THE ROLE OF ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS IN PREVENTING THE YOUTH FROM ENGAGING IN VIOLENT EXTREMISM: A CASE OF THE KILINDI DISTRICT IN TANZANIA

ALI JUMA AYUB

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY THE OPEN UNIVERSITY OF TANZANIA

2022

CERTIFICATION

The undersigned certifies that he has read and hereby recommends for acceptance by the Open University of Tanzania a dissertation titled: ***The Role of Islamic Institutions in Preventing the Youth from Engaging in Violent Extremism: The Case of the Kilindi District in Tanzania,*** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Cooperation and Development of the Open University of Tanzania.

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Dr. Miraji Kitigwa

(Supervisor)

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DECLARATION

I**, Ali Juma Ayubu**, declare that, the work presented in this dissertation is original. It has never been presented to any other University or Institution. Where other people's works have been used, references have been provided. It is in this regard that I declare this work as originally mine. It is hereby presented in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts in International Cooperation and Development of the Open University of Tanzania.

Signature

Date

DEDICATION

To my beautiful and amazing wife Rehema, and my wonderful children Khayrat,

Alya, and Asmaa. I will always love and cherish you!

ABSTRACT

This study examines the role of Islamic institutions in preventing the youth from engaging in violent extremism. Guided by the Derealization theory and the Vulnerability theory, the study identifies the reasons for increased radicalization, the effects of engaging in violent extremism, the various solutions employed in fighting violent extremism and the role that Islamic institutions play in preventing the youth from joining or supporting the terror groups. This is a qualitative study that takes a case of Kilindi District. Data was collected from fifty (50) participants from the various Islamic institutions in Kilindi using interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs). It was found out that youths engage in violent jihadi or support terrorism due to persistent derealization through historical injustices and discrimination, political dissatisfaction, violation of human rights and the vulnerability resulting from insolvable poverty, lack of education, distorted religious teachings, unchecked youth associations and peer pressure. Even so, the apparent benefits of engaging in violent extremism are outweighed by the negative effects of doing so, such as the risk of death. While there are a few working strategies for prevention, such as providing employment and education to the youth, some other strategies as arbitrary arrests and harsh punishments were found to spark more radicalization. Even when Islamic institutions have played a significant role in deradicalization, many more youths seem to join and support terror groups. The study concludes that - although highly significant - the effort of Islamic institutions is not solely sufficient in fighting terrorism and violent extremism. Together with rehabilitation centers, proper religious teachings, employment and educating the youth, the study recommends that unanimous efforts of the government, security agencies, the private sector-including religious and non-religious institutions-must work together.

Keywords: Islamic institutions, violent extremism, Derealization, Vulnerability

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMA	The Africa Muslims Agency (AMA)
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AMYC	Answari Muslim Youth Center
BAKWATA	The National Muslim Council of Tanzania
CCM	*Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (the ruling Revolutionary Party of Tanzania)
CEP	Counter Extremism Project
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
GTD	Global Terrorism Database
IEDs	Improvised Explosive Devices
Maarif	Maahad Shamsil Maarifil Islamiya
NCTC	The National Counterterrorism Center
NMC	The National Muslim Council of Tanzania
PTA	The Prevention of Terrorism Act
TISS	The Tanzania Intelligence and Security Service
TPDF	The Tanzania People's Defence Force
TPF	The Tanzania Police Force
UN	United Nations

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1   Introduction

There is no doubt that, among the serious challenges facing the international peace and world security in general, radicalism, violent extremism and terrorism are perhaps inescapably fatal. It appears that terrorism, violent extremism, and radicalism have created and shaped a whole new dimension in the ordinary ways of human life. Mass killings and precocious deaths appear to be almost common in some parts of the current world as a result of these challenging problems. While security agencies establish measures for countering violent extremism, many more youths are radicalized and recruited into such extremist groups as al-Shabaab every day. Tanzania is not an exception when it comes to the problems related to violent extremism. The country is listed among terrorist-targeted countries because it poses as not only a recruitment but also a training center where graduates of violent extremism join radicalized groups in carrying out attacks outside Tanzania, especially on neighbouring countries – while Tanzania itself faces, but a few attacks of violent extremist nature (Walwa 2018; Bwire 2019; Dang 2019).

The role of religion and religious actors in matters of peacekeeping and security is often considered as either a source or a resolution to such conflicts (Silvestri and Mayall, 2015). This does not mean, however, that the role of religion in preventing violent extremism should be undermined. Since preventing and countering violent extremism using security forces has not always been entirely successful, this study

sought to examine the role that such religious institutions as Islam play in preventing the youth from engaging in violent extremism. This chapter is a general introduction and the important initial stage that the researcher took towards arriving to the above objective. The chapter systematically highlights the background to the problem, the statement of the problem, the objectives and their underlying questions, the significance of dealing with violent extremism, the scope that the study will take together with the structure of entire dissertation.

1.2 Background of the Problem

It is hinted in the above introduction section that terrorism and violent extremism are perhaps the biggest threats in the world and arguably the most threatening events in international peace and security. It is argued that both international and regional organization's military and intelligence agencies are on constant struggle to combat attacks or threats as a result of either terrorism or violent extremism. This implies that neither an individual country nor the collected powers of regional communities are immune from the unprecedented impact of violent extremism (Walwa, 2018). Even though, it is generally argued that, in an overall sense, stronger evidence appears to exist for programs that aim at countering violent extremism among some notable at-risk populations, than for programs that aim at preventing violent extremism by reducing causes or the structural drivers (Kelly, 2019). It is therefore important to note that there are some structural drivers of violent extremism. It is equally important to look into whether or not prioritizing the process of countering violent extremism outweighs the significance of preventing such violent extremisms.

Extremists and terrorist groups like the al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab, and many other terrorist organizations have seemingly expanded their presence in Tanzania, albeit in a relatively less extent compared to Kenya and other neighbouring countries (Walwa, 2018; Dang, 2019). Analysts in Tanzania have often demanded for measures to prioritize the creation of a bulwark against radicalization for regional security especially in East Africa. These analysts are plausibly worried that increased activities of al-Shabaab in the neighboring country of Kenya presents a serious spillover effect on Tanzania. It is always inferred that there is a risk for both radicalization and recruitment to be done in Tanzania. It is not surprising that Tanzanians are among those who make part of the foreigners who are fighting for al-Shabaab both in Somalia and Kenya. For this reason, it did not shock the world that, in 2015, a Tanzanian was among those who were charged with direct involvement in the ruthless al-Shabaab attack on Kenya, which left nearly 150 people dead, most of whom were students at Garissa University College (Bwire, 2019; Dang, 2019). Even so, Tanzanians have been arrested in relation to terrorism not only in Kenya, but also in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia and Mozambique (CEP, 2018; Walwa, 2018).

It is evident that Tanzania has not been directly targeted by al-Shabaab attacks despite such involvements. It is suggested that this could be partly due to the fact that Tanzania is not directly sharing a border with Somalia and only an inconsequential number of Somalis are in Tanzania if compared to Kenya for example. Further to these reasons, unlike such neighbouring countries as Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya, for instance, Tanzania has not been targeted by the al-Shabaab

attacks for an important reason that Tanzania is not part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops, which primarily works to support the Somali government in its efforts to fight terrorism against the al-Shabaab. It is evident that al-Shabaab engage in terrorist attacks against the AMISOM making countries, including Uganda and Kenya (Dang, 2019).

Even though it seems as if no direct attacks were targeted by terrorist, in view of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), forty-three (43) terrorism incidents were reported in Tanzania between 2008 and 2017. In spite of the fact that this number is high for a period of ten years, it is an extremely low number if it is compared to Kenya, which registered about 574 incidents during the same period (Dang, 2019). It is noteworthy that some incidents of terrorism in Tanzania were allegedly committed by Tanzanians. It is however the case that, in 2014 and 2015, there arose groups of unidentified armed people who attacked the police, religious officials and institutions and the government, which spiked terrorism events in Tanzania. Similarly, in 2016, two incidents were highlighted by the US Department of State as related to terrorism. The first is an attack in which about fifteen assailants armed with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), axes and machetes spontaneously attacked the "Masjid Rahman" mosque in the Mwanza Region of Tanzania, killing three people including the mosque's imam (Walwa, 2018). The second is an attack launched by armed assailants on a police station, stealing several weapons (Dang, 2019). In both incidents, no terrorist group claimed responsibility, thus, questions remained as to whether these attacks were done by Tanzanians.

Notwithstanding efforts from the government and security agencies, attacks from unidentified groups increased in Tanzania. In 2017, there were a series of attacks, which were suspected to be terrorist, that were dominant in Kibiti area, which is in the coastal region – *Pwani* (Walwa, 2018). In these attacks, more than thirty police officers and local government officials, especially from the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) were killed. It appears that the assailants never claimed any allegiance to any terrorist group. Statements from the police force in Tanzania with regard to the incidents referred to the perpetrators of the killings as criminal bandits. All the same, there were counterterrorism efforts that were led by the Tanzanian security forces in response to these attacks. The results were the arrest and detention of several hundreds of suspects, the majority of whom Tanzanians. Such arrests and detentions received blessings from the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA). This suggests that – in the past decade or so – violent extremism in Tanzania has been on increase.

There have been worries that the Tanzanian government and security forces have either underreported the terrorism-related incidents or minimized them in character as "criminal" in nature. This suggests that the actual number of terrorist incidents is perhaps higher than what the government of Tanzania chooses to publicly disclose (Dang, 2019). This explains why the single notably major terrorism event remains to be the September 1998 attack on the US embassy in Dar es Salaam by al-Qaeda operatives and Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which at the same time attacked the US embassy in Nairobi (Kundnani and Hayes, 2018). The eyes of the international community turned to al-Qaeda and, in the aftermath, both Tanzania and Kenya

assumed the role of collateral victims of a US targeted terrorism campaign. It is known however that Tanzania has been targeted by other 'terrorist-like' attacks including in 2012 when police officers in Zanzibar were hacked to death with machetes and in 2016 when attacks were witnessed in Tanga Central Bakery Supermarket.

It was the attack on the US embassy in Dar es Salaam that roused the need for initiating antiterrorism in Tanzania. At the same time an apparatus for countering violent extremism was initiated. Thus, the PTA which established Tanzania's basis for counterterrorism was passed in 2002 and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was established in 2005. The NCTC is basically an interagency unit under the Ministry of Home Affairs in Tanzania. The components of NCTC include the Tanzania People's Defence Force (TPDF), the Tanzania Police Force (TPF), the Tanzania Intelligence and Security Service (TISS), the immigration services and prisons force (Walwa, 2018). What is crucial about the NCTC is that its role is articulated as that of preventing rather than that of responding to attacks of terrorist nature. Yet, the NCTC provides the focal point for the Tanzanian government to join the international efforts in engaging in acts that counter violent extremism. At this point it feels like the local community – including religions and religious actors – does not make part of the NCTC and the people together with religious institutions in Tanzania are somehow ignored in the counter violent extremism struggles.

It seems, however, that the TPF has been using the community policing program for a while now. Even if the national strategy on countering violent extremism in

Tanzania is yet to be finalized, the NCTC has taken advantage of the TPF's community policing program, making it one of the central approaches to countering violent extremism. Reports, however, show that the TPF's community policing program has not been sufficiently effective so far (Kundnani and Hayes, 2018). The program seems to have failed in its struggle to address community safety and security issues (Dang, 2019). This suggests that community policing might not entirely be the desired effective approach to preventing the rising elements of violent extremism. Scholars have instead suggested that the morality of the youth who make the highest number of those being recruited and radicalized should be examined. Moral values can be installed into the society through religious teachings and practices. This does not suggest that the current military emphasis should be ignored. The argument follows from Vittori, Bremer and Vittori (2009) who argue that the US assisted military emphasis in Tanzania ought to incorporate softer options, namely enhancing democratic governance, and encouraging the inclusion and participation of Muslims in the Tanzanian political system. Obviously, democratic governance is enhanced through enabling judicial, constitutional, and law-enforcement reform. It seems clearer but not evident, however, that religion (especially Islam) has a significant role to play when it comes to preventing violent extremism in Tanzania (Walwa, 2018).

Even if religions might have a role to play in countering violent extremism, it is not always and positively the case that they play such a role. It must be noted too that, in attempting to understand the roots of radicalism and extremism, religions play a significant role. According to Bwire (2019), for example, radicalism and extremism

are aspects that can be noted in all religions. It is noted for instance that such religions as Christianity, Islam and Judaism tend to exhibit notorious extremism through the application of Crusades, Islamic jihadists groups and Torah respectively (Bwire, 2019). The Islamic jihadists groups include al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda and Boko haram to mention some. This suggests that, while religions have some unknown role to play in preventing violent extremism among the youth, it is sometimes the case that the same religions are the causes or rather the roots of such violent extremism among the youth. More often than not, operatives and terrorists' supporters who were arrested – and sometimes killed – by security forces happen to be Muslim youth between the age of sixteen and thirty-five. Despite the uncertainty, it must be plausibly the case that such Islam related religious institutions like the National Muslim Council (NMC) of Tanzania and the Africa Muslims Agency (AMA) among others have training programs such as Madrasas and moral programs in Mosques where the youth can get basic humanitarian knowledge based on what Islam is and what exactly it is for one to be religious.

Mandaville and Nozell (2017) have argued that, over the past few years, there has been increased interest and space for including notable religious actors in matters concerning policy and struggle on prevention and countering violent extremism. These debates, however, have not shaded any clear light on the degree to which religious factors contribute to violent extremism. Even if it seems the potential role of religion as a driver of radicalism and violent extremism is significant, it seems that causality is not certain. The uncertainty is for the reason that religion usually interacts with other wide range of factors as preaching and teaching, which are prone

to misapprehensions. There is a possibility for a promising alternative approach that entirely depends on the role of religion in violent extremism. In this approach, religions could have a function of "facilitating mobilization, providing a counternarrative, providing a justification, and sanctifying violent acts" (Mandaville and Nozell, 2017: p. 1).

It is likewise commonplace that religious leaders are among integral and significant members of any civil society. Leaders in well institutionalized religions are key contributors to both the public welfare and political discourse. There is therefore a need to carefully engage these religious leaders in all spheres of government work. Of course, there is also a need to be sensitively aware of the potential risks and power asymmetries (Mandaville and Nozell, 2017). It is at least clear in the literature that understanding the ways in which religious factors affect violent extremism especially among the youth is one way in which countering violent extremism solutions that somehow need the engagement of the religious sector can be designed and implemented.

In determining the ways in which religious actors can be partners in countering violent extremism, one must look into the questions of (a) when and how to engage the actors, (b) how to design an effective training for them, but even more effectively, (c) how to ensure such partnerships across sectors is inclusive. These might be key in addressing potential political obstacles, albeit not directly useful for this study. Still, there is a need to avoid unnecessary governmental interference in religion. Studies can instead look into the matter of how to ensure not only an

appropriately sized but also inclusive engagement with religious actors and, generally, religion in the context of preventing violent extremism. The need to embark on this goal sparked this study into looking at the question of: what is the role of religious institutions in preventing the youth from engaging in violent extremism in Tanzania?

