

**INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DESIGNING OF
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN THE EDUCATION SECTOR IN
TANZANIA**

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**A THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
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CERTIFICATION

The undersigned certifies that he/she has read the work and hereby recommend the acceptance by the Open University of Tanzania a proposal titled: **“Institutional Factors Influencing the Designing of Public-Private Partnerships in the Education Sector in Tanzania”** in fulfilment of the requirements for the Doctorate Degree in Education of the Open University of Tanzania.

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DECLARATION

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.....

Signature

.....

Date

DEDICATION

This PhD Thesis is dedicated to my family notable of whom; My late Grandfathers George Henry Sekayita and Leonard Kakirebwa Mukasa; My Grandmothers Deborah Sekayita and the late Zawedde Nanteza; my late Father, Joseph Kityo Lubega; my late step-father Wilson Luutu; my Mother, Mrs. Joyce Sekayita Luutu; my uncles Stephen Sekayita; Paul Senyonga Sekayita and Charles Matovu Tamusuza; my sisters Rosette Lubega, Juliet Namale, and Loy Luutu; my brother Ronald Seguya Binywera; my son, Jonathan Matovu Mukasa and my daughter Joanna Nazziwa Mukasa.

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of study was to establish the reasons for the persistent complaints against Private Public Partnerships (PPPs) designs, despite the positive and deliberate efforts by the Government of Tanzania (GoT) towards putting up an enabling policy framework. This study employed a Mixed Research Approach, and Case Study design to find out the influence of institutional factors in terms of laws, policies, and beliefs on the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania. Qualitative data were collected through interviews, and documentary analysis, and were analysed using thematic, and content analysis. Quantitative data, were analysed using inferential statistics, and were tested for reliability with a Cronbach's alpha (α) of 0.84. Pearson Chi-square tests and confidence intervals were used to analyse the degree of association between views of the public and private sector respondents over selected hypothetical statements. The study had 95 respondents (N=95, 100%), 88 responded to questionnaires (N=95, 83.6%), while 25 were interviewed (N=95, 23.8%) and 11 were both interviewed and answered questionnaires (N=95, 12%). It was found out that, so far there are no long-term PPP contracts implemented in the education sector. Also, it was found out that the constantly changing education policies and the negative attitudes towards the private sector in education are still a major challenge towards the designing of PPPs in the education sector. It is therefore recommended that the Government of Tanzania (GoT) through the Ministry of Education Science and Technology should develop an independent PPP policy for the education sector.

Keywords: Designing, Institutions, Public-Private Intermediaries, Public Private Partnership, Public Good, and Structural Adjustment Policies

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BEST	Basic Education Statistics in Tanzania
DART	Dar-es-Salaam Rapid Transport
ESDP	Education Sector Development Programme
GCPs	Government-Community Partnership
IAD	Institutional Analysis and Development
IAE	Institute of Adult Education
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPC	Investment Promotion Centre
LG	Local Government
LGRP	Local government Reform Programme
LMG	Local Municipal Governments
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MOEVT	Ministry of Education and Vocational Training
NIE	New Institutional Economics
NPM	New Project Management
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PMORALG	Prime Minister's Office regional administration and local government
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
TCE	Transaction Cost Economics
TCT	Transaction Costs Theory
TDV	Tanzania Development Vision
TNBC	Tanzania National Business Council
TPSF	Tanzania Private Sector Foundation

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

This chapter gives the background information, a brief account of the evolution of Public – Private investment policies in Tanzania, the statement of the research problem - the purpose of the study, research objectives, research questions; and significance of the study. The chapter ends with the organisation of the thesis.

1.2 Background to the Study

The term “Public Private Partnerships” (PPPs) is an important part of the lexicon in public investment policy in Tanzania. PPPs provide a process by which the role of a government as a provider of would-be public services like education is rolled back, while the private sector is deliberately expanded (Delmon, 2017; Meunier, & Quinet, 2010; Ngowi 2005). Unfortunately, in Tanzania the establishment of formal institutions in terms of laws and policies that support a market-based system in the education sector is still work in process. The World Bank (2020) adds to this concern by highlighting the broad lack of capacity to conduct business in Tanzania, which was ranked 141 among 190 economies in the ease of doing business index, despite indicating an improvement from 144 in 2018.

According to Jomo (2015) there is a need for private and public partners to be thoughtful in the design and implementation of PPPs to prevent pitfalls from the past, especially recognising the challenges related to the implementation of the ambitious year 2030 agenda for Sustainable Development. Ndandiko (2006) warned against the “*wholesale*”

application of PPPs by the governments of developing economies, by trying to emulate the experiences of successful models in developed countries. According to him, there are striking differences in the institutional structures between the developed and developing countries. Unlike developing countries, developed countries have relatively strong public, and private sector institutions, a sound economic resource-base, an appropriate and enforceable regulatory framework (Roland, 2008; Bortolotti, & Milella, 2008; LaRocque, 2007). Similarly, Delmon (2017) warned against governments focusing mainly on implementing PPPs in an ad hoc manner, instead build a conducive PPP framework and with various models and approaches. That is why more research was needed to determine the institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs with special attention to the education sector.

Delmon (2017) advocates for adopting a relevant institutional framework by guarding against replicating wholesale from any given country. Figure 1.1 illustrates the model of a comprehensive framework necessary for viable PPP projects found in most of the more developed economies. A sound institutional framework should guide PPP development, including a stable legal framework, solid financing mechanisms, sound appraisal systems, and consistent revenue management and monitoring mechanisms (Delmon, 2017; Wobst, 2001). Policymakers should not be hoodwinked by the so-called “best practice” PPP programmes developed by other countries over many years through numerous challenges innovations and for a specific legal, political, and capital context.




Figure 1.1: A Comprehensive PPP Framework

Smith (2007) stresses the importance of institutional arrangements in determining much of what roles the state can and play in governance. The provision of the would-be public services through the PPPs on technical of administrative rigidities, legal capacity, the improvement of public sector management, the legal framework for development, accountability through better auditing, decentralisation, the policing of corruption, civil service reform, and improved information on policy issues for both decision-makers and the public (Williamson, 2000 & Hodgson, 2007). The design of PPPs involves the use of the governance mechanism that focuses more on process and outcomes than on formal institutional arrangements and it is these processes and unwritten silent norms that attracted the attention of this research.

The OECD (2013) observed that the private sector in Tanzania is marginalised and suffers from sporadic policy changes, which increase uncertainty for all parties. Tanzania's policy framework for private investment is to some extent complex and outdated, for example, some policies can be found in various sections of the Public-

Private Partnership regulations Act of 2014 (and revised 2017), the Public Procurement Act 2011, The National Investment Promotion Act was enacted in 1990 (and revised 1997), and sector-specific Acts.

The World Bank, (2016) advocates for establishing effective PPP institutions with relevant capacities, including establishing a “PPP Centre” that is well facilitated on top of a robust institutional framework. Studying the influence of institutions on the designing of PPPs is crucial for providing insights into the role of institutions play in providing stability and certainty, which can help both the public and private sector stakeholders in the designing of PPP projects in the education sector. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Government of Tanzania (GoT) undertook Structural Adjustments Policies (SAPs) that were aimed at orienting the country’s institutional framework towards increased cooperation between the public and private sector in delivering services to the public, including education services. The development of PPPs is directly proportional to the development of the market system, (Galabawa, 1990). Twaakyondo, Bhalalussesa and Ndalichako 2002; Van Arkadie, 1995).

Barnes (2011) identified different areas in the education sector under which PPP models can be designed. These include; policy-making, formulation of plans, evaluation, and implementation, ownership, management, funding, running of institutions, academic aspects, special education programmes, like bridge courses, teacher training services, extra academic aspects, examinations, including entrance examinations, support services, hostels, healthcare, transport, maintenance, security, and so on. Though the policy formulation is normally considered an exclusive prerogative of the state, in many

countries recently, hybrid partnership models have also evolved, involving new combinations and permutations of state and non-state sectors engaged in a range of activities in education. The GoT has given clear indications that there is a need to increase the mobilisation and flow of resources from the private to the public sector (Twaakyondo et al., 2002; URT, 2010). The Tanzania National Development Vision 2025 requires the Government to support and stimulate various actors participating in economic growth, by encouraging the private sector to undertake investments in socio-economic goods and services like education through the framework of PPPs (McGaghie, Bordage, & Shea, 2001; Regoniel, 2015; URT, 2010).

The study of the institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector was done in the realm of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). In Tanzania, the adoption of SAPs was not a straightforward affair following serious disagreements with the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) especially regarding the conditions for the standby loan arrangement in 1979 and the insistence to devalue the Tanzanian shilling. In a bid to have control over the process, the GoT instead launched its first customised National Economic Survival Programme (NESP) in 1981 (Van Arkadie, 1995; Wobst, 2001). The objective of this programme was the conditional liberalization of the economy, and it supplanted the fourth five-year plan. However, the NESP did not achieve much because it was built around the old existing economic structures and institutions. Instead, the GoT adopted a three-year SAP in 1982, which was prepared along with the World Bank, following the advice of the Tanzanian Advisory Group (TAG).

According to Wobst (2001), this SAP package was an exclusively national effort and many pundits viewed it as a home-grown solution to the broad SAPs by the World Bank and the IMF that had attracted serious criticism. Even with the domestically agreed reforms, the GoT was reluctant to implement policy measures. It was not until the Fiscal Year (FY) of 1984/85 that the government launched its first significant reform aimed at liberalising the economy. The question remains how has the designing of PPPs in education sector been influenced by the new structural dispensation as a way of achieving the Tanzania Development Vision (TDV) 2025.

Traditionally, especially during the 1970s through the 1980s, the Government of Tanzania (GoT) had an obligation, to provide education to all, after launching the policy of *Education of Self-Reliance* of 1967. However, as Ngowi (2005) observed, from the mid-1980s, the winds of change blew across Africa causing many and far-reaching social, political, and economic changes. The role of the public sector in the development process was realigned in many countries (Larbi, 1999; Liviga, 2011; Ngowi, 2005; Wobst, 2001). The government's role changed mainly to that of a facilitator for private sector-led economic development and growth. World Bank (2016) highlights that the Privately managed public services facilitate the delivery of between 12 and 29 percent more connections per worker to services such as power and water to the tune of over 85 percent higher than in the case of publicly managed projects.

According to the Education Situation Analysis paper (URT, 2005), the education sector had become more complex and diversified with a wide variety of providers, including not only the state but also the private sector, NGOs, CBO, and FBOs. The interface between the public and private sector calls for a rethinking of governance, and the

interactions among structures. Similarly, the National Public-Private Partnership Policy (URT, 2009) also acknowledges that the performance of PPPs has been mixed largely due to the complexity of such projects and lack of clear guidelines and procedures for their development and implementation”. Designing PPPs most especially in the education sector brings together partners from different backgrounds, therefore it is important that a careful study of how the institutional terrain influences their cooperation in the form of PPPs.

According to Bengesi, Mwesiga, and Mrema, (2016), private sector participation in PPP, particularly in education Tanzania, remains low despite the numerous government efforts towards creating an enabling institutional framework for their growth and development. Bengesi et al. (2016) identified the need to interrogate the adequacy of the enabling policy, legal and institutional mechanisms; the understanding of the PPP concept by the stakeholders; and the possibility of the existence of partnership constraints in the education sector.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

The GoT has given clear indications that there is a need to increase the mobilisation and flow of resources from the private to the public sector. However, according to Omari (2014) in Tanzania, the relationships between the Private - Public Partnership management in the education sector have been chequered, historically rocky, and antagonistic. Therefore, it is difficult to envisage the successful designing of PPP contracts in the education sector without understanding the laws, policies, and informal rules that govern the interaction between public and private sector actors in the education sector.

Studies show that there is mutual suspicion, and inequality between the public, and private sector partners. Hence, it is not wise to embark on the designing of PPPs in the education sector without examining the cause of the conflicts. Most of the challenges facing the implementation of PPP in general and in the education sector in particular, can be linked to the flawed designing process. Even the National Public-Private Partnership Policy document (URT, 2009) recognises the underlying challenges and risks in negotiation and approval processes for Public-Private Partnerships and calls for well-guided negotiation and approval system. Therefore, it was imperative to investigate the influence of the institutional factors in terms of laws, policies, beliefs and norms on the designing of PPPs in the education sector by examining the views of both the public and private sector stakeholders.

1.3.1 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of study was to establish the reasons for the persistent complaints against PPPs designs, despite the positive and deliberate efforts by the GoT towards putting up an enabling legal and administrative framework (Lather, 1986; URT, 2009).

1.3.2 Specific Research Objectives

- (i) To identify the existing PPP models and contracts in the education sector in Tanzania.
- (ii) To determine the formal and informal institutions that influence the designing of PPPs in the education sector.
- (iii) To determine the effect of changes in the institutional framework, on the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania.

- (iv) To examine the views and perceptions of the public and private sector stakeholders towards the challenges faced in designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania.

1.3.3 The Research Questions

The general research questions are derived from the research objectives and these include:

- (i) What are the main Public-Private Partnership models and contracts in the education sector in Tanzania?
- (ii) What formal and informal institutions influence the designing of PPPs in the education sector?
- (iii) What is the effect of changes in the institutional framework on the design of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania?
- (iv) How do the public and private education sector stakeholders' perceive the challenges faced in the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania?

1.4 Scope of the Study

The scope of the study refers to the parameters under which the study operated (Simon, 2011; Wiersma, 2000). The scope of the study was limited to allow its completion within a reasonable time and budget constraints. The study area of PPPs is such a wide and broad concept with various dimensions, especially in the education sector in Tanzania. That is why this research was limited to studying a few public institutions, (Hale & Napier, 2001; David & Sutton, 2004). This study was confined to the design process of PPPs in terms of their negotiation and establishment as opposed to their

development, implementation and performance appraisal. The literature review shows that there are several interactions between the public and private sector, but the scope of this study was limited to formal contractual relationships.

1.5 Significance of the Study

The results of this study are significant to the various partners and actors to see beyond superficial and misleading explanations about PPPs to understand the influence of institutions towards the improved PPP designs in the education sector. (Liviga, 2011; Ngowi, 2005; Omari, 2014).

This study is significant to the GoT because it clears the dilemma between PPP policy-making and implementation. A critical analysis of the empirical studies on the subject of PPPs in the education sector highlighted the research gap over the need to investigate more about the challenges faced in designing PPPs in the education sector. The most serious challenge to the successful implementation of PPPs in the education sector is the failure to embrace both the formal and informal institutional factors prevailing at the formation stage. Therefore, this study helps the policy makers to embrace the primacy of the institutional challenges right at the designing level of the PPPs.

This study is significant to policymakers because it provides a basis for a better understanding of what type of PPP models are implemented in the area of secondary education. Before this study, there was a knowledge gap over the different types of interaction between the government and the private education sectors. The results of this study indicate a clear difference between interaction, participation, dialogue, and

PPPs (Afonso, & Henne, 2015). Therefore, this study helps the stakeholders, to rethink the different ways in which to design efficient and effective PPPs in the education sector.

The study is significant to the GoT both at the national and local government levels because it helps to rethink the way PPPs are designed in general and in the education sector in particular. The results of this research are significant in helping the stakeholders revisit the primacy of SAPs as means of providing a clear policy framework in which education service delivery can be improved using PPPs. The results of this research indicate that the perceived conflicts stem from a weak institutional framework. Therefore, it is significant that the government focuses on building the relevant laws and PPP policies that will form the backbone for the designing of PPPs in the education sector.

The study is significant to the public - private sector intermediary bodies and policy makers because it covers the knowledge gap arising from the failure to understand the sources of conflicts and suspicions between the public and private sector stakeholders. The study shows that without understanding the view points of the different stakeholders, the work of the public-private sector intermediaries is difficult. The results of the study specifically address the institutional factors like beliefs, norms and cultures which is at the heart of the interaction between the public and private sectors. This study is important to the academic community and future researchers because it reignites the discussion of the post SAPs era of the late 1980s and 90s. The results of this study show that a favourable business environment is very important for the success

of the private sector. This study not only sought to find answers to the research questions but it helps generate more questions to inspire other researchers most especially of a quantitative variety. Further research of a quantitative nature will help make generalizations regarding the policies, practice, and performance of the PPPs not only in the education sector but also in other related fields.

1.6 Limitations of the Study

Simon (2011) defined limitations as the potential weaknesses of the study that are beyond the researcher's control. First, there is a time constraint in which the case study nature of the research only captured a snapshot of the conditions of the pre-current institutional framework. Another limitation is that though this study is a mixed-methods study it is majorly qualitative therefore, the objectives chosen stem from the research questions and seek to capture answers relating to the; *who*", "*what*", and "*where*". However, the research was unable to exhaustively determine *why*" and "*how*" because even with Mixed Methods Research, such questions were not adequately answered due to the case study approach that captures a limited sample study (Leedy, & Ormrod, 2010; Simon, 2011; Wiersma, 2000).

There is a limitation that the research tools in this study cannot be applied to a larger population because each respondent is asked many questions aimed at capturing their perceptions and experiences some of which span long years of experience (Simon, 2011; Wiersma, 2000). The findings of a phenomenological study require the researcher's interpretation of subjective conditions that might not be accurate, which predisposed the study to biases and preconceived experiences and phenomena.

These limitations notwithstanding, serious efforts were spent on reducing researcher bias to the lowest minimum. The research adopted multi-case studies instead of one to increase the “*Reliability*” of the research results, which is to say “*Dependability*” as suggested by Lincoln and Guba (1985). The research tools were designed in a way that they capture as much information as possible from a relatively small sample size, as compared to surveys and longitudinal studies. Serious attempts were being made to make the research questions flexible and transferable to meet the criteria of internal validity.

1.7 Delimitations of the Study

Leedy and Ormrod (2010) defined delimitations as those characteristics that limit the scope and define the boundaries of research. According to him, delimitations are within the control of the researcher. The study did not cover any PPP contracts either at the primary school level or the tertiary level because the study concentrated on finding out the institutional factors affecting the designing of PPPs with secondary schools; The study did not cover the implementation, contributions and performance evaluations of the PPPs in the education sector because the variable of interest is the “*Designing*” of PPPs. Also, the study did not examine the critical success factors for PPPs much as they are important. Instead, the research focused on the institutional factors that can provide stability in a conflict-ridden PPP education sector (Omari, 2014); the study was limited to Dar-es-salaam, Dodoma, and Pwani regions meaning that there were many experiences from other regions that inspired this study, but it is impossible because of the small sample size that only serves the needs of this research (Leedy & Ormrod 2010; Simon 2011; Wiersma 2000); the criteria of having a minimum of 3 years’ experience of working with PPPs were important when finding information to the

qualitative research question. Another serious delimitation of this study is that officers, though having worked for a slightly shorter period, they might have acquired valuable and relevant experiences relevant to the study.

1.8 Organisation of the Research Report

The organisation of this thesis contains five chapters. Chapter One is focused on the introduction, which contains a description of the background to the problem, statement of the problem, the establishment of research objectives and research questions, the rationale of the study, and the organization of the thesis. Chapter Two presents a literature review that covers conceptual definitions of important terms of the study, theories guiding the study and empirical literature review and establishing the existing research gap, which helped justify the study of institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania. Chapter Three represents the research methodology, research paradigm, research variables, research design, and approach/strategy, research timeline and ethics, the study area, population and sample size, sampling procedures, methods and technique, data collection methods, techniques and instruments, data analysis plan and processing procedure. Chapter Four provides the presentation of findings and results of the research into the factors influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania. Chapter Five summarises the findings, conclusions, and recommendations for both action and further research.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the operational definitions of the key variables and concepts. Based on the statement of the problem this chapter elucidates more on the theories guiding the study and the conceptual framework. Under this chapter critical review of the previous empirical studies on PPPs in general and the education sector in particular was conducted. The review of the scholarly work helped the researcher to identify the research gap, hence refining the research questions and objectives.

2.2 Operational Definitions

2.2.1 The Public and Private Sector

2.2.1.1 The Public Sector

The public sector is engaged in the activities of providing government goods and services to the public. The enterprises, agencies, and bodies are fully owned, controlled, and run by the government whether it is central or local government. The public sector is made up of National, regional, and local educational authorities. According to Bray (2000), the public sector has a unique obligation to provide basic education for all, but they cannot be expected to supply every human, financial or organisational requirement for this task. Ahmed and Ali (2004) defined the public sector as the public-owned enterprises, and/or institutions. In the education sector, the public sector actors include; Local Municipal Governments (LMG) or Local Government (LG) or urban authorities or city cooperation public sector in the education sector gets its responsibility by laws

and regulations or by policies related to education. The urban authorities get their powers and obligations from the central government authority. Public actors are controlled by laws enacted by central government authority.

Bray (2000) identifies two types of public sector organizations; either the government fully finances them through the revenues they raise by collecting taxes, duties, fees, and so on, or the government holds more than 51% of the total share capital of the company, which comes under various ministries. According to Ahmed and Ali (2004), despite the recent moves by various governments to reduce the size of the public sector, it remains the largest sector by far in the provision of education, employment, water, electricity, health, security, and others.

2.2.1.2 The Private Sector

The PPP Act 2017 (URT, 2017a) defines a private sector as any sector other than a public sector including non-profit making non-governmental organisations. While Fennell (2007), defined the private sector as a segment of the national economy that is owned, controlled, and managed by private individuals or enterprises. The private sector can either be formal or informal, where; the formal private sector mainly includes registered businesses or community associations. On the business side, companies are divided based on sizes such as; small, medium, and large enterprises, which are either privately or publicly traded organisations. The private sector is not homogeneous and covers a variety of non-state actors, including businesses, NGOs, charities, and faith-based organisations (Bray 2000; Fennell, 2007).

Table 2.1: Differences between Private and Public Sector Innovation

	Private Sector	Public Sector
Organising Principles	The pursuit of Profit, of Stability or Growth of Revenues.	The enactment of Public Policies.
Organisational Structures	Firms of many sizes, with options for new entrants.	The complex system of organisations with various (and to some extent conflicting) tasks
Performance Metrics	Return on Investment	Multiple performance indicators and targets
Management Issues	Some managers have considerable autonomy, others constrained by shareholders, corporate governance, or financial stringency.	While there are efforts to emulate the private sector management practise, managers are typically under high levels of political scrutiny.
Supply Chains	Most firms are parts of one or more supply chains, with larger firms tending to organise these chains.	The public sector is typically dependent on private suppliers for much of its equipment and is a very important market for many firms.
Employees	The nature of the workforce varies considerably, and relations between employees and management range from fractious to harmonious. Efforts are made in some firms to instil company loyalty.	Public sector employees are typically highly unionised (economists and social scientists in the central administration and health- and social professionals as nurses, social workers, child-care workers, teachers in the public services).
Sources of Knowledge	Companies have considerable flexibility in sourcing innovation-related information from consultants, and trade associations.	Despite large resources, parts of the public sector may be constrained from using private sources of knowledge (other than those of suppliers). Public sector sources of knowledge
Time Horizon	Short-term in many sectors, though utilities and infrastructural services may have long horizons	Short-term: policy-initiated innovations must pay off within the election period.

Source: Modified from Miles (2008)

Table 2.1 illustrates the theoretical models and the objective of public interest is interpreted as welfare maximization. The difference in public and private sector innovation is indicative of an existing conflict of interest between the public administration and private partners.

2.2.1.3 Designing of PPPs

According to GTZ (2010), the term designing is the construction of an object or system without an explicit prior sketch such as; coding, and graphic design. The designing process can either be a brief or lengthy one. Designing is a complicated process that involves considerable research, negotiation, reflection, modelling, interactive adjustment, and where necessary re-designing. It is a roadmap or a strategic approach for the stakeholders to achieve the anticipated results. When designing individual PPP projects within the “classical PPP” setting, it is important to differentiate such a project from the “*Cross-Sector Partnerships*”.

2.2.1.4 Stakeholders

Stakeholders can be defined as “actors” who have an interest in the issue under consideration, and have or could have an active or passive influence on the decision-making and implementation processes. According to Brugha and Varvasovszky (2000), stakeholders are persons that are affected and can also affect the organisation’s actions/inactions, objectives, and policies. Examples of stakeholders include; creditors, directors, employees, government (and its agencies), owners (shareholders), suppliers, unions, and the community that take part in public private partnerships.

Allen and Kilvington (2010) divided Stakeholders into two groups including; Primary stakeholders who are the immediate communities of interest, for example, in the realm of this study, private schools' owners; secondary stakeholders (intermediaries) who are the intermediaries in the process and may include the local authorities and other institutional bodies. It is important to conduct a thorough stakeholder analysis to incorporate the needs of those who have a ‘stake’ or an interest in finding out the

influence of the institutional framework on the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania. According to (Brugha, & Varvasovszky, 2000), Stakeholder analysis is an approach, a tool or set of tools for generating knowledge about the actors, individuals and organisations to understand their behaviour, intentions, interrelations and interests; and for assessing the influence and resources they bring to bear on the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania.

2.2.2 Public-Private Partnerships

There are as many definitions as those attempting to define the term “Public-Private Partnerships”. There is no clarity on the scope, nature, and definition of the term based on several modes in practise. Tanzania’s PPP Policy (URT, 2009) defines the concept of PPP as;

an arrangement between the public and private sector entities in which the private entity renovates, constructs, operates, maintains, and manages a facility in whole or in part, based on output specifications while assuming the associated risks for a significant period and in return, receives benefits and financial remuneration according to agreed terms (URT, 2017a p5).

According to Tshombe et al., (2020) a PPP is collaboration between government and the private sector concerning the implementation of a specific project and this collaboration is based on a specific prescribed time period. PPPs are institutional arrangements that constitute rules defining the relationships that govern the partnerships, roles, responsibilities, and accountability mechanisms either formal or implied (Nkya, 2004; North, 1990; Sohail, Plummer, Slater, & Heymans, 2003). The overall aim of PPP is to meet public needs, which would not have been realised without

joint efforts. Partnerships in education may differ depending on the actors who are involved or the type of partnership contract.

The terms “*Privatization*”, “*Outsourcing*”, “*Contracting Out*”, “*Public-Private Partnerships*” (PPP) and “*Public Finance Initiative*” (PFI) are often used interchangeably, contributing to the confusion surrounding the understanding of “*Public-Private Partnership*”. That is why Iossa et al. (2007), called for a more extensive explanation of the term to enable the understanding and meaning of Public-Private Partnerships from different angles. In essence, there are both quantitative and qualitative dimensions to understand the ontological questions of “what PPPs are” and “what they’re not”. It is preferable that when studying the designing of any given project, in this case, a PPP in the education sector in Tanzania, outcomes must be clearly defined before embarking on the actual designing of any project.

According to Education International (2009), the term “*Public-Private Partnership*” represents a notion of an umbrella covering a broad range of agreements between public institutions and the private sector, aimed at operating public infrastructures or delivering public services. Zhang and Chen (2012) identified the following, PPP projects common characteristics: a private partner provides the design, construction, financing and operation of the infrastructure, in return for payments either from the users of the infrastructure or from the public client itself; public and private partners share risks and jointly manage them through better utilisation of resources and improved project control and PPP projects are based on a long-term contract to encourage innovations and low life cycle costs. Michael (2002) defines PPP as a partnership involving one private for-profit organisation and one public or non-profit organisation that has agreed to share a

common objective to create social value and to share the effort and benefits. In a narrow and traditional sense, the notion of PPPs refers to legally formalised forms of cooperation between public and private parties. A broader and more recent definition of PPPs, however, also includes less formalised cooperation.

Blagescu and Shaeffer (1994) identified two other terms related to partnership, that is, “*Involvement*” and “*Participation*”. Most analysts consider the two terms to be relatively weak forms of the interaction between the public and the private sector. On the other hand, the term “*Partnership*” implies a more active and committed involvement. Partners share responsibility for a joint activity, whereas participants may merely cooperate in someone else’s activity. Barnes (2011) depicts the lack of consensus around what a PPP is and that is important to agree on the essential elements, which include the four broad tools of; governance or management; the development process; pro-poor growth and financial arrangements. According to him, conversations about PPPs are often confusing as there are multiple types of partnerships and individuals frequently have differing models in mind when speaking about PPPs.

Notwithstanding the elusiveness of the meaning of partnership, the use of the term indicates the “rules of engagement” indicating how the different players are involved, and expected to behave in their association with one another. Klijn and Teismans (2000) defined Public-Private Partnerships as the cooperation between public and private actors with a durable character, risks, and benefits.

It should be noted that not every transaction between the public and private sector constitutes a PPP. Therefore, under this research efforts were spent to find out a more acceptable definition for public-private partnerships (PPPs) about whether it involves a formal agreement and honest brokers in the process or not. It is important to emphasise the formality of the agreement because partners may perceive high uncertainty in terms of the expected net benefits and high governance costs that would result from a contract (Rangan, Samii, & Van Wassenhove, 2006). A distinction must be made between three PPP engagements, that is to say; communication, cooperation, and collaboration between actors in the two sectors. With this clear distinction of what a PPP contract is, it is important to contrast PPPs with other forms of public-private engagements.

2.2.3 Institutions

There is no single and universal definition of the term ‘institution’. Nonetheless, according to Scott (2008), institutions are social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience. For more clarity, Ostrom (2005) using the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework defines institutions as “shared concepts used by humans in repetitive situations organised by rules, norms, and strategies”. This definition goes some distance in making improvements on the multiple, opaque, and conflicting definitions of institutions in the literature. Institutions are composed of cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that, with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life. Institutions are transmitted by various types of carriers, including; symbolic systems, relational systems, routines, and artefacts (De Soysa, & Jütting, 2007; Obirih-Opareh, & Post, 2002).

North (1991) described institutions as the formal and informal rules and norms that organise social, political, and economic relations. The term “*institution*” commonly applies to both formal and informal institutions. Informal institutions include; customs and behaviour patterns in society, while formal institutions entail the formal procedures created by entities such as the government and public services. Primary or meta-institutions are institutions such as broad families enough to cover other institutions (Elsner, 2012; De Soysa, & Jütting, 2007; Williamson, 2000). Institutions operate at different levels of jurisdiction, from the world system to localised interpersonal relationships. Institutions by definition indicate stability but are subject to change processes, both incremental and discontinuous.

2.2.4 Public-Private Partnership Types and Models

Pidd (2003) defines a model as an external and explicit representation of part of reality as seen by the people who wish to use that model to understand, to change, to manage and to control that part of reality. Models are used as “*tools for thinking*”, or “*convenient worlds*”; part of the process of “*reflection before action*”. PPP models can be seen from different perspectives depending on the arrangement (Fall et al., 2009; Locussol, Fall, & Dickson, 2009). PPP models can range from performance-based service contracts to full concession (concessions; affermage - lease contracts; management contracts, and service contracts).

2.2.4.1 Service Contracts

According to Healther (2007), a service contract involves the public sector hiring a private company to carry out specific tasks for a period. Normally, a service contract can run for a period between 1–3 years. In this arrangement, the public authority retains

the main role as the provider of the infrastructure service. Instead, it only contracts out portions of its operation to the private partner. It is incumbent upon the private sector partner to deliver the agreed upon service as per the agreed cost and performance standards that were set by the public sector. Service contracts are usually awarded on the basis of the highest bidder, which works well given the time constraints and the period and their limited scope.

It is the obligation of the government or its representative authority to pay the private partner a predetermined service fee, on the basis of either one-time fee or unit cost. The private contractor can increase the profits by reducing the operating costs without compromising the stipulated service standards. The private operator is faced with a challenge of improving the profitability of the project by either using a cost-plus-fee formula, by freezing fixed costs like labor, or participates in the profit-sharing system. Under a service contract, it is the responsibility of the government to fund any capital investments (Ahadzi, & Bowles, 2004; Healthier, 2007).

2.2.4.2 Management Contracts

According to Healthier (2007), under a management contract, the public sector contracts out some if not all the management and operation of the intended project, which could involve the provision of utilities like health and education. However, the public sector retains the ultimate obligation of providing the service, while the private sector contractor is delegated the responsibility of effecting the daily management and control to the private partner or contractor. Unlike under a service contract, under a management contract, the private partner provides the working capital but does offer

the strategic finance for the investment (Ahadzi, & Bowles, 2004) Figure 2.1 (Healthier, 2007) illustrates the typical structure of a management contract.




Figure 2.1: Structure of Management Contract

Under a management contract, the private sector operator receives a payment that is contractually predetermined to cover the labour and other anticipated operational costs. The private contractor is incentivized by bonus payment for achieving the predetermined targets. Similarly, the private contractor can also be incentivized by being allowed to share in the profits. In the final analysis however, under a management contract, the obligation for major capital investment is the responsibility of public sector authority, especially the funding of expansion and improvements of the project.

2.2.4.3 Affermage or Lease Contracts

According to Healthier (2007), an affermage contract is a public-private sector arrangement where the private sector operator assumes the responsibility of operating

and maintaining the utility, but does is not responsible for the financing of the investment. Under the affermage, the private operator retains the operator fee out of the receipts (*prix du fermier*), but in turn pays to the awarding authority an additional surcharge from customers to recoup the investments that the public sector authority made on the infrastructure. Under the affermage contract, the private sector operator receives a fee that is presumed to be enough to cover the operation costs, while the public sector authority takes the risk of the receipts of the collections from the customers so as to cover its investment commitments.

In many cases affermages are public owned entities but operating as private sector firms with the required autonomy from the public sector. Under a lease contract, the private partner takes the responsibility of the entire service and is obliged to ensure high quality and service standards. Affermages usually last for about 10 years but may be renewed for up to 20 years. Under an affermage the financial risk for operation and maintenance is the full responsibility of the private sector operator.

In other word, the private contractor is responsible for both the in losses and the unpaid consumers' debts. Leases do not involve any sale of assets to the private sector. Figure 2.2 (Healther, 2007) shows the lease contract's typical structure. In many ways, an affermage is similar to a lease contract; however, unlike a lease an affermage allows the private sector contractor to collect revenue from the customers, and uses the collections to pay the contracting authority an affermage fee, and keeps the remaining part of the revenue. An affermage fee is usually agreed predetermined rate per unit sold.




Figure 2.2: Structure of a Lease Contract

2.2.4.4 Concessions

A concessions contract gives the private sector operator (concessionaire) the responsibility of providing the services prescribed in the contract including; operation, maintenance, collection, management, and construction and rehabilitation of the system. Under a concession, the concessionaire has to provide for all the capital investment including the strategic assets. However, such assets are still publicly owned during the concession period. It is the role of the public sector authority to ensure that the prescribe performance standards are met. The private sector operator is responsible for collecting the tariffs and user charges from the customers. The concessionaire takes the responsibility of providing all capital investments required to build, upgrade, or expand the facility. Much of the funds for such expenses are obtained from the user charges collected. In rare cases, the government may also provide some financing support to help the concessionaire fund its capital expenditures. Public investment in concessions can in form of an investment “subsidy” or viability gap financing. A

concession contract is typically valid for 25–30 years so as to grant enough time to the private sector operator recoup the capital invested and earn appropriate sufficient return over the investments made in the concession. A concession model allows the, the government to be compensated for its contribution by receiving part of the tariff collected. A concession contract's typical structure is shown in Figure 2.3 (Healther, 2007).




Figure 2.3: Structure of a Concessions Contract

2.2.4.5 Joint Ventures

Joint ventures are a viable alternative to full privatization. A joint venture provides the infrastructure where the facility or project is co-owned by both the public and private sector operators. Under a joint venture, the partners have a choice of either forming a new company or to assume joint ownership of an existing company through the sale of shares to one or several private investors. The established company can raise capital by selling shares to the general public through the stock exchange. The established company must maintain its independence from the government and ensure that the high

standards of good corporate management are met. On top of playing a regulatory role, the government on the other hand as a shareholder, is keenly interested in the profitability and sustainability of the project. A joint venture contract is usually supported by complementary contracts in form of concessions and performance agreements that help to align the activities of the project to the desired objectives. Under the joint venture project, both public and private partners have the responsibility of investing in not only the strategic capital but also share the risks. Figure 2.4 (Healther, 2007) is the typical joint venture contract's structure.




Figure 2.4: Structure of a Joint Venture Contract

Public-Private Partnerships models are classified differently depending on the design and construction of the required new facilities, and hence the emphasis on the terms: construction, operations, and ownership. In Tanzania, the National Public-Private Partnership Policy (URT, 2010) has provided the following models of PPPs: build–own–operate, build–operate–transfer (BOT), buy–build–operate, design-build-operate

and build–develop–operate. The resulting options include; Design and Build (DB); Design Build and Operate (DBO); Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT); Build, Lease and Transfer (BLT); Design, Build, Finance and Operate/Maintain (DBFO/M); Build, Own and Operate (BOO); and Buy, Build and Operate (BBO). Figure 2.5 represents the PPP models on a continuum of investment and level of risk, and the extent of government control. The following terms are commonly used to describe partnership agreements in Tanzania (URT, 2009), although this should not be considered a definitive:

Design-Build (DB): The private sector designs and builds infrastructure to meet public sector performance specifications, often for a fixed price, so the risk of cost overruns is transferred to the private sector. (Many do not consider DB's to be within the spectrum of PPP's).

Operation & Maintenance Contract (O & M): A private operator, under contract, operates a publicly-owned asset for a specified term. Ownership of the asset remains with the public entity.

Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO): The private sector designs, finances and constructs a new facility under a long-term lease, and operates the facility during the term of the lease. The private partner transfers the new facility to the public sector at the end of the lease term.

Build-Own-Operate (BOO): The private sector finances, builds, owns and operates a facility or service in perpetuity. The public constraints are stated in the original agreement and through on-going regulatory authority.

Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT): A private entity receives a franchise to finance, design, build and operate a facility (and to charge user fees) for a specified period, after which ownership is transferred back to the public sector.

Buy-Build-Operate (BBO): Transfer of a public asset to a private or quasi-public entity usually under contract that the assets are to be upgraded and operated for a specified period of time. Public control is exercised through the contract at the time of transfer.

The higher the level of risk the more the private sector assumes control and the government is more of an enabler than a provider (Al-Shqairat, 2009; Ndandiko, 2006; URT, 2009). Also, Public-Private Partnerships models can take the form of Service contracts; management contracts; lease contracts; and similar arrangements; concessions; and joint ventures. Different Public-Private Partnership forms are more readily adapted to particular sectors or project types and have been used more extensively in these contexts (Gunnigan, 2007; Li, 2003).




Figure 2.5: Various Arrangements of PPPs in Practice

The “For-profit” sector began entering into education a big way either formally as ‘for-profit’ entities or in the garb of trusts and foundations. It should be noted that the term “PPP model” is not always used consistently across countries or even within a country. What matters is that the risk allocation and incentives built into a specific PPP scheme. Zhiang and Chen (2012) argued that when designing a PPP model there is a need to strike the right balance between the interests of the public and private sectors. A typical model of PPP implies that the private sector should provide infrastructure and service delivery; it may also be responsible for designing, financing, building, and operating; and it recovers its investment through lump-sum payments from the governments, and through user charges. Under such a model, the partners develop a clean mechanism to share the risks. Pauline (2002) saw the analysis of PPPs in education as a complicated process due to the lack of clarifications on the models proposed by the governments, and a myriad of models in the literature, the most common in the literature on education are contracting models (Barrera-Osorio, & Guáqueta, 2009; La Rocque, 2006; Patrinos).

According to La Rocque (2006), contracting involves a government agency agreeing with a private provider to procure a service, or a bundle of education services, in exchange for regular payments. However, Petrino in World Bank (2018) defined contracting as the process whereby a government procures education or education-related services of a pre-defined quantity and quality at an agreed price from a specific provider.

Models that work in one setting may not work in another and there is no guarantee that models that once worked successfully are successful. In many systems, opting for

service delivery through PPPs is opting for the decentralisation of structures. Unfortunately, most governments are apprehensive when they fear the loss of control. They also fear the loss of efficiency and an increase in inequalities in decentralised systems (La Rocque, 2006; Patrinos et al., 2009). Mostly the public sector is uneasy with the diversity of practices, which results from the increased number of decision-makers, which diminishes the central role of the state. The operation of effective partnerships may require radical changes in this domain where it requires a significant reduction in the role of the state. It may not sit well, particularly with government personnel, and also be disquieting to other members of society, who have come to believe that the state is the prime provider and guardian of the social good.

Table 2.2: Different PPP Models and their Characteristics

Contracting options		Asset ownership	Operation and maintenance	Capital investment	Commercial risk	Typical duration
Existing asset	Service contract	Public	Public and private	Public	Public	1–2 years
	Management contract	Public	Private	Public	Public	3–5 years
	Lease contract	Public	Private	Public	shared	8–15 years
	Concession	Public	Private	Private	Private	25–35 years
New Asset	Build Operate and Transfer	Public and private	Private	Private	Private	20–30 years
	Divestiture	Private or Public and private	Private	Private	Private	Indefinite

Source: GTZ (2010)

When building a PPP model, emphasis should be paid on understanding the expertise of each partner that best meets clearly defined public needs through the appropriate allocation of resources, risks, and rewards. As illustrated in (Table 2.2), PPPs can span

a spectrum of models that progressively require a unique mechanism to set-up, manage and deliver the PPP. At one end, there is straight contracting out as an alternative to traditionally delivered public services (Katarina, 2006; Tilak, 2010). At the other end, some arrangements are publicly administered but within a framework that allows for private finance, design, building, operation, and possibly temporary ownership of an asset (La Rocque, 2006; Patrinos et al., 2009). Several PPP models are vague and can many have common features, they are also significantly different.

Table 2.3: PPP Models Based on Options/Arrangements

Option	Service contract	Management contract	Lease contract (Affermages)	Concession
• Ownership	Public sector	Public sector public sector	Public sector	Could be either
• Financing of investment	Public sector	Public sector	Both	Private sector
• Financing of operations and maintenance	Public sector	Public sector	Private sector	Private sector
• The private sector risk profile	Low	Low	Medium	High
• Financial and commercial risk	Low	Low	Medium	High
• Duration (yrs.)	1 – 2	3 – 5	5 – 10	20 – 30
• Responsibility for setting tariffs	Public sector/ Regulator	Public sector/ Regulator	Private sector/ Regulator	Private sector/ Regulator
• Method of payment	Unit price	Cost + Bonus	A portion of tariff	Tariff
• The objective of private sector participation	Operating efficiency	Operating efficiency	Operating efficiency capital	Mobilise private capital

Source: SADC BA Public-Private Partnership Capacity Building Programme (2007)

According to the widely prevalent models, the government may take the initiative and invite the private sector to join the in its efforts towards education development through a specific project; or private sector may take such an initiative (*unsolicited bids*) and

convince or compel the government to accept a new method of operation in which the private sector and the government jointly deliver a service/activity. According to Katarina (2006) state and private sectors come together on a specific task, various models of PPP are available and all involve a formal contract between the government and the private sector to carry on some specific pre-defined activities in education. Under the PPP model, it is possible to set up, run the institutions, and carry on a particular activity in education – all financed by the state and through self-generated resources.

2.2.4.6 Forms of Engagement between the Private and Public Sector

Gulati and Higgins, (2003) argue that the concepts of teamwork, partnership, collaboration and cooperation have become part of the lexicon in the organisation arena. Before the fully-fledged PPPs can be constituted, there are various forms of public-private engagements, which depend on several factors notable of which is the scope of coverage and the duration. Public-private partnerships can take various forms and include both collaborative (non-legal binding) and contractual (legally binding) agreements (Katarina, 2006; La Rocque, 2006; Patrinos et al., 2009).

In Tanzania, recently there has been an increased interest in PPPs, at least at a policy statement level and there is heightened rhetoric and innocuous euphemisms of phrases like “mobilising the community”, “togetherness”, “*Harambee* initiatives”, “self-help” or “citizen involvement” and others that can be used to hide the true picture of the failure of the PPP framework in Tanzania. Titles and names have been given to the public - private interactions, including what Arnstein (1969) uses in Figure 2.6 to show the

levels of community participation. The lower rung of this ladder shows a serious form of non-participation by the community. However, the authorities find nice words to shield away from the attention. The mid-range rungs (3, 4, and 5) show tokenism, in which the civil society called around the table but make no binding resolutions as far as designing PPPs is concerned. At the top of the ladder, rungs (6, 7, and 8) illustrate the development of partnerships and the ultimate control and determination of the destiny by the citizens.

Public-Private Interaction does not involve a formal contract but the exchange of information between the public and private sectors. Public Private Interaction is the basic level where, the public sector reaches out to the private sector, and it ensures that the private sector understands government policies and regulations. Under the public-private interaction, the two sectors share data of their activities with the public sector, as Kamando (2014) indicated that the public sector interacts with the private sector at the community level.

At the public-private interaction level, the two sectors build a network of shared interests and concerns, though sometimes they are symbolic. Bryman (2001) identified the following interactions in the field of education; *Geographic communities*, which embrace the individuals living in relatively small areas such as villages, districts or suburbs; *Ethnic and racial groups*, especially the minorities with self-help support structures; *religious groups* of various kinds; *communities based on shared family concerns*, including Parents' Associations which are based on adults' shared concerns

for the welfare of their children; and *Communities based on shared philanthropy*, and in many cases operated by specifically designated charitable and political bodies.

Public-Private Dialogue goes further—in this type of partnership, the public and private sectors cooperate and negotiate around issues of mutual interest, focussing on government policies and regulations that impact the private sector. Such a dialogue does not require a formal agreement or a shared investment, but it involves both sectors working together to ensure that policy is formulated effectively to have the best possible outcome.




Figure 2.6: Ladder of Citizen Participation

According to Afonso and Henne (2015), a Public-Private dialogue builds up the capacity of private sector organisations to engage with the public sector and advocate on behalf of their members, strengthen the media to cover business topics and initiate relevant research from a range of academic institutions. Figure 2.7 (Barnes, 2011) represents the Public-private relationships that involve two or three types of

engagement. The overlapped areas of the circles labelled P1, P2, and P3, where; P1 represents *Public-Private Interaction*. Under such an interaction, the emphasis is made on the communication of information to assist each entity; P2 represents *Public-Private Dialogue* here emphasis is on cooperation around and the issue of mutual interest, and P3 represents *Public-Private Partnership* where the emphasis is placed on collaboration formalised in a contract that is jointly designed and implemented. *Public-Private Partnership* is the most complex relationship between the public and the private sectors. It involves a formal agreement between the public and private sector partners, with clearly defined roles and responsibilities for each around their joint implementation of an activity designed to address a weakness in the education system. Typically, the agreement specifies the investment made by each partner and the conditions under which each party assumes risks and reap benefits.




Figure 2.7: Forms of Public-Private sector Engagements

2.2.4.6 Classification of PPP Contracts in Education

Before this study was conducted into the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania, it was important to first confirm that the entity evaluated was a PPP. They may differ depending on the type of contract entered, and the actors involved in the

partnership. Table 2.4 summarises the most common Public-Private Partnerships in the literature on education are contracting models (LaRocque, 2006; Patrinos et al., 2009). According to LaRocque (2006), contracting involves a government agency agreeing with a private provider to procure a service, or a bundle of education services, in exchange for regular payments. A slight variation is that of Patrinos et al. (2009) definition from the World Bank (2018) as, the process whereby a government procures education or education-related services of a defined quantity and quality at an agreed price from a specific provider.

Table 2.4: Five Types of Contracts in Education

What government contracts for	Definition	Contract types
• Management, professional services (input)	Government buys school management services or auxiliary and professional services	Management contracts Professional services contract (curriculum design)
• Operational services (process)	Government buys school operation services	Operational contracts
• Education services (output)	Government buys student places in private schools (contracts with the school to enrol specific students)	The contract for education of specific students
• Facility availability (input)	Government buys facility Availability	Provision of infrastructure services contracts
• Facility availability and education services (input and output bundle)	Government buys facility availability combined with services (operational or outputs)	Provision of infrastructure contracts with education services contracts

Source: Patrinos, World Bank (2006)

Reimers (1997) argued that the matrix could be used first to map the starting and ending points in a process of management reform, and second to define the different stages needed to progress in that continuum. For instance, he suggested, it is unrealistic to

expect communities of parents who have traditionally lacked a voice in the conduct of school affairs to play a significant role in the school organisation because they have been given a cheque book to pay the teachers' salaries. However, transferring this function to communities might be a sensible starting point to increase the competencies of local communities and their sense of efficacy, and gradually to change the skills and attitudes of parents, teachers, and administrators.

2.2.4.7 Special Purpose Vehicles

In a PPP, the private firm or consortium of private firms undertaking the project typically establishes a specific project company, called a *Special Purpose Vehicle* (SPV). The SPV independently signs the PPP contract with a public entity to build, own, and operate a specific infrastructure project. On the one hand, establishing an SPV is a practical mechanism to delegate a specific entity to undertake negotiations and operations; on the other, it is also a form of security. If a sufficiently large project fails, it could lead to insolvency for the private partner(s). A SPV acts as a legally distinct entity, reducing liability to the parent company, and generally finances large new stand-alone projects off the corporate balance sheet. (IISD February 2013). Figure 2.8 illustrates how the public and private sectors typically form a consortium, also known as Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) to bid for the Design-Build-Finance-Operate contract. It shows the responsibilities cascaded to the SPV by way of financing and implementation. In the final analysis, the PPP SPV should be structured in a way that it is mutually beneficial to all the parties because it is acting in the best interest of the partners.




