumpa (who claimed descent from a fani), rose in 1775 against the ruling Arab element demanding full equality and the ‘right to marry Arab women’. Domoni fell with ease providing the rebels with enough fire-arms to lay siege to M’samudu itself. Fortunately for the Hassanites, they had on loan a platoon of British marines who found Tumpa with their first shots as he was riding on an elevated platform under a large red umbrella.226 Tumpa’s death ended a movement that could have had far-reaching consequences for Anjouan as well as for the other Comoros. Yet, as the eighteenth century drew to an end, the real problems were just beginning for the Comoro group. Outrigger fleets from Madagascar, manned by the Sakalava and Betsimisaraka, began to raid the four islands for slaves and caused lasting terror among the local inhabitants. The sea raids ended by about 1825, largely because of British interventions.227 Moreover, upheavals caused by the Merina expansion in Madagascar resulted in at least one unexpected event. Mayotte became Malagasy-speaking, following the massive Sakalava flights from Iboina, and the island acquired Malagasy sultans (Ramanetaka, a kinsman of Radama I, and Andriantsoli, the last Sakalava–Iboina ruler).228 Indeed, for the Comoros, being half-way between Africa and Madagascar was not at all easy.

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225. ibid., Vol. V, pp. 53, 156 and 159. (The French Captain, Péron, gave aid in 1790 to Anjouan against Mayotte which would be turned over to France as a protectorate fifty-three years later.)


228. A brief account of Ramanetaka and Andriantsoli appears in A. Gevrey, 1870, pp. 217–25.
The Mascarene Islands: Réunion, Mauritius and Rodrigues

In contrast to Madagascar and the Comoros, the three Mascarene Islands remained uninhabited until the arrival of Europeans in the Indian Ocean. Their location east of Madagascar was instrumental in transforming Réunion (Bourbon) and Mauritius (Ile-de-France) into strategic maritime stations controlled by the large overseas trading companies. The two larger islands in the Mascarene group also grew into plantation economies which came to affect, at different times and with different intensity, not only eastern Madagascar but also eastern and south-eastern Africa and even coastal India. After 1638, the Dutch concentrated on Mauritius, exploiting its timber and developing a slave trade with Madagascar, but in 1710 they abandoned the island. Réunion obtained its earliest settlers in 1646 and 1654 from Fort Dauphin, roughly an equal number of French and Malagasy rebels against the initial French East India Company which, nonetheless, made Bourbon into its preserve from 1664 until 1719. The French had colonized Mauritius from Réunion by 1721 and both islands were under their second East India Company until 1767, when the Mascarenes were turned over to the royal administration. Having learned of the French Revolution in 1790, the planters of Réunion and Mauritius began to assert a form of local nationalism which stood against such metropolitan measures as the abolition of slavery in 1794 and the Convention’s attempt to send its agents, two of whom were expelled in 1796. The Napoleonic Wars proved adverse to the French Mascarenes. Mauritius passed to British control for good and there was a temporary halt in the supply of slaves. Beyond the changing political aspects, however, Réunion and Mauritius were about to enter the period of their most pronounced economic successes.

Around 1710, Réunion and Mauritius together had some 2000 inhabitants. A third were slaves. By mid-century the population had increased by 300 per cent but more than two-thirds of it now consisted of servile

229. Rodrigues, a volcanic rock of some sixty square miles located several hundred nautical miles from both Réunion and Mauritius, is not included here. For this island see J. F. Dupon, 1969, and A. J. Bertuchi, 1923. The three islands obtained their present collective name in the 1820s and A. Toussaint, 1972, is the standard work on the subject. Réunion was formerly named Bourbon, and the French re-named Mauritius as Ile-de-France. Current names are retained.

230. This central fact also argues against direct population movements from Indonesia to Madagascar across the Pacific, movements which should otherwise have given the Mascarenes their tompon-tany as well.

231. For the Dutch at Mauritius see A. Pitot, 1905.

232. See Father J. Barassin, 1953.

233. For an excellent summary of the post-1719 periods see A. Toussaint, 1972, pp. 38–106 (Company and royal administrations). Among the longer accounts, see A. Pitot, 1899; C. Grant, 1801; and A. Lougnon, 1956 and 1958.
labour. By the end of the 1700s the two islands had 120,000 inhabitants including some 94,000 slaves. Already, early in the eighteenth century, there were five visible groupings in the local society — whites of the first-settler families; white créoles; mulatto créoles; resident white foreigners (including many English ex-pirates and some Dutch refugees from their own East India Company); and slaves who were further sub-divided into black créoles and those not born in the islands. There were few emancipated slaves before 1797 — for example, in 1788, there were only 950 on Réunion out of 45,800 inhabitants and on Mauritius only 2,456 out of a total of 42,828 inhabitants in the same year. An important change nonetheless occurred within the local slave population as the Mascarene buyers turned gradually away from Madagascar and toward Africa and India in search of new labourers. At least one cause of this shift was the belief that the Malagasy were especially prone to form fugitive-slave colonies. ‘Slaves from Madagascar’, according to a 1758 report, ‘have the greatest propensity to escape. Many among them, out of love for liberty, fled into the mountains, amid inaccessible forests, and came in groups to attack the plantations on which they had been slaves’. In fact, marronnage in Réunion and Mauritius was, like everywhere else, a response to slavery made possible by the environment and it lasted as a chronic problem until far more recent times, when almost no Malagasy were involved.

Although sugar cane had been grown on Mauritius since 1639 its first sugar-mill only came into being during the administration of Mahé de Labourdonnais (1735–46), who also re-organized the Mascarenes into a base against the British in India. But, Mauritius did not really export sugar before the advent of royal French government which discarded the restricted-trade policies of the French East India Company and opened the islands to all French nationals at the end of the 1760s. Coffee, introduced to Réunion in 1715 to become its main crop, attained its last bumper harvests in the early 1740s. It was in such a state of decline by 1767 (as a result of Antilles competition) that Réunion’s planters had to diversify into spices. During the next three decades, the Mascarene
Islands became ‘the focal point of a real “route des Iles”’ as ‘commercial interest shifted from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean’.\textsuperscript{241} Mauritius, which used to be visited by some thirty ships a year during the Company days, saw a tenfold increase in incoming vessels by 1803, many of them belonging to foreign merchants, especially from the United States after the North American War of Independence. It could be said that, around 1800, the privileged minorities in the Mascarene Islands had a standard of living equal to or superior to those of all other colonial outposts.

\textsuperscript{241} A. Toussaint, 1967, p. 94.
Various historical labels have been applied to the period 1500 to 1800 in African history. In many history books the period is referred to as 'the era of the slave trade'. Such works tend to over-emphasize the importance of the slave trade as a factor in African history; they overlook the fact that, in West and Central Africa, 'the slave-trade era' extended to about 1850 and, in East Africa, the nineteenth century was the period of the slave trade, if we exclude the earlier slave trade to the Muslim world. The label also ignores the fact that some parts of Africa, for instance South Africa, were hardly affected by the trade at any time. Other historians, especially the neo-marxists, identify the gradual integration of Africa into the world capitalist economy dominated by Europe as the main feature of the period. More emphasis is therefore placed by such historians on Africa's external relations than on internal developments. The African peoples are portrayed as hapless victims of world forces which they can neither comprehend nor control. Africa begins to be marginalized and racist ideas about the continent and its peoples become intensified and consolidated. Yet other historians single out population mobility and the final settlement of the continent as the distinguishing characteristic of the period. They fail to see that, with the exception of a few cases, there were hardly any mass migrations in Africa after 1500. Still other writers would wish to discuss the history of the three centuries in terms of a series of ecological catastrophes. They regard droughts and famines as the chief determining factors during this period.

Each of these labels has some element of truth, but none of them can adequately describe the complexity and dynamism of these three centuries of African history. In this final chapter, we shall attempt to characterize the historical development of African societies during this period, basing our discussion largely on the various chapters in this volume.

Perhaps it might be appropriate to begin with the fundamental question of population mobility. It was important for this period of African history but, as Vansina warns in Chapter 3, 'no more characteristic of the period 1500 to 1800 than any other'. Most of Africa was already colonized by 1500 and what oral traditions refer to as migrations in such areas were, in

1. Ch. 3, p. 46.
Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century

effect, population expansion and drift. Only north-east Africa, covering modern Somalia, southern Ethiopia, southern Sudan, northern Kenya and northern Uganda, experienced mass movements of population during this period. The peoples involved were the Oromo, the Somali, the Luo, the Karamojong, the Kalenjin, the Turkana and the Maasai. These movements, according to Vansina, were ‘in effect the story of the colonization of marginal lands ... All other major areas had been occupied and settled’.²

What is of greater significance than the usual concern with migration is the fact that the period 1500 to 1800 is crucial for social formations on the continent. Most of the inhabitants of the different regions of Africa coalesced during these three centuries into the wider social, economic, religious, cultural and political aggregates that make up the African peoples today.

As African societies evolved into distinct ethnic groups with their own peculiar linguistic and cultural characteristics, much of Africa was being transformed because of changes in Africa’s external relations. In 1500 most African societies were relatively independent of the rest of the world, their external links being tenuous. But by 1800 much of Africa had become integrated into the circuits of the world market which securely linked it to Europe, America and Asia. The process of integration was facilitated by the establishment of new communities on the continent such as the Dutch settlers in southern Africa, the Portuguese in Angola and on the east coast and the Ottomans in Egypt and the Maghrib. Many African societies gradually changed their means of living, their location or both. Soon relationships radically different from any before grew up within and between societies. These new relations were characterized by dominance and dependence both internally and in a world system in which Europe became dominant.

Pathe Diagne has identified the main new economic structures that developed during this period as the caste system of production which developed in Western Sudan, the Niger–Chad region and the Sahara; the predatory economy which became widespread in the areas bordering the Mediterranean, the Nile, and the Indian Ocean; and the entrepôt or trading-post economy which characterized the area bordering the Atlantic Ocean.³

The predatory economy, for example, was the outcome of Spanish and Portuguese expansionism and depended mainly on piracy and tributes and duties rather than on trade and industry, as was the case before 1500. The Mediterranean and Indian Ocean sub-systems, for example, were completely disrupted by the predatory economy. It pauperized the countryside which was later further disrupted by the slave trade. A military aristocracy that relied on piracy and raiding using the services of freemen and slaves emerged. This exploitative and oppressive system provoked

². Ch. 3, pp. 68–9.
³. See ch. 2.
several peasant revolts, especially in Western Sudan, the Niger-Chad region, Egypt, the Sahara, the Maghrib, Ethiopia and Lower Zambezia.

Like the predatory economy, the entrepôt economy concerned itself little with creative business. The new maritime entrepôt towns were fortresses and scenes of violence and spoliation, rather than commercial or industrial centres. On the Guinea and equatorial coasts, in the Kongo, Angola and Senegambia, the Portuguese looted more than they bought. From 1650 to 1800, the principal feature of the entrepôt economy was the Atlantic slave trade.

The societies affected by the entrepôt economy were gradually transformed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This was a complex process which involved major reorganizations. The main feature of the reorganizations, particularly in West-Central Africa, was that the trading networks, not the states, became the dominant factor. In most places on the coast, there was a general breakdown of centres of authority and a splintering of political power. As M'Bokolo has shown,

Organization of trade, on the African side, was not a state monopoly: competition benefited a few individuals, princes, commoners and even some ex-slaves who formed a new aristocracy jealous of its privileges and keen to secure political power... At Loango it was the new men - brokers, traders, caravan leaders and other middlemen - who came out best as they had the means to purchase land from the king and build up an entourage of many free or servile dependants. At the end of the eighteenth century there is mention of commoners with 700 dependants who were making war or cultivating land on their own account.4

In other words, as the states declined so did the old ruling classes, which a merchant class arose to replace or complement. The Portuguese penetration of Southern Zambezia, for instance, eroded the power of the indigenous ruling class and facilitated direct forms of peasant exploitation by Portuguese mercantile capital. 'The convergence of regional trade networks with long-distance trade', writes Bhila, 'gave rise to an African merchant class called vashambadzi... [They acted] as middle-men between the foreign traders and the African peasant producers.'5

Similar developments produced the 'Mestizos and Creoles' of the Rivers Casamance, Guinea and Sierra Leone. The Afro-Portuguese and the Anglo-Africans of Sierra Leone were merchant groups which acted as middle-men between European ships and the African societies of the interior. They were mostly agents in the service of European mercantile capitalism and they enriched themselves considerably.

Even in the case of the Fundj and Fur sultanates, where the sultans appeared to patronize and protect the long-distance trade linking them

4. See ch. 18, p. 532.
5. See ch. 22, p. 682.
with Egypt and the Red Sea, the bulk of the trade was in the hands of the Sudanese *djallaba* (traders) who acted as the middle-men and financiers of the long-distance trade.

Thus from relative isolation in 1500, the various peoples of Africa gradually became integrated into the world economy. In most cases, this integration was accompanied by sharp social and political changes.

Despite the collapse of large states in Western Sudan and north-east Africa at the beginning of our period, 'the percentage of areas controlled by states on the continent', writes Vansina, 'was higher by 1800 than it had been by 1500'. But it was not only the area covered by states that had increased during the three centuries: the period also witnessed many examples of political consolidation through the expansion and centralization of political institutions. Thus the two processes of state-building and centralization of political authority characterize this period.

In north-east Africa, for example, although the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries witnessed the collapse of the Christian Ethiopian empire and anarchy continued intermittently until 1855, when Theodore II inaugurated the age of the great emperors, there was expansion of the Christian Ethiopian empire southwards which stimulated the growth of new states such as Boša, Kaffa, Sekko, Wolayta and Dauro.

In the case of Madagascar, we have the opposite process of centralization. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, Madagascar still consisted mainly of small and self-contained chiefdoms. But by the end of that century, western Madagascar under a Sakalava empire, and several kingdoms, emerged among the highlanders and among the south-eastern, south-western and southern peoples. In the eighteenth century, the Sakalava empire reached its apogee and the eastern littoral became politically united for the first time into the Betsimisaraka confederation. By 1800, these two states were in decline and the state of Imerina, formerly weak and disunited, was on the ascendancy.

A similar process of consolidation and centralization occurred in the Lower Guinea coast. According to a 1629 map, there were thirty-eight states and kingdoms in the region, founded by the Ga and Akan peoples. Between 1670 and 1750, a major political revolution took place in the forest and coastal regions of Lower Guinea. From the thirty-eight states of the 1629 map had emerged the three large empires of Aowin, Denkyira and Akwamu which by 1750 had merged into the single empire of Asante.

Other examples of states that expanded and evolved centralized political systems during this period are Buganda, Rwanda and Maravi.