1.3   Statement of the Problem

Certainly, some of the upsurge violent conflicts that Tanzania experiences tend to have radical and extremist bearings. It has been argued that the apparent notable presence, absence, or prolongation of these extremist-related violent incidents in some areas in Tanzania, can only be best explained by the established community resilience mechanisms for not only preventing but also countering violent extremism (Walwa, 2018). However, it has proven to be the case in Pwani and elsewhere in Tanzania that community early warning structures are not efficiently operational. As such, it has been demandingly challenging for the government of Tanzania and its security organs to interact with the communities in order to gather useful information in response to the unprecedented insecurities. This strategy is not always effective though. Unquestionably, there is a need to shift the attention by investing more on community-based response systems and early warning. This mechanism, as Walwa (2018: p. 124) argues, might provide for "vital form of resilience to prevent and to counter rising forms of violent conflicts in Tanzania." One way of going back to the community is by looking into one of the basic institutions for moral education – the religious institutions.

The threat of violent extremism is felt in Tanzania and, even if to a larger extent, in the neighbouring countries. The aftermath of the 1998 US embassy attack in Dar es Salaam is featured by a lot of Tanzanian young men and women's arrest due to matters regarding their engagement in terrorism and violent extremism. The arrest of Tanzanians in such countries as Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Mozambique, and the DRC, for example, is proof that Tanzania is currently facing the global terrorism threat, not just as a ground for attacks but as a center for recruiting and training terrorists and violent extremists who launch attacks on other countries. It appears that, in Tanzanians, youth are the most vulnerable for the enigmatic recruitments aimed at radicalization and violent extremism. The several established state devices in Tanzania, such as the NCTC for one, may not be able to prevent the radicalized recruitment of youth, despite their efforts to counter violent extremism. It is suggested that moralizing the youth through religious teachings and practices might effectively provide for an answer to the challenge of preventing violent extremism. It is far from the evident, however, what role a religion such as Islam can play in such prevention endeavor. Silvestri and Mayall (2015) for example argued that religion can play its role as the source or resolution of violent extremism depending on the context. Thus, this study sought to examine the role of religious institutions in preventing the youth from engaging in radicalized violent extremism. In order to effectively do so, the study takes a case of Islam religion in Kilindi District, in the Tanga region of Tanzania.

1.4   Objectives of the Study

This study is basically constituted of a general objective, which is more subdivided

into specific objectives.

1.4.1 General Objective

The study set out to examine the role of Islamic institutions in preventing the youth from engaging in violent extremism in Tanzania.

1.4.2 Specific Objectives

Using the Kilindi District of Tanzania as a case, rather specifically and narrowly, the study intended to:

i)   Identify the various reasons for increased engagement in violent extremism among the youth in Kilindi District, Tanzania.

ii) Examine the extent to which increasing engagement in violent extremism affects the youth in Kilindi District, Tanzania.

iii) Assess the effectiveness of various solutions employed in dealing with youth engagement in violent extremism in Kilindi, Tanzania.

iv) Carefully examine the role of such Islamic institutions in dealing with youth engagement in violent extremism in Kilindi District, Tanzania.

1.5   Research Questions

To address the above objectives, the study sought to answer the following questions:

i)   What are the reasons for increased engagement in violent extremism among the youth in Kilindi District, Tanzania?

ii) How does increased engagement in violent extremism affect the youth in Kilindi District, Tanzania?

iii)   How effective are the solutions employed in dealing with youth engagement in violent extremism in Kilindi, Tanzania?

iv)   To what extent do Islamic institutions help in dealing with increasing engagement in violent extremism among the youth in Kilindi District, Tanzania?

1.6   The Scope of the Study

The study examined the role of such religious institutions as Islam and its religious actors in preventing violent extremism among the youth in Kilindi District in the Tanga region of Tanzania. The implication was such that the scope of this study was somewhat limited to examining such religious roles within the boundary of Tanzania. Even if this was the obvious case, the study still employed only those roles that are in place or may be in place for religious institutions in Kilindi District. That being the case, the study was set in such a way that it only looked into whether or not religion could have an impact on (a) the reasons that the youth have in engaging in violent extremism, (b) the effects that the youth face when exposed to violent extremist environments, (c) the in solutions in place for countering violent extremism, and (d) the prevention of violent extremism. The study relied on interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) as tools for primary data collection, which made it inexorably qualitative.

1.7   Significance of the Study

It is worth noting that a research must not only be of significance to the researcher but also in some way must significantly address the real-world problems in people's

lives and the society at large. It is the case with this study as well because it does not only extend its significance to researchers and academicians but also to the government, security agencies, policy makers, religious institutions, the youth and crucially the general local community. With regard to academicians, researchers, and academics in general, the study broadens prospects regarding the conception of violent extremism and the role that religious institutions can play when it comes to preventing the reasons for – and effects of – increased youth engagement in violent extremism. The study also looks into different theories, such as the derealization theory and the vulnerability theory. This means new perspectives of the interpretations and applications of these theories are offered in this study. It should be noted also that this study lays a solid foundation for future studies, whether on the same or related topics by other researchers and scholars in this area or areas related to conflict and conflict resolutions.

This study is further significant in that it contributes to the existent body of knowledge on the solutions employed in both countering and preventing radicalism and violent extremism both within and outside Tanzania. Given the ambiguities of the role of religion in radicalization and violent extremism, as it has been highlighted in the background section, it is important to build an academic perspective and a more recent development in the aspect of how such religions as Islam can contribute in preventing violent extremism. Further to the expected academic significances above, it makes sense to remember that this study acts as the researcher's partial but necessary requirement for the awarding of the degree of Master of Arts in

International Relations, Cooperation and Development of the Open University of Tanzania (OUT).

When it comes to the government, security agencies policy makers and eventually the religious institutions themselves, the study provides a basis for knowledge and awareness on the need for inclusivity, if at all the struggles on countering and preventing radicalization and violent extremism are to be as successful as desired. Consequently, methods employed so far by the government and security agencies in retaliation to violent extremism are further sharpened, better partnership policies are proposed and designed, and significantly people's (or the youth) moral behaviours are properly shaped. All these aspects have a significant impact on national, regional, continental, and even world peace and security struggles. This study sought to partly reduce to minimum the prevailing derealization challenges that the youth face, which make them so vulnerable that they instead opt for recruitment to radicalized groups and training for violent extremism.

1.8   The General Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation was structured in a way that the very first chapter is a general introduction to the problem and its context. Chapter One is a foundation on the background and the statement of the problem under study. It further identifies the objectives and research questions that the study hopes to address and answer. In short Chapter One establishes the ontological and epistemic foundations for undertaking this study. Subsequently, Chapter Two is the initial stage that was necessarily taken in order to clearly understand the topic, variables, and the research gap necessary for

undertaking this study. Chapter Two, which follows next, brings into attention scholarly perceptions and other researchers' works on aspects related to this study's topic. The second chapter, therefore, establishes the conceptual, theoretical, and empirical grounds for this study. The next one is Chapter Three, which is the methodology chapter. This chapter basically addresses in a systematic and careful way the step-by-step techniques that were employed for the purpose of ensuring that this study's findings are valid and reliable. It offers methods, designs, approaches, and tools for collecting, analyzing, presenting, interpretation of primary data. Chapter Four is a practical careful analysis, presentation, interpretation, and discussions of the collected data. Finally, Chapter Five offers a summary of the findings, the various conclusions drawn in the study and recommendations from such findings.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1   Introduction

This chapter brings into light the scholarly perceptions and previous research works on topics related to the role of religion in countering or else preventing violent extremism. Chapter Two is clearly crucial in that its role is central in clarifying the concepts, revealing the theories, exploiting the empirical findings from other studies, and highlighting proper methodologies used for studies in this area. Regarding underlying theories, this study is best described by Judith Butler's theories of "Derealization" and "Vulnerability" (Butler, 2009; 2014). The chapter equally addresses the question of whether there exist empirical studies that have been conducted on the role of religious institutions in preventing violent extremism, in Tanzania or elsewhere. There are certainly some, but limitedly few and addressing other issues altogether (see e.g., Silvestri and Mayall, 2015; Walwa, 2018; Dang, 2019). Clearly, some scholars have studied, even if partly, the correlation between prevention of violent extremism and the role of religion.

It is, however, far from being evident whether these findings on related variables apply to the case in Tanzania. It is also not clear whether the role of religion and religious actors becomes vivid. This chapter sought to show that there is a research gap with regard to the above dilemmas. It offers conceptual clarifications, theoretical and empirical studies reviews, and the conceptual framework of the study.

2.2   Description of Key Concepts

Under this section, several key concepts used in the study are clarified.

2.2.1 Extremism

Defining the concept of extremism has always been a complex phenomenon. Scholars such as Bwire (2019) however, have insisted that always thought of complexity is not evident. This stand is likely because there is a way that extremism can be conceived. In the most possible simple way, extremism refers to activities (feelings, beliefs, actions, attitudes, strategies) of a human character that is clearly far removed from the ordinary ways of human life. In settings involving conflict, extremism manifests itself as a severe or an exaggerated form of conflict engagement (Bwire, 2019). It must, however, be noted that in the process of labelling certain people, groups, or activities as being "extremist" and the process of determining that which is ordinary in any extant setting is either a subjective or a political matter that largely rely on views and perspective of the one who defines.

It is commonly the case that extremisms or extreme acts are more likely, but not always, employed by the least advantaged people and the marginalized groups – or else the most vulnerable and poor people (Silvestri & Mayall, 2015). These people or groups normally perceive other good forms of conflict engagement like the normative forms, for example, as either biased or blocked for people or groups of their nature. Bwire (2019) mentions Hamas and Islamic Jihad as examples of such marginalized groups. It makes sense to think of extremism as a result of failures in reason and dialogue. In order to be heard in such scenarios, people tend to resort to

physical confrontation and hostility. This is when violent extremism arises. Before analyzing the concept of violent extremism, however, it is important to first coherently concede the meaning of another rather controversial concept of radicalism.

2.2.2 Radicalism

The concept of radicalism is often closely related– and most times taken as synonymous – to extremism. These concepts are distinct though. Etymologically, the term "radical" is from the Latin term *radix,* which simply means a root. It seems as if, when people are said to be ideologically radicalized, for example, they assume the strength of the roots that carry the whole tree of the ideology. However, the concept of radicalism mostly refers to groups, whether religious or political that choose to employ revolutionary means in order to bring their desired change in the society (Bwire, 2019). The general feeling is that the concept of radicalism is less used in religious cycles than it is used in politics. The United Kingdom is often accredited for having been the first to initiate radicalism when a "radical reform" of the electoral system was politically supported. It is the case, therefore, that with time the concept of radicalism gained popularity to positively denote an ideology that is progressively liberal.

The theme of radicalization has been highlighted in scholarly works as controversial when it is related to religion. In their study, Silvestri and Mayall (2015) showed that there is lack of conclusive evidence on the ways and the manner in which religious institutions play any role in potential radicals, the process of radicalization or the

actual radicalized convicted terrorists. It seems that more often radicalization is blamed on the notable global or societal transformations and the challenges that these transformations bring to either individuals or their identities (Schmid, 2013). It is not surprising, therefore, that scholars such as Aly and Striegher (2012) and Silvestri and Mayall (2015) claim that when Islamist terrorism is closely viewed it is easier to conclude against the counterterrorism policies that religion such as Islam assumes a far lesser role in radicalization. This implies that the role of religion towards radicalization of the youth for violent extremism is sometimes exaggerated.

2.2.3 Violent Extremism

Scholars such Varman and Al-Amoudi (2016) understand the concept of violence in terms of a specific form or type of aggression that always involves harm, coercion, and injury. Their conception of violence includes among other things the use of physical force in order to injure or harm someone and some equally harmful yet more insidious forms of symbolic and non-physical violence, which tend to make coercion unaccountable (see e.g., Butler 2009; Varman and Al-Amoudi 2016). It seems at this point that when extremism gets violent, coercion, injury and harm are inevitable. Perhaps in order to understand the concept of violent extremism better, it is important to take a closer look on the "terrorism". What is certainly similar between violent extremism and terrorism is that they are both forms of crimes (LaFree and Gruenewald, 2018). However, it is important to recognize the extant differences between violent extremism in form of terrorism and ordinary crime. More often than not, while traditional criminals appear to be generally driven by selfishness and personal gain violent extremism and terrorism tends to be motivated

by the furtherance of some form of altruism and political causes (LaFree, Dugan, and Miller, 2015). Surprisingly, while common criminals tend to hide and avoid detection, violent extremists and terrorists unabashedly commit serious crimes and often seek popularity, acknowledgement, and the largest possible audiences, which appears to be justified by what they perceive to be contributing to greater or common good (LaFree and Gruenewald, 2018).

2.2.4 Terrorism

Perhaps the line is more blurred when the concept of terrorism is compared to that of violent extremism. Scholars have been tempted to use terrorism and violent extremism interchangeably, as if they were same thing. Precisely, however, terrorism has been conceded as all activities, strategies, and tactics of using threats, force, and violence to the non-combatants in order to influence certain political, social, or economic goals, and most often to remove a certain government from power or influencing political goals (LaFree, Gary and Freilich, 2017). It makes sense to think of terrorism as a magnified form of violent extremism. Terrorism seems to have started as a result of the rise of both inter and intra continental violent extremisms which on many occasions and many countries – including Tanzania of course – have resulted to not only loss of life but also destruction of infrastructures and nature (LaFree, Gary and Freilich, 2017).

It is clear that the term terrorism is not subject to some universally agreed conception. However, against the above conceptions, terrorism in some other conceptions is broadly understood as a method of applying coercion that either

utilizes or threatens to utilize violence. Whether the use of a mere threat or actual use of violence, terrorists always intend to spread fear in order that they may attain their desired ideological or political goals (UN, 2018). It is argued that, in the contemporary conceptual analysis of violence, it is important to find a distinction between terrorist-related violence and ordinary kinds of violence. However, it seems difficult to plausibly draw a rational line between violent extremism and terrorism, apart from considering terrorism as some form of magnified violent extremism.

The implication of the UN conception of terrorism is that, in a terrorist-related violence, a certain person A attacks some helpless entity B (whether another person or infrastructure), to either convince or coerce some authoritative person C to change one's position with regard to some policy or action that person A desires. Fear is normally spread by attacks of these sorts because, unexpectedly, the violence is directed against victims who are always considered innocent (UN, 2018). Certainly, these kinds of violence not only put pressure on such third parties as governments' positions on certain issues, but also call for these third parties to prevent or counter any future attacks of the sort. Experience also shows that terrorists in the contemporary world would use any form of violence. They also indiscriminately target the helpless civilians, the powerful military facilities, the authoritative state officials, among others (LaFree, Gary and Freilich, 2017).

2.2.5 Religious Radicalism and Extremism

To get a clearer understanding of the concept of religious radicalism and extremism should be understood, two dominant religions in Tanzania can be highlighted. These

include Christianity and Islam. These religions are said to be notorious in exhibiting extreme tendencies. By extreme tendencies it is always implied the tendencies which one would not in ordinary sense associate with religion (Mirza, 2007; Bwire, 2019). It may not make sense, for example, for a religious person to engage in actions that destroy *God's good creation.* Mirza (2007) argues that religious values have actually become redundant. He thought that religion is not only on the retreat but also that crime has grown rampant. As a consequence, Mirza thought that truth is swiftly disappearing and justice as it should be known is on the verge of complete extinction. Signs like these in any society are positive signs of both morally decadency and radicalism (Mirza, 2007).