Figure 2.8: A typical DBFO Project Structure

2.3 Formal and Informal Institutional Factors

Tolbert and Zucker (1996) contend that institutional analysis is incomplete without understanding how the formal and informal institutional factors and how they reinforce each other. It is common practice to focus too much on formal rules, such as policies and laws, and ignore or relegate the informal setting such as beliefs and cultural norms. Therefore, a relevant institutional analysis should attract answers from questions about a wider set of factors that interact to shape the incentives for actors to behave in particular ways. However, Janine (1997) highlights that unfortunately there is no widely accepted framework for analysing institutions and if it is there, it is still work in progress.

Institutional analysis helps disentangle the messy web of many interacting institutions by raising critical questions about different types of institutions and how they interact to influence the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania (Elsner, 2012; Herrera, Van Huylenbroeck, & Espinel, 2005; Ostrom, 2005). Any meaningful analysis of institutions influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector should not be primarily concerned with any single institution; instead, attention should be equally paid to a multiplicity of institutions and their interaction (Janine, 1997; North, 1990). This broad perspective widens the field in which institutions operate to influence not only the design but also the operation of PPPs.

According to Ostrom (2005), institutional analysis is used to assess the capacity and behaviour of organisations. It is used to identify limitations that may undermine policy implementation. Such limitations may be inter/intra-relationships between sectors, and they may be system-wide. Education sector Situation analysis, URT (2010) suggests that a thorough institutional analysis is required so that human resource constraints do not frustrate the effective designing of PPPs. When conducting an institutional analysis, the net should be cast wide to include areas such as; education, market access, health, the environment, and others (Elsner, 2012; Herrera et al., 2005). Much as institutional analysis places emphasis on formal institutions, such as rules, resource allocation, and authorization procedures, it also evaluates “*soft*” institutions, such as informal rules of the game, power relations and incentive structures that underlie the process of designing PPPs in general and in the education sector in particular.

The broad nature of the institutional analysis notwithstanding, deliberate efforts were taken to avoid getting involved in the ideological conflict between the different strands of institutionalists, mainly departure from the Old Institutional Economists (OIE) and the New Institutional Economists (NIE). However, one important exploit of these differences to this study as Elsner (2012) indicated, is that the NIE is focused on themes like the transaction costs, which is one of the theories guiding this study. Institutional analysis is interwoven in the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) that is useful in comparative contractual analysis. It is useful to show how different forms of governance work in various circumstances. Williamson (2000) described TCE as the “*governance*” branch of NIE.

According to Ngaruko (2010), TCE is the most widely used approach in New Institutional Economics (NIE) because it holds the centre of NIE. The governance approach is unique because it emphasises incomplete contracts, which is one of the relevant theories guiding this study. Normally, the institutional factors provide regulation as the natural means of achieving the result of perfect competition while avoiding the messy and wasteful process of the competition itself (Acemoglu, & Robinson, 2008; De Soysa, & Jütting, 2007). Institutions are stable valued and recurring patterns of behaviour as structures or mechanisms of the social order they govern the behaviour of a set of individuals within a given community. Institutions are identified with a social purpose, transcending individuals and intentions by mediating the rules that govern living behaviour.

According to Obirih-Opareh and Post (2002), the institutions emanate from local conditions, including wealth, physical characteristics, the strength of community organisation, and prevailing policy of the authorities. These laws, policies, rules, and regulations may directly or otherwise have a significant impact on the designing of PPPs in general but in the education sector in particular. Ever since the declaration by Matthews (1986) that “*institutions do matter*”, there has been a growing interest in institutions’ literature, and the study of the institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania is an addition to the same. According to Högberg (2009), the ever-changing nature of institutions has a significant influence on economic development and poses interesting challenges to researchers and actors alike. The different types of institutions tend to change at different rates of speed and it is the responsibility of the major economic and political actors to study and come up with policies that can harness such changes.

Institutions are structures and mechanisms of social order; institutions are a principal object of study in social sciences, such as education, political sciences, anthropology, economics, and sociology. Institutions are also a central concern for law, a formal mechanism for political rule-making and enforcement (De Soysa, & Jütting, 2007; Högberg, 2009; Tolbert, & Zucker, 1996). As Public-Private Partnerships become more prominent in most countries, the concern is raised over how institutions can be used effectively in their designing and control, especially given that in several ways, there are conflicting objectives between the parties. Williams (2000) uses (Figure 2.9) to illustrate, the relationship between the level of institutions ranging from formal to informal and the extent of developing governance structures, given the duration of the

PPP project. The long-term projects requiring the development of a sound governance structure in the form of a strong institutional framework. Institutions provide a relatively predictable structure for everyday social, economic, and political life. They shape people's incentives (or calculations of returns from their actions) and behaviour. They establish a predictable, though not necessarily efficient or uncontested structure for human interaction (De Soysa & Jütting, 2007; North, 1991). Some argue institutions shape but do not necessarily determine behaviour. They lead to enduring patterns of behaviour over time but they are also subject to change. However, institutionalised behaviours can be difficult to change. Institutions are constantly being reformed through people's actions. Institutions change the way societies evolve (Elsner, 2012; Leftwich, & Sen, 2010; North, 1990). People may deliberately create individual formal organisations commonly identified as "institutions" but the development and functioning of institutions in society, in general, may be regarded as an instance of emergence. That is, institutions arise, develop, and function in social self-organisation beyond the conscious intentions of the individuals.

2.3.1 Institutions and Organisations

The distinction between institutions and organisations needs to be taken seriously by policy-makers because both are still often used interchangeably and confusingly (De Soysa, & Jütting, 2007; Acemoglu, & Robinson, 2008). The term 'institution' is different from the word 'organisation'. Institutions refer to cultural values, legal frameworks, market mechanisms, and political processes: the 'rules of the game', while organisations are groups of individuals bound by a common purpose. In other words, there is a reciprocal relationship between institutions and organisations to the extent that

organisations are shaped by institutions and, in turn, the organisations help to shape the institutions. According to the DFID (2010) Institutions, are neither self-generating nor self-sustaining, therefore, as sets of ‘rules of the game’, and they achieve little on their own. Economic, political, and social institutions are shaped, implemented, undermined or reformed by individuals and organisations. Institutions are brought to life by people and organisations (De Soysa, & Jütting, 2007; Leftwich, & Sen, 2010; North, 1991).




Figure 2.9: The Structure of Economics Institutions

Some social scientists view organisations as the material expressions of institutions. Some see social groups such as government bodies, tribes, and families as institutions. Some identify ‘primary’ or ‘meta’ institutions to be the family, government, economy, education, and religion. Organisations also influence how institutions change.

2.3.2 Formal and Informal Institutions

Formal institutions are the written laws, regulations, legal agreements, statutes, contracts, and constitutions, that are enforced by third parties and supported by the rule of law (Carey, 2000; De Soysa, & Jütting, 2007; Leftwich, & Sen, 2010). While informal institutions, are the unwritten norms, customary practices, standard operating procedures, routines, conventions, and traditions that are deeply embedded in culture and its associated ideology (Herrera et al., 2005; North, 1990). This study considered the contribution of cultural/social institutions and given that these are sometimes normative and multidimensional, they are subject to varied interpretations.

According to North (1991), belief structures are transformed into societal and economic structures by institutions, which include both formal rules and informal norms of behaviour. In practise, formal and informal institutions can be complementary, competing, or overlapping and sometimes they are relatively stronger/weaker; inclusive/discriminatory depending on the context. That is why Leftwich and Sen (2010) said that sometimes, informal institutions undermine formal ones but they can even substitute for them.

2.3.3 A Public Institution

Aldrich and Ruef (2006) defined a public institution as an organisation with a social entity or structure that retains a public identity while changing from one region of the country to another. Public institutions are socially constructed by human activities, which are restrictive and goal-directed. Public institutions constitute that part of a country's economy that is concerned with providing various public utilities. Such

institutions arise from a political process, that is, they are established and controlled by the government to increase productivity, service delivery, and customer satisfaction.

2.3.4 Formal Private Sector

The 'formal private sector' can be defined as “private-sector corporations, institutions, firms, and individuals, operating registered and incorporated businesses with official business licences, an organised labour force governed by labour laws, some degree of capital investment, and modern technology” (Elsner, 2012; Furedy, 2004; Unsworth, 2010). It includes; registered enterprises conducting education services like; teaching, accommodation of students, teacher training and capacity building, and others.

2.3.5 Informal Private Sector Institutions

The informal private sector includes; unregistered, unregulated activities undertaken by individuals, families, groups, or non-registered small-scale enterprises. Ahmed and Ali, (2004) explained that, the informal sector is neither regulated nor controlled by government agencies, and most of the informal sector entrepreneurs do not pay taxes, because they do not have trading licences, and they are excluded from the social welfare and government insurance schemes. Due to poverty, unemployment or underemployment, many informal sectors are active in the education sector in most developing countries.

Klundert and Lardinois, (1995) argue that informal institutions have been largely overlooked, but in many countries, it is informal institutions and rules that give insight into governance issues. To understand the political behaviour in a country it is important to look at how informal institutions influence behaviour. Informal institutions and

personalised relationships are pervasive and powerful, but they can contribute to the progressive and regressive outcomes (Furedy, 2004; Klundert, & Lardinois, 1995; Unsworth, 2010). Therefore, rather than focussing on rules-based reform, policymakers should consider using indirect strategies to influence local actors.

Equally important are informal institutions in shaping the design and implementation of PPPs in the education sector. The interface between formal rules and informal constraints is illustrated in Figure 2.10. The intersection segment provides the institutional framework in which PPPs can be designed and implemented. According to Unsworth (2010), it is unfortunate that development practitioners tend to prioritise formal institutions, viewing informal ones as separate and detrimental to development outcomes. Instead, it is the informal institutions that persist and retain legitimacy, unlike the formal state institutions that may be weak, fragile, and conflict-affected. These institutions are diverse and may include community mechanisms or customary local governance institutions.

An informal institution has socially shared rules, which are unwritten, but understood by everybody. And as such, they are an inherent part of the culture of a given country (Elsner, 2012; North, 1990; Williamson, 2000). North (1990) highlighted those informal practices are referred to as "*cultural*", for example, *clientelism*, and corruption, which are part of the political culture in certain places. However, informal institutions are not cultural, although they are shaped by the behaviour of a particular political landscape, but they should be looked at in the same way as formal institutions to understand their role in a given country. Informal institutions are particularly used to pursue a political agenda, or a course of action that might not be publicly popular, or

even legal, and can be seen as an effective way of making up for the lack of efficiency in a formal institution.




Figure 2.10: The Interaction between the Formal Rules and Informal Constraints

2.3.6 Primary or Meta-Institutions

Primary or meta-institutions are institutions that encompass many other institutions, both formal and informal for example, the family, government, the economy, education, and religion. Most important institutions, considered abstractly, have both objective and subjective aspects including money and marriage. For example, the institution of money encompasses many formal organizations, including banks and government treasury departments and stock exchanges, known as "institutions", as well as subjective experiences, which guide people in their pursuit of personal well-being (Hodgson, 2007; North, 1991). The designing of PPPs and other public-private initiatives have focussed primarily on formal institutions and their capacities at the central level, side-lining and informal institutions, which has prevented the evolution of an organic process of reform driven by local actors and allows effective resource mobilisation into important sectors like education.

As a way of enhancing economic growth and development – including education, Hodgson (2007) called for an increased focus on institutional structures that constrain or empower individuals, and frame their incentives and disincentives above the simplistic explanations that used to focus on inputs, production functions and outputs. According to him, the predominant model of economic activity, in both microeconomics and macroeconomics, was on factors of production primarily capital and labour – as inputs into some mysterious production process, leading to flows of outputs. For a long time, little has been known about firms, in this case, a given PPP project and has been treated as a “black box”, completely ignoring the structural determinants of its existence, boundaries, and performance made up of institutions.

2.3.7 Economic, Political and Social Institutions

Social, economic, and political institutions are not distinct; they overlap and have inter-penetrative relations. According to DFID (2010), any institutional analysis should explore the possibility that economic institutions are unavoidably political in their origin, effect, and impact. However, also political institutions and processes profoundly affect the shape and functioning of economic institutions and practices.

2.3.8 Economic Institutions

Formal economic institutions are the most basic in a market economy. This type of institution helps define and protect property rights, determine the ease or difficulty and length of time it takes to start a business, facilitate exchange and promote and regulate organised coordination and competition (North, 1990; Wiggins, & Davis, 2006). Many institutions influence economic behaviour and they range from rules governing

education and safety to rules on the environment and employment of children. In totality, such institutions form a web that can either promote or frustrate economic activity and growth outcomes as illustrated in Table 2.5. However, such outcomes depend on the interactions between the economic and political or social institutions with which they overlap.

Table 2.5: Classification of Economic Institutions

Function	Examples	Informal regulating agency	Typical formal Regulating agency
Property rights Establish rights; decide between competing claims; inform of non- owners & police	Land tenure Inheritance law Intellectual property rights: patents, copyright	Land registries Probate registry Patent offices	Oral history, chiefs & other local political authorities Custom Oral history, chiefs & other local political authorities Custom
Reciprocity: facilitating transactions Establish rules of exchange, respect for contracts Provide information Reduce or re-allocate risk	Weights, measures, Standards Contract law; Dispute Arbitration Public information on markets Physical provision & organisation of markets (e.g., auction rings, stock exchanges,) Banking conventions, Instruments (letters of credit, etc.) Auditing & accounting conventions Insurance companies	Standards bureaux Civil courts; arbitration councils Market information agencies Local authorities; stock exchanges/ bourses Bank regulatory agencies Professional associations	Elders, religious courts Customary points for exchange (crossroads, etc.) Market hierarchies (Market mammals/queens/ etc.) Haveli systems
Co-operation & Organisation: Allow Interactions within organisations • Collective action & cooperation (in labour, price negotiation) • Realising economies of scale and managing diseconomies of scale	Laws on limited liability & bankruptcy Competitio n policy Regulations on cooperatives, charities, civil associations Auditing & accounting conventions Employment regulations	Register of companies Commissions on monopolies & mergers Co- operatives, ministries, bureaux Professional associations Mini labour, employment tribunals	Social norms of cooperation Custom

Source: Wiggins (2006)

Informal economic institutions include; conventions, norms, and traditions that govern access to opportunities like credit, as between genders or social groups, or which embody the rules, which facilitate cooperation between some groups while excluding

others (Elsner, 2012; Schmid, 2004; Wiggins, & Davids, 2006). Economic institutions are difficult to distinguish from social institutions and have political implications the norms of trust and reciprocity.

2.3.9 Political Institutions

Political institutions define how power is obtained, used and controlled, and by whom, and how authoritative decisions are made both at the national and local government level. Such decisions concern economic institutions and the respective rights and obligations of states and citizens against each other (Hodgson, 2007; Ostrom, 2005). Formal political institutions refer to formal rules, laws, and, especially, constitutions, which prescribe how official political power is sought, won, distributed and controlled at national and sub-national levels (Helmke, & Levitsky, 2004). Political institutions specify the formal rules of the game and they are everywhere. The formal political institutions are closely linked with the social and cultural institutions. This interlocking web of institutions may be complementary to each other but may also undermine compromise or subvert others.

2.3.10 Social Institutions

Social institutions have a big influence on relations and interactions between individuals and amongst many social groups, including those defined by age and gender. According to Hodgson (2007), the whole idea of informal institutions is built around social and cultural institutions mainly focussing on religious institutions. Although there are, increasingly, formal institutions governing social interaction, especially public

behaviour, most cultural and social institutions are informal in the sense conveyed above and they shape the behaviours of mainly private and communities.

The multiple perspectives and lack of practical tools make it difficult to understand how institutions influence a particular situation, whereas numerous tools exist for stakeholder, problem, and power analysis. Yet, thinking critically about institutions is important to social change-focused development. A country's institutional framework has a substantial impact on the success or failure of a PPP, but the structure itself guarantees neither success nor failure. The interplay of social, political, and economic factors within an institutional structure may in many ways determine the outcome of a Public-Private Partnership project (Hodgson, 2007; Janine, 1997; North, 1990).

The institutional structure should aim at both facilitating PPP development and providing clear boundaries to protect the interests of all stakeholders. Social, economic, and political factors constitute an institutional structure of a particular environment that provides firms with advantages for engaging in specific types of activities there. Firms in different types of economies react differently to similar challenges (Hodgson, 2007). The success or failure in the designing of Public-Private Partnerships greatly depends on institutions in the form of social, economic, and political environment. Businesses whether public or private tend to perform more efficiently if they receive institutional support. Figure 2.11 shows a framework based on four institutional domains – meaning, association, control, and action, which connect to structure social interaction. Each of the four domains has two sub-domains.

In summary, institutional analysis framework incorporates attention for four main functions of institutions as ways of making meaning of our lives and the social and natural world we inhabit; the associations we make to work together to achieve social, economic and political objectives; the basis for control over what individuals and organisations should or can do; and reoccurring action carried out by individuals or organisations in social, economic and political life. In Tanzania, it is important to seriously consider the current concerns about the profit motive of private schools against the notion of free education, which forms the basis for the stakeholders' beliefs ('meaning') about the risks of the government entering into a partnership with the private sector ('action'). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that to survive, organisations must conform to the rules and belief systems prevailing in the environment because institutional factors, both structural and procedural earn the organisation legitimacy.




Figure 2.11: Framework for Exploring the Complexity of Institutions

For instance, Multinational Corporations (MNCs) operating in different countries with varying institutional environments face diverse pressures. Some of those pressures in the host and home institutional environments are testified to exert fundamental influences on competitive strategy (Dacin, 1997; Deephouse, 1996; Suchman, 1995). Social, economic, and political factors constitute an institutional structure of a particular environment that provides firms with advantages for engaging in specific types of activities there. Businesses tend to perform more efficiently if they receive institutional support.

2.4 Changes in the Public – Private Investment Institutional Framework

In the 1980s and early 1990s many developing countries, Tanzania is not an exception, introduced SAPs to the public policy challenge of resource mobilisation and ensuring their efficient allocation in the education sector. This study revisited and analysed the public policy terrain as far as designing PPP in the education sector and the results of this study help to realigning the conception stages with the implementation processes of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania.

According to Mosha (2012), Tanzania has had three clear national policies including; capitalism (1961–1967), socialism and self-reliance (1967–1985), and liberalisation - *The Tanzania Development Vision 2025* (URT, 1999) as major national philosophies. Such grand policy frameworks have impacted the education system since independence. The major education policies range from the Policy of Integration (1961–1967), Education for Self-reliance Policy (1967 - 1985), and of pre-currently, the Education and Training Policy (URT, 1995). The legal and administrative policies form the

cornerstone of a country's institutional framework that is why under this study focus was given to policy changes and their impact on the designing of PPPs.

The Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (URT, 2000) reported that the GoT had amended and enacted several investment-related laws and policies, undertaken financial reforms, liberalised its trading regime; put in place an attractive investment package that includes tax exemption over schools, agriculture and hospital equipment, and profit repatriation and undertook some initiatives to promote and develop the private sector. Tanzania is now one of the most liberal investment regimes in Africa. Tanzania just like any other organised society has developed and continues to develop institutions that ensure stability and certainty in the delivery of some services. Van Dijk (2008) suggests that transitional economies, Tanzania unexceptional, and can opt for an independent regulator defending the interests of society at large, or leave it to the political system or the companies themselves to organise supervision.

In the 1980s and 1990s, Tanzania was not spared from the “world-wide” wave of opening for the private sector the areas that were hitherto a preserve and prerogative of the government (Larbi, 1999; Liviga, 2011; Ngowi, 2005). The adoption of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) under the auspices of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) made way for reforms. Entry restrictions for private businesses were relaxed in most economic sectors. That is why the Economic Recovery Programme and the Economic and Social Action Programme were devised with the IMF in 1986 and 1998, respectively, and laid the groundwork for market reforms. “Ujamaa” socialism was officially abandoned with the endorsement of the “Zanzibar

Declaration” in 1991 (OECD, 2013; Van Arkadie, 1995), although this change is still debateable among the leading political players and stakeholders.

In the past twenty years, Tanzania has lagged behind many of its neighbours in the development of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). A contributory factor has been the lack of a robust legal framework with which to implement such projects (Ngowi, 2005; Brans, 2011; Ndandiko, 2006). The evolution of the policy and legal framework can be analysed with special considerations over regulatory arrangements, organisational and administrative capacity, and strategic aspects relating to the economic and commercial environment for the formulation of PPPs. The TDV (2025) stipulates the vision, mission, goals, and targets to be achieved in relation to economic growth and poverty reduction by 2025 (URT, 2009). The institutional terrain of Tanzania is by and large guided by the Tanzania Development Vision (TDV) 2025. The overarching goal of TDV is to attain sustainable social and economic development by undertaking various initiatives towards poverty reduction.

According to the Education Sector Situation Analysis Report (URT, 2005), the *Sector-Wide Approach* to education development has been intended to alleviate the problem of fragmented interventions. The effective designing, and implementation of PPP call for the pooling of resources in the form of human, financial, and materials by involving all key stakeholders in education planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation (URT, 1998). MKUKUTA was developed as a complementary effort to TVD 2025. Meanwhile, the Education and Training Policy (ETP) of 1995 later revised in 2014 was seen as an essential component of the policy framework that involved the Education Sector Development Programme (ESDP, 2010), whose successful implementation

produced the SEDP I, and II, (URT, 1995) provides the facilitation, development and implementation of PPP in the education sector; however, some stakeholders have not taken advantage of these provisions. The development of PPP is a common practice in some countries in East and Southern Africa and Tanzania is not an exception.

In most African countries private education has been restricted especially after independence, while reviewing their policies towards the private sector. The “pendulum effect” of the constantly changing public policies, especially the following changes not only of governments but even a change of education ministers and officials at the ministry of education, affect the designing of PPPs (Larbi, 1999; Liviga, 2011; Ngowi, 2005; URT, 2015). Extreme changes create uncertainty for all parties and create new challenges for partners willing to enter into a long-term contractual relationship, which forms the basis for the negotiation and designing of viable PPPs not only in education but in all other sectors.

In a bid to entrench the central government control over the economy, more than 425 public enterprises across all sectors were created under the Economic Recovery Programme (URT, 1986). Unfortunately, in the 1980s, the vulnerability of the system became obvious with dismal performance indicators for example Tanzania’s GDP grew by 1percent, while inflation was more than 30 percent, foreign reserves were depleted and acute budget deficits were the order of the day, which were mainly caused by the unending government heavily subsidies to the nonperforming public corporations.

By the early 1980s, the economy of Tanzania had deteriorated to the extent that Tanzania was the World’s second poorest country in terms of GDP per capita (Galabawa, 1990 & Van Arkadie, 1995). These crises signalled a need for movement

towards a market economy and, in 1987, the government's focus was on financial reform and a redefinition of the role of the government to be that of policymakers, the maintenance of law and order, provider of basic social and economic infrastructure and facilitator of economic growth.

Twaakyondo et al. (2002) highlighted that the GoT has been able to put in place favourable policies to enable both local and foreign investment. Such policies included the promotion of institutional reforms to aid the development of the private sector, including the development of PPPs (Liviga, 2011). These policies, including the national framework of laws, regulations, and administrative processes are used as a guide by the different government authorities, during the negotiation and implementation of PPPs. Since 1985, the economy has been liberalised, though nominally, although the actual measurement of the extent of liberalisation is not available.

According to Waigama (2008), in order to effectively design and implement PPPs, it is important to embrace the privatisation policy. That is why the government established an agency body, Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC) through the public corporations (amendment) Act, of 1993. The PSRC was charged with the broad objective of improving the performance of public corporations through the private sector by encouraging wider ownership by the people, foreign capital and technology, nonetheless, without undermining public revenue collection (PSRC, 1996). By March 2000, PSRC had privatised 283 entities and 16 noncore assets out of 425 parastatals (PSRC, 2000).

2.5 Challenges Facing the Designing of PPPs in the Education Sector

Worldwide, there is interest in PPPs despite the many challenges encountered in many countries and the substantial controversy over their implementation and evaluation. Consequently, there are louder calls for improved designing of PPPs as a prerequisite for improved implementation and service delivery. The experience of Public-Private Partnerships implemented in the energy, minerals, water, and transport sector show that there have been underlying poor contractual arrangements. Therefore, there is a need to strengthen the existing system to safeguard national goals, concerns, and interests, by analysing the following challenges.

2.5.1 Absence of a Legal and Institutional Framework

The National Public-Private Partnership Policy document (URT, 2009) spells out that PPP projects have yielded mixed results mainly due to unfavourable contract terms for the public contracting authorities. Such failures have been attributed to the absence of a legal and institutional framework specifically designed for long-term contractual cooperation between the public and private sectors. Striking a favourable balance between the social and profit orientations of the public and private sectors respectively has proved to be a major challenge in a market-oriented logic. Tilak (2006) argues that nowadays, the main government objective of proposing PPP is to raise private funds and save public resources, while the private sector is interested in making quick profits, treating education as a business.

According to Ahadzi and Bowles (2004), most reported challenges reported in the implementation of PPPs are associated with the initial stages at the designing process in terms of unduly high bidding costs and pre-contract time overruns, which are made worse mainly by the protracted and faulty nature of the negotiations. The empirical research conducted under this research, indicates that pre-contract time and cost overruns are crucial in pre-determining a successful PPP contract. The main players in the designing process of PPPs should pay a keen interest in the pre-contract processes.

Special consideration should be given to high-quality technical bidding proposals and high-quality financial proposals. While the financial capabilities of the public sector are ranked lowest in influencing the procurement, it can bring on board the organisational and technical capabilities. Designing a PPP project involves many stakeholders and Figure 2.12 shows that stakeholder consultation is essential at all levels of designing a PPP (Healthier, 2007). It is further illustrated that PPP designing is an integral part of policy development.

A design must highlight specifications, plans, parameters, costs, activities, processes, and how and what to do within legal, political, social, environmental, safety and economic constraints in achieving that objective. According to the GTZ (2010), the typical PPP designing process involves inception or proactive analysis of potential ideas within each sector; feasibility studies giving detailed technical analysis to determine if the project is good value for money for the country; the open procurement process of determining the best fit private sector company and deal with the implementation of Projects, including monitoring and evaluation to monitor risks and ensure contract compliance (URT, 2010). Guasch (2004) noted that, if the PPP is designed properly,

the incentives that guide public bureaucracies and private organisations provide mutual benefit to the partnership.

However, if PPPs are poorly designed, they may leave the public no better-off and worse off than if the government had relied on its resources to conduct the tasks. A well-coordinated designing strategy for PPPs increases the chances of successful projects not only in the education sector but also in the lessons and experiences to be shared with other sectors. The government (URT, 2014) envisages an expanded vision and new commitment towards increased service delivery.

If such a vision is to be realised, then PPPs must be central and contribute to the planning, implementing, managing, and evaluating various education programmes. According to the ADB (2008), successful designing of a PPP should encompass and embrace the uniqueness and particularities embedded in the wider field of institutional factors. The key to adopting an institutionally diverse approach in the processes of designing public-private partnerships is to avoid competition between informal and formal state institutions. It is important to understand the conditions in which they can be beneficially linked, and as part of designing a PPP, a PPP must be built upon a sector diagnostic that provides a realistic assessment of the current sector constraints. These include technical issues; Legal, regulatory and policy frameworks; institutional and capacity status; commercial, financial, and economic status.




Figure 2.12: The Generic PPP Project Sequence

2.5.2 Negotiating a PPP Contract

The negotiation of a PPP contract is a **policy issue** under the PPP Act 2009. The National PPP policy acknowledges the underlying challenge and risks in the negotiation and approval processes of PPPs and calls for a well-guided **negotiation** and approval system (URT, 2009). The whole concept of a partnership hinges on the understanding of rights and obligations on behalf of each partner. Given that some partners might have an undue advantage over the other – bargaining power.

Ahadzi and Bowles (2004) indicated that a better understanding of what is important to the different partners during the negotiations is a very important precept in improving the process of designing PPPs. According to Hartwich, Tola, Engler, González, Ghezan, Vázquez-Alvarado, Espinoza, & Gottret (2008), a well-negotiated organisational design for the partnership enables efficient decision-making, work organisation, information exchange, monitoring, and evaluation.

The negotiation of a partnership should be done in accordance with the partnership's needs, which depend on its scope, the types of actors, and its size. Possible organisational designs include an operating team, a representation committee, a managing committee, and a manager model. Some major barriers to designing successful PPPs are the long planning-horizon, the complexity of various projects, and the cultural contexts within which they are formed. Designing PPPs is challenged by; ambiguity, complexity, and dynamics (Huxham, & Vangen, 2000). In the PPP design stage, risks are effectively controlled through appropriate risk allocation and the right selection of the PPP model. In the selection stage, the most competent private bidder is chosen through competitive bidding, which would offer cost-effective services at required quality standards.

The bargaining power of one of the parties is augmented, especially if the output or the assets involved in the transaction are *specific*. Worse still the hold-up factor (*the readiness to walk away*) is more likely to surface in the negotiations if a restricted number of suppliers possess the necessary equipment and or skills to the accomplishment of the activity. Under this research, deliberate measures were taken to

assess the relative bargaining positions of the consenting parties. According to the National PPP policy; there is insufficient capacity in negotiations, procurement, implementation, and management of PPPs (URT, 2009).

The question remains, which party benefits or loses in terms of either, a stronger or weaker bargaining position from the prevailing policy framework on negotiation and bidding? While designing PPPs, it is important to make formalised and legal negotiations built on; contractual agreements, temporary associations, or the creation of new legal entities. National legislations in the form of institutions and organisational norms should support the designing of PPPs (Hartwich et al., 2008). During the negotiation process, rules of engagement must be stipulated in the contract to avoid any undesired risks of collaboration. Partners may be afraid of participating in a partnership strained by traditions not only in the community but also within the organizations and other legal implications.

2.5.3 Financing of Public-Private Partnerships

Financing PPP is an equally important challenge facing the designing of PPPs in general but in education in particular. The Education and Training Policy (URT, 1995) makes it clear that the financing of education is a shared responsibility between various stakeholders, including government, donors -World Bank, development partners, local government authorities, parents, and communities. The funds from donors and other funding agencies are channelled directly into the government through General Budget Support (GBS) (URT, 2006, 2007). Communities are contributing through the Education Sector Development Programme - ESDP (URT, 2010).

The programme is a sector-wide approach to pool human, financial and material resources, and was established to implement education programmes including the Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP) and the Secondary Education Development Plan (SEDP I (2004 – 2009) and SEDP II 2010–2014). Ideally, the arrangement of these contributions is based on 80:20 ratios (i.e., government 80% and community 20%).

According to UNESCO (2011) Tanzania, despite a needs-based financing formula for education, funding gaps between local government authorities have widened. Such funding gaps arise from the underlying inequality that heavily outweighs the effects of redistribution. Each country has its model for budgetary resource management, which is partly determined by the efficient use of these resources. Overall, one can distinguish two fundamentally different approaches: the expenditure-driven and results-oriented. Applying the results-oriented approach the management of budgetary resources occurs by managing and controlling the results to be achieved under certain spending limits. The beneficiary fulfils certain quantitative and qualitative objectives within the limits of the available financial resources (Mutambi, 2013; UNESCO, 2011). In the spirit of optimisation, the saved resources can be used for the needs of other beneficiaries. This mechanism helps to balance the interests of sponsors and budgetary resource beneficiaries.

An important bottleneck facing the education sector in Africa and in Tanzania in particular is access to reliable, inexpensive financing. Compared with other developing regions of the world like, East Asia, China, and India, the education sector in African

has less access to loans and overdrafts use more internal funds and retained earnings to fund investments and operating costs, pay much higher interest rates and required to register many more assets as collateral. Market failures are rampant because small-scale private schools are less likely to get loans, cash flow problems are enormous, as funds are tied up in raw materials, finished goods inventories, overdue payments, and refunds owed by the governments (Mutambi, 2013). The banking sector has weaknesses; supplier-credit facilities, poor information, communication, and weak contract enforcement have led to a heavily cash-based environment. Tanzanian private schools still report serious difficulties with finance. Interest rates and collateral requirements are still high compared to other developing nations. However, some African governments and the government of Tanzania in particular are progressively trying to address some of these concerns.

2.5.4 The Abolition of School Fees

The abolition of the enrolment fees was the result of what Chonjo (1994) described as *“the coming together of many streams to form a river”*. A mutually reinforcing process of; the huge unpopularity of the fees; civil society mobilisation; the government’s increasing awareness of the need for reform and a shift in the global discourse from cost-sharing towards free schooling. According to the (ESDP, 2010), primary school fees were abolished in 2002 and enrolment became compulsory. The plan for primary education in specific is summarised in a document called the Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP). Under this research, it was worth investigating whether the introduction of free education has a positive or negative impact on the designing of PPPs in the education sector.

On 27 November 2015, the Tanzanian government issued Circular 5, which implements the Education and Training Policy and directs public bodies to ensure that secondary education is free for all children (Shukia, 2020; URT, 2015) including the removal of all forms of fees and contributions. The Circular reads; *“Provision of free education means pupils or students will not pay any fee or other contributions that were being provided by parents or guardians before the release of new circular”* (URT, 2015). However, while most fees are covered, including exam fees, some indirect costs remain for example: for school and sports uniforms and learning materials such as exercise books and pens. With this Circular, the government has gone beyond its Constitutional obligation to provide free, quality primary education and brings Tanzania in line with the target of Sustainable Development Goal 4, which requires States to ensure that everyone “completes free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education”. The content and context of circular number “5” has been misunderstood and its application was based on wrong premises and misinterpretations.

Parents have misunderstood the obligations and extent of responsibility by withdrawing from any school-related expense. Consequently, the government issued the Government Circular Number 6 of 2015, which was later supplanted by the Government Circular Number “3” of (URT, 2016). The circular made important clarifications on the responsibilities of the various education stakeholders. The circular allocated the parents the responsibility of sharing the cost in terms of school uniform and sports gears, learning materials including exercise books and pens/pencils, and food cost for day students.

Tilak (2010), on the other hand, observed that instead of being mutually complementary, the two sectors can be mutually exclusive, hence contributing to the overall shrinking of the total resource base, as public funds may decline under a PPP arrangement. The very understanding of the role the state plays undergoes a drastic change and based on the facts; it is even possible to contest it. That is why Ngowi (2005) recommended that the role of the government should instead diminish from that of a financier to that of an enabler/facilitator so that the market can pick from there and thrive.

According to the National PPP Policy document (URT, 2009), Tanzania should utilise all available options to attract increased private sector investments including PPPs, which is essential to achieve the National Development Vision 2025. However, depending on non-government service providers in general, or truly private schooling in particular, to achieve EFA targets or MDGs in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), is a flawed proposition for several reasons (Lewin, 2007; Pinaud, 2007). Tanzania, just like in many other developing economies, lacks adequate financial resources to invest in the education sector. With the increasing interest in adopting the (PPP) model of service delivery, governments have found a new tool, which can surmount these financial hindrances.

So far, on average, the private sector is responsible for 66% of investments made in Africa. It employs more than 90% of the formal and informal of wage earners and produces 75% of the economic output. Therefore, further consolidation of the state - private sector relation still has more development potential (Kapoor, 2013). The GoT has shown serious indications to shift from public to private finance for the delivery of

infrastructure projects or related services. The involvement of the private sector in the delivery of public service is not, therefore, a new phenomenon (Nisar, 2007; Twaakyondo et al., 2002). The growing awareness of the difficulties and limitations of public funding for infrastructure development has led to many governments to utilise private finance as a financing tool. However, the amplified role of the private sector needs to be seen in a much wider perspective of the evolving political and economic institutions that create an economic environment that induces increasing productivity.

2.5.5 Partnership Preconditions

Jamali (2004) identified critical success factors and policy requirements for successful PPP designing and implementation. These include; trust, openness, fairness, and mutual respect. Also, the designing and structuring process for a PPP should follow relevant procurement principles mainly; accountability, transparency, value for money, and fair competition. Such principles not only ensure good designs, but also the effective and efficient implementation of PPP projects. PPPs can be held together by common interests, that help to reduce the reliance on formal/legal powers and strengthens the position of the structural framework. For a sound PPP model to work, the pre-requisites include among others; the *mutual commitment to agreed objectives*; and *mutual benefit* for the stakeholders involved in the partnership.

2.5.6 Goal compatibility

Setting goal compatibility is another critical pre-condition for designing of PPPs is that of goal compatibility, which is reflected by an appreciation that both the public and private sectors share a common goal of reducing risk and increasing certainty and the

capacity of the partners to execute their roles. Goal compatibility is enhanced by the credibility and transparency of the procurement process and the greater education and sensitization of the stakeholders (Henderson, & McGloin, 2004; Rondinelli, 2004).

2.5.7 Establishing Trust

DFID (2010) highlights that effective “Partnerships” in any walk of life rely on trust and mutual understanding, especially in Tanzania, whereby the government, private sector and civil society need to come together at a national and local level in more meaningful and productive ways. The lingering forms of mistrust between the two sectors need to be addressed if a “win-win” position is to be developed depending on the strengths of the respective parties (Henderson, & McGloin, 2004; Rondinelli, 2004). To meet the MDG targets in 2015, it should be appreciated that all parties and stakeholders are part of the solution and have a role to play. More complex cross stakeholder collaborations are required and these are likely to have a far more disruptive effect on traditional value chains and sector boundaries, creating a new set of development approaches that involve hybrid business models, hybrid funding models, and hybrid delivery models.

There is no doubt that the relationship between the partners under a PPP project is that of mutual dependence and such dependence must be built on trust, which necessitates an open approach to decision making and enables the establishment of mutual trust between the public and private sectors (Henderson, & McGloin 2004; Rondinelli, 2004; Rosenau, 1999; Zhang, & Chen, 2012). Structuring a PPP should be based on worldwide best industrial practices and learning from unsuccessful projects to reach a win-win outcome. In addition to planning the project and allocating risks for enhanced

efficiency, a well-designed PPP forms the basis for the other stages, including the implementation phase. Indeed, trust is a key element of cooperative relationships and prior ties is important under conditions of uncertainty, as is the case with PPPs for development.

2.5.8 Past Experiences with PPP Projects

The confidence and trust between the parties in the PPP contract greatly among other things hinges on either party's past reputation in honouring the respective contractual obligations. The public sector enjoys a prominent and elevated role in the designing and implementation of PPP, therefore its adherence to the contractual obligations is important for attracting future PPPs (Rosenau, 1999; Zhang, & Chen, 2012). However, the public sector's readiness to enter a PPP arrangement depends upon its past experience with the private sector over infrastructure and service projects.

Therefore, the particular nature of infrastructure investments notwithstanding, past experience in running these projects is a critical predictor of successful future arrangements. PPP arrangements are likely to be higher in countries with previous PPP experiences. Also, Pauline (2002) noted that previously, private institutions were not permitted to provide education, in Tanzania. This rejectionist discourse only works if the state can act against private providers and that they would not find other means like ICTs to offer education programmes.

2.5.9 Transparency

According to Johan (2011), successful designing of PPPs greatly depends on a transparent government that has instituted a competitive procurement process; a focused

and well-prepared implementation plan; and the savvy negotiation of each agreement to yield the greatest value based on the type of PPP. The key is matching the right partnership with the right situation to fulfil a nation's infrastructure requirements, secure public support and generate an economic gain. Transparency in the competitive bidding process, along with clearly defined regulations and criteria for selection, is important in attracting high-quality private investors (Huxham, & Vangen, 2000).

The procurement process should also be as simple and straightforward as possible, with a clear outline of the project and partner-vetting process, the project scope, who bears what risks, and the steps for negotiations? A realistic timetable and a fair competitive process further reduce the government's risk in undertaking the tender process.

2.5.10 Collaboration

One of the challenges facing the designing of PPPs in the education sector, is the forging of collaboration dimensions between the partners – that is, joint decision-making, administration, organisational autonomy, and mutuality, (Thomson, & Perry, 2006). However, many partnerships come up against “collaborative inertia”. Furthermore, as a way of avoiding it, there is a need to develop more effective, accountable, and tailored modes of structuring and coordinating the partnership. PPPs must confront partners with complex particularities and their respective challenges. That is, the partners must cope with different organisational and sectoral backgrounds (Caplan, 2001; Rosenau, 1999). Therefore, the parties have to strike a balance between shared accountability and partner autonomy.

2.5.11 Mutual Benefit

PPP stakeholders need to face the challenge of ensuring that there is mutual benefit arising from the different roles assigned at the drafting stage and as later revised to the satisfaction of every partner. The roles of purchaser and provider of education services should be spelt out to different entities within the education administrative agencies and the other stakeholders involved in the partnership (Venkatraman, & Bjorkman, 2006). The stakeholders in a PPP transaction must be able to find a mutual commitment to Agreed Objectives.

The partners have to respect the existing ownership and hierarchy structures, and adapt their partnership design accordingly, especially when defining the partners' autonomy and areas of shared accountability (Rosenau, 1999). Accountability requires clarity in assigning responsibilities to project participants and answerability of the concessionaire to the government, regulator, and the public. Strikingly the theories of PPPs, although mentioning transparency, rigorous implementation, and quality assurance in their PPP promoting documents, they emphasise how and why to implement PPPs (Patrinos et al., 2009; LaRocque, 2006, 2007, 2008; IFC, 2001). In other words, the promotion of PPPs is placed in higher importance than such aspects that do not make it clear privatisation.

2.5.12 A Relative Sense of Equality between the Two Partners

Given the power play between the public and private sector, both partners should be equally strong, to eliminate each other's negative influences, which enable them to share a common vision and purpose for the time they remain as partners (Venkatraman, & Bjorkman, 2006). Unfortunately, as Draxler (2012), pointed out that there is acute inequality between the governments and the private sectors in terms of the power

structures. With such a huge gulf in power and control, the adoption of PPPs can lead to the distortion in national priorities, increase in costs, promotion of unhealthy competition, and privatisation of public goods.

2.5.13 Leadership of the PPP Project

In the power relationships, both partners need to be equally strong, so that they can eliminate the negative influence of each other and share a common vision and purpose of development. Alexandra (2012) argues that because the governments and private sectors are unequal in their power structures, the formation of PPPs can lead, to distortion in national priorities, an increase in costs, promotion of unhealthy competition, and privatisation of public goods.

Overall, there is still a big cloud of confusion prevailing over which roles should be performed by the different players. Similarly, Tilak (2010) argues that often the running of PPPs distorts as to whom the partnerships are accountable to, according to what criteria and who sets the priorities. The issue of long-term sustainability is also often ignored in PPPs.

Traditionally, education has been the state monopoly, as it is considered as a public good, producing a huge set of externalities, and social merit good with external benefits beyond what the private consumers of education are willing to pay for. An important function of education is to promote equity in society and contribute to nation-building. Besides, market imperfections and information asymmetry justify it to be under state monopoly. Education is also considered not for profit and not a business (Samaratunge,

& Bennington, 2002; Klijn, & Teiseman, 2000; Pollitt, & Bouckaert, 2011). Several countries still develop and promote the development of institutions in the form of legislation that maintains such the domination of the state. Nonetheless, there is a growing influence of the profit-seeking private sector in education. It is feared that private education even under the guise of PPPs compromises the traditional roles and responsibilities of education.

The justification of such leverage is based on the level of country risk; the reputation of the private parties involved in the project; and characteristics of the infrastructure sector and the particular condition in which the project operates. The high level of discretion is subject to a stable political, social, legal, and economic environment for private investments, and the private parties have a good reputation. However, according to (Zhiang, & Chen, 2012), if a country lacks a sound legal system; a high level of discretion may significantly increase the private sector's perception of risks and, consequently an increase in the cost of capital.

The private sector is concerned that the government's discretionary power may be misused. Table 2.6 illustrates a model through which the public and private sectors can share roles and responsibilities over a given project. The sharing of different roles helps to alleviate the concern over overlapping roles and duplication of services and resources. A clear and dichotomous spelling out of responsibilities is necessary, especially if recourses are provided to the private sector against the government's possible inappropriate discretionary decisions.

Table 2.6: Responsibility for the Realisation of Different Stages of a PPP Project

	Preparation of the enterprise	Designing	Implementation	Operating and Maintenance
Private sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identification and evaluation of different (specific risks) bounding (connecting) with the enterprise • Defining the optimal nature of the enterprise • Forming of the SPV responsible for the realisation of works • Making the best bid (tender or other) for the realisation of the project 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collecting special permission opinions • Forecast of income from the enterprise (Added Value) • Giving the price for the realisation of the enterprise (payment mechanism) • Collecting the needed funds for the realisation • Negotiations of conditions of collaboration with under-contractors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Doing appropriate works connected with fittings (building site) • Constructing of detailed technical project • Constructing the object (infrastructure) according to the schedule and payments • Efficient transmission (transfer) the infrastructure to operating for operate partnership insurance of the infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operating and maintenance of the infrastructure and reconstruction investments • Good quality (condition) of the infrastructure in the moment of transferring it to the public sector • Debt service and realisation of return for shareholders of the SPV • Taking different risks (insurance, inflation, and others)
Public sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defining enterprise and defining initial documentation. • Formation of a special implementation group responsible for working out detailed specifications of the enterprise of the enterprise • Making formal decisions about the realisation • Preparation of tendering documentation • Organising of public procurement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collecting and securing funds needed for realisation • season payments for private sector • Buying land and infrastructure using rights connected to the enterprise • Collecting special permissions, decisions, and opinions • Negotiating the final conditions of the realisation of the enterprise. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitoring of the private sector • Negotiating possible changes of specification of public procurement • Realisation of insurance obligations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitoring of payments made to and by the private sector

Source: modified from Warszawa (2002) pp. 16–17

2.6 The Theoretical Framework

According to Eisenhart, a theoretical framework is a structure that guides research by relying on a formal theory that is constructed using an established, and coherent explanation of certain phenomena and relationships. It is an organised, coherent, and systematic articulation of a set of issues that are communicated as a meaningful whole. Under this mixed methods research – (QUAL + qual), the theoretical framework began with an already structured theoretical framework. Unlike the traditional theoretical frameworks in quantitative designs that are developed during data collection.

This study used the structured theories, which helped to prevent any preconceptions on the findings (Grant & Osanloo, 2014). The research into the institutional factors influencing the design of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania was guided by three major theories; *The Institutional Theory*; *The Incomplete Contracts Theory* and *The Transaction Costs Theory*. Based on the ‘Economics of contracting’ literature, these theories provide the best guide in the drafting, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of PPPs around the world.

According to Schmidt (2004), these theories were independently developed but, in many ways, they are axiomatic, complement, and even overlap each other. The theories under this study were useful in designing the research questions, guiding the selection of relevant data, interpretation of the data, and were used to propose explanations of the underlying causes or influences of the changes in the institutional framework on the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania.

2.6.1 The Institutional Theory

Institutional theory is concerned with the deeper and more resilient aspects of social structure. It considers the processes by which structures, including schemes; rules, norms, and routines, become established as authoritative guidelines for social behaviour. According to Kraft (2007), Institutional Theory is “*Policy-making that emphasises the formal and legal aspects of government structures*”. It is a widely accepted theoretical posture that emphasises rational myths, isomorphism, and legitimacy (DiMaggio, & Powell, 1983; Kraft, & Scott, 2008; Scott 2008; Williamson, 1975).

The institutional theory studies how legitimacy pressures, social institutions and institutionalised behaviours shape the forms and functioning of inter-organisational relationships. Other researchers like Scott (2008) have built on this perspective emphasising that a key insight into institutional theory is imitation, rather than necessarily optimising their decisions, practices, and structures. They contend that organisations look to their peers for cues to appropriate behaviour. Different components of institutional theory explain how these elements are created, diffused, adopted, and adapted over space and time; and how they fall into decline and disuse.

In order to survive, organisations must conform to the rules and belief systems prevailing in the environment (DiMaggio, & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2008; Williamson, 1975), because institutional isomorphism, both structural and procedural, earns the organisation legitimacy. Assumptions of the theory include institutions have material and cultural characteristics – Embedded agency in interests, identities, values, and

assumptions of individuals and organisations are embedded within the prevailing institutional logics; Society is inter-institutional; analytical levels; individuals competing and negotiating; Organisations in conflict and coordination; Institutions in contradiction and interdependency (DiMaggio, & Powell, 1983, Meyer, & Rowan, 1977). Institutional theory emphasises that organisations must conform to these rules and requirements if they are to receive support and be perceived as legitimate.

Institutional theory not only explains why organisational structures, like PPPs become entrenched, but also how and why the change occurs. The designing and development of PPPs, especially in the education sector must happen in the transition stage of the economy from the centrally planned economy to a more market-driven economy. Under such circumstances, in order for such changes to occur, Jennings (1994) described two types of institutional pressure that can be instrumental in promoting change. First, there must be an introduction of new rules that are backed by clear enforcement, and coercive means to stimulate organisational change through institutional dependencies.

2.6.2 The Incomplete Contracts Theory

Hart et al., (1997) defined an incomplete contract is that type of contract, which does not consider all relevant variables. An incomplete contract has gaps, missing provisions, and ambiguities and must be completed through renegotiation or by the courts, with strictly positive probability in some states of the world. In reality, many contracts are vague or silent on several key features. Measured against the complete-contract benchmark, in the presence of private information, complete contingent-claims contracts are no longer feasible (Hart, & Moore, 1988; Williamson, 1975; Tirole, 1999). However, why economic agents sign such contracts? The proposed explanations

usually relate to the bounded rationality of economic agents and the verifiability of variables about contract fulfilment. One of the salient features of a PPP project are the long contract period, attributable to the long-life cycle of infrastructure facilities, which take a long time to build and operate.