A more common political phenomenon during the three centuries was for a declining or collapsed state to be succeeded by several localized states or by economic systems. In Central Africa, for example, larger and larger states were formed and by the sixteenth century the Kongo, the Tio, Loango and Ndongo (future Angola) kingdoms were in existence, with the

6. Ch. 3, p. 72.
Kongo kingdom being the most dominant and centralized. But from 1665 the states began to decline and territories were reorganized on a larger scale on the basis of economic imperatives dictated by the slave trade.

In the Upper Guinea coast, successor states to the empires of Songhay and Mali arose in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Grand Foul empire arose in the seventeenth century on the ruins of Songhay, but gave way to the empire of Kaarta during the second half of the eighteenth century. Along the Atlantic, the countries that had resulted from the dismemberment of Mali were unified by Kaabu (Gabu) in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and then by Futa Jallon in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the centre, the recovery took place at the beginning of the eighteenth century under the aegis of the Bambara of Segu and in the south, the Dyula (Juula) organized the empire of Kong in the eighteenth century.

A similar process can be witnessed in Southern Zambezia. The decline of the Great Zimbabwe gave rise first to the Torwa state and later and more importantly to the Mutapa empire at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Fragmentation and decline of the Mutapa state began in 1629. The empire fell into decay and disorder during the eighteenth century, although the Mutapa polity did not finally disappear until 1917.

In most of the new states that emerged, original systems of government and administration were developed. Dahomey, for instance, represented a new idea of the state. It had been created by migrants from Allada in about 1625 who established their rule over diverse groups. The traditional view had regarded the state as a larger version of the family. The new idea developed in Dahomey was that of a strong centralized state ruled by an absolute king demanding unreserved loyalty from all citizens. The novel ideas of the state and systems of government developed in different regions of Africa, especially in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, call for further study.

There also emerged in most of these states various social classes: aristocrats, military groups, commoners and slaves. For example, the Kanuri society in Borno was highly stratified. It was broadly divided into two classes, the kontuowa (ruling class or nobility) and the talia (commoners) and both these had several divisions. Differences of speech, dress, household furniture, architecture and residence distinguished the classes and their divisions. In Hausaland, as the aristocrats and traders grew rich, the distinction shifted to an economic level with the attajirai (the wealthy) and the talakawa (the poor).

The aristocracy – administrative and military – grew rich by various methods of exploitation. It soon developed an ideology of oppression. In Egypt, for instance, as the Ottoman empire declined, internal struggles between different social strata developed: not for political independence, but for the control of the economy and the country and its political institutions. The critical state of the economy was a reflection of the
oppressive politics whereby the majority of the people was controlled and exploited by a small élite made up of Mamluk beys and their retinues. This oppressive situation led to the rise of popular literature in Arabic, especially poetry and satire, dealing with the exploitation of the peasants.

As we have already emphasized when discussing the results of a predatory economy, there were several peasant revolts against these oppressive regimes in west, north, east, central and southern Africa. There is an urgent need for a thorough study of these peasant uprisings in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. To begin with, we need a typology of these peasant resistance movements. Secondly, the lower classes in many areas were not a homogenous group: some were not even peasants. But generally speaking, it can be stated that the lower classes, whoever they were, fought against a deterioration of their position, at least in order to maintain the status quo.

The slave trade

The usual questions raised in connection with this subject, such as slave censuses or the effects of the slave trade on African societies, have been discussed in Chapter 4 and in the relevant sections of most chapters in this volume. It is therefore unnecessary to repeat such discussions in this concluding chapter. Rather I wish to draw attention to a few basic questions regarding the slave trade which, I feel, African historians should be raising.

First, to what extent should the slave trade be emphasized in African history? In other words, as African historians, what is our interest in the slave trade? All races have been enslaved in the past: even the word itself is derived from ‘slavs’, who are East Europeans. But all other groups have found a way of removing it from their consciousness. The Jews, for example, were once slaves, but they now interpret their slavery as a special and unique condition assigned to them by God. The Africans are keen to over-emphasize the importance of slavery in their history to such an extent that the term ‘slave’ is almost being equated with ‘African’. As D. B. Davis has brought out clearly in his *The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture* and *Slavery and Human Progress*, slavery is a major phenomenon in the ideology of the modern Western world which we must attempt to understand. It inspires much of the negative attitude towards Africa and the Africans.

In Chapter 4, Inikori attempts to assign quantitative weight to the rôle of black slavery in the economic progress of the Western world. This is another fundamental question which must be faced and dealt with exhaustively. Marx and Engels argued that though slavery is and always was immoral, it has nevertheless been essential for economic and therefore social progress. Without slavery, they argued, there would have been no Greek or Roman civilization. Inikori argues that African slavery was crucial.

for the development of the Atlantic-oriented geo-political and economic system and the industrialization of Western Europe. On the other hand, Fernand Braudel has presented in his three-volume *Civilization and Capitalism* a different picture of the rise of European capitalism to world power, starting with the unchanging subsistence economy of the peasantry, through the market place and, finally, the story of how a few bankers and merchants, by monopolizing trade and maximizing profit, helped create a series of world economies centred in Europe and so extended the growing power of European capitalism. He attributes the growth of European capitalism to the multi-national combines such as the House of Fugger of sixteenth-century Augsburg and the East India Company of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The role of the African slavery in this debate needs a radical reassessment.

J. E. Harris has raised in Chapter 5 one other important question related to chattel slavery. From all the available evidence, it is clear that the process of dehumanizing the African intensified during 1500 to 1800, as a result of the increase in chattel slavery from 1619.

The intercontinental slave trade, more than anything else, established a world black presence. It led to a major African diaspora, especially in the Americas and the Caribbean. According to Harris:

- It was the nature of this trade and its consequences which, especially in the Americas and the Caribbean, caused Africans to organize freedom struggles which over the years established the common concern for the redemption of Africa and the liberation of blacks throughout the world ... This process continued, despite colonial rule, and may indeed be the greatest historical consequence of the African diaspora.

Indeed, this was the foundation of the Pan-African Movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

### Introduction of new food crops

The introduction of new crops from the Americas has been seen by many writers as a positive aspect of the Atlantic trade system. Some have argued that the introduction of the new crops — which inevitably led to changes in diet — improved the health of the Africans and, consequently, led to population increase. As a standard textbook on African history has put it:

> New crops from the Americas made it possible for tropical Africa, and especially the forest regions, to sustain populations several times larger than those of the past. Maize, peanuts, and manioc — to name

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only three – permanently altered the relations of Africans to their environment.\textsuperscript{10}

But as M'Bokolo has cautioned, the effects of these agricultural changes on the African population are difficult to interpret. 'Did they, as has often been stressed, contribute through a more secure and more diversified food supply, to a greater physical resistance among the populations and a higher rate of population growth?' He finds no evidence for these claims. On the contrary, he points out, cassava has limited nutritional value and the people who relied on it most, such as the Tio and the Mbosi, suffered from serious malnutrition.\textsuperscript{11}

Population trends during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are difficult to discern because new diseases such as smallpox that were to become recurrent scourges were introduced into Africa at the same time. It was also during this period that the Atlantic slave trade reached its peak.

What is certain, however, is that the new crops from the Americas and Asia introduced by Europeans to various African regions between 1500 and 1800 diversified the agricultural economy of the continent. These included maize, cassava (manioc), groundnuts, various types of yam, sweet potatoes, citrus fruits, tomatoes, onions and tobacco. Many African food crops, such as bananas, sorghum, millet and yams, were gradually superseded during this period by cassava and maize. Thus the present-day heavy reliance by Africans on maize and cassava as the main staple diet date back to this period.

Socially, according to M'Bokolo, this agricultural revolution contributed, along with trade, to the establishment of a new division of labour. He contends that men gradually abandoned agricultural tasks such as land clearing, cultivation and preparation of crops to the women and slaves, preferring instead to devote themselves to trade which was more lucrative. The development of domestic slavery and other forms of dependence was therefore a direct consequence of these agricultural changes.\textsuperscript{12}

Ecological catastrophes

Attempts have been made to provide a periodization of African history primarily based upon climatic conditions and to argue that there is a meaningful correlation between severe periods of aridity and major historical events. Our period in particular is seen as drought-prone.\textsuperscript{13}

Such analyses tend to give the physical environment such importance that Africans are reduced to hopeless victims of nature. There is also the danger of stressing the drought years at the expense of the normal and

\textsuperscript{10} P. D. Curtin, S. Feierman, L. Thompson and J. Vansina, 1978, p. 214.
\textsuperscript{11} Ch. 18, p. 531.
\textsuperscript{12} See ch. 18.
The historical development of African societies, 1500–1800

above-average years. This has led some historians to over-generalize about famines in pre-colonial Africa. Nowhere do such historians discuss how Africans creatively responded to the droughts. How, for example, did droughts affect and contribute to changes in systems of production and distribution, the ennoblement of food crops and methods of food preservation?

The question of droughts and famines also relates to the larger issue of the efficiency of African agriculture in the pre-colonial period. As Vansina has pointed out, the 1500–1800 period, for example, witnessed the emergence of intensive technologies for land use which, in turn, allowed higher densities of population.

The lower Casamance, Igbo country, the Cameroon grasslands with their ‘domesticated’ vegetation, the mountains in the Great Lakes area along the western rift with their systems of irrigation and/or intensive cultivation of bananas, small spots such as the Kukuya plateau with its novel forms of fertilization or the valley of the Upper Zambezi where floods were used, all are still exceptions in western and central Africa. In northern Africa, including Egypt, with the largest oasis in the world, intensive oasis agriculture was millennia old by this time.

In short, although the practice of intensive agriculture in most parts of Africa was not as old as it was in Northern Africa, small pockets of intensive farming emerged, especially in Western and Central Africa. In such areas, advanced agricultural methods, such as terracing, crop rotation, green manuring, mixed farming and regulated swamp farming, were used. These topics deserve more attention from historians than the usual generalizations about famine and drought in Africa.

Christianity and Islam

Christianity declined in Africa during the period 1500 to 1800, especially in Ethiopia, on the east coast and, to a lesser degree, in the Kongo. Islam, on the other hand, gained momentum in West Africa, Sudan, Ethiopia and on the east coast.

On the Lower Guinea coast, for example, Christianity was introduced into the region by the Dutch and the British. Initially, they established elementary schools in their castles at Cape Coast, El Mina and Accra. Later, in the 1750s, missionaries were sent to Cape Coast by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel. Also, some of the new converts, especially the children of mulattos and traditional rulers, were sent abroad for further education, and many returned home as teachers and missionaries. Thus the foundation of the Christian revolution that was to take place in West Africa in the nineteenth century was being laid during this period.

14. See ch. 22.

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In the Kongo, Christianity was introduced during Afonso I’s reign (1506–43). Under the direction of his son Henrique, who was consecrated bishop in Rome, he made the Catholic Church the state religion. But Christian fervour declined in the Kongo until 1645 when a large number of Italian Capuchin missionaries arrived. About 400 missionaries came to the Kongo and later Angola during the seventeenth century, to spread the gospel, especially in the rural areas. As Vansina has explained, Christianity was first introduced into the Kongo by the Portuguese and was confined largely to the urban nobility, with the ecclesiastical structure remaining chiefly Portuguese. But from 1645 to 1700, the Italian missionaries were engaged in an intense campaign to convert as many people as possible, particularly in the rural areas. Both Christianity and Islam, during this period, were syncretic. Christianity in the Kongo, for example, co-existed with traditional religion. Indeed, they had so much influence on one another that, as Vansina concludes,

> From the sixteenth century onwards there can be said to have been a single religion in which, at least among the nobles, features of Christianity and features of the old religion had merged. The main spread of this religion took place in the seventeenth century … This new religion was the source of Haitian voodoo.

Attempts to organize independent churches also date back to this period. In the Kongo, attempts to establish an indigenous church started in the 1630s and reached a peak in 1704 when Dona Beatrice Kimpa Vita began to preach a reformed Christianity called *Antonianism* which rejected the missionaries and the whites. Henceforth, indigenous Catholicism prevailed in the Kongo.

Turning now to Islam, it is evident that the expansion of the Islamic frontier in Africa constitutes one of the important themes of the period 1500 to 1800. In the Lower Guinea coast, for example, the Mande and Hausa traders introduced Islam. It spread along the northern trade routes reaching Asante and Baule in the 1750s. By 1800 Kumasi had a thriving Muslim quarter with a Kur'ānic school. In the Upper Guinea coast, the Fulbe and the Mande were responsible for the expansion of Islam. They formed a Fulbe–Malinke religious alliance, not only to convert the peoples of the region but also to subjugate them. Thus the spread of Islam was associated with political domination in many regions of Africa. This comes out clearly in the Senegambia where the opposition between the Muslim theocracies against the *ceddo* (warlord) regimes forms the background to the history of the region. In the Sudan, Islamization of northern Sudan created an ideological frontier between northern and southern Sudan which is still strong. The period saw the establishment and expansion of two

16. See ch. 19.
17. Ch. 19, p. 573.
Muslim savannah states – the Fundj and Für sultanates. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Islam continued to spread in the Bambara, Mossi, Kong and Gwirika kingdoms, through traders, prayer-leaders and even violence. The same process of Islamic expansion was witnessed in Hausaland and in Borno.

Apart from the simple geographical spread of Islam in Africa at this time, Muslim fundamentalism was an important factor in many areas. There was the Nâsir al-Dîn movement, for example, which started in Mauritania and was directed southwards. Its motives were partly economic (to control the trade in grains and slaves) and partly religious (to purify and reform Islam by replacing arbitrary rule with Muslim theocracy). The same reformist tendency is discernible among the Muslims in Hausaland, especially during the eighteenth century. A community of Muslim scholars, with similar political, economic and religious backgrounds developed in various centres and became critical of the established order represented by the aristocrats. The most outstanding of these scholars was Malam Djibril dan 'Umaru who advocated Islamic reforms. Both 'Uthmān and 'Abdullāhī dan Fodio were his disciples. As the rule of the aristocrats became more oppressive, the scholars openly attacked the established order. This is the background to the *djihād* of the nineteenth century.

As a result of the oppression of the African peasantry by the rural and urban élites, especially in Western Sudan, the Niger–Chad region, Egypt, the Sahara, the Maghrib, Ethiopia and Kongo, the Muslim leaders and the Christian messianic movements found it easy to enlist the mass support of the peasantry. Men of religion promised equality and an end to injustice. They condemned the traditional aristocracies and the Europeans as the disruptive factors and causes of social injustice.