There are certain notable extremist and radical tendencies which appear to be cutting across in Islam and Christianity. Scholars have pointed such tendencies as (a) belief that only one's ideology is right, (b) others and their beliefs are wrong, (c) a person's enemies are the enemies of the person's god and that those against one are against one's God, (b) people of other faiths must join one's religion, failure of which the result is death. There is a common belief that, while a person and his or her fellow believers are extremely special, others – who believe otherwise are totally not important. (Ali, 2016; Bwire, 2019). Perfect examples among the Christians are found in such groups as Pharisees, Zealots and Puritans and among Islam the good examples are the Wahhabis and Salafis. Yet, as scholars on religious radicalization and violent extremism put it:

> Research on the causes of conflict, on faith-based terrorism and Islamic radicalisation is inconclusive in its attempts to identify patterns or variables such as poverty, personality traits, inequality or others that can

determine the degree to which one religious identity or another is prone to violent actions. Although it has been shown that religion can contribute to the escalation of conflicts, there is no fixed recipe for establishing which combination of actors, claims, external factors and religious features can ignite tensions and violence, where religious dimensions are central (Silvestri & Mayall, 2015: pp. 71-72).

2.3   Theoretical Literature Review

With regard to the facts that (a) violent extremism shapes and redefines the morality of individuals and behaviour international relations (e.g. Aly, Taylor and Karnovsky, 2014), (b) terrorism and violent extremism pose perhaps the greatest threat to the (inter)national security and world peace (e.g. Bwire, 2019), (c) violent extremism has greatly fallen out of the actions that one would normally perceive to be rational and human (e.g. Silvestri & Mayall, 2015), and c) that this study focuses on the role that religious institutions especially Islam can play in preventing the youth from engaging in violent extremism in Tanzania, in this section, only the theories that focus on how the behaviour of those recruited into radicalized groups for violent extremism are reviewed. This considers the suggestion that perhaps those forming the behaviour and reactions of individuals to locally based problems and challenges are significant in preventing violence feelings from arising from the most vulnerable and neglected individuals. It must be clear with the theories discussed below that violent extremism are essentially a result of derealization of certain individuals by those who consider themselves powerful people in the dominant discourses and the vulnerability of these derealized individuals. Since these theories describe the study, it makes sense to think of the objective as being the role of religious institutions in ensuring that the derealized and most vulnerable among the youth do not go ahead in their reactions to become violent extremists. The underlying theories are as follows:

2.3.1 Derealization Theory

Derealization is a theory defended and applied by Judith Butler in most of her works. "Derealization" entails a situation that must occur in cases where particular identities or individuals are excluded from a certain discourse. Such a situation comes with the effect of creating what Butler (2009) calls ungrievable lives. To be derealized is not the same as to be made subordinate. More often than not subordinate identities are considered to be inferior, but part of the category. However, even more fundamentally, derealized identities are excluded for the reason that they do not suitably fit the recognizable categories for significant requirements. By significant requirements it is meant here a place where someone may express needs, vindicate rights and claim to exist as a human being. Examples of such individuals on Butler's (2009) views include the derealized identities of prisoners at Guantanamo who are denied both legal discourses and media coverage. Another good example includes the transgendered persons who fall out of the discourses of patriarchal societies and feminist discourses (Butler, 2014). What Butler suggests is an analysis of the violence which is inherent to and caused by derealizing others. In short, derealizing someone is considering the person unreal and delete their presence in the society (implicitly stated in, Varman & Al-Amoudi, 2016).

Derealization is intrinsically an act of violence that operates symbolically at the level of pathologizing, negating and criminalizing the unrecognizable identities (Varman & Al-Amoudi, 2016). A derealized subject, therefore, is completely deprived of one's ability to describe oneself as human. There are several ways in which derealization can encouragingly further (physical) violence namely, (a) whenever the

presence of subjects who fall out (the deviants) of the dominant categories is considered a danger to the social order, (b) making derealization acceptable by choosing to allow violence against unreal persons to be unchecked therefore making violence against the ungrievable persons to remain unaccountable for and unpunishable in tribunals, crime investigations and public discussions. (Butler, 2004; 2009). From these insights Varman and Al-Amoudi claim, "This foreclosure of violence and its victims operates as an attempt to maintain social order. At the same time, it also tends to generate spirals of resistance and paranoia followed by intensified violence" (2016: p. 1912).

The above claim shows that Butler is conscious of the fact that derealized persons are not always passive victims. When derealized, individuals tend to resist violence in various ways. As Butler (2004: p. 33) puts it, "[derealized individuals] have a strange way of remaining animated and so must be [continuously] negated". People who are considered unreal continue to live a normal life by breathing, occupying space, speaking, and bonding. Even when it appears that the voices of the unreal is ignored, their bodies segregated, their language considered unintelligible to the dominant, their rights to associate negated, it still is the case that the unreal people must go on with life. It is not surprising therefore that when people are derealized, they form resistance through associations. It is in these associations that that the derealized individuals form bonds, develop certain counter-discourses which may render them intelligible among themselves and others, and try to countervail the extant derealization by claiming their rights and underlying freedoms (Varman & Al-Amoudi, 2016).

The feelings of paranoia among the dominant discourses are sometimes created when the derealized individuals are perceived to persistently resist. This explains the claim, "the derealization of the [other persons] means that it is neither alive nor dead but interminably spectral" (Butler, 2004: p. 33). This implies that the derealized individuals are not part of the living humans, neither are they part of the revered dead humans but are some kinds of alien ghosts. This maintains and intensifies the spiral of violence. It is because as Butler puts it: "the infinite paranoia that imagines the [endless] war against terrorism […] will be one that justifies itself endlessly in relation to the spectral infinity of its enemy" (2004: p. 33). Obviously, derealization is dehumanizing. When people are dehumanized they tend to react. This situation creates a need to form associations that take the reaction into extremes. These extremes are normally accompanied with (physical) violence, which creates paranoia among the derealizing agents and those perceived to be in dominant discourses. This is to say; violent extremism is closely associated with reactions of the derealized individuals. Preventing violent extremism, therefore, requires that one looks into extant forms of derealization in the society.

2.3.2 Vulnerability Theory

Vulnerability is yet another theory that is pioneered and mainly defended by Judith Butler. In Butler's (2014) view, when actors resist the extant derealization, they tend to do so by showcasing their vulnerability. This is to say, if people choose to resist derealization, the consequence is finding themselves in heightened situations of vulnerability to retaliation and violence (Butler, 2014). Even though, when subjects display publicly their vulnerability, they then create a notion of reaffirmation of the

fact that as human subjects they are real and they are endowed with desires and needs, irony and reflexivity. Butler (2014) fears that, when subjects are signified as "vulnerable" within legal regimes or human rights discourses, they become objectified as always "vulnerable". Thus, vulnerability tends to acquire a paternalist appropriation by those who are dominant as a political position which is typical for those who lack agency and the powerless.

Despite being instrumental for repairing some of the injuries, public displays of vulnerability efface the political agency of populations that are labelled vulnerable. It appears that the dominant groups are the ones who silence the protests of the vulnerable by choosing to make claims of vulnerability (Butler, 2014). There appears an ideological confiscation, reversal, and seizure. This suggests that vulnerability displays can sometimes rationalize and expand inequalities. Nonetheless, Butler (2014) believes that these situations do not limit effectiveness of displays of vulnerability in limiting dominance. Vulnerability can still limit dominance by either creating renewed forms of agency that necessarily depart from the dominant ideal of a political subject who chooses to establish agency by either denying one's vulnerability or engaging in violent action (Varman & Al-Amoudi, 2016). This implicitly implies that, when individuals are vulnerable, they tend to either deny the obvious fact that they are vulnerable or react violently to the vulnerability.

In summary, the two implied theories in Butler's context are particularly relevant and significant for this study of violent extremism in that it lays a ground for a theoretical prism that shows that when individuals are *derealized* and *vulnerably* the result is

that there is: (a) dominant groups (b) unchecked violence, (c) diffused resistance, (d) paranoid reactions, and even more shockingly (e) intensified violent acts.

2.4   The Empirical Literature Review

It should be evident by now that the concept of "violent extremism" – at least theoretically – is associated with the bond that an individual, who is *derealized* or rather *vulnerable* in some respect, decides to form in order to react to the derealization and vulnerability. This means that people are not born violent, and that violent extremism is not an inborn trait, but rather a social phenomenon. It also implies that one does not choose to become violent unless the society has chosen to dehumanize the person or that the dominant and powerful have chosen to treat the person in a way that one perceives to be dehumanized. It is as if violent extremism arises as a form of retaliation where one chooses to become human again. It is, at least theoretically, certainly the case that violent extremism has causes, it has goals to achieve, it has people to affect, and it can be prevented. There is a need, therefore, to carefully look into the reasons for violent extremism, what violent extremism hopes to achieve, the role of religious institutions and the means used to prevent violent extremism as suggested from different other studies conducted empirically in Tanzania and elsewhere. The focus here, of course, will be more on the Islamist violent extremism.

2.4.1 Reasons for Islamist Extremism in East Africa

The 2019 qualitative study by Bwire which uses historical analysis to describe events and issues found out that from the 1980 to 2000 there arose secular bent ideologies

namely, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil (Eelam) and the Hindus in Sri Lanka among others, who used both politics and religion to forge grievances among them. The study analyzed the emergence of radicalism and violent extremism in Kenya. The study also argues that Kenya leads in East Africa as a country that appears to have been selected as the battlefield of terrorism activities for the Somalian based Al-Shabaab extremists. It can be hypothetically inferred that whenever the devotees of any specific religion are radicalized, and these adherents of the religion are taken to the very extreme by their practices and beliefs, and even more whenever these devotees are stretched beyond the agreeable standards or norms according to orthodox and scripture means, they inevitably become dangerous to humanity. What Bwire (2019) suggests is that radicalism and violent extremism find their real root in religion.

There is another study conducted by Ali in 2016 on "Islamist Extremism in East Africa". The study qualitatively looked into the reasons for Muslim's radicalization and engagement in violent extremism. It is clear from Ali's study that the extremist Islamist ideology that takes hold in Tanzania and other East African countries is imported from elsewhere, but the ideology is worsened when exposed to factors that meaningfully resonate with it. Even if violent extremists have often exhibited distinguished levels of experience, wealth, education, and zealousness, it is clear that "socioeconomic marginalization fuels the credibility and dispersal of extremist narratives" (Ali, 2016: p. 5). Take a case of East Africa, for example, where perceptions of unequal socioeconomic distribution and status and also some ill-advised actions of the state have to a great extent nudged Muslims toward what is

considered enlarged conservative tendencies. This implies that the self-perceived low statuses have created reasons for the plausibility of the "us versus them" or "they are better than us" narratives.

What the above argument entails is that there can be found legitimate grievances among East African Muslims. These grievances include (a) higher youth unemployment percentages than the national averages in Kenya and Tanzania, (b) scarring lower rates of primary and secondary school attendance and completion Muslims, (c) fewer schools and most of the times insufficient teachers in Kenya and Tanzania, (d) hindered economic opportunities, (e) absence of clearly defined property rights, leading to occasional land seizures by large non-local firms or the government, and (f) government actions that alienate, including detaining of Muslim religious leaders and low inclusion of Muslims in leadership and governance. It appears that, while Christians tend to perceive their lives same or better than others, a comparatively less number Muslims tend to behave the same way. In Tanzania, however, this has not necessarily led to religious tensions – at least it is not explicitly the case.

What most empirical studies hope to show is that local phenomenon creates the challenge of Islamic extremism. By local phenomenon, it is meant that perceptions of religious (or else Islamist) discrimination are higher in some specific areas. These areas include those in which exclusionary and divisive Islamic narratives are extant and prevalent. Examples in Tanzania include areas like Zanzibar, some sections of Dar es Salaam and – significant for this study – Tanga (Ali, 2016). It is also

important to note that Muslims who tend to get associated to extremist interpretation of Islam in Tanzania are the minority, albeit vocal. However, Ali concludes, "the growth of this minority reflects and perpetuates a steady erosion of [Tanzanian] resilience in the face of the extremist Islamist ideology that has been coursing the region" (2016: p. 5). The study recommends that better means to confront Islamist extremism should be employed. This is because employing extrajudicial or heavy-handed police actions may backfire by inflaming more exclusionist and cleavages narratives leading to more violent extremism.

2.4.2 Public Perceptions of Violent Extremism and Islam

Another qualitative study by Sobolewska was conducted in Britain in 2010. The basic argument in her study was that, after the famous 2001 (9/11) terrorist attack in the US, the ignorant public in Britain was thrown into the complexities of the world of Islamic extremism and the ideology that Islam had some sort of animosity feelings towards Western societies and values. The 2005 bombing of transport system in London affirmed the Islamic threat among the British public and government. It was then perceived that Islam had a role to play both as a value system and a religion. This is to say, Islam did either potentially or actually support Muslims' extremism. Sobolewska (2010) feels that there is a growing fear of radicalizing Islamic religion which feeds into the fears of Muslim religiosity per se. Islam is perceived as the basic ground for what is considered hostile anti-Western values and attitudes. It was made clear in this study that in Britain, and in large parts of today's Western world, the confusion about correlations between the political and the religious, and the

assumed links between Islam religiosity and extremism hinder public rational debates.

The study found out that it is important to undermine claims that Islam plays a role of replacing the identities of individuals who are derealized and alienated and that (young) Muslims are vulnerable to such alienation. It is important to remember as Sobolewska (2010) would affirm that the public should be less concerned about the growing number of young Muslims that (tacitly) support terrorism than government policies that bring about such feelings. This is to say, Islam as a religion has little or no contribution to make, if compared to what governments do to spark the feelings of violent extremism. What is implied here is that Islam has little impact on the increasing violent extremism than the impact that violent extremism has on the people's perception of Islam religiosity. At least ignorantly so, people tend to think it is Islam that perpetrates ill-feelings of extremism.

2.4.3 The Role of Islam in Preventing Violent Extremism

In 2012, Aly and Striegher conducted a study which applied the four-phase radicalization model which took a case study of first convicted terrorist in Australia, using interviews with the convict and a qualitative analysis of the convict's trial. In this case the four-phase model was examined to see if it was valid for home grown terrorism cases and the role of religion in radicalizing individuals towards violent extremism. In this study it was found that policy response plays a far greater role in radicalization of persons toward violent extremism than religion (Aly and Striegher, 2012). The implications are therefore noted on counterterrorism programs. This is

because in countering violent extremism, these programs must understand who plays a role in radicalization towards violent extremism. Therefore, even if the role of Islam is always thought to be that of radicalization, this claim happens not to be empirically grounded. It is not surprising that Miller (2013) proposed that schools should provide education on the role of religion in violent extremism.

The 2014 study by Barrelle qualitatively – through interviews – studied individual disengagement from violent extremism, especially in a Western context. It was found out that people do not understand how terrorists can exit extremism and be reintegrated back into the community. While it is difficult for most extremists to be normal citizens again, some do eventually make it back to their lives, sometimes unassisted. It is therefore possible that that one gets naturally disengaged. Most of the times, however, they would need deradicalization from the extremist perspectives. The study concluded that most extremists and radicals quit at some point.