To reduce transaction costs, the partners enter PPP contracts that prevent them from hold-ups (Hart, & Moore, 1988; Tirole, 1999; Williamson, 1975). However, it is not possible to anticipate every incident and development that affects the partnership over the contract period, and even if all contingencies would be predictable, it is presumed to be too complicated to include all that in the contract. Thus, PPP contracts are incomplete. Renegotiations of PPP-contracts, that may arise, generate inefficiencies and make residual rights significantly relevant. When studying the institutional factors influencing the design and implementation of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania, the emphasis was placed on understanding the strengths and weaknesses of any Public-Private Partnership contract (Hart et al., 1997; Moore, 1988). The study of the institutional factors considered a span of the project life cycle and given the long-term nature of the PPPs; it makes these theories even more relevant to this study.

Assumptions of incomplete contracts theory include *Rationality*; in a sense that some contingencies cannot be imagined, or to the cost of writing complex contracts; and the existence of transaction costs; transaction costs comprise the ex-ante costs of searching and information; drafting and negotiating an agreement, and costs of safeguarding the agreement. The ex-post costs entail the costs of; evaluating the input; measuring the output; and monitoring and enforcement (Tirole, 1999; Williamson, 1975). According to (Tirole, 1999) incomplete contract models are preceded by the invocation of

transaction costs, namely one or several of the following three ingredients: *Unforeseen contingencies*: Parties cannot define ex-ante the contingencies that may occur or actions that may be feasible at a later date (Hart & Moore, 1988; Saussier, 2000; Tirole, 1999; Williamson, 1975). So, they must content themselves with signing a contract such as an authority or ownership relationship that does not explicitly mention those contingencies, or with signing no contract at all; *Cost of writing contracts*- Even if one could foresee all contingencies, they might be so numerous that it would be too costly to describe them in a contract; *Cost of enforcing contracts*; courts must understand the terms of the contracts and verify the contracted upon contingencies and actions to enforce the contract.

According to Saussier, (2000), when economic agents decide to collaborate, they create a 'contract interface' to guide the transactions, the subject of the collaboration. To maximise the gains the interface must be correctly designed. In real life, many types of contracts exist, of which, some are precise and strive for completeness, while others are 'light-weight' and are incomplete. What motivates contractual choices by economic agents? To address this question, it is important to first understand why economic agents (the partners) sign incomplete contracts (Hart, & Moore, 1988; Hart et al., 1997; Tirole, 1999). The level of incompleteness is then analysed as an endogenous choice but not as a badly designed contract. On this basis, most real-world contracts are incomplete because they are not contingent on all relevant, publicly available information; they are renegotiated frequently, interpreted, and completed by the courts.

The development of a PPP project requires both firms and governments to do the following; prepare and evaluate proposals, develop contract and bidding documents, conduct bidding and negotiate deals and arrange funding mechanisms. That is, the parties can devise a contract that leaves them no worse off than they were before describing the physical states **ex-ante** (Siemer, 2004; Tirole, 1999). The unpredictability of the output and the ever-changing policy framework of the education sector render the incomplete contracts theory relevant in measuring the performance of Public-Private Partnerships. It is worth investigating whether the viability and sustainability of the Public-Private Partnerships depend greatly on how the parties negotiate because of the information asymmetries regarding the risks and potential benefits of the related parties. A typical timeline PPP model is given in Figure 2.13. At the initial stages (date 0), there are limitations on what can be done on a contract basis, especially on what formal institutions can enforce in the courts of law (Dorward, 2001; Hart, & Moore, 1988; Tirole, 1999). However, at later dates like at 3 and 4, the contractual obligations are binding to either party and there is room for the renegotiation of the incomplete contracts.




Figure 2.13: A Typical Contract Timeline

2.6.3 The Transaction Costs Theory

The theory of transaction costs was used in guiding the research into the institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania. The simplified modern theory of transaction costs argued by Siemer (2004) holds that *“if all parties can assign a probability description of their possible payoffs, then the fact that they cannot describe the physical states, for example, the possible characteristics of the goods to be traded, in advance is irrelevant to welfare”*. According to Cowen and Parker, (1997), transaction costs arise from the costs of seeking out buyers and sellers and arranging, policing, and enforcing agreements or contracts in a world of imperfect information. According to this theory, agents or partners are opportunistic but limitedly rational.

Herrera et al. (2005) provided a clear link between the transaction costs and institutions when he argued that institutions provide the basic structure by which human beings throughout history have created a framework to reduce uncertainty in exchange. According to him, transaction costs depend on the type of institution, which justifies the rationale for engaging in public-private partnerships. Siemer (2004) argues that institutions are designed to achieve efficient outcomes, which means that they cannot be ignored in economic analysis because they play a key role in economic performance. The theory of transaction costs is rooted in Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). It is built around the argument that all but even the basic transactions require a minimum a simple mechanism to protect the transacting parties from various hazards associated with the exchange. Williamson (2000) referred to this mechanism as the

governance structure. The appropriate governance structure entails the institutional framework and it depends upon the characteristics of the transactions. All these factors influence the overall transaction cost referred to by Dorward (2001) as “*Governance Costs*” (GC).

Designing a PPP contract should be done in a transaction cost framework, where according to Ngaruko (2010) economic organisation imposes costs because complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete. This approach diminishes the orthodox economic model of competitive general equilibrium in which all contracts are assumed to be complete (Hart & Moore, 1988). In reality, such contractual incompleteness is risky and the contracting parties must find a way of dealing with the unforeseen contingencies, which in essence leads to additional costs of re-contracting and re-negotiation through the courts otherwise the parties incur *mal-adaptation costs* in particular when it comes to specific asset investments.

According to Klein (1999), the theory of transaction costs induces the contracting parties to envisage, contractual difficulties can arise from several sources including; bilateral dependency, weak property rights; measurement difficulties and over searching; inter-temporal issues that can take the form of disequilibrium contracting; real-time responsiveness; long latency and strategic abuse, and weaknesses in an institutional environment. According to Ngaruko (2010), the above constraints can impose mal-adaptation costs. Therefore, it is in the interest of the PPP stakeholders to reduce the potential costs of mal-adaptation by matching the appropriate institutional structure with the particular characteristics of the transaction.

2.6.4 Assumptions of the Transactions Cost Theory

Williamson (1975) identified three assumptions of the transaction costs; the agents' *bounded rationality*, that originates incomplete contracts due to the impossibility of foreseeing, in the contracting moment, all future situations; *opportunism* that occurs when one of the partners pursues his short-term self-interest and; *the asset specificity*, when the owners of production factors incurs costs if they deviate the assets to another use, and leads to the conclusion that the best use is improved by internalisation. Internalization is preferred over the externalisation if three conditions are verified. Klein (1999) highlighted that the presence of transaction costs in writing a contract induces parties to write incomplete contracts because; costs to think through all possible states of the world; costs to write down all possible contingencies - using legal code; difficulty in describing a contingency unambiguously so that the contract can be verified in the courts, even if the contingency is obvious to the contracting parties.

Williamson (2000) indicated that parties write incomplete contracts **ex-ante** that have to be completed and renegotiated as they go along. However, the incomplete nature of the contract yields inefficiencies for several reasons, including boggling in renegotiation yields delay and inefficient decisions; asymmetric information may arise during the relationship, which prevents the implementation of an ex-post efficient allocation; these costs would not matter very much if the parties could easily switch to alternative contracting parties. However, in many situations, the parties are locked in with each other and a break up would be inefficient. In these situations, the hold-up problem

arises. According to Iossa et al., (2007), a public-private partnership increases the level of risk and responsibility to the private contractor than in traditional procurement. The government only shoulders part of the risk since it only specifies the basic services it intends to deliver, design, and construct. While the private sector bears the biggest if not all the operational risk.

Under any PPP, the partners are more likely to exhibit a high degree of *opportunistic behaviour* because most of the transactions are uncertain (Hart, & Moore, 1988). Public-Private Partnerships in education operate in uncertain circumstances; it is difficult to predict the education requirements of the market not to mention the changing syllabi. In Tanzania, just like any other developing country, there is a constant review of the curriculum to suit the development challenges.

It is this constant review, which creates the uncertainty concerning the product specification, hence prompting opportunistic behaviour. It is difficult to guarantee the execution of the contract where there are constant reviews of the curriculum, and the policies are constantly changing with changes in government policies. The research spent more time on finding out to what extent have the PPP contracts changed given the ‘pendulum’ movement of government policies in Tanzania from 1967 - Education for Self-Reliance. What adjustments have been made regarding the removal and reinstatement of school fees in education?

2.7 The Empirical Analysis of Relevant Studies

This section presents the empirical literature about the study of the institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania. So far, the literature review shows that there is no shortage of research into the concept of Public-Private Partnerships in general and the education sector in particular. In this section, the analysis of various studies related to institutions in the area of PPPs is presented. Studies under review cover experience from Tanzania, the East African region, and some other African countries.

2.7.1 Experiences of PPPs in the Education Sector in Tanzania

Omari (2014) in his research into *The Predicament of Public-Private Partnerships in Education* discovered that the concept of partnership is problematic, even when it is not supposed to be so. According to him, the main problem arises because most partners are greatly unequal. He reiterated that the state should stop dictating terms and the agenda. In the same research Omari (2014) gives a chronological account of the frosty and acrimonious relationship between the government and Faith Based Organisations (FBOs) aided schools. In Tanzania, the relationships between the *Private - Public Partnership* management in the education sector have been chequered, historically rocky, and antagonistic. Omari (2014) discussed the prerequisites for successful PPPs notable of which the *Negotiation of a Fair Deal Structure*.

According to him, “*fairness in negotiating a deal structure means that all parties are reasonably satisfied, at the point of departure, that they will receive the important outcomes enough to be included in the transaction documentation*”. This research

elevated the issue of negotiation further, by asking whether the negotiation process involves appreciating transaction costs. How far the existence of transaction costs does lead to the drawing up of incomplete contracts?

During the colonial period, *the 1927 Education Ordinance* was passed. The education system provided for racially disaggregated schools where the public schools were preserved for the children of the rich and chiefs, while private schools were preserved for the economic and political elite. It also provided exclusive schools for Europeans and Asians (Omari, 2014). Similarly, Christians and Moslems, created their schools for their followers. Here there was no partnership but competition, economic, racial, and religious exclusivity, and hence the religious and racial tensions of the time, subdued as it might have been, which means that PPPs have been in existence for over 30 years, therefore a considerable amount of time and legal work is necessary to form such consortia.

Moshi and Soka (2014) in their research into the "*Ability of Local Community on the Financing of Primary Education Projects in Tanzania*" called for increased accountability to root out the possibility of the embezzlement of public funds into education. They appreciated an important need to establish a clear policy and regulatory framework, which calls for the active involvement of the local community in decision making; poor communication; socio-economic crisis, especially among the parents; promoting the effectiveness of school committees; and involving unnecessary politics in educational projects.

Kamando (2014) conducted a qualitative study to find out GCPs (*Government-Community Partnership*) in the Provision of Education in Rural Tanzania. The central purpose of her study was to explore GCP in the provision of education in rural communities in Tanzania. Her study examined the literature to explore tensions around the concepts and issues in the discourse on the collective working spirit, including the wider perspective offered by the historical background and the political complexity of partnerships working in community development. Like Omari (2014), she highlighted the power imbalance between government agencies and the communities. The problems associated with the practice of GCP in education and community development in rural communities are systemic and associated with a system in which power is disproportionately distributed among the GCP actors (Kamando, 2014). Using the Social Capital Theory, her study concluded that strengthening network ties and building social capital might not be adequate; rather, there is a need for a responsive government with a grounded mutual power structure based on transparency and trust. That is why this research using the institutional theory explored the different contractual engagements of the PPPs and found ways of measuring the extent to which the anticipated inputs and outputs are measured against the outcomes.

Twaakyondo et al., (2002) studied the history of PPPs in the education sector. According to them, the presence of collaboration and practise of PPPs can be traced to years before Tanzania got independence in 1961. Tanzania became a centrally planned economy in 1967 and everything government-controlled. He highlighted the brief institutional history since independence by saying that between the country's independence in 1961 and 1996, the government had created 425 parastatal enterprises.

However, overtime the economy deteriorated; revenue was low and production was almost nil. This situation was particularly notable in the 1980s immediately after the 1978–79 war with Uganda that drained most of the resources and in turn exposed the vulnerability of the public sector, which forced the government to subsidise heavily the public corporations to keep them operating, which created a favourable opportunity to look up to the private sector to bring in the much-needed resources both financial and human.

Afonso and Henne (2015) sought answers to the research question: “*How can the public-private dialogue/partnerships in Tanzania develop to improve the local business climate?*” Driven by this question, this research identified and analysed the current major constraints in designing of PPPs, and thereafter identify the potential solutions. Their findings augmented the studies of (Omari, 2014; Kamando, 2014) by arguing that in Tanzania the PPP terrain has been dominated by mismanagement, distrust, and lack of transparency. He is one of the optimists towards the adoption of PPPs. According to him, next to purely economic benefits, PPPs can have a positive effect on the state – private relationship, especially if a PPP can help improve the deadlocked collaboration. He identified deep distrust as one of the major challenges for Tanzania’s development.

Afonso and Henne (2015) further observed that the informal sector was a major challenge to both the public and private sector activities in Tanzania. In their study, they discovered that Tanzania is amongst the top three African countries with the largest informal sector. With such a burgeoning private informal sector, there is a serious challenge of dismal government revenue collection, therefore reducing the efficiency

with which public services are delivered. The limited contribution of the informal sector to developing activities hints a clear internal challenge that is both affecting economic growth and the blossoming of fruitful PPPs. Despite their scepticism, they still expressed optimism in the growing global importance of the PPPs compared to traditional approaches. Even though PPPs are facing some well-founded critique, they have great potential for bringing new movement in the rather stagnating development process of the last decades. Its great popularity on the African continent can be seen as several governments supported such initiatives recently.

2.7.2 Experiences from PPPs in other Sectors in Tanzania

According to the World Bank report (2016), Tanzania has for the last decade been among the fastest growing economies in the world and has a relatively solid macro-economy. Growth in Tanzania has been concentrated in a few capital-intensive sectors such as mining and telecom, and soon natural gas. There has been an uptake in PPP activity in such sectors recently. However, the “*jury is still out*” as far as the verdict on the performance of the PPPs in Tanzania is concerned. According to the former Prime Minister of Tanzania Hon. Mizengo P. Pinda, in his foreword to the National Public-Private Partnership Policy document (URT, 2010), “PPP have been implemented successfully by Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs) in education, health and water sectors for many years.

2.7.2.1 PPPs in the Transport Sector

Bengesi et al. (2016) studied and assessed the understanding of the PPP concept between the partners and factors associated with the low participation of the private sector actors. The study recognised the GoT’s efforts to create an enabling environment

that attracts the full participation of the private sector in the development of transportation infrastructure. Such an environment includes the PPP policy, legal framework, and associated institutions. This study revealed that the government has improved and reviewed the institutional framework that has helped accommodate stakeholders' constructive opinions and interests. Much as there were significant improvements, the findings also indicated areas of improvement for both the public and private sectors, including finding out whether there is a common understanding of the PPP concept, unawareness of prospects by private actors, insufficient capital market, lack of sufficient capacity by local private actors, lack of transparency along the PPP procurement chain, lack of negotiations and project-monitoring skills among the relevant public officials, and double-dealing among some public officials responsible for PPP processes.

The findings call for a concerted amendment of the institutional framework to enhance a common understanding of the PPP concept, create sufficient awareness of PPP prospects among the private actors, raise capital market, increase the capacity of the local private actors and ensure transparent PPP procurement procedures while reinforcing adherence to the public code of conduct among public officials and building their negotiation and project management skills.

Bengesi et al. (2016) also revealed that the PPP-funding mechanism is a crucial tool to complement government resources for revitalising the overstretched and dilapidated transport infrastructure. According to him, the Ministry of Finance and Planning created awareness and built capacity on PPP policy and legal frameworks to 200 stakeholders engaged in banking and policymaking professions. The understanding of the PPP

concept among the two partners is uncommon. Private sector actors typically lack a comprehensive definition of the concept, which is stipulated by the policy. At a time when the public sector has been blamed for the failure to put in place the supportive environment for the private sector, Bengesi et al. (2016) conducted a study on behalf of the ESRF and discovered that most private sector actors are not aware of the existence of some PPP opportunities, such as options for unsolicited projects in the transportation infrastructure, and uninformed of existing prospects. In short, the study concluded that; Tanzania's capital market is still underdeveloped and does not give much support to the private sector to invest in transportation infrastructure; the government has also been slow in decision making towards potential PPP projects. The failure to realise the opportunities provided by PPPs is attributed to the lack of a suitable mechanism to transfer calculated risks to the private sector.

Bengesi et al. (2016) discovered that some government officials lack proper negotiation and project monitoring skills to close meaningful business deals with the private sector, hence leading to either delays or low-quality deliverables; there is corruption among some public officials as observed in the instigation of suspicious contracts and cost inflation in the procurement process; the private sector doubts the loyalty of the government in keeping up with its commitments and obligations as stipulated in PPP contracts and the private sector is concerned with red tape and lack of transparency in the procurement process related to PPP projects.

2.7.2.2 PPPs in the Management of Municipalities in Tanzania

Ngowi (2005) researched the application of PPPs in the "*Management of Municipalities in Tanzania*" in his paper he discussed the application of the PPP concept in eight (8) municipalities/councils¹ in Tanzania – Arusha, Morogoro, and Dodoma Municipal Councils; and Njombe, Muleba, Bariadi, Kigoma and Kisarawe councils. He found that the application of PPPs in Tanzania is still a new phenomenon mainly because the adoption of PPPs in Tanzania is the outcome of the Structural Adjustment Policies that started in the 1980s.

According to him, understanding PPPs requires an understanding of the relevancy of the context of privatisation. It is the policy of privatisation that has made the application of PPP possible. Ngowi (2005) identified several challenges in the application of PPPs in the management of municipalities in Tanzania. These mainly included the limited capacity of both the private and public sectors to properly operate and manage a PPP arrangement. He discovered that, on the whole, the private sector had a diminished capacity to properly participate in PPP projects. The private sector in Tanzania still lacks hands-on skills as far as; contract knowledge, contract formation, negotiation, and management in the context of PPPs is concerned. Any attempts to cover this deficiency only works to increase the transaction costs in terms of hiring legal expertise.

Ngowi (2005) identified other challenges confronting the application of PPPs in the municipalities was the aspect of the general inadequacy of the much-needed funds, knowledge, expertise, experience, and equipment by the private sector. According to him, the majority of the players in the private sector lack the above capacities. In addition, before PPPs are applied, these conditions must be in place, including

possession of the appropriate amount of money, knowledge, equipment, and experience. To make matters worse, even where some private firms may satisfy the above conditions, there is an acute problem of a huge informal sector with little or no documentation.

In addition, the nature of the private sector in Tanzania makes it difficult to prove and verify that certain equipment, such as tractors belongs to a firm as these are normally registered in individuals' names but used for business purposes. According to him, these and other similar challenges, make it difficult to properly apply the PPP concept in Tanzania. It becomes a challenge, for example, to get quality service providers that can adhere to standards and terms of reference in service provision.

Itika, Mashindano, and Kessy (2011) researched "*Success and constraints of improving PPPs in health services delivered in Tanzania*". The intension was to provide the details on the areas needed to strengthen PPPs in terms of; how they are initiated and how the challenges can be overcome. Their findings indicate that several challenges were facing the PPPs in Tanzania, including; a poor regulatory framework, poor coordination of PPP activities, weak financial support, lack of stakeholders' trust, lack of commitment and accountability, limited human resource capacity and utilisation, limited access to essential drugs, and failure to adhere to professionalism.

Itika et al. (2011) concluded that the areas of partnerships are increasing in number and demand, despite the long history of the marginalisation of the private sector. Therefore, to avoid the known poor performance of the PPPs, instead, it is now time to observe the partnership norms. Itika et al. (2011) recommended that, as in other countries where

PPPs are more successful, there is a great need to have specific regulatory frameworks, with clear formulas on how to initiate PPPs depending on the type of project needed. Such a regulatory framework would provide optional models suitable for particular PPP projects with clear guidelines not only to the government officials but also to the private people on the merits and demerits of each option.

Itika et al. (2011) found that even though various pieces of legislation and guidelines in Tanzania are useful in initiating and design PPP models and projects. There were no specific regulations for PPPs and the level of awareness of general laws is low. There were no clear guidelines on how to initiate PPPs, which led to ad hoc actions depending on the situation at hand. This impromptu action was mainly common in PPPs in primary health-care service delivery, where PPPs have largely depended on how particular public officials understood and interpreted government intention and strategy to work with the private sector through the health sector reform- strategy.

Itika et al. (2011) concluded that PPPs are the best policy option for improving health service delivery in the country, despite the strong dissatisfaction with their performance in the health sector. The poor performance of the PPPs in the health sector has led to increased conflict between the government and the private sector. To rectify the situation, Itika et al. (2011) recommended that the local authorities should establish PPP units that are responsible for identifying suitable areas for partnerships, conducting feasibility studies, facilitating monitoring and evaluating their establishment. Such units work to coordinate PPP initiatives with support from the national level unit.

2.7.3 Experiences of Public-Private Partnerships in East Africa

Most of the governments in the East African region are faced with budgetary constraints, which have forced them to adapt to the policy of mobilising private resources and spread the risks to the private sector. In the new international economic order dominated by SAPs, deliberate steps have been taken to roll back the government frontier in the provision of public services and increase the role played by the private sector. According to Ahmed (2000), in the recent past, countries because of the growing importance of service sector to their economies, have promoted several interventions to supplement the traditional means of service delivery through fiscal budgets; the role of measures like Public-Private Partnerships is now fronted as another means to achieve the desired education outcomes. Unfortunately, the governments in the East African region are running overstretched education budgets.

Brans (2011) conducted research aimed at analysing PPPs as a policy tool for Universal Secondary Education in Uganda. His findings were that; the key drivers to developing PPPs were; negotiation, mutual understanding, and transparency. It was found that effective negotiation requires clear communication, accommodating nature, and the desire for both parties to want to partake in constructive dialogue. The study revealed that respondents were satisfied with the current level of transparency and mutual understanding between public and private partners. In addition, it was discovered that the negotiation and spirit of wanting to collaborate, dovetailed well with the direction inferred from the terms of a legal contract. Also, negotiation, transparency, and adherence to a contract were found to be complementary tools and processes, in working towards a successful collaboration. Trust was found to stimulate the acceptance

of each partner's objectives and promote the establishment of long-term meaningful relationships.

Brans (2011) indicated his concern over the way the promoters of the Universal Secondary Education programme (USE). The official discourse is only representing the programme in good light and emphasising its benefits. Could this dispute be due to the lack of dissent in Uganda's education field, or is it because the plan is faultless, or is the discursive power of the promoter's argumentation engulfing all critique? Brans (2011) observed that Uganda is facing a daunting task of implementing PPPs in education sector. In Uganda PPPs is a relatively new experiment of global policies in national politics. Uganda is one of the first examples that experiments with "free" private schools for secondary education instead of the more common low-fee private schools PPPs in developing countries. The big challenge to Uganda is that they must make deliberate institutional reforms to accommodate the new experiment of PPPs in education. To make matters worse, there has been limited documentation of the experiences of state and non-state relationships in practise despite active global policy debates. Academic studies and statistical data regarding the implemented PPPs are scarce, and it concerns a relatively recently implemented programme.

In Kenya, Waichanguru (2010) researched the Municipal council of Nyeri, to determine whether the institutional framework was suitable for administrating the PPP projects. It was found that the successful of administering PPP projects greatly depended on the structure of the institutions. Waichanguru (2010) found out that the municipal council needed to partner with institutions that would enable it to develop the capacity to plan, negotiate, implement, and monitor PPP projects successfully.

Furthermore, there was a need to develop the well-defined criteria for engaging the private sector and the council must review the well-defined criteria for engaging the enactment of the Public Procurement and Disposal Act (Public-Private Partnership) regulations of 2014. It was recommended that the municipal council should create a unit to handle Public-Private Partnerships; it undertakes staff training to enhance the capacity to undertake Public-Private Partnerships and reviews all Public-Private Partnership agreements and aligns them with the requirements of the Public Procurement and Disposal Act (Public-Private Partnership) regulations 2014.

In Uganda Ndandiko (2006), studied PPPs in the local governments and used an overarching question - *Do developing countries have the institutional capacity to implement PPPs?* He found that there are major constraints to the adoption of PPPs to service delivery under the local government, because of a general lack of PPP prerequisites including; a lack of policy guidelines, weak regulatory frameworks, lack of awareness, limited or no training, and weak public/private sector institutions. His study also revealed that there was a lack of a national and sectoral policy and regulatory framework on PPP in Uganda, which was a major deterrent to extend the PPP concept to local governments. Ndandiko (2006) warned against the “*wholesale*” application of PPPs by the government by trying to emulate the experiences of successful models in developed countries.

According to Ndandiko (2006), there are striking differences in the institutional structures between the developed and developing countries. The big challenge to

Uganda is that they must make deliberate institutional reforms to accommodate the new experiment of PPPs in education. To make matters worse, there has been limited documentation of the experiences of state–non-state relationships in practise despite active global policy debates. Academic studies and statistical data regarding the implemented PPPs are scarce, which concerns a relatively recently implemented programme. His study also revealed that there was a lack of a national and sectoral policy and regulatory framework on PPP in Uganda. In addition, it was a major deterrent to extend the PPP concept to local governments. Flaws that need to be addressed were highlighted to enhance PPP use as alternative modes of public procurement.

Ndandiko (2006) also discovered that there was a misunderstanding of the term PPP. A broader term private participation was used to highlight the private sector involvement in infrastructure development and service delivery. He reported that all seven municipalities studied understood PPP to mean “*privatisation*”. Yet still, all seven municipalities also regarded their relationship with the private parties a *partnership because* the municipality retained supervisory powers and that both the public and private parties had a stake in the venture.

According to Ndandiko (2006), it was surprising to note that all seven municipalities studied agreed that they are in a partnership, but preferred to call the arrangements privatisation. In reality, he adds, the private sector undertakes activities either for or on behalf of the municipality. Control and ownership of the infrastructure facilities remain with the municipality. The institutional actors including; the municipalities, the private

partners and stakeholders are not fully conversant with the PPP approach. Although the Ministry of Local Government – Uganda (MOLG) defined the term PPP, in one of their training manuals, its understanding has remained elusive. He concluded that PPPs exist within the municipalities in Uganda, but what is lacking is formally stressing its usage and developing it as a mode of public procurement.

Ndandiko (2006) expressed his dismay with most developing countries that are economically depressed, lacking the resources to effectively design and implement PPPs. He concluded from his study that benchmarks for the successful introductions of PPPs in developing countries are missing. It would then be interesting to determine why in the circumstances the governments go ahead and introduce PPP arrangements anyway even when public sector institutions in developing countries are weak. The economic resource base and regulatory framework are inadequate. He cautioned against the broadening and adoption of PPPs in the context of developing countries, despite the highly rated benefits. The dilemma in adopting the PPP approach, especially in the education sector starts with the status of the countries. Meunier and Quinet (2010) added that much as the PPP model is appealing, but once implemented, challenges become more evident especially in management, which diminishes the capacity to mobilise resources for effective design, let alone the implementation of viable PPP contracts.

2.7.4 Experiences of PPPs from the Rest of Africa

Johan (2011) researched - *Critical Success Factors for Public-Private Partnerships in South Africa*; with an overarching question; “*What are the critical factors that can be replicated that separate successful PPPs from PPPs that do not deliver or that collapse?*” In her study, she identified the importance of; public governance, private

sector collaboration, entrepreneurial studies, and a collection of perspectives on success. These perspectives include those of stakeholders, of private operators, of the third sector and perspectives from disciplines and knowledge and practise frameworks such as project management, corporate governance, enterprise risk management, and organisational design.

Awortwi (2004), conducted research on the private sector involvement in local governments (LG) service provision in Ghana exposed the gap between PPP policy expectations and outcomes, which he attributed to get the fundamentals wrong. He found that contrary to the PPP benefits portrayed in literature, there were no gains from the PPP arrangement in Ghana. There was no evidence of PPP improving service quality; no cost savings instead the Local Government and users were paying more than they used to when services were delivered directly (in-house); no efficiency gains were recorded and that the private companies did not bring in any substantial financial and managerial expertise. Governance shortcomings escalated in that PPP provided a new means through which the power of the central government and rent-seeking private individuals is exercised. The local government failed to separate the principal and agent, which created conflicts of interest. Contract discipline enforcement and monitoring of contract terms, competition, and local government capacity were poorly developed, hence, the disappointing results. They conclude that private involvement is not the solution to poor service delivery and high costs, but the problem is the inability of the Local Government to become smart actors able to regulate, monitor and facilitate new ways of solving public problems.

2.8 Research Gap

According to Müller-Bloch and Kranz (2015), a *research gap* arises whenever a systematic reviewer's ability to draw conclusions is limited. According to them, a research gap holds a function as a starting point for research. A research gap can arise from of, a knowledge gap, theoretical gap, and geographical gap. In this research, a brief review of the empirical studies helped to identify the research gaps that were used to generate the research question and research objectives.

Mkoga (2013) conducted research on the "*Impact of Public-Private Partnership on Quality Education of Secondary Schools in Tanzania*". He found out that, Public private partnership contributed to improving education quality through expansion of student access to schooling. According to him, PPPs helped in delivering education to low-income families, financing school inputs and building school infrastructures and higher academic achievement. However, he did not come up with a clear statement of the types of PPP contracts he studied and he did not mention any school that was run on the basis of PPPs. A knowledge research gap arose from the need to find out the nature of PPP contracts implemented in the education sector in Tanzania. Mkoga (2013) used a sample that drew 50 participants, and it included academic teachers, school owners, school managers in private secondary schools and governmental officials at Bagamoyo district. The researcher employed a randomly and purposive sampling. The randomness of the sample presents a challenge that there some respondents might not have had the relevant information concerning the subject of PPPs and such responses might mislead the results. That is why under this research, mixed methods research with a bigger sample of 95 respondents. The sample was obtained using non-probabilistic sampling

technique was drawn from members of both public and private institutions with more hands-on experiences in working with PPPs projects. Mkoga (2013) justified of the choice of Bagamoyo district because it had many private schools, which might have contributed to conclusion that the good performance of private schools is synonymous with PPPs. It remained to be concluded whether the presence of private schools means the presence of PPPs. That is why a knowledge research gap grew to determine the type of PPP contracts and models in the education sector in Tanzania.

Kamando (2014) conducted a qualitative study entitled “*Government-Community Partnership in the Provision of Education in Rural Tanzania*”. The central purpose of her study was to explore *Government-Community Partnership* (GCP) in the provision of education in rural communities in Tanzania. Her study involved 113 participants from two districts of Mwanga and Manyoni. She concluded that there were weaknesses in the building of the network ties and there was an urgent need for the government to review the power structure based on transparency and mutual trust. She highlighted the power imbalance between government agencies and the communities.

The problems associated with the practice of GCP in education and community development in rural communities are systemic and associated with a system in which power is disproportionately distributed among the GCP actors. She saw an urgent need to establish the legal framework guiding the partnerships between the government and the rural communities. Based on the recommendations of her study, a geographical research gap arose that there was a need to shift the attention to more urban settings and near the seat of government where the major actors in the public private dialogue are

located. The need to conduct research into the institutions affecting the designing of PPPs emanated from her second recommendation for further study that another picture of GCP should be painted by working with urban communities instead of focusing on the nature of GCP working in rural communities.

That is why this study was conducted in more urban areas of Dar-es-Salaam, Pwani and Dodoma regions to provide a contrast of the views and perceptions of the stakeholders towards the nature of institutional framework affecting the designing of PPPs in the education sector. This empirical study into the Government-Community partnerships by Kamando (2014) inspired the second objective of the need to find out the institutions that influence the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania.

Omari (2014) conducted research with the title; *“The Predicament of the Public – Private – Partnership in Education in Tanzania”*. While using a qualitative data collection method of documentary review, he found out that in many countries, Tanzania not an exception, the relationship inside the PPPs is unfriendly, hostile and antagonistic. He studied the changing education institutional framework in Tanzania and came up with impressive findings on colonial laws and ordinances stretching all the way from the 1927 education ordinance that legitimised racially segregated schools; the 1969 Education Act which saw the nationalisation of all schools including those that were run on a PPP basis; the state further consolidated its hold on the education system by passing the Education Act No. 25 of 1978 in which major elite and church schools were nationalised and this marked the end of PPPs in education in Tanzania. However according to Omari (2014), the government resurrected the idea of re-engaging with the

private sector under a new policy regime started under the Strategy of economic Recovery Programme in 1986, and later the Education and Training Policy of 1985. It is now a long time since Omari (2014) conducted and concluded his research in 2014, more national policies on PPPs have been introduced and in the education sector in particular. Therefore, following the findings of Omari's research, there a knowledge research gap arose from the need to investigate the impact of the new legislations and public investment policies on PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania. Unlike Omari (2014), the primary data in this research was collected in form of interviews with the leaders of the Faith Based Organisations, and leading public and private sector officials. This mixed methods approach, sought to investigate the effects of changes in the legal and institutional framework on the designing of PPPs in the education sector up to the present day.

Afonso and Henne (2015) conducted research entitled, *“The potential and challenges of public-private dialogue and partnerships in Tanzania; a real-life analysis of the local investment climate project in Dodoma”*. In their mixed methods research they sought answers to the over-arching question: “How can the public-private dialogue/partnerships in Tanzania develop to improve the local business climate?” They interviewed 35 respondents, in various sectors and thereafter, they compared the interview outcomes with secondary data. The area of their study was in Dodoma region but mainly focusing on the local government administration institutions, with the interest of understanding which challenges hampered the public private dialogue. They found out that in Tanzania the civil society is hardly involved in the PPP efforts, which created a major challenge.

They recommended that it was important to first establish a PPD as a pre-stage for the PPPs because a PPD should serve as a control organ, before adopting PPPs. They concluded that PPPs face many institutional challenges and can easily be abandoned before huge amounts of resources are dedicated to such projects. Based on their findings and conclusions, a knowledge research gap arose from the need to find out whether the challenges faced by the partnerships at the rural community level are similar to the challenges at the national institutional level. Therefore, under this research there was need to go back to Dodoma, but also go to urban setting in Dar-es-Salaam and Pwani regions to not only find the opinions of both the public and private sector stakeholders but also the challenges faced in the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania. The need to find out the views of both the public and private sector stakeholders' challenges faced in designing PPPs in the education sector inspired the fourth research objective.

2.9 The Conceptual Framework

According to Dixon, Gulliver and Gibbon, (2001) a conceptual framework shows the series of actions that the researcher envisages to carry out during a given study. It is arranged in a logical structure that provides a picture or visual illustration of how ideas in a study relate to one another. Under this study, the conceptual framework is used to explain how the research problem was explored and it is used to present an integrated method of looking at a problem under study (Grant, & Osanloo, 2014; Liehr, & Smith, 1999).




Figure 2.14: The Conceptual Framework

This Mixed Methods Approach, study primarily, used theory as a conceptual tool in making sense of a complex relationship between the institutional factors and the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania. The conceptual framework in Figure 2.10 presents an own - constructed model in which the researcher shows an integrated way of focussing on the research problem by addressing research objectives that arise from the research questions. The conceptual framework is a graphical illustration of the relationship between the independent variables including the formal and informal institutional framework and the dependent variables of designing of PPPs in the education sector. In the end, the conceptual framework is used to show how improvements in the designing of PPPs in the education sector can be made (Camp, 2001; Imenda, 2014; Grant, & Osanloo, 2014; Kraft, & Scott, 2008; Liehr, & Smith, 1999).

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter describes how this study was conducted and the research techniques that were adapted when collecting the relevant information on the research topic and shows how the data were analysed (Denzin, & Lincoln, 1994; Guba, & Lincoln, 1994). The chapter explains how the subsections of the study are organized including; research paradigm (theory), research design, research approach, research variables, research strategy, research timeline, research ethics, the area of the study, the population of the study, sampling techniques, research instruments, and data collection procedures and data analysis. This chapter describes the procedures that were employed to determine where, how, and from whom data were collected and analysed.

3.2 The Research Paradigm

Peshkin (1993) described a research paradigm as a shared world or a set of assumptions on understanding reality and it includes the methodology, elements of an ontology, and epistemology. Kuhn (1962) first used the word paradigm to mean a philosophical way of thinking. Also, Guba and Lincoln (1994) defined a research paradigm as an overall conceptual framework within which a researcher may work, that is, a paradigm can be regarded as the basic belief system or worldview that guides the investigator.

Mackenzie and Knipe (2006) defined research paradigm as a term used to describe a researcher's 'worldview'. This study was built upon the interpretive and constructivism paradigm to generate knowledge and understanding of the world from subjective

experiences of individuals working with the PPPs in general but in the education sector in particular. The philosophical rationale for this study necessitated the adoption of the mixing of qualitative and quantitative models of research into a single study of pragmatism.

3.2.1 Interpretive Research Paradigm

Based on the above definitions, the research paradigm guiding this study adopted an inter-subjective epistemology and the ontological belief to prove that the reality around the influence of institutional factors on the designing of PPPs in the education sector is in several respects socially constructed. The social construction explores the value that the population of interest, for example the value that stakeholders attach to collaboration, and interaction between the public and private sectors. Also, social construction explores the value and meaning attached to institutions both formal and informal, and the associations made between these variables. The research problem and objectives create the need to determine the meanings of phenomena from the standpoints of stakeholders (Kuhn, 1962; McMillan, 2000; Stake, 1994). Some variables under review are culturally derived and historically situated in the development of not only the PPPs in Tanzania, but the co-existence of both the public and the private sector.

Under this interpretive research paradigm, every effort was spent to understand the viewpoint of the subject being studied that is, the stakeholders in the PPP sector in Tanzania, instead of the viewpoint of the researcher. This paradigm is also referred to as the *Constructivist Paradigm* because it puts emphasis on the understanding individuals placed on what PPPs are and what the respondents perceived to be the

associated policies and relevant institutions. Hence, the key element of this interpretivist paradigm is that reality is socially constructed (Bogdan & Biklen, 1998; Strauss, & Corbin, 1990). In this paradigm, the theory does not precede research but follows it so that it is grounded on the data generated by the research its self. Interpretivism is closely related to *Constructivism* in a way that it addresses essential features of shared meaning and understanding, whereas constructivism extends this concern with knowledge as produced and interpreted (Punch, 2005; Chalmers, Manley & Wasserman, 2005).

In the context of this study, individuals that are, the major stakeholders in PPP projects in education constructed their knowledge within the social-cultural context influenced by their prior knowledge of PPPs and understanding that is why this research was placed within the parameters of a constructivist epistemological discourse. Constructivism is based on the argument that the world is “constructed” by people and that these constructions should be the driving forces investigated in social science research (Sobh, & Perry, 2006). Similarly, institutional factors in terms of laws, policies and beliefs are also a social construction. That is why such institutions vary from one community and country, to another. Constructivism is the recognition that reality is a product of human intelligence interacting with experience in the real world. Elkind (2004) stressed that the acceptance of constructivism is when human mental activity is included in the process of knowing reality.

Lester (1999) argues that the phenomenological nature of the research paradigm is concerned with the study of experience from the perspective of the individual, ‘bracketing’ taken-for-granted assumptions, and usual ways of perceiving. Epistemologically, phenomenological issues are based on a paradigm of personal

knowledge and subjectivity and emphasise the importance of personal perspective and interpretation (Guba, & Lincoln, 1994; Peshkin, 1993; Mackenzie, & Knipe, 2006; Morgan, 2007). As such, this research into the influence of the institutional factors on the designing of PPPs in the education in Tanzania exploited phenomenology to build a powerful research design as to gain an insight into understanding the subjective experience, gaining insights into people's motivations and actions, and cutting through the clutter of taken-for-granted assumptions and conventional wisdom, regarding the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania.

3.3 Mixed Methods Research Approach

Mixed methods research is a philosophically underpinned model of inquiry combining qualitative and quantitative models of research. The Mixed Methods Approach involved both qualitative and quantitative approaches to answer at least one research question. In this regard, research questions one, two and four were addressed using a qualitative research inquiry, while research question 3 sought to find a association between the changes in institutional factors and the designing of PPPs, hence a more quantitative approach was applied. The pragmatic philosophy underpinning this study allowed for a systematic application of appropriate qualitative and quantitative methods to address each question (Guba & Lincoln 1994; Peshkin, 1993; Mackenzie, & Knipe, 2006; Morgan, 2007).

Therefore, the results of the mixed methods research provided knowledge in a more meaningful manner than either model could achieve alone (Creswell, 2007; Shah, & Corley, 2006). This Mixed Methods Approach to inquiry was most suited for addressing the research aims of this study, because it collected both descriptive and exploratory

data, which was relevant to the qualitative methodology of this study. The data obtained enabled the discovery of the motives and desires of the population studied (Creswell, 2013; Mouton, 1996). The overall goal of mixed methods research, when combining qualitative and quantitative research components, was to expand and strengthen a study's conclusions and, therefore, contribute to the published literature.

While employing the Mixed Methods Approach, priority was given to the qualitative principles of; *Trustworthiness*, *Credibility*, *Transferability*, *Conformability*, and *Authenticity* (Bryman, 2001; Cohen et al., 2000; Corbetta, 2003; Shah, & Corley, 2006). The qualitative part of this mixed methods research as research that focused on the interpretation of phenomena in their natural settings to make sense in terms of the meanings people bring to these settings (Denzin & Lincoln 1994). While using qualitative methods of the mixed methods, data were collected on personal experiences, introspection, stories about life, interviews, observations, interactions and visual texts, which are significant to people's life. The qualitative part of the mixed research approach provided a comprehensive interpretation of concepts, constructs, and opportunities, which brought the research closer to "reality" – ontology. The quantitative part of the mixed methods helped the researcher make statistical inferences based on the data collected and descriptively analysed.

3.4 The Concurrent Triangulation and Case Study Research Designs

As part of a mixed method co- relational study, a concurrent Triangulation research design was used to increase understanding of the phenomenon of designing PPPs in general but the education sector in particular. The concurrent design, executed both components simultaneously, (QUAL + quan) with the qualitative study as the primary

component, while the quantitative study as supplemental (Morse 1991; Shah & Corley, 2006). This study utilized a concurrent triangulation research design, and a case study design (Creswell et al., 2003; Herriott, & Firestone, 1983; Yin, 2009).

A Mixed Methods Approach (QUAL + quan) was used, indicating that some quantitative data were collected to add meaning, although the study was mainly qualitatively focused on exploring views, attitudes, and perceptions of the stakeholders towards the institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector. In that regard, qualitative and quantitative methods were employed and data from both sources were collected concurrently (Morse, 2003). As shown in Figure 3.1, data were analysed separately and then integrated for interpretation (Creswell et al., 2003; Denzin, & Lincoln 1994; Shah, & Corley, 2006).

The qualitative data obtained mainly from interviews were confirmed and strengthened by quantitative data that were used to give the statistical inferences on the same topic (Denzin, & Lincoln, 1994; Morse, 2003). Figure 3.1 is modified from Creswell et al. (2003) and is used to illustrate how corroborating the evidence provided by triangulation in the classic sense of the term. Figure 3.1 shows how the data collected by the dominant research method i.e., quantitative are supported by the evidence obtained from the data collected using the qualitative method. Triangulation using mixed methods research helps increase the validity of the study (Greene, et al., 1989; Shah & Corley, 2006).

Additional benefits of Mixed Methods Research include the reduction in method and researcher bias accomplished using two independent methods to measure the same

construct. To achieve the purposes of a triangulation study, both methods were implemented simultaneously (Greene, et al., 1989). For this reason, Creswell (2007) classified such studies as “*Concurrent Triangulation Designs*” where data analysis is conducted concurrently or separately and the results were integrated for interpretation. Under this concurrent triangulation research design (Figure, 3.1), the researcher not only collected and tabulated data but also obtained facts about the current state of the PPP contracts in education using quantitative data to make cross-comparisons and establish relationships between the changes in the policy framework and the designing of PPPs in the education sector. While using this descriptive research design, the meaning was assigned on the understanding of Partnerships, and interactions between the public and private sectors. According to Moffatt (2015), it is imperative and logical to incorporate the design features into the broad theoretical perspectives, so as to assess the quality of the research study.




Figure 3.1: Triangulation of Findings using Mixed Methods Research

The qualitative part of the mixed methods research sought to obtain answers to the basic questions of “*who*”, “*what*”, “*when*” and “*where*” while the quantitative part of the mixed method sought to address questions regarding “*why*” and “*how*” because such questions aim at finding out the causal relationships. Therefore, this mixed methods research was based on both unstructured and semi-structured approach to understanding the perceptions, experiences, and perspectives of the partners and the stakeholders by exploring the meaning and expectations; they give to Public-Private Partnerships.

According to Moffatt (2015), selecting a good research design is critical and relevant in guiding the plan, structure, and strategic build-up of the research, and it was relevant in obtaining the relevant answers to the research questions. The concurrent research design affected the overall significance of the research findings; the type of statistical analysis used and was useful in arriving drawing conclusions. Under this Mixed Methods Design research paid special attention to finding out the existing relationships between the public and private sector in education; the prevailing practices; beliefs, views, or attitudes; on-going processes; or developing trends (Jackson, 2009).

This research was neither intended to make accurate predictions, nor to manipulate variables determine the cause-effect relationship, but the quantitative nature of the mixed research methods was used to establish the influence of institutional factors and the designing of PPPs. This research was used to take a snapshot of the existing situation as far as the influence of the institutions on the designing of PPPs in the education sector is concerned. The descriptive nature of qualitative research helped to the state of affairs

as they were and the researcher had no control over the variables, that is, nothing was manipulated (Catherine, 2000; Hale, 2012; Moffatt, 2015).

3.4.1 Rationale for the Concurrent Triangulation Research Design

The empirical studies, especially in Tanzania, show that there was limited evidence that PPPs in the education sector have been given enough attention in the post SAPs era of the late 1980s and 90s. The use of this research design, supported the need for more explorative qualitative work aimed at describing unknown phenomena, especially in unique contextual settings where there has been a serious increase in voices calling for the reduction in the governments' control over education (Ngowi, 2005; Omari, 2014). Concurrent triangulation was advantageous in a way that it was possible to save time and resources. It was possible to obtain more clarity on some issues when the same respondents took part in both the interviews and answering questionnaires. Otherwise going back to the same department after a given period, some of the officers might have been transferred or have a tight schedule to attend to the research. Also, the need to identify significant relationships between the views of the public and private sector respondents supported the use of quantitative methods. The concurrent and case study design allowed for the rich conceptualisation of the influence of institutional factors on the designing of PPPs in the education sector in the context of SAPs (Hurley, 1999; Ragin, Nagel, & White, 2004; Shah & Corley, 2006).

3.4.2 Rationale for the Case Study Design

According to Yin (1994), a case study is an empirical inquiry, which investigates a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are unclear and during which multiple sources of evidence are

used. Moffat (2015) adds to the definition of a case study as a form of mixed descriptive research focussing on a small group of participants, or the group as a whole.

The case studied in this research attempted to derive constructs from the field by an in-depth examination of the institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania. The research strategy adopted was a case study aimed at creating an understanding of the different institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania.

The definition of a case study has been, and still is, debated among researchers, however, it is safe to agree with Gerring (2007) that, it is an intensive study of a single unit or a small number of units -the cases, to understand a larger class of similar units - the population of cases). The case study in this research sought to study not one unit but many smaller units including four public sector departments and three private sector organisations. The rationale for using a case study strategy in the research was that it provided additional information on the extent of the institutions in the designing process of PPP in general but the education sector in Tanzania in particular.

The case study strategy facilitated the conduct of a purposeful sampling of public and private institutions. The case study method provided an opportunity to verify the data collected from various sources, which helped to gain access to files and reports from the relevant organisations under scrutiny. Yin (2003) stressed the importance of documents in any data collection plan because they play an explicit role when using case studies and a systematic search. In this mixed methods research, case studies were suitable in determining the cause-effect relationship between variables; however, they were of limited use for making generalisation because of a limited sample size. Case

studies allowed for the deployment of multiple data collection methods such as questionnaires, interviews, documentary reviews, and direct participant observations.

A multiple case design is appropriate when a researcher is keen to use more than one case to gather data and draw up a conclusion based on the facts retrieved. A multiple case design serves to confirm evidence, which enhances the reliability and validity of the research work. (Figure 3.2) provides a simplified graphical summary of the typical sequence used in a case study, which was a major guide during the data collection process (Yin, 1994).

In this research into the institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector, multiple cases were studied including respondents from both the public and private sectors the data were linked and later interpreted. Under this research, serious attempts were made to make the case study relevance, by ensuring that the knowledge it generates applies also to other cases than its own.