Finally, it should be noted that the Africans looked at Islam, as they viewed Christianity, syncretistically. They accepted Islam while at the same time remaining faithful to their traditional religion. As Izard and Ki-Zerbo point out, these syncretisms later developed with Christianity in Africa and in Afro-American worship in Brazil, Haiti and Cuba. Thus they conclude, for example, that 'Islam presented itself to the Bambara with institutions such as polygamy, divorce, repudiation and slavery that did not systematically challenge their own.'

18. Ch. 12, p. 364.
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Abbreviations and list of periodicals

AA Antananarivo Annual, Antananarivo
Abbia Abbia, revue culturelle camerounaise, Yaoundé.
ABUP Ahmadu Bello University Press, Zaria
AE Annales d'Ethiopie, Rome
AEC African Economic History, Madison, Wisconsin
AESC Annales: Economies, sociétés, civilisations, Paris
Africa Africa, Rome
AHS African Historical Studies (now IJAHS), African Studies Center, Boston University
AL Africana Linguistica, Tervuren: Musée royal de l’Afrique centrale
Anais Anais da Junta de Investigações do Ultramar
Annual Review of Anthropology Annual Review of Anthropology, Palo Alto, CA
Anthropos Anthropos: Revue internationale d’ethnologie et de linguistique, Fribourg
Arabia Arabia: the Islamic World Review, Slough, UK: Islamic Press Agency
Arnoldia Arnoldia, Salisbury: National Museums of Rhodesia
ARSOM Académie royale des sciences d’Outre-mer (formerly ‘Institut royal colonial belge’ and ‘Académie royale des sciences coloniales’), Brussels
AS African Studies (continues as Bantu Studies), Johannesburg: WUP
ASR African Social Research, Lusaka: University of Zambia
ASR African Studies Review, Camden, NJ
AVG Annuaire des voyages et de la géographie
BAM Bulletin de l’Académie malgache, Antananarivo
BARA Bulletin de l’Académie royale des sciences d’Outre-mer, Brussels
BCEHSAOF Bulletin du Comité d’études historiques et scientifiques de l’Afrique Occidentale française, Dakar
BCGP Boletino cultural da Guiné portuguesa, Bissau
BEM Bulletin économique de Madagascar, Antananarivo
BGHD Bulletin de géographie historique et descriptive, Paris
BIEA British Institute in Eastern Africa, Nairobi
BIFAN Bulletin de l’Institut français (later fondamental) d’Afrique noire, Dakar
BIFHR Bulletin de l’Institut historique belge de Rome
BLEE Bulletin de liaison – Linguistique-ethnociologie, Abidjan: Centre universitaire de recherches de développement, University of Abidjan
BLS Bulletin de liaison saharienne, Algiers
BM Bulletin de Madagascar, Antananarivo
BODE Bulletin officiel de la Direction de l’enseignement, Madagascar
BS Bantu Studies, Johannesburg
BSGL Boletim da Sociedade de Geografía de Lisboa, Lisbon
CA Codices Aethiopici
CCAH Cahiers congolais d’anthropologie et d’histoire, Brazzaville
CCB Centre de civilisation burundaise, Bujumbura
CEA Cahiers d’études africaines, Paris: Mouton
CEDA Centre d’études et de diffusion africaine, Paris/Abidjan
Bibliography

CHM  Cahiers d'histoire mondiale, Paris: Librairie des Méridiens
GIS  Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie, Paris: PUF
CJAS  Canadian Journal of African Studies, Ottawa: Canadian Association of African Studies, Department of Geography, Carleton University, Ottawa
CNRS  Centre national de la recherche scientifique, Paris
CNRSS  Centre nigérien de recherches en sciences sociales, Niamey
Congo  Congo, Brazzaville: Centre National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques
CRA  Centre de recherches africaines, Paris
CRDTO  Centre de recherche et de documentation pour la tradition orale [Research and Documentation Centre for Oral Tradition] Niamey
CSCO  Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, Paris
CUP  Cambridge University Press
CUP  Caribbean University Press
CVRS  Centre voltaïque des recherches scientifiques, Ouagadougou
CZA  Cultures au Zaïre et en Afrique

EALB  East African Literature Bureau, Nairobi, Kampala and Dar es Salaam
EAPH  East African Publishing House, Nairobi
EHA  Études d'histoire africaine, Kinshasa
EHR  Economic History Review, Cambridge: Economic History Society
EN  Études nigériennes, Niamey: IRSH
EUP  Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh

GASS  Accra
GNQ  Ghana Notes and Queries, Legon
GSSJ  Ghana Social Science Journal, Legon
GUP  Ghana Universities Press

HAJM  History in Africa: A Journal of Method, Waltham, Massachusetts
HAIHR  Hispanic American Historical Review, Durham, NC: Duke University Press
Hespéris  Hespéris, Rabat: Institut des hautes études marocaines
HUP  Harvard University Press
HUP  Howard University Press, Washington, DC

IAI  International African Institute, London
IAS  Institute of African Studies, University of Nairobi
ICS  Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London
IFAN  Institut français d'Afrique noire, Dakar
IFAHJS  International Journal of African Historical Studies, Boston: African Studies Center, Boston University
IFMS  International Journal of Middle-Eastern Studies, Cambridge: CUP
IRES  Institut de recherches économiques et sociales, Léopoldville
IRSH  Institut de recherches en sciences humaines, Niamey
IUP  Ibadan University Press

JA  Journal asiatique, Paris
JAAS  Journal of Asian and African Studies, Tokyo
JAH  Journal of African History, Cambridge: CUP
JAS  Journal of the African Society (later African Affairs), London
JEH  Journal of Economic History, Wilmington, DE: Economic History Association
JES  Journal of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa: Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Haile Salassie I University
JHSN  Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, Ibadan
JHUP  Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore
JIMM  J. Inst. Mining Met.
JMBRAS  Journal of the Malay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Singapore
JNH  The Journal of Negro History, Washington, DC
JRAI  Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, London
JRAS  Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, London
JSA  Journal de la Société des Africanistes, Paris
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GLOSSARY

abar: the (large) dugout canoes of Hausa, Kebbi and Nupe.
abba gada: in Oromo Society (Ethiopia), the leader of an ethnic group, elected from among the members of the gada.
Abbot (title) (from the Aramaean abbā, father): the head or superior of an abbey; also a title of respect given to monks.
abte: an Ethiopian honorary title: highness.
'abīd (sing. 'abd: is the ordinary word for 'slaves' in Arabic, more particularly for 'male slaves', 'female slaves' being imā (sing. ama).
abuela: the earliest inhabitants of Unyakyusa (Lake Malawi region).
Ab Shaykh (title) (Arabic): a rank that was second only to that of the Sultan; a post that commanded great authority.
abuna (title): the Patriarch of the Abyssinian Church; the metropolitan of the Ethiopian Church.
abusua kuruwu: Asante clan pot.
abusuapanin: head, leader (of a (Akan) family, etc.).
achikunda: in the prazo system, armies of slaves, i.e. the lower class, as opposed to the dominant class or prazeros.
ada ('traditions of the country'): sword, emblem of authority (in Borno).
adamfo ('client state'): in Greater Asante, a system of provincial administration in which each of the states composing the confederacy served the Asantehene through one of the kings or member-states of the confederacy or one of the wing-chiefs of the Kumasi state, usually resident in Kumasi.
adanudo: a rich Ewe cloth (in Ghana).
adinkra: broad cloth with Akan traditional motifs and symbols stamped on it.
Adontendem (title): one of the wing-chiefs of the Kumasi state, vassals of the Asantehene.
Adonten or Krontire: the Advance Guard division of the Akwamu state and metropolitan Asante.
agape: a 'love-feast' connected with the Lord's Supper.
aghaw (Arabic): high-ranking officers of the militia.
Ah (title): Commander of the Janissaries (in Egypt).
Agona Adontendem: the Advance Guard division of the Denkyira state.
aguadente (Portuguese): fire-water, a kind of brandy.
ahl al-usul (Arabic): members of the old lineage and rank.
ajami: transcription in Arabic of African languages (e.g. the Hausa ajami manuscript).
akuaba: small wooden or terracotta maternity dolls. Still to be found in Ghana.
Akumatire: the Right wing of the Denkyira state.
Akwasihene (title): 'the King of Akwamu'; one of the wing-chiefs of the Kumasi state, vassals of the Asantehene.
Akyemekhan (title): Minister of Foreign Affairs and Head Linguist, in the Akwamu and Denkyira empires.
alcaid (from the Spanish alcaide, formerly alcaye, captain); the governor or commander of a castle or fortress (as among Spaniards, Portuguese or Moors) – see ka'īd.
alci: collectors (in Maninka).
Alfa: title borne by the chiefs of the provinces (dime) in the Confederation of Futa Jallon.
algaia: a musical instrument (in Hausaland).
Alfa: title of an officer (in Kānem).
Aljaravais (Portuguese): clothes from the Barbary states.
alcaid or alka: the African counterpart of the Mediterranean alcaid.
Almamia: land tenure and taxation systems (in Futa Jallon, Futa Toro and the Sokoto caliphate).
amadies: boats (in Senegambia).
Almamy (title in Bundu, Futa Jallon and Futa Toro): a Fulfulde version of the title Imām.
amahiga: sub-clans, in Haya country.
amanyaabo ('owner of the town'): king (in the Niger delta).
amashanga: sub-clans (in Rwanda).
amatega: raphia bracelets.
amatsano: in the Maravi state, the caretakers of the Kalonga’s shrine at Mankhamba.
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amenokal (title): The Tuareg equivalent of the Muslim imām and ḥādi.

āmir (Arabic): title given to generals, commanders, provincial rulers and sometimes to the sovereigns of small countries (splet 'emīr' in the West).

Amī al-ṣaqlījī (Arabic): the unit which gave protection to the pilgrim caravans travelling to Mecca.

Amīr al-Khāzna (Arabic): the units responsible for escorting the Egyptian treasury to Istanbul.

Amīr al-muʾminīn (Arabic): caliphal title meaning 'prince, Commander of the Faithful'.

āmos: Portuguese overlords.

Ampagnito-bē (Malagasy royal title): great, sacred royal ancestor; father of the people.

anaratākina: linguistic taboo (in Mahafaly, Madagascar).

andria: lord, noble (in Malagasy).

andriana: the noble classes (in Merina, Madagascar).

Andrianoni: Antemoro title carried by the first ruler of the Onilahy kingdom in Madagascar.

anto-ankāra: 'people of the rocks', i.e. the Antankara of Madagascar far north.

Apayajye: a group of goldsmiths and craftsmen from Denkýra.

ardo or rugga: the Fulbe equivalent of the Muslim imām and ḥādi.

aringas: in the prazos, a system in which the previous distinction between colono and slave had become blurred.

arivo: thousand, thousands (in Malagasy).

arratel: in Portuguese, a weight measure equivalent to a pound.

'aرش (Arabic): ethnic area; community or group holdings; communal land.

asage: an Akan warrior.

Asantehene: title of the paramount king of Asante.

Asarkī or Inna: title of the sovereign's sister in Zamfara (Hausaland).

asiento or assiento (Spanish asiento, seat, meeting place of a tribunal, treaty, contract, from asentar, to seat, make an agreement): a contract or convention between Spain and another power or company or individual for furnishing African slaves for the Spanish dominions in America.

Askiya: royal title adopted by the Songhay sovereigns to distinguish themselves from the preceding Sonni dynasty.

asomfo: a golden stool of the Asante.

atesin: graves, in Teso (Great Lakes region).

attajirai (or masu arziki): rich traders; the wealthy (in Hausa society).

audencia: 1) a tribunal in which the sovereign of Spain gave his personal attention to matters of justice; an ecclesiastical or secular court representing the king of Spain; 2) a high court of justice in a Spanish colony frequently exercising military power as well as judicial and political functions; 3) a provincial or territorial high court in modern Spain; 4) the jurisdiction of an audiencia.

azāna (Arabic): armed unit.

azzīya (Arabic): saint.

ayari (Hausa): caravans linking Azbin and Hausaland.

Ayilol: see Cilol.

Ayo (or Lurum'ayo or Lurum'yo) (a Mossi title): king of Lurum.

'Azaḫān (sing. 'ażāb): an Arabic word meaning 'an unmarried man or woman', 'a virgin', applied to several types of fighting men under the Ottoman and other Turkish regimes between the thirteenth and the nineteenth centuries. They were a component of the imperial Ottoman troops or odaya.

azalai or azalay: a term for the great caravans made up of several thousand camels (or to be more precise, dromedaries), which in the spring and autumn carry salt salt from the salt deposits of the Southern Sahara to the tropical regions of the Sahel and the Sudan. The salt deposits of Taoudenni have replaced those of Taghaza, a source of wealth of the kings of Mali and of Gao (fourteenth-fifteenth centuries).

aze: fiefs.

baadolo: serfs (in Takrūr).

babika or bamhika (sing. mubika): the slaves, one of the strata in Kongo society.

babuta (sing. mubuta, from vata or evata, 'village'): the rustics, one of the strata in Kongo society.

bacucane: a house-born slave (in Hausaland).

bad: the Mossi equivalent of the Moorish naaba

badolo: serfs, in Takrūr.

Baganwa: title of the princes of royal blood (in Burundi).

bagazam: see dan Aṣbin.

Bahargazal: see dan Bahar.

Bāḥr nagāḥ ('sea-king'): the governor of the northernmost province of the Ethiopian empire.

bahaushe: trader (in Hausaland)
bhahutu: see muhutu.
bairu: ennobled (clans).
Bakaban tumbu: in Takrûr, farmers who have turned back to the land.
bakama: see mukama.
bakungu: chiefs (in Burundi and Rwanda).
balama or kanfari: in the Songhay empire, a kind of viceroy or inspector-general of the empire; commander of the army.
Balangira: in Haya country, princes of royal blood.
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Biton: Bambara title meaning 'the Commander'.

bolo (‘arm’, in Bambara): a division of the infantry in Samori Ture’s army, formed of several sën.

boma (Swahili): an enclosure or stockade used for herding beasts and for defensive purposes.

bomo: blanket (among the Akan).

bozales (Spanish): unlike the ladinos, the bozales were slaves brought directly from Africa and who had had no previous contact with Europe.

Brak: title in Waalo.

buch jodong gweng: council of the elders (among the Luo).

buch piny: council of Luo sub-ethnic groups.

bud-kasma: (Mossi) head of a budu.

buda: in the patrilineal and patrilocal Mossi society, this term denotes any descent group, from the broadest and the oldest to the narrowest, that operates as the exogamous reference unit.

bugo (pl. buguba): (Mossi) fertility priest.

buguba: see bugo

buguridala (from buguri, dust): Sudanese word to designate the divine, the consultant.

buhake: a type of clientele link (in Rwanda).

bukin duku (‘Feast of Thousands’): a tradition in Hausaland whereby it had to be proved that a yield of 1000 sheaves of millet or sorghum could be obtained.

bulala: see mbarma.

bulopwe: the Luba concept of power (Luba royalty was founded on the principle of bulopwe or ‘sacredness’).


burjoum: a court of appeal (in Kânam-Borno).