The questions arising out of these would include whether or not it is hard to leave voluntarily; whether or not something can be done to minimize any future radicalization; whether pre-radicalized individuals can be reintegrated back into the society; etc. Certainly, there will be issues of belonging, identity, and purpose if reintegration is not done properly and with proper authorities (Barrelle, 2014). It is not surprising that Barelle (2014) argues that the social identity mechanisms which are practically implicated in radicalisation are perhaps constituted of a causally essential and significant component of deradicalization, disengagement and reintegration. In this case, prevention mechanisms and disengagement interventions –

including religious ones – can only be successful if it is clear and evident the reasons as to why people enter and leave violent and extreme groups, or else choose to become or not become terrorists.

It is clearer now that there are a number of factors that can give one the reason to join radicalized groups. It is, however, not always the case that whenever people face these challenges then they resolute to violence and joining extreme groups. Either way, that religions, especially Islam, play a central part in radicalization is a notion among the ignorant or else the uninformed public. It is highlighted that government policies play a greater role for such movements. It is not clear though whether religion plays, even if just a small, role in enhancing radicalization or in preventing violent extremism among the followers and the society at large. The present study will address this gap in literature by looking into the role of religious institutions like Islam in preventing violent extremism among the youth in Kilindi District, Tanga – Tanzania.

2.5   Conceptual Framework

Strictly, conceptual frameworks should not be perceived as mere drawings nor are they to be conceded as arbitrary assemblages of disparate concepts (see, e.g., Yin, 2014). The present study similarly concedes a conceptual framework as the researcher's roadmap or construct, in which all the key research variables and concepts are given some significant integral part to play. The implication here is that a conceptual framework lays a plausible ground for interpretative and causal approaches to the obvious extant social reality. This is to say, conceptual frameworks

do not intend to offer an analytical or causal setting of the study. Similar to Creswell (2012), this study considers its conceptual framework as the fundamental mind structure of the research. The mind structure is primarily constituted of certain abstract but real ideas and concepts that the present study examined, experimented, analyzed, and observed.

The researcher's illustration of the conceptual framework is presented just below. At the face of it, it can be noted that the illustration is composed of independent variables and the dependent variable. This illustration shows the correlation that can be established between the independent variables including (a) the main causes or rather reasons for youth radicalization towards violent extremism namely, derealization, vulnerability, exclusion, religious ideologies and significantly the socio-economic and political policies and positions, (b) the effect of those reasons namely, radicalization, extremism and terrorism, and (c) efforts to find solutions and the role that such organs as the international community, the government, security agencies, the local community and even more significant for this study the religious institutions and the dependent variable namely, the prevention of youth from engaging in violent extremism. From the conceptual framework, it can be noted that it is not clear whether the independent variables do *enhance* or *prevent* the dependent variable. It becomes obviously clear, therefore, that the present study's conceptual framework (shown in Figure 2. 1) is not only the result of the synthesis of the analyses and discussions of theories, concepts, but also a critical review of the empirical literature. By critical review, it was not meant that the results from scholars regarding violent extremism were criticised, but rather that the studies were carefully

examined in order to highlight the strengths and weakness in extant literature in order to shade some light to the present study's research gap.

Independent Variables   **Dependent**

Figure 2.1: The conceptual framework

Source: Researcher's own construct as inspired by literature review, 2022.

2.6   Synthesis and the Research Gap

It is evident from the conceptual framework above that the causes, effects, and perceived solutions to violent extremism among the youth have some impact on youth engagement or disengagement from radicalization into violent extremism and terrorism. Studies failed to clearly illustrate what exactly the kind of this impact is.

Clearly, while people tend to suggest that religion is a cause for radicalization of youth into violent extremism, empirical studies have proven this to be either not the case or exaggerated. Yet, there is wide consensus in the literature that religion has a role to play. Considering the nature of the causes of youth radicalization towards violent extremist groups, there is a feeling that it is possible that religious institutions have not been included enough as among useful solutions into youth's unbecoming behaviours. What is clearly the case is that there have been measures in place to counter and perhaps to prevent violent extremism. These measures have been mainly militarized and taken away from the local community. It is expected that religious institutions and religious actors can provide for a closer impact on youth's engagement or disengagement from violent extremism (see e.g., Aly and Striegher, 2012; Miller, 2013; Barrelle, 2014; Walwa, 2018; Bwire, 2019). It seems to be far from the obvious, however, whether this role of religious institutions and religious actors could one of preventing youth radicalization into violent extremist groups. These uncertainties provided for the basic justification for the present study's need to examine the role of religious institutions – specifically Islam – in preventing the youth from engaging in violent extremism, taking Kilindi District in Tanzania as a case.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1   Introduction

Analyses of concepts, theories and scholarly empirical findings were carefully presented in Chapter Two, which was basically a review of the literature related to the causes, effects, and solutions to the problem of violent extremism among the youth, in relation to religion. From the literature review, it is shown that little or nothing has been done with regard to the question of: what is the role of religious institutions in preventing the youth from engaging in violent extremism? It is this question that the present study sought to address. The second chapter significantly highlighted scholarly viewpoints with regard to the various methodologies for conducting research in areas such as these. Chapter Three, therefore, is a groundwork of the detailed steps, procedures, frameworks, and major guidelines that the present study adopted and relied on in order to not only validly collect, analyze and interpret data but also reliably discuss the data in line with extant literature as per the problem. Chapter Three is a step-by-step explanation of the research design, research paradigm, research approach, the area of study, the nature of the population, the sample and sampling procedures, tools employed in data collection, processing and analysis, the validity and reliability of the data and the research ethical considerations.

3.2   Research Design

According to Kothari (2004), a research design is best described as a plan of action

of the guidelines for data collection, analysis, and interpretation, which has the objective of ensuring that the findings are validly and reliably relevant. Following the trend of empirical studies related to this topic, the qualitative research design was adopted. It must be noted that the study seeks to gain more insights on the role religious institutions and actors can play in preventing the youth from engaging in violent extremism. It is equally important to note that, since qualitative designs are research projects employing qualitative methods, and qualitative methods use relatively small sample sizes, this design will perfectly suit this study (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). The present study completely relied on the quality of obtained responses rather than the emotional and quantity insights which are always employed by the quantitative designs. Despite being central to the data collection process, the qualitative design also enhanced the researcher to maintain objectivity, to sustain a neutral position and to remain independent (see Creswell, 2009).

3.3   Research Paradigm

It is argued that a research paradigm is a unique methodological feature that guides the researcher's belief on the trend and choice of one's research topic, methods, and the entire process of conducting and writing the research (Creswell, 2009). Having a proper and consistent knowledge on the basic paradigm is a significant road map for research. Being qualitative, the suitable paradigm is *constructivism*. Qualitative designs emanate from what is considered to be more different and fundamental set of beliefs or paradigms than the ones that underpin quantitative designs (Denzil and Lincoln, 2011). While quantitative research is basically grounded on positivism, which is a belief that reality is not only singular but discoverable only by appropriate

experimental methods, constructivism does not dispute with this claim. The constructivist claim is that phenomenon and demographic features may have significant influences on this reality (Creswell, 2009). Succeeding the notion of the constructivists, the present study assumed that there is no single reality. The researcher did, therefore, elicit participants' perceptions of reality.

3.4 Research Approach

In a qualitative research, one is expected to focus not only on the events that transpired the choice of a certain research topic but also on the outcomes that those events have or can have, from the perspectives of the participants of the study. The present study employed the *phenomenological* approach. This approach is necessary because, apart from being compatible with qualitative studies, there is a particular phenomenon namely the role of religious institutions in preventing the youth from engaging in violent extremism that the researcher wants to better understand or else describe. It must be clearer now that the purpose of phenomenological approaches is to describe the essence of a certain phenomenon by exploring and examining it from the perspective of those who have directly experienced it. It makes sense to infer that the purpose of phenomenological approach was to understand the sorts of meanings that the participants choose to ascribe to the particular phenomenon.

3.5 The Study Area

It was stated earlier that this is a case study. As such, the study was conducted in Kilindi District. Kilindi is a rural district council, which is in Tanga Region in Northern Tanzania. The district covers an area of 6,444 square kilometers and,

according to the 2012 statistics from the National Bureau of Statistics, a density of 36.76 per square kilometer. The district is also neighbouring the regions of Morogoro and Dodoma in Tanzania. Kilindi District was selected because: (a) the district is in Tanga, which is a region that has faced direct violent extremists' attacks (see e.g., Walwa, 2018), (b) the district is dominantly Muslim, and significantly (c) Kilindi is associated with recruitment and training of violent extremists. On one account, for example, it is argued that the first four operatives of Al-Shabab arrived in Tanzania twelve or more years ago, joining a local mosque in Kilindi District (CEP, 2018). The Counter Extremism Project, herein abbreviated CEP, (2018) also shows that it is not clear how the Al-Shabab operatives entered the country but when the local Tanzanians chose to distance themselves from them, there broke fights in 2008 leading to the decision by the operatives to buy land and build a mosque strictly espousing al-Shabab teachings.

Further justification can be stated for selecting this particular area of study. It is mainly because of Kilindi that the Tanzanian authorities, since 2008, have been forced to link its numerous incidents to al-Shabab. In 2013, for example, the TPF made the first major arrest of al-Shabab operatives in Mtwara region confiscating firearms, machetes, and terrorist training materials (Walwa, 2018). All operatives arrested were Tanzanian nationals who had intensively engaged in military training. Soon after this arrest, the TPF in Kilindi District, Tanga Region went ahead and dismantled a terrorist training and child indoctrination camp. In this process, 69 suspects were arrested and dozens of completely brainwashed recruits between the age of 4 and 13 were set free, excluding of course more than 32 women (CEP, 2018).

Training materials instructing the need for Muslims' liberation in East Africa and the world at large were also seized. These children were found in a mosque learning fighting and killing skills, and hate for non-Muslims (CEP, 2018). About 20 completely brainwashed children required at least a three-week rehabilitation program to heal and become normal again. These are evidencing that Kilindi District provided a useful area for the present study that sought to understand the role of Islam in preventing the youth from engaging in violent extremism.

3.6   The Population

The population is simply described as the complete set of every member or case that could take part in the study (Yin, 2014). The population can be large or small depending on either the size of each case in the study area, the objects of inference, the design of the study, and the sort of the problem to be addressed. Hence, the population reflects both the people and the elements in the mind of the researcher about the kind of data to collect and the reason for doing so. In a correct and precise manner, the population of the current study was composed of all the religious institutions and religious actors (strictly Muslim leaders) and youth (Muslims) below the age of 45 in Kilindi District. It is evident that the unit of the present study relied on the responses of the participants.

3.7   Sampling Design and Sample Size

A sampling design is a procedure which is framed for the sole purpose of extracting a sample from the study's population (Kothari, 2004). It is obvious that the sample will be representative of the entire population and most often the information which is

retrieved from the sample is generalized of the whole population. In order to successfully make such generalization, therefore, the researcher selects individuals from the population who possess some representative features. These representative features must be observable in the entire group or else population. The present study employed the quota sampling technique in which only 14 individuals with necessary features like the religious leaders and youth (some of whom were those previously recruited in radicalized groups) with the right age, Islamic religion affiliation and residents of Kilindi were purposefully selected for face-to-face interviews. Moreover, snowball sampling technique was employed to select 36 other individuals for focus group discussions. The sample size for this study was therefore fifty (50) participants.

3.8   Sources and Methods of Data Collection

While it appears in common experience that methods vary depending on discipline, the emphasis on systemic accuracy and honesty in methodology remain untouched. There are two methods for the accuracy and honesty in academic research to be manifest. The primary source in which data is obtained from the originator and the secondary source in which data is basically a replica of what others have done or used in their studies. This study employed both primary and secondary sources of data. On one hand, primary data was obtained from the researcher's engagement with the participants through interviews and focus group discussions. On the other hand, the secondary data for the present study were retrieved from documentary and report reviews. It must be noted that secondary sources of data in large parts of Chapter Two came from relevant books, journal articles, official reports, and textbooks. The

secondary sources were also significant because, from these reliable publications, the list of references for the present study were obtained.

3.9   Tools of Data Collection

This study used in-depth interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) in collecting primary data from the participants. With regard to interviews, fourteen (14) close-ended and open-ended questions were constructed in order to get a clear understanding of the participants' perception of the role of Islamic institutions in preventing the youth from engaging in violent extremism. The interviews were conducted on six (6) carefully selected religious leaders (actors) from Islamic institutions in Kilindi District. Eight (7) more interviews were conducted on youth leaders and/or local government leaders and one (1) interview was conducted on a former recruited member of radicalized groups. The questions were developed in both Swahili and English languages. This was to ensure that the participants were comfortable with the use of language in order to fully describe the phenomenon in question. Open-ended questions were also formed in line with the four objectives of this study. In order to cross-verify the responses obtained through interviews, there were FGDs for each objective. Each focus group was made of nine (9) participants, making a total of 36 participants for FGDs.

3.10 Data Analysis and Presentation

Analysis and presentation of data were done in a way that described the extant variation between the participants and their responses, explained and described relations between the variables of the study and described each individual's

experiences in relation to the role of religious institutions and religious actors in preventing violent extremism among the youth of Kilindi District. This enabled for descriptions of the norms of the group selected for discussions as well. For effectiveness, thematic analysis was employed. By thematic analysis it is meant here that the researcher closely examined the data and identified common themes, or else topics, patterns and ideas that have the same meaning and appear repeatedly. The researcher then familiarized into the themes, coded them, and generated themes in line with the objectives of the study.

3.11 Validity and Reliability of the Study

The researcher of the present study ensured that reliability and validity of the collected data is checked. It is commonly suggested that an academic research should maintain content validity and reliability. The content validity and reliability are determined by whether or not the problem is wisely defined and measured. Another way is by ensuring a thorough and extensive review of literature to determine key variables, theoretical and empirical frameworks, and common methodologies (Yin, 2014). More intuitively and plausibly, validity is more of the ability the tools of research to measure the expected measurement, e.g., the interviews and FGDs. To ensure validity and reliability, therefore, a pilot test study was conducted with a sample of five respondents who were not included as participants in the finally sample size. The pilot study was significant for the clarification of the instructions, sequences, and apparent errors in the research instruments (interviews and FGDs) prior to the actual process of data collection.