Figure 3.2: Sequence of Case Study Method

Just like all other methods, the choice of the case study research strategy into the institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs, in the education sector was done given the possible strengths and weaknesses, which are reviewed as follows:

First, a case study in this study was used for hypothesis-generating rather instead of hypothesis testing. This case study is exploratory by nature and because the sample is small, it is difficult to generalise the findings compared to a large, quantitative cross-case study (Catherine, 2000; Hassan, & Veeraghavan, 2000). This case study sought to generate knowledge about what policies, laws, and constraints that influence the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania. Though the sample is small, it is enough to shed light on whether institutions impede the development of PPPs in Tanzania. Second, the biggest drawback of the case study strategy was that it generated internal validity (credibility) rather than external validity (transferability). Since it included only one or a small number of cases, it suffers problems of representation. But, it's internal validity is augmented by the case of the study. Thirdly, a case study strategy does not necessarily require procedural data analysis and it is open to various interpretations of the research data because it is susceptible to bias and affect the outcome of this research.

3.4.3 Research Variables

Under this mixed methods research, given the concurrent triangulation design between qualitative and quantitative methods, it was convenient to put a dichotomous distinction between the independent and dependent variables to determine how *the institutional factors* affect *the designing of PPPs*. As earlier indicated, priority was given to the

interpretive paradigm, as a way of finding out subjective reasons and meanings that are behind the influence of the institutional framework on the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania.

3.5 Area of Study

The area of study was Tanzania because Tanzania provides the best-case scenario for the study of transitional economies involving the movement away from a centrally planned economy in the 1970s up to the end of the 1990s, and now a more “market-driven” economy (Van Arkadie, 1995). The study of the institutional factors is also a study of governance and it was suitably conducted in Tanzania because, unlike most of the other countries in the East African region, there is long-standing history in which the public and private sector live side by side, especially in the area of education.

Political stability in a hostile neighbourhood notwithstanding, Tanzania has experienced extreme changes to its macro-economic management policies and administrative framework. Such extreme changes come along with serious transformations and adjustments in the governance of the country, which affects the delivery of public services including education (Liviga, 2011; Ngowi, 2005; Van Arkadie, 1995). Therefore, as far as this study is concerned, Tanzania provides the best and convenient setting to study governance issues that come along with such institutional changes.

It was important to conduct the study in Tanzania because the development of enduring institutions requires stability consistency and certainty and that can only be found in Tanzania, which is different from the other countries in Africa and the East and Central African region. Perhaps Tanzania is the only beacon of hope for stability in a sub-region

riddled with conflict and turmoil. However, stability is necessary but might not be a sufficient condition for developing long-lasting institutions.

3.5.1 Why Dar-es-salaam, Dodoma and Pwani?

The study was focused in Dar-es-Salaam, Dodoma, and Pwani because it is virtually impossible to conduct the study in the whole country. According to the *Basic Demographic and Socio-Economic Profile Report Tanzania Mainland April* (URT, 2014), Tanzania is a vast country with 28 geopolitical administrative regions and 136 districts.

Therefore, it was necessary to scale down the area of study down Dar-es-salaam, Dodoma and Pwani. Dar-es-salaam hosts the offices of the most of the relevant offices to the research including; the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC); Tanzania National Business Council TNBC; the Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF). So any study that relates to Public-Private Partnership policies and regulations should collaborate with the main public and private sector institutions located in Dar-es-Salaam. Dodoma is the seat of government, and any study that involves policies and laws governing institutions would be incomplete without contacting the relevant ministries and government departments based in Dodoma. Both Dodoma and Dar-es-Salaam epitomise what is happening around the whole country, and the results of this qualitative study conducted can conveniently be transferred to fit into the circumstances of other towns around the country. Pwani was first chosen because it has one of the public schools earmarked as one of the schools with a long-proven record of a PPP between the government and FBO – the church.

3.6 The Population

The population that was studied varied in composition and structure, but in general the following categories, as summarised in Table 3.1, were given special attention; officers at the Ministry of Finance and Planning because it hosts the “PPP centre”; Ministry of Education Science and Technology in the Department of Planning and Policy.

Table 3.1: Summary of Sample Size and Sampling Techniques

Category	Target population	Sample size	Percentage %	Sampling technique
• Classroom teachers	70	50	71	Opportunistic
• Head/Deputy teachers	15	10	60	Opportunistic
• Academic masters	15	8	53	Snowballing
• Tanzania National Business Council (TNBC) officials	15	5	33	Purposive
• Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF) officials	15	8	53	Purposive
• Ministry of finance and planning officials	10	6	60	Purposive
• Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology - Dodoma	10	6	60	Purposive
• Tanzania Managers and Owners of Non-Government Schools and Colleges (TAMONGOSCO)	5	2	40	Purposive
Total	160	95		

3.7 The Research Sample

According to the Presidential Circular number 1 of 2001- URT (2001), therefore, officers at the TNBC were contacted because they are in charge of the Public-Private Dialogue; equally, important were the officers at TPSF because they are a leading platform to promote investment projects between the government and private sectors. Also, contacted were the Managers and Heads of FBO aided schools, Heads of local

and international NGOs involved in education Public-Private Partnerships (URT, 2009). Each identified group of the population gave information and shared experiences about the Public-Private Partnerships and their perceptions on the influence of the institutional factors on the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania.

A sample of individuals was selected in the anticipation that the sample is representative of the population, instead of collecting information from all its members, especially when the population was considered to be large. Table 3.2 provides the summary of the respondents by sector and organisation. A total of (N = 95, 100%) respondents participated in the study including 88 that responded to questionnaires (N = 95, 83.6%), while 25 respondents were interviewed (N = 95, 23.8%), and 11 respondents that were both interviewed and answered questionnaires (N = 95, 12%). Special focus was put on public-sector officials from 4 public ministries and departments. Also, the sample included officials from 2 private sector organizations, Head teachers and managers from 8 Secondary schools and secondary school teachers from 8 secondary schools both public and private.

Table 3.2: The Study Sample

	No. of organizations Institutions		Respondents Interviewed	Answered questionnaires
Public sector	Public Ministries	2	7	10
	Departments	2	2	10
	Public schools	2	7	15
Private sector	Organisations	2	2	23
	NGOs	1	2	2
	Private schools	6	4	28
Total	Total (N = 15, 100%)		25 (N=95, 23.8%)	88 (N=95, 83.6%)

Source: Field Data (2019)

When taking a sample, the following questions were confronted: What is the group of people from which the sample would be drawn; how many people were needed in the sample; how would these people be selected?

3.7.1 Sampling Techniques

The research Mixed research approach led to the non-probabilistic search for participants in the research sample by using the following sampling techniques; *Purposive*, *Snowballing*, and *Opportunistic* (Sobh, & Perry, 2006).

3.7.2 Purposive sampling

Purposive sampling is also referred to as a *judgmental* or *expert sample*. *The main objective of this* type of non-probability sampling technique was to produce a sample with respondents that were carefully selected non-randomly. Purposive sampling helped to obtain 27 respondents that had the relevant to the subject being studied (Sobh, & Perry, 2006; Mark, Warren, Francine, John, Tanya, Alison, Nick, Paul, & Karen, 1997). Purposive sampling gave the researcher a significant control over which individuals, organisations and institutions to be included in the research sample. In addition, it allowed the researcher, without prejudice, to actively direct and guide the research into the institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania.

The research purposively sampled officers at the PPP centre under the Ministry of Finance and Planning. These officers added valuable knowledge and experiences to the research especially so because the PPP act of 2017 places the PPP centre in charge of all PPP contracts in the whole country. Similarly, the research purposely sampled the

leaders of the three (3) Faith-Based Organisation Secondary Schools in Dar-es-Salaam and Pwani regions in Tanzania. According to the National PPP policy document URT (2009) these secondary schools are a success story for the implementation of PPP projects worth emulating. It was considered that with such a vast experience spanning over 40 years, when purposively sampled, they greatly enriched the information obtained from the research tools.

Furthermore, the leaders of TAMONGOSCO (Tanzania Managers and Owners of Non-Government Schools and Colleges) were purposely sampled because according to Omari (2014) were considered important stakeholders in the PPP in the education sector. TAMONGOSCO has been an important interface between the public and public sectors in providing education services. Respondents from TAMONGOSCO greatly enriched the quality of the data when addressing the research questions.

During the data collection process, the research purposively sampled the leading public-private sector intermediaries of Tanzania National Business council and the Tanzania Private sector foundation. Much as the two institutions are distinctive, one is a public sector institution, while the other is private; there is a close interface and sometimes overlapping roles of the two institutions as they bridge the gap between the public and private sectors. The two institutions were purposively sampled because they are the only active interface between the public and private sector.

According to the *Presidential Circular number "1" of 2001* (URT, 2001), TNBC was established with the mandate of bridging the investment gap between the public and the private sectors by supporting the Public-Private sector Dialogue. Therefore, any inquiry

into the designing of PPPs in general and in the education sector in particular should, as of necessity, start or actively involve the two main organs with the constitutional mandate to organise and coordinate a Public Private Dialogue in Tanzania.

Criticism has been raised against the use of the purposeful sampling technique that the selection process is subjective and might lead to biased responses. However, under this research, great care was taken of not being judgmental. The literature review and background study helped identify the leading institutions that were relevant to the study. Also, the questioning was highly objective to the extent that no questions regarding the independence of the respondents were be raised, hence seriously boosting the validity of the results. Criticisms notwithstanding, purposive sampling under this study yielded a manageable amount of data that was easier to analyse and helped in identifying important themes.

3.7.3 Snowballing

Snowball sampling, is a non-probability method also known as *chain referral sampling*. Through this sampling method/technique 8 respondents were contacted (Table, 3.2). This method of sampling was used to locate the difficult to find a segment of the study population especially the relevant public – private intermediaries (Heckathorn, 2002). The qualitative nature of this mixed method approach was aimed at generating knowledge. It was difficult to find suitable respondents, especially in the area of PPPs scattered and hidden from plain view. In this study, the researcher used solicitation of referrals to other potentially eligible respondents. That was believed to have relevant information, and experiences about PPPs not only in the education sector but even in other areas.

According to the PPP regulations act 2014 (URT, 2014) the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) was charged with housing and coordinating the PPP Unit. It was the first institution contacted for information, unfortunately, it was learnt that it had been transferred to the Prime ministers' office in Dodoma. After obtaining some valuable information relevant to the study, the researcher solicited for the contacts of the relevant officers at the PPP centre that were provided. The researcher contacted the Prime Minister's office the investment division who provided quality information in terms of experiences and opinions on the subject under review and later recommended to the researcher to go to the Ministry of Finance and Planning PPP division for more information.

The snowballing process of building a sample continued until when the researcher contacted the *Procurement Department* under The Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology. The researcher contacted this department with the assumption that they had information concerning any public sector expenditure. The information sought for was scanty and after solicitation, the researcher was recommended to contact the education commissioner's office under the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology. The Snowballing sampling was useful because the sampling frame was available and the respondents were equipped with most of the answers to the research questions (Gummesson, 2000; Mark et al., 1997; Merriam, 1988; Patton, 1990).

Snowballing was good for the research because while in Dodoma most of the respondents were in a close-knit group of people operating in the same area. Snowballing was also important because the respondents had developed a network of

individuals that had the right experiences. Through this sampling technique, other people with relevant experiences were contacted to enrich this research with their experiences. This sampling technique revealed and unveiled important insights, into the research questions. This referral process continued until an acceptable number of eligible respondents was located.

3.7.4 Opportunistic Sampling

Opportunistic sampling is also known as *incidental, accidental, grab, convenient sampling*. It is a type of non-probability sampling, which involves the sample being drawn from that part of the population, which is close to hand (Mark et al., 1997; Merriam, 1988). Most of the opportunistic sampling attracted 60 respondents and it occurred in offices or departments where no particular individual could be purposefully sampled, but the researcher approached offices and departments where he believed that he could get the relevant respondents. Most of the respondents that were opportunistically sampled answered questionnaires. Opportunistic sampling had one outstanding advantage that the target population was readily available and convenient. However, valuable time and resources were lost during this the opportunistic sampling exercise because the information sought was scanty (Sobh, & Perry, 2006; Patton, 1990).

3.7.5 Sampling Procedures

The following set of procedures was followed when building up the sample (Mark et al., 1997; Merriam, 1988; Patton, 1990). In other words, what qualifies a person or institution to be included as a sampling unit in the study? For a public officer to be included in this study as a sample unit, he/she must have worked with at least a PPP

projector involved in a PPP dialogue in the past three years. Such a period of service was considered to be enough for the officer to have accumulated enough experience information concerning PPPs. Also, the officers that were contacted must have been pre-currently at work to give current and up-to-date information. Private School owners whose schools were engaged in some form of Partnership with the government were considered credible sample units if they meet the minimum requirements of two to three years of partnering experience with the government. Priority was given to FBO schools with more than 30 years of experience of partnership with the government (URT, 2009).

During the *first cycle*, the researcher spent 7 days in the Dodoma, the seat of the GoT, collecting data from public institution officers in the different ministries and departments purposively sampled and considered relevant to the study. During the first stage, data were mainly collected using 10 personal in depth interviews and 2 group interviews involving six (6) public sector officials in one of the central government ministries and one public school. The baseline data obtained at this stage enabled the researcher to make the necessary changes to the questionnaires to make the tool more effective in capturing more data. This stage was important in establishing a basic understanding of the PPP policy framework and conceptual issues relating to PPPs in general and in the education sector in particular. It was a hands-on experience to match theory and practise, as far as PPPs are concerned. In addition, the results of this study indicate the first-hand experience from various government departments in action, especially as they are settling down into their new offices following the policy of the GoT transferring to Dodoma capital city.

The *second cycle* of data collection was conducted mainly in the Dar-es-Salaam and Pwani regions of Tanzania. Data were collected from four (4) institutions/organisations. 8 in-depth personnel interviews were conducted while 2 personal interviews were conducted via telephone. Data from questionnaires from heads of schools and secondary school teachers, whose experiences in teaching and previous contact with government agencies, both at the national and local government levels provided valuable data.

3.8 Data Collection Methods in the Study

The purpose of data collection was to obtain information to keep on record, to make decisions about important issues, and to pass the information on to others. Data were collected primarily to provide information regarding the influence of the institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector (Gummesson, 2000; Mark et al., 1997; Merriam, 1988; Patton, 1990). Data collection occurred early in the development of a project, and was formalised through a data collection plan, which had the following activities; Pre-collection activity - agree on goals, target data, definitions, methods; data collection and presenting the findings, involved sorting and analysis.

The data were collected and it was useful in drawing inferences and conclusions of the study. Furthermore, depending on the plans and time frame, and choice was made to start with documentary analysis interviews, and then questionnaire. The data-collection procedure included: the discussion of the tools; the discussion of how to manage data collection tools and how the data collection tools were employed (Gerring, 2007; Kvale, 1996; Punch, 2005). The data collection tools included questionnaires and interviews,

which were used to bring about a deeper understanding of the context of the institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania.

3.8.1 Questionnaires

The basic questionnaire method involved providing respondents with a printed list of questions to be answered (Mark et al., 1997). The questionnaire method involves pre-printed questions that are supplied to the research sample. Questionnaires were useful in structuring and finding a common measurement to the respondents' answers, some of which were *random* and *unstructured* during the interview sessions. The information collected was checked against the data collected from the field by another method, which enabled the researcher to design data collection data and collection strategies. Also, the questionnaire enabled distant respondents to take part in the research, which makes the findings of the research more representative. Questionnaires were used to collect the quantitative data relating to the third research objective that aimed at finding out cause - effect relationship between the changes in the institutional framework, and the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania.

3.8.2 Questionnaire Return Rate

The researcher managed to collect 88 questionnaires out of the expected 126, which represents 70% of the questionnaire research instruments distributed in the target population sample. Mulusa (1990) says that a 50% return rate is adequate, 60%, and 70% excellent. The return rate was hence considered adequate to provide the required information for data analysis.

3.8.3 Administration of Questionnaires

Supervised questionnaires were useful especially in the interest of maximising the benefit from the purposive research sample frame; the researcher delivered the questionnaires personally to the respondents whose experiences and views towards inequality greatly contributed to the enrichment of the research process (Creswell, 2013; Gerring, 2007; Mark et al., 1997). While the *Semi-supervised*; where used and were delivered to the sample units but given time to think, read, complete the questions, and later collected for analysis.

3.8.4 Closed-ended Questionnaire

Closed-ended questions include all possible answers and prewritten response categories, and respondents were asked to choose among them. For example, multiple-choice questions, scale questions (Creswell, 2013; Gerring, 2007; Mark et al., 1997). Closed-ended questions were used in this research because they attracted the attitudes of the stakeholders in PPPs by providing them with a set of 6-step likert scales ranging from example “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. As these follow a set format, and most responses are easier to enter into a computer for easier analysis, greater numbers can be distributed.

3.8.5 Open-ended Questionnaire

Open-ended questions were integrated with other forms of questions in the questionnaire. Such questions allowed respondents to answer in their own words (Creswell, 2013; Gerring, 2007). This type of questionnaire does not contain boxes to tick but instead leaves a blank section for the response to write in an answer. Commonly

solicited data in open-ended questions include opinions of respondents on a certain issue; reasons for certain behaviour; and descriptions of certain procedures, practices or perceptions with which the researcher is not familiar.

3.8.6 The Combination of both Closed-ended and Open-ended

The use of both close ended and open-ended questionnaires began with a series of closed-ended questions, with boxes to tick or scales to rank, and then finish with a section of open-ended questions with a more detailed response as summarized in Table 3.3. According to Siniscalco and Auriat (2005), a questionnaire is said to be standardised when each respondent is exposed to the same questions and the same system of coding responses is used. Under this research, steps were taken to ensure consistency when respondents were given the same questions. The consistency in asking questions provided the researcher with a common standard of interpretation.

Table 3.3: Types of Qualitative Research Questions

The type of research question		Examples
Qualitative research question (exploratory)	Ontological research question (Capturing participants realities)	What is the nature of? What are the lived experiences of...? What is it like being ...?
	Epistemological research question (understanding phenomenon)	How does ...? What does it mean...? What factors influence...?

Source: Saldaña (2013)

In addition, this made the results of the research more reliable because a common standard limited the subjectivity not only in asking the questions but also in the interpretation. However, extreme care was taken to ensure that the intended respondents were the ones that answered the questions. Also, the researcher granted

ample autonomy to guarantee participant anonymity. The lack of interaction that is common with the self-administered questionnaires was complemented with the use of interviews to capture more views and experiences of the respondents.

3.8.7 Interviews

Under this study, interviews were used as one of the tools to collect data and to gain knowledge from individuals. 25 respondents were interviewed and the interviews conducted under this research were designed to meet the objectives of the research objectives that sought for qualitative data (Creswell, 2013; Gerring, 2007; Kvale, 1996). Interviews were not only used to collect data but were useful in gaining knowledge from respondents. The respondents were presented with oral-verbal stimuli to which they supplied suitable oral verbal responses. Kvale (1996) regarded interviewing as “an interchange of views between two or more people on a topic of mutual interest. He advocated the use of interviews because they are central in human interaction for knowledge production”.

Under this research, interviewing was conducted in the most rigorous way possible to ensure *reliability* and *validity* (trustworthiness). In practical terms, during this research the interviewing methodology was used to make the research: *Reproducible*, that is, someone else could use the same topic guide to generate similar information; *Systematic*, to ensure that it is not merely a matter of picking interviewees or data that support our pre-existing ideas about the answers; *Credible*, the questions asked, for instance, and how they are asked were reasonable ones for generating valid (or ‘truthful’) accounts of the respondents’ experiences with PPPs. *Transparent*, questions

were asked in a manner that allowed the respondents to relate and respond to the data collected in the earlier cycles and rounds (Punch, 2005; Marshall & Rossman, 2010; Sobh, & Perry, 2006). Different types of interviews were conducted, including; Structured interviews - to maximise validity and trustworthiness; Semi-structured interviews - to ensure reliability and transferability; unstructured interviews - to ensure flexibility and conformability; non-directive interview - to ensure authenticity.

3.8.8 In-depth Personnel Interviews

These interviews are also referred to as qualitative or unstructured and they are less structured than semi-structured ones. This type of interview is used to explore in detail the respondent's own perceptions and accounts (Gummesson, 2000; Mark et al., 1997; Marshall, & Rossman, 2010). 25 respondents were interviewed, and the tool was suitable for collecting qualitative data that was mainly addressing research question 1, 2 and 4. It was important to gain an in-depth understanding. The interviewer used simple opening questions such as 'Tell me what you know about PPPs'. In-depth interviews were found to be flexible and were used to collect a large amount of information, especially when the respondents helped to clarify on the follow-up questions (Patton, 1990; Punch, 2005).

In-depth interviews were used to explore, and probe subtle issues especially relating to the perceptions of the PPP stakeholders towards the challenges facing the designing of PPPs as indicated in research objective 4. Personal interviews were advantageous in a way that they provided quick feedback as compared to written questionnaires. However, organising the personal interviews was a challenge because some of the purposively

sampled respondents had tight schedules to the extent that the appointments had to be rescheduled on a number of occasions. One of the purposively sampled respondents had travelled and the interview was conducted over the mobile phone. This denied the researcher the convenience of talking face to face, however this never diminished the quality of the information obtained from the interview scheduled questionnaire.

3.8.9 Group Interviewing

Group interviews were used for generating information on collective views, and the meanings that lie behind those views. Group interviews just like the personal interviews collected qualitative data that was mainly addressing research objective 1, 2 and 4. The qualitative data collected was useful in generating a rich understanding of participants' experiences and beliefs (Sobh, & Perry, 2006; Steward, & Shamdasani, 1990). Group interviews were conducted involving two sets of respondents representing different case studies. One group interview involved 3 public sector officers in the Ministry of Finance and Planning in Dodoma and the second group interview involved 3 secondary school teachers from an FBO aided school in Dar-es-salaam region. There was a slight delay in the beginning of the interviews because it was not easy to accommodate the time of the interviews in the normal office schedule. Nonetheless, it was possible to put the respondents together and everything else moved as highlighted in the interview schedule.

The researcher started with a broad question before moving onto the more specific issues relating to the institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania. The systematic approach encouraged an open and easy

discussion, which brought out true feelings and thoughts of the respondents. At the same time, the interviewer focused on the discussion, which was similarly used during the group interview involving three officials at a government ministry at Dodoma.

The study of the institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector involved the use of interviews because they are easier for respondents, especially because the information sought was mainly the respondents' opinions or impressions. In the middle of scanty information interviews provided greater flexibility, especially when the respondents were allowed to restructure questions especially in the case of unstructured interviews (Steward, & Shamdasani, 1990). Unlike the close-ended questionnaires, the use of interviews was useful in controlling the samples, which made it easier to check for any missing basic information as far as the research questions were concerned.

Caution was taken when conducting interviews on the questions relating to the costs involved in terms of facilitating the meetings, because such information can be confidential. Also, care was taken to avoid interviewer bias because the information sought was private and some of it like *rents obtained from running PPPs*. Such information could only be obtained through a carefully organised and conducted interview. Furthermore, there was a need to put a comparative spin on issues and questions by allowing unstructured interviews in which gave the respondents enough room for flexibility (Marshall, & Rossman, 2010; Punch, 2005; Steward, & Shamdasani, 1990). Nonetheless, standard questions were presented to all respondents to put a measuring scale on the responses given to come up with a more reliable outcome.

3.8.10 Document Analysis

According to Bowen (2009), document analysis is a systematic data collection procedure involving reviewing and evaluating documents. This research method was vital in obtaining qualitative data addressing the requirement of research objective 2 that sought to discover *the formal and informal institutions that influence the designing of PPPs in the education sector*. Most of this data sought for, entailed official documents whose detailed explanation could best be obtained by the study and analysis of the relevant documents. Similarly, the documentary analysis was useful in obtaining data addressing the requirements of research objective 1 that involved the search for information relating to the nature of PPPs implemented in the education sector. Previous studies involving academic journals, and PhD theses provided valuable information that spiced up the other obtained from the interviews and questionnaires.

Documentary analysis mainly focused on both printed and electronic data that provided computer-based information and material transmitted through the internet. Just like any other data collection methods used under qualitative research, document analysis was used in this research and proved to be crucial, because it enabled the researcher to obtain secondary data from original works, including; books, journals, papers, reports, theses, and official statistics in the form of documents both printed and electronic. The study of the various policy documents including the National PPP Policy (URT, 2009), information obtained from such documents was vital in eliciting meaning, gaining an understanding, and developing empirical knowledge when triangulated with other data obtained from primary sources such as questionnaires and interviews.

This research into the institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania was largely exploratory. With exploratory research the facts are scanty and one way of answering the ontological questions, especially relating to the PPP policy and regulatory framework was to conduct a documentary analysis (Connell, & Waring, 2001). The exploratory nature of the research helped structure the unstructured responses, which are typical of most phenomenological and interpretive research that is prone to subjective interpretations, hence reducing the impact of potential biases. To increase the credibility of the research, document analysis was used along with other qualitative research methods as a means of triangulation.

Documents that were mainly used in this document analysis were mainly books, journals, memoranda, government circulars (URT, 2015: URT, 2009,), and various public records, which were found in libraries, newspaper archives, and organisational or institutional files. Much as raw data collected from the study sample population in form questionnaires and interviews were the basis for data collection and analysis, the documentary analysis backed up such descriptions and interpretations. Document analysis yielded data - excerpts, quotations, or entire passages - that were organised into major themes, categories, and case examples specifically through content analysis (Labuschagne, 2003).

This study into the institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector adopted a case study design. Document analysis applied particularly to qualitative case studies involving intensive studies producing rich descriptions of a single phenomenon, event, organisation, or program (Yin, 2014). Through the

documentary analysis, it was possible to construct other research tools as questions in both the interview schedule and the questionnaires were built on what was analysed from the public documents such as laws/acts, policies, and circulars.

The research involved the study of the changes in the institutional framework for PPPs involving changes in the laws and policies. Even the most experience respondent would not provide the much-needed information to adequately satisfy the research questions. Instead, the documentary analysis provided background information as well as historical insight into the evolution of PPP policies and the changes in the regulatory mechanism. The information provided insight, which helped the researcher understand the historical roots of specific issues (Bowen, 2009; Yin, 1994). Furthermore, the documentary analysis provided a contextual understanding, which was vital during data collection, interviewing and drafting questions in the questionnaire.

It was useful to use documentary analysis in identifying contradictory and corroboratory evidence. In the circumstances where the evidence was been found to be contradictory, the researcher has made several recommendations for further study (Bowen, 2009; Yin, 2014). The documentary evidence was found to be corroboratory, and the information was convergence with earlier research work, which makes the research findings more trustworthy and credible (Itika et al.; Ngowi 2005; 2011; Omari, 2014).

3.9 Validity and Reliability

Validity refers to the degree to which a test, tool, or technique is capable of measuring what is supposed to be measured. Validity deals with the soundness and effectiveness of measurement instruments of research and to what extent the test complies with the

aims it is designed for (Golafshani, 2003; Rowley, 2002). Ensuring validity presents a practical problem, especially when dealing with qualitative research. Under this study, it was important to establish if it attained both *Internal* and *External Validity* and it was important to examine if the research measured up to the “analogous” terms of *Credibility* and *Transferability* that were proposed by Lincoln, & Guba, (1985) and summarized in Table 3.4. The credibility criterion involves establishing that the results of qualitative research are believable from the perspective of the participant in the research. Serious attempts were made to describe and come to a clear understanding of the phenomena of interest from the participant's perspective, under this mixed methods research into the institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania.

Table 3.4: Validity and Reliability in Qualitative Research

Traditional Criteria for Judging Quantitative Research	Alternative Criteria for Judging Qualitative Research
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal validity • External validity • Reliability • Objectivity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Credibility • Transferability • Dependability • Confirmability

Source: Lincoln, & Guba, (1985)

The respondents in the research sample were purposefully selected because the research greatly depends on their experiences to add credibility to the study (Golafshani, 2003; Lincoln, & Guba, 1985; Rowley, 2002). Interview questions were relevant to studying the influence of institutional factors on the designing of PPP in the education sector in Tanzania. The research objectives were used to validate the literature review. Validity concerning the research design was confirmed through the following types of validity tests as shown below:

Transferability refers to the degree to which the results of qualitative research can be generalised or transferred to other contexts or settings, and it is a challenge to qualitative research, which draws data from different sources, especially of a constructivist paradigm, like, (Golafshani, 2003; Lincoln, & Guba, 1985; Rowley, 2002). From a qualitative perspective, transferability is primarily the responsibility of the one doing the generalising. To overcome such challenges, under this research, deliberate steps were taken to enhance transferability by doing a thorough job of describing the ontological and epistemological questions related to the institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs in education in Tanzania. After which, the person who wishes to "transfer" the results to a different context is then responsible for making the judgement of how sensible the transfer is.

Reliability (Dependability) demonstrates that the operations of a study, such as the data collection produced, can be repeated with the same results (Golafshani, 2003; Rowley, 2002). It is a term that refers to data accuracy. Under the qualitative research design, the term "Dependability" as suggested by Lincoln, and Guba, (1985). Data are said to be reliable if the same process is replicated and it achieves the same result or outcome. Dependability and reliability are concerned with obtaining the same results if the same thing is observed twice. Equally, data reliability can be achieved through documentation of procedures and appropriate record keeping. For example, interviews and conversations were tape-recorded and are used to verify the authenticity of the information reported, including the manual transcriptions, when used and repeated by another researcher. To emphasise the dependability of the research outcomes, there was an elaborate account for the expected ever-changing context within which research was

conducted. Special attention was paid to changes that occurred in the settings and how these changes affected the way the research is approached. For the quantitative data based on the standardised items, the Cronbach's alpha (α) was 0.841, which is said to be good for statistical analysis (Hulin, Netemeyer, & Cudeck, 2001)

3.10 Data Analysis Methods

This research into the institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania was a mixed methods research design, which required both qualitative and quantitative data analysis methods. Qualitative tools that were analysed using thematic and content analysis. The collected data were coded and analysed according to specific objectives and research questions. Qualitative data analysis involved several closely related operations that were performed to summarise and organise the collected data, in a manner that answered the research questions (Golafshani, 2003; Ryan, & Bernard, 2000). Whereas quantitative produced nominal and non-parametric data were analysed using descriptive and inferential statistics.

3.10.1 Qualitative Data Analysis

Thematic analysis method was used for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns, themes within data. The thematic data analysis was used to put meaning to the qualitative data that were obtained mainly from the interviews and the documentary analysis. It involved recording and playing back the verbal discussions with respondents, followed by breaking the recorded information into meaningful smallest units of information, subjects and tendencies and presented them as text (Golafshani, 2003; Ryan, & Bernard, 2000).

However, coding, which is an interpretive technique that sought to obtain and organise the data, provided a means to introduce its interpretations into certain quantitative methods was done. Thematic analysis is one that looks across the data to identify the common issues that recur and identify the main themes that summarize all the views collected (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun, & Clarke, 2006). Thematic data analysis is the most common method for analysing qualitative data. Qualitative data analysis is a personal process with few rigid rules and procedures. Thematic analysis is seen as a foundational method for analysing qualitative data because such data are diverse and complex.

A thematic data analysis was chosen as the appropriate method because it facilitates a thorough examination of current developments in the field, enabling the identification of ways themes or patterns develop from qualitative data. However, great care was taken when using the thematic approach because according to (Antaki, Billig, Edwards, & Potter, 2002) the method has been criticised on the basis that it lacks clear and concise guidelines around which means that “anything goes” nonetheless it is still a preferred option given the advantages of its being flexible. Braun and Clarke (2006), recommendations were taken into consideration by identifying the main themes as the basis for the findings. These included; familiarisation with data; generating initial codes; searching for themes; reviewing themes; define, refine and naming themes; and producing reports.

3.10.2 The Thematic Data Analysis Processes

Step 1: *Read and annotate transcripts*

Step 1 is the most basic stage where the preliminary observations were made. However, an overview of the data was not provided, which was particularly useful during the first few transcripts, where the researcher was still trying to get a feel for the data.

Step 2: *Identification of the main themes*

At step 2, there was a need to carefully go through the anecdotal responses that were given by the respondents to each question to understand the *meaning* they communicated. (*‘What is going on here?’*). From these responses was possible to develop broad themes that reflect these meanings. Respondents may have used different words and language to express themselves. It is important to select the wording of the theme in a way that accurately represented the meaning of the responses categorised under a theme. These themes became the basis for analysing the text of unstructured interviews. The themes were made as abstract as possible, so that the data analysis was not limited to summarising the text, but to think of the meaning of text.

The next step was to start looking in detail at the data to identify themes in the margins of each transcript or set of notes, to note what the respondent is referring to. It is useful to number the lines, to make it easy to refer to each segment of data when coding. The main themes identified included; *the choice of the right partner under a PPP project; Conflicted Project Leadership; splendid Isolation; The Legal and Regulatory Framework; The Rocky History between the Public and Private Sectors; Lack of*

Commitment from Partners; Conflicting and Fragmented Policy framework; Conflicting objectives; PPP Funding Mechanisms; Government Control over Education; Parallel Implementation Mechanisms of PPP Policies; Uncoordinated changes in the Framework for PPPs in Education Sector; The “Strongman” Syndrome; The Social-cultural belief system.

Step 3: *Assign codes to the main themes*

The number of times a theme occurred in an interview was recorded, and then other themes from the responses to open-ended questions were also assigned codes. The identification process of the themes from the same question continued until a saturation point is reached. The themes were written and each was assigned a code, using numbers or keywords. These initial themes were gathered together to develop a *coding scheme*, which is a list of all themes and the ‘codes’ that were applied to the data. Each broad code had several sub codes (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun, & Clarke, 2006). Ryan and Bernard (2000) recommended that it is better to begin developing the coding scheme as soon as initial data have been collected. Early analysis helped shape later data collection and to determine whether the right questions being asked including; is this the right sample unit? As well as giving feedback to the respondents.

Step 4: *Classification of the responses under the main themes*

After identifying the themes, the next step was to go through the transcripts of all respondents and classify the responses under the different themes. Then codes are applied to the whole set of data, either by writing the codes on the margins of transcripts or notes or by marking the text online (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun, & Clarke, 2006; Ryan, & Bernard, 2000). At this stage, it was possible to amend the coding scheme as the data

were studied in detail. Ideally, the whole data set should be coded, which ensured that the analysis did not only concentrate on the atypical or ‘exotic’ extracts of data, but was truly a comprehensive analysis.

Step 5: *Integrate themes and responses into the text the research report.*

After identifying the responses that fall within different themes, the next step is to integrate into the text of the report. While discussing the main themes that emerged from their study, verbatim responses were used to keep the feel of the response - where appropriate. Also, there was the counting of how frequently a theme has occurred, and then provide a sample of the responses. It entirely depends upon the way the research findings were communicated to the readers Ryan and Bernard (2000).

3.10.3 Quantitative Data Analysis Methods

The SPSS software was used to test and analyse the non-parametric categorical quantitative data. The chi-square test for independence and association between the views of the public and private sector respondents was suitable in analysing the statistical inferences of the ordinal data from a six (6) scale questionnaire. The results of the quantitative analysis were useful in making the qualitative data more explicit. A six (6) scale was used and to avoid non-commitment to the choices, the neutral option was avoided. Instead, lightly disagree and lightly agree was used to give a clearer shade of opinion. The respondent had to place a tick in where the opinions and feelings deemed fit. In the scale (1= strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3=lightly disagree 4= Lightly Agree, 5= Agree and 6= Strongly Agree).

The Pearson chi-square statistic value (X^2) was used to measure the association between the views of the public and private sector officials over different hypothetical questions related to public policy, and institutions. The results of the chi-square test of association were used to show whether there was a significant association or no association between the views of the public sector respondents and the views of the private sector respondents, degrees of freedom and the sample size were used to determine the chi-square and the p value. (Degrees of freedom, N = sample size) = chi-square statistic value, p = p value). A big Chi-square statistic value ($X^2 > 10$) indicated that the views of the two sectors were very different over the hypothetical question in the likert scale, while a small Chi-square statistic value ($X^2 < 10$) indicated that the views of both sectors – public and private, were closer. The chi-square test also produced p values that were used to retain or reject the hypothetical statements provided in the likert scales.

The other quantitative data obtained from the structured questionnaires were from the “YES” (1) and “NO” (2) questions. This was analysed using the confidence intervals which were useful in showing the variability around point estimates. The confidence intervals were reported around the upper and lower limit i.e., 95% CI [upper limit, lower limit]. With a confidence interval of 95%, $p < .005$ indicated that there was a significant ground on which to reject the hypothetical question, while $p > .005$ there was not significant evidence in the data to reject the hypothetical question provided (Neyman & Pearson 1928; Trafimow, 2017).

3.11 Ethical Issues

Collecting information; any requests for information may put pressure or create anxiety on a respondent, which can raise ethical questions on the part of the participant. In this light, research is required to improve conditions. Provided any piece of research is likely to help society directly or indirectly, it was acceptable to ask questions, and all the respondents' informed consent was obtained. Any failure to justify the relevance of the research would inevitably lead to waste the respondents' time, which was considered unethical.

Seeking consent; in every discipline, it is considered unethical to collect information without the knowledge of the participant, and their expressed willingness and informed consent. Informed consent implies that subjects are made adequately aware of the type of information sought for, why the information is being sought, what purpose it would be put to, how they are expected to participate in the study, and how it would directly or indirectly affect them. The consent must be voluntary and without the pressure of any kind (Creswell, 2013; Gerring, 2007; Kvale, 1996).

Providing Incentives; the respondents participated in a study without expecting any monetary or personal rewards and selfish incentives. Instead, they realised the importance of the study and viewed their contribution as a building block towards solving an existential problem. Giving a present before data collection is unethical but it was ethical to show gratitude to respondents for sharing their experiences and information because they are giving their time;

Seeking sensitive information; certain types of information can be regarded as sensitive or confidential by some people. The researcher took serious caution in obtaining such

data because when the respondents gave such data, it was bordering on their privacy. Therefore, extreme care was taken to avoid asking questions that would upset or even embarrass the respondents.

The possibilities of causing harm to the participant; there was a need to carefully examine whether the involvement of some respondents was likely to harm them in any way. Harm includes all types of research that might include hazardous experiments, discomfort, anxiety, harassment, invasion of privacy, or demeaning or dehumanising procedures. Every effort was spent to minimise the risk of harm or discomfort, if any, it was not greater than ordinarily encountered in daily life. At most, steps were taken to prevent anxiety or harassment (Creswell, 2013; Gerring, 2007; Kvale, 1996).

Maintaining confidentiality; sharing information about a respondent with others for purposes other than research is unethical. The researcher carefully identified the study population and put the findings into context without exposing the identities of the participants. The information provided by respondents was kept anonymous because it was deemed unethical to expose the identity of individual's responses. Therefore, after the information was collected, the source could not be known.

Avoiding bias; it is considered to be unethical for the researcher to be biased. Bias is a deliberate attempt to either to hide what has been found in the study or highlight something disproportionately to its true existence (Creswell, 2013; Gerring, 2007; Kvale, 1996). The researcher witnessed conflict between public and private sector officials in terms of their views. Under such a strained relationship, all attempts were

taken to ensure an equally balanced approach not only during the data collection process, but also in the analysis and report writing.

Provision or deprivation of solutions; both the provision and deprivation of solutions/intervention may pose an ethical dilemma for the researcher. It is unethical to provide a study population with solutions that are neither effective nor beneficial. There are no simple answers to these dilemmas. Ensuring informed consent, ‘minimum risk’ and frank discussion as to the implications of participation in the study helped resolve ethical issues.

Using inappropriate research methodology: It is unethical to use a procedure knowing that it is inappropriate, for example, selecting a highly biased sample, using an invalid instrument or drawing wrong conclusions. *Incorrect reporting:* To report the findings in a way that changes or slants them to serve the researcher’s or someone else’s interest is unethical. *Inappropriate use of the information:* The use of information in a way that directly or indirectly adversely affects the respondents is unethical. If so, the study population needs to be protected. Sometimes it is possible to harm individuals in the process of achieving the aims of the research.

CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction

The data were gathered through questionnaires, interviews, secondary data documents, and telephone interviews. Pseudonyms were applied to the respondents and their places of work, so as to keep the anonymity and confidentiality of the respondents. The qualitative findings in this chapter are reported with direct extensive quotes from the participants to illustrate their points of view as one of the ways of proving the validity criterion.

4.2 Respondents' Characteristics

4.2.1 Academic qualifications

The academic qualifications of both the private or public sector officials played an important part in obtaining the required information. Based on their academic qualifications the majority of the respondents have bachelor's degree qualifications, which adds credibility to the quality of the answers, indicating that respondents understood the complexity of policies and institutions. The high education levels of the co-respondents enriched the study of PPPs in general and in the education sector in particular. Both public and private sector officials were asked to indicate their **level of education** on the questionnaire and those who were directly interviewed were asked a direct question regarding their level of education. Table 4.1 summarises the statistical distribution of the responses in absolute frequency (N = 88, 100%). It was found that most respondents were first degree holders but results also show that there are well academically grounded officers in both the public and private sectors with post-graduate

qualifications not only analysing the policy framework but reliably make recommendations necessary to improve the designing of PPPs in the education sector.

Table 4.1: The Education Qualifications of the Respondents

	Education Level			Total
	Diploma	Bachelor's degree	Post graduate	
Public Sector	5 14.3%	16 45.7%	14 40.0%	35 100.0%
Private sector	7 13.2%	31 58.5%	15 28.3%	53 100.0%
Total	12 13.6%	47 53.4%	29 33.0%	88 100.0%

Source: Field data (2019)

The strong academic background enabled the respondents to effectively answer the questions. The credibility of responses was boosted by the fact that some of the respondents were PhD holders (Lincoln, & Guba, 1985).

4.2.2 Work Experience with PPP Projects

The quality in terms of credibility and authenticity of the responses to the questionnaire depends, in part, on the experience the respondents have acquired. Table 4.2 summarises the statistical information on the respondents' work experiences (N = 88, 100%) that responded to the questionnaires. A big percentage (N = 88, 38%) had worked on PPP/PPD projects between 1 – 2 years. Nonetheless, the quality of the responses was greatly improved by the respondents that had worked for more than 10 years (N = 88, 13.6%). The experiences of the respondents notwithstanding, some the purposively sampled respondents that were interviewed had a long record of working with PPPs/PPDs.

Table 4.2: Public Private Dialogue Work Experience

Statement	For how long have you worked with PPPs, Public Private dialogue or any other form of Public private initiative?					Total
	Less than one year	1 - 2 years	3 - 4 years	5 -10 years	10 years and more	
Public Sector	13 37.1%	12 34.3%	2 5.7%	2 5.7%	6 17.1%	35 100.0%
Private sector	8 15.1%	22 41.5%	7 13.2%	10 18.9%	6 11.3%	53 100.0%
Total	21 23.9%	34 38.6%	9 10.2%	12 13.6%	12 13.6%	88 100.0%

Source; Field data (2019)

4.2.3 Age distribution

It was imperative to identify the **age distribution** of the respondents as another demographic characteristic with a bearing on the quality of the responses. Other factors remaining constant, the researcher assumed that the age of the respondents has a direct bearing on the experiences acquired in the field of work. It is the age-long experience that increased the credibility of the responses to the questions.

Table 4.3: The Age Distribution of the Respondents

	Age of respondents					Total
	20 - 29	30 - 39	40 - 49	50 - 59	60 +	
Public Sector	4 11.4%	18 51.4%	11 31.4%	2 5.7%	0 0.0%	35 100.0%
Private sector	12 22.6%	26 49.1%	13 24.5%	1 1.9%	1 1.9%	53 100.0%
Total	16 18.2%	44 50.0%	24 27.3%	3 3.4%	1 1.1%	88 100.0%

Source: Field data (2019)

It is difficult to conclusively determine the quality of the responses based on age, but one would assume that respondents with more advanced age have acquired more experiences that can enrich the level of discussion surrounding the PPP policy

framework. When asked to indicate their age, the responses are summarised in Table 4.3 that shows the statistical distribution in absolute frequency ($N = 88, 100\%$). The average age was 34 years, and the study greatly benefited from the experiences acquired by the older respondents even though they constituted a smaller percentage of the respondents.

4.2.4 Gender

The gender of the respondents was among the major characteristics of interest in understanding the perceptions towards the institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector. There were more males than females that responded to the questions both the interview schedule and the written questionnaire. Table 4.4 summarises the statistical distribution of the age of the responses that responded to the questionnaires in absolute frequency ($N = 88, 100\%$).

Table 4.4: Gender Characteristics of the Respondents

	Gender		Total
	Male	Female	
Public Sector	20	15	35
	57.1%	42.9%	100.0%
Private sector	34	19	53
	64.2%	35.8%	100.0%
Total	54	34	88
	61.4%	38.6%	100.0%

Source: Field notes (2019)

Even with purposeful sampling, it was not the intension of the researcher to target more males than females. Nonetheless, it was found out that overall, more male responded to the questions in both the public and private sector, with ($N = 88, 61\%$) were male, while ($N = 88, 39\%$) were female. By sector, on average there were more men than women in

the public sector, while in the private sector still, more men responded to the questionnaires than females. Therefore, it was determined that males took a more active role in the study. Nonetheless, the males' domination of responses does not bias the responses towards a particular argument and does not in any way negatively affect reliability (dependability) of the research results.

4.3 The PPP Models and Contracts in the Education Sector in Tanzania

The incomplete contracts theory postulates that at the minimum, there must be a legal document binding partner together. This theory inspired the first research question and, in an attempt, to determine the types of contracts whether complete or incomplete, the researcher worked on the assumption that it would be useful to first determine the existing nature of PPP models or contracts; it is such contracts that would reveal the kind of PPP model that the parties had entered into. Second, in addressing this objective, it was imperative to determine the respondents' understanding of the concepts of privatisation and PPPs (McFetridge, 1997). It was equally important to filter the various themes that arose from the respondents' views, opinions, and experiences to determine the respondent's understanding of the PPP contracts and models by using the definition PPP Act (URT, 2017a) definition as the yardstick. Some of the quantitative and qualitative data about the PPP models and contracts are reported below:

4.3.1 The Difference between Privatization and PPP

Before making any conclusions on the nature of PPPs implemented in the education sector it was important to establish whether the respondents understood the difference between the main concepts of privatisation and PPPs. There has been confusion and

mix up of the understanding terms privation and Public-Private Partnerships (McFetridge, 1997). Therefore, it was imperative to find out first whether the respondents had a conceptual understanding of these terms. Respondents were asked a question that required them to *indicate their understanding of the concepts of privatisation and PPP*. Most respondents interviewed, gave a clear understanding of the differences between the two terms.

It was found that there is a clear understanding that the two concepts were different, which was confirmed by Mr Momo, an administrator in a public office located in Dodoma and he had this to say;

“... the two concepts are different because privatisation is the total transfer of ownership of the project from the public to the private sector, but under a PPP, the two sectors work together on the same project. . .”.

The results of the group interview that involved Mrs. Baibui, Mrs. Jipandie, and Mr Tunae. Mrs. Simama also confirmed the same position, which helped the research because the respondents were clear and they guided the study, which increased the reliability of the research tools. The above findings were triangulated with the findings of quantitative data from the questionnaires. Respondents were asked to indicate their opinion on a Likert scale of 1 – 6, where 1-strongly disagree and 6-strongly agree. The responses are recorded in Table 4.5, which summarises the statistical distribution in absolute frequency (N = 88, 100%). A chi-square test was conducted to find out whether there was an association between the views of both the public and private sector over the hypothetical notion that,

“The terms Privatization and a PPP contract are one and the same thing”.

Table 4.5: The Difference between the Concepts of Privatisation and PPPs,

Statement:	The terms “Privatization” and a “PPP contract” are one and the same thing.					
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Lightly disagree	Lightly agree	Agree	Total
Public Sector	14 40.0%	15 42.9%	6 17.1%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	35 100.0%
Private sector	18 34.0%	27 50.9%	3 5.7%	4 7.5%	1 1.9%	53 100.0%
Total	32 36.4%	42 47.7%	9 10.2%	4 4.5%	1 1.1%	88 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests						
		Value	df		Sig. (2-sided)	
Pearson Chi-Square		6.52	4		.002	
N of Valid Cases		88				

** Pearson Chi –square of association is significant at .005 level (2 – tailed)

Source: Field data (2019)

The chi-square statistic value of 6.52 shows there was an association between the views of both the public and private sector over the hypothetical statement, meaning that both the public and private sector respondents shared similar views. There was sufficient evidence to reject the hypothetical statement because the p value was equal to .002 hence the data observed was statistically significant to reject the hypothetical statement $X^2 (4, N = 88) 6.520 p = .002$. This finding shows that the terms privatisation and PPPs as understood by both the public sector and private sector respondents are two different things. Therefore, the finding that no PPPs are being implemented in the education sector is based on the firm understanding of the differences between the terminologies.

4.3.2 Public-Private Dialogue

The incomplete contracts theory assumes that the partners a put together by *bounded rationality*. They write incomplete contacts because some contingencies cannot be imagined. Instead, it was found out that there were neither complete nor incomplete PPP contracts implemented in the education sector; at best the parties are still the level

of dialogue. There are no formalised working relationships between the public and private, instead there are a series of meetings and interfaces where the parties interact and participate in selected areas of selected projects by way of procurement and tendering. It was found that even the officers that have the constitutional mandate of coordinating the activities of both private and public sector through the responses of their senior managers mentioned no single PPP project in the education sector. Instead, they treat their role, as that of promoting dialogue in the hope that this dialogue will sooner than later be able to produce PPP contracts.

When asked:

“What role does your institution play in promoting the interaction between the public and private sectors?”