Buur: a title (in Kayor).

Buami: socio-political-religious institution in Bemba and Rega societies.

cafre (from Arabic kāfir, infidel): an inhabitant of the Cafrerie, i.e. the non-Muslim territories of Africa south of the Equator (see Kaffirs).

capitäo-mor (pl. cápitãos-mores) (Portuguese): in Shona country, a representative of merchants in a feira, appointed by the Portuguese administration.

caracas (shells, shellfish, cowries in Portuguese): small stone beads found in the Zambezia region.

caratàze: passes for vessels.

Cavushàn: one of the components of the imperial Ottoman troops (adjakès).

ceddo (pl. cëddë): warlord, war chief (in Senegambia).

Çeràkise: Cerkes is a general designation applied to a group of people who form the northwest branch of the Ibero-Caucasian peoples. They were one of the components of the imperial Ottoman troops or adjakès.

chái: see kät.

chechia: red woollen bonnet.

chemwa: see njemani.

chidi: fiefs (in Borno).

chikunda: in the prazo system, a slave army under the authority of a sachikunda.

chikwange: a well-known bread among the Kongo, obtained from the cassava root.

chimas: fief-holders (in Borno).

chima gana: junior fief-holders (in Borno).

chira: in Luoland, an incurable disease supposedly imposed by the ancestors on wrong-doers and their descendants.

chiroma (a Borno title): heir apparent.

chuanja: in the prazo system, top slave.


cire perdue: lost wax.

cofo: a unit of the nzimbu (Kongo).

Colona: a talisman (in Hausaland).

colono (Portuguese): colonist, settler (in prazos).

comprador (from Portuguese comprar, to purchase, buy): 1) Formerly, the name of a native servant employed by Europeans, in India and the Far East, to purchase necessaries and keep the household accounts; a house-steward. 2) Now, in China, the name of the principal native servant, employed in European establishments, and especially in houses of business, both as head of the staff of native employees, and as intermediary between the house and its native customers. 3) One held to be an agent of foreign domination or exploitation.
Glossary

cootigu: fee payable by tenant farmers.

Creole (from Spanish criollo, 'native to the locality, country'): a person of European ancestry born in the former colonies (West Indies, Guyana, Reunion); Creole: a language, born of the black slave trade (sixteenth-nineteenth centuries), that has become the mother tongue of those slaves' descendants (in the West Indies, Guyanas, Indian Ocean Islands, etc.). There exist Creoles based on French, English, Portuguese, etc.: the Creole of Guadeloupe, the English Creoles of the Caribbean, etc.

crusado (or crusado) (pl. cruzados or cruzados) (from Portuguese cruzado, literally 'marked with a cross'): an old gold coin of Portugal, originally issued by Alfonso V (1438–81) about the year 1457, having a cross on the reverse in commemoration of the king's crusading struggle against the Muslims of North Africa; also: a similar Portuguese coin in silver first issued by John IV (1640–56).

curva: known as 'customs' in lands under Portuguese influence, 'duty' in English; a tribute paid by the Portuguese to the Mutapa rulers.

dabey: in Songhay, a village of slaves.
dadda yiyan: war songs; blood songs (in Futa Toro).
dady: in Sakalava country (Madagascar), the cult of the ancestors; ancestral Volamena relics.
dafing: clan (among the Marka).

Dagaci (title): a court dignitary (in Kano).
dagga (from Zulu and Xhosa daka, mud, clay, mortar): a mortar used in Southern Africa that consists chiefly of kneaded mud (mixture of mud and dung).

Damel: title of a ruler (in Kayoe).

Damel-Teen: title of a ruler (in Kayor).
dana or dayna (from the Amharic danyaa): judge.

Danau (title in Zamfara, Hausaland): a governor who owed his title to the name of the town in which he resided, an important trading centre from where he kept watch over the roads leading south and west of Keffi.

dan Azbin or bagazam: a breed of horses from Azbin.
dan Bahar or Bahargazal: a breed of horses from Bahr al-Ghazal.
dandali ('the opening of the "U"'): the settlement's main street of most Kanuri U-shaped towns and villages.

Dan Dubal (a title in Hausaland): in Zamfara, an adviser on religious affairs, the custodian of Zamfara's history and responsible for praying for the army's victory.

Dan Kodo (a title in Hausaland): see Dan Dubal.

Dâr al-Islâm: 'the world, the house, the sphere of Islam' in Arabic; privileged territory (as opposed to the Dâr al-şarâb/Dâr al-kufr inhabited by 'infidels' and 'pagans') under the sovereignty of the Muslims, where the Muslim community lives and where: (i) canon law or sharia is observed; (ii) the social and political order of Islam reigns and public worship is Muslim (even if not all the inhabitants are Muslim).

Dar al-ḥlam: 'the world, the house, the sphere of Islam' in Arabic; privileged territory (as opposed to the Dâr al-şarâb/Dâr al-kufr inhabited by 'infidels' and 'pagans') under the sovereignty of the Muslims, where the Muslim community lives and where: (i) canon law or sharia is observed; (ii) the social and political order of Islam reigns and public worship is Muslim (even if not all the inhabitants are Muslim).

Dar al-żarâb/ Dar al-ḥarâb, 'the world, the sphere of war', in Vol. III.

debe: a village of slaves (in Soninke).
debeere: a village of slaves (in Fulfulde).

Deferdâr (Arabic): comptroller of the financial administration of the province (in Egypt).

deggwâ: in Ethiopia, sacred hymns in praise of the Holy Trinity, Jesus Christ, the Virgin Mary, saints or angels. They had different names according to their metre or the tradition of their origin (see kene, malâkê and salâm).

dey (from Turkish dayî, 'maternal uncle') (honorary title): 1) a ruling official of the Ottoman empire in northern Africa, especially the head of the Algiers Regency from 1671 to 1830, i.e. before the French conquest in 1830; 2) also designated a lower rank in the Janissary militia; towards the end of the tenth/sixteenth century in Tunis, the name was born by the heads of the 40 sections of the militia.

al-Dhâhabî (from dhâhab, pure gold in Arabic): 'the Golden': nickname of Ahmad al-Manṣûr, the sixth sovereign of the Moroccan dynasty of the Saâdî.

diatigu: a title (in Timbuktu).

Dibâlram: road tolls (in Borno).

diema: Mossi regional kingdoms or chiefdoms.

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Dikko: title created in the eighteenth century in Kebbi (Hausaland), and which was borne for the first time by a Pullo whose mother was the sovereign's daughter.
dimaajo: house-born slave (in Fulfulde).
dimo (pi. rimbe): free man (in Futa Jallon).
Dirki: a talisman (in Hausaland).
disi (‘chest’, in Bambara): the centre of Segu's army when arrayed in battle order.
diwal (pi. diwei): a province (in Futa Jallon).
diwal (Arabic): central state coffers or treasury; Council of State; military pension roll; collection of poetry; large hall or chamber; ministerial departments; ruler.
diwe: see diwal.
djallâb (Arabic): slave merchants, slave traffickers, called 'importers'. They acted as the middlemen and the financiers of the long-distance trade.
djamâ’a (Arabic): meeting, assembly. In the religious language of Islam, it denotes 'the whole company of believers', djamâ’at al-mu’mînîn, and hence its most usual meaning of 'Muslim community', djamâ’a islamiyya.
Djamâ’ (‘the gatherer’ in Arabic): the nickname of ‘Abdallah, leader of the ‘Abdalläbi state.
al-Djazzär (‘butcher’ in Arabic): the nickname of Ahmad Boshnak, a mamlûk from the Egyptian bey ‘Ali Bey’s retinue.
djihâd: literally 'effort' in Arabic; djihâd akbar: 'supreme effort'; 1) the struggle against one’s passions; the greatest effort of which one is capable; an effort to attain a specific goal; 2) personal effort of the believer to serve the Islamic faith, particularly the struggle to defend Islam, its land and the Muslims against the impious enemy, or to enlarge Islamic territory (Dâr al-Islâm); by extension, 'holy war'.
djinn (Arabic): spirit.
al-Djinn (‘the devil’ in Arabic): the nickname of the Egyptian bey ‘Ali Bey.
djuad (Arabic): warrior chiefs.
Djuad: see garmi.
dukowo: territorial divisions (in Eweland).
dunuba (Bambara): in Segu, a drum which, skilfully played, transmitted messages over considerable distances.
dupi: the servile class (in Western Nilotic societies).
Dwabenene (‘the king of Dwaben’): the leader of two of the vassal states (Krakye and Bassa) that formed the Confederacy of Greater Asante.
dwar: tented camp.
dyon goron (Bambara): status acquired by a woloso when his children took his place and paid an annual indemnity to his master.

cčâge: the leader of the Ethiopian clergy.
egusî: a local crop (in Igboland).
ekanda: in Kongo society, matriclan, matrilineage, but also ethnic group, republic: in short, any community.
Ekine or Sekiapu: a mask-dancing secret society; a masquerade society of the Delta states.
Ekpe: the Ekpe society of Calabar was an adaptation of a cult of the leopard (Mgbe) present among many forest groups in the Cross river valley and in parts of the Cameroon.
Ekpo: a secret society (among the Ibibio).
emin (from Arabic amin, faithful, trustworthy): an Ottoman administrative title usually translated ‘intendant’ or ‘commissioner’; tax collector. His function or office was called emânet.
emirate: in Ankoré (present-day Uganda), a system of military organization.
emuron: a seer (in Teso).
endahiro: taking of an oath (in Ankore).
enfunzi: a kind of goldcrest, the taboo of the Bahutu, Bahinda and Silanga dynasties (of the Great Lakes region).
erasa: see rasa.
erihma: the sacred tree of Ryangombe/Kiranga (in Haya country).
escales: factories.
eso (Yoruba): in Qyq, warriors devoted to ‘training in warfare’.
etego: in Lango (present-day Uganda), multi-clan ritual groupings.
Glossary

evata (Kikongo): village (Kongon kingdom).
eze (Igbo title): king.
eze Nri (title meaning ‘ruler’, ‘the king of Nri’, among the Igbo): priest-king with ritual and mystic, but not military power.

faa (Bambara): father of a biological community.
faama (Bambara title): lord holding supreme power; man of power and authority.
faa ya: fathers (in Bambara).
faa yafa: sacred (in Malagasy).
Fahatele: in Iboina (Madagascar), first minister; royal official.
faa: a corruption of faa yi.
faa yi (Arabic pl. faakah): ‘doctor of the law’; 1) scholar versed in fik; jurist; 2) literate person; 3) theologian.
fallah (pl. fallahin) (Arabic): a peasant (in North Africa).
Famoriana: the Antankara Royal Council (Madagascar).
fanadir: cage (in Borno).
fanafody: curative amulets (Madagascar).
fanane: snakes (in Malagasy).
fandroana: annual royal-bath ceremony (in Merina, Madagascar).
fan: in the Comoro Islands, the first Islamic chiefs who had originally succeeded the Bedja of pre-Islamic times.
fa farba: government officials.
far or farma: title of the Mande sovereigns.
farin or faren: rulers of provinces; governor.
Farinya (comes from Fan and pharaoh): ‘ruler’ in Soninke, Mande, etc. Farinya denotes a monocracy as opposed to the controlled monarchical oligarchy of the original mansaya.
fa (the king of a dukomo (in Eweland).
fidda dtwant (Arabic): fine silver coins.
fig: (Arabic): the science that codifies and explains the prescriptions of the shari'a; canon law; jurisprudence; Islamic law.
fi: a Mossi thanksgiving festival.
fi: chief (in Malagasy).
fi: a linguistic taboo (among the Sakalava of Madagascar).
fla-n-ton (or ton): peer association; the fla-n-ton brought together the members of three successive promotions of those circumcised.
folahazomanga (in Malagasy, ‘those who came to Mahafaly from elsewhere’): a component of Mahafaly society, Madagascar.
folk: ruins (in Bamum, Cameroon).
fon: in Songhay, house-born slave.
jam (from jama, to cover, to shelter): clients (in Kongo).
jumwa pamba dyumbi (in Kikongo): the keeper and maker of charms and royal diviner at the court of the Luba king.
jet: in the Maghreb, groups assimilated with the Arabs.
gabar: in Ethiopia, a peasant who worked the lands for the benefit of the landed élite and was, like the
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fallâh, similar to a serf, or at least a tributary or client obliged to pay the gabir, depending on whether he was a share-cropper or a tenant farmer.
gabari: merchant (in Ethiopia).
gabas: serfs.
gabir or siso: a tax paid by the gabar.
gabirecco (an honorary title in Ethiopia): page.
gada or luba: a classification of the Oromo society of Ethiopia by age groups based on an abstract numerical principle. It is an egalitarian system which involves rule by rotation age-groups.
gaisuwa or tsare: payment of regular gifts to superiors (in Hausaland).
Galadima (a Borno title): a kind of prime minister or grand vizier in whom the conduct of all affairs of state was vested. The title was borrowed from Borno, but there it designated the governor of the western provinces, that is, those nearest to Hausaland; in Katsina, an important official who deputized for the Sarkin; in Kano, a military leader; in Sokoto, the caliph’s adviser, acting as the caliph’s link with the emirates.
Galadiman Gari (a title in Kebbi, Hausaland): an official responsible for internal security.
galaq: a tax payable to the political chief of the Takrûr aristocracy.
Galoji: in Kebbi (Hausaland), title conferred upon Fulbe in contact with the herdsmen.
gan: guest, foreigner, in Wolof.
gandu or gandaye: collective household farm (in Zamfara, Hausaland).
gandun gida (Hausa): the family field, generally known as gona, the generic name for any field.
garassa: Sudanese blacksmiths.
garashi: a land system granting exclusive grazing rights to the owner (in Rwanda).
gimaje: long dyed cotton dresses (in Kanuri).
gobbi: an annual tax on mines.
gonüllüyan (sing., gonüllü): a Turkish word meaning ‘volunteer’; in the Ottoman empire it was used as a term for three related institutions: 1) from the earliest times of the Ottoman state, volunteers coming to take part in the fighting were known as gonüllüyan; 2) in the tenth/sixteenth century we find an organized body known as gonüllüyan in most of the fortresses of the Empire; they might be called out to serve on a campaign or take part in frontier-fighting; 3) in the eleventh/seventeenth century a body known as gonüllüyan is mentioned also among the paid auxiliaries who, under various names, were recruited in the provinces to serve on a campaign.
gorongo or fure: tobacco flower (in Kanuri).
Gounga-Naaba (Mossi title): a dignitary with military responsibilities.
Grand Kâdi (title): Chief Judge of the sharîa Court.
grumetes: African auxiliaries recruited by the lançados.
guda or goda (from the Amharic geta or the Tigrai goya): master.
Gulma: title of a high-ranking dignitary among the Songhay.
gült: in Ethiopia, feudal land; certain rights possessed by the lord (e.g. the right to collect tribute in kind from each household in the district and to appropriate labour for work on his farms or on other projects he might designate).
gumbala: in Futa Toro, the war song of the sebhe, which consist of hymns to courage. It is the epic song of death in which the ceddo assumes his destiny as a warrior, his faithfulness to his ancestors and to the ethic of his caste.
gumus: the king’s headwife (in Borno).
gurma (Hausa): right (e.g. theurma bank of the river, as opposed to hausa, the left bank).
gweng’ (pl. gweng): a Luo semi-autonomous political and territorial unit.
Gyaasche (title): Minister of Home Affairs (in the Akwamu and Denkyira empires).
Hâbshi: one of the terms used in India to denote those African communities whose ancestors originally came to the country as slaves, in most cases from the Horn of Africa, although some doubtless...
sprang from the slave troops of the neighbouring countries. The majority, at least in earlier times, may well have been Ethiopian, but the name was applied indiscriminately to all Africans, and in the days of the Portuguese slave trade with India many such Habsjñ were in fact of the Nilotic and Bantu peoples.

habūs (Arabic): lands belonging to religious communities.