3.12 Research Ethics

Several ethical standards for doing an academic study were obeyed. Before engaging in data collection, permissions were sought from the Open University of Tanzania, whereby the researcher filled a clearance form, and from the relevant authorities in Kilindi Districts (see Appendix II). Consultations were also made with the supervisor – Dr. Kitigwa – on proper guidelines for conducting academic research. Questions in the tools of research were drafted in a way that did not violate proper methodologies for qualitative research. Also, informed consent was also sought from the respondents. Further to that, the research was designed in such a way that it aimed at public good. Aiming at public good implies the need for the researcher to maintain publicness, replicability, and transparency. Lastly, the collected data from participants was strictly used for the purpose of the present study.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS, AND DISCUSSIONS

4.1   Introduction

Chapter Four comes as a presentation and discussion of the collected and analyzed data, which was precisely analyzed in line with the research objectives. The chapter specifically looked into a) the reasons for increased youth engagement in violent extremism, b) the way such increased youth engagement in violent extremism affects them, c) the various solutions employed so far in dealing with the problem of youth engagement in violent extremism and how effective the solutions have been, and d) the role that Islamic institutions plays in deradicalizing and preventing the youth from engaging in violent extremism. The data was collected in Kilindi District, focusing on the above objectives. It is in this chapter that the researcher presents the analysis of the data, carefully interprets the data, and engages in deep explanatory discussions considering the various related previous scholarly works. In doing this, the researcher was guided by the Derealization and Vulnerability theories together with the selected methods as explained in Chapter Three. Data was collected from both leaders of Islamic institutions and the youth, one of whom is pointedly a previous recruited member of radicalized groups who operated in Kilindi District.

4.2   Demographic Features

Generally, it is acknowledged that, the use of varying demographic features in a research not only assures wide and informed perspectives of respondents' perceptions but also the exploits all the basic ideas from distinct, and yet, useful, and

conversant levels of thought. It is on these same grounds that the participants of the current study came from distinct demographic groups. The groups did significantly represent relevant varying demographic features. Regarding the features, study's participants were accordingly distributed into age, education, occupation, sex, and marital status.

4.2.1 Distribution in Age

Table 4. 1 below shows that respondents used in the current study ranged between the age of 18 and 65years.More than two thirds (34 respondents, which is 69 percent) were youth ranging between the age of 18 and 35. Almost a quarter (12 respondents, which is 24 percent) were young or mid aged adults from the age of 36 to 45. The minority (4 respondents, which is 8 percent) were adults at their late years, i.e., 46 and above. Almost three quarters (36 respondents, which is 72 percent) were married, while about one fifth (20 percent) were single and the minority (8 percent) were divorced. These statistics are crucial for in that they manifest how the respondents used were matured enough, in terms of age and approach to life, to significantly comprehend the research questions. The implication here is that it is the youth and young adults who are more interested in initiatives for preventing the youth from engaging in violent extremism. Intuitively, this is because this age is perhaps the most targeted for recruitment since they develop interests and desires to bring changes to the society. As a former recruited young man affirmed during an interview, "The process of radicalization targets young men and women, especially those in secondary schools and university levels."

Table 4.1: Age-marital status cross tabulation

			Marital Status			Total
			Single	**Married**	**Divorced**	
Age	18-25	Count	6	8	2	16
		% within age	37.5%	50%	12.5%	100%
	26-35	Count	4	14	0	18
		% within age	22.2%	77.8%	0%	100%
	36-45	Count	0	10	2	12
		% within age	0%	83.3%	16.7%	100%
	46-55	Count	0	2	0	2
		% within age	0%	100%	0%	100%
	56-65	Count	0	2	0	2
		% within age	0%	100%	0%	100%
Total		**Count**	**10**	**36**	**4**	**50**
		% within total	20%	72%	8%	100%

Source: Field Data, 2020

4.2.2 Distribution in Sex

Since the study used the quota and snowball sampling techniques, it was difficult to achieve gender balance. This partly explains why the difference between male and female respondents was significantly huge. It was, however, not surprising that the majority (84 percent) of the respondents were males while only a few (16 percent) were females (see Table 4. 2). This suggests that men were readily available to participate in this study than their women counterparts. It could be for the reason that the culture in the study area gives women little or no significant roles to play in religious institutions. This does not mean, however, that women had no role to play in the whole process of radicalization for violent extremism. The 2018 CEP report shows that women and children were part of those recruited by radicalized groups. The few women who participated in this study is an indication that women are also concerned about the danger of being radicalized into violent extremism and therefore they need to find a solution. This does not suggest that men provide for more

terrorists or extremists than women. It only suggests that there is a change of behaviour in this particular society and while women were less readily available to take part in this study, they are in an equally similar danger of being radicalized. Table 4. 2 also shows that a few respondents who took part in the study were either single or divorced while the majority of men were married. Obviously, in this particular society there is developed wider interests on family affairs, specifically issues related to ensuring the safety of the households.

Table 4.2: The sex-marital status crosstabulation

		Marital Status			Total
		Single	Married	Divorced	
Sex	Female	4	0	4	8
		50%	0%	50%	100.0%
	Male	6	36	0	42
		14.3%	85.7%	0%	100.0%
Total		**10**	**36**	**4**	**50**
		20%	72%	8%	100.0%

Source: Field Data, 2020

4.2.3 Distribution in the Level of Education and Employment

Table 4.3 shows that none of the participants were uneducated. In fact, more than three quarters (38 respondents, which is 76%) had graduated with at least a secondary education certificate. Hence, the participants could reliably understand the questions and validly provide relevant answers. It also significantly implies that the Kilindi District has enough reservoir of well-educated individuals on whom to rely on in strategizing about the best way to find solutions to the problem of radicalization of the youth into violent extremism. Likewise, those recruited from among the youth could weigh the effects of terrorizing the world. The CEP's (2018)

report similarly shows that the causes of radicalization could be far from the lack of education and that other factors, mainly political and economic, influence such decisions to enter into such radicalized groups. The fact that more than a quarter (28 percent) of the respondents were unemployed shows that unemployment could be a serious problem in Kilindi District, and it could be used as a factor to influence radicalization of the youth into violent extremism. The table shows that the level of education does necessarily impact people's employability.

Table 4.3: The level of education- employment crosstabulation

			Employment Status			Total
			Unemployed	Employed	Self	
Level of Education	No formal education	Count	0	0	0	0
		% within	0%	0%	0%	0%
	Primary Education	Count	6	2	4	12
		% within	50%	12.5%	37.5%	100%
	Secondary Education	Count	4	9	2	15
		% within	26.7%	60%	13.3%	100%
	Bachelor's Degree	Count	4	13	2	19
		% within	21%	68%	11%	100%
	Post-Graduate	Count	0	4	0	4
		% within	0%	100%	0%	100%
Total		**Count**	**14**	**28**	**8**	**50**
		% within	28%	56%	16%	100%

Source: Field Data, 2020

4.3 Reasons for Increased Youth Engagement in Violent Extremism in Kilindi

The study sought to examine the reasons behind increased youth engagement in violent extremism in Kilindi District. As an initial stage towards achieving this objective, knowing whether or not it is true that there are youth at Kilindi who have been taking part in radicalized movements of violent extremist nature was important. All (100%) of the respondents thought that there have been youths who are linked to

terrorism in Kilindi District. An interview with a head of an Islamic institution in Lwande Kilindi affirmed,

> The youth are the most tempted group to join the terrorist groups. Of course, the reason is the youth can be better activists of radicalism than the elderly. Hence, it is not surprising that the terrorists would target the youth and that the youth would join in higher numbers than the elderly.

During an interview with, a former recruited member of the radicalized groups in Kilindi informed that the youth are more effective because being a member of radicalized groups requires constant running and ability to live in harsh conditions which may not be effective for the elderly and children.

The above claim seemingly deviates a bit from the CEP (2018) report that children were among those found completely brainwashed are receiving fighting trainings in Mosques. However, what the interviewees suggested is not that children were not recruited for radicalized groups. Rather, their suggestion is that the youth operate more effectively in carrying out terrorist assignments and that the youth can easily offer their support to terrorism. It is clear from these findings that the youth are the most vulnerable targets of recruitment into engaging in violent extremism. These findings are also justified by Sobolewska (2010) who affirms that the public ought to be concerned of the growing number of young Muslims who somewhat tacitly support terrorism. It seems therefore that youth recruitment into violent extremist groups is not necessarily the result of being seducing but the choice that someone makes individually. A former recruited member of the radicalized groups confirmed during an interview, "I have had a long-vested passion to get to learn, know, understand, and take part in Jihad, even if many people have facilitated my goal."

Table 4.4: Reasons for increased youth radicalization in Kilindi

Reason	Frequency	Percent
Lack of Awareness and Education	40	80
Lack of Proper Religious Teachings	48	96
Poverty in Kilindi	40	80
Globalization and Rise of Global Terrorism	5	10
Peer Pressure among the Youth	34	68
Unchecked Religious Associations	20	40
Derealization and Political Reasons	18	36
Power fights among Islamic sections	4	8
Forceful Recruitment	12	24
Individual Desires, Wants and Wishes	10	20

Source: Field Data, 2020.

As stated earlier, the respondents were asked to provide as many reasons as they could for increased radicalization in Kilindi District, especially among the youth. The majority of the respondents thought that a) lack of awareness and proper education, b) lack of proper religious teachings, and c) the unwarranted poverty in Kilindi District play a central role among the reasons for increased radicalization. In emphasis, an Imam in a mosque in Kilindi said, "It's all ignorance. The youth have no adequate knowledge, they are basically reckless when it comes to matters of religion, which results in sinful life desires. Instead of following the teachings of their sheikhs, they opt listening to new teachings from some Arabs, especially from Pakistan who frequently visit Tanga areas of Handeni and Kilindi." Even if the majority had a feeling that poverty and ignorance played a central role, some respondents still felt that poverty and ignorance were not necessary elements. The former recruited member of the radicalized groups for example claimed that there were a lot of university students and graduates together with well-off persons behind such movements and that he personally was a university student before he decided to join the violent extremist groups. It implies that there could be more reasons than just

ignorance and poverty. It still does not disqualify poverty and ignorance as reasons that cause the majority of the youth to join radicalized groups.

When poverty and ignorance are not in play, the respondents had a feeling that d) peer pressure among the youth, b) unchecked religious associations, and c) the long-vested feeling that the government de-realizes certain persons – particularly Moslems – are causative agents of increased violent extremism in Kilindi District. To emancipate themselves, some youths had to form certain small communities with the aim of learning more about Islam. In these small communities, which one of the youths called *"darasa duara"* – literally translated as "a circular class" – a class taught in form of seminars whereby a topic is presented, and participants who aspire to learn more about Islam invited for questioning and discussions. Significantly, when the youth gather in such classes, they get to influence each other to join radicalized groups. During an interview, a former recruited member of the radicalized groups said, "It is in some of the *darasa duara* that the meanings of Islamic teachings are distorted and completely altered to take the direction that the tutor wants to convey. It is in these *darasa duara* that we get to know the persons who have similar (extremist) views as ours." Hence, there are some religious associations from among the youth that are unchecked.

It seems that there are some imposed Islamic associations from outside the country that are neglectfully unchecked. Such associations come in form of Islamic sects, but at the end they are said to turn out to be activists of violence and distorters of Islamic teachings. Some respondents had a feeling that such associations as Answari come

from Arab Maghreb countries especially the Middle East. An interviewed head of an Islamic institution in Lwande Kilindi boldly says, "It is easy for the youth to be seduced to join Jihad as they can easily believe that Jihad is a valid religious teaching that finds blessing in the Quran." It was also claimed during FGDs that some of the institutions and/or that invest their energy day and night to radicalize the youth come from outside the country making it easier for the youth to believe in what they teach. What makes it easier for these associations to penetrate and spread their teachings is the fact that local religious leaders are not fiscally empowered as a motivation for genuine teachings. The lack of funds among local religious tutors makes it difficult for them to convince the youth that theirs is the right path towards understanding and interpreting the Quran.

Perhaps an even more serious reason is the assumption that Islamic youth are somewhat derealized by the government. Most respondents thought that political reasons played a catalyst role in increased youth engagement in violent extremism. "In Lwande village, for example, we have not had good health, education and infrastructure services since independence. Surprisingly, it is about 16 Kms from Lwande to Kilindi and about 135 Kms from Kilindi to Handeni. Yet, there are very poor road networks. Even when the government seems to have forgotten these places, they still would go to the poor farmers to collect taxes and other revenues. Unsurprisingly, there were fights between the youth and the police in 2013/2014", said a sheikh in Kilindi. This is of course in line with the derealization theory and the vulnerability theory because it makes sense to think of the government as having derealized the people of Kilindi and as a result caused some of the youths to have

reacted out of their vulnerability. Bwire (2019) and Walwa (2018) similarly thought that one of the entailing reasons for the increased radicalization of the youth is the obvious neglect by the government to provide necessary services to Islamic communities. It is clear therefore that some youth feel like they have been allowed to suffer, neglected, denied opportunities to life, among others, just because they are Moslems. This calls for a strong reason enough to engage in violence for such rights. Just because of the rise in technological discoveries, globalization has been inevitable. Globalization seems to come with global terrorism. It appears that it is easier to communicate and learn skills and teachings about Jihad in online platforms and even traditional media such as televisions and radios. The youth too get to know about Jihad from similar sources. Similarly, there have been increased travelling among the youth. A sheikh said, "You will see many youths with passports and other travel documents now than ever before. It is on these journeys that they get to meet people who convince them to join Jihad." A formerly recruited member of the radicalized groups that operated in Kilindi claimed that it is through travelling that he met people who could take him to the proper Jihad teachings. "It is these people who would teach us how to assemble machine guns, how to shoot and how to make bombs." Thus, apart from mere globalization, the rise in technology plays a significant role in moulding the youth towards terrorism.

While some individuals were forced to join the violent extremist groups, respondents claim that there are many individuals who join terrorism out of their desires, wants and wishes.

> Sometimes children and women are being radicalized. It is not always possible for a little kid or a young woman to want, wish or desire to join

Jihad unless there has been some force that the child cannot resist, and this is not exclusive to kids and women alone … some young men too are forced into joining the violent extremist groups

The above claim is consistent with the 2018 CEP report which shows that children and women were part of those brainwashed and recruited to join radicalized groups. A former recruited member of the radicalized groups affirmed that people were not just forced into joining those groups but were equally forced to remain in even when they wanted to quit.

Figure 4.1: The causes of vulnerability among Moslem youths
Source: Field Data, 2020.

All participants in the current study agreed that Moslem youths were comparatively more vulnerable to recruitments into violent extremism than were their Christian counterparts. The reasons for the above stand are of course similar to the above general reasons for the increased radicalization of youths in Kilindi. It was argued that, unlike Christians, Moslem youths feel oppressed and side-lined. As a result,

they lose hope and get easily pulled towards terrorist thoughts. The government was accused of having forgotten about the Moslems and having not provided enough and quality social services. Consequently, the Moslems feel derealized and vulnerable and therefore a feeling of empowering themselves through Jihad can easily penetrate into their minds.

It was equally significant to raise a question onto the respondents concerning the reasons for these extremist ideas to particularly arise now and not in the past. It was argued that such ideas have always been there. It is only recently that more violence and awareness about the movements came to light. However, it was similarly agreed that there has been a substantive increase in the recent years. Advancement in technology and inflow of religious distorters received the more blame. Ultimately, all respondents appeared to have blamed it on bad governance and derealization in the era where activists raise considerable awareness about to the Moslems (see Table 4. 5). Yet, religious institutions were blamed for failure to offer the youth with the proper religious teachings. A Sheikh summarized,

> Those who make such decisions carry a heavier blame for making those wrong decisions. Still, parents, families and the entire society are equally blameworthy.