Mr Tititi an officer in a public institution while representing others said;

“We hold a grand meeting between the public and private sectors and at that meeting, 40 members are present where 20 represent the public sector while the other 20 represent the private sector and so far serious progress has been done.”

When asked a probing question,

“If everything is working well then why is it that up to now your discussions have not yet produced a single working PPP apart from the mere sporadic mention of the term?”

Mr Tititi who represented others had this to say;

“Our main duty is to promote a conversation between the two sectors may be in the future such partnerships can emerge. However, as of now, we are promoting a Public-Private Dialogue and not a Partnership. For example, in the recent meeting, most of the private sector tender holders and suppliers complained about delayed payments, which negatively affect their businesses, which was discussed and resolutions were made and I hope there will be an improved business environment and to us, it was a success.”

The above findings indicate that that the Public Private Dialogue can be used to promote the designing of PPPs. However, there is a weak implementation mechanism for bringing together the stakeholders on two sectors into a formal level involving contracts. This finding affirms what the Institutional theory holds that, in order for the organizational structures and practices become entrenched, there must be an introduction of rules backed by enforcement mechanisms including coercive pressures to stimulate organisational change either directly or indirectly by way of institutional dependencies (Jennings, 1994).

Respondents were asked the questions in the interview schedule that:

“What are the PPP contracts and models being currently implemented in the education sector in Tanzania”?

This question mainly targeted public officials, and the following are some remarks by one of the senior public sector officers like, Mrs. Simama. She said the following;

“Currently it is official that there are no PPPs in the education sector. Following the reforms, several private-school owners were sensitised and they opened many schools and we are acting independently. The only time we engage in the private sector is through MOUs or ordinary procurement process. For example, we can engage TEN/MET in a short undertaking like training. In addition, we recently received serious communication from the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance and Planning the PPP division to stopped us from referring to such small-time engagements with the private sector as PPPs. Based on such a circular for sure we do not have any PPP arrangements at all in the education sector.”

A similar view was shared during a group interview that involved Mr Tunae, M/s Jipandie and M/s Baibui all senior officers under a public sector office located in Dodoma.

According to Mr Tunae;

“So far, there are no known PPP contracts or arrangements between the government and the education sector. We are acting independently because the government has its objectives so is the private sector. The government only interfaces with the private sector through MoU (Memorandum of Understanding). Such an arrangement so far is not well developed in the education sector but at least in the health sector because the government should provide for public utilities like health. However, these are no formalised PPPs, with the hospitals to facilitate some of the expenses of the hospitals. Such hospitals include; KCMC, Bugando, and others.”

In a quest to determine the nature of PPPs being implemented in the education sector, the researcher visited one of the FBOs aided schools. During one of the interviews, respondents were asked to give their views towards the position given by the government in the National PPP policy (URT, 2009) *that FBO aided schools provide an example of success stories for PPP in the education sector*, a senior administrator of an FBO aided school Mr. Bututula in his words he said;

“What are you talking about? As far as I am concerned, I have been here as the head for a long time, but I have never seen such a contract neither have I ever been to a meeting to discuss that PPP. All I know is that the government took over this school in 1968 and the two parties separated that is not what I consider a partnership. I cannot say it was an amicable separation and since then the school is 100 percent government-owned, although the land belongs to the church. The two sides shared the buildings and as you can see that chapel over there belongs to the church and that house over there is the house of the priest. However, the church has no say in how the school is managed.”

The above qualitative data from the interviews indicate that there are neither long term PPP contracts nor PPP models currently being implemented in the education sector in Tanzania. This finding is supported by the findings of Mukasa, Mnyanyi, and Ngirwa (2021b) that the relationships between the Institute of Adult education and the Open schools is closest to having PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania. In this *Principal – Agent* arrangement, the IAE is the principal while open schools are the agents that conduct Open Distance Learning (ODL) to the out of school youths but there is no concretised formal concessions PPP model.

4.3.3 Splendid Isolation

The researcher worked on the assumption that close cooperation between the public and private sectors is a necessary and sufficient condition for the eventual designing of PPPs. However, it was not the case because it was found that both the public and private sectors were acting in isolation of each other. One of the salient themes identified from the responses was that there was an independent action in delivering secondary education, which confirmed that currently there is no interaction and if there is only limited collaboration, at best, between the public and private sectors in providing secondary education. A close examination of the qualitative data obtained in the interviews shows that most respondents confirmed that no PPPs were being implemented in the education sector. Instead, there was a huge gap between the two sectors in terms of cooperation and establishing clear guidelines on the rules of engagement.

The researcher probed the respondent further with a question “*then, how are the two sides working together because it seems you cannot wish each other away?*”

Mr. Bututula responded that;

“At the moment the church has a representative on the school board as an x-official. His role is limited to that of an observer. He does not come in as part of the PPP arrangement but to represent the church. All I can say is that the two sides are working together, but they are independent of each other. It is like a divorce settlement, where the parents separate but they have visiting rights to the children and they hang around each other for the sake of their children. For example, recently the church offered a water project to the school out of humanitarian grounds but not as part of a contractual obligation”.

It was found that there is no working relationship between the government and private schools, which contradicts the position portrayed in the National PPP policy document (URT, 2009), that PPPs have been successfully implemented in the education sector with the FBOs. Mr Bututula's position was in contradiction with the responses from the leaders of the FBO aided schools whose response to the question of *“what is the type of PPP contract does your school have?”* Some responses included that of the headmaster Mr Jiji who said that;

“Maybe they have a different meaning of the word PPP contract and you should go and ask them. However, as far as I am concerned, there is nothing like that”.

The researcher asked similar questions to the leaders of another FBO aided school and the respondents were 3 school administrators that were interviewed together in a group interview, and some responses were as follows; Mr Embe had this to say

“There is no PPP if that is what you are asking because since 1968, the two sides completely separated and the land was shared. Recently, the church built its primary school on their share of the land and we are not concerned. In addition, they are no longer using the church building in the middle of the school campus. They have been able to build a big and better church over there. We are now fully-fledged government schools with no ties at all to the church. The church is free to even start their secondary school and I hear that they are in serious preparations to start a university on the section of the land they shared during the separation.”

In a similar vein to determine how the nature of the relationship between the church and government in managing the school, the researcher asked a probing question of whether the *church has any significant role it plays now in the schools?* Another senior school administrator Mr Parachichi said that;

“Apart from sending priests to come to school and conducting prayers, and participating in community programmes organised by the school, the church does not take part in the management of the school. As Mr Embe said, we are completely separate.”

The quantitative data collected from the questionnaires confirmed the findings from the interviews that there are no PPP contacts in the education sector in Tanzania. The following are some responses to the question when asked whether;

“Contracts in the education sector are not serious PPP contracts but merely interactions and cooperation between government and private schools?”

Respondents were asked to indicate their opinion on a Likert scale of 1 – 6, where 1-strongly disagree and 6-strongly agree. The responses are recorded in Table 4.6, which summarises the statistical distribution in absolute frequency ($N = 88, 100\%$). A chi-square test was conducted to find out whether there was an association between the views of both the public and private sector over the supposition that;

“Contracts in the education sector are not serious PPP contracts but merely interactions and cooperation between government and private schools?”

A chi-square value of 13.55 indicates that there was a less association between the views of both the public and private sector respondents over the hypothetical statement. Nonetheless, the hypothetical statement was retained because there was no sufficient evidence in the observed data to reject it, $X^2 (5, N = 88) 13.55 p = .019$. The hypothetical

statement was maintained and there is an agreement that the pre-current PPPs in the education sector are mere interactions and cooperation that fall short of contractually structured PPPs.

Table 4.6: Comparing PPPs with Interactions and Co-operations

PPP contracts in the education sector are not serious PPP contracts but							
Statement:	mere interactions and co-operations between the government and private schools						
	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Lightly disagree	Lightly agree	Agree	Strongly agree	Total
Public Sector	0	3	9	5	11	7	35
	0.0%	8.6%	25.7%	14.3%	31.4%	20.0%	100.0%
Private sector	1	16	11	12	12	1	53
	1.9%	30.2%	20.8%	22.6%	22.6%	1.9%	100.0%
Total	1	19	20	17	23	8	88
	1.1%	21.6%	22.7%	19.3%	26.1%	9.1%	100.0%
Chi-Square Tests							
	Value		df		Sig. (2-sided)		
Pearson Chi-Square	13.55		5		.019		
N of Valid Cases	88						

** Pearson Chi –square of association is significant at .005 level (2 – sided)

Source: Field data (2019)

This finding indicates that there is still a long way to go before any PPP contract is negotiated let alone be signed, which confirms what Omari (2014) discovered that the current relationship between the FBO and government is acrimonious at best, which proves that the results of this research meet the qualitative criteria of transferability to the extent that another researcher can visit the same study population to confirm the same findings. This finding goes a long way in confirming that no PPP

contracts are being implemented in the running secondary schools in Tanzania, which contradicts the results of the study that was conducted by Mkoga (2013).

According to him;

“Public Private Partnership contributed to improving education quality through the expansion of student access to schooling, delivering education to low-income families, financing school inputs and building school infrastructures and higher academic achievement.” (Mkoga 2013, p. 64)

The question remained; how could the non-existent PPPs make any such elevated contributions? The answer might lie in the normative and subjective interpretations of what different people consider a PPP arrangement. If the private sector can work and deliver some education services, along with the public sector, it is seen as a PPP. The simple interaction confirms that what has been displayed as success stories and even taunted as PPPs are mere procurement contracts of delivering or supplying equipment, delivering infrastructure in a principle-agent arrangement but not a PPP contractual arrangement that involves long-term processes and builds on mutual consent.

This finding is similar to that of Itika et al. (2011) that they did not find any PPPs in the health sector in Tanzania, except there was only one specific PPP project at Mwanza in the area of construction that was operated under the collaboration between the government of Tanzania and Bugando Medical Centre, on construction and management of a Blood Bank for the Lake zone.

The failure to establish the existence of PPPs in the education sector points to the possibility that earlier statements about the presence of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania, were suppositions and inferences based on conjectures. Even Ndlichako and

Carr-Hill (2005) highlighted such in the education sector situation analysis final report (URT, 2005) when they failed to find any evidence of financial support to the tune of 7 million for the construction and modification of schools catering for students with disabilities even if it was mentioned in the ESDP (URT, 2010). Furthermore, the World Bank (2016) supported this finding by asserting that Tanzania has not consistently adopted competitive processes in the implementation of its PPP programme. The triangulated data proves that there is little or no progress as far as designing, implementing, and monitoring PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania.

Most of the public sector officials, Private Sector officials, and secondary school teachers have attested to the fact that there are no PPPs in the education sector which contradicts the allegations made by many documents and studies made hitherto and the mentioning of PPP arrangements is in passing. No wonder one respondent attested to the fact that the Ministry of Finance and Planning had issued a circular that was aimed at preventing all ministries and government departments from referring to such short-term business interfaces with the private sector actors as PPPs. Therefore, so far, it can be concluded that no PPPs are currently being implemented in the education sector in Tanzania.

4.3.4 Proposed PPP Models in the Education Sector

Research objective (i) sought to identify the existing PPP models and contracts in the education sector in Tanzania. It was important to examine the respondents' views and opinions towards the PPP models and find out their opinions on the way PPP models can be designed in the education sector. Respondents were asked to indicate their

opinion by marking “YES” (1) or “NO” (2) to various hypothetical statements relating to PPP models, and in response, they made suggestions of the possible PPP models. The quantitative data in Table 4.7 (N=88, 100%) shows the Hypothesis Test Summary, Non-parametric tests of confidence intervals of the “YES” (1) and “NO” (2) and the asymptotic significance values.

4.3.5 Design and Build Model

Respondents were asked to indicate their opinion by marking “YES” (1) or “NO” (2) to the hypothetical statements that “The private partner only designs and builds the PPP project but does not operate it”, 95% [CI] = 1.67, 1.85; $p < .001$. Majority of the respondents as summarised in Table 4.7 did not agree with the supposition that from the collected data was significant to reject the hypothesis, which means that the Design and Build (DB) model is not a preferable choice.

Table 4.7: Design and Build Model

Statement:	The private partner only designs and builds the PPP project but does not operate it		
	Yes	No	Total
Public Sector	14 40.0%	21 60.0%	35 100.0%
Private sector	7 13.2%	46 86.8%	53 100.0%
Total	21 23.9%	67 76.1%	88 100.0%

Source: Field Data (2019)

The qualitative data from the interviews was triangulated with the quantitative data from the questionnaires, summarized in Table 4.9, and there was less support for the private sector taking full control over the PPP project especially in the long run.

Table 4.8: Hypothesis Test Summary for “YES” (1) and “NO” Responses

Hypothesis	Mean	Std Dev	Std error	95% confidence Interval		Sig.	Decision
				Lower bound	Upper bound		
1. The private partner only designs and builds the PPP project but does not operate it	1.76	.429	.046	1.67	1.85	.000**	Reject the hypothesis
2. The private sector on top of designing and building the PPP project, should finance it but later transfer its ownership to the government after satisfying the maximisation of welfare	1.45	.501	.053	1.35	1.56	.456	Retain the hypothesis
3. The private partner should own the project in the long run after satisfying the maximisation of welfare	1.31	.464	.049	1.21	1.41	.000**	Reject the hypothesis
4. The government should finance the PPP project but allow the private sector to design, build operate with a possibility of private partner transferring ownership to the government	1.76	.492	.046	1.29	1.50	.070	Retain the hypothesis
5. The government designs, builds, finances the PPP project but leases it on a long-term basis to the private partners and on the expiry of the lease the government takes over its total control	1.49	.503	.054	1.38	1.60	.915	Retain the null hypothesis

**Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .005.

*Nonparametric Tests: one Sample Test occurs with probabilities of .500 and .500.

Source: Field Data (2019)

4.3.6 Build, Lease and Transfer

Respondents were asked to indicate their opinion by marking “YES” (1) or “NO” (2) to the hypothetical statements that “The private sector on top of designing and building

the PPP project should finance it but later transfer its ownership to the government after satisfying the maximization of welfare.” 95% [CI] = 1.35, 1.56; $p < .456$. Majority of the respondents of the respondents agreed with the hypothesis.

Table 4.9: Build, Lease and Transfer

Statement:	The private sector on top of designing and building the PPP project, should finance it but later transfer its ownership to the government after satisfying the maximization of welfare		
	Yes	No	Total
Public Sector	23 65.7%	12 34.3%	35 100.0%
Private sector	25 47.2%	28 52.8%	53 100.0%
Total	48 54.5%	40 45.5%	88 100.0%

Source: Field Data (2019)

It was found out that from the collected data the hypothesis was retained, therefore the Build, Lease, and transfer model was more preferable model for the respondents. The qualitative data from the interviews was triangulated with the quantitative data from the questionnaires as summarized in Table 4.9, and it was found out that there was support for the “Build, Lease and Transfer (BLT) as prescribed in the National PPP policy of 2009.

4.3.7 Concessions and Afterimages

Respondents were asked to indicate their opinion by marking “YES” (1) or “NO” (2) to the hypothetical statement that “The government designs, builds, finances the PPP project but leases it on a long-term basis to the private partners and on the expiry of the lease the government takes over its total control.” 95% [CI] = 1.38, 1.60; $p = .915$. In response, was indicated in Table 4.7, they gave their opinions and the analysis shows that it was a statistically insignificant to reject the hypothesis.

Table 4.10: Concessions and Affermages

Statement:	The government designs, builds, finances the PPP project but leases it on a long-term basis to the private partners and on the expiry of the lease the government takes over its total control		
	Yes	No	Total
Public Sector	22 62.9%	13 37.1%	35 100.0%
Private sector	23 43.4%	30 56.6%	53 100.0%
Total	45 51.1%	43 48.9%	88 100.0%

Source; Field Data (2019)

The qualitative data obtained from the interviews and documentary analysis was triangulated with the quantitative data from the questionnaires, as summarised in table 4.10, there was a general support for the possibility of concessions and affermages. The finding is similar to what Mukasa et al. (2021b) found out that to be the relationship between the IAE and open schools in Tanzania. Though not formalized a PPP arrangement, this relationship bears all the qualities of a concession PPP model under the principal – agent relationship between IAE and private open schools and performance contracts. According to the National PPP policy document, the concessions model is the most practiced model in Tanzania in other sectors (URT, 2009).

4.3.8 Design Build Operate Transfer Model

Respondents were asked to indicate their opinion by marking “YES” (1) or “NO” (2) to the hypothetical statement that “The government should finance the PPP project but allow the private sector to design, build and operate with a possibility of private partner transferring ownership to the government.”, as shown in table 4.11. 95% [CI] = 1.29, 1.50; p = .070.

Table 4.11: Design Build Operate Transfer Model

Statement:	The government should finance the PPP project but allow the private sector to design, build operate with a possibility of private partner transferring ownership to the government		
	Yes	No	Total
Public Sector	18 51.4%	17 48.6%	35 100.0%
Private sector	35 66.0%	18 34.0%	53 100.0%
Total	53 60.2%	35 39.8%	88 100.0%

Source: Field Data (2019)

In response, they gave their opinions and the results show that the majority of the respondents, maintained the hypothesis, as summarised in Table 4.7. The qualitative data obtained from the interviews and documentary analysis was triangulated with the quantitative data from the questionnaires, there was support for the possibility of the support of the Design Build Operate Transfer Model.

4.3.9 Build Operate and Own

Respondents were asked to indicate their opinion in Table 4.12 by marking “YES” (1) or “NO” (2) to the hypothetical statement that, “*The private partner should own the project in the long run after satisfying the maximization of welfare.*” 95% [CI] = 1.21, 1.41; $p < .001$. In response, they gave their opinions and the analysis shows that there was enough statistical evidence to reject the hypothesis as shown in Table 4.7. However, the qualitative data obtained from the interviews and documentary analysis was triangulated with the quantitative data from the questionnaires shows that there was little confidence in the private sector to out rightly take over the project in the long run.

It was found out that there was little support for the PPP model of the “*Build Operate and Own (BOO)*” (URT, 2009).

Table 4.12: Build Operate and Own

Statement:	The private partner should own the project in the long run after satisfying the maximization of welfare		
	Yes	No	Total
Public Sector	20 57.1%	15 42.9%	35 100.0%
Private sector	41 77.4%	12 22.6%	53 100.0%
Total	61 69.3%	27 30.7%	88 100.0%

Source: Field Data (2019)

4.3.10 Experiences from PPPs in other Sectors

It was anticipated that the methods and systems adopted in the designing of PPPs in other sectors such as mining, transport, and others would inspire the designing of PPPs in the education sector. The researcher had an assumption that there was a capacity to transfer and share experiences between the different sectors. To this effect, during the interviews, the researcher asked the respondents to give their views on, what *experiences that can be learnt by the education sector from other currently running PPPs in other sectors*. Among the responses was Mrs. Jipandie who had this to say;

“Currently the only PPP conducted in Tanzania is the DART (Dar-es-Salaam Rapid Transport) popularly known as “Mwendo Kasi” and it is run as on a concession basis, where the government owns the infrastructure in the form of the roads and the private partner owns all the buses. Most of the would-be PPP projects are still at the feasibility study stage even the DART project must be revisited so that it can be in line with the current laws and regulations of the PPP policy because it was passed before the current law was in place.”

More investigation, however, is needed to determine whether the institutions that are in charge of coordinating the PPP activities have comprehensive coverage because some

respondents argued that the government is in partnership with the private sector, which is beyond the knowledge of the PPP centre in the Ministry of Finance and Planning.

A leading officer at leading private institution Mr Papaya reckoned that;

"I am convinced and sure that PPPs are being implemented in other sectors such as agriculture and some include; TCC (Tanzania Cigarette Company), Kilombero Sugar, SAGCOT (Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania) – the best example of a PPP in Tanzania."

The researcher followed up on some of the suggested PPPs by Mr Papaya on both phone and websites it was difficult to get much information, but the evidence from the interviews with the leaders and on their websites shows that is the respondent confirmed that they are in partnership with the government, but it does not correspond to the data obtained from the responses of the public institution in charge of the PPPs.

This information is however not conclusive and more research is needed in this area. Similarly, Itika et al. (2011) found that in the health sector, the initiation of PPPs is subjective, which depends on the situation at hand. It is most common among PPPs in primary healthcare service delivery, where the formation of PPPs largely depends on the goodwill of public officials and how they have understood and interpreted the motives of the government to work with the private sector of the health sector reform-strategy.

The qualitative data obtained from the documentary analysis supported the finding that there are institutional rigidities impeding the designing of PPPs and they are not limited to the education sector but also other sectors including health. According to Mshana, Aagard, Cullen and Tschida (2018), they found out that found the community PPPs in

health forums are not functioning at the regional level and in the community setting, despite the well-illustrated pathways aimed at engaging the public and private sector partners from top to bottom. Just like this study, their study revealed that there is a mismatch between the national PPP policy, private-sector strategic planning documents, and the faith-based PPP implementation plan.

4.4 Formal and Informal Institutions Influencing the Designing of PPPs

4.4.1 Formal Institutional Factors Influencing the Designing of PPPs

The “*Institutional Theory*” not only explains why institutions persist, but also how changes can occur through institutional dependencies. Similarly, the descriptive dimension of the Mixed Methods research paradigm sought to generate knowledge (ontology) by explaining the existing and working institutional framework in terms of laws and policies. This notion inspired the second research question, which sought to determine *what formal and informal institutions influence the designing of PPPs in the education sector*.

When addressing this research question, as of necessity, the PPPs in education sector were not studied in isolation because institutional factors are collective and cut across several sectors. This broad view notwithstanding, specific policies and laws relevant to the education sector and PPPs were studied. It was found from the documentary review that there is a substantial legal and administrative structure that can be put to good use in aiding and facilitating the designing of PPPs in the education sector. These include; the Public-Private Partnership Act, added on June 18th, 2010 to the Gazette of the United Republic of Tanzania, as amended by the PPP amendment Act of 2014, added to the

Gazette of the United Republic of Tanzania - hereinafter referred as the "PPP Act"; the Public-Private Partnership Act, (2010).

Public-Private Partnership Regulations of 2011: - hereinafter the "PPP Regulations"; the Public Procurement Act - Regulations, (2013) Subsidiary legislation, published in the Gazette of the United Republic of Tanzania, - hereinafter the "Procurement Regulations" This law that came into force in 2014 has been amended into the PPP Act of 2017 when it was published in the Government gazette. Furthermore, there are informal institutional factors in the form of the agreed conduct in terms of cultural beliefs and institutionalised mind-sets that have influenced the designing of PPP in the education sector.

Respondents were asked to indicate their opinion on a Likert scale of 1 – 6 where 1 (strongly disagree) and 6 (strongly agree), on the supposition that “**The existing legal and regulatory framework supports the fair negotiation of a PPP contract**”. Table 4.13 summarises the responses (N = 88, 100%) and A chi-square test was conducted to find out the association between the views of the public and private sector over the hypothetical statement $X^2 (5, N = 88) 12.94 p = .024$.

Therefore, observed data was not significant to provide evidence to reject the hypothesis. The hypothetical statement was maintained meaning that the existing legal and regulatory framework supports the fair negotiation of a PPP contract. It was found that there is a belief and trust in the existing legal and regulatory framework in aiding the designing of PPPs in the education sector. The chi-square statistic value stood at

12.94, which indicate limited association between the opinions of the public and private sector respondents. Most of the public sector respondents indicated their agreement with the supposition that the existing legal and regulatory framework supports the fair negotiation of a PPP contract.

Table 4.13: The Regulatory Frame and the Negotiation of a PPP Contract

Statement:	The existing legal and regulatory framework supports the fair negotiation of a PPP contract						
	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Lightly disagree	Lightly agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
Public Sector 5	5	7	9	4	5	35	
	14.3%	14.3%	20.0%	25.7%	11.4%	14.3%	100.0%
Private sector 3	7	8	26	9	0	53	
	5.7%	13.2%	15.1%	49.1%	17.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Total	8	12	15	35	13	5	88
	9.1%	13.6%	17.0%	39.8%	14.8%	5.7%	100.0%
Chi-Square Tests							
		Value	df		Sig. (2-sided)		
Pearson Chi-Square		12.940	5		.024		
N of Valid Cases		88					

** Pearson Chi –square of association is significant at .005 level (2 – sided)

Source: Field data (2019)

On the other hand, the private sector respondents also on average agreed with the supposition, is triangulated with the qualitative data leads the finding that the existing legal and regulatory framework if put to good effect can be very effective in aiding the negotiation and designing of PPPs in the education sector.

4.4.2 The Legal and Regulatory Policy Framework

According to Kraft (2007), *Institutional Theory* is policy-making that emphasises the formal and legal aspects of government structures. Based on this theory the researcher worked on the assumption that there is an elaborate formal institutional arrangement in terms of a sound legal and regulatory policy framework showing a systematic way in

which PPPs in general and in the education sector, in particular, are designed. The research assumed that there is a one-stop centre where all questions relating to the designing and implementation of PPPs can be answered. Secondary data collected in terms of documentary analysis indicate that apart from the National PPP policy (URT, 2009) and the PPP act (URT, 2017a), other key policies are guiding the provision of education including National Macro-policies, sectoral education policies, and programmes. According to the Education Sector Performance Report (URT, 2010), the sectoral policies and programmes include the Education Sector Development Programme (1997) revised in 2001 and 2008, the Education and Training Policy (1995), which is currently under review.

4.4.3 The National PPP Policy (URT 2009)

The qualitative data from the documentary analysis indicates that before the enactment of the National PPP policy (URT, 2009), PPPs were implemented either by virtue of existing laws such as the Public Corporation Act of 1992 as amended by Act No. 16 of 1993, or through sectoral legislation (OECD, 2013). The National PPP policy has highlighted the challenges that must be addressed before an enabling environment for PPPs can be created. According to the National PPP policy (URT, 2009), currently, PPPs implemented in Tanzania are concession agreements for running existing enterprises with limited provisions for rehabilitation and new investments (URT, 2009), which limit the scope of operation and it is under this study that it was found that there is a need reorganise the institutional terrain that influences the designing of PPPs in the education sector.

Based on the National PPP policy (URT, 2009), the PPP Regulations provide for the minimum essential information for unsolicited PPP proposals. The minimum essential information under the Procurement Regulations for unsolicited PPP proposals requires that the socio-economic impact on local communities must be included. Section 10 (3) of the PPP Act requires that the feasibility study shall include technical and socio-economic impact analyses.

Regulation 13 (i) of the Procurement Regulations provides that the feasibility study report shall contain recommendations or advice on the technical and economic viability of the project(s). When asked to comment on the solicited and unsolicited bids for PPPs as provided by the National PPP policy (URT, 2009). Respondents were asked to rank which PPP policies in terms of the least important (1) and most important (6) policy respondents' thought were influential to the designing of PPPs in the education sector, the results from the quantitative data from the questionnaires are summarised in Table 4.14 ($N = 88$, 100%).

A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the association between the public and private sector views and the hypothesis that;

“The National PPP policy of 2009 is not comprehensive enough to guide the designing and implementation of PPPs in the education sector”.

The Association between the views of the private and public sectors was not significant because of a chi-square value (χ^2) of $21.60 > 10$, $\chi^2 (5, N = 88) 21.60 p < .001$. However, despite the less association between the public and private sector views, there was statistical evidence from the observed data to reject the hypothetical statement, which

means that the policy the National PPP policy of 2009 is comprehensive enough to guide the designing and implementation of PPPs in the education sector.

Table 4.14: The National PPP Policy and the Designing of PPPs

Statement: The National PPP policy of 2009 is not comprehensive enough to guide the designing and implementation of PPPs in the education sector							
	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Lightly disagree	Lightly agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
Public Sector	7 20.0%	11 31.4%	5 14.3%	3 8.6%	9 25.7%	0 0.0%	35 100.0%
Private sector	1 1.9%	10 18.9%	7 13.2%	22 41.5%	8 15.1%	5 9.4%	53 100.0%
Total	8 9.1%	21 23.9%	12 13.6%	25 28.4%	17 19.3%	5 5.7%	88 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests							
	Value		df	Sig. (2-sided)			
Pearson Chi-Square	21.602		5	.001**			
N of Valid Cases	88						

** Pearson Chi – square correlation is significant at .005 level (2 – tailed)

Source: Field data (2019)

Despite the lack of PPPs currently implemented in the education sector, it was found that, the National PPP Policy (URT, 2009) remains a major institutional principal document that guides how PPPs, in general, should be designed, implemented, and monitored. Still, a good number of public sector officials experienced first-hand the amendments made on the PPP of 2014 to produce new PPP act cap 103 of 2017.

The quantitative data in Table 4.14 indicates that most of the respondents agreed with the supposition that the National PPP policy of 2009 was not comprehensive enough to guide the designing and implementation of PPPs in the education sector. This quantitative data from the questionnaires when triangulated with the qualitative data from the interviews and documentary analysis, and it was found out that the National

PPP policy (URT, 2009) was formal institutional factor influencing the designing of PPP in Tanzania but can be reviewed to make it more comprehensive.

4.4.4 The Education and Training Policy (1995)

A careful study of the data obtained from the documentary analysis, qualitative data through interviews, and quantitative data, indicate that the Education and Training Policy of 1995 and the associated SEDP is one of the formal institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector. On 27 November 2015, the Tanzanian government issued Circular number “5”, which implements the Education and Training Policy and directed public bodies to ensure that secondary education is free for all children (URT, 2015). It included the removal of all forms of fees and contributions.

According to the Circular,

“Provision of free education means pupils or students will not pay any fee or other contributions that were being provided by parents or guardians before the release of new circular” (URT, 2015 p. 2).

However, while most fees are covered, including exam fees, some indirect costs remain for example: for school and sports uniforms and learning materials such as exercise books and pens. The GoT, used this circular to go beyond its constitutional obligation to provide free, quality primary education and brings Tanzania in line with the target of Sustainable Development Goal 4, which requires States to ensure that everyone “completes free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education”. The quantitative data summarised in Table 4.15, indicates that Free Universal Secondary

Education policy of 2015 was among the policies highly ranked among the factors influencing the designing of PPP in the education sector in Tanzania.

Table 4.15: The Education and Training Policy and the SEDP

Statement	Education and training policy of 1995 and the associated SEDP has only worked to increase the control of government over education					
	Disagree	Lightly disagree	Lightly agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
Public Sector	2 5.7%	13 37.1%	15 42.9%	5 14.3%	0 0.0%	35 100.0%
Private sector	4 7.5%	19 35.8%	18 34.0%	11 20.8%	1 1.9%	53 100.0%
Total	6 6.8%	32 36.4%	33 37.5%	16 18.2%	1 1.1%	88 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests						
	Value		df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)		
Pearson Chi-Square	1.704		4	.790		
N of Valid Cases	88					

** Pearson Chi –square of association is significant at .005 level (2 – sided)

Source: Field data (2019)

A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the association between the public and private sector views and the hypothesis that “The **Education and training policy of 1995 and the associated SEDP has only worked to increase the control of government over education**”. There was a significant association between the views of the private and public sectors because of a chi-square value ($X^2 < 10$), X^2 (4, $N = 88$) 1.704 = .790. However, despite the close association between the public and private sector views, there was no statistical evidence to reject the supposition ($p = .790$), which meant that the Education and training policy of 1995 and the associated SEDP has only worked to increase the control of government over education. The qualitative data obtained by way of interviews, help to elucidate the quantitative data in Table 4.16 as far as education and training policy is concerned. The documentary analysis shows that there is a need to rethink the whole idea of Fee-free basic education, given its far

reaching implications on not only the limited resources, but also the negative impact on the motivation of the teachers.

According to Shukia (2020), the fee-free education policy has caused confusion and parents are threatening to withdrawal from school engagements, which jeopardize the principle of the equitable delivery of education. When asked to give their views on the impact of the policy of free secondary education on private schools, M/s Vululu had this to say;

“The government policy of Universal Secondary Education, has suffocated private schools, which has led to serious reductions in school enrolments as more students prefer to go for government education even with the clear understanding that it is in many ways poor quality. To make matters worse, some government officials even intimidate and threaten some of the civil servants who take their children to private schools. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to talk about a meaningful partnership...”

It was found that as long as the government supports free education, not only weakens the private schools but also reduces the chances of forming and designing PPPs in the education sector because while the private sector partner is thinking of charging money by way of school fees, the private sector partner is working of providing free education. This diversity created mainly by the free education policy makes it difficult to design PPPs in the education sector.

4.4.5 The PPP Act of 2017

Data obtained from documentary analysis through secondary sources and from interviews show that the PPP Act CAP 103 is one of the formal institutional frameworks that influences the designing of PPPs in general and in the education sector in particular.

This law that came into force in 2014 has been amended into the PPP Act of 2017 when it was published in the Government gazette. The law was established to provide for legal and institutional frameworks for the implementation of Public-Private Partnership agreements; to set rules, guidelines and procedures governing public-private procurement, development, and implementation (Ndabhona, 2013; Bengesi et al., 2016). It was part of the government continuous policy of reviewing the institutional framework of PPP to accommodate the concerns of its partners, resulting in the amendment of Acts and Regulations. For example, to address bureaucracy, the amended PPP Act and Regulations have set a time frame for making decisions on the submitted proposals ranging from 15 to 30 days.

According to Sections 2 and 3 of the PPP Act (URT, 2014), any Ministry, Government, department, Local Authority, or Statutory Corporation can act as "contracting authority" for PPP projects, and act in partnership with any private sector entity. All PPP projects approved by the PPP Centre are subject to scrutiny and approval by the PPP Technical Committee and the National Investment Steering Committee. Section 7 of the PPP Act, the Technical Committee considers and approves proposals forwarded to it by the PPP Centre and submits these to the National Investment Steering Committee for scrutiny.

Furthermore, it is tasked with the overview of the Public-Private Partnership Facilitation Fund according to Section 8 of the Amendment to the PPP Act of 2014 (URT, 2014). When asked *“why is it that so far, no PPPs have been formed and education is actually one of the public goods that the government must provide?”*

Mr Momo responded that;

“I can blame the various contracting authorities that have given the mandate to initiate PPP proposals in the areas of need, which includes the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, the Regional and District education offices and others, to identify the projects that can help increase the delivery of public services”.

The findings indicate an elaborate institutional framework in the form of laws and policies that support the designing and implementation of PPPs not only in the education sector but also in other sectors. Unfortunately, PPPs have not taken off as a reliable method for delivering public services. Most of the studies, even in other sectors like transport (ASRF, 2016), local government (Ngowi, 2005), Health (Itika et al., 2011), and others conclude by advocating the adoption of PPPs. None of these pieces of research have out rightly condemned the use of PPPs. Instead, as discovered under this research; it is the incoherency and inconsistencies in the institutional framework for PPPs that have delayed the formation and development of PPPs in general but in the education sector in particular.

4.4.6 The Tanzania Investment Centre

The National Investment Promotion Policy and Investment Code of 1990 (and revised 1997) led to the establishment of the Investment Promotion Centre (IPC) now known as Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) with the responsibility, among others, of coordinating the activities of all Public-Private Partnerships in Tanzania. The Act provides investment incentives, identifies priority areas for investment and provides safeguards to protect private investors against expropriation. However, the amended PPP Act of 2014 answered some calls to centralise the coordination of the PPP under the “PPP Centre” replacing the “Coordination Unit” previously under the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) also fused into the “PPP Centre” and the former “Finance

Unit” formerly under the Ministry of Finance. The PPP Centre is constituted within the Office of the Prime Minister (URT, 2014). It was found that so far the TIC has not been central in promoting PPPs. The researcher presented the possibility to a senior officer in one of the relevant government ministries in Dodoma, *about the benefits of having at least an information desk about PPPs at the TIC.*

Mr Momo had this to say;

“The projects at TIC are purely commercial and we have no business in that. However, for sure we should revisit some of these policies. It might make sense to have such an information desk. We may have to reconsider some of these policies, especially after we have developed enough capacity in terms of human resources training”.

The findings indicate that policymakers and implementers have not taken advantage of the existing opportunities and interfaces between the public and private sectors. Some reasons for the solutions to the causes for the failure of PPPs not only in the education sector do not require any new legislation or enactment of new policies. Instead, it requires an energised team of officials willing and able to overcome the challenges facing PPPs as laid out in the National PPP policy document (URT, 2009).

4.4.7 Informal Institutional Factors Influencing the Designing of PPPs

The Social-cultural belief system

Based on institutional theory, this research assumed that there are informal rules and patterns of behaviour in Tanzania, which influence the perceptions of the stakeholders as far as the designing of PPPs in the education sector is concerned. Inspired by the constructivist nature of the research paradigm, the research sought to obtain personal experiences, views and opinions regarding the Informal rules and behaviour. The best

way to obtain such information was through unstructured, and semi-structured qualitative means including, interviews and documentary analysis. It was found that the main informal institutional factor influencing the designing of PPPs is the old mentality from the old socialist system of the 1970s and 80s.

According to Van Arkadie (1995), the adoption of the Arusha declaration of 1967, made Tanzania become a centrally, planned economy. The government through its benevolence became the “great provider” of all the leading public services and utilities. Furthermore, it was found that socialist mindset, which is at the heart of institutionalised belief that the government is a better guardian of social good in terms of delivering better education. Even when the evidence provided by Omari (2014) shows that private schools including seminaries and other FBO aided schools are doing much better than the government schools.

According to him;

“The state is unable to provide good quality education because about a decade ago, public schools, especially the special secondary schools such as Ilboru, Mazengo, Tabora, Old Moshi, Mzumbe and Kibaha, were among the best top 10 schools, leading in pass rates. Ilboru is currently in a major crisis as students and staff revolted while it was down at 41st position nationally. Today, they have been overtaken by private and quasi-private schools, such as Feza, Mzizima, Kifungiro, Tusiime, and many Seminaries such as Miriam in Bagamoyo, St Francis in Mbeya and Umbwe in Moshi”pp 15.

Also, there are ideological and policy inconsistencies between the socialist and liberal ideologies. Politicians have fanned the flames of the Arusha Declaration of 1967, even if they do not practise what they preach. In so doing, they take advantage of the

increased votes from the unsuspecting voters but they are promoting a belief and a sense of entitlement to free services.

This finding agrees with Omari (2014) who said that

“Tanzania makes a good case study of the relationship between the public and private sectors in the provision of education. The socialist policies ushered in by the 1967 Arusha Declaration were anti partnership, mainly due to fears that private education would dilute the socialist course”. p,13

The qualitative data from the interviews and documentary analysis was triangulated with the quantitative data obtained from the questionnaires and it was found out that the old practice of the belief in communal ownership still lingers on and has an impact on the community's view towards PPPs in the education sector. Respondents were asked to indicate their opinion on a Likert scale of 1 – 6 where 1 (strongly disagree) and 6 (strongly agree). The results are recorded in Table 4.16 which summarises the statistical distribution respondents' views and opinions ($N = 88$, 100%). A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the association between the public and private sector views over the hypothesis that;

The old practice and belief in communal ownership of important productive resources discourages the growth of not only private schools but also the engagement in PPPs”

There was a less than significant association between the views of the private and public sectors because the chi - square statistic value ($X^2 > 10$), $X^2 (5, N = 88) 14.097$ $p = .015$, but the supposition was retained with a slight margin with a p value.015. The majority of the respondents agreed with the supposition and was found out that the belief in

communal ownership is a non-formal institutional factor negatively affecting the designing of PPPs in the education sector.

Table 4.16: The Old Practice and Belief in Communal Ownership and PPPs

Statement: The old practice and belief in communal ownership of important productive resources discourages the growth of not only private schools but also the engagement in PPPs							
	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Lightly disagree	Lightly agree	Agree	Strongly agree	Total
Public Sector	5	4	5	4	5	12	35
	14.3%	11.4%	14.3%	11.4%	14.3%	34.3%	100.0%
Private sector	14	0	10	15	6	8	53
	26.4%	0.0%	18.9%	28.3%	11.3%	15.1%	100.0%
Total	19	4	15	19	11	20	88
	21.6%	4.5%	17.0%	21.6%	12.5%	22.7%	100.0%
Chi-Square Tests							
		Value	df			Sig. (2-sided)	
Pearson Chi-Square		14.097	5			.015	
N of Valid Cases		88					

** Pearson Chi –square of association is significant at .005 level (2 – sided)

Source: Field data (2019)

When asked to give his views towards the view that;

“... the Socialist mindset of “Ujamaa” could still be playing a big part in preventing the formation of PPPs in the education sector”

Mr Momo answered that

“I must admit that our society still expects handouts from the government and that is why even private schools are struggling to survive. Therefore, under such circumstances, PPP schools with user charges similarly face serious challenges because people still want to get free things. I believe that private schools have better facilities, but still, most parents prefer free universal education”.

However, other officers in the same office gave a contradictory view towards the seemingly enduring legacy of socialism to the formation of PPPs in the education sector.

According to Mrs. Jipandie said that;

“I do not think that it has anything to do with the lack of PPPs in the education sector, which mentality died a long time ago. Most Tanzanians appreciate the market system, and the prominent actors were born after the policy was ended. I believe there must be other reasons limiting the formation of PPPs”.

This data can be triangulated with more quantitative data obtained from the questionnaires. Respondents were asked to indicate their opinion on a Likert scale of 1 – 6 where 1 (strongly disagree) and 6 (strongly agree), whose responses are summarised in Table 4.17 which shows the statistical distribution in absolute frequency ($N = 88$, 100%).

A chi-square test of association was performed to examine the relationship between the public and private sector views over the hypothesis that;

“.... with a socialist mentality of communal ownership and hatred towards private business it is difficult for the public to accept the private sector into PPPs”

There was a less than significant association between the views of the private and public sectors because of a chi-square statistic value of ($X^2 = 17.18$) was much greater than 10, X^2 (4, $N = 88$) 17.18 $p = .002$. However, with a p value of .002, the hypothetical statement was rejected by both the private and public sector respondents. The results of the quantitative data in Table 4.17 show that there is an agreement with the qualitative data obtained from the interviews. The public sector to a great extent is the dominant

sector not only in education but also in other sectors. The private sector marginalised because of the strong links to between the public sector and the lingering institutional mechanisms of the socialist era of the 1970s and '80s.

Table 4.17: Communal Ownership of Resources and the Growth of PPPs

Table 10: Chi-Square Analysis of Responses and the Growth of PPPs							
Statement:	With a socialist mentality of communal ownership and hatred towards private business it is difficult for the public to accept the private sector into PPPs						
	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Lightly disagree	Lightly agree	Agree	Strongly agree	Total
Public Sector	0 0.0%	2 5.7%	7 20.0%	6 17.1%	4 11.4%	16 45.7%	35 100.0%
Private sector	8 15.1%	6 11.3%	9 17.0%	15 28.3%	8 15.1%	7 13.2%	53 100.0%
Total	8 9.1%	8 9.1%	16 18.2%	21 23.9%	12 13.6%	23 26.1%	88 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests							
			Value	df	Sig. (2-sided)		
Pearson Chi-Square			17.178	4	.002**		
N of Valid Cases			88				

** Pearson Chi –square of association is significant at .005 level (2 – sided)

Source: Field data (2019)

This finding agrees with Omari (2014) who said that;

“Tanzania is still recovering from the socialist era of 1967 when education was nationalised and the state had a monopoly in education is deemed fit for Tanzanians. It is recovering from a slumber, and a serious one, to realise that partnership with the private sector in financing and managing education delivery can be beneficial to all persons in the country” p, 13.

This finding confirms the secondary data obtained through a document analysis where Ngowi (2005) found that there are many challenges to the application of the PPP concept. According to him, the main challenge is that the socialist, public sector dominated economic philosophy is still lingering in some people’s minds. These include people in some key policy and decision making and implementation positions.

The above findings were triangulated with the data obtained from the interviews, questionnaires and documentary analysis and it is now clear that the failure to abandon the old belief system of communal ownership of resources – “*Ujaama*”, is one of the institutional factors that has prevented the designing of PPPs in the education sector (Ngowi, 2005; Omari, 2014). The increased government control over the education sector through the SEDP II and the ETP (URT, 1995) scares the potential private partners.

Most people, especially in the public sector, believe and have made others believe that the provisions of education exclusively through the public schools are the best to the extent of promoting the crowding out of private schools let alone the PPPs. Formal institutional factors included policies that have affected the designing of PPPs in the education sector. Policies pushing for UPE -Universal Primary Education, and most recently Universal Secondary education under circular number “5” of 2015 of the United Republic of Tanzania, have been singled out as one of the major causes of deterioration in the quality of education at all levels in Tanzania (Chonjo, 1994; Omari, 2014). Opponents of UPE have even conjured up other derogatory means out of the acronym standing for “*Ualimu Pasipo Elimu*” with a direct translation of - teaching without education.

Data obtained from the documentary review shows there are still vestiges of the socialist era in the current institutional framework. Some policymakers are holding attitudes against the PPPs because their worldview could be rooted in the fifth part of the Arusha Declaration of 1967, which includes a short resolution on the principles that the country’s leadership should adhere to. According to Van Arkadie, (1995) the document

states that TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) and government leaders were not allowed to; own shares in any company; be on the board of any privately-owned enterprise; receive two or more salaries; or own a house that is rented out to others.

Table 4.18: The Impact of the Policy of Universal-free Education on PPPs

Statement:	The policy of Free Universal Secondary Education of 2015 discourages the private sector from investing in PPPs in the education sector						
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Lightly disagree	Lightly agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
Public Sector	5 14.3%	7 20.0%	1 2.9%	9 25.7%	3 8.6%	10 28.6%	35 100.0%
Private Sector	3 5.7%	11 20.8%	16 30.2%	8 15.1%	11 20.8%	4 7.5%	53 100.0%
Total	8 9.1%	18 20.5%	17 19.3%	17 19.3%	14 15.9%	14 15.9%	88 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests							
		Value	df			Sig. (2-sided)	
Pearson Chi-Square		25.305 ^a	4			.000**	
N of Valid Cases		88					

** Pearson Chi –square of association is significant at .005 level (2 – sided)
Source: Field data (2019)

As long as there are influential politicians in privileged positions that wield sign the use of PPPs in delivering the much needs public services despite the rich policies and laws that seem to support their use. Data were triangulated with the quantitative data from the questionnaires as the respondents were asked to indicate their opinion on a Likert scale of 1 – 6 where 1(strongly disagree) and 6 (strongly agree). A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the association between the public and private sector views over the hypothesis that;

“The policy of Free Universal Secondary Education of 2015 discourages the private sector from investing in PPPs in the education sector”

There was a less than significant association between the views of the private and public sectors because of a chi-square statistic value of ($X^2 = 25.305$) was much greater than

10, $X^2(4, N = 88) 25.305 p < .006$. However, with $p < .006$, the hypothetical statement was retained but narrowly by both the private and public sector respondents. The results are recorded in Table 4.18, which summarises the statistical distribution respondents' views and opinions ($N = 88, 100\%$).

4.4.8 The “Strongman” Syndrome

The research was conducted on the assumption that there are working institutions independent of the individuals. According to the institutional theory, institutions are built by individuals, but they are supposed to be independent of the individuals that helped put them up (North, 1990). It was found that most of the decisions that influence the designing of PPPs are built around individuals leading to the normative conclusion that there is a great affinity for the “*strongman syndrome*”. This informal institutional structure involving the centralised nature of government supervision and operations allows the domination of a few strongmen/women to the extent that the current PPP practices and attitudes are greatly leaning on the subjective value system of a few officers in important offices. Most respondents in different ways acknowledged the centrality of the current system in shaping not only the attitudes of the most public officers towards the adoption of PPPs in the education sector, but also the entire policy and regulatory framework for PPPs.

Mr Tunae said that;

“So far, we do not have any PPP arrangement with private schools, which I think it depends on the type of leadership. There used to be a serious interaction, but currently it seems that there is no interest in the work of the private sector. We have spent a lot of money into public schools, especially the Ward Schools and there is less willingness to work with private schools”.

This finding is in agreement with what Afonso & Henne (2015) discovered that;

“Our experience, which agrees with other development workers who spent several years in Tanzania, has shown, that the work attitude in Tanzania favours long discussions in which everything should result in a consensus. In this way, Tanzanians avoid that a person can be blamed for potential failure. However, it also implies the slow progress as nobody feels responsible for progress and thus actively pushes for completion. Donor organisations are partly to be blamed as they introduced sit-in allowances in the past to increase the participation level of local beneficiaries”.

It was found that there is a presence of the “Strongman Syndrome”, which on its own is an informal institutional factor preventing the development of institutions that would eventually facilitate the designing of PPPs in the education sector. It was found that it has been difficult to develop the capacity of officers to enable the institutions to be independent of the individuals and that is a serious institutional handicap, negatively influences the designing of PPPs not only in the education sector but in general.

This finding confirms the findings of Afonso & Henne (2015) in their research; they discovered that;

“There are structural issues within the public sector. For example, when interviewing the Capital Development Authority in Dodoma, the official stated that several key decisions, e.g., in the distribution of the real estate, are connected to one person only. Thus, if the responsible official is sick, travels, or died, there is no possibility to continue the process until he/she returns or the position is newly filled. Examples like these increase the obstacles for businesspersons to interact in public-private partnerships with the local authorities.” p, 43

While contributing to the development of institutional theory, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that to survive and earn legitimacy, private organisations must conform

to the rules and belief systems prevailing in the environment. It was found that based on this theory, the development of PPPs in general and in the education sector in particular faces uncertainty. The building of institutions around individuals has been responsible for the lack of continuity in the policy framework that guides PPPs in Tanzania (Afonso & Henne, 2010; Ngowi 2005; Omari, 2014). For example, even the transfer of an individual officer from one office to another or even the death of one was seen as a serious handicap to the operation of the institution. For example, when asked *why there was no one with the experience concerning PPP at TIC, especially so since it was the home of the PPP Unit,*

The officer replied that;

“... one of the leading officers died and the other was transferred to the Ministry of Finance and Planning”.