ḥadīth (Arabic): account of an act or word of the Prophet Muḥammad, reported and transmitted by his companions; the collection of the ḥadīth, called sunna, is regarded by the Muslims as the second source — after the holy scripture — of the dogma and law of Islam (the ḥadīth in Islam is the nearest equivalent of the Christians' New Testament reporting the acts and words of Jesus).

hakura: tax exemption.

halika (Arabic): creation.

hallahens (Portuguese): clothes from the Barbary states.

Hammboay: in the Sakalava kingdoms (Madagascar), officials acting as overseers of the dady cult.

ḥankhir (Arabic): wheat-producing regions under urban control (in Tunisia).

hanză (from nso, 'house' in Kikongo): parcel (in Angola).

haoustic (Arabic): wheat-producing regions under urban control (in Algeria).

Ḥarāfīn (sing. Ḥarāfīn) (Arabic): originally, serfs (ḥaraṣīn) in Maghreb. The term denotes black peoples throughout the Sahara, but particularly in the west — e.g. the oases of southern Morocco and Mauritania. Their origin is uncertain: they have been called black Berbers.

al-hayr (Arabic): welfare, form of greeting.

hayu: judges (among the Oromo of Ethiopia).

hazne or hazaine: treasury.

hzamanga-lava (Malagasy): group-altar.


hidjra: the usual translation 'the flight' is incorrect as the true meaning of the Arabic word is 'severing previous ethnic ties and entering into new ones': the term denotes the emigration of Prophet Muḥammad and his followers from Mecca to Medina (the former oasis town of Yathrib) on 16 July 622, a date that has become the first year of the Muslim calendar (hegira).

himaye (Arabic): protection charges; caution money protecting the conquered townsfolk from looting.

hore kosan: grazing land.

hulinān (Arabic): special tax usually eight times the annual income from the benefice.

(the) ḥusayniya (Arabic) or husseinists: the followers of Ḥusayn b. 'Alī.

ibhaya: country.

iblis (Arabic): devil.

Idara: the common name in modern Arabic, Persian, Turkish, etc., for administration. The term appears to have acquired its technical significance during the period of European influence.

īḍāza (Arabic): certificate.

ifejioku ('the yam force'): one of the eze Nri's powers (in Igboland).

iğbhugu: countries (in Rwanda and Burundi).

iharana: trading-post in north-eastern Madagascar.

iko: power (in Hausaland).

ikţā (Arabic): 1) the fiscal allocation of an emir, always strictly monitored and updated, of the revenue of one or more localities, according to status and the number of men in his service; 2) delegation of tax-collecting powers granted by the prince to a military or civilian officer in regard to a fiscal district, as remuneration for a service rendered to the state; this concession was revocable; 3) distribution of fiscal concessions for maintenance of the military class; 4) military fief system.

ikwu (Kikuyu): a yam.

iłari (system): an aspect of Oyo state organization introduced in the Dahomey state by Tegbesu, the last of the Dahomey founding dynasty.

'ilma (Arabic): religious knowledge.

ilizam (Arabic): according to the ilizam system which superseded the muḥaṣṣat system by about 1658, lands of every village or group of villages were offered for public auction and the highest bidders (the muṣāṣazines) were given the right to collect taxes from the peasants and such lands became their ilizam.

imām (Arabic): honorary title awarded to the eminent legal experts who, between the second/eighth and the third/ninth centuries, codified the whole body of Muslim law in various intellectual centres of the Muslim world, particularly Medina and Baghdad; a title given to the founders of law schools and to major theologians; chiefs, supreme leader of the Muslim community; among the Shi'ites, equivalent of a caliph (must be a descendant of 'Alī).
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imāmāt: the leadership of the Muslim community; caliphate or inherited power; office or rank of an
imām; function of the imām as head of the Muslim community; the region or country ruled over by
an imām (e.g. the imāmate of Yemen).
imiziro: a taboo (in Burundi and Rwanda).
indabo: a village of slaves (in Hausaland).
īmā: see āmārī.
īnammā: in Kebbi (Hausaland), title of a governor who kept watch over the western frontier.
lōnka: the Imamono councils of elders (Madagascar).
insilimen: see zuwaya.
inamasango: a village head in Shona country.
ītem unw: see ātem.
īyāla (eyālet, in 'Turkish') ('management, administration, exercise of power'): in the Ottoman empire
the largest administrative division under a beylerbey or governor-general. In this sense it was officially
used after 1000/1591.
jaam: captive (in Waalo).
jaami buur: Sudanic royal captives.
jadak: guest, foreigner, tenant (in Luo).
Jaaggorde: the Council of electors (in Futa Toro).
jagos: territorial sub-heads (among the Luo).
jamana: see kafu.
jangali: the livestock tax paid by stockbreeders (in Hausaland).
fengu: the most prestigious secret society among the Duala, Isuwu and other neighbouring groups,
based on the veneration of water spirits.
jibda: musk (in Hausaland).
jodak: stranger lineages and clans to whom parts of the Luo gwenge were leased.
jodong gweng': see buch jodong gweng'.
jodongo: elders (see buch jodong gweng').
jombri jon (in Mande): slaves owned by the jon tigi, the farba, the jaami buur or the sarkin bayi who,
although slaves themselves, belonged to the dominant ruling class in the state and society.
jom jambere: in the Futa land tenure system, a person entitled to clear the land with an axe.
jom jayngol: in the Futa land tenure system, a person entitled to clear the land by burning.
jom leydi: in the Futa land tenure system, the first occupant and clearer of land.
jom jambere: in the Futa land tenure system, the master of the land.
jon: captive (in Mande).
jon tigi: royal captive, royal slave (in Mande).
jonya (from the Mande word jon meaning 'captive'): Black African captive.
jumbe: in the Comoro Islands, this term denoted the daughters of the fani, who came to marry the
Sunnite newcomers.
jurungul ('crown'): a special coiffure worn by a Kanuri married woman.

(ja) Ka'ba: the vast cube-shaped edifice (ka'ba comes from the Greek kubos, a die) of grey stone in the
centre of the Great Mosque at Mecca, towards which Muslims face when praying. Sealed in its wall
is the Black Stone, which, according to the Kur'an, was brought to Abraham by the Angel Gabriel,
and which every Muslim should, if possible, go and venerate at least once in his or her life.
kabaka: ruler, king (in Buganda).
kabary: public assemblies (in Madagascar).
kaabila (Arabic pl. kbabi'īl): a large agnatic Arab or Berber group the members of which claim to be
descended from one common ancestor and who may 'jointly own an area of grazing land'.
kabunga: chief (in Kongo).
kāfsi (Arabic): among Muslims, a magistrate concurrently discharging civil, judicial and religious
functions in accordance with Muslim law (shari'a).
kāfī al-kabīr (Arabic): chief judge.
Kaffir (from Arabic kāfīr, pl. kuffār): a word meaning infidel, ungodly person, unbeliever; someone
with no revealed religion; someone who does not adhere to monotheism in accordance with Muslim
law. It is applied by the Arabs to all non-Muslims, and hence to particular peoples or nations.
kaft: a plant that may be related to yam.
kafu or jamana (in Mande): provinces; small state-like territorial units (among the Malinke and the
Bambara).
ḥādī (Arabic): commander, army chief; provincial governor; ḥabila chieftain.
ḥāds-lazzām (Arabic): tax farmers (in the Maghreb).
Glossary

kaigama (Borno title): governor of the northern provinces (in Kano).

kā'īm makām (Arabic): deputy vice-regent.

kakaki: a long trumpet (in Hausaland).

kakwata (pl. tukwata): a special Lunda official.

kalaba: the final ceremony of the marriage (in Kanuri).

Kalala: head of the vanguard (among the Lunda).

kalaram: turban (in Kanuri).

kalimbo barata: marriage ceremony (in Kanuri).

Kamsuogo-Naaba (Mossi title): a cununch responsible for the harem.

kanam: a provincial chief in Senegambia.

kanun: potash.

kānūn or lkanūn (from the Greek kanōn, rule): the corpus of legal regulations (canon law).

Kanūn Name: a decree which sought to regulate political, military, civil and economic life in Egypt under the Ottoman administration.

karabîma tulla: a scholar (in Borno).

Karfi (title): in Zamfara (Hausaland), the official entrusted with assembling everything the sara kunan rafi had levied.

karite: shea butter nut.

kasa: territory (in Hausaland).

kaqaba or qasba (Arabic) (casbah/kasbah in English): capital; (small) town; citadel, castle or fortress (in North Africa).

kasalla (from the Arabic word salah, prayers): washing of any sort, even of animals (in Kanuri).

Kāshīf (Arabic): head of district (in Egypt) whose task it was to maintain the irrigation system and levy taxes from the farmers; tax collector.

katīda: an Arabic or Persian panegyric, elegiac or satirical poem or ode, usually having a tripartite structure. The term is derived from the root kāṣada, 'to aim at', for the primitive kāṭāda was intended to eulogize the kābīla of the poet and denigrate the opposing kābīlas. Later it was concerned with the eulogy of patrons.

kassas: a decree which sought to regulate political, military, civil and economic life in Egypt under the Ottoman administration.

kauri (title): a military leader (in Katsina, Hausaland).

kawngal: fishing ground.

kataya (pi. makinay): a fortified village; an enclosed or fortified settlement (among the Miji-Kenda people of East Africa).

kazembe: a general (among the Lunda).

kazi: a title found in south-east central Africa; it is a variant of the Muslim kādī.

kela yasku: a special coiffure usually worn by a Kanuri unmarried girl.

keleigui (Bambara): in Segu's army, a war-leader or leader of an expedition.

kene: sacred hymns, in Ethiopia (see deggma).

kente (also Kente): a banded material; also, a long garment made from this material, loosely draped on or worn around the shoulders and waist.

kewiga: the successors of the Christian priests (in Ethiopia).

kettuna: garrison towns.

khâlīf or khâlîf (a title) (Arabic): caliph, successor of the Prophet, sovereign responsible for ensuring observance of Islamic law on earth.

khâmes (Arabic): vassals, serfs (in the Maghreb).

khâmmâ (Arabic): one-fifth share-cropper.

khâmmâsât (Arabic): fifth share-cropping of the land; tenant farming.

khârâj (Arabic): a land tax, sometimes paid in kind (and in addition to the cash poll tax or djizya) on land belonging to the dhimmī (non-Muslims living in Muslim territory under the status of 'protégés of Islam'); by extension designates all land taxes (see also ra'a).

khāzin (Arabic): treasurer.

khâmba (a title) (Arabic): address delivered by the khaîib (preacher), from the top of the minbar (mosque chair)
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of the Great Mosque, during the noontime Friday prayer, in which God’s favour was invoked on the recognized caliph in the city and, where applicable, the prince from whom the governor of the town held his delegated power.

kiamfù (derived from Yar, the imperial title): the leader of the Yaka.
kia ukisi: holy, sacred.
kiwindji: region under the responsibility of the kilolo (Luba).
kifuka (Kikongo): ‘urbanity’, ‘politeness’, i.e. the behaviour of a client.
kifuka kia utinu: court of the king (in Kikongo).
kism’s’ryo: a Mossi ancestral shrine.
kilbù: natron (in Kânembu).
kilolo (pi. bilolo): territorial administrators; chiefs (among the Luba/Lunda).
kifuka (Kikongo): ‘urbanity’, ‘politeness’, i.e. the behaviour of a client.
kifuka kia utinu: court of the king (in Kikongo).
kis’rogo: a Mossi ancestral shrine.
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kimpasi (a healing association in Kongo): a cult whose aim was to banish mpasi.
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ladende or lazenda: large estates; large plantations in Latin America.

Ladinos (Spanish): the first Africans in America brought there from Europe by the Conquistadores. They were mainly from Senegambia and had either been previously brought to Europe, or were born there. They were called ladinos in America because they knew Spanish or Portuguese, and were at least partly influenced by the civilization of the Iberian countries.

laibon: a Maasai ritual leader.

laman (first occupant): a territorial chief.

lamana (from the Sereer 'master of the land'): denotes a system of land tenure and a political system in which the masters of the land also exercised power. The lamana of the masters of the land developed into the Mansaya of purely political chiefs.

lanbens (Portuguese): clothes from the Barbary states.

laucados (from Portuguese lançar, to launch out an adventure) or tangomàos ('people who had adopted local customs'): emigrants who had settled on the (African) continent with the agreement of the African sovereigns, intermarried and set themselves up as commercial middlemen. They formed part of the many expatriates who populated the southern rivers and the Atlantic islands (especially Cape Verde). Most of them were Portuguese, with a sprinkling of Greeks, Spaniards and even Indians. They also came to include more and more halfbreed children, the filhos da terra (children of the land).

landdrost: a resident magistrate (in southern Africa).

lapto (literally, 'translator'): a native interpreter.

larde kangema: the nominal owner of the land (in Borno).