Table 4.5: Governance and the derealization of the Moslems

Presumed Influences of the Government	Frequency	Percent
Poor Social Services in Kilindi	20	40
Poor Infrastructure in Kilindi	7	14
Lack of Employment among the Youths	16	32
Revenue Collection and Police Brutality	4	8
Inequality in Government Senior Positions	1	2
Improper Measures against Terrorism	2	4
Total Respondents	**50**	**100.0**

Source: Field Data, 2020.

4.4   The Effects of Increased Youth Engagement in Violent Extremism

Among the main objectives of this study was to determine whether or not increased youth engagement in violent extremism had any positive or negative impact, especially on the youth. In this regard, the study sought to find out whether or not taking part in violent extremism is any beneficial to the youth and, if it is the case, whether or not the negative effects do not outweigh the positive ones. As an initial stage towards achieving this, the respondents were asked to present their personal and societal perception of youth engagement in terrorist action in Kilindi District. Figure 4. 2 below shows that while a significant minority (2%) of the respondents thought violent extremism could impact positive changes in the society, about a tenth (10%) agreed that violent extremism had both positive and negative effects on the youth while the majority (88%) strongly believed that there was nothing positive about Jihad movements.


Figure 4.2: Effects of youth engagement in violent extremism
Source: Field Data, 2020.

The findings above are a preliminary hint that even if taking part in Jihad movements is generally bad to the one recruited, it could be occasionally good to them provided certain circumstances. One discussant urged everyone to imagine a scenario where people have been neglected by authorities and the only way to stop such oppressions is through violence. The discussant meant that communities that have been neglected for a long time and individuals that have somehow been derealized may consider dying for their rights a better option. This is not to appraise terrorism and violent extremism but to urge authorities to always allow options in resolving problems and to always practice distributive justice. Nonetheless, the majority of the respondents thought that engaging in violent extremism is nothing more than just jeopardizing one's own life and many more negative effects. A former recruited young man said,

> There are not any positive effects. It is an entirely undesirable kind of life. We constantly run, we constantly hide and even worse we are constantly hunted. Our friends die, others are jailed, all we do is live away from our families for a course we never really achieve.

Engaging in violent extremism was thus generally labelled less beneficial than not doing so.

4.4.1 Apparent Benefits of Engaging in Violent Extremism

Expectedly, for a group of sensible human beings to resort to violence, there must be some goal they want to desperately achieve which is at least beneficial to them. It must therefore be the case that the pioneers and supporters of violent extremism are either completely brainwashed and insensible human beings or have certain benefits to acquire out of the terror attacks they create. Assuming the latter, the respondents were requested to present any of the explicit benefits that the youth and a community

like Kilindi could gain out of engaging in violent extremism. It was noted earlier that most respondents thought that engaging in violent extremism is madness and that most youth take part into such movements out of ignorance. However, the assumption that those who engage in violent extremism are always mad and ignorant is not helpful. Historically, some notable changes in the world were necessitated by violence. Certainly, there must be good reasons for people to do this, and these reasons must be even if partly beneficial to them.

Walwa (2018) too thought that those who are willingly recruited to join the radicalized groups had certain expectations. Those who join out of poverty expect to become rich; those who join out of oppression and other forms of injustices expect to bring about change; and those who join out of search for political power and recognition similarly hope to get into power or else to be recognized. Whichever the case, certain positive benefits are expected. A sheikh said during an interview that some of these youths find themselves having joined Jihad unknowingly. But most of them go to such movements in search of deep understanding of their religion. It is difficult to know which religious teachings right and which ones are not. As such, when a young person falls onto the hands of Jihadists they get radicalized through teachings and easily fall into the trap of violent extremism. This suggests that people do not always join Jihad knowingly. It also means that a good intention to understand God could be misused by those who are entrusted with the powers to teach and preach. It is not surprising that a Sheikh said, "Some of their teachings could even promise heaven to those who join radicalized groups." It is evident therefore that those who join radicalized groups hope to achieve certain benefits (for hypothetical

benefits see Table 4. 6). This does not suggest in any way that those who are radicalized into violent extremism gain the benefits at the end. Yet, experience – as in the CEP (2018) report – shows that there are significant socio-political and economic changes that such movements can bring about to the society.

Table 4.6: Summary of expected benefits of engaging in violent extremism

	Frequency			Percent
	Female	Male	Total	
No benefits	4	40	44	88
Equal Rights	0	1	1	2
Religious recognition	0	1	1	2
Political Positions	0	1	1	2
Economic Justice	0	2	2	4
Youth Empowerment	0	1	1	2
Total Respondents	**4**	**46**	**50**	**100**

Source: Field Data, 2020

4.4.2 Negative Effects of Engaging in Violent Extremism

It has been argued that engaging in violent extremism could have both some positive and negative effects. At least quantitatively, it is possible to think that the negative effects outweigh the positive ones since the majority of the respondents did deny violent extremism of any form of benefits to the one engaged in it. The formerly radicalized young man supported this stand saying, "Every mission has a destiny. After looking into the future destiny of the mission I was engaged in, I only saw destruction. Meanwhile, there were a lot of graceful countries like Libya, Syria and Iraq who wish to go back to the peace they lost because of violent extremism." He added, "I have a contribution to make to humanity. Remaining in these kinds of movements makes me an agent of destruction. I wish to be part of the solution, not one of those destroying the youth." This implies that engaging in violent extremism

is only destructive and entirely meant to destroy the life of those engaged in it. Table 4.7 reveals that the negative side of engaging in violent extremism does in fact outweigh the positive effects. It is shown that youth engagement in violent extremism only destroys their future, their respective families' well-being. At the same time violent extremism propagates hate, conflict and untimely death which creates fear and terror among the people. The nation's peace is thus jeopardized by those who rather misuse the name of God in the process.

Table 4.7: Negative effects of engaging in violent extremism

	Frequency			Percent
	Female	Male	Total	
Positive Effects Only	0	1	1	2
Destroying Families	1	6	7	14
Destroying the Nation's Peace	0	8	8	16
Destroying the Future of the Youth	2	19	21	42
Creating Fear and Terror	0	6	6	12
Propagating Hate, Conflicts and Death	1	4	5	14
Misusing the Name of God	0	2	2	6
Total Respondents	**4**	**40**	**50**	**100**

Source: Field Data, 2020

4.5   Solutions for the Problem of Youth Engagement in Violent Extremism

The questions of whether or not there are measures in place against increased violent extremism in Kilindi may not be a significant one. This is because, as it has been argued in several studies (see e.g., Walwa, 2018; Ali, 2016; Dang, 2019; Vittori, Bremer and Vittori, 2009) there have been several measures in place meant to prevent violent extremism among the youth in Kilindi and elsewhere in Tanzania. Apparently, most of these measures are engineered by the government, government agencies and other coercive instruments of the government. There is a huge feeling that the measures have not incorporated the general population well enough. A

director of an Islamic Institution in Kilindi claimed, "It is one thing using coercion to resolve such problems. In fact, coercion has not been really successful. However, working closely with the people and institutions that have direct impact on the lives of the people could work better." What the director suggests here is that strategies other than force are required in order to bring about solutions to the problem of violent extremism. Table 4.8 shows that there were multiple proposed solutions to the problem.

Table 4.8: Strategies in place dealing with violent extremism in Kilindi

Strategies	Frequency	Percent
Laws and punishments	44	19
Frequent police ambush	30	13
Political empowerment	12	5
Proper religious teachings	42	18
Emphasis on education	33	14
Local community policing program	21	9
Family intervention	44	19
Creation of economic opportunities	8	3
Total Responses	**234**	**100**

Source: Field Data, 2020

4.5.1 Effective Resolution Strategies

It appears that people in Kilindi District are not only aware of the problem of youth engagement in violent extremism but also the various solutions in dealing with the problem. Of course, there was a feeling among most of the respondents that some of these applied resolution strategies are more effective than others. Despite using a combination of all these strategies, the respondents felt that more efforts and initiatives required. It seems that ensuring provision of proper religious teachings to the people is one of the working strategies against youth radicalization into violent extremism. A former member of the radicalized groups said, "Sometimes while in

mosques a non-radical sheikh would preach against Jihad. These kinds of teachings converted some of us and somehow created some sort of disagreements among the members." A sheikh also said that just because improper religious teachings are the main causative agents, it makes more sense to ensure whatever people are taught is religiously proper. It was also claimed that the people of Kilindi needed political empowerment and created economic opportunities. It was argued that most of these violent acts are sparked by political dissatisfactions and insolvable poverty. Creating political and economic satisfaction would therefore give the youth no reason to engage in violent acts. Just as scholars such as Walwa (2018) and Dang (2019) it was suggested that community policing program or generally the involvement of the local community as part of the solution would also be a rather more effective strategy.

Table 4.9: Effective solutions to youth engagement in violent extremism

Working Strategies in Kilindi	Frequency	Percent
Providing Proper Religious Teachings	22	44
Ensuring Political Empowerment	8	16
Creating Economic Opportunities	11	22
Community Policing Program	9	18
Total	**50**	**100**

Source: Field Data, 2020

4.5.2 Ineffective Resolution Strategies

Clearly, despite purposeful efforts from the government and elsewhere the problem of youth engagement in violent extremism seems to have persisted in Kilindi. Obviously, either all or some of these efforts are not effective. The respondents were requested to highlight those efforts that they thought were ineffective. It was determined that laws, punishments, and frequent police (or rather militarized)

ambushes were not effective in dealing with the problem. It seems that laws were ineffective as it was claimed that those who were caught were later released after a short while, only to continue with the same movements. Related to the issue of inefficient laws is the fact that some associated punishments only meant to make those caught rather more radical. It was claimed that some of those caught were being brutalized and forced to do things that were against general Islamic faith. A sheikh in Lwande Kilindi said, "It's all rumours that, once the radicalized are caught by the police, they are tortured, forced to drink alcohol, etc. These are ineffective because once they are released they spread the rumours about what the police did and as a result hostility, enmity and hatred are intensified."

The above quote was to emphasize on the fact that the punishments given were meant to destroy more instead of correcting the wrongs and changing the lives of the youth. Further to that was the issue of frequent untimed police raids and militarized ambushes. There was a feeling that such raids and ambushes victimized the innocent, created unnecessary fear, tension and hate, and generally affected people's passions about those who are radicalized. A young discussant said, "Seeing what the police does, it is difficult to reveal the identity of those that you suspect that they are engaged in violent extremist acts. At times we know to a greater extent that my relative or sibling or partner is radicalized. It does not feel right to inform the brutal forces." It calls for community policing programs whereby the general population is made part of the solution to the problems of the society. Figure 4.3 shows that half (50%) of the respondents were against frequent police (and militarized) ambushes while the remaining half (50%) were either against laws or punishments.

Ineffective Strategies

Figure 4.3: Ineffective resolution strategies
Source: Field Data, 2020

4.5.3 Proposed New Strategies

Dang (2019) thought that the problems leading to radicalization in Tanzania were different from those causing the same elsewhere. Strategies in fighting the problem of youth engagement in violent extremist acts might thus require differentiated and unique strategies. Ignorance or precisely lack of quality education is a dominant problem in Kilindi. It frequently incurred that the youth keep making wrong decisions and ill-faced judgements about their faith and life in general simply because they are ignorant. This does not imply that the radicalized never went to school, rather that it is easier going into the mind of someone who does not think properly and instil radicalized thoughts. Equally, it was suggested that parents, guardians and other family members should ensure that none of their members falls into the trap of radicalization. About a fifth (see Table 4.10) of the respondents thought that religious teachings and certain hate speeches should be filtered. About

another fifth suggested that people's problems including unemployment should be addressed since these are the core causes of youth radicalization.

Table 4.10: Proposed solutions against youth radicalization

Newly Recommended Solutions	Frequency	Percent
Provision of Quality Education	21	42
Family Intervention	9	18
Filtering of Religious Teachings	10	20
Creating Alternative Jobs	4	8
Solving People's Problems	6	12
Total	**50**	**100**

Source: Field Data, 2020

4.6   Islamic Institutions and the Prevention of Violent Extremism in Kilindi

There was a strong feeling among the respondents that Moslems, Islamic societies and Islamic institutions were unequally and unfairly treated. It was for example alleged that some of their properties such as plots of land, houses, business projects, and other investments had been illegally confiscated. It was advised that these things should be returned to original owners in order to do away with those who are fighting to get their rights. It seems therefore that sometimes the youth fight for what is rightly theirs. Even so, in this study, the most central objective was to examine the role of Islamic institutions in preventing the youth from engaging in violent extremism. Of course, fighting of one's own rights might not justify violating someone else's right to live. Since the study was conducted in Kilindi, it was important to first determine the various Islamic institutions in the district which has such wards as **Kibirashi**, Jaila, Kikunde, **Kilindi**, Kilwa, Kimbe, Kisangasa, Kwediboma, Kwekivu, Lwande, Mabalanga, Masagalu, Mkindi, Msaja, **Mafisa**, Bokwa, **Negero**, Pagwi, Saunyi, Songe, Tunguli and Kimigasiwa (bolded are those

that have been hit with violent extremist acts). There are also such institutions and mosques in Kilindi as the National Muslim Council of Tanzania (famously BAKWATA), Maahad Shamsil Maarifil Islamiya (Maarif), Answari Sunna or Answari Muslim Youth Center (AMYC) and Markaz Ibn Taymiyyah (Salafism). These institutions must surely be either facilitating or preventing the youth from engaging in violent extremism.

Table 4.11: What Islamic institutions do to prevent youth radicalization

Activities to Prevent	Frequency	Percent
Nothing	13	26
Proper Religious Education	10	20
Counseling	6	12
Employment	5	10
Reconciliation	4	8
Not doing enough	12	24
Total	**50**	**100**

Source: Field Data, 2020

With regard to the role that an Islamic institution plays in preventing the radicalization of the youth into violent extremis, respondents were asked to identify the common activities done by the institutions for the purpose of saving the youth from the problem. About half (50%) of all respondents thought that the Islamic institutions in Kilindi were either doing nothing or not doing enough about it. Some of these institutions were said to have their headquarters in Tanga which is kilometers away from Kilindi. As such, the branches in Kilindi and elsewhere may not have enough powers to initiate prevention programs. Similarly, the headquarters may not always know priority matters for the people of Kilindi. These reasons caused the feeling that the Islamic institutions are either completely not concerned

with the problem of youth engagement in violent extremism or that their concern is too minimal to impact any significant change to the youth of Kilindi. However, the other half (50%) thought that the Islamic institutions are doing just about enough even if it is not entirely impactful. It was claimed that some mosques provide proper religious teachings to the youth, enabling them to differentiate true from untrue interpretation of the Quran. "Sometimes a sheikh would preach things that caused havoc to our movements" emphasized the former member of the radicalized groups. A sheikh added, "we perhaps do not have funds for doing big things about it. But, we certainly use the little opportunities to preach to them proper teachings. We also certainly help in matters of reconciliation which cause people to engage in confrontations."