These findings confirm and reaffirm the findings of Afonso and Henne (2015) who concluded that;

“The private sector is lacking an efficient umbrella organisation, which can lobby for its member’s needs. Organisations like the Tanzanian Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Agriculture who should provide service, structure, and a collaboration platform for its members are too weak and without convincing arguments, for businesses to join them”. p, 47

Based on the findings obtained from the concurrent triangulation research design, it was confirmed that the “*strongman syndrome*” is one of the informal belief systems prevailing in Tanzania’s investment environment that influences the designing of PPPs in the education sector. The domination of the strongmen should be seen as an indictment serious weakness in the institutional framework whereby the institutions that are supposed to show stability, clarity, and continuity are built and collapse

around the individuals. If PPPs are to be a reality in the provision of public utilities efforts should be taken to wilfully rid the institutional terrain of the “strong men/women”.

4.4.9 The Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs)

The National PPP policy (2009) acknowledges the centrality of the FBOs in the implementation of the PPP in the education sector. These organisations and religion occupy such a central role in the lives of many Tanzanians. Respondents were asked to indicate their opinion on a Likert scale of 1 – 6 where 1(strongly disagree) and 6 (strongly agree), A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relationship between the public and private sector views over the hypothesis that;

“Culturally there is a belief that a PPP contract in education is only possible with religious institutions such as churches and mosques (FBOs)”.

The responses were as follows; are summarised in Table 4.19, which summarises the statistical distribution in absolute frequency (N = 88, 100%). It was found that FBOs are an important institutional factor that influences the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania. There was a less than significant association between the views of the private and public sectors because of a chi-square statistic value of 18.75 was much greater than 10, $X^2(5, N = 88) 18.75 p = .002$. Given the less than significant association between the public and private sector views, however with a $p = .002$, the hypothetical statement was rejected by both the private and public sector respondents. The quantitative data results were triangulated with the qualitative data from the interviews and it was found out that PPP contracts in education should not be limited to religious institutions such as churches and mosques (FBOs).

Table 4.19: Cultural Beliefs Towards PPPs and Religious Institutions

Statement: Culturally there is a belief that a PPP contract in education is only possible with a religious institution like churches and mosques (FBOs)							
	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Lightly disagree	Lightly agree	Agree	Strongly agree	Total
Public Sector	0 0.0%	5 14.3%	4 11.4%	4 11.4%	9 25.7%	13 37.1%	35 100.0%
Private sector	16 30.2%	9 17.0%	4 7.5%	9 17.0%	9 17.0%	6 11.3%	53 100.0%
Total	16 18.2%	14 15.9%	8 9.1%	13 14.8%	18 20.5%	19 21.6%	88 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests							
		Value	df			Sig. (2-sided)	
Pearson Chi-Square		18.747	5			.002**	
N of Valid Cases		88					

** Pearson Chi –square of association is significant at .005 level (2 – sided)

Source: Field Data (2019)

The above quantitative data are analysed and collaborated with other qualitative data from interviews and documentary analysis, and it was found out that informal institutions such as religion and faith are still strong and influence the designing of PPPs in the education sector but the community is more open to accepting other private sector partnerships with the government.

The quantitative data results were triangulated with the qualitative data from the interviews and it was found out that the faith-based organisations are no longer an important informal institution influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector as summarised in Table 4.20. A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the association between the public and private sector views over the hypothesis that;

“The cultural and religious institutions play a leading role in determining whether the government should enter into a PPP arrangement with the private sector schools”.

Table 4.20: The Role of Cultural and Religious Institution in Designing PPPs

Statement: The cultural and religious institutions play a leading role in determining whether the government should enter into a PPP arrangement with the private sector schools							
	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Lightly disagree	Lightly agree	Agree	Strongly agree	Total
Public Sector	1 2.9%	10 28.6%	3 8.6%	8 22.9%	7 20.0%	6 17.1%	35 100.0%
Private sector	2 3.8%	9 17.0%	27 50.9%	4 7.5%	11 20.8%	0 0.0%	53 100.0%
Total	3 3.4%	19 21.6%	30 34.1%	12 13.6%	18 20.5%	6 6.8%	88 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests							
			Value	df		Sig. (2-sided)	
Pearson Chi-Square			25.180	5		.001**	
N of Valid Cases			88				

** Pearson Chi –square of association is significant at .005 level (2 – sided)

Source: Field Data (2019)

There was a less than significant association between the views of the private and public sectors because of a chi-square statistic value of 25.18 was much greater than 10, X^2 (5, $N = 88$) 25.18 $p < .001$. The less than significant association between the public and private sector views notwithstanding, the observed data was statistically significant ($p < .001$) to reject the, the hypothetical statement. The cultural and religious institutions should play a limited role in determining whether the government should enter into a PPP arrangement with the private sector schools.

4.5 Effects of Institutional Framework Changes on Designing of PPPs

Williamson (1975) identified many assumptions of the transaction cost theory including the bounded *rationality* of the agents to the contract. Bounded rationality is built around the possibility of foreseeing future situations and certainty. The partners' bounded rationality therefore, is affected by changes in policies, and inspired the third research object, which investigated *the effect of changes in the institutional framework on the*

designing of PPPs. The research was guided by the institutional theory of contracts, which is concerned with the deeper and more resilient aspects of social structure. According to Kraft (2007), Institutional Theory is “*Policy-making that emphasises the formal and legal aspects of government structures*”. The quantitative part of this Mixed Methods Research approach gave special attention to finding the cause effect relationship between the changes in the institutions and the designing of PPPs in the education sector.

Many policy changes were examined right from the adoption of the Arusha Declaration of 1967, which made Tanzania become a centrally planned economy, to the most recent including the SEDP I and II. It was found that extreme changes have created uncertainty for all parties and create new challenges for partners willing to enter long-term contractual relationships, by eroding away the basis for the negotiation and designing of viable PPPs in education. In addition to the data obtained from secondary sources such as official documents, questionnaire and interview schedules the thematic and descriptive data provided the following findings:

4.5.1 Uncoordinated changes in the Framework for PPPs in Education Sector

The research guided by the institutional theory, considered the processes by which structures, including schemes; rules, norms, and routines, become established as authoritative guidelines for social behaviour. The 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a mass movement towards the privatization of state assets facilitated through the National Investment Promotion Act (enacted in 1990 and revised 1997) to create Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) and the creation of the Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission charged with divesting 400 public enterprises and state assets (URT,

2009). Even with such changes so far, it has been discovered that they have not supported the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania.

Data from the documentary analysis shows that many changes to the existing policy framework have been made, even before the previous changes have not yet taken root, which presents a practical challenge to the officers to the extent that they must start all over again each time such changes are made. It was found out that, for example, the PPP centre in the Ministry of Finance and Planning department for PPPs, so far is yet to put up a coordination desk with the TIC, which is responsible for coordinating private investments in the country.

It was found out that the constantly changing and conflicting policies are a problem to the effective designing of PPPs in the education sector. Qualitative data from the interviews were triangulated with the quantitative data from the questionnaire and there is an agreement that the constant and sporadic changes in the policy framework make it difficult for the parties to enter PPP contracts. Table 4.21 summarises the views and opinions of the respondents were asked to indicate their opinion on a Likert scale of 1 – 6 where; 1 (strongly disagree) and 6 (strongly agree).

A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the association between the public and private sector views over the hypothesis that *“There are conflicting and contradictory policies in the education sector”* There was a significant association between the views of the private and public sectors because of a chi-square statistic value of 5.73 which was lower than 10, $X^2 (4, N = 88) 5.73 p = .221$.

Table 4.21: Changing and Conflicting PPP Policies in the Education Sector

Statement:	There are conflicting and contradictory policies in the education sector					
	Strongly Disagree	Lightly disagree	Lightly agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
Public Sector	5 14.3%	5 14.3%	3 8.6%	19 54.3%	3 8.6%	35 100.0%
Private sector	5 9.4%	3 5.7%	13 24.5%	25 47.2%	7 13.2%	53 100.0%
Total	10 11.4%	8 9.1%	16 18.2%	44 50.0%	10 11.4%	88 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests						
	Value		df	Sig. (2-sided)		
Pearson Chi-Square	5.726		4	.221		
N of Valid Cases	88					

** Pearson Chi –square of association is significant at .005 level (2 – sided)

Source: Field Data (2019)

The significant association between the public and private sector views notwithstanding, the observed data was statistically insignificant ($p = .221$) to reject the, the hypothetical statement therefore it was retained. When asked about his views towards the changes in the policy framework towards supporting the designing of PPPs, Mr Papaya had this to say;

“I also know that NBC (National Bank of Commerce) is a partnership between the government and the private investor. I want to find more about the deal between Airtel mobile phone service provider and TTCL, which must have been a PPP even I understand that the IFM (Institute of Financial Management) is running collaboration courses with some university in India, which qualifies as a PPP”

When the data were triangulated with that from the interviews and questionnaires, it is was found that some of the policy changes made in the Education sector have negatively influenced the designing, implementation, and monitoring of PPP in the education sector.

4.5.2 Parallel Implementation Mechanisms of PPP Policies

The researcher held an assumption that a clear PPP coordination and implementation mechanism must have been developed 10 years after the enactment of the National PPP policy (URT, 2009). It was found that there are parallel and competing mechanisms, living side by side in the PPP policy framework. Furthermore, there are constant changes in the management, control, and coordination of the education sector.

When commenting about the same, Mrs. Vululu said that;

“For us in the private sector, we are confused about whom to contact and conduct negotiations. A few years ago, education was under the Ministry of Education and Vocational training, later it is under the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology and we are now receiving communication from the president’s office (TAMISEMI). Let me tell you there is much competition just within the same government each ministry is trying to outdo the other, to impress the president. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to arrange any meaningful discussion over PPPs never”.

The researcher probed further by asking the respondent to give *suggestions to the government in terms of areas in which she thought the two sectors could cooperate and probably form PPPs?* Mr Vululu replied that;

“That will be impossible because the government does not show any willingness to work with us. I can only say that all we want is to remove the policies that deny us from increasing the school enrolments”.

The above finding is inconclusive about the extent of the weak implementation mechanisms, but it is a pointer to the argument that there is a big gap in terms of trust and corroboration between the two sides. More should be done to identify the possible area of cooperation and where possible training should be conducted on both the public and private sectors. To have a clearer picture of the challenge facing the public and

private sector in terms of cooperation; the above qualitative data were triangulated with the quantitative data obtained from the questionnaires. Respondents were asked to indicate their opinion on the Likert scale of 1 – 6, where; 1 (Strongly Disagree), while 6 (Strongly Agree). Table 4.22 (N = 88, 100%) summarised the responses to the supposition that.

A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the association between the public and private sector views over the hypothesis that **“partners do not commit to the issues agreed”**. There was a limited association between the views of the private and public sectors because of a chi-square statistic value of 21.073 was bigger than 10, $X^2(4, N = 88) 21.073 p < .007$. The less than significant association between the public and private sector views notwithstanding, the observed data was statistically insignificant ($p < .007$) to reject the, the hypothetical statement.

Table 4.22: The Commitment from the Partners

Statement:	There is no commitment from the partners on issues that are agreed					
	Disagree	Lightly disagree	Lightly agree	Agree	Strongly agree	Total
Public Sector	1 2.9%	1 2.9%	7 20.0%	15 42.9%	11 31.4%	35 100.0%
Private sector	9 17.0%	11 20.8%	19 35.8%	8 15.1%	6 11.3%	53 100.0%
Total	10 11.4%	12 13.6%	26 29.5%	23 26.1%	17 19.3%	88 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests						
		Value		df	Sig. (2-sided)	
Pearson Chi-Square		21.073		4	.007	
N of Valid Cases		88				

** Pearson Chi –square of association is significant at .005 level (2 – sided)

Source: Field Data (2019)

4.5.3 Increased Government Control over Education

The researcher's impression was that there was a positive environment in which PPPs in the education sector could be designed and promoted. However, it was found that the implementation of the Secondary Education Development Program (SEDP) I and II is one of the policy changes that have harmed the designing of PPPs in the education sector. This study assumed that there is a complementary policy framework to support the National PPP policy (URT, 2009) aimed at promoting the negotiation and promotion of PPPs in general and in the education sector in particular. Unfortunately, the implementation of the SEDP both I and II (URT, 2010) is one of the formal institutional factors that hurt the designing of PPPs in the education sector because it has increased the hand of the government in providing education while competing against the private sector. According to Mrs. Vululu when asked *about the policies that she thought might be responsible for the lack of PPPs in the education sector*, she had this to say;

“The increased expenditure by the government on Ward schools has reduced private sector ability to enrol students. Some government officials are proud of it, and they do not even consider us because it is more centralisation of government control over education than what is said in the newspapers and on the radio. . . “

This finding confirms the finding of Omari (2014) who said that;

“The Directives of the Arusha Declaration and Education for Self-Reliance of 1967/68 saw further consolidation of the state in dictating on education policy and nature of education provided in all schools.”

The above findings contradict the conclusion made by Kamando (2014). In her research, she concluded that;

“The Education and Training Policy (ETP) of 1995, was introduced (URT, 1995) as part of the ESDP was enhanced following the economic crisis. Such policies were seen as necessary during the transition from a socialist political-ideology in which the government was responsible

for the provision of important social services to a free-market economy. The ETP policy was intended to accommodate the newly adopted SAPs conditions, which created the necessary conditions for the introduction of cost-sharing, privatisation, and liberalisation of education provision”.

According to her, the implementation of ETP presupposed the application of PPPs in which the policy invited various groups including private agencies, individuals, organisations, and communities to establish, manage, and administer schools at primary and secondary levels.

Table 4.23: Domination of the Public Sector in the Provision of Education

Statement:		The government is too dominant over the provision of education through public schools				
		Disagree	Lightly disagree	Lightly agree	Agree	Strongly agree
Public Sector	1	7	1	8	18	35
	2.9%	20.0%	2.9%	22.9%	51.4%	100.0%
Private sector	10	19	6	12	6	53
	18.9%	35.8%	11.3%	22.6%	11.3%	100.0%
Total	11	26	7	20	24	88
	12.5%	29.5%	8.0%	22.7%	27.3%	100.0%
Chi-Square Tests						
			Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	
Pearson Chi-Square			20.447	4	.023	
N of Valid Cases			88			

** Pearson Chi –square of association is significant at .005 level (2 – sided)

Source: Field Data (2019)

These data were triangulated with the quantitative data from the questionnaires, with responses to the standardised questionnaire were designed using a Likert scale to direct the respondents' choices of the opinions and feelings deemed fit. In the scale (1= strongly disagree, 6= Strongly Agree) as summarised in table 4.23 (N = 88, 100%).

A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the association between the public and private sector views over the hypothesis that; *“The government is too dominant over the provision of education through public schools”*. There was a less significant association between the views of the private and public sectors because of a chi-square statistic value of 20.45 was greater than 10, $X^2 (4, N = 88) 20.45 p < .023$. The less than significant association between the public and private sector views notwithstanding, the observed data was statistically insignificant ($p < .023$) to reject the, the hypothetical statement.

The quantitative data results were triangulated with the qualitative data from the interviews and it was found out that the government plays a dominant over the provision of education. However, some of the qualitative data from the interviews did not agree with this position and their view agrees with Mr Tititi, a senior administrator working with a public institution aimed at bridging the two sectors, according to him, the institution he is working for is democratic and the private sector is represented;

“One of the pending issues the president highlighted was that of unpaid arrears on the tenders provided by the private businesses, and the last meeting the president himself chaired, it was agreed that the government should pay all outstanding arrears to enable private businessmen/women to conduct their businesses properly”.

When asked a probing question;

“I have heard from the leaders and owners of private schools that the ground is not levelled between the public and private education sector. Have such leaders presented their grievances to your attention?”

Mr Tititi replied that;

“... yes, we have the heads and owners of private schools and colleges as our members and like I can show you on this schedule

of problems, solutions, and recommendations, their problem have been taken into account. In one of the meetings, someone suggested a PPP arrangement, but we are yet to work more towards that. In case of any problems with fairness, I think the problem is on their side because they have 20 members on the council and it is better for them to raise some of these on their side of the council than to complain. However, as far as I am concerned, everything is moving in the right direction”.

The above finding shows that there are established forums for dialogue and coordination of the activities between the public and private sectors. The framework for guiding the provision of secondary education is leaning in favour of more government schools, which has done more than enough in discouraging the collaboration between the public and private sectors in the provision of education.

4.5.4 Changes in PPP Funding Mechanisms

One of the sticking issues relating to the designing of the PPPs in general and in the education sector in particular is the issue of financing. To address this problem, Section 10A of the PPP Act (URT, 2014) provides the establishment of the *Public-Private Partnership Facilitation Fund*. The main purpose of this fund is to support the contracting authorities to meet the project preparation costs and to ensure that projects considered socially desirable due to their economic benefits but not commercially or financially viable are implemented. It was not in the realm of this research to determine how social viability was established, instead, it was interesting to determine whether the institutions are working and to what effect! When asked to explain how such financing facility works, Mr Momo had this to say;

“The government has put in place the Availability Payments Facility to pay the private partner. It is like the government is taking a soft loan from the private investor, which should encourage the formation of PPPs because the private sector is assured of

recovering their expenses. The government must provide public services even in circumstances where it is difficult to recover some expenses through user charges”.

Based on the above findings, it is plausible to argue that much as the onus is with the public sector to initiate the process of a PPP project in terms the solicited bids, but the private sector has not done enough to engage the public sector in the form of the unsolicited bids (URT, 2009).

Table 4.24: The Funding of PPP Projects

Statement: The leading financial institutions consider education a high-risk area of investment and are not willing to finance the development of PPPs in the education sector.						
	Disagree	Lightly disagree	Lightly agree	Agree	Strongly agree	Total
Public Sector	3 8.6%	8 22.9%	7 20.0%	12 34.3%	5 14.3%	35 100.0%
Private sector	1 1.9%	17 32.1%	11 20.8%	16 30.2%	8 15.1%	53 100.0%
Total	4 4.5%	25 28.4%	18 20.5%	28 31.8%	13 14.8%	88 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests						
	Value		df	Sig. (2-sided)		
Pearson Chi-Square	2.829		4	.587		
N of Valid Cases	88					

** Pearson Chi –square of association is significant at .005 level (2 – sided)

Source: Field Data (2019)

The existence of the Availability Payments Facility would make it easier for the private sector to propose and based on the willingness of the public sector, engage in PPPs in the education sector. This qualitative data was triangulated with quantitative data obtained from the questionnaires and it was determined that funding is not a major challenge faced in the designing of PPP in the education sector was the issue of funding, as summarised in Table 4.24 (N = 88, 100%).

A chi-square test of association was conducted to find out the association between the views of both the public and private sector respondents. It was found out that there was a significant association between the views of the private and public sectors over the hypothetical statement that “*The leading financial institutions consider education a high-risk area of investment and are not willing to finance the development of PPPs in the education sector*”. $X^2(4, N = 88) 2.83 p = .587$. The significant association between the public and private sector views notwithstanding, the observed data was statistically insignificant ($p = .587$) to reject the, the hypothetical statement.

4.6 Stakeholders’ Perceptions of the Challenges of Designing PPPs

Mixed Methods Research approach dominated by the qualitative research methods gave special attention to finding out the views of the respondents who were required to give their perspective and views towards the challenges faced in the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Sector in Tanzania. The thematic data analysis method highlighted many salient themes and presented below;

4.6.1 Conflicting Objectives

The research assumed that to design effective PPPs in the education sector, there must be goodwill and utmost good faith between the public and private sectors. Unfortunately, when data were collected and analysed, it became clear that there is a wide gap between policymakers and implementers as far as the designing of PPPs in the education sector is concerned. It was found that there are irreconcilable differences between the public and private sectors to the extent that most of the public sector officials talked about wishing the private sector schools to have a “*natural death*”. Omari (2014) reported that the relationship between the PPP management in the

education sector has been rough, historically rocky, and sometimes antagonistic. He concluded that there was no partnership but competition, economic, racial, and religious exclusivity and this finding is in line with what this research has found out. Mukasa et al. (2021a) found out that there are more challenges yet to be surmounted to increase trust between open schools and the IAE, especially since the institute also runs parallel open schools alongside private open schools. This duplication and overlapping of roles can lead to disruption has a serious handicap on the delivery of NFSE just like Shirima (2016) found.

According to him, there was duplication of administrative positions and functions caused by differing administrative structures, as well as incoherent policies and incomparable institutional directives. The information given by a senior public sector official confirms the fractious relationship between the two sectors when she was asked a probing question *to comment about the policy statement in the National PPP policy document that PPPs have been successfully implemented with FBOs*, Mrs. Baibui had this to say;

“Regrettably, the current PPP policy has not recognised the FBOs’ role in PPP in the education sector. These schools were nationalised I think in 1968 and they are 100 owned by the government, which ended the PPP arrangement...”

It was found that most public sector officials in Tanzania were confronting a serious conflict whereby, on one hand, they must embrace the increase in the size of the public sector at the same time be seen promoting the private sector. The National Public-Private Partnership policy (URT, 2009) gave a clear policy direction of the need to reduce the size of the public sector.

When studying the possibility of the two sectors working together to provide secondary education, it was found that the public sector actors mainly take decisions that are deliberately sizing out the private sector, especially in the education sector. When asked in a probing question over what she *thinks about the need for the government to work with the private sector in providing education services*, Mrs. Simama had this to say

“I am worried you are talking about complicated things because there is no way we are working with the private sector currently because we have more government schools that what we even need, therefore there is no need for PPPs...”

M/s Jipandie, a senior official, in a public office, shared a similar view when he said that;

“For sure if we can develop or own schools that can provide good education the way the government anticipates then, there is no need of entering PPP arrangements with the private schools. If we increase government expenditure on free education PPPs will have no meaning...”

Such an attitude is at the heart of the most government institutions charged with PPP-contracting status, and does not spell well for the designing of PPPs in the education sector. The comments and experiences of a leading member of a private sector institution in a different interview confirmed that the institutions that are supposed to work together to produce enduring partnerships are not on the same footing. When asked in a probing question *about the kind of relationship with the government* Mrs. Vululu had this to say;

“There are no partnerships because first, it is important to have willing parties to the partnership. More input is needed on behalf of the public sector to accommodate the weak private schools and not wish them a natural death...”

Senior administrators at a leading public school repeated the talk of the “*natural death*” when they were responding to the question about *the possibility of a future working relationship between the two sectors* and Mr Parachichi had this to say;

“These days there is almost no difference between the private schools and the government school. I must admit that some of the more serious private schools are academically performing better than most public schools, but we have tremendously improved. The salary difference is not that big and some of the private schools are even paying less. With such an improvement, we do not need to work with the private sector. Can you imagine out of the 200 students allocated to our school to join in Form 1 this academic year, more than 180 took up their admission, which shows that public schools are doing much better and private schools will suffer a natural death if they do not get enough students...”

When asked;

“What do you mean by a “natural death”? I had a similar concern from one of the owners of a private school complaining about the same;

Mr Parachichi said;

“We do not mean that there is a deliberate policy by the government to kill private schools, but if the government schools can put their act together, they can compete favourably with private schools. However, of course, the mediocre private schools with less capital and poor management systems will suffer more and will close...”

This finding indicates a mismatch between the ideal position of the need for the public sector to work with the private sector in the National PPP policy document (URT, 2009) and the practise on the ground. It is shocking to find that the much-hyped rhetoric is no matched by any tangible results on the ground.

4.6.2 Conflicting and Fragmented Policy Framework

It was found that there is a mismatch between the PPP Policy framework and the implementation mechanism. Despite the enactment of impressive Acts of parliament i.e., the PPP regulations Act 2014 and the PPP Act of 2017 CAP 103, there is little work on the ground. This finding is similar to what Itika (2007) found that there are various pieces of legislation and guidelines in Tanzania that could be used to initiate and design PPP models and projects, but there is no specific regulation for PPPs and there is limited awareness of the general laws and policies concerning PPPs.

The finding is similar to that of Mukasa et. al. (2021b) observed that there are weak and unsystematic coordination mechanisms between the various Public-private sector intermediaries, despite the numerous PPP policies in the education sector. They called for the strengthening of the Public-Private intermediaries especially those with the authority and mandate to coordinate the Public Private Dialogue (PPD).

According to them, an effective business environment for PPPs can still be attained without necessarily rolling out more PPP policies. A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the association between the public and private sector views over the hypothetical statement that;

“The constantly changing and conflicting policies are a problem to the effective designing of PPPs in the education sector”

Respondents were asked to rank on a Likert scale of 1–6 (where 1 – strongly disagree and 6 – strongly agree) as summarised in Table 4.25 (N = 88, 100%). There was a significant association between the views of the private and public sectors

because of a chi-square statistic value of 9.73 was much lower than 10, $X^2(4, N = 88) 9.73 p = .045$. The significant association between the public and private sector views notwithstanding, the observed data was not statistically significant ($p = .045$) to reject the, the hypothetical statement.

Table 4.25: Changing and Conflicting Policies

Statement:	The constantly changing and conflicting policies are a problem to the effective designing of PPPs in the education sector					
	Disagree	Lightly disagree	Lightly agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
Public Sector	0 0.0%	1 2.9%	5 14.3%	19 54.3%	10 28.6%	35 100.0%
Private sector	3 5.7%	12 22.6%	4 7.5%	24 45.3%	10 18.9%	53 100.0%
Total	3 3.4%	13 14.8%	9 10.2%	43 48.9%	20 22.7%	88 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests						
	Value		df	Sig. (2-sided)		
Pearson Chi-Square	9.725 ^a		4	.045		
N of Valid Cases	88					
a. 3 cells (30.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.19.						

a. 3 cells (30.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.19.

** Pearson Chi –square of association is significant at .005 level (2 – sided)

Source: Field Data (2019)

This finding is further supported by Mukasa, et al. (2021b) who found that there is an environment of mistrust between the IAE and private open schools, especially when it comes to treating the institute's owned open schools and private open schools. They concluded that the most outstanding challenge that can derail a partnership between private open schools and the Institute of Adult Education (IAE) are the obvious unfair competition between the institute and private open schools as it is a supervisor.

4.6.3 Lack of Commitment from Partners

It was also found that there is a lack of commitment from the different partners. According to the national PPP policy document (URT, 2009) the public sector is the main contracting authority with the prerogative of initiating the solicited PPP projects looking for private partners. Unfortunately, not even one solicited PPP project has been reported by the respondents in the education sector. Despite the weaknesses in the private sector, the GoT has not put enough effort in planning for PPPs, including education (Ngowi, 2005; Itika et al., 2011). Most of the leading actors in the sector acknowledge that there are limited or no efforts from the government ministries and departments concerned to initiate or even engage the private sector at the level of a PPP. In response to the question - *from your experiences what are the challenges facing the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania?* Mrs. Vululu had this to say;

“The main problem is the limited support from the public sector. I do not believe that the public sector has any interest in the private sector let alone any interest in creating partnerships with the private schools”.

The above findings indicate that much as there are pronouncements and declarations of the two sides’ willingness to work together, there is no evidence that the two are working together. Therefore, the lack of commitment to the declared positions has been found out as a serious challenge to the designing of PPPs in the education sector. The primary quantitative data collected from questionnaires as summarised in Table 4.25 indicates that most respondents viewed the lack of commitment from the partners as a serious challenge to designing PPPs.

4.6.4 The Rocky History between the Public and Private Sectors

Based on the public proclamations and policy statements from various government departments, it was assumed that there was support not only towards the private education sector but also the adoption of PPPs. It was found that another challenge facing the designing of PPPs is that the nationalisation of schools in 1968 still bears indelible scars on the rocky historical relationship between the two sectors. This research did not find enough evidence that the public sector, as the contracting authority, is reaching out to the private sector by way of forming partnerships. Currently, at best the main interface between the two sectors is the tendering and procurement process. When he was asked a probing question; *is it true that some of the public officials are not in favour of the private sector schools?*

Mr Tititi disagreed with this view and he said that;

“....no that is not true, because the attendance of public officials in the public-private sector dialogue meeting is strong. The public sector gives private sector priority and they are working hard to see that there is a healthy dialogue between the public and private sectors. If they were not interested, then why should they attend with such high calibre delegations....?”

The findings above indicate that much as some respondents do not treat the relationship between the two sectors as rocky, by and large the majority have the opinion that it is rocky and more effort is needed to improve it. The private sector officials were resolute in their condemnation of the public sector as the main hindrance towards PPPs. The public sector defended its self by blaming the private sector. This quandary is similar to what Ngowi (2005) attributed to the general inadequacy of the much-needed funds, knowledge, expertise, experience, and equipment by the private sector.

According to him, most players in the private sector lack the capacity to accommodate the interests of the other party. In addition, before PPPs are applied, these conditions must be in place, including possession of an appropriate amount of money, knowledge, equipment, and experience. To make matters worse, even where some private firms may satisfy the above conditions, there is an acute problem of a huge informal sector with little or no documentation (Ngowi, 2005). The mutual mistrust between the public and private stakeholders is not limited to the education sector as Itika et al. (2011), discovered and recommended that the long history of mistrust between the government and the private sector needs to be worked upon. Therefore, policy directed interventions for improving PPPs should be not only a collaborative effort among the PPP key stakeholders but also each stakeholder should make efforts to abide by accountability and transparency principles.

The above qualitative data from interviews and documentary analysis was triangulated with the quantitative data from the questionnaires and it was found out that the rocky relationship between the two sectors is a serious challenge to the designing of PPPs in the education sector. A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the association between the public and private sector views over the hypothesis that; *“There is a lack of trust based on the rocky and hostile history between the partners”*.

Table 4.26 summarises the quantitative data, and it was found that there was a less than significant association between the views of the private and public sectors. The chi-square statistic value of 14.46 was higher than 10, $X^2 (5, N = 88) 14.46 p = .013$.

Table 4.26: The Rocky and Hostile Relationship

Statement:	There is a lack of trust based on the rocky and hostile history between the partners						
	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Lightly disagree	Lightly agree	Agree	Strongly agree	Total
Public Sector	2	0	6	9	11	7	35
	5.7%	0.0%	17.1%	25.7%	31.4%	20.0%	100.0%
Private sector	11	4	12	16	4	6	53
	20.8%	7.5%	22.6%	30.2%	7.5%	11.3%	100.0%
Total	13	4	18	25	15	13	88
	14.8%	4.5%	20.5%	28.4%	17.0%	14.8%	100.0%
Chi-Square Tests							
	Value		df		Sig. (2-sided)		
Pearson Chi-Square	14.457		5		.013		
N of Valid Cases	88						

** Pearson Chi –square of association is significant at .005 level (2 – sided)

Source: Field Data (2019)

The less than significant association between the public and private sector views notwithstanding, the observed data was not statistically significant ($p = .013$) to reject the, the hypothetical statement. The quantitative data results were triangulated with the qualitative data from the interviews and it was found out that there is a serious lack of trust based on the rocky and hostile history between the partners.

4.6.5 Overlapping Roles of Various Government Offices

One of the assumptions of this study was that there is a well thought out policy framework where the roles of the various government departments are spelt out. It was found that overlapping roles is still a major challenge to the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania. The constant policy changes have continued to create more parallel centres than the intended complementary units to facilitate the development and implementation of PPPs in Tanzania.

It was also found that the PPP (Amendment) act of 2014 CAP 103 had a serious policy change that effectively closed the operations of the PPP unit from TIC (Tanzania Investment Centre) to the Prime Minister's Office under the "PPP Centre". Unfortunately, within a short time before the institutional capacity and inertia could be developed, the PPP Act of 2017 moved the operations of the "PPP centre" to an unspecified ministry. Currently, it is the PPP Division in the Ministry of Finance and Planning that is acting as the PPP centre. At the same time, there is an investment office in Prime Minister's office that is still supposed to deal with PPPs.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the constant changes have contributed to the failure to design PPPs. All actors are in a constant move and have not got time to rethink and revisit some of the important principles laid down in the National PPP policy (URT, 2009). When asked about the seemingly overlapping roles between the PPP centre in the Prime Minister's Office and the "PPP division" Mr Momo said that;

"According to the PPP act of 2017, we are now the PPP centre. For us, we are tasked to check the values and advice on the viability of the various projects, but we do not enter the contracts directly for us we are at the strategic level. We have been mandated to run not only the PPP division in the Ministry of finance and planning, but we double as the PPP centre that was supposed to be in the Prime Minister's Office. So, the Ministries and local governments (TAMISEMI) should continue to engage in the private sector and identify projects in education, and they make forwarding recommendation to us for the feasibility study and coordination with other important actors..."

Many respondents from the private sector identified the duplication and overlapping of roles as a serious bottleneck. According to many, the public sector is fragmented and it is unclear to the private sector whom and which department to contact in case of any

proposed partnership. When asked the question concerning the challenges faced, Mr Papaya had this to say;

“It seems like the government is competing with itself. Sometimes we receive correspondences from the Ministry of Education, others from the Tanzania Education Authority and under such circumstances it is difficult for our clients to make clear decisions....”

This view is similar to that expressed by Mrs. Vululu who said that;

“As an institution representing private school owners, we are on many occasions confused with the correspondences some coming from the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology and others from TAMISEMI and are all working through their regional and district offices. She added that; under such circumstances, it becomes difficult to make meaningful discussions let alone, meaningful partnerships and collaboration....”

This finding agrees with what Afonso and Henne (2015) recommended that;

“The objective of the initiative that supports PPPs must be to create a strong society with three equally skilled sectors interested in collaboration. Consequently, strengthening the Chamber of Commerce would reduce the gap between the ideal theoretic situations and current reality”.

The above findings indicate that there is no institution specifically established to coordinate the public and private sectors in the docket of education is another challenge. A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the association between the public and private sector views over the hypothesis that;

“The constantly changing and conflicting policies are a problem to the effective designing of PPPs in the education sector”.

There was a significantly close association between the views of the private and public sectors because of a chi-square statistic value of 9.725 which was lower

than 10, $X^2(4, N = 88) 9.73 p = .045$. The significantly close association between the public and private sector views notwithstanding, the observed data was not statistically significant ($p = .045$) to reject the, the hypothetical statement.

Table 4.27: Changing and Conflicting Public Sector Policies

Statement: The constantly changing and conflicting policies are a problem to the effective designing of PPPs in the education sector						
	Disagree	Lightly disagree	Lightly agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
Public Sector	0 0.0%	1 2.9%	5 14.3%	19 54.3%	10 28.6%	35 100.0%
Private sector	3 5.7%	12 22.6%	4 7.5%	24 45.3%	10 18.9%	53 100.0%
Total	3 3.4%	13 14.8%	9 10.2%	43 48.9%	20 22.7%	88 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	9.725 ^a	4	.045
N of Valid Cases	88		

a. 3 cells (30.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.19.

**** Pearson Chi –square of association is significant at .005 level (2 – sided)**

Source: Field Data (2019)

The quantitative data results summarised in Table 4.27 were triangulated with the qualitative data from the interviews and it was found out that the constantly changing and conflicting policies are a problem to the effective designing of PPPs in the education sector.

It was found out that there is less clarity for partners especially from the private sector. The only existing platforms to coordinate the PPP activities are mainly coordinating other fields rather than education related work. This finding is in line with Mukasa et al. (2021a) who found out that there are many Public-Private sector intermediaries that

have led to the duplication of efforts. Therefore, there is an urgent need to harmonize the different roles to reduce and better still, remove the disruptive overlaps that can have a serious handicap on the effective implementation of PPP policies in Tanzania. The efforts of the different intermediaries should focus on the recommendations of the Government Blueprint (URT, 2017a) the Blueprint for Regulatory Reforms to Improve the Business Environment.

4.6.6 Failure to Recognise Education as an Area of Private Investment

Another challenge is the failure to view education as a private good, which the government along with the private sector can gain benefits not only in terms of maximising social welfare but also providing quality education at a lower price because of the competition. During the interview, respondents were asked *whether the government would have got more value for money if they formed PPPs with local instead of building the ward secondary schools*, Mr. Bututula agreed with this supposition and said that;

“For sure collaboration with the private sector would significantly reduce the huge amounts of money spent on the construction of one more extra school in the ward but with poor quality products. If the chance was there for sure it would be great. . .”

When asked the same question, Mr Tititi shared a similar view by saying that;

“I believe that would be good and it would solve the problem of resource duplication because as much as there would be some money to be paid, the quality of education would improve and there would be a greater benefit than now when the government is acting alone....”

When asked *whether they had received any clients seeking to interact with the government in the provision of education*, Mr Papaya had this to say;

“I have to admit that currently, we have not received any client from the private sector wishing to be connected with any government project. I think most people have not looked at education as a lucrative business. Most people, especially in the government have made us think that education is a public good....”

These findings indicate an urgent need for the government to streamline its operations. Just like Brans (2011), discovered, that there is a challenge whereby there is also some confusion and controversy among the different bodies that serve as intermediaries between the government and the private sector. More efforts should be spent on ironing out the differences, some of which are conceptual while others are procedural.

When asked about *the would-be possible outcomes if the government financing the private schools instead of building ward schools*,

Mr Papaya said that;

“... This could have been so great, first the government could seriously cut down on the expenses of providing poor quality education and the private sector in education would have grown quickly. ...”

The above findings show that there is an urgent need for the government to realign priorities and strategies, which is similar to what Awortwi (2004) determined that, in Ghana that there was a gap between PPP policy expectations and outcomes, which he attributed to getting the fundamentals wrong. Currently, the government is stretched between the need to deliver social services like education as a way of maximising social welfare and the need to mobilise resources to finance such services. More research is

needed to confirm this position, but from the views of the respondents, the government should rethink its position on the direct provision of free secondary education and its impact not only on the private schools but on the formation of PPPs in the education sector.

4.4.7 The Choice of the Right Partner Under a PPP Project

The research was conducted with the belief that there was a clear mechanism to guide the different partners on matters of mutual interest. On this basis, it was the notion of the researcher that it was possible to synchronize various standpoints, in the case that PPPs in the education sector were to be formed. Unfortunately, it was found that so far, the two sectors are distant especially due to the mutual distrust. It was important to determine which sector and within each sector, who would be the best partner. The question then arose within the private sector, is it better for the government to enter into a partnership with private businessmen or the FBOs? During an interview this question was presented to Mrs. Simama, she was asked; *“Are the FBOs could be better partners than individual businesspersons owning schools?”*

She had this to say;

“It is difficult to work with the private sector, especially the FBOs because the problem is that we have been here before; they want to put the religion first instead of national education. That is why the government in 1967 nationalised all these schools so that the education given is representative of the national education objectives. The problem is that the government passed a law that guaranteed the FBO compensation for the schools in terms of land and buildings. For example, I think it was Zanaki in Upanga that was promised land either in Goba or Mbezi beach, and I am not sure whether it was implemented. So, for us in government, we do not talk about PPPs at all. All those schools like Forodhani are now national secondary schools up to Form 6 and the government is doing a good job...”

4.4.7.1 Conflicted Project Leadership

Governments and private sectors are unequal in their power structures; therefore, there is still confusion over which roles should be performed by the different players. Similarly, (Alexandra, 2012 & Tilak, 2010) argues that often the running of PPPs distorts as to whom the partnerships are accountable to, according to what criteria and who sets the priorities. This research was conducted find out the challenges facing the designing of PPPs in the education sector was the leadership of the PPP project. The qualitative data obtained from in-depth interviews shows that there was some support for the public sector to take leadership of the PPP projects, it was however discovered that there was overwhelming support for the private sector to take the leadership of a PPP project in education. Most respondents both public and private wanted the government to build the institutional capacity to take back the project eventually, though more research is needed to come up with a generalised position When asked, *just in case any PPPs were successfully formed, which sector do you think should take the leadership of the PPP project?*

Mrs. Jipandie said;

“In the event of a PPP project I think it should be the private sector to take the lead, but eventually, the project should finally go back to the government. The government should assume a subordinate role otherwise the mismanagement that is common in the public sector will still affect the private sector. Should the government play the leading role, then there will be no work done to improve the efficiency in public service delivery. It is only important for the government to develop KPIs (Key Performance Indicators) to ensure the maximisation of social welfare...”

A similar view was shared by Mr Tunae, acknowledged the differences between the two sectors and he had this to say;

“The government is more concerned with the provision of the services, while the private sector wants to recover as much revenue as possible through user charges. In addition, it has made the formation of PPPs difficult. In addition, if PPPs are to be formulated, the private sector should bear a great risk. Unfortunately, most private sector actors in Tanzania are not willing to take such risks. That partially explains why the PPP sector still requires a lot of work to be done...”

It was found out that most respondents did not agree with the suggestion that the government should play a leading role following the designing of PPP projects because of the given track record of inefficiencies in providing public utilities including education. Respondents were asked to give their views and opinions to the supposition that; *“Experience shows that the government is unable to provide better quality public services efficiently therefore it should only play a limited role in any PPP project in the education sector.”* respondents were asked to rank on a Likert scale of 1–6 (where 1 – strongly disagree and 6 – strongly agree). Table 4.28 (N = 88, 100%) summarised the quantitative data. A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the association between the public and private sector views over the hypothesis that;

“Experience shows that the government is unable to provide better quality public services efficiently therefore it should only play a limited role in any PPP project in the education sector”.

There was no significant association between the views of the private and public sectors because of a chi-square statistic value of 16.46 which was higher than 10, $X^2(5, N = 88) 16.46 p = .006$. The lack of a significant association between the public and private sector views notwithstanding, the observed data was statistically significant ($p = .006$) to reject the, the hypothetical statement. It was found out that the respondents still

believed and trusted that the government had a central role to play in the designing and implementation of PPPs in the education sector.

Table 4.28: Government Leadership of a PPP Project

Statement: Experience shows that the government is unable to provide better quality public services efficiently therefore it should only play a limited role in any PPP project in the education sector.							
	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Lightly disagree	Lightly agree	Agree	Strongly agree	Total
Public Sector	3	8	4	1	6	13	35
	8.6%	22.9%	11.4%	2.9%	17.1%	37.1%	100.0%
Private sector	1	4	0	7	9	32	53
	1.9%	7.5%	0.0%	13.2%	17.0%	60.4%	100.0%
Total	4	12	4	8	15	45	88
	4.5%	13.6%	4.5%	9.1%	17.0%	51.1%	100.0%
Chi-Square Tests							
		Value	df			Sig. (2-sided)	
Pearson Chi-Square		16.463 ^a	5			.006	
N of Valid Cases		88					

** Pearson Chi –square of association is significant at .005 level (2 – sided)

Source: Field Data (2019)

Most of the respondents that were interviewed preferred the government to take a back seat as the private sector took the leadership, and so did the respondents in the questionnaires who preferred the private sector to assume the leadership of the PPP projects.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the summary, conclusions, and recommendations of the study. The first section reviews and summarizes the major findings and conclusions of the study, and how they helped answer the research questions, while the second section elucidates the recommendations for action and further research.

The study was conducted in Dodoma, Dar-es-Salaam and Pwani regions of Tanzania. A sample of 95 respondents was obtained through purposive and snowballing and opportunistic sampling techniques. A mixed methods approach was adopted, which used the Concurrent Triangulation and case study research designs to collect both qualitative and quantitative data. The purpose of study was to establish the reasons for the persistent complaints against PPPs designs, despite the positive and deliberate efforts by the GoT towards putting up an enabling legal and administrative framework. The findings of the study were summarised according to the research questions (RQ) in the statement of the problem in chapter 1, as listed below;

RQ1: What are the main Public-Private Partnership models and contracts in the education sector in Tanzania?

RQ2: What formal and informal institutions influence the designing of PPPs in the education sector?

RQ3: What is the effect of changes in the institutional framework on the design of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania?

RQ4: How do the public and private education sector stakeholders perceive the challenges faced in the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Sector in Tanzania?

5.2 Summary of the Major Findings

The summary of the major findings appears in textual generalisations built around the research questions in the statement of the problem in form of; words, numbers and statistical measures woven on a meaningful statement devoid of discussions.

5.2.1 The Main Public-Private Partnership Models and Contracts in the Education Sector in Tanzania

The findings of this study revealed that currently no formal PPP long-term contracts being implemented in the education sector in Tanzania. Both the qualitative and quantitative data obtained from the research tools helped confirm this position that there were no formal PPPs implemented in the education sector. A chi-square test was conducted to find out whether there was an association between the views of both the public and private sector over the supposition that; *“Contracts in the education sector are not serious PPP contracts but merely interactions and cooperation between government and private schools?”*

A chi-square value of 13.55 indicates that there was a less association between the views of both the public and private sector respondents over the hypothetical statement. Nonetheless, the hypothetical statement was retained because there was no sufficient evidence in the observed data to reject it, $X^2 (5, N = 88) 13.55 p = .019$. The hypothetical statement was maintained and there is an agreement that the pre-current PPPs in the

education sector are mere interactions and cooperation that fall short of contractually structured PPPs. The pre-current PPPs in the education sector are mere interactions and cooperation that fall short of contractually structured PPPs.

It was found out that the majority of the respondents trusted the public sector more in the PPP leadership in the education sector. When designing a PPP, the public sector needs to be given substantial control over the project that is provided by the private sector. Respondents were asked to indicate their opinion by marking “YES” (1) or “NO” (2) to the hypothetical statements that “The private partner only designs and builds the PPP project but does not operate it”, 95% [CI] = 1.67, 1.85; $p < .001$. Majority of the respondents did not agree with the supposition that from the collected data was significant to reject the hypothesis, which means that the Design and Build (DB) model is not a preferable choice.

The qualitative data from the interviews was triangulated with the quantitative data from the questionnaires; there was less support for the private sector taking full control over the PPP project especially in the long run. Overall, the private sector should be given a free hand to bring in the much-needed management skills, technologies, and financial resources, but in the final analysis, the government should be the custodian on the PPP project

5.2.2 Formal and Informal Institutions Influencing the Designing of PPPs in the Education Sector

Qualitative data shows there are **formal institutional factors** that influence the designing of PPPs in the education sector including; the Public-Private Partnership Act

(2010) - Public-Private Partnership Regulations of 2011; the Public Procurement Act - Regulations, (2013) Subsidiary legislation. The sectoral policies and programmes include the Education Sector Development Programme (1997) revised in 2001 and 2008, the Education and Training Policy (1995), which is currently under review. Furthermore, the policy of free universal secondary education of 2015 discourages the private sector from investing in PPPs in education. *“The existing legal and regulatory framework supports the fair negotiation of a PPP contract”*.

A chi-square test was conducted to find out the association between the views of the public and private sector over the hypothetical statement $X^2 (5, N = 88) 12.94 p = .024$. Therefore, observed data was not significant to provide evidence to reject the hypothesis. The hypothetical statement was maintained meaning that the existing legal and regulatory framework supports the fair negotiation of a PPP contract. It was found that there is a belief and trust in the existing legal and regulatory framework in aiding the designing of PPPs in the education sector.

It was found that there are *informal institutional factors* influencing the designing of PPP in the education sector. The evidence from both the quantitative and qualitative data shows the old system of “*socialism*” is resurgent and the belief that the government should be the major benefactor makes the people not to trust the adoption of PPPs in delivering education. A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the association between the public and private sector views over the hypothesis that; *The old practice and belief in communal ownership of important productive resources discourages the growth of not only private schools but also the engagement in PPPs*

There was a less than significant association between the views of the private and public sectors because the chi - square statistic value ($X^2 > 10$), $X^2 (5, N = 88) 14.097$ $p = .015$, but the supposition was retained with a slight margin with a p value.015. The majority of the respondents agreed with the supposition and was found out that the belief in communal ownership is a non-formal institutional factor negatively affecting the designing of PPPs in the education sector. There is an institutionalised belief that the government is a better guardian of social good in terms of delivering better education. This ideological residue from the by-gone era is reinforced by the politicians that have fanned the flames of the Arusha Declaration of 1967 and its perceived advantages over the more market driven economy by the liberal economists.

5.2.3 The Effect of Changes in the Institutional Framework on the Design of PPPs in the Education Sector in Tanzania

It was discovered that the uncoordinated changes in the Framework for PPPs in Education Sector. Many changes to the existing policy framework have been made. It can be summarised that that respondents from both sectors share a view that the constantly changing policies are a threat to the designing of PPPs in the education sector. A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the association between the public and private sector views over the hypothetical statement that; *“The constantly changing and conflicting policies are a problem to the effective designing of PPPs in the education sector”*

There was a significant association between the views of the private and public sectors because of a chi-square statistic value of 9.73 was much lower than 10, $X^2 (4, N = 88) 9.73$ $p = .045$. The significant association between the public and private

sector views notwithstanding, the observed data was not statistically significant ($p = .045$) to reject the, the hypothetical statement. It was found that there are parallel and competing mechanisms, living side by side in the PPP policy framework. Furthermore, there are constant changes in the management, control, and coordination of the education sector.

5.2.4 The Stakeholders Perception of the Challenges Faced in the Designing of PPPs in the Education Sector in Sector in Tanzania

It was found that the stakeholders have a view that the rocky history between the public and private Sectors is one of the major challenges facing the designing of PPPs in the education sector. A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the association between the public and private sector views over the hypothesis that; *“There is a lack of trust based on the rocky and hostile history between the partners”*.