Larhle-Naaba (a Mossi title): a dignitary who combined military and ritual functions.

las li: the descendants of the great marabout families who constituted 'the aristocracy of the sword and the lance and the book and the pen' at the top of the rimbe (in Futa Jallon).

lazenda: see ladende.

lazzäm (Arabic): tax farmers.

legha (Arabic): henchmen.

lemba ('to appease, to divert the anger of a nkisi'): in Kongo, the lemba association was an association of biomi or high priests consecrated to a nkisi called Lemba. The activities of these priests were all related to the lemba: to appease the anger of a nkisi or to invoke a nkisi (lemba nkisi); to remove a danger (lemba sunga); to restore peace in the country (lemba nsi); etc.; also: judges.

Legr: in Futa Toro, the Legr, sung solely by Sebbe women at marriages or circumcisions, are heroic songs summoning up contempt for death and the protection of honour.

leydi hujja: land bond (in Fulfulde).

leydi janandi: state-owned lands.

leydi maal: see bayti maal.

leydi urum: a system of land control under which allegiance was owed by means of the worma, coupled with the muud al-hürum tax.

lfidi (Hausa): a quilted armour; horse trappings; the quilted protection for war-horses.

Lfidi (title in Hausaland): Commander-in-chief of the heavy cavalry division.

Limamin Ciki (title in Hausaland): a Kanuri scholar responsible for the education of the royal family.

Linger: a title (in Kayor).

lizma (Arabic): in the Maghreb, farming-out of the provinces, customs, etc.; tax-farming.

lonחומ'panilo or vohitsy mananila: collaterals, in Madagascar.

luba: see gada.

lukanga: a senior Luba judge.

Lukonkeshia: see Rukonkesh.

Lurum'ayo or Lurum'yo: see Ayo.

Lurum'yo: see Lurum'ayo.

maabo: Mande blacksmiths.

macamos: the macamos were gangs of slaves surrounding the Muwe Muta, i.e. they corresponded to the Sudanic royal captives (färba jon, tonjon or jaami buur).

macube: slaves, captives (in Fulfulde).


Madaki: the title of the queen-mother (in Kano).

Madawaki: in Katsina (Hausaland), officer-in-charge of the royal stables; leader of the cavalry and/or commander-in-chief of the army.

madhhab (pl. madhâhib) (Arabic): legal schools named after their founders who bear also the honorific title of Imâm. There are four of these schools: Malikism, Shafiism, Hanafism and Hanbalism.
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Madjilisse (Arabic): a body of jurists.

madrasa (Arabic): a primary and secondary Kur'anic school; madrasa designates more particularly an establishment of higher religious education (as a rule attached to a mosque) for the training of the Sunnite clergy, the 'ulamā'.

Mafouk: in Central Africa, a title borne by the mercadores.

magaji: a warrior; a successor (in Hausaland).

Magajin Baberi (a title in Kebbi, Hausaland): an official in charge of external affairs.

Magajin Gari or Sarkin Gari (a title in Kebbi, Hausaland): a village chief; an official responsible for internal security; in Sokoto, the caliph's adviser, acting as the caliph's link with the emirates.

Magajin Sangedu: in Kebbi (Hausaland), a title conferred upon Fulbe in contact with the herdsman.

magira: the queen-mother (in Känem-Borno).

Makram: the king's official sister (in Känem-Borno).

Maguzawa: there are non-Muslim groups in both Nigeria and Niger who speak only Hausa and who share the Hausa culture, but who refuse to be called Hausa people. In Nigeria these people call themselves, and are called by other Hausa, Maguzawa (or Bamagije), whereas in Niger they are known by the name Azna (or Arna) – the Hausa word for ' pagan'. Since the name Maguzawa is probably derived from the Arabic madjūs (originally 'fire-worshippers', then 'pagans' generally) it is possible that the polarization between Hausa and Maguzawa/Azna began only with the spread of Islam among the common people in Hausaland, after the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Maguzawa: in Ethiopia, an agape, i.e. a 'love-feast' connected with the Lord's Supper.

mahalla (Arabic): in the Maghrib, an armed expedition; armed camps.

mahanga (ilala palm - Hyphaene natalenis): a tree found in the lowveld areas of Southern Zambezia, the sap of which was used to make an intoxicating wine called njemani or chemma (in Hlengwe).

maham: privileged peoples from whom Moroccan state officials are recruited.

Majlis: in Känem, the highest council of state normally presided over by the mai and composed of military and religious notables.

maina: eligible princes (in Borno).

Mainin Kinendi (title in Borno): the Islamic and legal adviser to the mai.

mailo system: the system of land tenure introduced into East Africa under British colonization; it combines chiefdom with ownership and the right to speculate in land.

maim: a title found in south-east/central Africa.

(m)ala (Arabic): in the Maghrib, an armed expedition; armed camps.

Malions (Madagascar): Bara provincial governors (Madagascar).

mambo: a title found in south-east/central Africa.

mamponghene: the leader of Gonja, one of the vassal states that formed the Confederacy of Greater Asante.

Manantany: the first minister, in Sakalava kingdoms (Madagascar).

Manara: the large central dome (in architecture).

Manda Hausakoy (a divinity): the fisherman-blacksmith from Yawuri.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mandi-Mani</td>
<td>'the Lord of the Manou': the title of the greatest suzerain in the Sierra Leone-Liberia region.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mandi-Mansa</td>
<td>the title of the Emperor of Mali.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mândjil or Mândjuluk</td>
<td>the title which Fundj monarchs bestowed on their principal vassals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mandresirafy</td>
<td>among the Antankara of Madagascar, the purveyors of invincibility, sacred objects passed on from ruler to ruler.</td>
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<tr>
<td>mangesti egi 'abherawit</td>
<td>the 'Holy Empire', i.e. Ethiopia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangi Mrwe</td>
<td>the paramount chief of the Ugweno clans of Tanzania.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mani</td>
<td>in the Kongo kingdom, a high-ranking noble; a landlord; a governor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mani Kabonga</td>
<td>in Kongo, name given to the clergy assigned to the spirits, from the village level to that of the kingdom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mani Kongo</td>
<td>the ruler of the Kongo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manona</td>
<td>farmers in (Hausaland).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mansa (in Maninka)</td>
<td>the king, the holder of the most important political power (in Mali).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mansaya (in Maninka)</td>
<td>1) royalty; political territorial groups headed by a mansa; 2) a socio-political system, whose dominant ruling class was a polyarchy of an élite of laymen or priests, freemen or slaves, caste or guild members, or noblemen or commoners. It was financed by the taxes which those controlling the machinery of government levied on trade and produce. It was not a landed aristocracy or proprietor class.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mantse</td>
<td>king, among the Ga.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>marabout</td>
<td>the word does not have the same meaning in the Maghreb as in Black Africa. In the former it applies both to a holy person who has founded a brotherhood and to his tomb; in sub-Saharan Africa it designates any person with some knowledge of the Kur'ân and other sacred writings who uses that knowledge to act as intercessor between the believer and God, while drawing upon traditional divinatory sources and the use of talismans. In the eyes of the public he is a scholar in the religious sense of the word, a magician, a soothsayer and a healer.</td>
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<tr>
<td>marubtin bilbaraka</td>
<td>in Barka, the offspring of pilgrims, usually North Africans.</td>
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<tr>
<td>marinda</td>
<td>a healing association (in Kongo).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marisa (title meaning 'the Destroyer'):</td>
<td>in Katsina (Hausaland), the title of a governor who kept watch over the eastern border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maroserana ('many paths' in Malagasy):</td>
<td>reflects the custom of the first Maroserana kings in Mahafaly to place their residences in the middle of habitations with paths radiating in all directions to villages around them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>marula or nkanyi:</td>
<td>the marulu (Sclerocarya caffra) is a tree of the family Anacardiaceae, found in central and southern Africa, and bearing an oval yellow fruit about two inches long that is used locally for making an intoxicating beverage; also marula plum: the fruit of this tree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masara ('Egyptian'):</td>
<td>maize (in Kanuri).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashinama</td>
<td>the title of an important Kanuri dignitary.</td>
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<tr>
<td>masu arziki:</td>
<td>see attajirai.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>masu sarauta:</td>
<td>in Hausaland, all those with any political authority; aristocrats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mawilds (Arabic):</td>
<td>legendary prose narratives about Muhammad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mažâlim (abuses) (Arabic):</td>
<td>a word whose singular mažâlima denotes an unjust or oppressive action. At an early stage in the development of Islamic institutions of government, mažâlim came to denote the structure through which the temporal authorities took direct responsibility for dispensing justice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mbafu</td>
<td>red dyewood, in Luba (Zaire).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mbaru or bulala:</td>
<td>local or ethnic leaders (in Kânem).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mboma</td>
<td>(a man of the Boma ethnic group): among the Tio, the word designates a stupid person or anyone in a lowly occupation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mbua</td>
<td>animal skin (in Kikuyuland).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meen</td>
<td>maternal family (in Kayor).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mercadores (Portuguese):</td>
<td>brokers; merchants, tradesmen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mestizo</td>
<td>a Spanish or Portuguese half-caste (Afro-Portuguese ...); also applied to other persons of mixed blood, such as Afro-Asians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(the) Mfecane (crushing), in Nguni languages and Lifaqane/Difaqane (hammering) in Sotho-Tswana:</td>
<td>a social and political revolution that took place in Bantu-speaking Southern Africa and beyond, during the first decades of the nineteenth century.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mfuka (Kikongo):</td>
<td>debt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mfuku (Kikongo):</td>
<td>usefulness, benefit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mgawi</td>
<td>the land divider (in the Maravi administration).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mgbe</td>
<td>leopard secret society (of the northern Cross river valley and the Cameroon).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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mhondoro ('lion'): in the Mutapa empire, spirit mediums whose function was to advise the emperor in all matters of state; national ancestor spirits.
misfà: submission (in Malagasy).
mîhîrāb (Arabic): 1) a niche, chamber, or slab in a mosque, indicating the direction of Mecca; 2) a niche motif of an Oriental prayer rug, resembling the shape of a mîhîrāb in a mosque.
mîkîrélo (a honorary title in Ethiopia): a royal counsellor.
mîlîmbû: taxes payable (to the Luba mulopwè) in food and local produce.
mîlîk: small family holdings; property; possession, ownership.
mînîngîlû: unpaid labour (a tribute paid to the Luba mulopwè by his officials).
mîthkâl (of gold, etc.) (Arabic): the Sudanese mîthkâl weighs approximately 4.25 g.
mîngû: a secret society opened to the rest of the population irrespective of social status (in Bamum).
mîkômba: the public executioner (in the Maravi administration).
mîlîrà (the mîlîrà cult): the ritual veneration of Mîlîrà, the spirit of the Great Kalonga Chinkhole, an ancestor of the Phiri royal lineages (see Chapter 21).
mîosâ: a priest (in Madagascar).
Mogîno-Naâba (a title): the Naàba of the Mossi country.
môgûmûggû (ceremonial jaw-bone): an Asante wine jar used for pouring libations on the Golden Stool.
môkõndîsi: chief (in Lingala).
Monomôtiàpa: see Mwene Mutapa.
montambà: among the Bobangi of the Congo basin, a slave sold by his kin.
montônge: a captured slave (among the Bobangi).
môroyâ (literally 'spoliation'): in Takûrû, a tax which entitled members of the élite to appropriate wealth wherever possible.
môyo: heart, in the Rozvi empire; soul, spirit in Kikongo.
mpânjaka: king, chief, ruler (in Madagascar).
mpânjaka-bë: title of a king given only to rulers of the great Bara clan (Madagascar).
mpânjaka-këly: the Zafimanely kinglets (in Madagascar).
mpâsî (Kikongo): suffering, poverty, need, calamity or affliction.
mpûndè: shells, among the Tumbuka of northern Zambezia.
mpûło: a Tumbuka grinding stone.
mpîfêkî: village chiefs (in Madagascar).
mpîsîrî: the chief priest of the Mahafaly kings (Madagascar).
mpô:k: a Lunda broadsword.
mopolë: a catfish (in Bambara).
mpûngû: the sacred shrine of the Pare of Tanzania.
mtîmî: see ntîmi.
musî: in the prazos, a poison ordeal done to establish the guilt or innocence of a person accused of witchcraft.
mûbât: see bakuta.
mûbi: see babika.
mugabal (the milker) or mukama (pl. bakama): king (in Bunyoro and Buganda).
mûhanûrû: an annual festival in Burundi, during which royal authority and the drums symbolizing it were renewed, and which celebrated the sowing of sorghum, and determined the most favourable date for this in a country with a long rainy season.
mûhûtû (pl. bahûtû): ethnic group in Burundi, Rwanda and several other states in eastern and central Africa.
mûidzû: the country's chief justice (in Kongo).
mukama: see mugabe.
mukanda: institution.
mukâta (Arabic): financial and administrative unit (in Egypt).
mukazâmû: in the prazo system, a slave chief having under him a sachikunda and his nsaka.
mûkisî (Kikongo): evil-spell; witchcraft; crime of poisoning; the poison itself.
makomondersî: a cultivation system through which the Shona used to obtain grain during famine.
mulàlûtto (Spanish mulato, from mulo, mule): one who is the offspring of a European and a Black; also used loosely for anyone of mixed race resembling a mulatto.
mulûpû (Mwene Mutapa): the title of the Luba king which signified the indivisibility of power that could not be shared.
multazîms (Arabic): the bidders who collected taxes from the peasants.
mûnûkî: a prophetess (in Kongo).
Munhumutûpà (a title): see Mwene Mutapa.
mupeto: in the Mutapa empire, forcible confiscation.
musharā (Arabic): rural products.
mussitos: in the prazo system, fugitive slave strongholds.
mussumba: a capital (town) (among the Lunda).
Mustaḩfīzan: one of the components of the Ottoman imperial troops or adıaks.
Musteferres: the personal guard of the vice-regent of Egypt; the personal guard of a sultan.
muud al-hurum or muudul horma: in the Senegal Futa, an annual tribute payable in grain (grain tax) to the Moors.
mvila: clans (in Kikongo).
mwami (pl. bami): the royal title of the former kings of Rwanda and Burundi.
mwangana: chief (in Lunda).
mwana Mwilamba: the head of the (Luba) army.
Mwanti or Mwanti: the chiefly title to which the name of the first Luba king (Yav or Yaav) was added to become the imperial title Mwanti Yav.
mwanti a ngand: a Lunda district headman.
Mwanti Yav: the highest Luba/Lunda title meaning 'Lord Yav', 'Lord of the Viper', referring to the distance between king and mortals: emperor.
mwembe: traditional maize (in Kikuyuland).
Mwine Munza: a Luba title meaning 'master of Munza'.
Mwine Lundu: the keeper of the Luba tradition and particularly of the unwritten constitution.
Mwine Munza: a Luba title meaning 'master of Munza'.