What the above extract implies is that some Islamic institutions in Kilindi play a crucial role of teaching the right things to the youth and reconciling parties in conflict. Even if this is the case, it seems that the youth who have been radicalized are also offered with some counseling in order for them to do away with those kinds of thoughts. Of course, counseling plays a more curative role than it does play a preventive role. Nonetheless, counseling the former radicalized youths helps in reducing the influence that the radicalized could have to the non-radicalized. Moreover, the presence of Islamic institutions in Kilindi seems to be an opportunity for the youth to earn some income. As stated earlier, poverty and unemployment rate contribute significantly into factors influencing the youth to engage in violent extremism. Providing employment to the people is hence a sure way to deal with the problem of youth engagement into violent extremism. Thus, while it might be true

that Islamic institutions in Kilindi District are not doing enough with regard to the problem of radicalization, it is equally true that there are attempts to help the youth do away with this problem.

4.6.1 Reasons for Failure to Prevent Youth Engagement in Violent Extremism

It seems that the Islamic institutions, just like the government security agencies, have failed to prevent radicalization of youth into violent extremism. The respondents were asked to offer reasons for the failure of the Islamic institutions to enhance such a change among the youth of Kilindi. It seems that there are various reasons that hinder such a progress. Firstly, it was determined that the Islamic institutions do not have funds or else a budget allocated for such initiatives as deradicalization of youths or even preventative programs. This being the case, it is always difficult to deal with the problem especially when those who sponsor youth radicalization have enough funds. During an interview, a sheikh in Negero said, "The youth are easily seduced because they are poor, and they need money. Those radicalized groups have funding. We do not have money. It is therefore very difficult to deal with this sort of problem." This suggests that lack of funds in the Islamic institutions in Kilindi is one of the primary factors influencing failure to prevent the youth from engaging in violent extremism.

Perhaps lack of funds may not be a serious challenge. There is notably a rather more serious challenge that faces some or most of these Islamic institutions. Since people engage in violent extremism secretly, it is difficult to know whether or not someone is part of these radicalized groups. It is possible therefore that a sheikh, or even a

head of an Islamic institution is a member of these groups. Thus, those institutions expected to bring about positive change to the youth might as well be the source of their destruction. Even if this sounds as if hypothetical, it is frugally real. During an interview, a former member of the radicalized groups revealed that some of the renowned sheikhs, head of institutions and even government officials are part of those radicalized movements. In such settings, finding a solution from within the primary cause of the problem is difficult.

Fear of the ruthless hands of the terrorist is another battling challenge. Most institutions are said to have failed because of fear. It was claimed that Islamic institutions fail to fight this war because they are afraid of those engaged in violent extremism. Those against the deadly movements are always considered enemies and blasphemous. A sheikh said that lot is to be done by the government in order to ensure their safety and that sheikhs in Islamic institutions develop a sense of courage and self-esteem. No one wishes to be targeted by the terrorists. In order for the Islamic institutions not to be targeted by those who might not wish to be opposed, the government and its security agencies are obliged to find the right way of dealing with this problem. Clearly, fear of being targeted is among the serious challenges facing the institutions in their desire to prevent youth radicalization.

For the above-mentioned reasons resulting to failures, respondents were engaged in a discussion on what they thought should be done to prevent further radicalization. In what follows, the question of what Islamic institutions and any other agencies should do is addressed in line with the various scholarly findings. What is clear from the

findings above is that there are hardly initiatives in place against youth radicalization in Kilindi; at least not those that are purposefully staged by Islamic Institutions. Even so, the suggestion here is that Islamic institutions cannot do it alone. They need the support from the government and other security agencies, society, families and the youth themselves.

4.7   Further Discussions

It is clearly shown that there is a role that Islamic institutions play in their attempts to prevent the radicalization of youth into violent extremism. It is similarly obvious that this role is either not impactful or the attempts require to be enhanced by some other forces from outside and within the Islamic institutions themselves. Of course, the challenges that these Islamic institutions face cannot be overlooked. Some of them are life and death challenges whereof anyone ought to be careful in dealing with. The fact that the (majority of the) people of Kilindi are notoriously poor and lack basic education for example is not a problem that anyone would expect Islamic institutions to resolve singlehandedly. Even so, this might not be a justification for not doing anything. It is intuitive that these institutions have a moral obligation to work on the people's problems and it is clear enough that radicalization, terrorism, and violent extremism are perhaps the most serious problems facing the people of Kilindi (see also CEP, 2018). This claim presupposes that most of the challenges befalling the Islamic institutions are not fatally unavoidable. It is therefore up to the institutions themselves to see whether or not they can actually do more to prevent youth engagement into violent extremism in Kilindi District.

It seems to be true that people are at the risk of being attracted to radical and violent extremist solutions when a particular society's human rights record is poor, political institutions are weak, there is a huge gap between the rich and the poor and even more importantly when the religious institutions are not established enough to impact moral teachings and proper religious education. This is in line with the findings by Hassan Juma Ndzovu (2018) who thought that religious institutions could lay a ground for violent jihadi ideology. The same kind of findings were reflected in the 2019 study by Juliet Wambui Kamau who thought in the Kenyan context that socio-economic and political settings of a country could be conducive to terrorism. She thought that the push factors for the youth to be engaged in violent jihadi, join the terror groups or generally support terrorism are derealization through historical injustices, the violation of human rights during security forces operations and discrimination that makes the youth vulnerable (see Kamau, 2019).

It seems that the term terrorism has come to be synonymous with fundamentalism, Salafi-jihadism, radical and militant Islam, and many other terms. Whatever the name one prefers to use it appears as if whenever the word terrorism is mentioned, a Moslem is somehow involved. The question is: what is at stake for Moslems in these sorts of fights? At first sight, it appears as if people are fighting marginalization, discrimination, and marginalization. However, several studies suggest that those who fund such movements actually aim at establishing an Islamic state (see for example, Kamau, 2019 and Dang, 2019). Thus, perhaps the political factors are a heavier push than other core factors such as the socio-economic ones. It was stated earlier in the current study that foreigners and foreign institutions play a demising role when it

comes to efforts to fight youth radicalization into terror groups in Kilindi. Provided that Islamic institutions are unified it makes it difficult to know what the other does or teaches and therefore penetration of the jihadi ideology becomes easier.

It is unsurprising therefore that perhaps the unresolved puzzle so far is what should be done to deal with the problem of youth recruitment into or support for the terror groups. The above is one of the core questions posed onto the present study's respondents. While it seems that there are initiatives in place, a lot was proposed in order to improve such initiatives. It is important to note that preventing radicalization in the world, in Africa and particularly in Tanzania is not an easy task. It is a task that requires the efforts of each member in the society. It equally requires high professionalism on the side of the government and its security agencies, private sector, religious institutions, and the general population at large. It was suggested for example by the former member of the terror groups that the government should establish several rehabilitation centers for the purpose of deradicalization. In doing so, the government can make use of those who are known to have decided to do away with the ill-faiths and ill-thoughts of violent extremism. It seems that common arbitrary arrests, inhuman punishments, and the torture of those convicted cause further radicalization. Since most of the youth who join or support the terror groups have been brainwashed and therefore sick, it makes more sense to initiate rehabilitation programs in order to help them heal.

Perhaps the most recurring suggestion was that the youth be educated. There is no running from the fact that ignorance plays a significant role in influencing the youth

into joining or offering their support to terror groups. Providing the youth with education would most definitely entail preventing them from carelessly joining the movements which jeopardize human life. Most of those who decide to quit such movements do so after becoming aware of the destructions and terrible things that jihadi ideology puts them into. It seems therefore that, if these youths had prior knowledge and were made aware of such projectable consequences, it could entail that they would not join or support the movements in the first place. Thus, while it remains in the hands of the government and governmental agencies to resolve the issue of educating the youth, the private sector – including Islamic institutions, families, and individual persons – are equally obliged to look into the problem and take part in educating the youth and the society at large. Significantly, education should not only mean getting degrees but rather getting the proper moral analysis of what one hears, together with thinking and problem-solving skills.

It is known that joining and supporting terror groups is a contemporary issue in Tanzania. This being the case, legal frameworks have to be frequently restructured in order to accommodate the rather growing problem. This means that there is a need for good and proportionate laws against both joining and supporting terror groups. By good it is intended those that are not meant just to punish but to enhance prevention of the problem. By proportionate, it is intended those laws that do not over exaggerate (too extreme) or underestimate (too soft) the problem, especially when it comes to punishments. It was elaborated earlier that punishments can spark further radicalization. Respondents were concerned with the fact that the current punishments only meant increase tension and hatred among the members of the

society in Kilindi. Eventually, the government through its legislative board is urged to invest in making both preventative and curative laws. It is for this reason that it was frequently recommended that, together with most other useful laws that are operative right now, the local community, the previously recruited persons, the NGOs, the religious institutions, and any other helpful stakeholders should be involved from initial stages of legal drafts of the bills to the passing of the laws against terrorism.

It can be deduced that there are significant correlations between Islamic institutions and the tendency of the youth to either join or support terror groups. The correlation could be one of preventative and curative nature or one of influential and causative nature. There have been purposeful efforts to fight youth radicalization and these efforts have been somewhat positively impactful. While some youths have as a result be deradicalized, however, it seems that more youths keep joining or supporting the terror groups. This does not imply that conclusions drawn that Islamic institutions have played a significant role in deradicalizing the youth are not true. However, blurred, the truth of drawing such conclusions is clearly indicated by the consistency shown in the various respondents' opinions concerning the role that the institutions have played. What seems to be clear is the fact that the efforts of the Islamic institutions alone are insufficient to put a stop to the mighty established powers of those who would rather see terror in the society.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1   Introduction

In Chapter Four, the collected data was analyzed, systematically presented, and carefully interpreted. This academic process went simultaneously with a critical discussion with regard to the various findings in relation to the role of Islamic institutions in preventing the youth from engaging in violent extremism. Thus, enough was presented regarding to the reasons behind increased youth engagement in violent extremism, the manner in which increased youth engagement in or support for terror groups affects them, the various effective and non-effective solutions against youth radicalization, and the role that Islamic institutions in Kilindi plays in both preventing and deradicalizing the youth from joining or supporting terror groups. Having successfully addressed the above objectives, the next step is to pull out the most significant insights. In Chapter Five, the researcher cautiously highlights and presents the summary of the key findings from previous chapter's discussions. This chapter also addresses the various conclusions that plausibly draws from the discussions, and the possible recommendations of the study. In this chapter too, the researcher lays the ground for possible future studies.

5.2   Summary of the Findings

It is noteworthy that this study examined the role of Islamic institutions in preventing the youth from being radicalized to join or support terror groups. Rather specifically, the study assessed the causes of increased radicalization of youth into violent

extremism, the effects associated with such radicalization, the solutions for the problem of youth joining or supporting terror groups and the role of Islamic institution in the prevention and deradicalization of those engaged in violent extremism. The aim was to find a permanent solution to the problem of increased terrorist activities among the youth, whereof government security agencies have not been entirely successful to resolve.

So as to be more systematic in addressing the related research questions, the qualitative research design was employed. In line with Creswell's (2009) suggestions, this design enabled the researcher to rely on the quality of responses, which were crucial in enabling the researcher to maintain objectivity, remaining independent and sustaining that which can rightly be described as a neutral position. Given the nature of qualitative designs, primary data was collected using interviews and FGDs whereby the researcher comparatively supplemented most discussions with evidence from reviewed literature. In this regard, secondary data also heavily relied on unswerving documents as books, articles, and other public official reports. Fifty (50) respondents were used from different backgrounds, which was crucial for diversified responses. What follows below is a summary of the findings of the present study as per specific objective.

5.2.1 Why Increased Youth Radicalization in Kilindi District?

The study found out that youths are linked to either joining or supporting terror groups in Kilindi District because the youth are the most vulnerable group. The youth were said be more energetic, decisive, active, and useful than the elderly and

children, and therefore the youth were usually targeted for recruitment. The 2018 CEP report sub-contrarily shows that children were among those recruited, trained, and completely brainwashed. However, the suggestion is that the youth could carry out terror operations rather more effectively and provided their desire for a better life. Thus, the youth are the most vulnerable targets of recruitment into engaging in violent extremism as Sobolewska (2010) would claim that the public ought to be concerned of the growing number of young Muslims who willingly choose to join or support terror groups.

It is not surprising that lack of awareness and ignorance, improper religious teachings, unwarranted severe poverty in Kilindi, peer pressure, unchecked associations and the derealization of the Moslems by the lack of social services were thought to be reasons for the increased radicalization. However, it was revealed that there were scholars and other persons considered fully aware joining or supporting the terror groups suggesting that ignorance or poverty may neither be a sufficient nor a necessary reason. Moreover, the lack of funds among local Islamic institutions and the availability of funds among the terror groups plays a key role in radicalization. Bwire (2019) and Walwa (2018) in the same way thought that the reasons for increased radicalization is the obvious neglect by the government to provide necessary services especially to poverty stricken Islamic communities. The feeling that people are neglected, allowed to suffer, and denied certain opportunities to life just because they are Moslems is a cause of alarm.

Increased technological innovations, transport and telecommunication networks

seems to come with the cloud of terrorism. People get trained and form jihadi groups through online platforms. It is through networking that the youth meet the wrong people. It is worth noting that while there are some individuals who are forced to join the terror groups, there are equally many individuals who join and support terrorism out of their own desires, wants and wishes. It was claimed that the youth were equally forced to remain loyal to the terror group despite wanting to quit. Moreover, Moslem youths were found to be comparatively more vulnerable to join or support terror groups than their Christian colleagues. Unlike Christians, Moslem youths feel hopelessly side-lined and oppressed as the government was accused of having neglected Islamic communities. The derealization feeling and the associated vulnerability among youths arises a feeling of self-empowering through Jihad. Bad governance, derealization, advanced technology, local religious institution, and religious distorters inflow were blamed to have accelerated radicalism in the recent years.

5.2.2 Effects of Increased Youth Recruitment into Terror Groups

Concerning theeffects of engaging in violent extremism, it was found out that joining or supporting Jihad movements is generally bad to someone, albeit some occasional benefits. The occasional benefits could be impacting change in the society as in the case of being neglected and being oppressed. Terrorism and violent extremism were not appraised but rather authorities were urged to allow options for democratic resolutions to people's problems. Yet, it was found out that joining and supporting the terror groups is nothing more than putting one's own life and many others' lives at risk. Thus, supporting the terror groups was found to be less beneficial than not

doing so. However, people often resolute to violence when they desperately want to achieve a beneficial thing. Yet, it was assumed that engaging in violent extremism is done out of ignorance and failure to think properly. It was also revealed that the assumption that those who join, and support terror groups are ignorant may not helpful because, historically, violence has brought necessary change in the world. Thus, a few benefits of joining or supporting violent jihadi were mentioned.

Scholars such as Walwa (2018) similarly thought that those who joined or supported terror groups had certain (genuine) expectations. The expectations are like getting rich, bringing about change such as justice, heaven or getting political power. This does not suggest in that those who join and support the terror groups gain the benefits at the end. In line with the CEP (2018) report, however, there are sometimes some significant socio-political and economic (positive) changes that violent extremism could at least accidentally result into. Even so, it was found out that the negative effects of joining and supporting the terror groups outweigh the positive ones. Those who engage in violent extremism only put their own peace and their countries' safety at risk. As such, engaging in violent extremism is only meant to be destructive. It is obviously determined that joining and supporting terror groups destroys someone's future, his or her respective family' well-being and jeopardizes the peace of the society at large. Perhaps the most terrible negative effects are that joining and supporting terror groups propagates hate, fear, and terror, irrigates conflict, and causes untimely death to the innocent.