It was found that there was a less than significant association between the views of the private and public sectors. The chi-square statistic value of 14.46 was higher than 10, $\chi^2 (5, N = 88) 14.46 p = .013$. The less than significant association between the public and private sector views notwithstanding, the observed data was not statistically significant ($p = .013$) to reject the, the hypothetical statement. The quantitative data results were triangulated with the qualitative data from the interviews and it was found out that there is a serious lack of trust based on the rocky and hostile history between the partners.

Also, it was found that the stakeholders had an opinion that the conflicting and fragmented policy framework is a serious challenge to the designing of PPPs in the

education sector. Despite the enactment of impressive Acts of parliament i.e., the PPP regulations Act 2014 and the PPP Act of 2017 CAP 103, there is little work on the ground. Most respondents had the opinion that conflicting public policies are a serious challenge. It was also found that the lack of commitment from the different partners is a major challenge facing the designing of PPs in the education sector.

A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the association between the public and private sector views over the hypothetical statement that; *“The constantly changing and conflicting policies are a problem to the effective designing of PPPs in the education sector”* There was a significant association between the views of the private and public sectors because of a chi-square statistic value of 9.73 was much lower than 10, $X^2(4, N = 88) 9.73 p = .045$. The significant association between the public and private sector views notwithstanding, the observed data was not statistically significant ($p = .045$) to reject the, the hypothetical statement.

5.3 Conclusions

Based on the findings, the following conclusions were drawn from the finding of this mixed methods approach study into the institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania. The sample population of 95 respondents was obtained through non-probabilistic sampling techniques including purposive and snowballing.

5.3.1 The Existing PPP Models and Contracts in the Education Sector in Tanzania

There was a failure to establish the existence of formal PPPs in the education sector, and this points to the possibility that earlier statements about the presence of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania, were suppositions and base on inferences based on conjectures. Therefore, both the qualitative and quantitative data all indicate that there are no PPPs that are currently being implemented in the education sector in Tanzania. There are only two main interfaces between the public and private education sectors including, public private interactions and public private dialogue. The GoT only interacts with the private sector through procurement contracts on the basis of principle-agent arrangement but not a PPP contractual arrangement that involves long-term processes where the partners share risks and constantly review the incomplete parts to take care of the transaction costs.

The leading public – private sector intermediaries in charge of the Public-Private Dialogue under the TNBC and the TPSF has not yet resulted in the formation of PPPs in the education sector. The qualitative data from interviews and documentary analysis indicates that at best the parties are still the level of dialogue, where a few public and private sector actors have a series of meetings to participate in selected areas of selected projects by way of procurement and tendering. This conclusion is based on the respondents' clear understanding of the distinction between the terms; privatisation and Public-Private Partnerships. Currently there is a Public-Private Dialogue conducted in the president's office but it has not yet produced PPPs in the education sector. Despite the PPD, there is a “splendid Isolation where, the two sides are acting independently

there is less cooperation especially because of unclear guidelines on the rules of engagement. Therefore, currently there are no PPPs in providing secondary education in Tanzania.

5.3.2 The Formal and Informal Institutions that Influence the Designing of PPPs in the Education Sector

It can also be concluded that the existing policy framework in terms of formal institutions and administrative structure can effectively facilitate the designing of PPPs in the education sector in the education sector in Tanzania. There are sufficient provisions for the effective designing and development of PPPs in the Public-Private Partnership Act, of (2010); the Public Procurement Act - Regulations, (2013) and the Subsidiary of the "Procurement Regulations".

There is less coordination between the sectoral policies and programmes that have a direct impact on the designing of PPPs in the education sector including the Education Sector Development Programme (1997) revised in 2001 and 2008, the Education and Training Policy (1995), and the SEDP I and II. It can also be concluded that the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) has not played a major role of facilitating the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania.

Also, it can be concluded that there are informal institutions in terms of the Socialist Mindset is influencing the designing of PPPs. Based on the perceptions of the respondents, there is a strong belief that the private sector is self-seeking in terms of looking for profits and should not be partnering with the public sector in delivering

education. There is a strong feeling that there should be communal ownership of schools hence reducing the ability for the two sectors to form binding relationships in terms of PPPs.

Furthermore, the policy of Free Universal Secondary Education of 2015 propagates the feeling of communal ownership and increases the government control over the education sector hence negatively affecting the possibility of entering PPP contracts. Another conclusion is that religion and FBOs are informal institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector. Much as the current relationship between the Faith Based Organisations with the government is rocky, they are still an important part of the PPP designing process.

Based on the findings obtained from the concurrent triangulation research design, it was confirmed that the “*strongman syndrome*” is one of the informal belief systems prevailing in Tanzania’s investment environment that influences the designing of PPPs in the education sector. The domination of the strongmen should be seen as an indictment serious weakness in the institutional framework whereby the institutions that are supposed to show stability, clarity, and continuity are built and collapse around the individuals. If PPPs are to be a reality in the provision of public utilities efforts should be taken to wilfully rid the institutional terrain of the “strong men/women”

5.3.3 The Effect of Changes in the Institutional Framework, on the Designing of PPPs in the Education Sector in Tanzania

It was concluded that the uncoordinated changes and sporadic changes in the Framework of PPPs in Education Sector, have made it difficult to link up the public

sector to the private sector by way of formalised PPPs as defined by the PPP Act of 2017. Based on the private school owners' perceptions, and experiences, the private sector is facing many parallel offices and policies. Such parallel and competing mechanisms live side by side in the PPP policy framework, which make it difficult to enter into a working formalised risk sharing arrangement. The very institutions that have the mandate to engage the two sectors are either feeble or have abandoned their intended central role of not only increasing the dialogue and interaction but pushing the two sectors to work on common projects.

It was also concluded that as long as the GoT continues to roll out policies that Increased Government Control over Secondary Education provision, suffocates the growth of private schools and this is a serious threat to the possibility of developing PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania. Policy changes like the Secondary Education Development Program (SEDP) I and II have provisions for the development and financing of PPPs, but the public officials in charge do not activate the clauses that are aimed at improving the PPD and consequently the selective implementation of such policies has harmed the designing of PPPs in the education sector.

It was concluded that there are overlapping roles of various intermediary institutions and departments. Based on the findings of this study, new intermediary offices between the public and private sectors are being created now and again without clearly phasing out the old structures. Overlapping roles erode away the clarity and transparency that prerequisite for signing a PPP contract. Overlaps are a product of the constant changing public investment policies, which have continued to create more parallel centres than the intended complementary units to facilitate the development and implementation of

PPPs in Tanzania. A closer analysis of the policy changes in recent years shows that there is less time to even evaluate the feasibility of the previous policy. Constantly changing policies are responsible for the identified duplication of roles in public sector handling of PPP investment. There is a challenge of identifying which over the roles played by the various public private sector intermediaries. This creates confusion and controversy among the possible private partners if PPPs were to be initiated.

5.3.4 Public and Private Education Sector Stakeholders Views of the Challenges Faced in Designing of PPPs in the Education Sector in Sector in Tanzania

It was concluded that that Conflicting objectives among the major actors in PPPs in the education sector is one of the challenges afflicting the designing of PPPs. Unless the stakeholders in PPPs put their act together by way of increased dialogue, the irreconcilable differences will continue to afflict the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania. Such conflicting objectives are the leading cause of the conflicting and Fragmented Policy framework, leading to a mismatch between the PPP Policy framework and the implementation mechanism. It can also be concluded that the more fragmented the policy framework has become; the less committed the partners become even to the earlier agreed basic areas of cooperation hence leading to the lack of trust and mutual respect.

Also, it was concluded that the rocky history between the public and private sectors is not history after all, if anything it is business as usual. This rocky relationship is fuelled by failure on the part of most public officials and politicians to recognise and treat education as legitimate area of private Investment with the aim of making profit. As long as there is scepticism on the part of the public officials towards the business

interests of the private sector, and the private sector fails to appreciate the social welfare intentions of the public sector, then the relationship will continue to be rocky.

It was concluded that the unequal power relations between the public and private sectors are a serious challenge facing the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania. There is a huge power imbalance between the two sectors. The government sector is powerful and holds all the cards, which diminishes the private sector's ability to negotiate a meaningful PPP. The fragmented nature of the private sector makes it even weaker especially at a time when most private proprietors fail to use the forums that could help them to have a common voice and strategy against the public sector. The private sector is pre-occupied with breaking-even and making some profit from the education sector rather than thinking of the broad strategic issues relating to designing PPPs.

Figure 5.1 shows the researchers own graphical illustration of the summary of conclusions made during this research. Based on the findings, it was concluded that currently there are no formal PPPs in the education sector, instead there are loose interfaces build around the principal-agent relationship of procurement. The designing of PPPs in the education sector involves an interaction of the public and private sector actors with divergent world outlooks. There are formal and informal institutions that will guide and influence the process of designing PPPs in the education sector including; the legal, policy and administrative framework, and the informal institutions like social cultural norms in terms of religious beliefs and political ideologies. However, the interface between the public and private sectors in designing PPPs in the education

sector is faced with a number of challenges that must be mitigated if successful PPPs are to be designed.




Figure 5.1: Institutional Factors and the Designing of PPPs in the Education Sector

5.4 Recommendations

This concurrent triangulation and case study design generated descriptive and exploratory data to explain the institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania. The recommendations of this mixed methods approach are based on the findings and conclusions and are aimed at addressing the research questions under this study. Based on the findings from this research, the

following recommendations are made with the hope of improving the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania as the following suggested below:

5.4.1 Recommendations for Action

5.4.1.1 Review of the Structural Adjustment Policies

The GoT through the relevant ministries should revisit the debate over the rationale for adopting the SAPs of the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the associated market principles. It was found that the new institutional framework for PPPs is rooted in the SAPs of the new macroeconomics liberalism. Unfortunately, the continuing expansion of the government control over the education sector has unintended consequences including the shrinking of the private sector schools. Based on the conclusions of this research, the GoT should revisit the Universal Free Secondary education (SEDP II URT, 2005) because it goes against the principle of economic liberalisation that was aimed at removing price distortions misleading the market. This recommendation is well-grounded in the neo-liberal economic ideology that embraces the idea that the private sector has a bigger role to play in the economy, and the government should play a regulatory role (Delmon, 2017). Increased government intervention may help to maximise social welfare but at the expense of market efficiency.

They GoT should increase its efforts towards a more market driven economy with a vibrant private sector. The growth of the private sector is a vital institutional factor in the designing and development of PPPs, not only in education but in other sectors. This recommendation is aims at removing the institutional overlaps and duplication that were identified in the findings of this study. It was found that the recent increase in public

schools is detrimental to the economic reforms and threatens the comprehensive change in economic institutions (Green, Rwegasira, & Van Arkadie, 1980; Sharpley, 1985).

Contrary to popular belief, the World Bank and the IMF (International Monetary Fund) should not be the only one to initiate structural adjustment. The GoT should take the initiative to introduce more structural reforms that will re-align the education sector with the grand macroeconomic environment of liberal market policies including designing and developing PPPs (Sharpley, 1985; Stewart, Frances, & Sharpley, 1985). This recommendation is not radical instead; it is calling for a sober review of the economic liberalisation and adjustment programme by using the already existing policy documents (URT, 2010; URT, 2005). The adoption of this recommendation will provide new insights and later develop the relevant institutional framework to deliver the much-needed education services in a manner that truly maximises social welfare.

5.4.1.2 Strengthening Civil Society

The GoT should increase the efforts of promoting the role of the civil society in education. It was concluded that the civil society including the FBOs are a major informal institution that affect the designing of PPPs in the education sector. Therefore, if the civil societies play a significant role in providing education, it will alleviate some of the fears expressed by the people against the profit motives of the private sector. A vibrant and empowered civil society helps to provide a reliable informal institutional framework that can aid the designing of PPPs in the education sector. It was discovered under this research that negative attitudes towards the private sector have contributed immensely to the failure of designing PPPs in the education sector. Under such

circumstances, the civil society should intervene in the campaign for PPPs and where possible highlight the associated advantages.

According to the Education Sector Performance Report (URT, 2010), most of the schools have been built through community support in their wards. A strong civil society should be spearheading the mobilisation and accountability of community contributions “*Michango*” Instead, the government has been given a freehand in collecting and using the same collections without engaging in any binding contractual obligation with the community. In addition, there is speculation that perhaps it is this freehand that makes some of the public officials not welcome a strong civil society and private sector due to lack of accountability. The empowerment of the civil society will not only increase the awareness of the importance of the two sectors working together but will be a constant reminder to the all-powerful government of its responsibilities to the policies aimed at increasing public private sector dialogue hence PPP.

5.4.1.3 Review and re-alignment of the National PPP Policy

The public and private sector intermediaries like TNBC and TPSF should be spearheading the efforts to make reviews and re-aligning the national PPP policy of 2009 with the liberal market principles. Based on the findings under this study, there is a need to review the current National PPP policy because, there is a mismatch between the positions taken and presented by the National Policy and the reality on the ground. Itika (2007) also observed that the policy claims that there has been a successful implementation of PPPs in the education sector and the health sector. He warned that having an appropriate PPP policy and regulatory framework is one thing, but making it effective is another. According to him, strong PPP framework requires that each partner

has a plan for sustained strengths, including financial, technical, and human resources, to fulfil the agreed obligations and be ready to account for whatever happens.

Not every public policy challenge can be solved by enacting laws but a review of the existing policy will help to attain the desired goal of increased PPP projects. For example, since the enactment of the National PPP policy, numerous Laws like the PPP regulations Act 2014 and The PPP act of 2017 cap 103 have been passed, but still the work of PPPs in the education sector is dismal. Therefore, it is recommended that instead of new numerous laws and policies, a clear implementation mechanism for existing policies should be devised. The starting point of such policies should be the National PPP policy review and where possible different PPP policies to address the different needs where the PPPs operate.

Tanzania, just like several other African countries is a transitional economy that has undergone radical reforms in recent decades following the adoption of the SAPs in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Most Sub-Saharan countries should rethink the delivery of public services following transformations that have shaped public policy over the past two (2) decades, including the adoption of the bundle of management techniques and practices called, the New Public Management (NPM) (Larbi, 1999; Foldvary, 1994).

5.4.1.4 An Independent PPP Policy for the Education Sector

It is recommended that the GoT through the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology and other relevant authorities, should establish an independent PPP policy for the education sector. It was found out that there is no specialised office in any of the leading public offices that organises the dialogue of the public sector and private education proprietors and raise that dialogue to fully fledged PPP contract. An

independent PPP policy for education will help to address the unique needs and peculiarities that are associated with investing in education. The National PPP policy works as a one size fits all, which is inappropriate to meet the different challenges of the different sectors.

According to Delmon (2017), the government must analyse, choose and implement policies intended to improve the PPP programme. This recommendation is similar to what Itika (2007) made that the local authorities, in this case, the decentralised education authorities should establish PPP units that will be responsible for identifying suitable areas for partnerships, conducting feasibility studies, facilitating monitoring and evaluating their establishment. Such units will coordinate PPP initiatives with support from the national level unit.

5.4.1.5 Change in the Attitudes Against the PPPs in the Education Sector

It is recommended that the civil society and the NGO community at large should work towards changing the negative attitudes towards the PPPs in the education sector. It was concluded under this research that there are acute negative attitudes towards the PPPs in general but in the education sector in particular. Some of the hostile attitudes emanate from the long history surrounding the introduction of SAPs and the growth of the private sector. The various interpretations of the crisis in the earlier regimes in the 1980s and 1990s, brings negative attitudes towards changing the current policies. Some pundits tried locating the causes of the crisis from factors from outside Tanzania and they resisted most of the reforms because they saw them as going against the very foundation of the socialist state created by the Arusha Declaration of 1967. While others accepted

that it was time to make serious domestic reforms, especially in the political sphere. Surprisingly, even after more than three decades of reform, there is no agreement over the origins of the crisis.

5.4.1.6 Capacity Building and Training

It is recommended that the GoT should increase the training of both the public and private sector workers in the areas of designing, implementing, and monitoring PPPs. The officers responsible for the PPP departments must preferably have a strong academic background in the areas of Economics, political science, education, and other relevant fields preferably at a post-graduate level. It is hoped that with such a strong academic pedigree the officers can scan and dissect the intricate theoretical and practical issues that are beyond the scope of novice politicians, who are vocal and can swing opinion in either direction or on many occasions with regrettable results. According to the World Bank (2016), well-designed, and well-resourced training programmes along with public outreach campaigns play a vital role in building awareness and forging consensus amongst the different PPP stakeholders including; government staff, private investors, financiers, and the broader public.

5.4.1.7 Campaign and Advocacy for PPP Investment

It is recommended that the Ministry of finance and planning should dedicate a special department aimed at increasing the awareness of both the benefits and drawbacks of engaging in PPPs. A special department will help the major policymakers to make informed and rational decisions concerning both public and private expenditure on important utilities like education. Such a campaign and advocacy strategy should be rooted in the rich theoretical background guiding the PPPs (Delmon, 2017). The

successful designing and operation of PPPs, as of necessity, should be followed by the genuine acceptance that the private sector must play an important role in the provision of would-be public utilities. The vetting process of the officers to do the advocacy work must bear in mind the need to employ people with a friendlier attitude to the private sector. Nonetheless, the private sector should not be given a “blank cheque” and a freehand in deciding the destiny of the PPPs because they also have some serious limitations.

5.4.1.8 Treatment of Education as an Investment Opportunity

It is recommended that the policy makers should advance policies that acknowledge education as an investment for not only the students, but also the private education proprietors. In a free market dispensation, the dynamics show that education is an economic good just like any other area of investment as far as the human capital theory is concerned (Mukasa, 2013). The rewards from education to an individual on many occasions are directly proportional to the investment made in the development of their human capital. The public schools have continued to perform dismally compared to private schools (Omari, 2014), and spells doom for the candidates going through the public education system.

According to Tilak (2010), education service has been taken hostage in the ideological fight between the Marxist and neo-liberal arguments. If investment in education is treated as any other investment that merits returns, then it will be possible to develop and promote PPPs in the education sector, based on respect for the interest of the private sector. Nonetheless the private school proprietors should not be given a free hand in determining the fees and the best way to do that is to engage them in a PPP arrangement

where the government monitors and makes sure that the social interest is protected. Therefore, it is important to treat education services as private good with returns depending on the level of investment in human capital.

5.4.1.9 Removal of the Overlapping Roles and Duplication of Offices

It is recommended that the GoT should review the entire Public /private sector intermediaries and the associated policy mix. It was found out in this study that the policy and institutional overlaps which was concluded that it is behind failure to design PPPs in the education sector. Based on the findings in this research (Chapter 4), the leaders at the PPP centre, should make serious steps and their utmost to address the overlapping and contradictory roles and offices. The PPP Act (URT, 2017), talks about creating a one-stop centre for addressing PPP issues, which is a good solution to the problem of the duplication of roles, but it creates a risk of centralisation. Unfortunately, the new PPP act of 2017 does not show the ministries, where the different departments will be situated, unlike the PPP regulations Act (URT, 2014). In addition, this might mislead the different actors and add to the overlapping roles and duplication of resources. That is why Delmon (2017) said that the legal framework should be simple and clear to the stakeholders, who should not by the complexity and comprehensiveness of the regulatory framework.

5.4.1.10 Initiation of Pilot PPP Secondary School Education Projects

It is recommended that the GoT through the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, should initiate pilot PPP Secondary School education. The findings show that there is a clear standoff between the public and private sectors not only in the education sector. Under such extreme conditions, it is recommended that deliberate

steps should be taken to design and operated pilot PPP projects. With such projects, it will be possible to increase the trust between the two sides. Delmon (2017) further advises the policymakers to; keep projects simple; the complex is not necessarily comprehensive or better; the PPP framework needs to be understood by a wide variety of stakeholders. Currently, the designing of PPPs in the education sector lacks any practical reference point from which to draw experiences. It is difficult to determine the facts relating to the merits and demerits of running PPPs because politicians and self-seekers have hijacked the discussion.

Therefore, before any conclusions can be made, a technical team should be constituted to design a model PPP project aimed at serving as a prototype. It is this experimental phase that can be used to as well test the institutional capacity of enabling the adoption of PPPs not only in the education sector but to the rest of other economic spheres. According to Delmon (2017) the simpler the project, the better it becomes. In the future, as the PPP project matures, the PPP framework may become more complex. However, in the early days, it is better to keep the framework simple. Different stakeholders will need to understand the framework – contracting authorities, relevant ministries, investors, and the public at large. The simplified operational mechanisms will help the key stakeholders to easily use and interact with the PPP policy framework.

To navigate around the plethora of international protocols and standards to which Tanzania is signatory including, the Education for all (EFA), Millennium Development goals (MDGs), and others including development vision plans. Most of these grandiose protocols and visions have the best intentions, but are difficult to implement because of the weak institutional framework (Bengesi et al., 2016; Galabawa, 1990; Twaakyondo

et al., 2002; UNDP, 1997). Most African countries have given a positive attitude towards embracing market principles as the most effective method for delivering much-needed services such as education and health. Unfortunately, such pronouncements without an elaborate institutional framework make the designing and implementation of PPPs in the education sector a myth.

5.4.1.11 Public Sector Leadership

It recommended that the government through the Ministry of Finance And Economic Planning and other public sector led intermediaries should take the initiative and take the leadership mantle into the designing of PPPs in the education sector. The findings show that most respondents had more faith in the government even after the contract has been concluded. Public institutions are given the mandate to lead the partnership (Itika, 2007; URT, 2009).

The study provides new insights into the working of public institutions and how responsibility is shared when designing PPPs in the education sector (Liviga, 2011; Ngowi 2005; Twaakyondo et al., 2002). Conclusively it is important to reaffirm the central role of the public institutions, in the form of regulatory and administrative structures, in influencing public opinion, which, creates attitudes towards the operation of the private sector. The public sector has competencies, stability and can provide clarity, which are the prerequisites for long-term contractual obligations (Hale, & Napier, 2001; Pistor, Raiser, & Gelfer, 2000).

5.4.2.1 Recommendations for Further Study

The scope, limitations and delimitations of this study have inspired the recommendations for further study, whereby a phenomenological study is associated with serious weaknesses resulting from the co-triangulation research paradigm and the associated qualitative design that dominated mixed method approach. Besides, there are delimitations of this study form a basis for further study. Similarly, further research is recommended to go beyond the scope of this study. When all is said and done, further research will help establish whether the basic qualitative standards, which dominated this mixed methods research, of this research including; credibility, flexibility, transferability, and conformability were met.

It is recommended that a quantitative study based on a positivist research paradigm should be conducted to determine the institutional factors influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania, because the phenomenological paradigm nature of this research based on qualitative research methods does not allow for generalisations as it used a smaller sample population obtained through purposive sampling techniques. That is why a survey using the quantitative methods research method should be conducted to allow for generalisations.

A survey using a longitudinal approach as opposed to the snapshot nature of the case study used under this study is recommended to capture how changes in institutional factors influence the designing of PPPs in the education sector over a long period. The probabilistic nature of the sampling techniques will be useful inadequately testing the hypothesis, thereafter enabling the generalisation to be made.

The scope of this research was limited to studying the designing of PPPs in the secondary school sector in Tanzania. Further research involving not only primary schools but also tertiary institutions should be conducted to expand the horizon of knowledge of designing PPPs in the education sector. The findings from research with such a wide scope in more challenging but the results might be more rewarding towards making generalisations about the PPPs. It would be appropriate for such research to adopt a survey method with a longitudinal approach.

It is also recommended that further research in the field of contracting should be conducted. Some of the respondents in this research were not very comfortable with questions relating to contracts. Further knowledge of the processes and conduct of negotiating and implementing contracts is needed, if there can be a realistic chance of improving the designing of PPPs in general but in the education sector in particular. The National PPP policy (2010) indicates that one of the challenges facing the development and implementation of PPPs in Tanzania is poor negotiation skills. That is why further research preferably of a qualitative nature should be conducted. This research mainly concerned itself with the institutional factors in terms of policy and attitudes, though some attempt was made to obtain data on contracting.

Furthermore, it is recommended that further research should be conducted to determine the dynamics behind the policy development process. The scope of the research only limited the study to study the existing policies influencing the designing of PPPs in the education sector in Tanzania. Policy development should, as of necessity require the input of the leading stakeholders. Unfortunately, the results of this study indicated that

most of the stakeholders, especially in the private sector were side-lined in the process of developing the policies governing the PPPs in the education sector. That is why it is recommended that a mixed methods study should be conducted to not only determine the existing practices in the development of policies that guide the development of PPPs but also find out how far policy development is an integral part of the improvement of the education sector.

It is recommended that further research should be conducted to find out ways in which PPPs in education can go beyond basic physical infrastructure, to the level of engagement in Open and Distance Learning. It was found that one of the challenges facing the designing of PPPs in general and in education in particular was the issue of ownership of the infrastructure. The computer age is here and it seems the major stakeholders in the education sector are still bickering over the old systems of delivering public utilities like education. Little is known in this area of possible cooperation between the government and the private sector in the area of online studies and flexible study programmes that do not necessarily require substantial physical infrastructure than previously held. That is why qualitative research is recommended to not only find facts on the ground but also to generate the hypotheses that can be further tested using quantitative research methods.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Consent Form

**Title: A Study of the Institutional Factors Influencing the Designing of Public
Private Partnerships in the Educational Sector in Tanzania**

Name of Researcher: Robert Buligwanga Mukasa Date _____ Signature

1. I confirm that I have read and understood the plain language statement for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason.
3. I understand that this study aims to protect my anonymity and confidentiality and that this will involve the secure storage of data, a process of de-identification of data and the use of a pseudonym or an ID number in any publication.
4. I consent to (please tick Yes or No):

• Being interviewed	Yes/No
• The interview being audio tape-recorded	Yes/No
• Being involved in a focus group discussion	Yes/No
• The focus group discussion being audio tape-recorded	Yes/No
• Observation of meetings which I chair	Yes/No
• Observation of community activities which I lead	Yes/No

Name of Participant _____ Date _____

_____Signature _____

Before this research could be carried out, its purpose and proposed methods were scrutinized and passed by the Faculty of Education of the Open University of Tanzania.

If you have any concerns regarding the way research is being carried out, you may contact my principal supervisor Dr. Cosmas B. F. Mnyanyi- Senior Lecturer; Head of Department Psychology and Special Education- cosmas.mnyanyi@out.ac.tz

Appendix 2: Questionnaire for Public Sector Officials

This questionnaire is meant for this research only. The information provided in this questionnaire will be used for this research purpose and not otherwise. You are not required to write your name. This questionnaire seeks information about your experiences with PPPs, especially in the education sector. It will take approximately 10-15 minutes. I appreciate your kind cooperation in advance.

SECTION ONE

(PERSONAL INFORMATION)

1. What is your;

i.	Sex	Male	Female			
ii.	Age (years)	20 - 30	31- 40	41 - 50	51 – 60	61+
iii.	Education level	Diploma	Degree	Postgraduate	other	

2. For how long have you worked on any Public-Private Partnership project?

Tick the relevant box (√)

Duration	Tick one
Less than one year	
1- 2 years	
3 – 4 years	
5 – 10 years	
10 + years	

3. What is the nature of your organisation/institution? (Tick One)

	Duration	Tick one
1.	Government secondary school	
2.	Private secondary school	
3.	Public institution	
4.	Private organisation	
5.	Non-government Organisation	
6.	Faith based organisation	
7.	Community based organisation	
8.	Other (Specify)....	

4. **On average how many PPP projects have you participated in?**

.....

5. **From your experience, which of the following would you consider to be a challenge to the designing of PPPs? Indicate your opinion by ticking either Yes or No and give a brief comment about your opinion**

Challenge	Yes	No
• Conflicting PPP public policies in the education sector		
• Lack of commitment from the partners		
• The unwillingness for the financial institutions to finance PPPs in education		
• Lack of PPP experts to negotiate for viable PPPs in the education sector		
• Difficulty calculating the money value of the external benefits and costs of education provided through a PPP contract		
• Lack of trust based on the rocky and hostile history between the partners		
• The high risks associated with long-term PPP projects		
• The increased moves by the government to dominate the provision of education through public schools		
• A “socialist” mentality of communal ownership and hatred towards private business		
• Corruption and mismanagement		

6. **Which of the following models would you recommend to be adopted when designing PPPs in the education sector?**

PPP Model	Yes	No
• The private partner only designs and builds a project but does not operate it		
• The private partner on top of designing and building the PPP project, should finance it but later transfer its ownership to the government after recovering his costs at agreed terms		
• The private partner should own the project in the long run after satisfying the maximisation of welfare		
• The government should finance the PPP project but allow the private sector to operate with a possibility of the private partner taking full ownership of the project		
• The government designs, builds, finances the PPP project but leases it on a long-term basis to the private partners and on the expiry of the lease the government takes over its total control		

SECTION B

(RANKING ITEMS)

7. **Please rank the following PPP policies in terms of the least important (1) and most important (6) policy you think is most influential to the designing of PPPs in the education sector**

No.	POLICY	RESPONSES					
		Least					most
		1	2	3	4	5	6
1.	The National PPP policy of 2009						
2.	The Universal Free Secondary Education Policy of 2015						
3.	Privatisation policy of 1993 The Secondary Education Development Policy of 2011						
4.	The Education and Training Policy of 1995						

8. **Please rank the following challenges to the designing of PPPs in the education sector, in terms of the least serious (1) and most serious (6)**

No.	Challenge	Level of Seriousness					
		Low					High
		1	2	3	4	5	6
1.	Conflicting public policies						
2.	Lack of commitment from the partners						
3.	Limited access to financing						
4.	Lack of PPP experts to negotiate PPPs in the education sector						
5.	Difficulty in monetizing the external benefits and costs of education						
6.	A rocky and hostile history between the public and private sectors						
7.	The high risks associated with long-term PPP projects						
8.	The government's provision of education through public schools						
9.	The socialist mentality of communal ownership						
10.	Corruption and mismanagement						

SECTION C
(STRUCTURED QUESTIONS)

9. **Read the statements below and indicate how closely they describe your experiences and opinions. Select a number that represents your opinion on the scale of 1 – 6 where;**
(1. Strongly Disagree, 2. Disagree, 3. Lightly disagree, 4. Lightly Agree, 5. Agree, 6. Strongly Agree)

		1	2	3	4	5	6
1.	PPPs contracts in the education sector are not serious PPP contracts but mere interactions and co-operations between the government and private schools						
2.	The terms “Privatisation” and a “PPP contract” are the same thing						
3.	To encourage private investment, the Private partners in a PPP contract should be granted the overall ownership of the project in the long run when the project closes down						
4.	The existing PPPs in education sector Tanzania can deal with long- term changes and adjustments						
5.	It should be the government to play a major and leading role in a PPP project to protect social welfare.						
6.	Experience shows that the government is unable to provide better quality public services efficiently therefore it should only play a limited role in any PPP project in the education sector.						
7.	Since the private sector is too focused on maximizing private profit, it should not be given the overall leadership of the PPP project.						
8.	The existing legal and regulatory framework supports the fair negotiation of a PPP contract						
9.	There is adequate knowledge concerning the process of starting and engaging in a PPP project and the process is very clear to all stakeholders						
10.	The policy of free universal education makes it difficult for the private sector to invest in PPPs in the education sector						
11.	The cultural and religious institutions play a leading role in determining whether the government should enter or not into a PPP arrangement with the private sector schools						
12.	As compared to the private sector, public sector institutions have played had a big influence on the promotion of PPPs in the education sector.						

13.	The National PPP policy gives the government bodies too much power over the negotiation of the PPP contracts						
14.	There is a lack of honesty, openness, and transparency between the public and private stakeholders during the negotiation process.						
15.	The adoption of market-driven economic policies makes it easier to negotiate PPPs in the education sector						
16.	The constantly changing and conflicting policies are a problem to the effective designing of PPPs in the education sector						
17.	The leading financial institutions consider education a high-risk area of investment and are not willing to finance the development of PPPs in the education sector.						
18.	The long-term nature of PPPs makes their designing implementation difficult						
19.	There is an adequate framework for each partner and other stakeholders in the PPP to independently ascertain the inputs (financial or otherwise) of the other partners.						
20.	It is difficult to establish equivalent monetary the external benefits and costs of education provided through a PPP contract						

Appendix 3: Interview Schedule

PPP Contracts and Models

1. Has your institution/organisation facilitated the drafting of a formal PPP contract? (If yes what is the duration?)
2. What is your view towards the argument that the promotion of PPPs in the education sector is just the same as promoting the privation of the education sector?
3. Do you believe that a PPP project is distinct from other government – community-based initiatives?
4. What do you think of the claim that the PPPs in the education sector are only interactions and collaborations between the public and private sectors but fall short of what would qualify as a typical PPP contractual arrangement?

Institutional factors

5. What changes in the policy framework have you witnessed that you think have had an impact on the designing of PPPs in the education sector?
6. Have you ever received funding from the Public-Private Partnership Facilitation Fund?
7. Do you believe that the adoption of private sector skills in management can greatly improve the performance of the public sector?

The leadership of the PPP project

8. Would you trust the government that can hardly meet its obligations to the capitation grants payments to public schools, to play a leading role in a given PPP project?
9. Non-government organisations and civil societies have developed the required skills and reputation that they can be trusted in taking the leadership of PPP projects in the education sector than the government. Do you agree?

Negotiation of PPP contracts

10. In your experience have you ever used the transaction costs theory as a basis for negotiating a PPP contract?
11. Are you aware of the hold-up problem between the partners and how have you been able to mitigate it?
12. Is it possible for the partners to enter into a long-term complete contract?

Challenges of designing PPPs in the education sector

13. From your experience, do you think that it possible for the stakeholders in the partnership to independently ascertain the inputs (financial or otherwise) of the various partners in a PPP?
14. Do you subscribe to the argument that if the government of Tanzania provides free education, it will make it difficult for the designing of PPPs in which the beneficiaries are required to pay user fees?

Appendix 4: Research Clearance Letter

THE OPEN UNIVERSITY OF TANZANIA

DIRECTORATE OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES

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Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
<http://www.openuniversity.ac.tz>



Tel: 255-22-2668992/2668445
ext.2101
Fax: 255-22-2668759
E-mail: dpgs@out.ac.tz

Our Ref: PG201610929

Date: 10th May 2019.

TEN/MET,
P o. Box 13547,
Dar es salaam.

RE: RESEARCH CLEARANCE

The Open University of Tanzania was established by an act of Parliament No. 17 of 1992, which became operational on the 1st March 1993 by public notice No. 55 in the official Gazette. The act was however replaced by the Open University of Tanzania charter of 2005, which became operational on 1st January 2007. In line with the later, the Open University mission is to generate and apply knowledge through research.

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In case you need any further information, kindly do not hesitate to contact the Deputy Vice Chancellor (Academic) of the Open University of Tanzania, P.O. Box 23409, Dar es Salaam. Tel: 022-2-2668820. We lastly thanks you in advance for your assumed cooperation and facilitation of this research academic activity.

Yours sincerely,

Prof. Hossea Rwegoshora
For: VICE CHANCELLOR
THE OPEN UNIVERSITY OF TANZANIA

THE OPEN UNIVERSITY OF TANZANIA

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Tel: 255-22-2668992/2668445
ext.2101
Fax: 255-22-2668759
E-mail: dpgs@out.ac.tz

Our Ref: PG201610929

Date: 10th May 2019.

The Ministry of Education and Vocational Training,
P. O. Box 9121,
Dar es salaam.

RE: RESEARCH CLEARANCE

The Open University of Tanzania was established by an act of Parliament No. 17 of 1992, which became operational on the 1st March 1993 by public notice No. 55 in the official Gazette. The act was however replaced by the Open University of Tanzania charter of 2005, which became operational on 1st January 2007. In line with the later, the Open University mission is to generate and apply knowledge through research.

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ext.2101
Fax: 255-22-2668759
E-mail: dpgs@out.ac.tz

Our Ref: PG201610929

Date: 10th May 2019.

Forodhani Secondary school,
P o. Box 3107,
Dar es salaam.

RE: RESEARCH CLEARANCE

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ext.2101
Fax: 255-22-2668759
E-mail: dpgs@out.ac.tz

Our Ref: PG201610929

Date: 10th May 2019.

Minaki High School,
P o. Box 28004,
Kisarawe,
Dar es salaam.

RE: RESEARCH CLEARANCE

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ext.2101
Fax: 255-22-2668759
E-mail: dpgs@out.ac.tz

Our Ref: PG201610929

Date: 10th May 2019.

The Permanent Secretary,
Ministry of Finance and Planning,
P. O. Box 2802,
Dodoma

RE: RESEARCH CLEARANCE

The Open University of Tanzania was established by an act of Parliament No. 17 of 1992, which became operational on the 1st March 1993 by public notice No. 55 in the official Gazette. The act was however replaced by the Open University of Tanzania charter of 2005, which became operational on 1st January 2007. In line with the later, the Open University mission is to generate and apply knowledge through research.

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Yours sincerely,

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E-mail: dpgs@out.ac.tz

Our Ref: PG201610929

Date: 10th May 2019.

Prime Minister office (PMO),
P o. Box 3021,
Dar es salaam.

RE: RESEARCH CLEARANCE

The Open University of Tanzania was established by an act of Parliament No. 17 of 1992, which became operational on the 1st March 1993 by public notice No. 55 in the official Gazette. The act was however replaced by the Open University of Tanzania charter of 2005, which became operational on 1st January 2007. In line with the later, the Open University mission is to generate and apply knowledge through research.

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ext.2101
Fax: 255-22-2668759
E-mail: dpgs@out.ac.tz

Our Ref: PG201610929

Date: 10th May 2019.

Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC),
P o. Box 938,
Dar es salaam.

RE: RESEARCH CLEARANCE

The Open University of Tanzania was established by an act of Parliament No. 17 of 1992, which became operational on the 1st March 1993 by public notice No. 55 in the official Gazette. The act was however replaced by the Open University of Tanzania charter of 2005, which became operational on 1st January 2007. In line with the later, the Open University mission is to generate and apply knowledge through research.

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THE OPEN UNIVERSITY OF TANZANIA

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Fax: 255-22-2668759
E-mail: dpgs@out.ac.tz

Our Ref: PG201610929

Date: 10th May 2019.

Tanzania National Business Council,
P o Box 4378,
Dar es salaam.

RE: RESEARCH CLEARANCE

The Open University of Tanzania was established by an act of Parliament No. 17 of 1992, which became operational on the 1st March 1993 by public notice No. 55 in the official Gazette. The act was however replaced by the Open University of Tanzania charter of 2005, which became operational on 1st January 2007. In line with the later, the Open University mission is to generate and apply knowledge through research.

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THE OPEN UNIVERSITY OF TANZANIA

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Tel: 255-22-2668992/2668445
ext.2101
Fax: 255-22-2668759
E-mail: dpgs@out.ac.tz

Our Ref: PG201610929

Date: 10th May 2019.

Tanzania Private Sector Foundation,
P o. Box 11313,
Dar es salaam.

RE: RESEARCH CLEARANCE

The Open University of Tanzania was established by an act of Parliament No. 17 of 1992, which became operational on the 1st March 1993 by public notice No. 55 in the official Gazette. The act was however replaced by the Open University of Tanzania charter of 2005, which became operational on 1st January 2007. In line with the later, the Open University mission is to generate and apply knowledge through research.

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THE OPEN UNIVERSITY OF TANZANIA

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ext.2101
Fax: 255-22-2668759
E-mail: dpgs@out.ac.tz

Our Ref: PG201610929

Date: 10th May 2019.

Twaweza,
P o. Box 38342,
Dar es salaam.

RE: RESEARCH CLEARANCE

The Open University of Tanzania was established by an act of Parliament No. 17 of 1992, which became operational on the 1st March 1993 by public notice No. 55 in the official Gazette. The act was however replaced by the Open University of Tanzania charter of 2005, which became operational on 1st January 2007. In line with the later, the Open University mission is to generate and apply knowledge through research.

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Appendix 5: Publications

ISSN 2348-3156 (Print)

International Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research ISSN 2348-3164 (online)

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Challenges Faced by Open Schools in Implementing the Concessions Model: A Case Study of the Institute of Adult Education in Tanzania

¹Robert Mukasa, ²Cosmas Mnyanyi, ³ColethaNgirwa

The Open University of Tanzania, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania

Abstract: This study determined the challenges faced by open schools in Tanzania when implementing a concession PPP Model in delivering Open Distance Learning (ODL) and Non-Formal Secondary Education (NFSE). The study adopted a Mixed Methods research design and data collection process involving nine (9) interviews including; sixteen (16) open school owners and four (4) officials from the Institute of Adult Education (IAE) and ten (10) Advanced level students. Also, quantitative data were collected from 20 questionnaires from teachers and students whose findings were triangulated with the qualitative data obtained from the interviews and documentary analysis. The results obtained from the data collected illustrate the respondents' understanding of what constitutes an open school; the level of institutional support to open schools; and the inherent challenges confronting the adoption to the concession PPP model. The findings show that open schools are diverse in character and composition, but they can be broadly divided into profit and non-profit open schools. It was also determined that despite the lack of a broad PPP institutional framework for open schools; there is a clear policy followed by the IAE in cascading its mandate to open school. In practice, open schools are concessions and performance contracts that operate on behalf of the IAE in providing Non-Formal secondary education (NFSE). It is recommended that there should be more dialog with the stakeholders to increase the cooperation between the IAE and open schools by finding better ways of financing open schools in the milieu of the PPP framework.

Keywords: Open schooling, public private partnerships, PPP Model, Concessions, Open Distance learning, challenges, Institute of Adult Education.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the study

This study investigated the challenges faced open schools in Tanzania when implementing a PPP concession model in the delivery of Non-Formal Secondary Education (NFSE). The new policy mix calls for better coordination between the public and the private sector in the provision of the would-be public services including education. The Education and Training Policy of 1985 (URT 2013) highlighted the adaption of the PPP model as one of the policies aimed at increasing private sector participation in the provision of education. This policy indicated the government's desire to change its approach from direct to the provision of education to enhance partnership with various stakeholders, including the private agencies and individuals to establish and manage schools at all levels. However, based on the guidelines to establish and register open schools in Tanzania (URT 2013), the open schooling sub sector, still has several challenges resulting from increased involvement by private sector interests and other stakeholders.

Any study of open schools (OS) in Tanzania as of necessity start with the IAE, which is a statutory body with the responsibility of coordinating the development of Open Schools in a Tanzania (URT 2013). The institute has the obligation and mandate to provide technical advice and support for existing government and private schools, community

Page | 231

or faith-based organizations and private-sector interests who wish to become partners in the provision of instruction for adult and out-of-school youths. According to Shirima (2016) the provision of (NFSE) for the purposes of this research also known as open schooling, is a new innovation in Tanzania as part of the ODL strategy of delivering education to out-of-school youths. Open schooling marks a shift away from the existing normative practices of providing education, as illustrated in Figure 1 (Shirima 2016). It illustrates the potential benefits of adopting an ODL strategy including the benefits of enhancing free learning, in a free learning environment, which all results from a paradigm shift from the traditional system of delivering education (Everard *et al.*, 2004; Fullan, 2007).

1.2 Statement of the problem

The Government of Tanzania (GoT) while keeping in line with its international obligations to attain Education for All (EFA), has suggested policies that are aimed at increasing access to education. Through the IAE network countrywide, more Tanzanians especially the out-of-school youths can now access NFSE. The commitments to increase access to education have been complemented with policies and institutional support aimed at attracting more resources from the private sector to finance the provision of education. Deliberate moves facilitate public-private partnership to improve service delivery (URT 2017). Unfortunately, the process of adapting to the PPP model of service delivery is still work in progress and it is riddled with many outstanding challenges. Much as the policies are clear on what to be done, to increase the Public-private joint stock projects, there is still a general lack of clarity on behalf of the implementing units. The implementation of PPP model in education is uncoordinated, intermittent and impromptu action by many players, especially the Public-Private Intermediaries. This state of affairs should not be allowed to continue because it risks the attainment of the overarching objective of the (EFA) and the associated Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The study investigated the challenges faced by open schools in Tanzania when implementing a concession PPP Model in delivering ODL.

1.3.1 Objectives of the study

- i. Determine the types of open schools implementing a concession PPP model in delivering education services in Tanzania.
- ii. Explore the views of the stakeholders to determine the challenges faced in the implementation of the PPP contractual models with open schools.

1.4 Significance of the Study

The results of this research help the stakeholders in the open schools in Tanzania to improve on the communication between the IAE and open schools. Shirima (2016) identified communication as one of the challenges of providing NFSE in Tanzania. Therefore, based on the results of this study, the stakeholders in Open schools will exploit the newly found knowledge, to improve on the communication and interaction. The challenges highlighted in this study should be a reference point for all stakeholders that wish to solve the problems faced by open schools. Such problems are diverse and, in many ways, unique to the individual schools. However, this study has classified these problems into broad themes that can provide a more coherent and broad understanding of the problems faced by open schools in Tanzania. It is preferred that the readers of this research report will now abandon the piece-mill and ad hoc measures to deal with the challenges of implementing concessions and affirmages, but adapt a more comprehensive approach.

1.5 Important Conceptual Definitions

1.5.1. Open Schools

According to the guidelines to establish and registering open schools (URT 2013), open schools are organizations that facilitate open learning. The official IAE list of registered open schools between 31/12/2013 and January 16, 2017 indicates that there were 428 open schools in Tanzania of IAE owns 60 Open Schools. The term ODL was coined in the later decade of the 20th century to combine two concepts into a single construct. Juhudi (2018), adds that the concept of ODL originates from two fundamental concepts that is, 'open learning' and 'distance-learning' and it is important to get a deeper meaning of the concepts. According to Onwe (2013), at present there is no universally accepted definition of the concept 'open learning'. While some educationists argue that 'open learning' means open entry and access to learning

opportunities and the removal of barriers to learning opportunities, others argue that 'open learning' can be substituted for flexible learning (Juhudi, 2018; Onwe, 2013). Komba (2009) views such openness in relation to the intake, participation, progression, completion and achievement.

Barriers to learning opportunities include the student's economic circumstances, socio-cultural factors, academic qualifications as well as teaching approaches. However, distance learning is an approach that takes learning to many learners who are separated by time and space, from those who are teaching. It is a mode that has a high potential for transcending barriers that are caused by distance, time, and age; thus, facilitating lifelong learning (Juhudi 2018; URT 2013; Komba, 2009). Figure 1 offers a diagrammatic illustration of how open schooling facilitates the departure from the traditional learning and instruction system toward the easier communication between participants in a learning system across time and space through technologies. Open schools should not be under the continuous, immediate supervision of tutors present with their learners in lecture rooms. Through distance learning the learner enjoys a high degree of autonomy in deciding what, when and how to learn. Worldwide, open and distance learning (ODL) is synonymous with Non-Formal Education, Non-formal Secondary Education, Open schooling and these concepts are on many occasions used interchangeably (Shrima 2016).

This method for delivering adult education targets the out of school youth and the vulnerable communities. According to Juhudi (2018), ODL offers new ways in which to widen access to education and it has a decisive role to play in meeting the demand for education. Importantly, ODL can contribute to the global commitment to provide quality and inclusive education for everyone worldwide, as expressed in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), especially SDG 4 and its targets (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 2013). SDG 4 states to 'ensure inclusive and quality education for all and promote lifelong learning' by 2030




Figure 1: Learner centred Instructional System in Open Schooling

1.5.2 The Institute of Adult Education

The study was conducted at the Institute of Adult Education (IAE) that has been mandated to provide open schooling in Tanzania. Open Schooling is an avenue through which learners are freely to follow general school curriculum at their own pace and without following formal school rules. According to the Institute of Adult Education (URT 2013), the Institute was established in 1960 as extra mural studies section of Makerere University College, under the University of London. In 1963, the Institute was upgraded to a department and placed under the Dar-es-Salaam University College. Later on, the institution became an autonomous entity as established by an act of Parliamentary No. 12 of 1975 under the then Ministry of National Education (Institute of Adult Education, 2008). In 1970, the national correspondence institute was established

as a unit of the IAE with the aim of expanding access to education for adults and out-of-school youths in both rural and urban areas. Since its inception, the institute at most directly provided out-of-school education using the same formal curriculum and indirectly through the open schools it registers and inspects. In 1995, under the guidance of Education and Training Policy (URT 1985) the institute has addressed most of the challenges relating to access, equity, and quality of distance education. The Institute among other things offers, Certificate Course in Law, Ordinary and Advanced level secondary education certificates and Teacher Education and Community Development. Based on such a mandate given to the institute, it was in the interest this study to determine whether the relationship between the IAE and open schools is based on a PPP model or not and what are the views of the stakeholders toward the challenges.