naaba (a Mossi title): chief.
nabanza: the keeper of the regalia and supervisor of rituals at the court of the Luba king.
nagado: the merchant caste (in Ethiopia).
nā‘ib (literally 'substitute, delegate, deputy'): the term applied generally to any person appointed as deputy of another in an official position, and more especially, in the Mamluk and Dihlī sultanates, to designate: a) the deputy or lieutenant of the sultan and b) the governors of the chief provinces. In its most common form, in Persian and Turkish as well as later Arabic, nā‘ib signified a judge-substitute, or delegate of the iādī in the administration of law.
nā‘ib al-ashrāf (Arabic): a representative of the Prophet's descendants.
nakombga: see nakombse.
nakombse (sing. nakombga) (Mossi): princes of the blood; sons or descendants of sons of princes who had not become chiefs; the royal nakombse = the royal lineage.
nalle: henna (in Kanuri).
nananse: Mossi princes.
nangatoobe: the upper caste (in Takrūr).
napoko (literally, 'chief woman'): the eldest daughter of a Mossi chief or king. On the death of a Mossi chief or king, between the official announcement of his death (not to be confused with the actual time of his death) and the appointment of his successor, his position is temporarily assumed by his eldest daughter, who is given the title of napoko; the napoko is a substitute for her father, whose clothes she wears.
napusum: Mossi ceremonies of greeting the king.
nawab: king.
nzwirimpemba (Kikongo): see nkadi ampemba.
nadalamba: queen mother with ritual role (among the Luba).
nndoki (pl. bando): worker of spells, sorcerer (in Kongo).
nndula: a Kikuyu green vegetable.
nnduma: the arrowroot plant of the inland water holes (in Kikuyuland).
neftenia: landed élite, landed nobility.
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nere: an African tree whose roots and seeds are used in traditional medicine.

nesombe: see nesomde.

nesomde (pl. nesomba) (Mossi): honest man; high-ranking dignitary at the head of groups of royal servants.

nevanje: a prince and heir-apparent in the Mutapa empire of Southern Zambia.

ngasiilino (Tio): in Kongo, the official responsible for collecting tribute and heading the administration.

ngabi: bush-buck taboo, usually associated with the dynastic clan of the Babito.

nganga: in Bantu languages, healer; sorcerer; medicine man; in Kongo, the recognized term for a religious expert, especially in nkisi.

nganga n'gombo: diviners (in Kongo).

ng'ango: iron-smelting kiln.

ngiri: a secret society for princes only (in Bamum).

Ngola: a title born by the king of Ndongo, a state to the south of Kongo.

nguri: mother (in Kikongo).

Nifa: the Right wing of the Akwamu state and metropolitan Asante.

nikpeko (Mossi): the eldest member (e.g. of a lineage).

nisâm (from Turkish nizâm, order, disposition, arrangement): the hereditary title of the rulers of Hyderabad, India, belonging to the dynasty founded by Asaf Jâf, Subahdar of the Deccan from 1713 to 1748.

njaki: a common Kikuyu bean.

njemani or chemma: in Southern Zambia, an intoxicating wine made from the mahanga or ilala palm.

nkadi ampemba or ncariampemba (from nkadi, a dangerous ancestral spirit, and mpemba, the here-after): the demon (in Kikongo).

nkangi (‘the saviour’): in Kongo, a crucifix which was the emblem of the judicial power.

nkere: blanket (among the Akan).

nkisi: the term, which means ‘initiation; magic power; mystic powers; spirit; ancestral force; sacred medicine; idol; fetish’, designates, in Kongo, the ideology of royalty derived from religious conceptions in general, in which three important cults played a role: ancestor worship; the worship of territory spirits and the worship of royal charms.

nkobi: a talisman (in Kikongo).

nkuluntu (‘old one’): the elder; hereditary village chiefs (in Kongo).

noma-n-bolo (Bambara): an initiation cult for boys.

ntempi or mtemi: a chiefship consisting of a small group of villages and neighbourhoods ruled by a single chief whom the villagers appointed from the ruling lineage (in Tanzania).

nthlava: the sandy soils where the Hlengwe used to build their homesteads.

ntufia: the sacred fire lit at his coronation by each king (maloango) of Loango, and which was to burn until his death.

nyia: the Kanuri marriage contract.

Nyaubanga (the Luo word for ‘sent by God’): in Northern Uganda, the period of droughts and famines that ended with the Great Famine of 1617–21, accompanied by a disease which wiped out the cattle herds.

Oba: the title of the founder of the ancient Kingdom of Benin, holder of religious and political powers.

Obeah (or obi): an African religion, probably of Asante origin, characterized by the use of sorcery and
Glossary

magic ritual; also: a charm or fetish used in obeah and: the influence of obeah (e.g. put obeah on a
person).
obi: an Igbo term, of probable Yoruba origin, for king or chief. The obi was appointed by the oba of
Benin.
obuotoyo: rock salt (in Yoruba).
oja: a corps of imperial troops introduced in Egypt by Sultan Selim I; also Turkish fortresses and
garrisons.
ogendini: sub-ethnic groups (among the Luo).
ohene: the king of the Kumasi state.
ôkoo (makoko): king (among the Tio).
okro or okra: a tall annual plant (Hibiscus or Abelmoschus esculentus) indigenous to Africa, and its green
seed-pods, used for soup, salad and pickles (also called gumbo).
omanhene: the king of the Akwamu and Denkyira empires.
ombiasa: often translated as 'sacerdotal person'; priest; medicine man; doctor, etc.; ombiasa encompass
a number of functions and have a number of categories into which they are subdivided among the
Malagasy.
ompanghalalan: royal messengers (in Malagasy).
omukama: king.
oni: king (e.g. the oni of Ife).
onjaty-ôb: high councillors of the Mahafaly clans (in Madagascar).
onjaty: earlier newcomers (on a land) (in Madagascar).
oni-tany: new lands (in Madagascar).
Oraamyan: title of Oranyan, a son of Oduduwa (the founder and first oni of Ije) and the legendary
founder of the Yoruba kingdom of Qyo, who is stated to have reigned at both Ije and Benin before
moving to Qyo; now the title of a god.
orkoiyo (pl. orkoyó): a spiritual leader (among the Nandi); also, a traditional leader (in Kenya).
osafohene: war leader in the Akwamu and Denkyira states.
other (pl. othene): in Labwor (Great Lakes region), multi-clan ritual grouping.
owimbali or quimbares: the Afro-Portuguese (in Kongo).
ozo: a high-ranking person (in the Igbo hierarchy).
panga (Swahili): a large broad-bladed knife used in Africa for heavy cutting (as of brush or bananas)
and also as a weapon (machete).
pasha (Turkish): honorary title attaching to senior office, particularly of military commander and
provincial governor, in the Ottoman empire.
pastas (Portuguese): 1000 pastas = 80000 cruzados (c. 1756-7) — see cruzado.
piny (pl. pinye): the territory of a Luo sub-ethnic group.
the (royal) poggyure (napoggyure) system: a system of capitalizing and distributing women (among the
Mossi).
pombe (Swahili): in Central and East Africa, a (possibly intoxicating) drink made by fermenting many
kinds of grain and some fruits.
pombeiros (in Portuguese): agents from pombe; barefoot mulatto merchants.
pombo: the Kikongo name for Pool people.
prazeros: in the prazo system, a dominant class, holder of the crown lands (prazos); estate-owners.
prazos (Portuguese): crown lands; agricultural estates; the prazo was also a Portuguese land-tenure
system.
prazos da coroa (Portuguese): crown land estates.
Quojabercoma: the country of the Quoja (Sierra Leone and Liberia).
raia (from Arabic ra'îya, flock, herd, subjects, peasants): a non-Muslim subject of the Sultan of
Turkey, subject to payment of such taxes as the dîzîya (poll tax) and the kharâdî (land tax). (See the
dhimmî of Vol. III).
rainis ny mpanjaka (royal friends'): the heads of the Mahafaly clans (in Madagascar).
ra'is (or reis): a Muslim chief or ruler; a Muslim ship's captain.
rakire: joking relationship (in Mossi).
Ramâdân the ninth month of the Muslim lunar calendar, during which Muslims observe a fast (saum).
Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century

Rangahy (Malagasy): a royal official (at Ambilobe, Antankara capital, Madagascar).
ras (Amharic rás, head, chief, from Arabic ra’ú) (a title): an Ethiopian king, prince, or feudal lord; also, the ruler of an Ethiopian province.
rasa or erasa (from the Amharic ras): head or chief.
Rasam-Naaba (a Mossi title): see Bin-Naaba.
al-RasKd (Arabic): an honorific title meaning ‘the Just’.
real-politik: a German word used to denote the notion of realism in politics.
(the) Reconquista: the process of Christian resistance to Muslim domination and the wars to eliminate Islam from the peninsula, covering the period between 722 (the battle of Covadonga) and 1492 (the fall of Granada).
refo rekê: serfs, in Sereer.
Regimento (Portuguese): instructions from the King of Portugal, granting privileges, especially to missionaries.
reis: see rás.
remoru: serfs, in Samba.
remiémy: the privileged, in Mahafaly society (Madagascar).
restàûlah (German): refugees.
ri: king, in Shillukland.
ribaba (or rábiita): (from the Arabic rabāta, to link, to tie): a link, a tie, a connection; an outpost that is fortified (against external threat); a fortress, a hermitage; a fortified centre devoted to religious and ascetic practices and/or to propagating the faith; also a body of Islamic precepts (da’wat al-hakk).
rima (a Mossi title – from rí, ‘to absorb or eat food that is not chewed’): king.
rimaybe or bellah (Mossi): prisoners tied to working the land; captives and serfs.
rimbe: see dimo.
ringu (from rí – see above, under rima): enthronement.
riyása (Arabic): leadership.
Rohandriam: the name of the highest Zafindraminia estate in Madagascar.
rola: turtle-dove (in Shona country).
rugga: see ardo.
Rukonkesh or Lukonkeshia (Luba/Lunda title): the queen-mother and head of the logistics for the court.
runde: slave villages (in Futa Jallon).
ruoth or wuon piny: the chief of the Luo buch piny.
Saburu (a title in Hausaland): the official responsible for security on the roads.
sachikunda: in prazos, the head of a chikunda army.
Sachiteve: a title (in Uteve).
saff (pl. sufuf) (Arabic): a confederation formed by alliances between kabilas.
saka: the section, the first level in the Mossi patrilineal and patrilocal society.
sakke: in Kebbi (Hausaland), the representative of the coopers, appointed by the sovereign.
sakkebee: cobblers (in Takrür).
salan: Ethiopian sacred hymns (see deggwa).
séléyane (Arabic): annual salaries.
samba remoru: in Kebbi, farmers who have turned back to the land; poor peasants of Takrür.
sampy: the royal divinity guaranteeing the well-being of the Imerina state (Madagascar).
Sanankunya: joking relationship.
sandjak (from Turkish sanjäk, literally, flag, standard): in the former Turkish empire, one of the administrative districts into which an eyalet or vilayet (province) was divided.
Sandjak Bey (a title, in Egypt): the governor of a sandjak; the highest military and administrative personnel of a district.
sandjak-beylik: the most important and fundamental military and administrative unit of the Ottoman empire grouped, regionally, under the authority of a beylerbey.
sandjion: trade slaves (in Bambara).
Sango: the thunder cult (in the Qyo religious system).
sanjag: see sandjak.
santu (Kikongo): a type of cross; a crucifix, but also a saint.
Santaraki (a title in Kano): a court dignitary.
sarakuman nomaxa: a title meaning ‘master of the crops’ (in Hausaland).
sarakuman rafi: in Zamfara (Hausaland), grazing-tax collectors.
sarauta: kingship (in Hausaland).
GLOSSARY

sarki (pl. sarakuna) (a title): head of state; chief; king (in Hausaland).

Sarkin (a title): chief; king (in Hausaland).

Sarkin bayi (a title in Hausaland): the king of slaves.

Sarkin dawaki (a title in Hausaland): a general in the cavalry division.

Sarkin fullani: a title in Hausaland.

Sarkin iyadi (a title in Hausaland): a general in the heavy cavalry division.

Sarkin poma (a title in Hausaland): chief, master of the crops.

Sarkin rafi (a title in Hausaland): Governor of the Valleys.

Sarkin shanu (a title in Hausaland): livestock tax-collector.

Sarkin tudu (a title in Hausaland): Governor of the Hills.

satula (Bambara): a kettle; prayer beads.

Satigi (a title in Futa Toro, meaning 'the Great Ful'): ruler.

saum (Arabic): compulsory dawn-to-dusk fast during the month of Ramadân, with abstinence from all physical pleasures (food, drink, sexual relations, etc).

Sax-sax: in Kayor, administrative officers appointed in villages by the central government.

Sayh: an Ethiopian religious chief.

sebe: see zeddo.

Satipa: see Ekine.

seif (literally 'foot' in Bambara): the basic unit of the faama of Segu's army.

Serdar: the commander of the military operating within or beyond Egypt's borders.

Serin Jakk (a title in Kayor): the Serin Jakk devoted themselves to religious activities and teaching.

Serin Lamb: agents of central government (in Kayor) responsible for the defence of the frontiers.

Shango: a Yoruba divinity.

shangwa: famine (in Shona).

Shantali: a protocol officer in Katsina (Hausaland).

shari'a (literally 'way', 'good road' in Arabic): detailed code of conduct; the shari'a comprises the precepts governing the ritual of worship, standards of behaviour and rules of living. It consists of laws that prescribe, permit and distinguish between true and false. The Kur'anic prescriptions it covers are complemented by prohibitions and explanations contained in the law (fikih). The sources of the Islamic shari'a are the Kur'ân and the hadith.

shârîf (Arabic pi. shurafà'): literally 'noble'; an honorary title given to all the descendants of 'Alî and of Fâïma.

shaykh (Arabic pl. shurafà'): old man; chief of an Arab kabila; spiritual master; title given to the founders of mystical brotherhoods, to great scholars and to teachers.

Shaykh al-Balad (Arabic): an unofficial honorary title, only indicating a senior among the Egyptian bay'is (senior grandee).

siba (Arabic): dissident blocks.