5.2.3 Solutions for the Problem of Radicalization into Violent Extremism

The assumptions of the present study are in line with those of such scholars as Walwa (2018); Ali (2016); Dang (2019); Vittori, Bremer and Vittori (2009), who argued that there have been several measures in place for preventing the youth from joining and supporting the terror groups. It was found out that the governmental agencies and its coercive instruments are at the fore front in fighting violent extremism. There is a, however, huge feeling that the measures are not inclusive enough. It was suggested that strategies other than the use of coercion are required to resolve the problem. It was implied that some of these resolution strategies are preferably effective to others. Nevertheless, more efforts and effective initiatives required. There is a need to provide proper religious teachings to the people because improper religious teachings are the main causative agents of radicalization among the youth. As a solution, political empowerment and creation of economic opportunities have – though not perfectly effectively – worked in Kilindi. Of course, it was stated earlier that violent acts are sparked by both political dissatisfactions and insolvable poverty.

It was also found out that despite purposeful efforts by the government, the religious institutions and everyone else, the problem of youth joining or supporting terror groups seems to be persistent in Kilindi. This implies that either the efforts are not sufficient, or they are not effective. It was found out that a number of measures taken such as laws, punishments, and frequent police (or militarized) ambushes were not effective in dealing enough to deal with the problem. Brutalizing those accused of being members of terror groups for example was thought to only attract more

radicalization. Similarly, raids and ambushes were found to victimize the innocent, furthering unnecessary fear, tension, anger, and hate, and generally create pity for the radicalized. Rather it was suggested that community policing programs whereby the general population is the solution was thought to work better. Dang (2019) similarly thought that Tanzania needs some unique strategies to resolve the radicalization problem. It seems lack of quality education and other social services is a dominant problem in Kilindi causing the youth keep making wrong decisions and judgements about both faith and life. As a solution, parents, guardians, and other family members were urged to ensure that none of their members falls into the trap of joining or supporting terror groups. Also, religious institutions and their teachings together with certain hate speeches require filtering. The reason for such filtering is of course that it is the distorted teachings and the unthoughtful hate speeches that are fundamentally the cause of radicalization.

5.2.4 The Role of Islamic Institutions

It was further claimed that Moslems, Islamic societies, and Islamic institutions have been unequally and unfairly treated for a long time. In certain occasions personal properties as plots of land, houses, business projects and various other investments were said to have been illegally confiscated. Sometimes therefore the youth fight to get what is rightfully theirs. Even so, Islamic institutions ought to play a role of preventing the youth from engaging in violent extremism in search of these rights. It makes sense to think that violence is not justified by fighting for one's own rights. It was generally revealed that the Islamic institutions are either completely not engaged into resolving the problem or that their concern is too minimal to impact any

significant change to the young Moslems in Kilindi. However little, the Islamic institutions may be doing just about enough. Some mosques for example provide proper religious teachings against the distortions of the jihadists. The institutions also facilitate reconciliation between parties in conflict and counseling of the formerly radicalized or those already brainwashed. Significantly, the presence of Islamic institutions in Kilindi reduces the unemployment rate as it offers employment opportunities to the youth. Thus, it was discovered that while it might be true that Islamic institutions are not doing enough in dealing with youth radicalization, it is equally true that they have genuine attempts to do away with this problem.

Clearly, Islamic institutions, as it is the case with the government security agencies, have failed to deal with youth engagement into violent extremism. The failure is caused by the fact that the institutions do not have funds, or a budget allocated for deradicalization or preventative programs – making it difficult to deal with those who sponsor youth radicalization. Various other serious challenges include the fact that those assigned with the task of deradicalization might be secretly members of the terror groups, in which settings finding a solution is difficult. Furthermore, people are afraid of challenging the ruthless hands of the terrorist. Most Islamic institutions therefore fail because of fear. Those against their course are often targeted as enemies and blasphemous. Since no one wishes to be a target of the terrorists, they abstain from opposing them. The government and its security agencies are therefore urged to find the right way of protecting those institutions facilitating deradicalization. What is clear is that there are hardly purposeful initiatives against youth radicalization in Kilindi staged by Islamic Institutions. Even so, the Islamic

institutions cannot deal with deradicalization alone. The support of the government, its security agencies, private sector, society, families, and the youth themselves is required.

5.3   Conclusions of the Study

This study carefully examined the role that Islamic institutions in Kilindi play when it comes to preventing the youth from engaging in violent extremism. At this stage, it can already be widely accepted that the Islamic institutions play a role to some extent. Islamic institutions might be playing some role in their attempts to prevent the radicalization of youth. It is however obvious that this role is either not fully impactful or the attempts require some advancement from outside and within the Islamic institutions. The fact that these institutions face some life and death challenges cannot be ignored. Apart from the fear of being targeted by the terror groups, most people in Kilindi are live in poverty and lack basic social services like education – the problems which Islamic institutions may not be able to resolve singlehandedly. Even so, this is not a justification for not acting against it. The Islamic institutions are morally obliged to resolve people's problems. Clearly, radicalization, terrorism and violent extremism are perhaps the most serious problems facing the people of Kilindi and this requires the intervention of the Islamic institutions. It can be concluded here that the challenges befalling the Islamic institutions are not fatally unavoidable. Instead, the institutions ought to do more to prevent the youth from joining or supporting the terror groups.

It appears that the youth are at a higher risk of being attracted to join and support the terror groups or resolute to violent extremism when the political institutions are

weak, human rights are violated, there is a wide gap between the poor and the rich, and when the religious institutions are not grounded on proper moral and religious teachings. Ndzovu (2018) likewise thought that weakly established religious institutions may be a foundation for violent jihadi ideology. Similarly, Kamau (2019) found out that certain socio-economic and political settings are conducive for terrorism. Largely, what attracts the youth to engage in violent jihadi or join the terror groups or else support terrorism is persistent derealization through historical injustices, violation of human rights during security forces operations and discrimination that makes the youth vulnerable.

Terrorism is sometimes synonymously termed fundamentalism, Salafi-jihadism, radical or militant Islam among many other terms. Whichever term one prefers to use, at least in the context of Tanzania, it is usually associated to a Moslem. It seems therefore that something is wrong with the institutions allowing these kinds of beliefs or else there are some serious benefits of joining or supporting terror groups. Of course, it appears that the Moslems fight marginalization, discrimination, and oppression. However, the funders of such movements are generally said to aim at establishing an Islamic state (see also Kamau, 2019). It is important to note that political factors could be a heavier push factor than other core factors. There is an influential force from people from outside Kilindi and foreign institutions setting back the efforts to prevent youth from joining terror groups. The nonunified nature of the Islamic institutions makes it difficult to know who penetrates the jihadi ideology. There are therefore significant correlations between the tendency of the youth in Kilindi to join or support terror groups and some role played by Islamic institutions.

Positively, this correlation is either one of preventative or that of curative nature. Negatively, the correlation could be one of influencing or causing radicalization. There are purposeful strategies to fight radicalization, which have somewhat been positively impactful. While a few have been deradicalized, many more youths keep joining or supporting terrorism and terror groups. It is a fact – regardless how blurred it is – that Islamic institutions have played a significant role in deradicalizing the youth. What is clearly the case is that the efforts of the Islamic institutions alone may not be sufficient to end the mighty powers of the terrorists and those who would rather resort to violence.

5.4   The Study's Recommendations

In this subsection recommendations to the problem of youth engagement in violent extremism in Kilindi District are offered. It seems that an effective solution for the problem of youth recruitment into terror groups or at least their support for violent extremism remains an unresolved puzzle. Even if there are strategies to fight violent extremism among the youth, new strategies and improvement on existent strategies were required. It is not easy preventing or fighting radicalization in the world. In order to do so, the efforts of each and everyone in the society may be required. Equally, the government and private sectors, security agencies and primarily the Islamic institutions, together with each member of the society ought to be highly professional. It was recommended for example that several rehabilitation centers should be established in order to facilitate deradicalization. Similarly, strategies of arbitrary arrests, inhuman punishments and torture should be stopped as they only spark further radicalization.

It is recommended that education should be provided to the youth. Ignorance seems to be a key factor influencing the youth into joining or supporting terror groups. Educating the youth would definitely entail preventing them from recklessly jeopardizing their own and other people's lives. Awareness of destructions and other terrible things as a result of jihadi ideology is a source of deradicalization. Ensuring prior knowledge of the evils of jihadi and its projectable outcomes, would entail that youth would not join or support the terror groups. It is recommended that while the government and governmental agencies ought to ensure that quality education is provided to every member of the society, the private sector – i.e. Islamic institutions, families and individuals – are equally obliged to ensure provision of education to the society in their own capacity. By education, it was not merely meant graduating with degrees but rather being provided with proper moral and critical analysis of various situations of life.

Being a recently arisen problem in Tanzania, legal frameworks must also recurrently be restructured to accommodate the rather growing global issue. It is recommended that good and proportionate laws are made in order to enhance the prevention of the problem and to regulate punishments. It is important to remember the concern that that the current punishments increase tension and hatred. It was eventually recommended that the legislative board should invest in making preventative and curative laws. Together with existent useful and operative laws the local community, NGOs, deradicalized persons, religious institutions and other stakeholders should be involved in preventing radicalization and making legal drafts of the laws against violent extremism.

5.5   Recommendations for Further Studies

Even if the study successfully addressed its objectives in line with the proposed theories of derealization and vulnerability, there were a number of issues that could not be addressed in this study but require further studies. Basically, for example, this study took a case of Kilindi District. A further study could focus on other affected areas of Tanzania, including the southern areas of Tanzania – bordering Mozambique – which are currently experiencing attacks of terrorist nature. The present study also focused on the youth. However, it was raised here several times that children and women too were being targeted for radicalization. Future studies can therefore focus on women or children. Further to that, there was raised a possibility that some Islamic institutions take part in radicalization. Future studies may look into the institutions that are notoriously radical. Similarly, the role of other institutions – including academic ones, Christian institutions, among others – might have a role they play as well. Future studies can focus on other institutions as well. Regarding certain ineffective resolution strategies such as the use of torture and inhuman punishments that enhance further radicalization, future studies could look into the violation of human rights behind these acts.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: INTERVIEW GUIDE

My name is **Ali Juma Ayub**. I am studying Master of Arts in International Relations, Cooperation and Development at the Open University of Tanzania. Specifically, my research topic is **"The Role of Islamic Institutions in Preventing the Youth from Engaging in Violent Extremism: A Case of the Kilindi District in Tanzania."** I am more than grateful to you for taking part in my study. This interview should take less than 30 minutes.

In order to ensure that I do not miss any of your comments, I will be both taping the session and taking notes. I assure you that I will keep all responses confidential. This implies that your interview responses and comments will only be used for the purpose of my current study and that I will not identify you as the respondent in any information in my study. It is important to remember that you do not have to talk about anything you do not want to, and you have the right to end this interview at any time.

SECTION A: INTERVIEWEE'S PARTICULARS

1. Age

2. Sex

3. Level of education

4. Name of the Islamic Institution

5. Position at the Institution

SECTION B: PREVENTING THE YOUTH FROM VIOLENT EXTREMISM

1. Why do you think the youth engage in violent extremism?

2. What are the reasons for the increased violent extremism in Kilindi?

3. Why do you think this was not the case in the past?

4. To what extent do you think the Moslem youth are vulnerable compared to non-Moslem youth?

5. How does the society view the problem of radicalization of the youth into violent extremism in Kilindi?

6. How serious do you personally think the problem is?

7. Are there any benefits associated with being part of radicalized groups?

8. How deep do you think the youth are affected by the problem?

9. What are the strategies in place in dealing with this problem in Kilindi?

10. Do you think these strategies are effective? If Yes/No, Why?

11. Which of the strategies that have been employed do you think are ineffective?

12. What does your institution do to prevent the youth from engaging in violent extremism?

13. Why do you think Islamic Institutions failed to prevent radicalization of the youth in Kilindi?

14. What more can be done to prevent any future occurrences of radicalization of the youth into violent extremism?

THANK YOU!

APPENDIX II: ETHICAL DOCUMENTS

THE OPEN UNIVERSITY OF TANZANIA

DIRECTORATE OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES

P.O. Box 23409
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
http://www.openuniversity.ac.tz

Tel: 255-22-2668992/2668445
ext.2101
Fax: 255-22-2668759
E-mail: dpgs@out.ac.tz

Our Ref: PG201800276

7th September 2020

Regional Administrative Secretary (RAS),
Tanga Region,
P.O. Box 5095,
TANGA.

RE: RESEARCH CLEARANCE

The Open University of Tanzania was established by an Act of Parliament No. 17 of 1992, which became operational on the 1st March 1993 by public notice No.55 in the official Gazette. The Act was however replaced by the Open University of Tanzania Charter of 2005, which became operational on 1st January 2007.In line with the Charter, the Open University of Tanzania mission is to generate and apply knowledge through research.

To facilitate and to simplify research process therefore, the act empowers the Vice Chancellor of the Open University of Tanzania to issue research clearance, on behalf of the Government of Tanzania and Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology, to both its staff and students who are doing research in Tanzania. With this brief background, the purpose of this letter is to introduce to you **Mr. AYUB, Ali Juma Reg No: PG201800276** pursuing **Master of Arts in International Cooperation and Development (MAICD).**

We here by grant this clearance to conduct a research titled *The Role of Islamic Institutions in Preventing the Youth from Engaging in Violent Extremism".* He will collect his data at Kilindi District Council from 10th September 2020 to 30th September 2020.

In case you need any further information, kindly do not hesitate to contact the Deputy Vice Chancellor (Academic) of the Open University of Tanzania, P.O.Box 23409, Dar es Salaam.Tel: 022-2-2668820.We lastly thank you in advance for your assumed cooperation and facilitation of this research academic activity.

Yours Sincerely,

Prof.Hossea Rwegoshora
For:VICE CHANCELLOR
THE OPEN UNIVERSITY OF TANZANIA

THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
PRESIDENT'S OFFICE
REGIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMET

Phone:027 2642421
Fax: 027 2647752
E-mail: ras.tanga@tamisemi.go.tz

In reply, quote

Regional Commissioner's Officer,
P.O.Box 5095,
TANGA.

Ref. No. **DA.228/258/04/266**   14 September, 2020

Vice Chancellor,
The Open University of Tanzania,
P.O.Box 23409,
DAR ES SALAAM.

REF. RESEARCH PERMIT

Kindly refer to the heading above.

I am glad to inform you that, your request as per your letter dated 7th
September, 2020 with **Ref. No. PG 201800276** has been accepted. Kindly be
assured that, Mr. Ayubu Ali Juma will conduct his research at Kilindi District
Council as requested.

However, Tanga Regional Administrative Secretary's Office will not incur any
financial resources that will arise due to the fact that, there is no budget set for
this kind of activity.

Best regards,

Isaya B. Method
**For: REGIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY
TANGA**

Copy: Regional Administrative Secretary,
            TANGA – To see in file.

;   District Administrative Secretary,
            P.O.Box 01,
            SONGE – KILINDI – Kindly Assist him

            Mr. Ayoub Ali Juma
            Student