1.5.3. The Concessions Model

The concession model is a public-private partnership similar to the Design, Build Operate and Finance (DBOF) model, but the main difference is that in a concession model the service provider in the case of this study recovers the costs through direct user charges in the form of school fees or a combination of charging school fees and government subsidies. A concession model entails the sale of the output direct to consumers Delmon (2017). While performance contracts are similar to concessions, the difference is that this time the service is provided by the public sector Delmon (2017), enforcing obligations under a performance contract can be difficult because both entities are public and the necessary dispute resolution mechanisms are absent. The service provider (the open school) in such PPP agreement retains the ownership of the school while providing the requisite service. According to Ankintoye et al., (2003), under a concession, the service provider can be given the exclusive right to operate the school and deliver the NFSE but make payments to the IAE for the right to do so. It is the obligation of the proprietor of the open school – service provider to invest in the improvement of the school -facility with the provision to pass the cost to the consumers in this case the students, in the form of school fees. Figure 2, illustrates the continuum of how responsibilities are shared between the public and private sector when offering a would-be public service. The extent of participation in a concession largely depends on the extent to which public interests should be protected. In the case of open schools, IAE can regulate the school fees charged by the concessionaires to avoid the public to be exploited.




Figure 2: Concession on the scale of private sector participation

An open school can also enter a joint venture PPP model in which the government through IAE and the private sector assume co-responsibility and co-ownership in an organization. It entails the pooling of their resources and generating share returns (Ankintoye et al., 2003). The returns are shared on the basis of the proportion of the investment each partner has made to the joint venture. The organization in question is normally a special purpose vehicle that looks at the interest of both partners on a day-to-day basis. (McCann et al., 2014; Trafford & Proctor, 2006). Therefore, a joint venture is the true partnership in all social and economic sectors between public and private partners. The level of private sector participation (Table 1) indicates that the private sector assumes increasing responsibility for the functions of design, build, operation and maintenance and finance. In the last case of full privatization, the private sector also assumes ownership of the infrastructure.

Table 1: The Concessions PPP model Matrix

Responsibility matrix for conventional procurement and PPP options							
			Public Private Partnerships				
Category	Works and service contracts (conventional procurement)		Management and maintenance contracts		Operation and maintenance concessions	Build transfer concessions	Privatization
Type	Design Bid Build	Design Bid Build	Management Contracts	Performance based contracts	Lease or franchise Affirmage	BOT/DBFO/ BOO	
Design	Private by fee contracts	Private by fee contracts				Private by concession agreement	
Build	Private by fee contracts						
Operation and maintenance	Public	Public	Public	Private by fee contracts			
Finance	Public	Public	Public	Public	Public		
own	Public	Public	Public	Public	Public	Public after contract	
Private sector revenue options					Tolls (Concessions Model)		
				Availability payments			
				Government guaranties and support; Other support			

Source; Fall *et al.*, 2009

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1 Approach and Design of the Study

This study employed a mixed methods research approach with a greater domination of qualitative study (QUAL + quant). This type of study first involved collecting qualitative data that were mainly obtained from interviews and documentary analysis, while on the other hand quantitative data especially obtained from the structured questionnaires were used to add meaning to the qualitative data. (Clarke & Braun, 2013; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Stake, 2010). The respondents gave personal accounts of their first-hand experiences and provided a deeper understanding of the phenomena of the public sector working with the private sector to deliver NFSE (Creswell, 2007). The (QUAL + quant) approach used in this study provided the researchers with in-depth knowledge and understanding of multiple perceptions of participants in the context of the relationship between open schools and the IAE.

2.2 Sampling and Sample Size

The idea behind the qualitative study is to purposefully select participants of the study that best help the researcher understand the problem and question from the viewpoint of the participants of the study (Creswell, 2007). This study employed a purposeful sampling technique to select the participants of the study. The study employed convenience sampling strategy. Purposeful sampling strategy helped the researchers select the participants at the Institute of Adult Education – at the headquarters – National level in Dar-es-salaam (Table 2). Three (4) senior officials at the IAE and sixteen (16) open school senior administrators were interviewed. Ten (10) students all in their Advanced level were also interviewed. Twenty (20) of the participants also filled in questionnaires.

Table 2: The categorization of the sample of respondents

Category	Frequency	Percentage (%)
IAE officials	4	13.3
Open schools' administrators	16	53.3
Students	10	33.3
Total	30	100

Source; Field data 2019

2.3 Data Collection and Analysis

Data were collected from participants with first hand experiences with open schools and open distance learning. While the researcher used the structured, the participants were asked to indicate their opinions on issues that were used to trap and collect information relating to the research questions. (Denzin, & Lincoln 1994) The data collected through open ended questionnaires were subjected to thematic analysis by assigning codes to the insurgent issues until when the saturation point was reached, a report was written. The researchers deductively identified themes as findings.

3. FINDINGS

The study established the challenges faced by open schools when adapting to a concession PPP model. In this line, researchers anticipated getting views for improving the delivery of NFSE through the ODL mode in Tanzania. A wide range of issues were identified from the participants' responses, which revealed the various interpretations of what they understood to be the relationship between the IAE and open schools in terms of partnership, the challenges of this partnership and the possible solutions to the challenges faced in this partnership. This analysis used the research questions a guide to cut through the responses, some of which are normative and it required researchers' intuition and analysis to make logical and acceptable conclusions (Creswell, 2007; Denzin & Lincoln 1994). Using the questionnaire data collection method, on a Likert scale of 1 – 6 respondents were asked to read the hypothetical statements and indicate how these statements closely express their experiences and opinions. Where: (1. Strongly Disagree, 2. Disagree, 3. lightly disagree, 4. Lightly Agree, 5. Agree, 6. Strongly Agree). The findings are summarized in Table 3.

The quantitative findings in Table 3 were triangulated with the findings from other data collection methods including interviews and documentary analysis. The results are discussed in this session to give a guide to the recommendations of the study. The following section presents and discusses some of the major findings from this study, focusing on the participants' first-hand experience with open schools.

Table 3: Summary of the Findings on the Interaction between IAE and Open Schools

Statement	1	2	3	4	5	6	Total/%
The IAE must give financial and technical support to private open schools.	9 50.0%	4 22.2%	1 5.6%	3 16.7%	1 5.6%	0 0%	18 90%
Open schools are too small and have a weak position to negotiate a fair PPP deal with the IAE.	7 41.2%	3 17.6%	1 5.9%	3 17.6%	1 5.9%	2 11.8%	17 85%
Open schools in Tanzania are agents working on behalf of the IAE	0 0.0%	1 5.0%	1 5.0%	3 15.0%	6 30.0%	9 45.0%	20 100%
There is equal treatment between the government and private open schools.	1 5%	2 10%	4 20%	6 30%	3 15%	4 20%	20 100%
The IAE and open schools should share ownership in open schools	1 5%	5 25%	6 30%	2 10%	4 20%	2 10%	20 100%
Open schools do not adhere to the regulations and standards set by the IAE.	0 0%	5 27.8%	2 11.1%	4 22.2%	3 16.7%	4 22.2%	19 95%
There is trust and confidence between the IAE and open schools.	7 35%	4 20%	3 15%	3 15%	1 5%	2 10%	20 100%

3.1 PPP model

The study assumed that the various stakeholders had a common understanding of the meaning attached to a PPP contract. Therefore, the subsequent analysis of the findings is built around the acceptable definition of a PPP by the Public Private Partnership Act of 2017 (URT 2017) as any formal collaboration between the public sector at any level (National and local governments, international donor agencies, bilateral government donors) and the non-public sector (commercial, and non-profit) to jointly regulate, finance, or implement the delivery of services, products, equipment, research, communications, or education. The extent to which the IAE is implementing the PPP model can also be analysed on the

A distance education official was of the view that IAE staff were supervising open school regularly and that there was a close supervision of the school. She said that

"The institute keeps track of the enrolment lists and the number of students and teachers at our centre. For example, the perform one class has ended and we had more than 500 students attending. The institute has been informed and we are now reopening for the regular classes."

The above findings indicate that the granting of a license to offer open schooling services is also tagged with the responsibility of coordinating the programs. It was found that the IAE coordinated the various programs of inspecting and evaluating the various open schools. Through its decentralized administrative mechanism, the IAE central coordinates the examination timetables but gives the open schools the right to design the school timetables.

Scheduling of activities

It was found that there is a partnership in the scheduling of activities, especially the structuring and administration of the examinations either end of term or mock examinations. Scheduling of activities shows that despite the failure to have a formalized PPP arrangement, between the IAE and open schools in the provision of NFSE is an indicator that there is room for more cooperation on a concession and performance contract basis. When **asked to comment about the areas of cooperation between the IAE and the open schools, an official at the IAE** had this to say

"The IAE is offering training and various forms of assistance even if it is not money, which is all aimed at making private open schools succeed. We send out experts and inspectors to these schools to improve their standards. We offer testing in the form of examination for their benefit. If examinations are not a form of assistance then I do not know what it is!"

Regular meetings

It was determined that there are regular meetings and consultations between the IAE and open schools. Open schools have an umbrella organization through which they channel their views and opinions to the IAE. It was determined that despite the regular inspections, the two sides meet every 6 months to iron out any outstanding issues. As one of the IAE officials had this to say;

"For the time I have worked in this office, we have created and promoted an atmosphere of free expression. We are in close contact with the open school even last June, we had a grand meeting that was also in part organized by their chairperson, in such a meeting that we address the burning issues, including timetables and schedules."

The above findings indicate that as long as there are regular meetings with the public sector and private sector officials, the partnership between the IAE and the open schools is working and all that is remaining is to elevate this cooperation to a more formal partnership indicated as concessions PPP model

Quality and Standards

The implementation of a successful partnership between the public and private open schools requires agreed upon standards in terms of facilities like quality/qualifications of the teachers, classroom size, sanitation, water facilities, tables and chairs and others. These form the prerequisites for the granting of an open school license. It was found that the open schools on behalf of the IAE subscribe to the standards and failure to comply do result in serious reprimand, suspension or withdrawal of the license all together. The quality and standards control mechanism is typical of the circumstances of the principle-agent relationship in which the contracting authority issues the standard guidelines to be followed by the private sector. One open school administrator during the interview had this to say

"The institute has given us the requirements and we try our level best to meet them. Our classes are up to date as I will show you and the teacher student ratio is not atrocious. We had a problem with a narrow road, but it has been solved. Unlike other tuition centres that claim that they are registered; they failed to qualify with the institute standards."

Finding more about the standards, the researcher probed with the question finding out more about the issue of whether open schools should put on uniforms just like other normal secondary schools. One of the open school administrators in Mwenge said that

continuum of the various PPP models, some of which do not strictly conform to the definition given above. Such models include

Contractual obligations

Any PPP project does involve a formal agreement in the form of a contract involving the principle and agent as stipulated by the PPP Act (URT 2017). It was found that at a basic level the IAE is the principal and open schools are the agents that conduct ODL to the out of school youths. Data collected from the interviews indicate the respondents' views to the question seeking to determine their **awareness of any formal contractual agreement between the IAE on behalf of the Public sector and the Open schools on behalf of the private sector**. It was found that both the IAE open school administrators acknowledged the formal relationship where the open schools are given the right and authority to operate but not a fully-fledged partnership, as one of the senior officials said that;

"For sure there is a partnership although we do not have a formal document explicitly talking about a partnership, but the guidelines given by the institute can serve that purpose...."

Similarly, to add to the argument that there is a basic contractual obligation another IAE officer had this to say;

Open schools are working under our guidance and they are implementing programs. We set the standards and schedule of examinations, especially the internal examination of the institutes and they are to adhere to those standards. If that is meant by a concession for sure open schools are implementing a concession model. However, I am not sure about the interpretation of a scenario where the institute is in common ownership with private open schools' proprietor.

Another open school administrator admitted that he had never thought of this as a PPP working relationship but practically that is what it was and he had this to say.

The institute officials like the new leader now, they come here to inspect and see if we meet the minimum standards. They provide us with the mock examination that students conduct for a proper national examination preparation.

The above qualitative data were triangulated with the quantitative data obtained from the questionnaires from a question that asked the respondents to indicate their opinion on the statement that **"Open schools in Tanzania are agents working on behalf of the IAE"**. The responses are recorded in **Table 3** that summarizes the statistical distribution in absolute frequency (n=20) and percentage (n=100). Most respondents (n=20, 45%) strongly agreed with the view that open schools were working on behalf of the IAE. This finding indicates that as long as the private proprietors whether Non-governmental organizations are given the right to implement the ODL programs on behalf of the Institute, but can recoup the expenses of building the infrastructure and the running costs of open schools, then it is a concession agreement. However, most of the participants even the senior administrators admitted that the registration forms and certificates of operation fall a little short from a formal PPP agreement, but for all intents and purposes open schools are concessions that work on behalf of the IAE.

Concession

The data obtained from the documentary analysis indicate that a concession is a special right granted by the government for a private company to operate and profit from an otherwise public sector asset in exchange for a concession fee or other form of payment for use of those assets (Zhuang & Shu 2012). Through the interview sessions, many respondents expressed their views and understanding that open schools are using the established administrative structure of the IAE to deliver Non-formal secondary education to out formal school youths.

Central coordination

When asked to comment **about working relationship between the Institute and the open schools**, most of the open school administrators were positive especially toward the inspection and regular communication from the IAE. As one of the administrators said that

"The IAE staff keep checking operations in Open School regularly, do not be surprised that even during this interview that they can easily enter here. In fact, the licensing of this centre was delayed because they were unhappy with the narrow road and ordered that it should be widened. We are in constant touch with the institute and we try everything possible to meet their requirements"

“Standards of open schools are directives from the institute and it is only under special circumstances like over age students or the sick that students can be excused from putting on uniforms for us all students must put on the school T-shirts as part of their uniform. The directives still apply to the time of reporting to school and leaving.

The above findings indicate that open schools are willing to abide by the regulations and meet the standards. It is up to the IAE to do the regulation and where possible formalize the relationship as a PPP contract preferably a concession model or performance contracts.

Equality and Free expression

One of the important prerequisites of a partnership is the sense of equality among the different partners. Respondents specifically the senior officers at the IAE and the administrators of the open schools were asked to give their views about whether the institutions in not overbearing on the open schools to the extent that there is no freedom to express views and concerns. It was determined although the IAE grant permission to open schools to operate; there is enough freedom to express one's views constructively.

The researchers asked; **“Does the institute gives equal treatment to the privately owned and its own centers?”** In response to the officer said that;

“We treat everyone equally. The unfortunate thing is that in Dar-es-salaam the resident tutor is housed here at the headquarters, but when we get to such meetings, we treat them equally just like any other open school proprietor.”

The same question of equality and fairness was raised to the attention of an administrator at a prominent open school in Ilala district and he had this to say;

For sure there is freedom of expression otherwise I would not even be telling you this word. When we open school practitioners, meet the IAE officials we feel free to talk and there is no overbearing on behalf of the institute. However, I do not agree that there is fairness for treating the institutes' own open schools and the private ones like ours. Can you imagine if National Council of Tertiary Education (NACTE) formed its own university! That is unfair.

The above qualitative data were triangulated with the quantitative data obtained from the questionnaires from a question that asked the respondents to indicate their opinion on the assertion that **“Open schools are too small and has a weak position to negotiate a fair PPP deal with the IAE”** The responses are recorded in Table 3 that summarizes the statistical distribution in absolute frequency (n=17) and percentage (n=100). Most respondents (n=17, 41%) strongly disagreed with the hypothetical statement, while only (n=17, 11%) strongly disagreed with the statement. The above findings indicate that despite the seemingly dominant position of the institute over open schools, there is a mutual and more equal power balance. The open schools can freely express their views without fear of recrimination and the institute acts with restraint to the extent that one senior official was calling for lighter penalties for the offending open schools.

Financial matters and material support

It was determined that the IAE does not give financial or material help to open schools. Normally in any partnership, different partners have different obligations to meet to make the partnership achieve the best of the desired end. Financial matters and material support are seen when partners from one entity, for example, the IAE is going out of his/her way to assist the other partner. Respondents from the IAE were asked **if they provide any form of assistance to the open schools**. One of the senior officials at the institute said that;

For sure it is difficult to quantify the kind of assistance offered by IAE. In terms of money, it's true, we do not offer any assistance because by law and policy we are not allowed to offer financial assistance to private proprietors. If anything, we also have our own open schools even in a worse off condition. However, when we get donations and assistance in terms of scholastic materials, we sometimes do also give to privately owned open schools in that we do not discriminate because the students that study are these schools belong to all of us.

The above qualitative data were triangulated with the quantitative data obtained from the questionnaires from a question that asked the respondents to indicate their opinion on the assertion that **“The IAE must give financial and technical support to private open schools.”** The responses are recorded in Table 3, which summarizes the statistical distribution in absolute frequency (n=18) and percentage (n=100). Most respondents i.e. (n=18, 76.6%) did not agree with the statement. About (n=18, 50%) overwhelmingly disagreed with the statement. In addition, at the extreme end no one (n=18, 0%)

strongly agreed with the statement. The above findings indicate that both public and private open school officials do not favour of the Institute providing assistance to open schools unless it is governments' own open school as one of the operating principles of a concession agreement.

3.2 The challenges in the development of a formal partnerships

In this study, researchers also, determined the perceptions of the stakeholders on the challenges of forming and running a formal partnership between the IAE and the Open schools. It was found that there are several structural and operational rigidities that have so far delayed the formalization and concretization of the concession PPP model.

Keeping up with regulations and standards

It was determined that some of the open schools are not respecting the guidelines give to them during the approval of their application and the eventual certification. According to a senior official at the IAE;

"It is difficult to enter a formal partnership with some of the private school owners who keep on changing offices even without informing us. Some of the owners of open private schools are crafty. There is one who was given the registration in Dar-es-Salaam but moved to Morogoro with the same registration without applying again. When we went to his school, we had to close it down and asked him to apply again through the Morogoro office."

It was found that if the IAE has exclusive power to close open schools, then forming a mutual relationship in a partnership is difficult. Even one of the senior IAE officials called for the review of the current policy whereby in case the owners of an open school contravene some rules, there should be lighter punishments than outright closure because ultimately the students suffer.

Communications

It was found that poor communication is a challenge to the formation of PPPs in delivering NFSE in Tanzania. Open school administrators were accused of sometimes not adhering to the regulations set forth by the IAE. However, equally, it was discovered the even the IAE also has on numerous occasions failed to meet the deadlines and schedules. An example it that of the up to now delayed mock examination results. Commenting about the delays a senior administrator at an open school had this to say;

"Can you imagine that we are now left with 1 month to write the National examination and the mock results are not yet out? We set our own examinations a month later and they are already out. We very much wanted the institutes' results so that we can make adjustments where necessary for the teaching if we are to get better grades. Releasing results are the full and sole responsibility of the IAE."

A similar view on communication challenges was shared from another administrator of open school who was dismayed with the kind of delay in giving the feedback. He had this to say;

In case the institute lacks enough human resources to conduct such examinations, they should hire more people because we greatly need the feel of the external assessment to our students.

When the students were asked about the challenge of the external examinations, most of them reaffirmed the words of the administrator that their success in part depended on the external examination and one of them had this to say;

"The external examinations give us a different feeling and I am confident that I did well. I prefer to study in this format of open school because I come in close contact with my teachers, unlike before when I was in a government school."

The above information was triangulated with the data obtained from the questionnaires that is summarized in Table 3, and it was determined that there is little confidence and trust and confidence if the two sides are to form a formal partnership. (n=20, 70%) disagreed with the hypothetical statement that there is trust and confidence between the two sides. The above information indicates a communication gap between the IAE and open schools. Despite the acknowledgment of the routine inspections, more clear communication channels and content being communicated should be devised. For example, clear timetables and schedules over examinations should be drawn and in case of any delays, clear communication about the same should be made to all the parties concerned. Regular communication will go a long way not only in reducing communication challenges but also building trust, which is the basis for a strong and enduring PPP project (DFID 2010).

Classification and standards

It was also found that the lack of standards and uniformity challenged the development of a serious partnership between the IAE and open schools. Some respondents were worried that there is no proper classification of open schools. The lack of standards based on various categories reduces the competition. One the senior open school administrators had this to say;

For us, we are discouraged that the institute has so far failed to classify open schools not only on the basis of the facilities offered but on the level of grades obtained in the national examination. We would prefer the institute uses a special program to obtain all the results of the open school centres from NECTA, classify them and publish such results. Setting standards will increase the competition among the open schools and consequently improve the standards of the services offered.

It was also learned some open schools would prefer to have proper uniforms and strict time tables like the regular schools but so far, the institute has been silent about it and such have not been protected against other schools that are not strict enough. Another senior administrator of an open school had this to say;

We lost several students to our rivals when we insisted on discipline and strict adherence to the school rules. We would prefer the institute puts us in a different category from other schools so that parents are informed of the differences. We do not want our students to move around the streets because there are so many challenges out there.

When asked about whether the call for uniformity will compromise the very essence of an open school administrator responded that;

We need the institute to make clear guidelines, especially with the capacity of students that a given school can take. You find some open schools especially that have poor facilities with overcrowded classrooms and poor services. Each school given the institutions' standards and categorization should have a maximum number of students.

The above information indicates that in order for the partnership between the IAE and open schools to work properly, there is a need to involve various stakeholders as a matter of policy development. The partnership meetings will help the sides in meeting the required standards in the provision of the NFSE in Tanzania through open schools.

Competition between the private and public open schools

To have a functioning partnership between the public and private sector, there have to be trust. Unfortunately, there is diminished trust and belief that the IAE can be neutral and fair in discharging its duties. Some respondents from private open schools claim that there is a conflict of interest on behalf of the institute. In response to the questions that; **do you think it is possible for private open schools to partner with IAE over the running of your open school?** One of the senior administrators said that;

"There is no way a private open school can enter a joint venture with the government, as those people want money no wonder, they have put up such government open schools to frustrate us. Can you imagine what it would be like if we share the same school!"

A similar question was given to a senior official at the IAE, and he had this to say;

"Already we are partnering at that level any further partnerships beyond that level would bring us back to the 1969 scenario when the government nationalized FBO run schools because they were not in line with the government objectives in my opinion nothing has changed so far"

When asked if government open schools also provide Free Universal Secondary education another IAE officer answered that

"No-the students in public open schools were paying school fees just like the ones in private open schools. The only difference is that for us we are not profit oriented, which makes our fees much cheaper...."

The above information reveals that some of the most outstanding challenges that can derail the partnership between private open schools and the IAE is the obvious unfair competition between the institute and private open schools as it is a supervisor. It was found that there is an environment of mistrust between the IAE and private open schools, especially when it comes to treating the institute's owned open schools and private open schools.

4. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The findings of this research agree with what Shirima (2016) determined that there is weak and unsystematic coordination of NFSE activities among the various entities across various levels. The findings of this research reveal that there is an appreciation by most of the respondents, especially the administrators and senior staff that open schools were working on a concession basis on behalf of IAE education, but the system has fallen short of accepting as a PPP arrangement. It was also learned that there are more challenges yet to be surmounted to increase trust between open schools and the IAE, especially since the institute also runs parallel open schools alongside private open schools. These tantamount duplicate roles and occasion but disruptive overlap can have a serious handicap on the delivery of NFSE just like Shirima (2016) found. According to him, there was duplication of administrative positions and functions caused by differing administrative structures, as well as incoherent policies and incomparable institutional directives.

The challenge of standards and categorization of open schools is still debatable and there is no agreement even among open school administrators. To some this strict approach goes against the very essence of what an open school should be as Mnyanyi and Mbvette (2009) who concluded that there were also indications of misconception about ODL mode of delivery. Some assumed that to be open means to have no control and to have no rules to guide the learning and assessment. Therefore, any formation of a partnership at a concession level should bring on board the different value judgments of the different partners, including the extent of control over the students. Any successful partnership must be built around effective communication. From the findings it has been learned that so far there is good communication between open schools and the IAE to the extent that one of the administrators at one open school applauded the current head of the institute who came personally to visit the centre to get a firsthand experience of what the schools are going through. Such communication and feedback should be encouraged as Ali & Ahmad (2011) point out, that it helps show that instructors are related to learner satisfaction in ODL program. Similarly, Hurd (2007) adds that, the absence of feedback coupled with isolation impact anxiety among distance-learning learners.

5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The relationship between the IAE and open schools in Tanzania is not a formalized PPP arrangement. Nonetheless, it bears all the qualities of a concession PP model between IAE and private open schools and performance contracts between the IAE and its own open schools. Most of the respondents admitted that, as long as the IAE has the power and right to set the standards and regulations that are to be followed by the open schools, then that is the principal – agent relationship that forms the basis for a PPP contract. Figure 3 (*self-constructed*) illustrates the researchers' impression and conceptual understanding of how the PPP concession model can be built based on the research findings. It is shown in figure 3 that the necessary building blocks in terms of institutional, support exists. What is remaining is the formalization of the partnership between the IAE and open schools.




Figure 3: The PPP Concessions Model between the IAE Open Schools

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Effectiveness of the Business Environment in Supporting the Implementation of Public-Private Partnership Policies in Tanzania's Education sector

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Abstract: This study investigated whether the Business Environment is effective in supporting the implementation of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) policies in Education in Tanzania. The study adopted the qualitative research technique whose data collection process included: documentary reviews and interviews. Three (3) semi-structured interviews were conducted involving five (5) officials from the Tanzania National Business Council (TNBC) and Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF) officials. Findings indicated TNBC plays a leading Public-Private sector intermediary with the responsibility of coordinating and promoting the Public-Private Dialogue. Based on the TNBC experience, outstanding challenges were related to the negative mindsets on both sides of the Public-Private Dialogue (PPD), the uncoordinated approaches by the major players, and limited advocacy for PPP investment in education. It is therefore recommended that institutions like the TNBC need to increase their advocacy for the PPP policies in education in several ways including increasing the awareness of the PPP policies; increased training and capacity building for the various stakeholders before and after entering their respective PPP contractual obligations; establish information desks to serve as regular and sustainable contact points for the dissemination PPP policy guidelines and protocol.

Keywords: Institutions, Public Private Partnerships, Tanzania National Business Council, PPP in Education, Investment Environment, Business Environment

I. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

This study investigated whether the business environment is effective in supporting the implementation of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) policies in education in Tanzania. At the heart of the Business Environment is the institutional support that involves the Public-Private Intermediaries in promoting the implementation of not only the PPP policies but also PPP projects. The Government of Tanzania (GoT) has emphasised the importance of urgently implementing the policies that foster greater private sector participation in the economy (URT 2016). The GoT has indicated its commitment to carrying out major reforms aimed at promoting good corporate governance and fostering service delivery including education, through the PPP model. Therefore there is a need to investigate and determine if the existing business environment and the associated policies are ineffective in

promoting the implementation of PPP policies in the education sector.

It is only appropriate that any inquiry into the effectiveness of the institutional set-up and organisational support to PPP investment policies starts with the TNBC, which was set up in 2001 as the highest consultative organ between the government and the private sector. Therefore, under this research, it was imperative to determine role institutions and organisational arrangements like TNBC play in creating an *Enabling Business Environment* for the implementation of the PPP policies with special attention to education. This research followed up on the conclusions of OECD (2013) that, Tanzania needed to improve on institutional coherence in the implementation of investment policies and regulations.

A Business Enabling Environment (BEE) helps to align the pre-current PPP policies with the overall objective of moving Tanzania towards industrialization for economic transformation and human development, as clearly set out in the second Five Year Development Plan document (FYDP II) (DCED 2008). According to PricewaterhouseCoopers (2019), the 2019/20 National Budget in Tanzania emphasized several macroeconomic objectives and targets notable of which, was objective (iii) that required improvements in the enabling environment for business and investment. An enabling business environment mainly involves the Construction and rehabilitation of various infrastructures for attracting private sector investment in the education sector.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The Government of Tanzania (GoT) has indicated the awareness and need to strengthen the Business Enabling Environment (BEE) through its *Blueprint for Regulatory Reforms to Improve the Business Environment*, under the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment (URT 2017). Unfortunately, it seems little progress has been registered so far, because according to the latest annual ratings of the World Bank (2019), Tanzania was ranked 141 among 190 economies in the ease of doing business index, which is an improvement from 144 in 2018. According to White (2010), even recent clarification and revisions made on the existing PPP policies are not enough without the proper coordination of the national organisational arrangements. This state of affairs casts a long shadow of doubt on the successful implementation of the

Second Five-year Development plan of 2016/17 to 2021/22 (FYDP II) whose theme is “Nurturing Industrialization for Economic Transformation and Human Development” (USAID 2018; URT 2016).

1.3 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study was to investigate whether the policy framework in Tanzania effectively supports the implementation of PPPs in the education sector. The study specifically, addressed three questions:

1.3.1 Objectives of the study

1. Find out the role of the organisational arrangements like TBNC in promoting favourable PPP policies in education in Tanzania.
2. Explore the views of the leaders at TNBC to find out the challenges policy changes pose on the implementation of PPP policies in education in Tanzania.
3. Use the experiences of various stakeholders to find out the solutions to the challenges faced in the implementation of PPP policies in education.

1.4 Significance of the Study

This study is significant in a way that helps the policymakers and implementers in finding answers to the conflicting and contradictory PPP policy framework. The study is important because it addresses the challenges of certainty, and continuity in the PPP policy framework. Studying the Business Environment is important in promoting PPP policies in education and provides new insights into the working of public institutions that are responsible for enhancing the implementation of PPP policies (Ngowi 2005).

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 A Business Environment

The DCED (2008) defines a business environment as a sub-set of the investment climate, consisting of a complex of policy, legal, institutional, and regulatory conditions that govern business activities. Furthermore, there are three broad sub-components of the national business environment including: the Policy, Legal and Regulatory Framework, which refers to the range of policies, laws and regulations that affect business owners; the Administrative Systems, which deals with the ways in which policies, laws and regulations are enforced, and includes issues such as governance; and National organisational arrangements (URT 2016, White, 2010). Government decisions may directly affecting the business environment, both at national and local levels. Business environments can vary across sub-national jurisdictions. Business environments are also referred to as “local business environments” and within specific industry sectors, they are referred to as “sectoral business environments”.

2.2 An Investment Climate

The World Bank (2018) has defined the Investment climate as “the set of location-specific factors shaping the opportunities and incentives for firms to invest productively, create jobs, and expand”. The rule of law, the presence of open financial markets, economic predictability, infrastructure, political stability, efficient labour markets, and human resource development. However, unlike the “business environment”, the “investment environment” is beyond the control of the individual organisations and institutions (White, 2010).



Fig1. The Investment Climate

Fig. 1 (White, 2013) shows how the institutional and organisational support can be mobilized to help the growth of private businesses and the associated PPPs. It illustrates the primacy of policy, legal and regulatory framework in creating and supporting a dependable National Business environment.

2.3 Tanzania National Business Council

This study of the Business Environment for the implementation of PPP policy mechanisms involves the study of organisation arrangements. As of necessity this study paid more attention to the “Presidential Investor Council”, also known as Tanzania National Business Council (TNBC). In addition, it is a statutory body with the responsibility of bringing together the public and private sector into a dialogue (URT, 2016; White, 2013; World Bank, 2010). According to the presidential circular number 1 of 2001, (URT, 2001), the TNBC was established with the mandate of bridging the investments gap between the public and the private sectors by supporting the Public-Private sector Dialogue. The National Business Council (TNBC) was launched in April 2001. It provides the main forum for public-private sector consultations on strategic issues of economic growth and development (Twaakondo et al., 2002; URT 2001).




Fig 2. The organisation structure of TNBC

Fig. 2 illustrates the organisation structure of the TNBC. It comprises of 40 members of equal numbers from the public and private sectors. The government nominates 20 members, including one from *academia*. The TPSF has an equal number and nominates representatives from different business sectors of which at least one of the *private sector* representatives comes from the labour movement. The Council meets twice a year and any member – public or private – can propose agenda topics, which are then approved by the Board. Common topics for Council meetings include investment climate, cost of capital, tax reform, and economic empowerment – all issues relevant to the private health sector (White 2013).

The *Vision* of TNBC is to be “the agent for promoting a dynamic and competitive economy” while the *Mission* is “to promote a healthy and robust economy where the guiding hand of government, through enlightened legislation and transparent governance enhances the development of private initiatives, encourages local and foreign investments and provides an enabling environment for economic growth” in a narrower sense TNBC has its *Purpose* as to “reach consensus and mutual understanding on strategic issues relating to the efficient management of resources in the promotion of social-economic development in Tanzania”

2.4 Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TSPF)

One of the leading public-private sector intermediaries is the TPSF, which forms a strong embodiment of the TNBC by nominating the 20 members of the private sector that meet the government delegation of 20 members. It was formed in 1998, utilizing the experience spanning over 12 years in a market

economy 1998, many Tanzanian companies came together to create the TPSF and iron out the differences within the private sector and to speak with one voice in dealing with the GoT. In the context of this study, the TPSF participated in the design of TNBC, while promoting private sector-led social and economic development, by representing the common interest of its members, and engaging in effective advocacy with the Tanzanian government.

2.5 Public Private Partnerships

The term PPP attracts different meanings stretching from participation and dialogue to the actual formation of a partnership between the public and private sectors. The PPP Act of 2017 defined a PPP as a *contractual arrangement between a contracting authority and a private part in which the private party; undertakes to perform for contracting authority function on behalf of the contracting authority for a specific period; assumes substantial financial, technical and operational risks in connection with the performance on behalf of the contracting authority function or use of government property; or receives a benefit for performing on behalf of contracting authority function or from utilizing the public property, (URT 2017, p5).*

III. METHODOLOGY

This study employed a qualitative research approach that involves collecting data based on personal experiences, introspection, unstructured and semi-structured interviews, and documentary analysis. Denzin & Lincoln (1994) defined qualitative research as a research that focuses on interpretation of phenomena in their natural settings to make sense in terms of the meanings people bring to these settings. The qualitative approach provided the researchers with in-depth knowledge and understandings of multiple perceptions of participants, in the context of the effectiveness of the institutional framework in implementing the PPP policies (Clarke & Braun, 2013; Stake 2010). The study was inspired by the phenomenological theory/paradigm to find out the perceptions, views and experiences of the stakeholders in the implementation of PPP policies in Tanzania.

3.1 Sampling and Sample Size

Sampling under this qualitative study was done to purposefully whereby, participants with the relevant experiences were contacted, which helped the researchers understand the problem from the perspective of the participants (Creswell, 2007). Under the purposeful sampling strategy, four (4) senior officials at both the Tanzania National Business Council (TNBC) and at the Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF) were interviewed. TNBC officials were purposefully sampled because they are the only institution that has an active interface between the public and private sector on a regular basis.

3.2 Data Collection and Analysis

Data was collected from participants with first hand experiences the institutional set up that affects the implementation of PPPs in education in Tanzania. While using the documentary analysis and interviewing, the participants were asked to indicate their opinions on numerous issues that were used to trap and collect information relating to the research questions. The data collected through semi-structured interviews was later subjected to thematic analysis by assigning codes to the insurgent issues, a when the saturation point was reached, a report was written.

IV. RESULTS

The qualitative findings from the interviews were triangulated with the findings from the documentary analysis as reported below;

4.1 The Role of TNBC

In addressing the requirements of first research objective, it was determined that TNBC plays an important role in, promoting the creation of a favourable Business Enabling Environment (BEE), because it performs various roles including; Coordination and policy management, regulatory services, lobbying and advocacy, and advisory services.

4.1.1 Coordination

It was found that TNBC plays a central role in coordinating the activities of the various public-private stakeholders across the various investment clusters. TNBC helps build and mediate in an effective dialogue on issues relating to both the public and private sector organizations and other stakeholders. When asked the question; *"From your experience what is your opinion about the work done in the implementation of PPP policies in education?"* A senior official at TPSF answered that,

"We have done our level best to build a dialogue, including members from the private school owners association. It is not automatic that they must agree each time they meet, but listening to one another helps reduce the tensions and has helped increase trust"

This finding agrees with the other qualitative data obtained from the documentary analysis (Mnenwa&Maliti2009; URT 2017), which shows that TNBC is part of a deliberate effort by the GoT to bring clarity in the regulatory framework. The 5th government of Tanzania has re-affirmed its commitment to ensuring that regulatory hurdles towards a smooth PPD are removed. The work of the public-private sector intermediaries like the TNBC is to ensure that the private sector operates in a friendly and predictable business environment while the government maintains its regulatory role.

It was also found that much as the TSPF and TNBC are dichotomous entities, they are just two sides of the same coin. Any private sector player who wants to take part in the PPD must go through the TPSF and there is no other way around it.

When asked whether TSPF has a working desk within the TNBC one senior TSPF official said that;

Currently, we do not have a physical desk in TNBC but I am sure that our physical presence daily is welcome because there is a lot of work to do together, which includes the coordination of the working groups and the activities of the different investment clusters. Together, we gather inputs into the PPD and most of the policy proposals and discussions of the private education sector should be channelled through the TSPF.

4.1.2 Lobbying and advocacy

It was determined that TPSF plays the role of advocacy under TNBC for the streamlining and rationalization of taxes and levies, which ensures the active participation of the private sector in a favourable business environment. When asked about the work done to support an enabling business environment, a senior officer at the TPSF had this to say;

"We are currently advocating for the review of the tax policy. I have advocated that some services provided by the PPPs should be zero rated services as far as Value Added Tax (VAT) is concerned. For example education, transport and other services at the municipality level. We now have a problem at Dar-es-Salaam Rapid Transport (DART) where the charges exclude VAT but the project must pay, which is one of the areas that need to be studied..."

The above data is triangulated with other qualitative data from the documentary analysis. The Blueprint for Regulatory Reforms to Improve the Business Environment (URT 2017) indicates that the Stakeholders have complained about the increasingly conflicting and duplicative policies and laws at the central and local government levels relating to taxes, levies, licencing and other charges.

4.2 The challenges of implementing PPPs policies in Tanzania

The second research objective of this study was to explore the views of the public-private sector stakeholders to find out the challenges faced in the implementation of PPP policies in Tanzania. It was determined that using the TNBC experience that outstanding challenges are faced when implementing PPP policies including;

4.2.1 Limited capacity of the PPP intermediaries

It was found that many PPP projects especially at the local government level lack the administrative, technical and scientific capacities to meet the conditions, which puts a serious strain in dealing with the public-private sector investment demands. When asked; *"what is your view towards the challenges faced when designing and implementation of the PPP projects in education?"* the official said;

"So far there are no clear guidelines of what PPP models that can be followed whenever the government wants to enter

into a contract with the private sector. I am worried that the PPP NODE under the local government has not done enough to provide clear methods of engagement between the government and the private schools. If we have a good structure I am sure it will be easier to follow the best practice. The problem mainly arises from the lack of a method to evaluate the public benefit even if it is not about the money..."

It was found out that there is limited capacity in the institutional framework to the extent that limited time is allocated to the established institution or policy to establish ground before another policy or office is created. One officer at TNBC exclaimed that;

"Can you believe that the recently established PPP centre in the Ministry of Finance and Planning, in now referred to as the PPP commission? I wonder whether it is due to the proficiency or a mere change of names without increasing their capacity".

With a limited human resource capacity, having an effective institutional framework for the implementation of PPP policies is a remote possibility. *"The process is changing the names but not the proficiency"* said an officer at TSPF

4.2.2 Many Intermediaries parallelism

It was also determined that there are occasional overlaps and duplication of roles in the area of public – private sector intermediation. The multiplicity of the intermediaries creates a serious challenge towards the creation and promotion of an enabling business environment for the successful implementation of PPP policies not only in education but in other sectors. In addition, there is limited coordination between the institutional pillars that were put in place to facilitate the effective implementation of the PPP policies in Tanzania (UNCTAD 2011; Mnenwa&Maliti 2009). Furthermore there are many public – private sector intermediaries including; the Tanzania National Business Council (TNBC) and the TSPF; the BEST program, and the National Investment Steering Committee (NISC). When asked *"what is the relationship between your organisation and other PPP intermediary bodies?"* One senior official at TSPF had this to say;

"There is a contradiction in the supervision and implementation of PPP projects. On top of the task force under the Ministry of Finance and Planning, there is also the parliamentary committee on PPPs that can review a PPP project at any time with the mandate to make drastic changes. Furthermore we have the Ministerial platform, the think tank, the East African community Platform, the National Tourism Board and others...."

The Blueprint for Regulatory Reforms to Improve the Business Environment (URT 2017) registers similar concerns over the multiple regulatory agencies with seemingly similar roles and functions have also raised concern from a cross section of stakeholders. In addition there was a need to clear the confusion between the role played by the President's and

the Prime Minister's office when it comes to PPP intermediation. It was feared that the overlap adds to the problem of multiple players in a crowded field of intermediation. When asked in a follow-up question as to which office does the TNBC fall under between the President's and the Prime Minister's office, a senior official at TNBC said that;

"AtTNBC we report to the President's office. Unfortunately, the president's office does not have a budgetary vote because it is not an independent government ministry. Instead we obtain the funding and other resources from the Prime Minister's office, but there is no confusion like some people believe"

4.2.3 Political influence and considerations

This study found that the effectiveness of such policies can be greatly reduced by the erratic and impromptu actions or inactions by the some politicians and local government leaders. When asked to explain *the interface between the organisation and the local PPP projects*, one senior official at TSPF said that:

"..I would suggest that some decisions should not be made basing on political gains. Instead, like the government has called out, it should be for the good of the projects. It is important to protect the current PPPs so that they can generate enough money to run profitably and pay for depreciation....?"

It was determined that the negative political influence is mainly felt at the local government level where lack of uniformity in charges across for the same services under the different LGA authorities. One senior officer at TNBC exclaimed that;

"Can you imagine one local government official prevented the allocation of a small piece of land to put up a toilet for a school in one of the municipalities where we run projects because of the differences on opinion based political party affiliation"?"

It was determined that PPPs at the local level are struggling and are not sustainable. Most of the politicians are only using such projects to justify their election. Projects are in the hands of people least interested in their efficacy and viability. To emphasise the point of the interface between their organisation and the local PPP projects the official added;

"The available funding mechanisms like the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) should focus on building the infrastructure. The projects need supervision and active management before looking at the monetary returns. The private partners should be given enough time to recover their costs and the government should most appreciate the service that has been provided,"

4.4.4 Lack of trust

It was discovered that contrary to the GoT's efforts to increase the cooperation between the public and private sectors; instead the mistrust has grown. The Blueprint (URT2017) was set out as a benchmark to show the GoT's commitment to increasing the trust and confidence that has been lacking between the public and private sector stakeholders. Addressing the challenges of mutual mistrust and how far the parties have gone solving it, one senior officer at TSPF had this to say;

"It's unfortunate that up to now we have not been able to hammer out long-term PPP projects, which this is because most of the participants in the dialogue are more concerned about short run than long run projects."

It was determined that effectiveness of the institutional framework in implementing PPP policies is limited by the growing mistrust between the public and private sector. The private sector stakeholders are not yet willing to commit their hard won resources into long-term projects with the government. While responding to the questions seeking the opinions on the reasons why the PPD has not yet produced a long-term PPP, a senior officer at TSPF said that;

"Amendments made last year made the PPP agreements subject to local courts arbitration. The PPP policies in Tanzania are attractive but care should be taken when introducing measures that might reduce the confidence of foreign partners in the local courts. Otherwise this might drive away the potential private partners."

The officer's contribution was supported by the qualitative data from the documentary analysis, whereby according to the (World Bank 2018): *"The private sector continues to struggle with recent legislation that is vague and often punitive to the private sector. This mutual suspicion between the two sectors looms over the prospect of creating and promoting a favourable investment climate although the GoT has a renewed commitment to engage in the public private dialogue and address challenges in the business environment. It is even more re-assuring that President Magufuli named 2019 "the year of investment" and as such has made many high-profile remarks highlighting the importance of the private sector."*

4.5 Solutions to the Challenges Faced in Promoting PPP Policies

The third research objective of this study was to find out the solutions to the challenges faced in the implementation of PPP policies. The research explored the experiences of various stakeholders and used the documentary analysis to find the possible solutions to the challenges as reported in the findings below;

4.5.1 Human Capacity Building and Education

It was discovered that the effectiveness of the institutional framework in implementing PPP policies can be improved by increasing the human resource capacity of the major actors. In

addition, this can be done through in-house training and other pedagogical methods. According to The Investment Policy Review (OECD, 2013), recommended that *"Companies, in this case PPP intermediaries, should increase existing in-house training programmes for staff, as well as to offer training opportunities over and above the immediate workplace training needs"*. In addition the IPR (OECD 2013) proposed that to improve the effectiveness of the training and capacity building, all training must, as of necessity, actively include the private sector. Failure to include the private sector produce appropriately trained officers.

4.5.2 Networking and Linkage programmes

It was determined that there is a need to increase collaborative work between the various PPP intermediaries especially in the education sector. The qualitative data obtained from the interviews showed that majority of the participants emphasised the need to work together. When making his contribution, a senior official at TNBC said that;

"All of us are doing our best in promoting a dialogue between the two sectors in the education sector. Unfortunately, some things are done when we are not aware of what other parties are doing. We must keep each other informed and if possible work together"

This finding is similar to the analysis in the Tanzania Investment Report (URT, 2018), which identified the need to increase the linkage programme between different actors in the different sectors. Such a linkage programme improves the skills of Tanzanian workers.

4.5.3 Increasing the advocacy

Sharing more information about the benefits of PPP investment will go a long way to eliminate the ignorance by the two parties. Information desks and similar task forces should be put in selected areas where the two parties mostly meet. To strengthen this argument, USAID (2018) stresses that;

"on top of the education sector, the Government, in collaboration with the private sector should allocate more resources through the public-private partnership for providing the necessary infrastructure in the areas earmarked for export processing zones for attracting investments geared to adding value to agriculture produce."

Such a protracted awareness dispels the fears and suspicions that have delayed, and in some cases limited the effectiveness PPD.

4.5.4 Special Purpose Vehicles

It was determined that one way of dealing with trust and management concerns over the PPP projects is to put up special purpose vehicles. A Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) is a private firm or consortium of private firms undertaking the

project typically representing the interests of both the public and private sector (UNACTAD 2011).

When responding to the question, “How can the challenges of managing projects be overcome? A senior TPSF official said;

“There is a need for establishing an agency to oversee the projects and it is important at a local government level because much as both parties would wish to independently run the project but experience shows that they cannot do it properly. I think it is important to enter into a special purpose vehicle, which would help mitigate all these problems and complaints I am not sure...”




Fig 4. A typical Public Private Partnership Intermediary Structure

Fig. 4 (self-constructed based on field data) illustrates how the public and private sectors can build and profitably gain from an enabling Business environment, by surrendering their interests to the Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV), and abide by the dictates of the PPP contract. This graphical simplification shows the responsibilities cascaded to the SPV by way of financing and implementation consequently; the PPP SPV should be structured in a way that it is mutually beneficial to all the parties because it is acting in the best interest of the partners.

V. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

This section discusses some of the major findings from this study. It was determined that there is weak and unsystematic coordination of activities among the various Public-private sector intermediaries, despite the numerous PPP policies. An effective business environment for PPPs can still be attained

without necessarily rolling out more PPP policies, which calls for the strengthening of the Public-Private intermediaries especially those with the authority and mandate to coordinate the PPD.

It was determined that there are many Public-Private sector intermediaries that have led to the duplication of efforts. Therefore, there is an urgent need to harmonize the different roles to reduce and better still, remove the disruptive overlaps that can have a serious handicap on the effective implementation of PPP policies in Tanzania (Mwapachu 2005). The efforts of the different intermediaries should focus on the recommendations of the government Blueprint. It provides a guide to the attainment of industrialization goals, in the shortest period possible.

It was discovered that there are serious inadequacies in the macroeconomic environment. Disagreements and uncertainties over taxation were highlighted as major sticking points in the successful implementation of PPP policies. Much as the focus of this study was on the business environment, matters relating to taxations fall under the docket of investment climate i.e. the fiscal policy of the broader macroeconomic policies. During the PPD, taxation rates and regimes should be discussed to improve the business environment.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that further study a quantitative nature should be conducted as a way of generalizing the findings, and there is a need for more studies on how to improve the BEE in Tanzania. The establishment of a BEE is still held hostage by the still lingering traditional systems of service provision, with deep-rooted institutionalized suspicion against the education private sector and its intentions.

It is recommended that a central body preferably TNBC, should take charge of identifying priority investment areas, which will help avoid the kind of fragmented approach to the implementation of not only the PPP policies, but also the associated PPP projects. However, the elevated role of the TNBC should not be misunderstood to mean increased centralization and domination by the public sector. In addition, the education private sectors' interests will be safeguarded, especially when TPSF that has a 50 percent stake in the PPD, which is enough to counter balance the feared public sector excesses.

It is further recommended that deliberate efforts should be spent towards the development of Well-coordinated National Arrangements that spell out the various roles and at what levels do the public and private stakeholders in the public-private dialogue. This recommendation agrees with the recommendations of the Blueprint (2017) which emphasises the need to increase capacity of accommodating the diversity of interest that results from the different businesses and individuals representing the various strategic priorities of the business community.

It is recommended that more efforts should be expended towards better PPP contract designing. The findings of this study that the work of contract design is still work in progress. Without proven and trusted mechanisms to draw contracts and ensure their implementation, the business environment will be ineffective in implementing the PPP education policies. It was found out more PPP education contracts are still being drawn for example the one with VETA. This situation becomes worse when the parties concerned are in disputes and contestations over the courts and their jurisdiction over the interpretation of the contracts (Mwapachu, 2005; Wangwe, 1999).

In conclusion, this research revealed that there are parallel intermediary efforts that wittingly or not contradictory. Consequently, it difficult to come up with a comprehensive business environment that effectively supports the implementation of PPP policies in education. The institutional set up in terms of rules, regulations and policies is filled with a multiplicity of actions and intensions. Rolling out more policies and regulations will add to the confusion. Unfortunately, the only workable solution is to bring more policies but this time, such policies should increase the coordination of the major PPP intermediaries.

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