Siddi: one of the terms used to denote blacks or African slaves in Asia.

silmolos (from Islam/Islamos): Muslim converts (in Malagasy).

sise: see gabir.

soba: petty chief; leaders (in Angola).

sofa (Bambara): the infantry corps (in the faama's army). The sofa were in theory grooms, but did not necessarily practise this occupation; they were part of the faama's household. Sometimes, to secure the undying devotion of the 'young men' the faama presided at their 'birth' to manhood through circumcision, making sure some of his own sons were involved in it too.

sojabe: among the Sakalava of Madagascar, the village elders, concerned with the minutiae of social life.

soldo (Portuguese): the payment of the capitãos-mores.

sombili: (ongoing) custom; prerogative (practised by the Zafirambo in Madagascar) to slaughter domesticated animals.

sonda (sing. sonda) (Mossi): collective names or mottoes.

sônde: see sonda.

sorabe (or volon'Onjatsy) (in Malagasy): Arabic script used to transcribe the Malagasy language; Arabic-Malagasy characters; manuscript in the Antemoro language written in Arabic characters. These are katibo's (scribes specializing in the writing and interpretation of the sorabe) traditions.

sorondamba (Mossi): young servants.

spahi (from Turkish spahi, horseman, mounted soldier): a horseman forming one of a body of cavalry which formerly constituted an important part of the Turkish army and was to some extent organized on a feudal basis.

şufi (literally 'dressed in wool', from the Arabic root, şūf, meaning 'wool' to denote 'the practice of...
AFRICA FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

wearing the woollen robe' (lahs al-sûfî), hence the act of devoting oneself to the mystic life on becoming what is called in Islam a sûfî: an adept of Muslim mysticism (Sûfîm or taṣâwâwu').

sûfî tariqâs: see tariqâ.

Sûfism (taṣâwâwu') in Arabic: ascetic Islamic mysticism originating in the eighth century and developing especially in Persia into a system of elaborate symbolism of which the goal is communion with the deity through contemplation and ecstasy.
sugedi: grass matting (in Kanuri).
sûd: an Arab market or market-place, a souk, a bazaar; shops grouped by corporations.
sulâ: coats of mail (in Hausaland).
sûlan: the sovereign or chief ruler of a Muslim country; especially (formerly) the sovereign of Turkey; also formerly, a prince or king's son, a high officer.

Sunankwaâneh: the Minister of Religious Affairs in the Akwamu and Denkyira empires.
surâ or dâg: in Takrûr, in the context of client-ships, the relationship between the pastoralists (the donors) and the agriculturalists (the recipients) of one who agreed of his own free will to be maintained by a rich man or an influential political leader for his own benefit.
sûkiro: the word sâkiro is derived from the verb kusâiki meaning 'to arrive at or reach a place'. Sûkiro literally means the person, vehicle or instrument through which gods and spirits communicate with the people. Thus a priest, rabbi and prophet in western culture and a caliph and mali in Muslim culture could be a sâkiro in the Shona society. The sâkiro should not be confused with a medical practitioner, ngangâ, or with a fortune-teller. The sâkiro was a priest, an intellectual, an educator, and a leader, wrapped into one person.

Swana Mulunda: see Swan Murund.
Swan Mulopwe: heir-presumptive and commander of the Lunda army.
Swan Murund or Swana Mulunda (a Luba/Lunda title): the symbolic mother of the society; symbolic queen-mother named Rweej.

tabalâ (Bambara): in Segu, a drum associated with each ruler and which announced war.
tabalaski (sacrifice): a Muslim religious festival in which the Bambara kings used to take part.
tafîr (Arabic): commentary of the Kur'an; exegesis.
tala'a: the commoners, one of the classes in Kanuri society.
talâkâwâ (sing. talâka): the ruled; in Hausa society, serfs; free commoners; the poor; poverty-stricken farmers and herdsmen of Hausaland and the Niger-Chad area.

Ta'îba: head of police and magistrate (in Bornoro).
Talempihity: in the Sakalava kingdoms of Madagascar, officials acting as overseers of the dady cult.
tâla: commoners in the Kanuri society (in Bornoro).
tale: Mossi commoners.
Tandonaka: councils of ministers (among the Imamono of Madagascar).
tangomâs: see lançados.

Tara (a Hausa title meaning 'The Council of Nine'): in Zamfara, Gobir and Kano, designated an electoral college responsible for the appointment of the successor to the throne from among the princes.
tarîqâ (Arabic pl. turû): literally 'way'; association or brotherhood (each tariqâ bears the name of its founder); congregation, Sûfî religious brotherhood; local centre of a religious brotherhood; lodge of brotherhoods.
tarîkh (Arabic): history in general, annals, chronicles; usually synonymous with 'historical account'. It is the title of a great many historical works, like Ta'rikh al-Sûdân (the history of the Sudan, or Negroes of West Africa - see Bilâd al-Sûdân); Ta'rikh al-Andalus (the history of Andalusia), etc.
tarîki: subgroups (in Malagasy).

Tasoba (a title): war chief; general-in-chief.
tasobamba ('masters of war' in Mossi): war chiefs.
tâta: a fort (in Bambara).
tatibâto: method of periodic tax collection used by the Antakara of Madagascar to finance the state.
Teen: a title (in Kayor).
tègg: Mande blacksmiths.
telèlèk saw ('great man'): designates the ideal of greatness in Ethiopian society.
tengsoba ('the master of the land' in Mossi): earth priest.
tenzi: epic poems (in Kiswahili).
teras da coroa: in the prazo system, a Portuguese crown property.
teskere: an export permit.
tiido: an altar (in Mossi).
timār (Arabic): fiefs.
Timimara: title of a ruler (in Madagascar).
tobe (Kanuri): large open cotton gowns either plain or dyed blue.
Togo-Naaba (a Mossi title): the chief's spokesman, who was responsible for ritual ceremonies.
tompon-menakely (a Malagasy title meaning 'masters-of-the-fief'): chiefs of village fiefs.
tompon-pany (masters of the land): original inhabitants (in Madagascar).
ton (Bambara): an association of boys circumcised at the same time; political association.
ton-djen (Bambara): the ton's griot.
ton-dyon ('captives of the ton', in Bambara) mostly captives or former captives taken in war.
tonjon: crown slaves (at the mansa's court).
ton-koro-boh (Bambara): in Segu's army, a reserve corps of experienced ton-dyon behind the disi.
ton-tigui (Bambara): chief; in the cavalry, quiver-bearers.
too: millet paste that forms the staple diet among the Bambara.
too-daga: too pot (in Bambara).
Torode: the Torode revolution of 1776 in Futa Toro was begun by the Torode marabout movement which took much of its inspiration from the success of the djihād in Bandu and Futa Jallon at the beginning of the eighteenth century. It was a revolt of the small peasants against both the muudul horma, imposed by the Moorish kabilas, and the oppressive eastern Muslim tax system introduced by the Islamized Denyanke aristocracy.
tore: in Born, specially designated title-holders.
trovo: a fort (in Madagascar).
Trek (the Great Trek - 1834-9): an emigration movement of the Cape Boers towards the Vaal and the Orange following the British thrust in South Africa.
trekboers: the Boer immigrant farmers who went across the Orange river in search of land before the Great Trek. They settled mostly in the south of what later became the Orange Free State.
tsare: see gaisuwa.
tsibidic: a general council (at the court of the Luba king).
tishang': the court of the Luba king.
tsi-mihety: the collective name adopted by the Tsimihety (Madagascar) to indicate, by refusing to cut their hair, non-submission to Maroserana authority.
tsiompy: famine (in Malagasy).
tsovo: name given by the Hlengwe to the basalt soils.
tubung ('masters of the land'): heads of small political units (among the Luba/Lunda).
Tséfêntjëwë: one of the components of the Ottoman imperial troops or aṣiks.
tukwata: see kakwala.
tumba: blessing (in Kongo).
tumbili: monkey (in Kiswahili).
tunka (a Soninke title): king.
Turabi: a protocol officer in Katsina (Hausaland).
turndal ('through the sand', in Bambara): derived from the arabic al-tareb, the land, and designates the divine, the consultant.
turuk: see tarika.
tweapea: (Akan) chewing-sticks.
twite: the officer who represented the Luba king in secular contexts; military chief.
Ubandawaki (a title): a military leader (in Zamfara and Gobir, Hausaland).
ubuhake: in Rwanda, a type of clientele link (see buhake).
ubugahire: a type of clientele link (in Burundi).
ubwoko: in Rwanda, the sacred code establishing royal rituals and the dynastic genealogy.
uki: a type of beer made by the Akamba; it is fermented for longer than that of neighbouring communities.
ukisi: in Kongo, holiness; divinity; divine will.
ukoko: lineage, descent.
ulamâ' (sing. 'ulim) (Arabic): Muslim scholars, erudite persons, doctors of law or theologians.
umboli: trader (in Känem-Borno).
umerâ-i-sherikise: Circassian amirs.
Umm Laham: the Great Famine of 1684 in Shillukland.
umuheto ('of the bow'): tax-gathering (in Rwanda).

umuryango, in Kirundi and Gih; ubwoko, in Kinyarwanda; uruganda, in Runyambo and Ruhaya: clan.

unguri ('the mother principle' in Kikongo): maternal, matrilineal relationship; matriarchy.

unguri ankama: seigniory (a Kikongo title still in use among the southern Suku about 1900).

urf: customs.

uruganda: see umuryango.

uthlanga: reed (in Zulu).

wata: rusticity (in Kikongo).

ubwoko, in Kinyarwanda; uruganda, in Runyambo and Ruhaya: clan.

unguri ('the mother principle' in Kikongo): maternal, matrilineal relationship; matriarchy.

unguri ankama: seigniory (a Kikongo title still in use among the southern Suku about 1900).

surf: customs.

uruganda: see umuryango.

uthlanga: reed (in Zulu).

wata: rusticity (in Kikongo).

vaha: a medium.

valohazomanga: the commoners in Mahafaly society (Madagascar).

vashambadzi: traders; African merchant class, in the Zambuzí region.

vata: to cultivate (in Kikongo).

veli: governor of a province (see wali).

Veybercoma: the country of the Vai (Sierra Leone and Liberia).

vidye: spirit (in Luba).

vilipate: royal gifts (in Malagasy).

visitador (Portuguese): inspector.

voandzeia subterrânea (from Malagasy voandzou): a genus of tropical creeping herbs (family Leguminosae) with trifoliate leaves and small axillary flowers, commonly called 'ground nut'.

voda: an African religion.

tohity mananía (Malagasy): see lono'mpanilo.

the 'Falafoysy ('white silver'): in Madagascar, the collaborators of the ruling Maroserana, descendants of white silver, sons of non-Maroserana women and Maroserana royals.

volamena ('red silver', i.e. gold): in Mahafaly (Madagascar), the tombs of the Zafivolamena (sons-of-gold), the ruling Maroserana branch among the Sakalava.

wa'azi: sermons (in Hausaland).

Wak'at al-sanadjik ('Clash of the Sandjak Beys'): an Egyptian treaty dealing with the revolt of the Fakariya beys in 1660.

wâkî (Arabic pl. awkâf): 1) an Islamic endowment of property to be held in trust and used for a charitable or religious purpose; 2) a Muslim religious or charitable foundation created by an endowed trust fund; 3) a juridical-religious measure taken by the owner of land or other real estate to vest its ownership in a religious institution (a mosque) or some public or social facility (a madrasa, hospital, etc.), and/or his or her descendants.

wâli (pl. wulát) (from Turkish váh): governor or vice-governor of a province (wilâya).

wasâmi: district chiefs, in the Ugweno state (Tanzania).

Wambai: a Kano title.

wark: gold (in Amharic).

washambadzi: see vashambadzi.


wasiliram: in Bornó, a special quarter assigned to wasili.

watan: fatherland; homeland; ancestral land.

wayilbe: blacksmiths (in Takrûr).

waâsir (Arabic) (title of the successors of Shaykh Muhammad Abû Likaylik): in the Ottoman empire, title of high-ranking state officials or ministers and of the highest dignitaries; holders of positions analogous to that of Muslim viziers; vice-regents, viceroys.

weg-piny: land-owning clans (among the Luo of Kenya).

Weranga-Naaba (a Mossi title): a dignitary who looked after the horses.

Widi-Naaba (a Mossi title): the political spokesman.

wilâya (pl. wîlâyât) (Arabic): one of the chief administrative divisions (provinces) of the Ottoman empire having as its head a wâli who represents the government and is assisted by an elective council, and being subdivided into wasâs (districts).

woloso ('born in the house', in Mande): the status acquired by a woman purchased by a community, as soon as she produced a child. A man could also acquire the same status as soon as his master had sufficient confidence in him; house-born slave.

worma: obligations of fealty. Worma introduced the idea of allegiance or fealty into Takrûr languages where such a bond did not exist; bond of fealty.

wuon piny: see wuoth.

Xaadi: a title (in Kayor).
Glossary

Yav: see Mwant Yav.
Yadega-tenga: the land of Yadega (Yatenga), in Mossi country.
Yatenga-Naaba (a Mossi title): the king of Yatenga.
yerima: the governor of the northern provinces (in Borno).
yiat: hunting grounds.
 yii (pl. yiiya): the household, the second level in the Mossi patrilineal and patrilocal society.
yiir kasma (Mossi): the head of the yiiiri.
yiira: see yiri.

zabyuya: a ritual announcement at the ceremonial investiture of Mossi chiefs.
zaka (pl. zakse): the smaller unit in the Mossi patrilineal and patrilocal society.
zakât (Arabic): compulsory alms-giving that, for any Muslim enjoying a certain income, consists of distributing a proportion — ranging from 2.5 per cent to 10 per cent — to the poor and to a specific category of the needy. The zakât is the fourth pillar of Islam.
zakse: see zakka.
zalunci: injustice (in Hausaland).
Zanna Arjinama: a titled official (in Borno).
zâniyya (pl. zamâyâ) (Arabic): religious brotherhood; brotherhood seat (and funerary sanctuary of the founding saint); cultural centre; when fortified and manned by defenders of the faith, it is called ribât.

zombi or zombie (of Niger-Congo origin; akin to Kongo and Kimbundu and Tshiluba nzambi, god, Kongo zumbi, good-luck fetish, image): 1) the deity of the python in West African voodoo cults; the snake-deity of the voodoo rite in Haiti and the southern USA; the supernatural power or essence that according to voodoo belief may enter into and reanimate a dead body; a will-less and speechless human in the West Indies capable only of automatic movement held to have died and been reanimated but often believed to have been drugged into a catalepsy for the hours of interment; 2) a person thought to resemble the so-called walking dead; a person markedly strange or abnormal in mentality, appearance, or behaviour.

zaunaya or insilimen: Berber or Sudanese marabout groups.
Zwayiya (the Zwayiya marabouts): a branch of the marabout movement.
Notes:
1. Identical names for peoples, areas, kingdoms and languages have been combined;
2. Page references for maps are in italics;
3. Titles and qualifiers have been omitted, except where there may be problems of identification;
4. Footnotes are referred to by the suffix n after a page reference;
5. Sub-entries are in alphabetical order, except where chronological order is significant.

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